



Report on an inspection of

Separation Centres

by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

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Introduction

The Separation Centre model was introduced in 2017 as one part of the government's response to a review into the management of extremism within the prison estate. The aim was to prevent prisoners with extreme views from radicalising their fellow inmates, presenting a risk to national security, supporting acts of terrorism or disrupting the good order or discipline of the prison. The centres were designed to be used for prisoners from any political or religious viewpoint, but so far, they have only been used for Muslim men.

There were nine men in total across the separation centres at Frankland in county Durham and Woodhill in Buckinghamshire when we inspected in April 2022. A third centre at HMP Full Sutton remained closed for the time being.

There were thorough processes for assessing which prisoners should be sent to the centres and meetings every three months considered each man's continued risks and the need for ongoing placement or evidence to support de-selection. The recently published report by Jonathan Hall QC suggested that there are more men currently in prison who may have been better placed in the separation centres, so it is likely that numbers will increase and Full Sutton's centre will reopen.

The centres inspected were very different environments which reflected the architecture of the prisons in which they were located. Woodhill was the brighter of the units with two stories of cells opening out on to a wide atrium. On the first floor a small gym meant that prisoners could exercise during the day, and downstairs there was a kitchen and separate room used for health care and other appointments.

The unit in Frankland was on a narrow corridor. There was a small room for association and an area for prisoners to cook and prepare food. With no facilities on the wing, staff had arranged for prisoners to visit the main prison gym and they could also be taken off the unit for education, but no prisoner was taking up this offer at the time of the inspection.

The serious staffing situation on which we commented in our 2022 independent review of progress of Woodhill also affected the separation centre. The day-to-day regime was often curtailed and the aims of the unit were potentially undermined by not having a consistent staff group to build relationships with prisoners and develop their own confidence and expertise working within a specialist unit. Despite this, some officers had built a good day-to-day rapport with prisoners and relationships were generally positive.

At the better-staffed centre in Frankland, prisoners had collectively decided not to engage with the regime meaning officers were often underemployed.

The decision by staff and leaders in both jails to describe the centres as "just another wing" meant that opportunities were missed to think more creatively about how to work with prisoners. At Frankland, the planned return to a post-COVID-19 regime would mean that those prisoners who refused to engage in formal education, training or work would be let out of their cells for less than two

hours a day during the working week. It is understandable that leaders want to treat prisoners fairly across the prison, but the separation centre has a specific purpose, and if prisoners are locked up for almost all of the day, staff will not be able to engage with them and could miss the chance to support those who wish to change their behaviour.

In both prisons, men were given the opportunity to complete the two deradicalisation programmes on offer, but given their well-established religious and political beliefs and the potential peer pressure from their fellows, this was too big a step for most prisoners. In some cases, better progress might have been achieved if staff, including officers, concentrated on building relationships with the men with the aim of encouraging and motivating them to at least take the first steps. This could lead to better engagement and in some cases a willingness to participate in the more formal interventions.

Overall, both centres were well-maintained, and prisoners lived in safe, reasonable conditions. They had good access to health care, including mental health services, as well as visits and phone calls.

The central team and prison leaders need to be clear about the psychological and philosophical expectations of the centres and make sure that all staff fully understand and deliver their specialist role. The challenge for the centres is to fulfil their aim in protecting others from harm while providing clear progression pathways for men to follow. For those who fully engage and show progression, carefully organised and supervised opportunities to have some limited contact with mainstream prisoners and staff would be a way of testing whether further reintegration is possible and safe.

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What needs to improve in the separation centres

During this inspection we identified eight key concerns, of which four should be treated as priorities. Priority concerns are those that are most important to improving outcomes for prisoners. They require immediate attention by leaders and managers.

Leaders should make sure that all concerns identified here are addressed and that progress is tracked through a plan which sets out how and when the concerns will be resolved. The plan should be provided to HMI Prisons.

Priority concerns

1. **Governors and the separation centre management committee did not have a jointly agreed strategy and action plan, setting out the centres' specific function that could be understood and acted on by staff.**
2. **Not all staff we spoke to were sure about how their work could promote progression and lacked an awareness of how best to deliver a more enabling and psychologically informed approach to changing prisoner's behaviour.**
3. **Almost all prisoners refused to take part in purposeful activity, complete offending behaviour work or engage with others such as Imams and psychologists** which meant their day-to-day interactions with staff were very limited.
4. **Staff were often over-optimistic about the level of engagement they could expect from some prisoners – such as participating in an offending behaviour programme aimed at deradicalising their beliefs.** They did not focus on some of the smaller steps that prisoners could take to begin to show progress.

Key concerns

5. **Woodhill was severely short of officers, which meant the regime in the centre was curtailed on an almost daily basis.** Some officers allocated to the centre had no experience of managing such a specialist population.
6. **Prison offender managers carried very high caseloads which** prevented them from developing their specialism or building meaningful working relationships with those in the centres.
7. **The management of intelligence, including monitoring telephone calls, was poorly resourced at Woodhill.** This had led to a significant backlog, including many calls made in languages other than English not being analysed promptly.

8. **Men who showed a willingness to participate in risk reduction work could not have their commitment tested through gradual and well-planned contact with mainstream populations.**

About separation centres

Context and aims

The creation of the separation centre was one part of the government's response to a review in 2016 into the management of extremism within the prison estate, and supplemented existing arrangements for managing extremism. Three centres were set up within Frankland, Woodhill and Full Sutton high security prisons, providing a total of 28 places.

Prisoners are held in a separation centre in accordance with Prison Service instruction 05-2017 and prison rule 46A (see Glossary of terms). The overall aim of the centres is to separate and control those who present a risk that cannot be managed in a mainstream location. Men are held separately from the wider prison population, reducing the opportunity for them to present a risk to national security, support acts of terrorism or disrupt the good order or discipline of the prison. The smaller size of the centres and higher levels of staffing provide a more supervised protective environment to counter some of the risks that exist in a less restricted environment. Delivering an individually tailored regime may also support the management of prisoners towards reducing the risks that led to their selection.

The Operating Manual sets out five reasons for selection:

- Prevent and disrupt terrorist activity by separating those who present a significant threat to national security by actively seeking while in custody to build their capabilities or perpetrate terrorist acts.
- Safeguard the mainstream prisoner population from being encouraged or induced to commit terrorist acts.
- Separate and disrupt prisoners who may be attempting to radicalise others, influence peers to adopt identities in prison that challenge the UK's fundamental values, and/or use criminal dominance to enforce the power of groups who seek to challenge these values.
- Safely manage those prisoners whose actions pose a significant threat to the safety of others and/or the good order or discipline of a prison.
- Provide separated prisoners with the opportunity to reduce their risks through desistance, disengagement and de-radicalisation in the long term.

An announcement was made by the government just as our inspection was concluding, confirming 'a comprehensive and bolstered approach to clamping down on terrorist activity in jails in England and Wales, following the publication of a landmark review carried out by Jonathan Hall QC, the government's independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.' This included strengthening the referral process for those needing to be in separation centres with a projected increase in the number of men placed in them.

