

Counter Terrorism Joint Inspection – National security division and multi-agency arrangements for the management of terrorist offenders in the wake of terrorist attacks

An inspection by HM Inspectorate of Probation, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services and HM Inspectorate of Prisons

July 2023

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Foreword

Terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020 by known terrorist offenders who were subject to licence supervision in the community by the probation service brought into stark focus the terrorist risk being managed across prison and probation. Subsequent public inquests and independent reviews have all highlighted failings within statutory agencies. While risk cannot be eliminated in its entirety, the public has a right to expect that cases such as these will be managed with nothing less than the greatest degree of rigour and professionalism.

In response to the attacks, prison, police and probation were all tasked with stepping up their strategy to managing this cohort of offenders in a more intensive and enhanced way. The National Security Division (NSD) was created as a separate division of the Probation Service. Counter terrorism (CT) policing invested in the creation of Counter Terrorism Nominal Management (CTNM) on a national basis. Together with existing prison and probation services, it is now responsible for managing those convicted of terrorist offences or identified as posing the highest risk of potential terrorist activity, even if they have no related convictions.

There was significant financial investment to step up services, and we have found that the subsequent quality of case management has been reassuring. Our joint inspection has found that NSD, probation, police and prison services have provided a solid foundation on which to further develop the approach to managing counter terrorism cases collectively. They have implemented much of the learning from previous reviews. Prison governors and directors were clear about the terrorist risk posed in their establishments and were actively managing this. Leadership across the NSD and CTNM was strong, and there were clear lines of accountability, enhanced by national multi-agency governance arrangements.

Enhanced national standards have been implemented to ensure that terrorist offenders in the community are subject to additional oversight throughout their sentences. Additional resources, including polygraph examinations and access to psychologists, all enhance the assessment and management of cases. Multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) and core groups act as the bedrock of multi-agency management within the NSD, allowing all professionals involved in a case to share expertise and give guidance. Prison, police and probation services were working together well and this was evidenced by the quality of casework found in this inspection.

While we are encouraged by what we have seen, the risk of further terrorist attacks has not abated. There is still work to be done. Although professionals are sharing information to ensure that informed assessment and management plans can be implemented, the recording and storing of information is disjointed at best. The NSD is not technologically equipped to receive or hold highly sensitive material, information is not routinely being shared with prison offender managers (POMs) and police are working across several IT systems. This all leads to a risk of intelligence falling through the gaps. There is not an up-to-date single operational framework to guide practitioners in managing these cases within custody and the community; this leads to risks of disparity in practice. All offending-related risks in these cases, not just terrorist behaviour, need to be considered and addressed. Domestic abuse checks were not routinely undertaken in all cases, and this requires attention. CT training for staff in prisons needs to be enhanced and POMs more involved in the management of terrorist risk within custody.

Nevertheless, the achievements of all agencies in laying promising foundations, at pace, have been impressive. We have jointly made several recommendations, which, if followed, should strengthen practice and address the gaps highlighted in this report.



Justin Russell

His Majesty's Chief Inspector
of Probation



Matt Parr

His Majesty's Inspector of
Constabulary



Charlie Taylor

His Majesty's Inspector of
Prisons

July 2023

Contextual facts

Arrests

166	Number of arrests for terrorism risk activity in the year ending December 2022 ¹
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Convictions and sentencing

51	Number of individuals convicted of terrorism risk activity in the year ending December 2022 ¹
18	Number of custodial sentences greater than four years given for terrorism risk activity in the year ending December 2022 ¹
19	Number of custodial sentences up to four years given for terrorism risk activity in the year ending December 2022 ¹
14	Non-custodial sentences given for terrorism risk activity in the year ending December 2022 ¹

Custody

226	Number of individuals in custody for terrorism-related offences at 31 December 2022 ¹
149 (66%)	Proportion of individuals in custody for terrorism-related offences at 31 December 2022 categorised with Islamist extremist ideology ¹
59 (26%)	Proportion of individuals in custody for terrorism-related offences at 31 December 2022 categorised with extreme right-wing ideology ¹
18 (8%)	Proportion of individuals in custody for terrorism-related offences at 31 December 2022 categorised with other or no specific ideology ¹

Releases to the community

27	Number of individuals convicted of terrorism released from custody in the year ending September 2022 ¹
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Total cases being managed by His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service

645	Total number of terrorist convicted, terrorist connected, and terrorist risk cases being managed in custody or the community – March 2023 ²
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Cases being managed by National Security Division

344	Number of total cohort of terrorist convicted, terrorist connected, and terrorist risk cases being managed in custody or the community by National Security Division – March 2023 ³
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¹ Home Office. (2023). Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, quarterly update to December 2022: annual data tables.

² Joint Extremism Unit Operational Letter. Total number of cases identified as terrorist convicted, terrorist connected or terrorist risk within HMPPS.

³ National Security Division (NSD) data: 65 cases in the community, four cases in hospital, 165 cases in custody allocated an NSD community offender manager (COM), and 110 cases in custody allocated a POM, with a shadow NSD COM.

Key terms

COM	Community Offender Manager
CT	Counter terrorism
CTNM	Counter Terrorism Nominal Management – police process of protecting the public from individuals who have been involved in or engaged with terrorism, aiming to support them to disengage from terrorist activity
CT Step Up programme	A raft of reforms to overhaul key areas such as joint working, rehabilitation and training across agencies managing CT risk
CTU	Counter terrorism units form part of the CTPN – there are nine regional CTUs within England and Wales
DDP	Desistance and Disengagement Programme – Home Office run programme which has four strands of intervention (theological intervention, practical mentoring, psychology and financial grants) for the purposes of supporting resettlement and rehabilitation
HII	Healthy Identity Interventions – an intervention designed for those who have committed terrorist offences. It supports desistance and disengagement from extremism. It encourages stronger positive and pro-social aspects of identity. It helps individuals develop resilience and supports them to identify ways of meeting their identity needs
HoNSU	Head of National Security Unit – assistant chief officer grade manager, who leads the NSD delivery unit
JCTPPH	The Joint Counter Terrorism, Prison and Probation Hub. Brings together HMPPS, the Security Service, and Counter-Terrorism Policing Network into one co-located tri-agency unit, improving the assessment of threat in both prisons and community. It aims to coordinate efficient intelligence sharing that enables more effective management of national security risk
JExU	JExU is the strategic centre for counter-terrorism work in prisons and probation. It was formed in 2017 as a partnership between the Home Office, Homeland Security Group and HMPPS
LRO	Lead responsible officer – detective chief inspector rank responsible as strategic lead for CTNM
MAPPA	Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements – where probation, police, prison and other agencies work together locally to manage offenders who pose a higher risk of harm to others. Level 1 is ordinary agency management, where the risks posed by the offender can be managed by the agency responsible for the supervision or case management of the offender. Level 2 and 3 require active multi-agency management

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NSD	National Security Division – a division formed in 2020 within the Probation Service that manages convicted terrorist, terrorist connected, terrorist risk offenders, critical public protection cases and serious organised crime offenders, delivered via National Security Units
PCT teams	Probation counter terrorism teams – a JExU resource that provides operational support and guidance to probation, partner agencies and prisons, immigration removal centres and youth custody service sites within a defined region
POM	Prison Offender Manager
PPL	Prison Prevent lead – a JExU resource that provides operational support within establishments to engage with identified offenders and contribute to Pathfinder/MAPPA
RCTL	Regional counter terrorism lead – a JExU resource that provides operational support and guidance to partner agencies and prison managers in both public and contracted prisons, immigration removal centres and youth custody service sites within a defined region
TACT	Abbreviation of the <i>Terrorism Act 2000</i> and <i>Terrorism Act 2006</i>
Terrorism	Terrorism is an action or threat designed to influence the government or intimidate the public. Its purpose is to advance a political, religious or ideological cause. The current UK definition of terrorism is given in the <i>Terrorism Act 2000</i>
Terrorist	An offender who has been convicted of a specified terrorist offence, as set out in Part 1 of Schedule 19ZA of the <i>Criminal Justice Act 2003</i>
Terrorist-connected	An offender who has not committed terrorist offences (that is, those listed in Part 1 of the Schedule) but who has committed other specified offences that the court has determined have a terrorist connection
Terrorist risk	Offender not charged with or convicted of terrorist or terrorist-connected offences, but who is identified by HMPPS or other agencies as presenting a terrorist risk
Triage	The process by which a decision is made about whether an offender will be supervised by the NSD or the Probation Service

Executive summary

Introduction

Three key organisations are responsible for managing terrorist and high concern terrorist risk cases: the National Security Division (NSD), part of the Probation Service; the Counter Terrorism Nominal Management (CTNM), part of CT Policing; and HM Prison Service (HMPS). The NSD and CTNM were set up quickly in response to terror attacks committed by known terrorist offenders in the community, on release from custody, in the United Kingdom during 2019 and 2020. HMPS has also experienced attacks within establishments by those known to subscribe to terrorist ideologies. Independent reviews by Jonathan Hall KC, and inquest findings into the terror attacks, have all found failings and made recommendations on what more needs to be done to manage this cohort of offenders more effectively. This joint inspection examines the implementation of these measures across prisons, the NSD, and CTNM to effectively manage and mitigate the risk of harm posed by terrorist offenders.

The glossary on page 7 provides a detailed breakdown of the terms used in this report.

Methodology

This joint inspection examined the work of prisons, police, and probation (NSD) services in managing terrorist and terrorist risk offenders. In total, 33 cases were inspected jointly by HM Inspectorate of Probation and His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS). We visited all five NSD units and nine police counter terrorism units (CTUs). We interviewed 20 probation practitioners/senior operating leads (SOLs) responsible for the cases in our inspection, with HMICFRS speaking with counter terrorism nominal managers for the respective cases. HM Inspectorate of Probation also spoke to five people who had been subject to supervision through the NSD. Inspectors from HM Inspectorate of Prisons reviewed the records of 48 prisoners, 46 of whom had been convicted of terrorist offences, and interviewed 34 prisoners in total. We held a range of meetings and focus groups across the NSD, CTUs and prisons, with staff with both operational case management responsibilities and strategic managers. Finally, inspectors from all three inspectorates held a range of meetings with national senior leaders from the NSD, Joint Extremism Unit⁴ (JExU) and CT Policing (CTP).

Leadership, strategy, and policy

Leadership overall was strong across prisons, the NSD and CTNM. Both the NSD and CTNM have the benefit of being stand-alone units within their wider organisations, with specific responsibilities for the management of terrorist convicted, terrorist connected and terrorist risk cases. Prisons are tasked with managing such offenders within the general prison population. It was evident that Pathfinder⁵ and wider JExU input was paramount in supporting the safe management of this cohort of offenders within establishments.

Both NSD and CTNM had been set up at pace, based on established principles for the effective management of high-risk cases. Both were being led proactively at a national and

⁴ Joint Extremism Unit - the strategic centre for counter-terrorism work in prisons and probation. It was formed in 2017 as a partnership between the Home Office, Homeland Security Group and HMPPS

⁵ Pathfinder - the CT-specialist, multi-agency process through which the terrorist risk of an offender is managed whilst in prison and on probation. This includes the deployment of a standardised set of tools for identifying and assessing an offender's terrorist risk and needs, and a range of controls and rehabilitative interventions to manage and address them.

regional level and there were clear lines of accountability across all three agencies, with good multi-agency governance structures in place.

As the organisations were set up at pace, service delivery has had to move at a faster pace than policy and supporting operational frameworks have been able to. Across both prison and probation services, the current operational framework for managing terrorist offenders is out of date. This has been plugged by various memorandums of understanding (MoUs) between teams and with partners, and standard operational procedures (SOPs) for frontline staff; however, this is not sustainable in terms of ensuring consistent delivery, especially for overloaded practitioners who sit outside the specialist teams who still have responsibility for some terrorist risk cases. This requires immediate review by the JExU to ensure that all cases are managed robustly.

We saw comprehensive quality assurance processes applied across NSD cases. This focus on quality was understood by all. Enhanced national standards were being applied consistently in the cases inspected; however, there is a lack of national performance management information against these measures, and this makes it difficult to evidence how well the NSD is meeting its enhanced supervision objectives.

Staffing

We found CT staffing in prisons, NSD and CTNM all to be at sufficient levels. Prisons had adopted various models for allocating CT-specific resources, depending on the category of establishment and risk identified. This included different ways of allocating cases to prison offender managers (POMs), and we saw some gaps in knowledge, with POMs having varying amounts of experience in managing this type of case. While there was an assurance about the level of uptake of basic CT training across the establishments we visited, we could not verify the uptake of this training for frontline officers in other establishments. CT Step Up funding, which is specifically designated for CT training in prisons, had largely gone unspent. This is of concern in terms of resilience and monitoring within other establishments. POMs told us that they were not aware of any published standard operating procedures for managing terrorist cases in custody, again identifying the need for an overarching operational framework.

There was a misconception among partners that the NSD had been able to recruit the 'crème' of officers. We found that the level of skill, knowledge and good practice evidenced by NSD probation officers was largely a result of intense training and quality assurance activities against all cases, with ongoing oversight through MAPPAs and visible managers who had knowledge of all cases. This work is intense, leading to questions of how long practitioners and managers could continue to demonstrate the 'gold standard' of practice expected as case numbers continued to rise. This was echoed for Heads of National Security Units (HoNSUs), who face rising demands from MAPPAs and commitments. There is no current workload management tool to measure the amount of time spent providing the enhanced standards of supervision for this cohort, and we felt this was a barrier to ensuring that future delivery modelling accurately reflects potential future demand.

Within CTNM, the teams were generally resourced sufficiently, with a good balance of skills across the teams. While there had been delays in recruitment and training, operational staff were in post and delivering CTNM functions. There were concerns about the demands on the lead responsible officer (LRO), and that the modelling of the time required to fulfil CTNM commitments at the time the CTNM was set up was inaccurate. This is of particular concern, as the cohort of cases is ever expanding. CTNMs also faced difficulty with recruiting support staff, because of vetting delays and low pay grades, a scenario seen across many public bodies.

Partnership working and information sharing

Partnership working, to ensure the effective management of this cohort of offenders, is enhanced across the prison estate by the Pathfinder process. This allows CT information to be shared throughout the lifetime of an individual's sentence, including into the community. However, it is concerning to see that POMs are not a routine part of this information sharing process. This may lead to gaps in sentence and risk management planning while the individual is in custody. We were concerned to see that offences committed by terrorist offenders in custody were not always prosecuted.

MAPPAs were well established and achieving the aim of offering a coordinated, multi-agency approach to managing cases. HoNSUs have worked hard with partners to achieve confidence in both the NSD and the process. The Security Service receives minutes from MAPPA; however, it does not attend, and therefore misses the opportunity to hear the full details of discussion. Core groups⁶ to ensure progress against MAPPA actions are streamlined and efficient. We saw responsive information sharing in cases outside formal meetings.

The current model, to keep all terrorist convicted cases as MAPPA Level 3 for an initial 12 months, was understandable as an initial response to the terror attacks and before the development of the NSD. However, it is no longer an efficient use of resources, in particular of the senior NSD and CTNM managers who are required to chair Level 3 panels.⁷ Once all risk management is in place and the individual has achieved a period of stability, cases could reasonably be managed as Level 2, given the knowledge and expertise of these multi-agency panels, which will continue to involve all of the relevant operational agencies. Management at Level 2 would maintain sufficient oversight, still led by the NSD and CTNM, and an escalation to Level 3 could be actioned at any time if required. Given the increasing caseload of the NSD in future, the current model will be unsustainable going forward without review.