Section 1 Summary of key findings

- 1.1 We assess outcomes for prisoners against four healthy prison tests (see Appendix I for more information about the tests). We also include a commentary on leadership in the separation centres (see Section 2). These judgements seek to make an objective assessment of the outcomes experienced by those detained.

Management of the centres

At this inspection we found that outcomes for prisoners were reasonably good.

- 1.2 There were clear, published criteria for the separation of prisoners, which were applied robustly. Prisoners were assessed for ongoing placement in the centres in accordance with the published procedures. A multidisciplinary team challenged decision making and provided accountability. Prisoners had a review every three months. Reviews had become more comprehensive over the previous year, but we were not sure why the format of the weekly reports written by staff at each centre differed so much in style and content. We also found weaknesses in how progress was measured and there was no aggregated analysis of prisoners' needs to inform the development of specific services.
- 1.3 Not enough had been done to implement a common model of clinical and operational delivery across the centres and some staff were unsure about how their work could promote progression. The level of experience among officers varied enormously and the severe lack of officers at Woodhill meant that some allocated to the centre had no experience of working in such an environment. There had been little staff training at Woodhill. Only two officers were receiving regular individual professional development sessions (see Glossary of terms) and annual staff health checks were not being completed regularly. However, group staff supervision took place regularly at both centres and most said they found it helpful.

Progression

At this inspection we found that outcomes for prisoners were not sufficiently good.

- 1.4 The organisational culture and day-to-day working within the centres did not yet offer an enabling or psychologically informed approach and pathways to progression were not sufficiently clear. Most men refused to take part in formal risk reduction work, which made it difficult to identify changes in behaviour. Prisoners told us about their lack of trust in staff, which further impeded their interactions with them.

- 1.5 Care and management plans were in place for each prisoner and were reviewed regularly. The expectation that men should address their offending behaviour by completing a formal intervention aimed at deradicalising their beliefs was proving unrealistic. More realistic and achievable targets were needed to help men take smaller steps towards progression and behaviour change. Men also had sentence plans to address their original offending behaviour, but some were too old to be useful and more achievable targets that recognised the prisoners' refusal to participate were required.
- 1.6 Men had reasonably good access to a psychologist. But some other specialist staff were under pressure. For example, prison offender managers at both sites carried very large caseloads and phone monitoring at Woodhill was poorly resourced, which limited its effectiveness.
- 1.7 Men at both sites limited their own time out of cell (see Glossary of terms) by refusing to take part in paid education, training or work. The regime at Woodhill did not allow men to leave the centre, but those at Frankland were offered regular opportunities to spend time away from the unit for purposeful or recreational activities in sessions arranged separately from the main population. Prisoners at Frankland were able to access the main gym for their sessions, while those at Woodhill were limited to a small gym in the unit. Men had not visited the library at either site since the pandemic had started.
- 1.8 Prisoners at Woodhill could not access classroom education and had declined to complete in-cell packs, although one was undertaking distance learning with the Open University. At Frankland, classroom education had been available for about six months in 2021, but at the time of this inspection all men had chosen to withdraw from it. Prisoners had also refused opportunities at both sites to undertake paid work.
- 1.9 Planning for possible deselection did not provide men with opportunities for gradual reintegration into prison life to test their compliance or progression, for example through attending offending behaviour programmes, the main visits hall or the gym alongside mainstream prisoners.

Safety

At this inspection we found that outcomes for prisoners were good.

- 1.10 Reception procedures were efficient at both sites. Induction was appropriate and all arrivals were offered information to explain separation. Nevertheless, at Woodhill, we were not confident that all prisoners received the full induction.
- 1.11 Safeguarding procedures mirrored those in the main prison. There had been no recorded incidents of self-harm in either centre during the previous year. Separation meant there was no access to Listeners

(prisoners trained by the Samaritans to provide confidential emotional support to fellow prisoners), but men could call the Samaritans' free phone helpline.

- 1.12 Some aspects of physical and procedural security at both sites were inconsistent and disproportionate. For example, at Frankland prisoners were searched when leaving their cell and again before entering or exiting another room a short distance away, despite being under direct supervision throughout. Unlocking protocols at each site were driven by the design of the building and were generally proportionate.
- 1.13 The management of security intelligence at Frankland was impressive, and there was a dedicated unit of skilled staff to analyse reports. At Woodhill it was a concern that there were significantly fewer staff available to manage security intelligence.
- 1.14 There had been one recorded act of violence since the centres opened – a serious assault against a member of staff. The incentives policy matched that in the wider prison, but, with such a small number of men, it might have been better to have a more flexible model tailored to the specialist nature of the centres. No physical force had been used against any of the prisoners in the previous year.

Respect

At this inspection we found that outcomes for prisoners were reasonably good.

- 1.15 Legal rights provision was adequate to meet prisoners' needs.
- 1.16 Access to health care services, including allied health professionals and dentistry was equivalent to what was available in the community. Partnership working between the prison, commissioners and providers was good. Health care leadership was effective at both centres, and leaders participated in, and contributed to, multidisciplinary case reviews. Medicines management arrangements were safe and effective.
- 1.17 Mental health services were available in both centres and there was a weekly drop-in session at Woodhill. The psychiatrist at Woodhill offered prisoners an annual mental health review, but none took up the offer. Substance misuse services were available at both centres.
- 1.18 Staff-prisoner relationships tended to be limited and mainly functional in both centres because of the reluctance of prisoners to participate in progression work or other day-to-day activities. Staff at Woodhill had done well to establish generally positive relationships with prisoners, but the men held at Frankland reported a lack of trust in and disengagement with the officers. They also noted that their small association area was often occupied by staff which limited their opportunity to play pool or watch TV together. These issues and their

belief that the separation system was discriminatory affected their willingness to interact with staff.

- 1.19 Staff training in equality and diversity was limited to what was provided during their initial induction programme. There was an appropriate focus on identifying equality issues in the quarterly reviews for each prisoner, but with so few men, it was not possible to monitor equality data meaningfully to identify themes or trends.
- 1.20 The prisons' Muslim chaplains visited the centres at least three times a week but. Islamic study classes had not resumed. At the time of this inspection, access to Friday prayers was limited by COVID-19 restrictions at both centres and men could not attend regularly.
- 1.21 Living conditions varied between the two centres. The Woodhill centre was large and bright, while at Frankland it was small and cramped, and prisoners said it felt claustrophobic. Facilities at both centres were appropriate and both were very clean and well maintained. Prisoners' religious dietary requirements were met, and they could cater for themselves outside their usual mealtimes.
- 1.22 Consultation arrangements differed at each centre. At Woodhill prisoners had been consulted individually in recent months. At Frankland there was no unit-based consultation.

Section 2 Leadership

National and local leaders provide the direction, encouragement and resources to enable good outcomes for prisoners. (For definition of leaders, see Glossary of terms.)