Police are in attendance at Pathfinder, although these are not usually the officers who will go on to be tasked with CTNM in the community. Again, this may result in gaps of intelligence exchange due to the complex and disjointed case recording systems used by different police forces. This requires an agreed process going forward. Across all three agencies we saw, the current shared platform, ViSOR, was rarely used to any benefit.

Although IT systems are not in sync, it was encouraging that information was being exchanged between partner agencies, and in a timely way. Relationships between partners were a strength, particularly between the NSD and CTNM, and this was reflected in the sharing of information. The Joint CT Prison and Probation Hub (JCTPPH), while not yet fully defined in terms of function, was contributing to information sharing between all partners, including the Security Service. The NSD, however, lacks the capability to independently record and store decisions, and actions involving the disclosure of secret information. This is an organisational vulnerability.

⁶ Core groups – professionals meeting with key attendees to address specific actions set within MAPPA, chaired by the NSD senior operating lead.

⁷ There are three levels of MAPPA management: Level 1, ordinary agency management which involves the sharing of information but does not require multi-agency meetings; Level 2, where an active multi-agency approach is required; and Level 3, if senior representatives of the relevant agencies with the authority to commit resources are also needed.

Keeping people safe

The arrangements to protect others from harm from terrorist cases in custody were effective overall. There was evidence that management of cases was coordinated on a local, regional and national level. Measures to monitor cases were proactive and sufficiently resourced, with the exception of access to timely interpretation services for monitoring non-English language phone calls by prisoners. POMS and prison prevent leads (PPLs) fed into pre-release MAPPA processes and release plans, including risk management. This was done to a high standard.

While terrorist cases are automatically transferred to NSD management, terrorist risk cases are triaged as to their suitability, based on what additional benefit NSD management would bring to the case that cannot be achieved outside generic Probation Service supervision with probation counter terrorism (PCT) team support. We found that these arrangements are working well and were informed by CT police intelligence. However, there were examples of cases being adopted due to the complexity of the individual's behaviour, rather than evidenced CT risk. In part this is because the scope of the inclusion criteria is too broad. This requires careful management to ensure the NSD does not become overwhelmed with inappropriate cases.

Supervision within the community was robust overall, balancing rehabilitative needs with tight risk management parameters. ERG assessments⁸ were used to inform the work with terrorist convicted cases; however, current operating procedures indicate that the Pathfinder Guidance Framework, used to assess terrorist risk cases, is not shared with POMs or COMs. This meant that the OASys assessments lacked detail on behaviours of concern and did not set out how the terrorist risk would be addressed in all cases. We identified that CTNM does not have an agreed national process for the risk assessment of all cases that it leads. This led to disparities in practice across the CTUs that we visited. Likewise, we did not see evidence of any formal risk assessment being undertaken before the police carry out home visits. This leaves officers potentially at risk and is not an acceptable position.

Domestic abuse enquiries were not routinely undertaken in all cases, and this requires attention. That said, child and adult safeguarding enquiries were well evidenced and, overall, victim-related issues were well considered. Risks associated with types of offending other than terrorism, such as sexual harm and domestic abuse, were less well addressed.

Promoting desistance and disengagement

Assessments for all cases where terrorist risk concerns were identified in custody happened swiftly as part of the Pathfinder process. While there were delays in beginning some interventions, both the Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP) and the Healthy Identity Intervention (HII) resources were made available, often early in an individual's sentence. POMs reported that structured risk assessments, namely Extremist Risk Guidance (ERG) and the Pathfinder Guidance Framework were not always made available to them, and this was a concern. We saw varying levels of engagement throughout sentences, with some POMs indicating that they did not have the skills or confidence to challenge terrorist offenders. However, there were also positive examples of keywork, particularly delivered through CT officers, who set clear objectives for the work to be completed on a one-to-one basis.

The handover from POMs to NSD community offender managers (COMs) was timely, with a good level of engagement by the COM with the individual approaching release. This often

⁸ ERG – Extremist Risk Guidance 22+. A structured professional judgement tool used by HMPPS since 2011, that assesses an individual along 22 factors, grouped in to three domains - engagement, intent and capability.

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involved face-to-face contact with the individual in custody and other agencies that would be working with them on release, setting strong foundations for the supervisory relationship. Assessments, sentence planning and implementation of supervision all helped to encourage desistance and disengagement from terrorist rhetoric in a structured way that managed risks. There was an increase in the number of individuals accessing both settled independent accommodation and education, training and employment (ETE) throughout their sentence, although these were low in numbers. The lack of access to both ETE and independent accommodation was seen as a barrier to resettlement in the longer term for many cases.

There was evidence of ongoing support through the DDP on release. The HII was planned where required, although on occasions there could have been a greater review of the learning from HII with the person on probation, particularly when the programme had been completed some time ago. The CTNM was routinely involved in decision-making on desistance and disengagement activities and engaged collaboratively in supporting individuals towards change.

Recommendations

The Ministry of Justice should:

1. commission storage systems capable of storing information classified up to secret to ensure that the National Security Division is able to safely record organisational decision-making and agreed actions following the disclosure of secret information
2. provide video and telephone technology to the National Security Division that is capable of sending and receiving secret-level information.

The Home Office and Ministry of Justice should:

3. commission the development of an efficient and effective Counter Terrorism Nominal Management case management system that enables all users to process a case through full lifetime management. The system should also enable the collection, analysis and reporting of appropriate performance and management information. The Multi-Agency Public Protection System (MAPPS) should be reviewed to consider whether it meets these needs.

His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service should:

4. review the current practice of requiring all terrorist and terrorist risk cases to be heard at Level 3 MAPPA meetings for a minimum of 12 months, making the approach more responsive to presenting risk and the professional judgement of MAPPA panels, and ensure the model is sustainable going forward
5. develop a bespoke tool for measuring performance against enhanced national standards.

The Joint Extremism Unit should:

6. strengthen leadership and practice through publishing an updated operational framework for managing terrorist and terrorist risk cases for probation and prison practitioners
7. review whether access to the Pathfinder Guidance Framework should be permitted to all staff holding terrorist risk cases
8. set out how to incorporate the Pathfinder Guidance Framework assessments into the Offender Assessment System to inform risk management and sentence planning for terrorist risk cases
9. revise the control and interventions matrix, to be more sensitive to levels of presenting risk
10. analyse the rate and quality of referrals into Pathfinder, by the Probation Service, to ensure terrorist risks are being identified and appropriate actions being taken in all relevant cases
11. ensure that the training given to prison offender managers and keyworkers equips them to confidently manage terrorists and those who present a terrorist risk.

The Probation Service should:

12. ensure domestic abuse and appropriate safeguarding enquiries are made in all cases at key transitional periods, and use this information to inform risk management and sentence planning
13. ensure all offending-related risks are identified and incorporated into risk management and sentence planning
14. develop a workload management tool to measure resource allocation across the NSD.

The Prison Service should:

15. ensure prison offender managers and keyworkers have regular and meaningful contact with offenders on their caseloads
16. prioritise basic extremism training for all frontline staff, including refresher training, where required
17. ensure prison offender managers have access to all relevant and up-to-date information relating to terrorist risk concerns to support robust case management
18. ensure risk management and sentence plans are informed by the most recent Extremist Risk Guidance or Pathfinder Framework Guidance assessment.

Counter Terrorism Policing

19. The senior national coordinator should review the Registered Terrorism Offender Assessment Framework process to ensure that it is fit for police led cases.
20. The senior national coordinator should work with the National Security Division and Joint Extremism Unit to develop and implement a risk assessment process for those tasked with visiting counter terrorism nominals in the community.
21. The Head of Interventions (Prevent and Nominal Management) should ensure that guidance is issued to regional Counter Terrorism Nominal Management teams that sets out a consistent use of ViSOR to support Counter Terrorism Nominal Management in the period before MAPPS is implemented and in any transition that may follow.

1. Introduction

1.1 Why this thematic?

This inspection was commissioned by the Criminal Justice Chief Inspectors' Group and forms part of the current Joint Inspection Business Plan 2021-2023.

The National Security Division (NSD) of the Probation Service was established in 2020, following a series of terror attacks by known terrorist offenders who were subject to probation supervision within the community. Independent reviews and subsequent inquests into the attacks have been critical of joint working arrangements and the sharing of information. The turnaround time for creating a new division to meet urgent risk management priorities was short. The financial investment was significant, 20 million pounds across the whole CT sector, and the interest of senior officials and ministers high. There was a need to demonstrate rigorous operational oversight of these cases quickly.

The purpose of this inspection was to examine the effectiveness of the NSD and assess whether it is delivering against its objectives to provide enhanced levels of management and interventions for the most high risk, and high profile, offenders in the community, through a dedicated and highly skilled workforce. The scope of the inspection also included how well prisons, police and JExU are working with the NSD to manage the risk of harm posed to the public by terrorist offenders throughout their sentences.

1.2 Background

Since the terrorist attacks in New York on 11 September 2001, the UK's approach to combating terrorism has evolved from focusing on the threat posed by foreign nationals affiliated with Al-Qaida and related groups, to focusing on the threat from 'home-grown' terrorists. Re-emerging in 2011, the Islamic State (also known as IS, ISIS, ISIL or Daesh), an off-shoot of Al-Qaida, took advantage of growing instability in Iraq and Syria to launch an offensive to create a caliphate. Its rhetoric was powerful, and leadership and marketing strong. It increasingly encouraged affiliates to carry out attacks, by any means, beyond the borders of the so-called caliphate. 2013 saw the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby at Woolwich Barracks in horrific circumstances, by attackers claiming to be 'soldiers of Allah'. Globally, 2015 saw attacks on a Russian aeroplane and coordinated attacks in Paris, and in 2016 there were further killings in Florida.

Government policy increasingly sought to confront the underlying causes of terrorist behaviour, including extremist ideology, not least due to IS rhetoric. Reported trends in 2016 suggested that the number of prisoners guilty of offences relating to terrorism and extremism were likely to increase. It was reported that at least 800 Britons had travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight, while others travelled to Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. A significant number of those returned to the UK, of whom a portion entered the criminal justice system (Ministry of Justice, 2016).

Attacks inspired by Islamic State were also carried out in the UK. 2017 saw several incidents – the Westminster Bridge attack, the Manchester Arena bombing, the London Bridge attack, and the Parsons Green tube train attack. In 2021, the MP David Amess was murdered by an individual thought to be an IS sympathiser. There were also right-wing attacks, in 2016, with the murder of MP Jo Cox, and in 2017 at Finsbury Park Mosque. These perpetrators were not managed by the prison or probation service, and risk wasn't seen as originating from known offenders.

Terrorist attacks in November 2019 (Fishmongers' Hall) and February 2020 (Streatham) changed this. They were carried out by individuals who were under the supervision of probation, within the community, for previous Terrorist Act (TACT) offences. This highlighted the need for an enhanced structure for managing such cases. It is known that the individual who undertook the Manchester Arena bombing had visited at least one convicted terrorist offender in custody in the lead up to his

offence in 2017. More recently, there was a fatal attack in Reading in 2020 by a released prisoner who had caused some extremism-related concerns before release and had unaddressed mental health issues. Subsequent attacks on officers in HMP Whitemoor in 2020, and an attack within HMP Belmarsh, again in 2020, led by the brother of the Manchester Arena bomber, all demonstrated the complexities and risks associated with managing terrorist, and terrorist risk, offenders, both within secure estates and on their release in the community.

JExU is the strategic centre for counter-terrorism work in prisons and probation. It was formed in 2017 as a partnership between the Home Office, Homeland Security Group and HMPPS. Regional Counter Terrorism (RCT) teams support the management of terrorist, terrorist-connected and terrorist risk cases within custody. When in the community, these cases were previously managed largely within generic local offender management teams, across both NPS and community rehabilitation companies, with the support of a national specialist JExU PCT team.

As a consequence of the 2019 and 2020 attacks in the community, 20 million pounds worth of investment was allocated through the CT Step Up programme. This investment has allowed the development of a resource-intensive probation division, offering a range of operational activities to strengthen and enhance the management of individuals who are supervised by the Probation Service in the community and present a threat to national security. This included a raft of reforms to overhaul key areas such as joint working, rehabilitation and training. The programme included establishing:

- a dedicated offender management division (NSD)
- the Joint Counter Terrorism Prison and Probation Hub (JCTPPH) to bring together HMPPS, the Security Service and CT Policing into one co-located tri-agency unit
- a new National Tactical Management capability (population management), enabling more coordinated placement of the highest risk terrorist prisoners within custody
- a new central counter-terrorism training team to overhaul the counter-terrorism training available to all frontline staff, and provide additional prison Prevent leads to increase the capacity for delivering training
- a Counter Terrorism Assessment and Rehabilitation Centre (CT-ARC) to respond to the diverse and changing nature of a terrorist offence or threat. With specialist staff, including researchers, it seeks to understand the terrorist and terrorist-risk cohort and how best to work with individuals, in an evidence-informed way, to reduce their risk and translate this knowledge into new ways of working with individuals. CT-ARC also provides quality assurance to improve product delivery and ensure effective implementation.

Project Cypher delivered the probation elements of the broader CT Step Up programme. This project had the priority objective of establishing the NSD, but also worked to enhance security in approved premises, increase electronic monitoring capabilities and introduce polygraph examinations for terrorist cases. This was delivered in tandem to Project Semper, the police programme to develop CTNM. The additional funding within the Probation Service was used to create the capability to manage offenders to an enhanced level of national standards, targeting very specific cohorts of high-risk offenders (terrorist, terrorist-connected and adopted terrorist risk offenders, high-risk serious organised crime nominals and critical public protection casework).

Individuals under the supervision of the NSD are subject to enhanced national standards. These were updated in June 2022 and include:

- all high and very high risk of serious harm cases will receive a minimum of two contacts per week for the first 12 months of supervision
- resettlement visits (at home or at an agreed location) will be made on a fortnightly basis for the first three months of supervision, and the first three months after leaving approved premises accommodation

- residency at approved premises will be provided for up to 12 months for high and very high risk of harm cases; the length of residency must allow for a three-month resettlement period to be applied at the end of the individual's residence in approved premises
- all high and very high risk of serious harm cases will be subject to electronic monitoring for a minimum period of 12 months
- polygraph examinations will be used.

Individuals who are managed by prison or probation, and who are identified as presenting concerning terrorist behaviours or who have been convicted of terrorist or terrorist-connected offences are referred into Pathfinder. This is a multi-agency case management process, managed by prison and probation counter terrorism teams. It operates through JExU and includes a range of critical partners, including representatives from the police. It includes standardised tools for assessing offender risk and need and provides multi-agency governance of all cases identified as posing a terrorist risk. Cases assessed as posing the lowest risk will mostly continue to be managed within generic offender management across the Probation Service. Those presenting the highest terrorist risk will either be allocated to management by the NSD or will be triaged as to their suitability for management in generic offender management, depending on overall risk and need.