- 2.1 Good leadership helps to drive improvement and should result in better outcomes for prisoners. This narrative is based on our assessment of the quality of leadership with evidence drawn from sources including the self-assessment report, discussions with stakeholders, and observations made during the inspection. It does not result in a score.
- 2.2 The centres were opened in 2017 as one part of a wider response to tackling extremism, and national leaders worked in partnership with departments across government to deliver the aims of separation. A government announcement, just as our inspection was concluding, set out plans to extend the use of separation. To date, there had been little evaluation of the effectiveness of separation.
- 2.3 There was no formal strategy or action plan to set out the longer-term vision or ambition for the centres to support local governors in developing their approach and provision. Senior leaders and staff at both prisons described the units as ‘just another wing’ and did not recognise fully the specialist function of this work. Few officers highlighted the importance of progression and reintegration in the work they were doing.
- 2.4 Leaders had not yet implemented a clear progression pathway. A new clinical delivery model had been drafted but was a very long way off from being implemented in day-to-day practice at either centre.
- 2.5 Opportunities had been missed to develop and deliver more tailored ways of working with prisoners so that their specific risks and needs could be addressed. For example, a more individual model for promoting good behaviour could have been introduced. The prisoners we spoke to said the current model did not provide them with incentives.
- 2.6 Leaders made sure that the regime was delivered reliably at Frankland, but at Woodhill, staff shortages continued to lead to regular closures, which limited the amount of time staff had to interact with prisoners and develop meaningful relationships.
- 2.7 There were some weaknesses in the allocation of resources. For example, leaders had not maximised the role of psychologists or prison offender managers at either site, and they only spent a limited amount of time in the centres.
- 2.8 The separation centre management committee (SCMC) was well established, and leaders had developed strong working partnerships with a range of key stakeholders, including the joint extremism unit at

the Home Office, government legal department advisors and, when planning for a release, the national security division. Joint working meant specialist guidance was available and lessons learned could be shared, while providing robust oversight of the selection, review and deselection processes. Leaders had secured funding to expand the membership of the SCMC to include positions such as a mental health nurse and a chaplain. The Probation Service had started to offer input a few months before the inspection, which was an important addition. Good information sharing had been promoted through the appointment of an analyst, who provided quality assurance for referral documentation.

- 2.9 Collaboration and partnership working were strong and a review by the Ministry of Justice had informed developments in policy and operational guidance, which were due to be published after our inspection.
- 2.10 Senior leaders welcomed external scrutiny, including visits from the International Commission for the Red Cross and our attendance at SCMC meetings over the previous two years. Independent scrutiny provided by the Independent Monitoring Board was limited at both centres.

Section 3 Management of the centres

The risks and needs of prisoners are thoroughly assessed, managed and monitored. Deselection takes place when appropriate and safe.

- 3.1 Since 2017, a total of 15 individuals had been held in the centres and at the time of our inspection there were nine men across two units. There were clear, published criteria for the separation of prisoners, which were applied robustly through the monthly separation centre management committee (SCMC) meetings, which shared evidence and made decisions. There was also input from various departments and agencies, including the Home Office and government legal advisors. An Independent Monitoring Board representative provided oversight at these meetings. An advisory board had been re-established following the relaxing of COVID-19 restrictions – membership was good and its work was beginning to provide independent opinions, advice and guidance on effective practice within the centres.
- 3.2 The assessment period was delivered as set out in the 2017 operating manual and, when necessary, more time was allowed to enable the prisoner to seek legal representation. The assessment phase included identifying relevant risk factors linked to the original reasons for separation and any necessary risk reduction work. All men we spoke to agreed that the processes had been followed correctly.
- 3.3 Each prisoner had a review every quarter to assess the need for continued separation. Reviews were managed well and written reports had become more comprehensive over the previous year, focusing on identifying individual needs. But more needed to be done to determine how to measure progress that could inform steps towards possible deselection from the centre.
- 3.4 Both centres completed weekly reports on the prisoners, which allowed them to discuss any issues with unit staff in a structured way and provide an ongoing record of their attitude, behaviour and progress. We were not sure why the format of the reports differed so much in style and content between the two centres. The reports from Woodhill were useful and informative, but those prepared at Frankland were simply a list of entries from P-Nomis (database used in prisons for the management of offenders), which added little value.
- 3.5 Programmes, such as the Healthy Identity Intervention, were available to address extreme or radicalised beliefs and behaviour. However, there was no aggregated analysis of prisoners' other needs that might have been influencing their offending behaviour or affecting their ability to progress. Offender assessment system (OASys) reports had not been used to provide aggregated evidence of the range of interpersonal or offending-related issues that men might have been experiencing. An analysis of prisoners' needs would have enabled leaders to establish and deliver a wider set of interventions and services to support the men's development.

- 3.6 Separation centres continued to achieve their core aim of protecting others in the main population from harmful behaviour. However, more needed to be done to implement a common model of clinical and operational delivery across the centres to influence the day-to-day management and underpinning ethos, which all staff working there could own and understand. Specialist units require very confident, competent and well-trained staff, yet not all officers we spoke to were sure about how their work could promote progression. The centre at Frankland had been open for the five years and the staff group had become experienced in their role with half saying they had worked there for over four years. The Centre at Woodhill had reopened in July 2020 so the staff group there was less experienced.
- 3.7 The Frankland centre was fully staffed but at Woodhill there was a severe lack of prison officers. The centre had been understaffed for a long time and some officers allocated to the centre, including a few who were on temporary detached duty from other prisons, had no experience of working in such an environment. The daily regime for prisoners was routinely curtailed because of the lack of officers (see paragraph 4.12).
- 3.8 There was a lack of staff training at Woodhill. For example, only five officers had completed the two-week mandatory training programme that covered topics such as working with a specialist population, well-being and resilience. In our survey, 37% of staff at Frankland and 33% at Woodhill said they had additional training needs that had to be addressed to help them become more confident in their role.
- 3.9 Staff support was not delivered consistently. At Woodhill, 56% who responded to our staff survey said adequate attention had been paid to safeguarding their mental health and emotional well-being, compared with 96% at Frankland. At Woodhill, only two officers were receiving regular individual professional development sessions (see Glossary of terms). Annual staff health checks had not been completed regularly. It was positive that both centres regularly delivered group staff supervision, led by a psychologist, and most said they found it helpful.

Section 4 Progression

Prisoners benefit from constructive time out of cell and opportunities to access support to explore their attitudes, thinking and behaviour. There is a clear focus on how prisoners can be deselected from the centre. Prisoners are supported to maintain contact with family and friends.

Individual case management

Expected outcomes: Opportunities to progress from the centre are clearly promoted and prisoners are able, and expected, to engage in them. All prisoners have a robust individual sentence plan which is based on an assessment of their offending-related risks and needs. This is regularly reviewed and implemented to reduce reoffending.

- 4.1 Most prisoners were serving long prison sentences, all presented a high or very high risk of harm to others, and all had been convicted of offences related to terrorism.
- 4.2 Most men refused to take part in the formal risk reduction work offered or to interact in any meaningful way with specialist staff which made it difficult to identify changes in their behaviour. It had proved hard to motivate those serving very long sentences, and the reasons men had been separated in the first place also limited their willingness to participate in the provision. Prisoners told us about their lack of trust in staff, which further impeded their interactions with them. They felt that everything they said or did was observed, recorded, given undue significance or misinterpreted. This not only applied to unit staff but also to psychologists and prison offender managers (see paragraphs 6.15 and 6.18).
- 4.3 Ways of working in the centres did not yet offer an enabling or psychologically informed approach. Pathways to progression, including criteria against which prisoners' progress towards deselection was to be assessed, were not sufficiently clear, but the clinical and operational delivery framework developed recently committed to providing an approach that focused on men's strengths and factors that might reduce their risk of offending and building rapport with them. The development of the model was a positive step forward and set out a coherent vision for promoting behaviour change, but both centres had yet to implement it, although some training had been delivered to staff at Woodhill.
- 4.4 Care and management plans to steer risk reduction work were in place for each prisoner and were reviewed every three months. Most prisoners chose not to get involved in creating or reviewing them and officers were not always familiar with the targets in them. Targets tended to be overly ambitious such as completing an offending behaviour programme aimed at deradicalising their beliefs, which most

men refused to do. Plans needed more realistic and achievable targets to help men take some very small, initial steps towards being willing to undertake the more formal programmes.

- 4.5 A minority of men had participated in their extremism risk guidelines assessment with a psychologist, but some had then refused to continue to take part in interventions once they had read their assessment.
- 4.6 Men could complete the Healthy Identity Intervention (HII) as well as a suite of support from the Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP) (see Glossary of terms), part of the Home Office's Prevent strand (see Glossary of terms), and leaders had worked with programme providers to develop a more flexible delivery model for men in the centres. One prisoner had just started to interact with a specially trained Muslim chaplain provided by the DDP who visited the centre.
- 4.7 Men had reasonably good access to a psychologist but at both sites they had taken on work with mainstream prisoners, which limited the amount of time they had to spend in the centres. This restricted the development of positive relationships that could have promoted better participation over time.
- 4.8 There was one prison offender manager (POM) at each site responsible for the men in each separation centre, but they carried very large caseloads. At best, they had the capacity to spend about one morning a month in the centres, which was not enough to build strong working relationships with the men. Workload pressures also prevented them from routinely attending the monthly separation centre management committee meetings.
- 4.9 Men had sentence plans to address their original offending behaviour, but some were too old to be useful, dating back to 2019. Targets tended to focus on high level and ambitious goals that these men were very unlikely to achieve because of their refusal to participate. The plans lacked realistic and achievable, short-term targets that recognised the prisoners' starting points, such as the fact they were dealing with peer pressure or had difficulties solving problems, building relationships with unit staff or developing supportive family contacts.
- 4.10 Some of the men were subject to child contact restrictions, which were managed appropriately at both sites. However, phone monitoring at Woodhill was poorly resourced and there was a backlog, which meant risks were not identified promptly (see paragraph 5.11). For almost three months, most recordings of calls in languages other than English had not been sent away for translation, and some completed translations had still not been analysed. Monitoring at Frankland was much better resourced and very efficient.

Time out of cell and purposeful activities

Expected outcomes: Prisoners have sufficient time out of cell (see Glossary of terms) and are encouraged to engage in recreational and social activities which support their well-being and promote effective rehabilitation.

- 4.11 The daily regime was different at each site. At Frankland, men had received additional periods of time unlocked under the COVID-19 regime. However, they were about to be removed and prisoners who refused to take up formal education, training or work would get only one hour and 45 minutes out of their cells every day from Monday to Thursday. This included time to exercise, shower, clean their cells, wash clothes, cook and make phone calls. Time out of cell would be better on Fridays (about three hours) and at weekends (about five hours each day). Prisoners who participated in gym sessions or social visits would get extra time unlocked.
- 4.12 The regime was theoretically better at Woodhill – men could have received about five hours a day during the week and six at weekends unlocked, but there were routine curtailments because of staff shortages. When we visited in April, there had been regime cancellations every day that month, with men missing out on either morning or afternoon time out of cell.
- 4.13 Men at both sites could spend an hour in the fresh air every day. Outdoor exercise for those at Woodhill rotated across three different areas. They had used a small, caged yard during much of the pandemic, but had recently been granted access to a larger yard with fixed gym equipment and a garden area just outside the unit. At Frankland, men had a sizeable caged yard with artificial grass, benches and a basketball hoop. Efforts were underway at Frankland to provide some gardening opportunities, and planters had been installed next to the yard.
- 4.14 Prisoners at Frankland had good access to the main prison gym. They had two dedicated 90-minute sessions a week and could use the cardiovascular machines, lift weights and play sports if enough men from the centre attended. Once COVID-19 restrictions ended, physical education instructors (PEIs) would also deliver a class in the centre's exercise yard and provide an education session focusing on diet and nutrition. Facilities at Woodhill were more limited as men could only use a small gym room in the unit for three hour-long sessions a week (see paragraph 5.9). They could not play sport, were not allowed to lift weights and had no input from PEIs.
- 4.15 Men could request library books at both sites, but none had been able to visit the main library at either site since the pandemic started. Weekly access would resume at Frankland once COVID-19 restrictions were lifted, but fortnightly access at Woodhill was not guaranteed because of staff shortages and a reluctance to escort men around the main prison site.

- 4.16 Men at both sites could cook for themselves, which they valued. Board games were available, but snooker and table tennis equipment had not been available for use at either site since the start of the pandemic.

Education, skills and work

- 4.17 All men could take part in part-time education, but delivery differed at each centre. Most men were suited to higher-level learning. At present, none of the men at either prison had chosen to participate in college education.
- 4.18 Men at Woodhill could not participate in classroom education. An outreach tutor from Milton Keynes College visited or phoned them every week. She had tried to involve them in learning using the full range of in-cell packs the college offered or the virtual campus, which had just been installed. Some men had completed in-cell packs during the early stages of the pandemic, but none had chosen to access the college's education provision so far in 2022. One prisoner was undertaking distance learning with the Open University, which he paid for himself, and college managers were helping him to access his course using the virtual campus. College managers planned to introduce secure laptops for distance learning in the centre but had yet to gain final approval.
- 4.19 At Frankland, men had been offered in-cell learning for the first 15 months of the pandemic. Milton Keynes College had then introduced classroom education from June 2021. Three of the five prisoners had participated in these sessions, which had greatly helped to establish trust and constructive working relationships among the men, tutors and separation centre staff. Learning had taken place every other morning for a total of nine hours a week, mostly in the unit classroom but sometimes in a workshop in the main prison. There had been a focus on art to enhance well-being and some work had been submitted to the Koestler Awards (which promotes the arts in criminal justice). However, by the start of 2022 all three men had chosen to withdraw from this. Due to pressures to deliver education across the rest of the prison, the education provision for the separation centre was due to reduce slightly once COVID-19 restrictions were lifted, giving the men six hours of classroom learning a week. Tutors continued to seek the prisoners' re-engagement and the provision would be reviewed if they returned to learning.
- 4.20 Some paid work opportunities were available at both sites, but men were refusing to take part in them. At Frankland men had been offered unit cleaning and for a time had been allocated to a flat pack assembly workshop for one session a week. Men at Woodhill had been offered work cleaning the unit, preparing breakfast packs or developing a garden area.