In response to the imminent threat made evident by the terror attacks in 2019 and 2020, CT Policing introduced a CT nominal management (CTNM) model with an objective to protect the public from individuals who have been involved in or engaged with terrorism, aiming to support offenders to disengage from terrorist activity. The CT Policing Network delivers CTNM through the nine CTUs in England and Wales.

Nominal management is not a new concept. Before the creation of CTNM teams, nominal management was conducted regionally, without national oversight. Registered terrorist offender legislation came into effect from 2009, and counter terrorism (intelligence) units managed offenders convicted of TACT and TACT-connected crimes within different regional CT departments. This process evolved following the Fishmongers' Hall inquest, and the creation of the NSD.


The new process seeks to take a consistent approach to managing individuals convicted of TACT offences or who represent a terrorist risk. This has resulted in greater interaction between policing partners and other agencies, who work collaboratively and in partnership, and adopt a balance of supportive intervention and enforcement. On behalf of chief constables, the nine regional CT heads are accountable for managing the national security risk posed by the nominals in scope for CTNM who reside within their region.

Key facts/statistics (including any notable trends)

Arrests and custody

- There were **166** arrests for terrorism risk activity in the year ending 31 December 2022, 19 fewer than in the previous 12 months (a decrease of 10 per cent).
- As at 31 December 2022, **226** people were in custody for terrorist offences in Great Britain.
- Of those in custody, the vast majority (**66 per cent**) were categorised as holding **Islamist-extremist views**; a further **26 per cent** were categorised as holding **extreme right-wing ideologies** and **8 per cent** were categorised as holding **other ideologies**.


The graph below shows the number of arrests for terrorism offences, or terrorism-related offences, from 2002 to 2022.



The number of arrests, and subsequent convictions, peaked during the period 2017-2019. An increasing number of cases are being sentenced to community disposals. A change in both extremist activity, and policing tactics, means that more offenders are prosecuted for lower-level terrorist offences, earlier in their trajectory of extremist offending. This keeps people safe in the short term; however, it means those individuals will be released quicker, having received shorter sentences. This comes at a time when historical cases that involved attack planning and a risk of serious harm are now entering Parole Board windows for release. A change in legislation, introduced as an emergency response to the Fishmongers' Hall and Streatham attacks, now requires that all terrorist convicted offenders can only be released before their sentence end date if directed by the Parole Board (*The Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act, 2020*). This adds additional uncertainty to planning for release, when actual release dates are not assured. The increase in convictions has resulted in CT Policing having to manage a higher number of registered terrorist offenders (RTOs) after their sentence-end date, when the statutory management of these cases by the Probation Service, in particular NSD, terminates.

Convictions

The graph below shows the number of convictions for terrorism-related offences split by custody length. The splits are (i) four years and over, including imprisonment for public protection (IPP) and life sentences; (ii) under four years; and (iii) non-custodial sentences. Hospital orders have been excluded from this data.



Over the last 12 years the number of terrorism-related convictions has increased overall.⁹ The largest peak was in 2017-2018, with 77 and 76 convictions for 2017 and 2018 respectively. This has since decreased and plateaued over the last four years to around 50 convictions per year. In the same timeframe, the number of non-custodial sentences has been increasing, currently peaking at 14 in 2022. Due to the relatively small numbers and resulting volatility of the data,¹⁰ there isn't a clear trend in the proportion of shorter and longer custodial sentences; however, the spikes in convictions between 2014 and 2019 may in part be explained by the emergence of IS as an additional threat to national security, and a change in policing, whereby potential terrorists were intercepted at an earlier stage.

Releases to the community:

- A total of **27** prisoners held for terrorist or terrorist-connected offences were released from custody in Great Britain in the year ending 30 September 2022.

Of these, **six** had received sentences of **less than four years**, and **17** had sentences of **four years or more**. No one was released following an indeterminate sentence for public protection. **Four** people had been convicted but had not yet been sentenced.

⁹ Adapted from table C.04 in Home Office (2022).

¹⁰ The relatively small numbers of people arrested for terrorism risk activity each year mean that proportionally large fluctuations in arrests can result from particular police operations, or individual cases involving multiple suspects. This should be borne in mind when interpreting trends over time

1.3 Aims and objectives

The inspection sought to answer the following questions:

- Does the leadership support and promote the delivery of a high-quality, personalised and responsive approach to countering terrorism?
- Are arrangements with statutory partners, providers and other agencies established, maintained and used effectively to deliver high-quality services?
- Is timely and relevant information available to support high-quality services to counter terrorism?
- Does the NSD have sufficient capacity and capability to support the delivery of high-quality services to counter terrorism?
- How effective are the arrangements at promoting desistance and disengagement?
- How effective are the arrangements at keeping people safe?

Scope of the inspection

This inspection included the management of offenders in custody and the community who were identified as terrorist convicted,¹¹ terrorist connected¹² or posing a terrorist risk.¹³ Our community case sample included individuals on licence following release from prison, as well as those serving suspended sentence orders or community orders, managed by the NSD. We did not include cases where the individual was identified as posing a terrorist risk, but their supervision was being managed by generic probation services. Although the NSD also manages serious organised crime cases and critical public protection cases, these were not within the scope of this inspection.

¹¹ Terrorist – When an offender has been convicted of a specified terrorist offence, as set out in Part 1 of Schedule 19ZA of the *Criminal Justice Act 2003*.

¹² Terrorist connected – An offender who has not committed terrorist offences (that is, those listed in Part 1 of the Schedule) but who has committed other specified offences that the court has determined have a terrorist connection.

¹³ Terrorist risk – Offender not charged with or convicted of terrorist or terrorist-connected offences, but who is identified by HMPPS or other agencies as presenting a terrorist risk.

1.4 Report outline

Chapter	Content
2. Leadership, strategy, and policy	This chapter considers the national and regional leadership of services and the governance arrangements. It examines the strategies and framework that underpin service delivery and explores how leadership impacts on links with other agencies responsible for managing risk.
3. Staffing	This chapter reviews staffing arrangements and explores the capacity and capability of each agency to support the delivery of high-quality services to counter terrorism. It considers the skills, role and responsibilities of staff within each agency and the management oversight of service delivery.
4. Partnership working and information sharing	This chapter reviews partnership working and the arrangements in place for information sharing between agencies. It considers the processes that underpin these arrangements, including Pathfinder and MAPPA, and the current limitations of IT systems to support the efficient sharing of information.
5. Keeping people safe	This chapter details the findings from our case inspections and explores the effectiveness of case management in keeping people safe and managing the risk of harm.
6. Promoting desistance and disengagement	This chapter details the findings from our case inspections and explores how desistance and disengagement are promoted across agencies.

2. Leadership, strategy, and policy

This chapter considers the national and regional leadership of services and the governance arrangements. It examines the strategies and framework that underpin service delivery and explores how leadership impacts on links with other agencies responsible for managing risk.

2.1 National leadership and governance

At a national level, there is a joint operating delivery model between the NSD and JExU. This arrangement is underpinned by an MoU, which sets out the boundaries of the roles of the PCT teams and NSD. The new practices were not embedded quickly in all units, because legacy ways of working within PCT teams were not aligned on a national basis. Having resolved these issues, the teams are working effectively together to ensure robust service delivery and case management. Collaboration with NSD is further supported by the historical relationships between PCT teams and CT policing.

National governance arrangements are in place, across both prison and probation, and support operational delivery, including addressing barriers when they arise. The National Security Governance Board, chaired by the probation director for the NSD, provides the link with regional probation services and JExU. This board is attended by regional heads of public protection and JExU and covers all aspects of the NSD's work, including management of TACT, serious organised crime and critical public protection cases. Additional CT probation and CT prison boards also ensure that links across JExU, NSD and CTNM at a strategic level are maintained. These arrangements, and local relationships, support strategic cooperation between partners, including the police. While all agencies retain individual accountability for delivery against their priorities, the aligned governance arrangements mean there is a whole-system approach to managing CT.

On behalf of chief constables, the nine regional CT heads are accountable for the management of the national security risk posed by the nominals in scope for CTNM who reside within their region. Regional CTNM staff are supported in developing effective practices, quality assurance and discharge of this duty by a national CTNM team, headed by a detective chief superintendent who is responsible for ongoing development of the network's CTNM capability. We found evidence of effective structures and guidance produced by CT Policing headquarters (CTPHQ). This included a manual of guidance, a performance framework, and ongoing support for regional units. This has enabled the CTNM units to adopt the vision, strategy and principles set out in the manual of guidance. Much has been achieved in a relatively short time.

There is an important relationship to be maintained, both on a national and regional level, with mainstream probation services. The relationship hasn't always been easy to navigate, given the significant investment in the NSD to deliver a gold standard service, at a time when generic probation services have been found wanting in many areas of service delivery. The arrangements in place for delivering enhanced management of those subject to NSD supervision, however, are supporting effective delivery of probation services within regions. Links with regional probation directors are facilitated on a one-to-one basis by the NSD deputy director, ensuring two-way communication of priorities across regions.

2.2 Individual agency leadership and governance

Prisons

Each prison in England and Wales has structured, formalised Pathfinder arrangements to manage the risk of serious harm posed by those convicted of terrorist offences, terrorist connected prisoners and terrorist risk prisoners. These arrangements are supported by staff from JExU, who offer advice and guidance to ensure consistency of approach and defensible decision-making. The arrangements are managed through regular meetings with a range of partners, both internal and external to the prison, to decide on actions to keep people safe. These include where the prisoner should be located, either in the establishment or within the prison estate, as well as whether the prisoner would benefit from an intervention to support desistance and disengagement from extremism.

Governors and directors in the custodial settings we inspected were clear about their responsibility and had a good understanding of the risk in their prisons. They had confidence in the arrangements for dealing with the CT risk, and that sufficient resources had been allocated.

We found that leaders in HMPPS actively supported work to manage the risk from terrorist offenders. For example, the HMPPS security directorate, through JExU, had developed a clear strategy to improve the coordination of work to manage the risk from terrorist offenders. The effectiveness of this work was monitored by a senior leader at a monthly CT prisons board. This forum had also identified opportunities for system-wide improvements, for example introducing a pilot to test a new approach to monitoring calls more efficiently.

The Pathfinder arrangements worked well overall in each of the custodial settings we visited. A range of partners were involved, including JExU and CT Policing, although the lack of sharing of information from these meetings with POMs did cause some concerns for inspectors and was not always consistent. The current operational framework for managing extremist offenders in custody is dated 2019 and does not incorporate changes that have been made as a consequence of the current Offender Management in Custody (OMiC) model. This requires review in order to ensure that all professionals, including operational staff, have clear guidance on Pathfinder processes and sharing of information.

Some partners had a regional or national responsibility, and decisions taken at the Pathfinder meetings, for example on movement of prisoners, showed a good and coordinated approach to risk management. Each prison also had a specific senior leader with responsibility for managing the risk from terrorism at the establishment. This individual chaired the Pathfinder meetings and was responsible for understanding the risks posed by each prisoner and the overall threat to the security and stability of the prison from those risks.

The high security prisons, which held most terrorist convicted offenders, also had a specific CT manager, who worked closely with the security manager. In most other prisons, responsibility for managing the risks rested with the security manager. At these prisons, the security manager received good support from one of the 12 JExU regional counter terrorism leads (RCTL), which helped to coordinate the work and promote consistency between sites.

The operational CT lead managers had a good understanding of the terrorist prisoners currently held in their establishment and provided a regular assessment of the risks at the establishment to the governor or director. They chaired the Pathfinder meeting and had regular contact with RCTLs. The operational leads were clear that decisions relating to the management of terrorist offenders lay with them, but that, when making decisions, they took account of advice and guidance from partners such as the RCTLs, which helped to provide consistency in delivery of the work across the estate.

Probation Service – National Security Division

Overall leadership of the NSD is strong, both on a national and regional basis. The initial NSD vision is to:

'... create a specialist, dedicated and highly skilled National Security Division, which provides an enhanced level of intelligence led monitoring, case management and intervention for the most high-risk, complex and high-profile offenders in the community.'¹⁴

NSD staff and managers are clear on that vision and the key delivery priorities. These are well communicated and actively reinforced within all delivery units.

The NSD is straddling both the target operating model of the Probation Service and standard operating procedures (SOPs) of JExU, to good effect. The SOPs and MoUs were put into practice to ensure that service delivery could begin quickly, rather than waiting for overarching policy to be put in place. This has made it possible to create a new national division at pace. This comes at a cost, however, of practice moving quicker than policy. The operational framework for probation practitioners within general offender management was found to be outdated, as it pre-dated the most recent terrorist attacks within the UK. There is a risk that continued use of SOPs and MoUs to drive practice, at the expense of an overarching policy, strategy and delivery framework, will become unwieldy for practitioners, both within the NSD and especially within generic offender management. This is an unacceptable position for practitioners. The introduction of a policy, strategy and delivery framework is, however, not within the gift of the NSD and sits within JExU's sphere of responsibility.

The NSD works to both a national delivery plan and a reducing reoffending plan. Both are ambitious; the national delivery plan includes 66 objectives, and the reducing reoffending plan encompasses a further 38, including working with partners, courts, sentence management, interventions, victims and prisons. HoNSUs give feedback against these targets on a quarterly basis, and all are clear about the priorities they are working to. However, there is a risk that, given how ambitious both these plans are, as well as the level of political scrutiny and internal auditing, there could be a splintering of how work is prioritised. From what we saw, however, HoNSUs were well supported and priorities were communicated consistently. The NSD's responsibility for case management was well understood by CT policing colleagues, although less so by those working in prisons. In stakeholder focus groups, there was a high regard for all NSD staff, and confidence that they had the ability to deliver safe case management within professional boundaries and to a high standard. This was reinforced by our case inspection findings.

The enhanced national standards are well embedded and achieving the objectives of strengthening offender management within this cohort. The addition of polygraph testing and psychologists within the NSD added to both risk management and the engagement of people on probation. These enhanced standards and access to additional resources reinforced the confidence that partners had in the NSD. Performance against the enhanced standards is not currently monitored statistically, given the absence of standardised management information reports. There is, however, comprehensive reporting against all other performance measures, with analytics undertaken on a routine basis to ensure minimum standards of performance are being achieved across the NSD.

The management model within the NSD is lean. Both HoNSUs and SOLs were accessible to practitioners and administration staff. All were clear about their roles and responsibilities, and there was a strong sense of teamwork. This was reflected particularly in the management of cases through both MAPPA and core group processes, with HoNSUs acting

¹⁴ NSD Document – CT joint inspection – The National Security Division.

as co-chairs for all Level 3 MAPPA meetings, and SOLs picking up responsibility for chairing Level 2 MAPPA meetings and core groups.

There is an established process for the triage of cases of concern into the NSD, based on Pathfinder assessed level of terrorist risk and subsequent assessment of suitability by the Probation Service, JExU and NSD. However, we were less assured about the capability of officers within local generic offender management to identify and then refer on or manage terrorist risk cases. In our sample of 10 triage cases, we saw some cases that had not been triaged into the NSD and had remained with the Probation Service offender manager. Generally, those cases were then managed well, with the support of JExU, but not always. This was only a very small sample, and there would be benefit in carrying out future inspection activity to look at this particular cohort.