Children, families and contact with the outside world

Expected outcomes: The centre supports prisoners' contact with their families and friends. Programmes aimed at developing parenting and relationship skills are provided. Prisoners not receiving visits are supported in other ways to establish or maintain family support.

- 4.21 Men had reasonably good access to social visits at both sites. They were able to book two visits a month, which were held separately from the main population of prisoners. At Woodhill, visits took place in a small room in the unit, but at Frankland they used an area away from the unit which was larger and more welcoming.



Frankland visits hall

- 4.22 Prisoners at both sites had been using secure video calls (see Glossary of terms) during the pandemic and reported no problems booking a session.
- 4.23 Men at Frankland had just had access to their first family day since the start of the pandemic, although, as with social visits, it was held separately from the mainstream population. There were no plans for family days at Woodhill. Men could move centres to access accumulated visits (where prisoners are allowed several visits over a few days).
- 4.24 Men at Woodhill benefited from in-cell phones and those at Frankland could use a phone on the unit landing every day. All men we spoke to said they could make calls easily.

Planning for reintegration or release

Expected outcomes: Prisoners are supported when they move to another separation centre, to mainstream prison locations or to secure health facilities. Resettlement support is provided for release into the community.

- 4.25 When staff were planning to return a prisoner to the mainstream population, men could not be reintegrated gradually. Staff could not test men's compliance or progression, for instance by observing their attendance at offending behaviour programmes with mainstream prisoners, their interactions with others in the main visits hall or their use of the gym alongside a small number of men from the main population.
- 4.26 Occasionally, a prisoner was released into the community, either because of parole or where the prisoner had served their determinate sentence. Planning for release was robust at both prisons and appropriately focused on the early involvement of multi-agency public protection arrangements. We saw evidence of good liaison between prison and community offender managers. Prisoners' accommodation, finance or other resettlement needs were addressed on an individual basis.

Section 5 Safety

Prisoners, particularly the most vulnerable, are held safely.

Escorts and early days

Expected outcomes: Separation centre prisoners transferring to, between, and from separation centres are safe, secure and are treated with dignity and respect.

- 5.1 Journeys to the centres were often lengthy because of where they were located. However, arrangements were generally good, and staff from the long-term high secure estate escorted prisoners, which allowed for direct transfers in prison vehicles to the centres. Reception procedures were efficient at both sites.
- 5.2 All new arrivals could have a shower in the centre and refreshments were offered if their arrival was outside mealtimes. The induction was appropriate and all arrivals received tailored information about separation, but we were not confident that the induction programmes were always completed or undertaken promptly enough. For example, at Woodhill none of the prisoner records known as 'induction passports' had been fully completed and we were not convinced that all prisoners had received a full induction.

Safeguarding

Expected outcomes: Prisoners' individual vulnerabilities are identified, they are protected from harm and neglect and receive effective care and support. Prisoners at risk of self-harm or suicide are identified and given timely, appropriate care and support.

Protection of adults at risk of abuse and neglect (see Glossary of terms)

- 5.3 The adult safeguarding policy used in the main prisons was applied to the centres. Staff we spoke to were aware of the need to identify men's vulnerabilities and, with such small numbers, staff were more able to respond to individual needs to protect them from harm.
- 5.4 Another route to identifying risks was through the multidisciplinary meetings known as dynamic risk assessment meetings (DRAM). They were held every week in both centres to consider the current risks and behaviour presented by individual prisoners. The primary purpose of the DRAM was to identify key changes in a prisoner's risk of mixing with other prisoners in the centre and to keep all men safe. Records that we reviewed demonstrated that attendance was reasonable. Representatives from psychology, health care and security

departments and from the offender management unit and chaplaincy participated, in addition to centre staff.

Suicide and self-harm prevention

- 5.5 There had been no recorded incidents of self-harm in either centre during the previous year. Should prisoners have been identified as being at risk of suicide or self-harm, staff said they would adhere to the wider establishment's procedures and HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) frameworks. This could, for example, include establishing assessment, care in custody and teamwork case management support for prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm or making a referral to local safer custody teams.
- 5.6 Each centre had a designated constant supervision cell and while neither had been used and both were adequately equipped, the cells were not in the most appropriate location. For example, at Frankland, it was in the middle of the residential landing, providing little privacy.
- 5.7 Separation meant there was no access to peer support schemes such as Insiders (prisoners who introduce new arrivals to prison life) or Listeners (prisoners trained by the Samaritans to provide confidential emotional support to fellow prisoners), but arrangements were in place at both centres for prisoners to make confidential and free phone calls to the Samaritans if required.

Security

Security and good order are maintained through attention to physical and procedural matters, including effective security intelligence.

- 5.8 As the centres were located within high security prisons, physical and procedural security arrangements were well developed. Most aspects of security, such as cell searching, were integrated into the main prison's procedures.
- 5.9 Nevertheless, some aspects of physical and procedural security at both centres were inconsistent and disproportionate. For example, at Frankland, prisoners were routinely given a rub down search when leaving their cell and again prior to entering or exiting another room a short distance away. This was despite being under the direct staff supervision throughout and without taking into account a prisoner's individual risk assessment or security status. Prisoners at Woodhill could not routinely attend other areas of the prison, such as the gym or a workshop, whereas they could at Frankland (see paragraph 4.15).
- 5.10 Unlocking protocols at each site were generally proportionate, mostly driven by the design of the building, and aimed to make sure staff remained in the direct line of sight of each other. Staffing issues often meant that prisoners had to return to their cells when a member of staff left the unit to carry out other work. There was a lack of interaction

between staff and prisoners at both centres, which hindered the development of meaningful relationships to underpin dynamic security.

- 5.11 The number of staff allocated to the management of security intelligence differed greatly between the two centres. At Frankland, the prison had a dedicated unit of skilled staff who could analyse security reports promptly. The team made good use of available staff and developed a useful range of intelligence tools that were used to assess risks and identify knowledge gaps. The team at Frankland also acted as a national resource, providing reports for the separation centre management committee when required. At Woodhill, intelligence monitoring for the centre was managed by the prison's local counter terrorism unit, which was also responsible for overseeing the main prison, yet was much smaller than the team at Frankland. Some key aspects of intelligence management at Woodhill, such as the interception of telephone calls, had been the responsibility of just one member of staff for several months, which had led to a backlog of calls waiting to be monitored (see and paragraph 4.10).