There was an active learning culture across the NSD, demonstrated through the way the division has responded to national inquests and reviews, as well as locally led pieces of work. There is evidence that the NSD has shared that learning across the entire network to promote best practice. Part of this learning process is regular quality assurance of case management, both across the NSD and the generic probation service, where terrorist risk cases are managed within probation delivery units. This activity takes the form of CT Quality Development Tool (CTQDT) assessment, whereby the management of a case in terms of assessment and written content is assessed against set criteria. There is a rolling programme of CTQDT activity, although in a small number of cases we saw that, even when this feedback is given to practitioners, actions are not completed to ensure that any gaps identified are rectified. That said, the quality assurance, and quality development, afforded to work with this cohort of offenders is working well overall.

Police – Counter Terrorism Nominal Management

The national CTNM vision statement¹⁵ is to:

‘Create a national effective and efficient service for the overt multi-agency management of individuals of CT interest, balancing control and change pathways, aiming to produce long term desistance and disengagement.’

CTNM is based on the governance principles ‘nationally coordinated, locally delivered’.

The stated purpose¹⁶ of CTNM is that:

Staff working within CTNM roles will work with both internal and external partners to reduce:

- risk and likelihood of re-offending
- risk of re-engagement with terrorism and extremism
- risk of mobilisation to violent extremism, and in doing so,
- protect the public.

We found effective leadership at a regional level. Managers and supervisors had a good knowledge of their cases; there was oversight of workloads; and communication within and between teams was evident. Variation in governance was seen across the nine CTUs, which was in keeping with the nationally coordinated, locally delivered service premise.

A lot of performance and management information is captured at a regional level. This is collated at a national level and used to understand trends, with a view to improving

¹⁵ National CT Nominal Management: Manual of Guidance V1.0.

¹⁶ National CT Nominal Management: Manual of Guidance V1.0.

performance. The main data collection tool is the Case Tracker. The process of collecting, updating, and sharing the data is set out in a detailed guidance document; however, the process is cumbersome, with spreadsheets needing to be shared, completed and returned on a regional to national level. Often discrepancies are found between what CTPHQ believe regions should be managing and what regions are actually managing. This results in emails being sent back and forth until agreement is reached. Once the spreadsheet is correct, data is returned to the JCTPPH to inform and update the national headcount of CT nominals.

The emailing of spreadsheets between CTNMs, CT Policing headquarters (CTPHQ) and the Joint Counter Terrorism, Prison and Probation Hub (JCTPPH) seems outdated and sub-optimal. It results in data that is only ever a snapshot in time rather than a live document accessible by all who need to view it. It also introduces delays and the opportunity for errors.

Nationally, the data enables senior leaders to understand levels of risk across the country, and provides an assurance that cases are being managed effectively. We found little awareness of the products arising from the data at a regional level. We found that the data provided to CTPHQ was often completed by staff performing the support function. Many of those interviewed felt that the process was burdensome, time-consuming and did not drive case management locally. One person referred to it as 'feeding the beast'.

Collaborative working on a single document is now commonplace and supported by cloud-based systems, which are common across police and government systems. These remove the risks of creating multiple copies of a document and sending by email. Consideration should be given to developing a system that uses this process.

In addition to providing information to CTPHQ, we found evidence that some regions were analysing data locally to produce more frequent meaningful information for supervisors and managers. This was to inform decision-making on risk and case management, for example monitoring the number of cases in the region per nominal manager, to ensure caseloads remain manageable. We found only limited awareness of protected characteristics in the case management data, and few examples of how it was used to improve nominal management.

We found that performance management within regional teams focused on the analysis of quantitative information rather than qualitative. We found little evidence of shared inter-agency understanding or analysis of data at a local level, and likewise we found little evidence of performance data being used to understand or improve performance. We found some evidence of good practice and learning being shared across agencies. However, this was limited to specific regions, with little being shared from a national perspective. We were told that good practice examples were shared on the police intranet service, Knowledge Hub,¹⁷ but there was little awareness of this at a local level.

We found that people were aware of the overall aims of the NSD and understood how they contributed to them. In most cases agencies worked well together towards common goals. Regular local governance meetings took place, with good attendance and representation from partner agencies. We saw good examples of leaders working together to both lead and task actions across organisational boundaries, such as the joint chairing of MAPPA meetings.

We found evidence of oversight and supervision of cases. Regular review meetings took place to review the risk and the associated case management plans. However, the variety of IT systems used to record data, and the absence of a single case management system, hindered the effective supervision of cases. It was difficult for supervisors to see how many cases were held by their team or to monitor the progress of those cases easily. In regions

¹⁷ [Welcome - Knowledge Hub](#)

where the CTU spanned different police forces, some supervisors were unable to view cases held by their team members from another force area. We also saw too much variation in what, where and how information was recorded. CTNM staff had asked for more guidance from CTPHQ on recording, storing, and sharing information.

2.3 Conclusions and implications

The NSD and CTNM were both set up at pace in response to emerging threats that required an alternative management approach to the one already in place across the Probation Service and CT Policing. This was done in a short space of time, and the distance travelled is impressive.

Existing processes, namely Pathfinder and the conduit role of both JExU PCT teams and RCTLs (prisons), have been supportive in setting up the new structures and the ability to deliver at pace. While prisons, probation and the police have all been managing terrorist cases for a number of years, the new structures afforded by the development of the NSD and CTNM have transformed the landscape for joint working. Both are being led proactively by strong leaders with a clear vision of the delivery priorities and with clear lines of accountability.

Enhanced national standards provide the framework for case management. This inspection found that these are being achieved and are meeting the objective of enhancing the management of terrorist and terrorist risk cases. However, delivery against these measures is not currently being monitored, and this is a gap in management oversight capability.

While there was clear guidance in place for CTNM, the operational expectations of the NSD and the wider prison and probation frontline are currently underpinned by a series of MoUs and SOPs. The previous operational framework for working with extremist offenders, both within prison and in the community, pre-dates the attacks that led to significant operational reform. Under the joint operational model between the NSD and JExU, responsibility for updating this framework sits with JExU. The lack of a current overarching operating framework creates confusion for practitioners and a lack of consistency outside specialist networks.

3. Staffing

This chapter reviews staffing arrangements and explores the capacity and capability of each agency to support the delivery of high-quality services to counter terrorism. It considers the skills, roles and responsibilities of staff within each agency and the management oversight of service delivery.

3.1 Prisons

Prisons had sufficient capacity to manage the risk presented by terrorist prisoners. Each had a designated operational CT lead, with support from RCTLs and wider JExU central functions. This supported the delivery of high-quality services to protect the public from harm.

The high security prisons benefited from a dedicated on-site counter terrorism unit (CTU), comprising a CT manager, one or more CT analysts and specific administrative support. At these prisons, the police counter terrorism prison intelligence officer (CTPIO) generally also worked on site. Staff in the CTU were very knowledgeable about terrorist risks and were confident in their dealings with prisoners. Most other prisons did not have staff designated specifically to CT work, although every establishment received support from the Regional Counter Terrorism Leads (RCTLs) and Prison Prevent Leads (PPLs).

Each of the high-security prisons had a dedicated PPL, while the remaining prisons were supported on a peripatetic basis by a regional network of more than 60 PPLs. The RCTL determined how the PPLs were deployed, and we observed resources being allocated in response to an increased number of terrorist prisoners held at particular establishments.

The role of the PPL included coordinating training on terrorism, primarily through delivery of the ASPECTS (Awareness for Staff on Prevent, Extremism and Counter Terrorism Strategy) package. Most prison staff we spoke to had completed this training, and wing officers said they were confident they could recognise and report extremist behaviours in the custodial setting. As a result, at all prisons we saw regular and relevant intelligence reports on terrorist prisoners submitted from a range of departments, such as wing staff, gym, chaplaincy and education, which reassured us that staff were alert to potential or emerging risks. JExU were not able to provide CT training figures for establishments on a national basis. It is noted that a significant amount of CT Step Up money was allocated to the roll-out of additional CT training across all prisons. However, we were advised that governors were unable to make staff available because of a range of competing factors that placed demand on staff resources. The allocated funding went largely underspent, suggesting that there may be gaps in knowledge and understanding among officers across the prison estate. While there may have been resource difficulties in releasing prison officers to complete training, an opportunity may have been missed to upskill Prison Offender Managers (POMs) using some of this funding.

While this is of concern, the resourcing of the work in the establishments we inspected was good. Most establishments had accessed CT Step Up funding and had used this well. This included using it to speed up and extend the delivery of ASPECTS training. Each of the two privately owned prisons had used it to recruit a dedicated CT analyst rather than continue to rely on regional support. At Manchester, it had been used to recruit three CT officers, and they were also assigned as keyworkers for the terrorist convicted prisoners. Their knowledge and commitment to this role were impressive and demonstrated good practice.

We found a variety of models within prison Offender Management Units (OMUs) for allocating POMs to manage terrorist prisoners. In one prison, a single POM was responsible

for managing all 10 prisoners. This POM had become a subject matter expert and developed excellent links with the CT team. However, this model did not offer any resilience should the POM be away from work, and there were no opportunities for the other POMs to develop their knowledge and confidence in this area.

At other prisons, POMs were allocated a single terrorist case each, but some told us they lacked knowledge of the issues and confidence in dealing with them. They were worried about saying the wrong thing when they spoke to the prisoners. Many POMs told us they would value additional training, and some were not aware of JExU and the roles of staff in that agency who might be able to offer support and guidance to them.

At all prisons, POMs' caseloads were very high. In addition to any terrorist prisoners, many POMs were managing over 100 other prisoners. This made it difficult for them to maintain regular meaningful contact with each one to ensure they remained engaged and motivated in the periods between any formal offending behaviour work. A number of Standard Operating Procedures had been produced by JExU to provide guidance for JExU and NSD staff managing terrorist offenders. However, OMU staff within custody who were also managing terrorist offenders were not aware of this guidance, supporting the need for an overarching operational framework to inform this work across HMPPS.

3.2 Probation Service – National Security Division

After initial recruitment issues, the NSD is now operating at near full staffing. There is a comprehensive induction programme for new staff and the training and support afforded to officers within NSD is impressive. Partners have indicated that the NSD has taken the 'crème' of practitioners, but the staff recruited into the NSD have varied length of service and previous experience, including legacy ways of working that have not always been helpful. Not all have been recruited into the NSD with the right CT skills and knowledge, and their level of practice has needed to be developed to reach the 'gold standard' expected in the management of these cases. In our view, it is the substantial investment in those officers, and the drive toward a 'gold standard' of case management, that makes the difference and is reflected in practice. In interview, 95 per cent of practitioners (19 out of 20) said they felt they had sufficient access to CT training, and the same number felt that the NSD promoted their continuous professional development. Access to quality and effective practice officers and the learning and development team within JExU, as well as access to experienced PCT teams on a regional basis, have all supported the development of NSD practice.

There are clear quality assurance processes in place to ensure that a high standard of practice is both reached and maintained. These include countersigning of all OASys assessments, management oversight at MAPPA and core groups, and monthly CT Quality Development Tool (CTQDT) activity, which applies to all terrorist/terrorist risk cases, whether they are managed by the NSD or by generic offender managers. They also include the imminent roll-out of a bespoke CT case audit tool, specific to NSD cases. Practitioners said that this wasn't just about achieving high-quality written assessments, but also about their ability to engage and manage cases in a risk-informed way, and the quality of their interactions with partner agencies. This multi-faceted approach, and the subsequent high standard of practice, was evident across most of the cases we inspected.

All practitioners interviewed as part of the case inspection (20 in total) stated that they received case-focused supervision that enhanced the quality of the work that they completed on their cases. Management oversight on cases was assessed as effective in 79 per cent of cases (26 out of 33). Where we felt this was lacking included cases where a significant period of time passed before initial assessments were signed off or entries on NDelius were overly brief or not evident at key points.

As previously indicated, the model of service delivery across the NSD is lean. This means senior and middle managers are visible and accessible. There were clear lines of communication, regular staff meetings and touchpoints. Most middle managers were receiving supervision on a regular basis, although not all.

The level of political and senior management scrutiny these cases attract, as well as the additional pressures as a consequence of the nature of CT work, cannot be overstated. This leads to questions about longevity and resilience within teams, and this will require ongoing monitoring. That said, all practitioners felt that sufficient attention was paid to their safety and wellbeing, at least most of the time, if not always.

There is a clear desire to share learning and understanding among agencies, and this benefits joint working practices. There is evidence that recommendations from all recent inquests and reviews have been implemented, and internal thematic analysis has been carried out to understand emerging themes from work being completed across the NSD. There is a real sense of a learning culture, and in part this is afforded by the restricted caseloads managed within units.

There is, however, no current workload management tool to accurately assess how much time is required per case. The original modelling to inform the establishment of the NSD suggested that each probation practitioner should supervise up to 12 cases. But we saw officers in some units who were already struggling with 12/13 cases. Resource modelling as services mature will need to pay attention to continuity and the ability to deliver services and supervision at the standard currently achieved.

There were clear lines of accountability across NSD and CTUs, as well as with JExU colleagues. Individuals were mostly clear in terms of roles and responsibilities, including case management, and these boundaries offered a safe environment within which to practice.

3.3 Police – Counter Terrorism Nominal Management

We found that CTNM units are generally adequately resourced and have sufficient capacity and capability to support the delivery of services. However, concerns were raised by senior managers about the capacity of the LRO¹⁸ role. LROs felt that the demand on their role was more than had been expected when funding was allocated, and this related in part to their responsibility for co-chairing Level 3 MAPPAs meetings. Many LROs said that CT nominal management was close to a full-time role, and yet they were only part-funded for it and had other responsibilities to manage.

While capacity and capability are currently sufficient, the continuing volume of cases falling within the scope of CTNM may impact on this in time unless more cases are deprioritised, or additional capacity is found. This is particularly relevant, as several TACT-convicted offenders who received lengthy sentences some years ago are now approaching release. At the same time, the more recent trend of earlier intervention in cases, resulting in shorter prison sentences, means these cases too are approaching release. Terrorist offenders can remain subject to restrictions and management for many years beyond their release.

Part IV of the *Counter-Terrorism Act 2008* created a notification scheme for registered terrorist offenders (RTO) who meet the relevant offence and sentence thresholds. CT Policing is the lead agency responsible for managing and enforcing Part IV requirements. Depending on the offender's age and length of sentence, they will be subject to notification requirements for 10, 15 or 30 years. Senior leaders in CTNM and the NSD are aware of this

¹⁸ Lead responsible officer – detective chief inspector rank, CTNM strategic lead.

issue and CTNM have commissioned Project Eleos. They hope this will provide further resilience in due course by looking at end-to-end management of cases and how this can be best achieved within current CT capacity. We would encourage this to be kept under regular review to ensure that demand does not exceed capacity.

We found that most CTNM teams have a good balance of relevant skills. Most CTNM teams recruited staff with experience in offender management and investigation, providing a good balance between nominal management skills and skills in investigation and enforcement. We saw some evidence of skills gap analysis taking place, including training plans that were in place to address any training needs. Many teams told us that they faced delays in recruitment and training caused by the length of time vetting can take and the limited availability of the national CTNM training course, which takes place every six months.

Some teams also reported difficulty in recruiting and retaining staff in the nominal support role. We were told that this was because of low pay and lack of opportunity for development. We found variation in the pay grade of this role across regions and variety in the roles and level of responsibility held. The nominal support role is essential to the effective operation of the CTNM teams.

We would encourage the head of interventions (Prevent and nominal management) to consider these issues with a view to addressing the rate of pay, responsibilities and staff fulfilment, and exploring opportunities for career progression.

3.4 Conclusions and implications

Staffing was sufficient across CT prison functions, the NSD and CTNM, and this was refreshing to see. Prisons are working in a diverse way to meet the CT challenges of individual establishments to good effect, although the demands on operational frontline prison roles and within prison offender management could impact negatively on these efforts. While we were assured of the training received by those we spoke to, there is a concern that planned training, in response to CT Step Up funding, has not been implemented fully, and this may lead to knowledge gaps for frontline officers across other prison establishments. POMs also lacked the skills required to work effectively with this cohort of offenders in some establishments and this impacted on their confidence to challenge terrorist behaviours.

There had been an extensive programme of induction, training and quality assurance within the NSD to deliver against a 'gold standard'. Practitioners were clear about what was expected of them and the quality of case management. There is, however, an unprecedented level of scrutiny of these cases, on both a national and regional level, and this has the potential to impact on resilience within teams. The work is intense and there is currently no way of quantifying this. There is a requirement to develop a workload management tool to measure resource allocation accurately across the NSD and to plan for future demand.

The commitment required from both HoNSUs and LROs in co-chairing MAPPAs is significant and growing. While the model works in ensuring that senior management has oversight of cases at the highest level, there are concerns about their ability to continue to deliver at this rate over the longer term, as more cases come on board. The HoNSU and LRO role is complex and demanding. The LRO role encompasses other policing responsibilities and it is recognised that the time that the role demands is more than was originally envisaged. CTNM has also struggled to recruit support staff and this is a risk to operational delivery.

4. Partnership working and information sharing

This chapter reviews partnership working and the arrangements in place for sharing information between agencies. It considers the processes that underpin these arrangements, including Pathfinder and MAPPA, and the current limitations of IT systems to support the efficient sharing of information.

4.1 Partnership working

The national governance arrangements for the NSD include partners, namely the police and prisons, and this was a particular strength that translated into operational practice. Partnership arrangements to manage the risks within each prison were working reasonably well, with the main vehicle for these relationships being the Pathfinder process.

There were strong links on a local level between the NSD, JExU and CT Policing, with MAPPA being pivotal to these relationships. HMICFRS found strong evidence of effective and productive partnership working between CTNM and the NSD, not only through formal meeting structures, but also at a tactical day-to-day level. Quotes such as:

“true partnership” and “one team”

were common throughout the inspection. All NSD practitioners interviewed felt that there were effective relationships with other agencies to support desistance and disengagement, as well as manage the risk of harm in the cases they were working on.

4.2 Pathfinder

Pathfinder enables a joint agency approach to risk assessment related to terrorism concerns presented by those managed by prison and probation. Despite its apparent complexity due to the intelligence-led nature of the work and the number of interested parties, the Pathfinder process worked well to identify and manage terrorist risk in prisons. The process was well established and maintained. Prison service Regional Counter Terrorism Leads (RCTLs) regularly attended prisons and actively contributed to decisions about managing risk, such as whether the prisoner should be referred to a separation centre. The RCTLs we spoke to were knowledgeable about the options available to them and appropriately focused on the risk posed by these prisoners.

Pathfinder was enhanced by the JExU Prison Prevent Leads (PPLs). It was positive that a PPL had been assigned full time to the two category B training prisons in response to an increase in the number of terrorist prisoners held at each. The Pathfinder meeting was usually attended by a core group of stakeholders from within the prison, such as psychology, chaplaincy, the OMU manager and the mental health team. It was positive that, at Manchester, the prison diversity lead was invited to all meetings, as the core attendees had identified a possible trend in the number of complaints about discrimination from some terrorist prisoners. However, across all establishments inspected, individual POMs who managed the prisoners being discussed were not routinely invited to the meetings. POMs told us they were asked to submit updates on the prisoners on their caseload, but seldom had any feedback, and many told us that they felt the relationship with security and CT staff was too distant. Some CT managers said they did not have confidence in the ability of some POMs to handle sensitive material appropriately but had not taken steps to address this.

Intelligence was shared at the Pathfinder meetings, and with others who needed to know it, when requested, but was not usually shared proactively. At some prisons, attendees at Pathfinder meetings could not take notes or share the minutes. It is of note that CTNM staff

do not routinely attend prison-based Pathfinders; this role is carried out by Counter Terrorism Prison Intelligence Officers (CTPIOs). If the case is being discussed in a prison outside the CTNM region, there is potential for a gap in the information being recorded on an accessible IT system for the subsequent owning police force.

We did not review community Pathfinder processes in their entirety, as part of this inspection, as it is a function owned and delivered by JExU rather than NSD. Probation CT teams, however, continue to manage cases via the community Pathfinder process, following release from custody, and do have access to the required IT system. Disclosure of appropriate information by PCT teams, into both NSD and generic probation services, facilitates the link between custody and community Pathfinder management.

4.3 Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA)

All terrorist convicted prisoners approaching a potential release date were managed under Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), and in all the cases we reviewed, partnership working between MAPPA representatives in the community, the prison and JExU was good. POMs attended all MAPPA meetings (either in person or via video link). The information supplied by POMs in advance of the meetings was comprehensive, and included information supplied by security departments and CT teams. PPLs were also routinely invited to MAPPA meetings, and this ensured that information could be shared from custody Pathfinder meetings.

Significant work has been undertaken to embed MAPPA processes within the NSD, incorporating the strategic management boards and adhering to agreed principles in the delivery of this important function. MAPPA and core groups are well attended and pivotal in managing the risk of serious harm posed by the cases within the NSD. They have become more streamlined and focused (particularly the core groups) over the last two years, building in efficiencies and gaining traction on how cases are managed. It was evident that many of Jonathan Hall KC's recommendations from his 2020 review of the management of terrorist offenders through MAPPA have been implemented. This includes chairs being involved directly in the management of the case through their wider team, the formulation of core groups to deliver against key MAPPA actions and the inclusion of a new MAPPA category, category four, for terrorist and terrorist risk offenders.

The Security Service does not attend MAPPA meetings. While we were given assurances on how the information it holds is shared at both a local and national level to inform decision-making, it is a concern that it is not present to hear the detail that is often shared as part of MAPPA discussions by those who work directly with the person on probation, although formal minutes from MAPPAs are shared. The wealth of information Security Service could gain from first-hand attendance is underestimated.

Following the Fishmongers' Hall and Streatham attacks, a decision was made by HMPPS that all terrorist convicted cases would be managed at MAPPA Level 3 for a minimum of 12 months. Although this isn't a legislative requirement or detailed in MAPPA guidance, this response was understandable, to offer assurance of robust risk management in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, at a time when cases were being managed within generic offender management. Practice has moved on significantly since then, with the establishment of the NSD providing specialist and enhanced oversight of the work in partnership with CT Policing.

Current estimates indicate that, over the next 12 months, approximately 120 terrorist and terrorist risk cases¹⁹ may be released from prison and allocated to the NSD. If all these

¹⁹ JCTPPH estimate based on analysis of cases in custody, March 2023.

individuals are released and become subject to NSD management, the current MAPPA model will be unsustainable because of the increasing number of cases being listed at level three, and the limited number of senior officers who can chair MAPPA meetings at this level. Chairing of Level 3 meetings sits with the HoNSUs and CT Policing LROs. They are privy to secret information to help support decisions on case management, both within and outside MAPPA. There are real concerns about the resilience of such a model moving forward.

We found that MAPPA levels were determined in a timely way in all cases inspected. With one exception, all cases were heard at MAPPA before release from custody. We saw good evidence that people on probation were engaged with the MAPPA process, and most of the individuals in the cases we inspected had been made aware of their MAPPA status and were given the opportunity to contribute to MAPPA meetings via their practitioner. The vast majority of cases in our sample were managed at Level 3 MAPPA. Overall, we felt the judgements about the MAPPA level were, at that stage, correct. The management level had been reduced to Level 2 in four cases, and we agreed with those decisions, which were clearly evidenced, and risk management remained robust.

Once an individual achieves stability in the community and MAPPA panel members are assured that risk is being managed effectively, the continued management at MAPPA Level 3 is not always needed. Further, the senior panel members in attendance at these meetings will be required in future for the newly adopted cases, many of whom will be released into the community from custody, when risk is likely to be increased. The ability to manage established cases at an appropriate lower level of MAPPA (but still involving all the necessary agencies) will allow specialist resources to be better targeted across all risk levels.

There was evidence of information sharing by the police, prisons and JExU at MAPPA meetings for all cases. Information provided by other agencies was routinely used to inform initial assessments. All plans for the work to be completed invariably included other agencies, including the police via CTNM. We found that CTNM actions set at MAPPA were carried out and reported back in a timely way. Police action plans were aligned to MAPPA risk management plans. We found that planning had made appropriate links to other agencies in all but one case. Information from MAPPA and core meetings, as well as information from other agencies, informed 94 per cent (31 out of 33) of the reviews completed. All practitioners interviewed as part of the case inspection indicated they felt confident in engaging in the MAPPA process.

Overall, we found that MAPPA was achieving its objectives and there was evidence of core groups maturing. MAPPAs were delivered best in units where there were very clear boundaries set for the dates and times they would be held, and all partners prioritised attendance according to pre-agreed schedules. Core groups were delivered with most effect when their purpose was clearly defined and directed from MAPPA to achieve a specific purpose.

4.4 Information sharing

All prisons had clear and effective links to share intelligence with the police through a CTPIO. In the high-security training prisons, the CTPIO was based in the CT unit within the prison, while at other prisons the CTPIO covered several prisons and prioritised their attendance based on the number of terrorist prisoners held at each establishment. However, we found that arrangements for investigating and prosecuting crimes committed by terrorist offenders while in custody, such as possession of a mobile phone, were not well defined and there was no specific process in place for managing this. We saw examples where, even though offences were reported, prosecutions had not been brought. This was a missed opportunity to manage the case more robustly. It is noted that Jonathan Hall KC (2022)

made a recommendation relating directly to this issue in his review of terrorism in prisons; however, at this point no policy action has been taken.

RCTLs ensured that establishments were aware of intelligence from external partners. Dedicated CT intelligence analysts promptly processed the internal intelligence received. The RCTL network within custody has supported access to case information for community NSD colleagues, when traditional routes have failed. This includes outside of formal meetings. The overall approach to information sharing within prison with POMs, however, was too cautious. This had the potential for the POM to be left unsighted on emerging evidence and information and did not sit well with the need for information exchange to be at the heart of risk reduction, suggesting that a wider cultural change is required.

Under the previous model of managing terrorist cases (within generic offender management in the community), secret information would have been shared with probation counter terrorism teams (PCTTs) and disseminated as appropriate to the NSD for case management processes. This has evolved, and NSD HoNSUs, as MAPPAs chairs, and increasingly Senior Operating Leads, have this information directly made available to them. This informs decision-making within case management, although there remains a legitimate sterile corridor, whereby sensitive information is shared with operational and senior managers but not frontline practitioners. There seemed to be a collaborative desire by senior leaders for these practices to be developed further, with both PCTTs and NSD being present at open and closed meetings with partners when deciding on actions to be taken in cases. This was not, however, echoed by middle managers within NSD, who suggested the sterile corridor needed re-setting, and again reflects how the lack of an overarching strategy, policy and operational framework can lead to disparities in practice. Operationally, however, we assessed that current processes are delivering what is required to ensure information is shared, albeit in often clunky ways.

As CT Policing co-chairs MAPPAs, there is oversight from both NSD and CT Policing perspectives. The JCTPPH facilitates the sharing of sensitive intelligence, specifically from the Security Service to NSD, to ensure that risk management is as informed as possible. The information shared remains the intellectual property of the owning organisation, and decisions to share such intelligence are made on a case-by-case basis. There are procedures in place to facilitate the safe sharing of this information, although these are not without their limitations and usually involve lengthy physical journeys.

Some CTNM staff questioned the value added by the JCTPPH. They told us that often they would attend 'Reveal' meetings with the JCTPPH to find that they were already aware of the information being disclosed. The value of the JCTPPH was more evident at a national level. The team was set up very quickly in response to specific recommendations following the Fishmongers' Hall attack. A key aim was to work across prisons, probation and CT Policing to be able to give a definitive figure for the number of CT nominals in the prison estate or on probation, or known to police but not to HMPPS, at any one time. In this regard they have succeeded and supply timely information on the nominal headcount. Leaders within CT Policing and the JCTPPH acknowledge that there is much more they would like the JCTPPH to do, to add value. They see it as an iterative process that they are working to improve.

Overall, however, the level of information sharing was reassuring. This was happening not only within formal MAPPA and core group functions, but also on a more frequent and informal basis among managers and practitioners in the NSD and CTNM. We saw examples of meetings with partner agencies being called at short notice to share information and make case management decisions. As one practitioner told us, they:

"...can have meetings in an emergency, so for instance can turn that around in an hour and all the professionals we are working with know them [person on probation]."

This level of flexibility and investment by other agencies is rarely seen in generic case management.

4.5 Storing information

The ViSOR system is accessible to police, prisons and probation and is designed as a national dangerous persons database, primarily to hold information on all offenders with a sexual offender registration requirement or offenders who are violent and potentially dangerous, and subject to MAPPA. This includes terrorist offenders. In both 2015 and 2022, HM Inspectorate of Probation found prisons and probation were not using ViSOR as a shared working tool and the quality of the information contained was rarely of a high standard. Unfortunately, we found a similar picture in this thematic inspection.

Most prisons had very few staff who were trained to use ViSOR, and much of the Pathfinder information was being held on different systems. This creates a risk of disparity between intelligence systems and means that users may not have ready access to all the information they need to manage risk. Within NSD, 14 out of 20 of practitioners indicated that they used ViSOR, some through administrators; however, the remaining six didn't.

The ViSOR system has only recently been upgraded for the management of CT cases and terrorist offenders. ViSOR was seen as ineffective and was used inconsistently by both the police and probation. When we inspected how CTNM teams recorded and shared information, we found that they:

- relied on copying and pasting, and often summarising, from one system on to another
- commonly used email to share information, resulting in information being held by individuals and not visible to others
- often shared information by telephone call, and did not then record that information on any system
- used numerous methods to hold the same, or similar, information; in total, 10 different methods were mentioned:
 - ViSOR
 - NCIA
 - NSN
 - HOLMES
 - email
 - PNN
 - One Note
 - SharePoint
 - local systems and shared drives
 - MAPPA minutes.

This has the potential to lead to duplication, multiple accounts of single occurrences and no single version of the truth. For example, when conducting joint visits to nominals, the police officer and probation practitioner both separately record the notes of the visit on their own organisation's computer system.

Most of the people that we spoke to were aware of this issue and the risks it presented. They were aware of the planned introduction of MAPPS to replace ViSOR, which it was hoped would provide the solution. Many at both regional and national level expressed doubts that MAPPS would completely solve the issue. MAPPS is still in development and its implementation is some way off. The risk is present and continuing. It is notable that, while 30 of the cases inspected by HMICFRS had a ViSOR record, in 22 of those cases, ViSOR was not being actively used as an information sharing tool.