Behaviour management

Prisoners live in a safe, secure and well-ordered environment where positive behaviour is demonstrated, promoted and acknowledged. Unacceptable conduct is dealt with in an objective, fair, proportionate and consistent manner.

Encouraging positive behaviour

- 5.12 Violence in the units was very rare and there had been no recorded acts of violence or disciplinary proceedings at either centre in the 12 months before the inspection. There had been one serious violent incident in October 2019 that had led to an injury to a member of staff. A further three prisoners had been restrained and placed on report for refusing an order to leave the communal kitchen at Frankland in November of the same year. Action taken following the incidents was appropriate and managed in accordance with the main prison's procedures.
- 5.13 Staff applied the main establishment's procedures and HMPPS frameworks, such as challenge, support, and intervention plans (CSIP) (see Glossary of terms) in cases where support was required, a prisoner's behaviour deteriorated or following an act of violence. In the previous 12 months, there had been one CSIP referral, where a threat was made against staff at the Woodhill centre, but following a review, staff managed the prisoner without implementing a formal intervention plan.
- 5.14 Both centres used the HMPPS incentives framework to promote positive behaviour, but it was largely ineffective because of prisoners' refusal to participate in the scheme. All the men interviewed agreed the policy was ineffective and most found it impossible to achieve

enhanced status as they were not taking forward their care and management plan targets. During the inspection, two men were on the enhanced level, but it provided few incentives to maintain their good behaviour. The centres had not considered the development or implementation of a specific policy that could be more effective in incentivising this very small number of men who displayed such disengaged behaviour.

Use of force

- 5.15 Force had hardly ever been necessary and there had been no recorded incidents in the previous 12 months. The last recorded use was in 2019 (see paragraph 5.12).
- 5.16 Each centre had two designated high control cells (a cell with furniture, bedding and sanitation, as well as a hatch in the cell door to assist in managing high-risk behaviour) that could be used for segregating refractory prisoners to maintain the good order of the prison. The cells were adequately equipped but had not been used in the previous year.

Section 6 Respect

Prisoners are treated with respect for their dignity.

Legal rights

Expected outcomes: Prisoners can access legal services and are made aware of their rights.

- 6.1 All prisoners had legal representation and legal aid was available to support them. Prisoners told us that they had no difficulty in communicating with their legal representatives, either in person, by telephone, or using video conferencing facilities. Men in both centres said video conferencing facilities could be booked reasonably promptly if they needed to speak to their legal representatives.
- 6.2 Arrangements for managing legal correspondence were satisfactory. Prisoners could correspond in writing, although they did not have access to computers, but at Woodhill there were plans to make a computer available soon.
- 6.3 At Woodhill, there could be some delays in sending out legal correspondence, mostly because of staff shortages. In Frankland, prisoners reported that legal mail was delivered reasonably quickly. Prisoners did not report any legal correspondence being opened in error.

Health, well-being and social care

Expected outcomes: Prisoners can access services that assess and meet their health, social care and substance use needs and promote continuity of care on release.

- 6.4 The inspection of health services was jointly undertaken by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) (see Glossary of terms) and HM Inspectorate of Prisons under a memorandum of understanding agreement between the agencies. The CQC found there were no breaches of the relevant regulations.
- 6.5 Effective partnership working was evident between providers, NHS commissioners and the centres. Health care leaders at both centres monitored the delivery of health and social care provision, undertaking regular clinical audits. Leaders participated in and contributed to prisoners' multidisciplinary case management plan reviews.
- 6.6 All separated prisoners received a health care screening on arrival, with referrals being made as necessary. Access to health services was prompt and arranged by prison staff. Although there was a lack of

privacy when undertaking initial health care assessments in the centres, prisoners were aware that they could be seen privately in the health care centres if needed.

- 6.7 Electronic clinical records were used, and clinicians could access them at both centres. A separate, well-advertised health complaints system was available at both centres, and we saw evidence of complaint responses being timely, polite and addressing the issue.
- 6.8 Both centres had robust arrangements for making sure prisoners attended their health care appointments. Men had good access to allied health professionals, such as physiotherapists and optometrists, and access to dental services were equitable to those in the community. Our review of records showed that documentation was good and that clinical staff sought patient consent.
- 6.9 Nursing staff were available at the centres 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and GP appointments could be made. We were satisfied that staff were appropriately trained and supervised. Prisoners we spoke to were happy with health care services and knew how to access them. Appointments at hospital in the community were arranged appropriately.
- 6.10 The centres had good procedures for responding to medical emergencies, with the necessary emergency equipment, including automated external defibrillators, available. Staff checked the emergency equipment every week.
- 6.11 There were clear arrangements for managing medicines, with suitable dispensing facilities and safe storage at each centre. Prisoners on medication had their medicines in possession. They had the required risk assessments and facilities to store their medicines securely.
- 6.12 Mental health support was readily available at the centres and included clinical psychology. The mental health team at Woodhill ran a weekly drop-in clinic and the psychiatrist offered an annual mental health review. At Frankland, two psychiatrists had seen all the prisoners. However, at the time of the inspection, none of the prisoners were involved with the mental health service. Prisoners we spoke to were concerned that discussions with mental health staff would not be confidential, despite service staff explaining medical confidentiality to them.
- 6.13 There had been no transfers to secure inpatient facilities under the Mental Health Act in the previous 12 months.
- 6.14 Clinical and non-clinical substance misuse services were available at the centres and information about each service was given to prisoners during their induction. Suitable arrangements were in place for administering opiate substitution treatment if required. At the time of the inspection, none of the prisoners were receiving substance misuse support.

- 6.15 Despite no-one receiving a social care package (see Glossary of terms), there were clear arrangements at both centres for social care assessments to be undertaken and processes to arrange for prisoners to have aids and adaptations if required.

Staff-prisoner relationships

Prisoners are treated with respect by staff and are encouraged to take responsibility for achieving their reintegration pathway and addressing their offending behaviour.

- 6.16 Staff at Woodhill had done well to establish generally positive relationships with prisoners. At Frankland, while relationships were polite, prisoners reported a lack of trust in and disengagement from officers (see paragraph 4.2). Very cramped conditions there meant that officers frequently congregated in the area that was supposed to be for prisoner association, which caused prisoners frustration and further undermined relationships.
- 6.17 In both centres, the reluctance of prisoners to take part in progression work and other activities, such as key working (see Glossary of terms) and education, meant that relationships tended to be limited and mainly functional. This lack of interaction also meant that specialist staff were unable to deliver support as intended.
- 6.18 Most officers in the Frankland centre had a general understanding of their role in promoting progression and reintegration into the main prison. Some attended care and management plan reviews and were aware of prisoners' targets. Officers in Woodhill were less clear about their role and staff shortages meant they often did not attend care and management plan reviews. None we spoke to at Woodhill were aware of targets for individual men.
- 6.19 Prisoners' belief that the separation system was discriminatory affected their willingness to interact with staff. The focus of officers we spoke to was primarily on gathering and reporting intelligence. This also inhibited relationships with prisoners, who felt that every conversation they had with them was then recorded and treated as intelligence (see paragraph 4.2).
- 6.20 Long-standing staff shortages in Woodhill led to frequent lockdowns at the centre, which limited staff's opportunities to develop more productive staff-prisoner relationships. High staff turnover also meant officers there were less experienced and less well trained than those in Frankland (see paragraph 3.7).