Overall, HMICFRS found a culture that encouraged information sharing and evidence of it occurring across most agencies. Case reviews also showed evidence of information sharing and actions taken to minimise risk. However, the way information was recorded, stored, and shared varied significantly across the CTNM regions. Most staff, across prisons, NSD and CTNM, could not access Pathfinder IT, so POMs and others may not have had all the latest relevant terrorism-related intelligence about the cases they were managing, without disclosure by RCT or PCT teams.

There appeared to be appropriate safeguards for sharing sensitive information and intelligence, but the lack of appropriate secure systems (for holding secret classified information) within probation potentially introduced delays to this happening. While there were well-rehearsed processes within CT Policing for sharing or 'breaking out' secret intelligence, these take time. We did not see evidence of a mechanism to enable probation to access this intelligence quickly in time-critical cases, other than through redacting the content of information shared.

The NSD lacks recording systems capable of safely storing secret, or higher, intelligence once it has been shared. While the storage of such information is less of a concern, as often the information requiring this level of handling is not owned by the NSD, the subsequent decision-making and agreed actions following revelation cannot be securely recorded. This is a vulnerability for HoNSUs particularly, and the vulnerability will only increase as the number of cases subject to NSD management increase. This is not an acceptable position for the long term. There is also a need for improved access to secure information exchange capabilities within the NSD, particularly for secret information, in a way that is more accessible and timely. Part of this uplift would need to include access to better technical equipment, namely secure telephone and video enabled facilities, to allow NSD staff to be on a more level playing field with their counterparts.

4.6 Conclusions and implications

Overall partnership working was well evidenced, both on a strategic and operational level, particularly between prisons, probation and police. Despite their pivotal role in managing cases before release however, POMs were not routinely part of the Pathfinder process and there were gaps in intelligence sharing within custody. This had an impact on the quality of case assessment before release. However, there was evidence of partnership working through the Pathfinder process with other agencies, and evidence of a host of controls and methods for monitoring terrorists within custody. These included appropriate prison population management actions and the monitoring of communications. We did, however, see delays to some of these measures, and that was of concern. Offences committed by terrorist offenders in custody, although reported to police, were not always prosecuted. These were lost opportunities to manage the cases robustly.

MAPPAs are well established and achieve the aim of offering a coordinated, multi-agency approach to managing cases, although the Security Service do not attend directly. HoNSUs have worked hard with partners to achieve confidence in both the NSD and the process. Core groups to ensure that progress is made against MAPPA actions are streamlined and efficient. Responsive information sharing was apparent in cases outside formal meetings.

The model to keep all terrorist convicted cases as MAPPA Level 3 for an initial 12 months was understandable as an initial response to the terror attacks and before the development of the NSD. However, it is no longer the most efficient use of resources. Cases could reasonably be managed as Level 2 once all risk management is in place and the individual has achieved a period of stability. This would ensure sufficient oversight is maintained within the NSD. The current MAPPA model will be unsustainable as case numbers increase. Management at Level 2, within the NSD specialist panel, would be adequate and ensure resilience in the delivery model going forward.

There is evidence of strong working relationships, particularly between the NSD and CTNM, and this is reflected in their approach to information sharing on a regular and timely basis. There are processes in place for sharing secret information; however, these are cumbersome. The NSD has no way of independently recording decision-making or actions set in response to the information received at a secret level. This is an organisational vulnerability and is an unacceptable position for staff to be subject to.

The recording of information across CTNM was also problematic, with up to 10 different recording systems being used. The national guidance for CTNM on recording and storing information needs to be strengthened, to avoid disparities in practices and improve the quality of recording. The Pathfinder IT system was only accessible to RCT and PCT teams. ViSOR, the shared platform used by the police, prisons and probation, was found to be lacking in detail and rarely used to any significant benefit. While there are new recording systems planned via MAPPS, it is unclear how effective these will be in meeting the need for a single case management system.

5. Keeping people safe

This chapter details the findings from our case inspections and explores the effectiveness of case management in keeping people safe and managing the risk of harm.

5.1 Prisons – pre-release

Arrangements to protect others from harm caused by terrorist prisoners were effective. Work often began before the individual came into custody. Prisons that served the courts for terrorist offences were notified of ongoing criminal investigations and were able to start planning for the arrival of that individual, for example where they would be safely located.

The use of mail and phone monitoring was effective overall. Decisions to carry out monitoring were taken at appropriate points during a prisoner's time in custody and considered information from a range of sources, including the police. In most prisons, calls were monitored by CT analysts who had the experience and specialist knowledge of what to listen for. We saw examples where these staff had identified concerning comments and taken appropriate action to safeguard others and protect the public.

The information supplied by POMs in advance of MAPPA meetings was comprehensive. It included information from a range of sources within the prison, and always contained an update from the CT team or PPL. The MAPPA meetings for terrorist offenders were chaired by senior managers from the NSD or CTNM, and the minutes we reviewed showed meaningful actions that had been agreed and carried out by partners, including action to safeguard family members. In all the cases we reviewed, the release plans for prisoners required them to reside for a period in an approved premises, and it was positive that the managers of these premises attended MAPPA meetings before the release.

All the cases we reviewed had a risk management plan. Some of these had been prepared by the POM during the initial part of the prisoner's sentence, and these were of good quality, with an appropriate focus on the risks posed by that individual while in custody and on release. In cases where the management of the prisoner had been handed to the NSD COM, we found evidence of a thorough discussion of risk between the POM and COM. The risk management plans completed by NSD COMs were of a very high quality, with a comprehensive analysis and control measures in the form of licence conditions in preparation for release.

The quality of case work by NSD COMs was very good. It included frequent face-to-face contact with the prisoner, which is something we seldom see in cases that do not involve a terrorist convicted prisoner. It was also notable that NSD COMs took an active interest in addressing any resettlement needs of the prisoner, such as securing identity documents and assisting with financial problems before release.

At most prisons we saw release plans that included the allocation of a Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP) mentor before release. This was positive, as it ensured consistency of support into the community and a greater likelihood that the prisoner would remain engaged and compliant when on licence.

5.2 National Security Division and Counter Terrorism Nominal Management

Overall, the implementation and delivery of services balanced risk management with the rehabilitative needs of the cases we inspected. NSD supervision enhanced the management of harm and protection of the public in the majority of cases. Overall, HMICFRS also found,

based on the information available to inspectors, that reasonable action had been taken to minimise the risk of harm to others.

Information provided by other agencies was routinely used to inform initial assessments by probation, as were additional assessment tools, such as Extremist Risk Guidance 22+. However, operating procedures in regard to the Pathfinder Guidance Framework indicated that these could not be shared with POMs or probation practitioners based in the community - Community Offender Managers (COMs). These additional assessments completed in respect of terrorist risk cases were therefore not recorded on the offender's file or used as part of the wider OASys process, and this was of concern. Past behaviour and convictions were considered in all cases inspected, and this informed current assessments.

There were known domestic abuse concerns in a third of cases inspected, and domestic abuse enquiries undertaken in two-thirds of all cases. We would expect to see domestic abuse enquiries undertaken in all cases. Conversely, there were current child safeguarding concerns in two-thirds of cases, and, reassuringly, appropriate information sharing on child safeguarding had happened in all cases. Adult safeguarding concerns were identified in nine cases and information had been shared appropriately in all but one.

We found that assessment focused sufficiently on keeping people safe in 28 out of 33 cases (85 per cent). Those marked as insufficient were terrorist risk cases where information relating to non-terrorist type risks, such as sexual harm or domestic abuse, had not been fully considered or incorporated into the overall assessment.

Sentence planning sufficiently focused on the factors linked to risk of harm in the majority of cases. We found that planning set out the necessary restrictive measures in all but one case, although the expected timescales were not always defined for the planned work. Overall, planning was sufficient in respect of both engaging the person on probation and keeping people safe in 31 out of 33 cases. This translated into sufficient implementation and delivery of supervision in 29 out of 33 cases. In well-managed cases we saw good join-up in the interventions being provided and the supervision received through the NSD. The person on probation was actively engaged in their sentence. The enhanced national standards, as well as additional resources provided by psychology and a more intense review by MAPPA and core groups, all contributed to this work.

Victim-specific concerns were sufficiently considered in all cases at the initial assessment stage and were sufficiently planned for in the vast majority of cases. In the very few cases where we did identify gaps, this again related to domestic abuse and work to address sexual offending. Enforcement within these cases should have been timelier and the work being completed on an individual basis should have been more focused and robust.

The additional measures afforded through the enhanced national standards for this cohort of cases, namely increased reporting, routine home visits, GPS location monitoring, extended residency at approved premises and polygraph examining, all supported the risk management strategy for cases. The value of an approved premises was considered in all relevant cases. However, we did not see the recommendations to the Parole Board, relating to approved premises residency, being agreed in all cases where this was suggested. In two out of 11 cases released by the Parole Board, the board decided not to release the individual to an approved premises, as had been recommended. This resulted in a requirement for extensive, and swift, risk management planning in response by both the NSD and CT Policing, to ensure a safe release with sufficient support in place.

We were reassured to see that home visits were happening in all cases (apart from one), to support the effective management of risk. Whilst there were processes in place to risk assess these visits by NSD probation staff prior to going out, worryingly, we did not see any evidence that CTNM police officers were carrying out formal risk assessments before

undertaking a visit to the individual being managed. We were told that no formal risk assessment process existed within CTNM and that individual police officers would dynamically assess risk on a case-by-case basis. Given that the nominals are the highest risk terrorism offenders, and many of them may see police officers and other officials as legitimate targets for violence, the absence of a requirement to conduct a risk assessment, and a framework or guidance for doing so, is concerning.

Contingency planning was particularly strong, and was reinforced by response plans. This detailed a clear and pre-populated decision-making framework for each case if the risk management plan was deemed to no longer be effective. This meant that swift action could be taken, including out of hours.

Enforcement action was taken when required in the majority of cases. When enforcement action resulted in recall or breach, the reports to inform this process were sufficiently detailed and analytical in all cases. Where the person on probation had been subject to recall or breach action, there were sufficient efforts to re-engage that individual in all cases. Alternatives to recall were considered in suitable circumstances and appropriate risk management strategies put in place to manage this accordingly.

In total, seven of the cases inspected had exited the NSD before the inspection, six due to sentence expiry and one due to a return to generic offender management. The process for cases to return to generic offender management within probation was well considered, although at this point rarely used. In three cases where onward management was required, including after the sentence, we assessed that exit planning was good.

This was supported by HMICFRS who also found that where a case had exited NSD management, there had been comprehensive planning for onward management by police. Some nominal managers, however, told us that although they used the Registered Terrorism Offender Assessment Framework (RTOAF) for those cases that were coming to the end of their licence period, they would also often seek to complete additional assessments. This was because the RTOAF was quite broad, and they wanted to focus more on policing risks. This has led to some CTNM teams developing and completing their own form and processes. This could lead to inconsistency between regions in how they assess and manage risk.

5.3 Triage into National Security Division management

As well as inspecting cases current to the NSD, we also looked at a sample of 10 cases that had been identified, through assessment against the Control and Interventions Matrix, as potentially appropriate for management by the NSD.

There is a clear line of accountability for the triage of cases into the NSD, and a consistent approach by the NSD units in terms of this process. This includes a profile of the case and a full discussion on the benefits that NSD management would offer, chaired by HoNSUs and attended by the relevant regional head of public protection and PCT lead. We found that eight out of the 10 cases were rejected from NSD management, and thus stayed in generic offender management.

Two cases were initially rejected, and then adopted into the NSD when circumstances changed, and risk had increased. Seven of the eight triage cases that remained within generic Probation Service management had sufficient follow-up by PCT teams to ensure that they were managed appropriately within the region. In one case, however, very little work was completed by the COM and, despite follow-up by the PCT team, there was less assurance that this case had had access to appropriate interventions to both assess and address concerns about terrorist risk. This was because the interventions were left to the COM to implement, and this didn't happen effectively. It was considered by inspectors that more support from the PCT team would have been appropriate in this case.

HMICFRS also reviewed the same 10 cases and found that each of the cases was known to CT Policing and, in most cases, they had contributed to the triage decision. Based on the information available, both the police and HMICFRS felt that the right outcome had been achieved in all but one case. This case had not been adopted into the NSD initially, and both CT Policing and HMICFRS considered that it should have been. This was, however, one of the cases adopted at a later stage when there was a change in circumstances, and the NSD was responsive in actioning this in a timely way. Overall, HMICFRS concurred that there were sufficient measures in place to manage these cases outside of NSD management in nine out of the 10 cases reviewed.

While the triage process is informed by CT Policing, via the PCT team, the police are not in attendance at this triage meeting – it is in effect a Probation Service allocation process. However, it is important that sufficient police information is available to inform the appropriate allocation of cases, based on all known risk. Some LROs thought that CT Policing should be present at the meeting. Everyone we spoke to, including LROs, agreed that the triage meeting was supplied with all the information required to make an informed decision. CTNM and LROs, however, felt that, with CT Policing not being present, this meeting was out of step with the close partnership working seen elsewhere.

The adoption into NSD management has a subsequent impact on CT Policing resources because, as terrorist risk cases, it becomes the responsible agency when cases reach their sentence end date. Within the wider inspection sample, we saw some instances where the links to CT risk were very tenuous and adoption into the NSD had been agreed to support the management of other complex needs. This model is not sustainable in the longer term, and ensuring the right cases are entering the triage process is paramount for the finite resources within both the NSD and CT Policing.

5.4 Conclusions and implications

The risk management of terrorist cases in custody was generally effective in those assessed as part of this inspection. There was evidence of local governors and directors working with JExU RCTLs to manage and mitigate risks within their establishments and CT processes were well established. They were proactive in monitoring cases, although there were delays to phone call monitoring. Prisons, via POMs and PPLs, fed into the pre-release MAPPA process, and information on risk information was shared appropriately.

CTNM co-chairs MAPPA and is sighted on all cases. At the point of transition to police-led management, at the end of statutory supervision by the NSD, there was deviation from the agreed national risk assessment process within some CTNM units, stating the RTOAF did not fully meet policing needs. We saw CTNM employing varying protocols to manage this, and this requires an agreed process. Likewise, we were concerned that CTNM has no organisational protocol for assessing the suitability of home visits when going out to terrorist offenders, and again this needs an agreed national protocol.

While ERG assessments were incorporated into COM risk assessments, we saw a lack of clarity amongst practitioners on what could and should be recorded in regard to the Pathfinder Guidance Framework, which underpins the assessment of terrorist risk offenders. This meant that there were some gaps in understanding the terrorist interest of those cases. Domestic abuse history and sexual harm offences were not always explored or addressed fully, and while this didn't result in an increase in risk of harm directly, it does need to be considered in all relevant cases going forward. That said, terrorist risk was managed well in all cases inspected.

We agreed broadly with the triage decisions made on which cases to adopt into NSD management and which to retain in generic offender management with JExU PCT team

support. Where cases remained in generic offender management, the input by PCT teams was usually sufficient to address the concerns. However, the Control and Interventions Matrix needs to be more sensitive to levels of presenting risk, as the current criteria for inclusion are overly broad and have the potential to lead to complex and needy cases, rather than national security risk cases, being adopted into the NSD.

6. Promoting desistance and disengagement

This chapter details the findings from our case inspections and explores how desistance and disengagement is promoted across agencies. Our findings follow the management of the case from prison into the community.

6.1 Prisons – pre-release

The Control and Interventions Matrix, an assessment completed as part of the Pathfinder process, made recommendations for interventions as soon as terrorist risk was registered. These assessments often recommended that the prisoner should undertake the Theological and Ideological Intervention (TII), which forms part of the Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP). It was positive that some prisoners were able to start DDP interventions early in very long sentences, and we saw examples of prisoners starting to complete offending behaviour interventions within their first few years in prison. This was positive and offered an opportunity for staff such as the POM to build on this through the remainder of the sentence.

Offending behaviour work would not be normally made available to prisoners who are on remand or yet to be sentenced. However, we saw a positive example at Wandsworth, where the concerns identified at the Pathfinder meeting were so significant that a remand prisoner was offered and accepted the opportunity to complete the TII with a specially trained theologian.

The TII involved working on a one-to-one basis with a specially trained chaplain from another prison, known as a chaplaincy intervention provider (ChIP). They were matched to prisoners after considering a range of factors, such as their cultural background, to increase the possibility that the prisoner would engage. While there were enough ChIPs nationally to meet demand and waiting lists were in single figures at the time of the inspection, we saw a few examples where the matching process had led to a delay and frustration for the prisoner.

Within 12 months of conviction, all terrorist prisoners had a detailed assessment (an ERG) completed by a forensic psychologist, which identified the risks and vulnerabilities that needed addressing to prevent further offending. This assessment often recommended that prisoners complete the Healthy Identity Interventions (HII) programme, to support desistance and disengagement from extremism by encouraging stronger positive and pro-social aspects of identity. Delivery of HII was good. It was delivered on a one-to-one basis by the same psychologist who had completed the ERG. Some prisons had dedicated forensic psychologists available on site, while others relied on accessing a regional team, but all had sufficient capacity to meet the demand. Many of the prisoners we spoke to had completed, were engaged with, or were scheduled to start HII, which was reassuring.

The recommendations from the ERG should be integrated into the sentence plan, but some of the plans we reviewed had not been updated by the prisoner's POM to reflect this. POMs told us that the completed ERG assessments were not routinely made available to them, which was a significant weakness.

We would expect to see POMs having regular contact with prisoners to develop rapport, trust and confidence, and to facilitate structured sessions to reduce their risk. In most of the cases we reviewed, POMs had monthly contact, but they were also managing caseloads of between 60 and 100 prisoners in total, which sometimes made it difficult for them to systematically devote time to all the terrorist prisoners.

We saw some good examples where the POM had used contact sessions to challenge extremist views. A number of these challenge meetings were carried out together with the PPL, but, overall, the quality of contact was lacking in many cases. Other than contact for a specific event, such as a Parole Board, the records of contact generally suggested a brief encounter with little evidence of work to keep prisoners motivated to progress. Some prisoners said they had become frustrated waiting to start an intervention, and we found that the POM had not done enough to keep the prisoner engaged. It was a concern that many POMs told us that they lacked confidence dealing with the terrorist cases and that they did not know enough about the HII or DDP interventions.

The work of POMs was complemented by regular and meaningful support from a nominated keyworker whose role was to develop constructive, motivational relationships with prisoners, and support them to take responsibility for their own development. We saw evidence of frequent keywork sessions with terrorist prisoners, often held on a weekly basis, which is much more frequent than we usually find for non-terrorist prisoners. However, the records suggested that the contact was usually a cursory discussion with no evidence of links to sentence plans. Many POMs told us they had not had any contact at all with the keyworkers for the terrorist prisoners they were working with, which served to undermine joint working.

At one of the privately managed prisons, managers had assigned members of the dedicated search team (DST) to carry out keywork for terrorist prisoners. While this had led to frequent contact, some of the prisoners told us they would not engage with these officers because they were part of the security department and thought they were only interested in gathering intelligence as opposed to helping them.

Keywork was much better at Manchester, where the CT officers had been allocated this role. These staff set meaningful targets for prisoners before the next session linked to sentence plans. The CT office was adjacent to the OMU and keyworkers had regular contact with the POM who managed all the terrorist cases.

6.2 National Security Division and Counter Terrorism Nominal Management

Pre-release work completed by NSD COMs was strong. All cases were transferred from POM to COM in a timely manner prior to release, and there was evidence of adequate communication and information sharing between the prison OMU and the COM to support decision-making and risk management of the case in the community. Overall, there was sufficient pre-release planning in all cases subject to prison release, 23 in total. This included evidence of joint prison visits between police and probation, as well as early contact by approved premises keyworkers and liaison with family members in the lead up to release. We saw evidence of DDP interventions being delivered before release, with follow-up in the community after release. All of these actions resulted in a strong foundation for management within the community.

Requirements of the sentence started promptly in the majority of cases. The type and nature of contact with the person on probation were correct to support desistance and disengagement in most cases. This contact with both their practitioner and other agencies supported strong working relationships. Stringent national standards were applied to this cohort, and we considered that the level of contact was both necessary and proportionate in all but one case.

Initial assessments were strong in analysing the individual's motivation and readiness to engage and comply with their sentence in all cases inspected. We saw several examples of how the person on probation had been actively involved in the assessment process, which improved overall engagement with the sentence. With the exception of one case, all

relevant diversity and personal circumstances were taken into consideration during the initial assessment. It was encouraging to see that identifiable strengths and protective factors were always considered as part of the assessment process.

Sentence planning sufficiently focused on addressing those factors linked to offending in 88 per cent of cases (29 out of 33). Where we felt those factors had not been addressed sufficiently, it related to identifying suitable interventions, particularly where the person on probation presented with complex issues and where there were multiple offending risks, including sexual harm and domestic violence.

There was an emphasis on ensuring that constructive interventions were delivered in the majority of cases, and in most cases, 31 out of 33, the individual was actively involved in the planning process, and their views were taken into account. We found overall planning was sufficiently focused in respect of both engaging the person on probation and reducing reoffending and promoting desistance and disengagement in the vast majority of cases.

We saw the provision of an allocated psychological resource within the NSD as a positive enhancement to case management and almost two-thirds of all cases inspected had a case formulation by a psychologist to inform the interventions and way of working with the person on probation. We heard from partners about how the input from psychologists, as well as from polygraph examiners, in MAPPA meetings and as part of core groups all aided the robust management of cases.

The most frequent factors identified to promote desistance and disengagement were linked to the person on probation's family and relationships, lifestyle, thinking and behaviour and attitudes. Key individuals in the person on probation's life were also engaged as part of the supervision process to support both desistance and disengagement in the majority of cases. This included family members, although practitioners indicated that they lacked access to structured family interventions, and they would have liked more support in working constructively with families to help achieve sustainable change for the longer term.

We saw evidence of diversity needs and personal circumstances being taken into consideration when planning interventions. There was evidence of practitioners working hard to ensure that individuals had access to the right services to support their needs, where possible on a local basis. This included considering religious needs and ensuring supervision was supportive of individuals to practise their faith. Mental health, neurodivergent and gender diversity needs were well considered and working practices adapted to proactively meet individual need.

Delivery of practical and theological interventions was provided primarily through DDP. We were encouraged by the positive work we saw completed through this programme. Practitioners identified access to these resources as a benefit in working with their cases, although the impact of the interventions delivered through the programme itself has not been verified. Practitioners were empowered to work with PCT team colleagues to ensure that individuals had access to the right DDP provision at the right time, and this included examples of best practice in carefully ensuring that individuals were paired with the most appropriate intervention provider to meet their needs. We did not see any obvious delay in interventions being provided. HMICFRS found that police views on interventions to support desistance and disengagement were sought and provided in a collaborative way to manage cases.

Most terrorist convicted cases had completed HII or had it as part of their current sentence plan. Recent interim evaluation studies²⁰ of HII have indicated that the programme does

²⁰ [Healthy Identity Intervention: findings from an interim outcome evaluation - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/research-data-and-analysis/publications/healthy-identity-intervention-findings-from-an-interim-outcome-evaluation)

appear to address some of the psychosocial factors that impact on engagement and involvement in an extremist group, cause or ideology. Findings point to HII supporting individuals to make positive changes that may contribute to their desistance and disengagement from extremism, and the use of HII was seen positively in terms of supporting change.

On a practical level, there were very low numbers of cases referred for support by commissioned rehabilitation services (three people referred into education, training and employment (ETE) provision and a further four referred for accommodation support, out of 33 in total), although practitioners often identified both ETE and accommodation as a rehabilitative need. In some instances, mentors, via DDP, supported the person on probation to access ETE, although we also saw examples where disclosure of a conviction for terrorism led to withdrawal of employment offers and college places. This is counter-productive to longer term rehabilitative goals, with many assessments identifying employment and education as protective factors.

We saw examples of local services being engaged to support and sustain the person on probation in just under half of the cases inspected, often facilitated through the working relationships built within MAPPAs and core group activities. We saw evidence of positive progress in the cases engaged within local services, for instance via community hub facilities, and considered this a positive model for future development, although this depends on availability of resources on a local basis.

Unmet needs were identified in a third of cases. These related to unmet mental health needs, inadequate access to neurodivergence specialisms, and barriers to accessing ETE and housing. These acted as a barrier to change; however, we did see improvements in terms of individuals building strengths and addressing needs in 23 out of 33 cases. Early outcomes demonstrated that reasonable progress had been achieved in two-thirds of all cases. This included an increase of seven cases in settled independent accommodation at the point of inspection, in comparison to at the point of release (where there were only two), and the number of those in ETE rising to nine individuals at the point of inspection (in comparison to only four individuals at the start of their sentence). We also saw assessed improvements against all factors linked to desistance and disengagement.

Although we saw a number of cases with ongoing unmet needs at the point of inspection, practitioners overall felt they had access to the right interventions and an appropriate range of services, in the cases we inspected. Information from MAPPAs and core meetings, as well as from other agencies, informed most of the reviews completed. Compliance and engagement were also sufficiently considered, and individuals actively involved in the review process, in most cases.

All staff have completed 'sincerity of change' training, delivered by a senior forensic psychologist within the high secure estate, and are aware of the potential for false compliance. The training is embedded in practice and forms part of case discussions. The co-chairing of MAPPAs meetings, between police and HoNSUs, as well as the additional perspectives brought to the table by both the psychologists and polygraph examiners attached to the NSD, help to assess sincerity. Desistance and disengagement activities were tailored to the individual and given careful consideration within multi-agency forums, where safeguards and appropriateness could be fully explored.

6.3 Conclusions and implications

As part of the Pathfinder process, there was a swift assessment of terrorist offending related behaviour and mindset early in prisoners' sentences. Interventions were generally offered swiftly. However, structured risk assessments, namely ERG and the Pathfinder Guidance

Framework, were not routinely incorporated into OASys assessments within custody, with POMs indicating they often did not have access to these. This is not acceptable, as it directly impacts on the ability to assess a case and the intervention needs, taking all behaviour into account. The level of contact between POMs and keyworkers was generally infrequent and often cursory. Keywork was best when delivered by specialist CT officers.

The pre-release work completed between COMs and POMs, however, was of a high standard. There was contact between the prisoner and their COM, as well as with CTNM police and approved premises staff before release. This was often face-to-face and fundamental in building the working relationship. All elements of sentence management in the community were delivered to a high standard. There was evidence of diversity needs and personal circumstances being taken into consideration, and supervision was responsive to changing needs. Interventions were mostly delivered in a timely way. While we did see some improvements in relation to accommodation and ETE status, these remained a barrier for many in their resettlement.

We saw evidence of DDP and HII being delivered to support personal change. CTNM was routinely involved in decision-making around the suitability of interventions and worked collaboratively with probation practitioners to promote desistance and disengagement.

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Annexe 1: Glossary

CHiP	Chaplaincy intervention provider – specially trained chaplains who work across prison establishments to deliver theological interventions
CT	Counter terrorism
CT ARC	Counter Terrorism Assessment and Rehabilitation Centre – set up as part of CT Step Up programme to allow expert psychologists to research, implement and evaluate rehabilitative interventions, to help draw offenders away from extremism and empower them to lead more fulfilling lives
CTNM	Counter Terrorism Nominal Management – police process of protecting the public from individuals who have been involved in or engaged with terrorism, aiming to support them to disengage from terrorist activity
CTPHQ	Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters sits at the centre of the CTPN and devises policy and strategy, and coordinates national projects to provide a single national CT Policing voice for key stakeholders
CTPIO	Counter Terrorism Prison Intelligence Officer – CT policing
CTPN	Counter Terrorism Policing Network – a specialist network of police teams within the UK responsible for the management of counter-terrorism risk and investigation of offences
CTU	Counter terrorism units form part of the CTPN – there are nine regional CTUs within England and Wales
CTiU	Counter terrorism (intelligence) units are responsible for managing intelligence within each CTU
CT Step Up programme	A raft of reforms to overhaul key areas such as joint working, rehabilitation and training across agencies managing CT risk
DDP	Desistance and Disengagement Programme – Home Office run programme which has four strands of intervention (theological intervention, practical mentoring, psychology and financial grants) for the purposes of supporting resettlement and rehabilitation
ETE	Education, training and employment: work to improve an individual's learning, and to increase their employment prospects
Extremism	The vocal or active opposition to fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs
HII	Healthy Identity Interventions – an intervention designed for those who have committed terrorist offences. It supports desistance and disengagement from extremism. It encourages stronger positive and pro-social aspects of

	identity. It helps individuals develop resilience and supports them to identify ways of meeting their identity needs
HMICFRS	His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services exists to promote improvement in policing and fire and rescue services to make everyone safer. It has a statutory responsibility for the inspection of police forces of England and Wales, and, since 2017, the fire and rescue services of England
HMPPS	HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS): the single agency responsible for both prisons and probation services. See note below on NOMS
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System is an information and technology system used by UK police forces for the investigation of major incidents
HoNSU	Head of National Security Unit – assistant chief officer grade manager, who leads the NSD delivery unit
JCTPPH	The Joint Counter Terrorism, Prison and Probation Hub. Brings together HMPPS, the Security Service, and Counter-Terrorism Policing Network into one co-located tri-agency unit, improving the assessment of threat in both prisons and community. It aims to coordinate efficient intelligence sharing that enables more effective management of national security risk
JExU	JExU is the strategic centre for counter-terrorism work in prisons and probation. It was formed in 2017 as a partnership between the Home Office, Homeland Security Group and HMPPS
LRO	Lead responsible officer – detective chief inspector rank responsible as strategic lead for CTNM
MAPPA	Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements – where probation, police, prison and other agencies work together locally to manage offenders who pose a higher risk of harm to others. Level 1 is ordinary agency management, where the risks posed by the offender can be managed by the agency responsible for the supervision or case management of the offender. Level 2 and 3 require active multi-agency management
MAPPS	Multi-agency Public Protection System – an IT solution commissioned by the Home Office to replace ViSOR. It is currently in development and there is no date for introduction
NCIA	National Common Intelligence Application – a national database and software application used by CTPN
NDelius	National Delius: the approved case management system used by the Probation Service in England and Wales
NSD	National Security Division – a division formed in 2020 within the Probation Service that manages convicted terrorist, terrorist connected, terrorist risk offenders, critical public

	protection cases and serious organised crime offenders, delivered via National Security Units
NSN	National Secure Network – national platform used by CTPN to store sensitive information
OMiC	Offender Management in Custody – a model that has been rolled out in all adult prisons, which entails prison officers undertaking keyword sessions with prisoners (implemented during 2018/2019) and case management, which established the role of the prison offender manager from 01 October 2019
PCT teams	Probation counter terrorism teams – a JExU resource that provides operational support and guidance to probation, partner agencies and prison, immigration removal centres and youth custody service sites within a defined region
PNN	Police National Network – allows forces to be able to communicate by email in a secure manner, and also hosts other applications
POM	Prison offender manager – see OMiC
NOMS	National Offender Management Service – until April 2017, the single agency responsible for both prisons and probation services, now known as HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS)
OASys	Offender assessment system currently used in England and Wales by the Probation Service to measure the risks and needs of offenders under supervision
Partners	Partners include statutory and non-statutory organisations that work with the participant/offender through a partnership agreement with the Probation Service, prisons or the police
PPL	Prison Prevent lead – A JExU resource that provides operational support within establishments to engage with identified offenders, and contribute to Pathfinder/MAPPA
RCTL	Regional counter terrorism lead – a JExU resource that provides operational support and guidance to partner agencies and prison managers in both public and contracted prisons, immigration removal centres and youth custody service sites within a defined region
RTOAF	Registered Terrorism Offender Assessment Framework
SMB	Strategic Management Board associated with MAPPA – responsible for managing MAPPA activities in its area, including quality and effectiveness
TACT	Abbreviation of the <i>Terrorism Act 2000</i> and <i>Terrorism Act 2006</i>
Terrorism	Terrorism is an action or threat designed to influence the government or intimidate the public. Its purpose is to advance a political, religious or ideological cause. The current UK definition of terrorism is given in the <i>Terrorism Act 2000</i>