Equality, diversity and faith

Expected outcomes: There is a clear approach to promoting equality of opportunity, eliminating discrimination and fostering good relationships. The distinct needs of prisoners with protected and minority characteristics (see Glossary of terms) are recognised and addressed.

- 6.21 Arrangements for overseeing equality and diversity work in the centres were appropriate. There were too few prisoners to monitor equality data to identify themes or trends. Nonetheless, there was an appropriate focus on identifying equality issues through prisoners' quarterly reviews. Staff had not received specialist equality training after their initial induction programme. There was little celebration within either centre of diversity, but appropriate arrangements were in place for Ramadan and Eid.
- 6.22 General prison systems were used to report discriminatory incidents. Prisoners at Woodhill had submitted two discrimination incident reporting forms (DIRFs) in the previous 12 months. Both concerned the same matter and received a response within a reasonable timeframe. No DIRFs had been submitted at Frankland over the previous year. The Zahid Mubarek Trust provided external scrutiny of the prison's DIRF responses.
- 6.23 None of the prisoners had a declared disability. There was an adapted cell for prisoners with disabilities at Woodhill, but not at Frankland.
- 6.24 The prisons' Muslim chaplains visited the centres at least three times a week but Islamic study classes had not resumed. Most men in both centres chose not to engage with support offered by the chaplaincy.
- 6.25 Friday prayers had recently resumed but they were limited by COVID-19 social distancing restrictions in force at both main prison sites. This meant that, at most, men could only attend prayers once every five weeks.

Daily life

Expected outcomes: Prisoners live in a clean and decent environment and are aware of the rules and routines of the centre. They are provided with essential basic services and can apply for additional services and assistance. Applications and complaints are dealt with efficiently and fairly.

Living conditions

- 6.26 Living conditions varied between the two centres. The Woodhill centre could hold up to 12 prisoners and was large and bright. It was spread over two floors and had large windows, which allowed natural light into the communal areas. The unit at Frankland consisted of a small corridor and prisoners described it as claustrophobic.



Woodhill unit



Frankland landing

- 6.27 Facilities at both centres were appropriate and included a self-catering kitchen, which the men appreciated, and which was not routinely available in the main units. The showers were well-maintained, and prisoners have access to a laundry room where they could wash their own clothing. Both centres had association areas with some recreational activities.
- 6.28 It was good that prisoners could go outside together to the exercise yards every day, but they varied between the sites. At Frankland, the yard was more appealing. It was bright and had artificial grass, benches and some wall art. Meanwhile, at Woodhill, although there was some exercise equipment, the yard was dreary and uninspiring. Neither centre provided opportunities for team sports.
- 6.29 Communal areas were very clean and well-maintained. All cells were single and well equipped. Men kept them very clean – they had daily access to cleaning materials.



Typical cell at Woodhill

Residential services

- 6.30 Prisoners' religious dietary requirements were met, and they could cater for themselves outside usual mealtimes. Our inspection took place during Ramadan and most prisoners were fasting. They were provided with suitable options and heated containers to keep their food warm overnight.
- 6.31 At Woodhill, prisoners had been consulted about their self-catering arrangements and could usually eat their meals together in the large association area. But those at Frankland said they were prevented from

eating meals together because officers sat in the association area, so they had to eat in their cells.

- 6.32 Prisoners could buy a suitable range of goods every week that mirrored the main prison's shop list. They could also order from a range of catalogues.

Consultation, applications and complaints

- 6.33 Consultation arrangements varied between the two centres. At Woodhill, prisoners had been consulted individually in recent months and had raised some suggestions to improve the facilities available. Minutes were captured together in one document, which allowed for feedback and action to be followed up. At Frankland, there had been no unit consultation and some staff had negative perceptions of the value of introducing it. Prisoners could raise suggestions by submitting applications to the prison's wider consultation meeting, but that was not an effective way of managing everyday life in the centre.
- 6.34 Application forms were freely available at both centres. More prisoner applications were submitted at Frankland than at Woodhill. Officers at Frankland encouraged prisoners to submit requests in writing as they wanted a paper trail of their request. At Woodhill, fewer applications were made as staff were willing to deal with requests informally.
- 6.35 Prisoners knew how to make complaints, and responses at both centres were timely and polite, and dealt with the matter concerned. All complaints were recorded and discussed at the quarterly data monitoring meeting, but the small number meant the scope for aggregating and analysing data was limited.

Section 7 Summary of priority and key concerns

The following is a list of the priority and key concerns in this report.

Priority concerns

1. **Governors and the separation centre management committee did not have a jointly agreed strategy and action plan, setting out the centres' specific function that could be understood and acted on by staff.**
2. **Not all staff we spoke to were sure about how their work could promote progression and lacked an awareness of how best to deliver a more enabling and psychologically informed approach to changing prisoner's behaviour.**
3. **Almost all prisoners refused to take part in purposeful activity, complete offending behaviour work or engage with others such as Imams and psychologists** which meant their day-to-day interactions with staff were very limited.
4. **Staff were often over-optimistic about the level of engagement they could expect from some prisoners – such as participating in an offending behaviour programme aimed at deradicalising their beliefs.** They did not focus on some of the smaller steps that prisoners could take to begin to show progress.

Key concerns

5. **Woodhill was severely short of officers, which meant the regime in the centre was curtailed on an almost daily basis.** Some officers allocated to the centre had no experience of managing such a specialist population.
6. **Prison offender managers carried very high caseloads which** prevented them from developing their specialism or building meaningful working relationships with those in the centres.
7. **The management of intelligence, including monitoring telephone calls, was poorly resourced at Woodhill.** This had led to a significant backlog, including many calls made in languages other than English not being analysed promptly.
8. **Men who showed a willingness to participate in risk reduction work could not have their commitment tested through gradual and well-planned contact with mainstream populations.**

Appendix I About our inspections and reports

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons is an independent, statutory organisation which reports on the treatment and conditions of those detained in prisons, young offender institutions, secure training centres, immigration detention facilities, police and court custody and military detention.

All inspections carried out by HM Inspectorate of Prisons contribute to the UK's response to its international obligations under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). OPCAT requires that all places of detention are visited regularly by independent bodies – known as the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) – which monitor the treatment of and conditions for detainees. HM Inspectorate of Prisons is one of several bodies making up the NPM in the UK.

All Inspectorate of Prisons reports carry a summary of the conditions and treatment of prisoners, based on the four tests of a healthy prison that were first introduced in this Inspectorate's thematic review *Suicide is everyone's concern*, published in 1999. For separation centres the tests are:

Management of the centres

The risks and needs of prisoners are thoroughly assessed, managed and monitored. Deselection takes place when appropriate and safe.