Terrorist	When an offender has been convicted of a specified terrorist offence, as set out in Part 1 of Schedule 19ZA of the <i>Criminal Justice Act 2003</i>
Terrorist-connected	An offender who has not committed terrorist offences (that is, those listed in Part 1 of the Schedule) but who has committed other specified offences that the court has determined have a terrorist connection
Terrorist risk	Offender not charged with or convicted of terrorist or terrorist-connected offences, but who is identified by HMPPS or other agencies as presenting a terrorist risk
Triage	The process by which a decision is made about whether an offender will be supervised by the NSD or the Probation Service
ViSOR	Violent and Sex Offender Register – a shared national IT application that provides a national database for police, probation and prisons to jointly register, risk assess and manage sex offenders and dangerous violent offenders
YOS	Youth offending services

Annexe 2: Methodology

The fieldwork inspections, and a week of national meetings, were completed during the period January to March 2023. This included inspections across all five national security units (probation), nine counter terrorism units (police) and six custodial establishments (prison). Meetings with HMPPS and JExU national operational and policy leads, as well as CT Policing, were completed at the end of the fieldwork. Information in advance was submitted by both national and regional teams.

HM Inspectorate of Probation and HMICFRS inspected a total of 33 cases, approximately seven cases per NSD unit, and interviewed police and probation practitioners. The cases consisted of people on probation subject to NSD supervision as part of post-custody licence, as well as those subject to community orders or suspended sentence orders who had been convicted of terrorist offences, or who had been identified as posing a significant terrorist risk. All cases began supervision during the period 01 April 2021 to 01 July 2022, and we were able to speak directly with five people on probation who were subject to supervision by the NSD. We also reviewed 10 triage cases to assess the suitability of this process. HM Inspectorate of Prisons carried 48 case file reviews of prisoners (46 convicted of terrorist offences). They spoke with 34 of the prisoners, who were serving sentences from two years to life – 10 were in the final 12 months of their sentence. Where possible, HM Inspectorate of Prisons also spoke to the POM in each case.

In addition:

HM Inspectorate of Probation spoke with:

- heads of national security units (HoNSUs)
- senior operational leads (SOLs)
- probation practitioners
- key stakeholders
- heads of public protection (HoPPs)
- regional probation counter terrorism teams (PCTTs – part of JExU)
- administrators (including MAPPA administrators and business managers).

HM Inspectorate of Prisons spoke with:

- prison offender managers
- key stakeholders
- governors
- prison directors
- partner agencies.

HMICFRS spoke with:

- lead responsible officer – detective chief inspector – strategic lead
- nominal management lead – detective inspector – operational lead
- nominal management supervisor – detective/police sergeant – team leader
- nominal manager – detective/police constable – nominal manager
- nominal management support – police staff – office support

National meetings were held with:

- deputy director of the NSD
- deputy director of the Security, Order and Counter Terrorism Directorate
- MAPPA lead (public protection group)
- JExU national operations and assurance team
- Desistance and Disengagement Programme
- JExU learning and development team
- approved premises national lead
- JExU head of operational delivery
- JExU policy team
- head of JExU
- NSD polygraph examiners
- NSD psychologist team, including CT psychology head of service and lead psychologist
- head of Joint CT Prison and Probation Hub (JCTPPH)
- senior national coordinator (CT Policing)
- CTNM national lead

Fieldwork in the community was undertaken by HM Inspectorate of Probation and HMICFRS as detailed below:

NSD region	CTU
Wales and South West	CTP Wales; CTP South West
North	CTP North West; CTP North East
East and South Central	CTP East; CTP South East
Midlands	CTP West Midlands; CTP East Midlands
London	Metropolitan Police – SO15.

HM Inspectorate of Prisons visited the following establishments:

Date	Prison
w/c 09/01/2023	HMP Belmarsh and HMP Wandsworth
w/c 23/01/2023	HMP Dovegate and HMP Lowdham Grange
w/c 30/01/2023	HMP Manchester and HMP Full Sutton

Annexe 3: Data tables

MAPPA

C 2 Was the MAPPA level determined in a timely way, relevant to the earliest possible date of release?	#	%
Yes	23	100%
No	0	0%
Not applicable	0	-

C 3 If the decision was made to refer to Level 2/3, was a timely meeting held, prior to release?	#	%
Yes	22	96%
No	1	4%

C 4 Did prison provide information to MAPPA meetings?	#	%
Yes, mainly in person	22	100%
Yes, mainly written information	0	0%
No	0	0%
Not applicable	1	-

C 5 Did JExU provide information to MAPPA meetings?	#	%
Yes, mainly in person	23	100%
Yes, mainly written information	0	0%
No	0	0%
Not applicable	0	-

C 6 Did police provide information to MAPPA meetings?	#	%
Yes, mainly in person	23	100%
Yes, mainly written information	0	0%
No	0	0%
Not applicable	0	-

D 17 Has the person on probation been informed of their MAPPA status?	#	%
Yes	29	94%
No	1	3%
No, but reasons why were provided	1	3%

D 18 What was the highest level of MAPPA management during this period?	#	%
Level 1	0	0%
Level 2	2	6%
Level 3	29	94%

D 19 In the view of the inspector, was the decision correct?	#	%
Yes	29	97%
No	1	3%

D 20 Has the MAPPA level changed during this period?	#	%
Yes, increased	0	0%
Yes, reduced	4	13%
No	27	87%

D 21 Is the rationale for change in level evidenced and recorded?	#	%
Yes, comprehensively	4	100%
Yes, partially	0	0%
No	0	0%

D 24 For Level 2 and 3 cases, is the person on probation given opportunities to contribute to MAPPA meetings (through the practitioner) and updated after MAPP meetings?	#	%
Yes, always	2	7%
Yes, mostly	25	86%
Rarely	0	0%
No	0	0%
Unclear	2	7%

R 2 Is reviewing informed by information from all relevant agencies, including core and MAPP meetings?	#	%
Yes	31	94%
No	2	6%

Keeping people safe

A 8 Does assessment draw sufficiently on all available sources of information?	#	%
Yes	31	94%
No	2	6%

A 9 Does assessment of risk of harm take into account past behaviour and convictions?	#	%
Yes	33	100%
No	0	0%

A 10 Are there current concerns about person on probation being a perpetrator of domestic abuse?	#	%
Yes	11	33%
No	22	67%
Not clear	0	0%

A 11 Were domestic abuse checks undertaken?	#	%
Yes, by the probation practitioner	20	61%
No, and should have been	7	21%
Checks made at court/report stage were sufficient	6	18%

A 12 Are there any current child safeguarding or child protection concerns in relation to this case?	#	%
Yes	22	67%
No	11	33%
Not clear	0	0%

A 13 Did child safeguarding information sharing take place?	#	%
Yes	26	100%
No	0	0%
Not clear	0	0%
Not required	7	-

A 14 Are there any current adult safeguarding concerns in relation to this case?	#	%
Yes	9	27%
No	24	73%

A 15 Did adult safeguarding information sharing take place?	#	%
Yes	8	73%
No	3	27%
Not clear	0	0%
Not required	22	-

A 16 Does assessment sufficiently consider victim specific concerns or risks?	#	%
Yes	28	100%
No	0	0%
Not required	5	-

A3S Does assessment focus sufficiently on keeping people safe?	#	%
Yes	28	85%
No	5	15%

D 27 In your view did the implementation and delivery of services balance risk management with the rehabilitative needs of the person on probation, taking a protected integration approach?	#	%
Yes	28	85%
No	5	15%

D 28 In your view, did NSD supervision enhance the management of risk of harm and protection of the public?	#	%
Yes	28	85%
No	5	15%

D3S Does implementation and delivery focus sufficiently on keeping people safe?	#	%
Yes	29	88%
No	4	12%
D 16 Are home visits undertaken where necessary to support the effective management of risk of harm?	#	%
Yes	32	97%
No	1	3%
D 13 Were enforcement actions taken when appropriate?	#	%
Yes	22	88%
No, and should have been	3	12%
No enforcement action required	8	-
D 14a Where recall/breach action is taken, is the rationale for these decisions clearly recorded and breach/recall reports sufficiently detailed and analysed?	#	%
Yes	16	100%
No	0	0%
D 14b Are sufficient efforts made to re-engage the person on probation after breach or recall?	#	%
Yes	16	100%
No	0	0%
P 2 Does planning sufficiently address factors relating to risk of harm and prioritise those which are most critical?	#	%
Yes	28	85%
No	5	15%
P 7 Does planning set out the necessary restrictive measures to manage the risk of harm?	#	%
Yes	32	97%
No	1	3%
P 9 Does planning make appropriate links to the work of other agencies involved with the person on probation?	#	%
Yes	32	97%
No	1	3%

P 10 Does planning consider the value of approved premises placement in this case?	#	%
Yes	27	100%
No	0	0%
Not applicable	0	-

P 11 Does planning set out effective contingency arrangements to manage the identified risks?	#	%
Yes	32	97%
No	1	3%

P 12 Does planning sufficiently consider victim specific concerns or risks?	#	%
Yes	27	93%
No	2	7%
Not applicable	4	-

P1S Does the planning focus sufficiently on engaging the person on probation?	#	%
Yes	31	94%
No	2	6%

P3S Does planning focus sufficiently on keeping people safe?	#	%
Yes	31	94%
No	2	6%

Promoting desistance and disengagement

C 7 Was the case transferred from POM to COM in a timely manner?	#	%
Yes	23	100%
No	0	0%

C 8 Was there adequate communication and information sharing between the prison OMU and COM to support decision making and management of the case in the community?	#	%
Yes	23	100%
No	0	0%

A 1 Does assessment analyse the motivation and readiness of the person on probation to engage and comply with the sentence?	#	%
Yes	33	100%
No	0	0%

A 2 Does assessment take sufficient account of how the person on probation's diversity may impact on their ability to engage and comply?	#	%
Yes	30	97%
No	1	3%
The record is clear there are no relevant factors	2	-

A 3 Does assessment take sufficient account of how the person on probation's personal circumstances may impact on their ability to engage and comply?	#	%
Yes	32	100%
No	0	0%
The record is clear there are no relevant factors	1	-

A 6 Does assessment appropriately identify relevant strengths and protective factors?	#	%
Yes	29	100%
No	0	0%
No strength or protective factors	4	-

D 1 Do all requirements of the sentence start promptly?	#	%
Yes	31	94%
No	2	6%

D 6 Is the level and nature of contact sufficient to support desistance and disengagement?	#	%
Yes	31	94%
No	2	6%

D 8 In your view was the level of contact necessary and proportionate to manage risk of harm?	#	%
Yes	31	97%
No	1	3%

D 11 Were there any identified unmet needs in this case that impacted on desistance and disengagement?	#	%
Yes	11	33%
No	22	67%

D 15 Are key individuals in the person on probations life engaged where appropriate to support their desistance and disengagement (including family members)?	#	%
Yes	27	93%
No	2	7%
Not applicable	4	-

P 1 Does planning sufficiently address factors relating to offending and prioritise those which are most critical?	#	%
Yes	29	88%
No	4	12%

P 3 Does planning focus sufficiently on constructive interventions?	#	%
Yes	30	91%
No	3	9%

P 4 Is the person on probation meaningfully involved in planning, and their views taken into account?	#	%
Yes	31	94%
No	2	6%

P2S Does the planning focus sufficiently on reducing reoffending and supporting desistance and disengagement?	#	%
Yes	30	91%
No	3	9%

R 9 Are local services engaged to support and sustain desistance and disengagement during the sentence and beyond?	#	%
Yes	16	73%
No	6	27%
Not applicable	11	-

O 2 Have there been improvements in those factors most closely linked to offending, both in developing strengths and addressing needs?	#	%
Yes, fully	5	15%
Yes, mostly	18	55%
No, not enough	6	18%
No, not at all	3	9%
Unclear	1	3%

O 6 What was the individuals' accommodation status at the start of the order/licence?	#	%
Settled, independent	2	6%
Settled, with friends/family	8	24%
Settled, hostel/supported accommodation	0	0%
Transient, with friends/family	1	3%
Transient, hostel/supported accommodation	0	0%
Approved Premises	16	48%
Homeless	5	15%
Unknown or unclear	1	3%

O 7 What was the individuals' accommodation status at the point of inspection?	#	%
Settled, independent	9	27%
Settled, with friends/family	6	18%
Settled, hostel/supported accommodation	2	6%
Transient, with friends/family	1	3%
Transient, hostel/supported accommodation	0	0%
Approved Premises	3	9%
Homeless	1	3%
In custody	10	30%
Unknown or unclear	1	3%

O 8 What was the individuals' ETE status at the start of the order/licence?	#	%
Full-time employed or self-employed	2	6%
Part-time employed or self-employed	0	0%
Full-time education or training	2	6%
Part-time education or training	0	0%
Unemployed	24	73%
Unknown or unclear	0	0%
Not available for work	5	15%

O 9 What was the individuals' ETE status at the point of inspection?	#	%
Full-time employed or self-employed	3	9%
Part-time employed or self-employed	3	9%
Full-time education or training	2	6%
Part-time education or training	1	3%
Unemployed	14	42%
Unknown or unclear	1	3%
Not available for work	9	27%