Progression

Prisoners benefit from constructive time out of cell and opportunities to access support to explore their attitudes, thinking and behaviour. There is a clear focus on how prisoners can be deselected from the centre. Prisoners are supported to maintain contact with family and friends.

Safety

Prisoners, particularly the most vulnerable, are held safely.

Respect

Prisoners are treated with respect for their dignity.

Under each test, we make an assessment of outcomes for prisoners and therefore of the centres' overall performance against the test. There are four possible judgements: in some cases, this performance will be affected by matters outside the centres' direct control, which need to be addressed by Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS).

Outcomes for prisoners are good.

There is no evidence that outcomes for prisoners are being adversely affected in any significant areas.

Outcomes for prisoners are reasonably good.

There is evidence of adverse outcomes for prisoners in only a small number of areas. For the majority, there are no significant concerns. Procedures to safeguard outcomes are in place.

Outcomes for prisoners are not sufficiently good.

There is evidence that outcomes for prisoners are being adversely affected in many areas or particularly in those areas of greatest importance to the well-being of prisoners. Problems/concerns, if left unattended, are likely to become areas of serious concern.

Outcomes for prisoners are poor.

There is evidence that the outcomes for prisoners are seriously affected by current practice. There is a failure to ensure even adequate treatment of and/or conditions for prisoners. Immediate remedial action is required.

Our assessments might result in identification of **areas of concern**. Key concerns identify the areas where there are significant weaknesses in the treatment of and conditions for prisoners. To be addressed they will require a change in practice and/or new or redirected resources. Priority concerns are those that inspectors believe are the most urgent and important and which should be attended to immediately. Key concerns and priority concerns are summarised at the beginning of inspection reports and the body of the report sets out the issues in more detail.

We also provide examples of **notable positive practice** in our reports. These list innovative work or practice that leads to particularly good outcomes from which other establishments may be able to learn. Inspectors look for evidence of good outcomes for prisoners; original, creative or particularly effective approaches to problem-solving or achieving the desired goal; and how other establishments could learn from or replicate the practice.

Methodology for this inspection

We inspected both centres and combined the findings into themes and judgements across the two. Five key sources of evidence are used by inspectors: observation; prisoner interviews and staff surveys; discussions with staff and relevant third parties; and documentation. During inspections we use a mixed-method approach to data gathering and analysis, applying both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Evidence from different sources is triangulated to strengthen the validity of our assessments.

This inspection was announced in line with other thematic inspections and included colleagues from the Care Quality Commission (see Glossary of terms).

This report

This report provides a summary of our inspection findings against the four healthy prison tests established specifically for separation centres. There then follow four sections each containing a detailed account of our findings against our *Expectations. Criteria for assessing the treatment of and conditions for men in separation centres* (Version 1, 2022) (available on our website at <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/our-expectations/prison-expectations/>). Section 7 summarises the areas of concern from the inspection.

Inspection team

This inspection was carried out by:

Charlie Taylor	Chief inspector
Sandra Fieldhouse	Team leader
Ian Dickens	Inspector
Martyn Griffiths	Inspector
Natalie Heeks	Inspector
Deri Hughes-Roberts	Inspector
Steve Oliver-Watts	Inspector
Jonathan Tickner	Inspector
Helen Ranns	Researcher
Shaun Thomson	Lead health and social care inspector
Lynda Day	Care Quality Commission inspector

Appendix II Glossary of terms

We try to make our reports as clear as possible, and this short glossary should help to explain some of the specialist terms you may find. If you need an explanation of any other terms, please see the longer glossary, available on our website at: <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/about-our-inspections/>

Care Quality Commission (CQC)

CQC is the independent regulator of health and adult social care in England. It monitors, inspects and regulates services to make sure they meet fundamental standards of quality and safety. For information on CQC's standards of care and the action it takes to improve services, please visit: <http://www.cqc.org.uk>

Challenge, support and intervention plan (CSIP)

Used by all adult prisons to manage those prisoners who are violent or pose a heightened risk of being violent. These prisoners are managed and supported on a plan with individualised targets and regular reviews. Not everyone who is violent is case managed on CSIP. Some prisons also use the CSIP framework to support victims of violence.

Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DPP)

The DPP focuses on rehabilitating individuals who have been involved in terrorism or terrorism-related activity and in reducing the risk they pose to the UK. The programme works by providing tailored interventions that support individuals to stop participating in terrorism-related activity (desist) and to move away from terrorist ideology and ways of thinking (disengage). The programme aims to address the root causes of terrorism, build resilience and contribute towards the deradicalisation of individuals.

Individual professional development (IPD)

IPD was designed specifically for staff undertaking high risk jobs, defined as those that have the potential to place huge emotional and psychological demands on staff because of the nature of the work. IPD is a peer-to-peer form of personal non-directive supervision expressly aiming to be preventative, helping to increase staff's resilience by providing ongoing 'on-the-job' support to try and stop potentially demanding situations becoming overwhelming by dealing with them in a safe, non-judgmental environment.

Key worker scheme

The key worker scheme operates across the closed male estate and is one element of the Offender Management in Custody model. All prison officers have a caseload of around six prisoners. The aim is to enable staff to develop constructive, motivational relationships with prisoners, which can support and encourage them to work towards positive rehabilitative goals.

Leader

In this report the term 'leader' refers to anyone with leadership or management responsibility in the prison system. We will direct our narrative at the level of leadership which has the most capacity to influence a particular outcome.

Prevent strand

Prevent is part of the government's counter-terrorism strategy. Its aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

Protected characteristics

The grounds upon which discrimination is unlawful (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2010).

Protection of adults at risk

Safeguarding duties apply to an adult who:

- has needs for care and support (whether or not the local authority is meeting any of those needs); and
- is experiencing, or is at risk of, abuse or neglect; and
- as a result of those care and support needs is unable to protect themselves from either the risk of, or the experience of, abuse and neglect (Care Act 2014).

Rule 46A

Prison rule 46A defines the categories of prisoners to be held in a separation centre. Separation is necessary where those presenting a threat, either in person or by influencing others, cannot be managed within the mainstream population. This may relate to the ability of influential individual prisoners to spread political, religious, racial or other views or beliefs among other prisoners to a point where harm is being caused or where motivated individuals are seeking to increase their ability to carry out terrorist acts or challenge the good order of a prison.

Secure video calls

A system commissioned by HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) that requires users to download an app to their phone or computer. Before a visit can be booked, users must upload valid ID.

Social care package

A level of personal care to address needs identified following a social needs assessment undertaken by the local authority (i.e. assistance with washing, bathing, toileting, activities of daily living etc, but not medical care).

Time out of cell

Time out of cell, in addition to formal 'purposeful activity', includes any time prisoners are out of their cells to associate or use communal facilities to take showers or make telephone calls.

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