Detainees under escort:
Inspection of a Third Country Unit removal to

France, Austria and Bulgaria

by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

17 January 2018
**Glossary of terms**

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Fact page

**Departure airport**
London Biggin Hill

**Destination countries**
France, Austria and Bulgaria

**Destination airports**
Toulouse, Vienna and Sophia

**Escort contractor**
Tascor (part of Capita plc)

**Number of detainees escorted**
23

**Number of escort staff**
80

**Health care staff**
Three travelled from the immigration removal centres, of whom two joined the flight.

**Length of journey**
13 hours 25 minutes (maximum)
Introduction

The UK is party to the Dublin Convention, a European Union law that determines which EU member state is responsible for considering an asylum claim and allows member states to transfer an asylum seeker to the responsible state.1 The Home Office’s Third Country Unit (TCU) manages such removals to and from the UK. Many detainees are returned to third countries using scheduled flights, but in February 2017 the Home Office started to use charter aircraft to remove groups of detainees. This report covers our first inspection of a TCU charter removal.

We had serious concerns about the way that this operation was conducted, principally around the excessive use of restraints. Nearly all detainees were placed in waist restraint belts for the entire journey. The documentation and our own observations showed that, in many cases, restraints were not necessary, proportionate or reasonable. Detainees’ compliance was not tested during the journey, and restraints remained in place for longer than necessary. We regularly inspect other detention settings where far more disruptive and challenging behaviour is managed without such physical restraints.

This is not the first time that such concerns have been raised. The Independent Monitoring Board (IMB) – which, like HM Inspectorate of Prisons, is a member of the UK’s National Preventive Mechanism – routinely monitors charter removals. The IMB monitored a third country removal to Germany in June 2017.2 All 30 detainees on that operation were placed in waist restraint belts at the immigration removal centre (IRC) from which they were collected. The IMB wrote to the immigration minister with its concerns about the blanket approach to risk, and shared the letter and response with us. The minister’s response in July 2017 stated: ‘We take the welfare of our detainees very seriously and we will accept nothing but the highest standards from the companies employed to manage the detention and removal of individuals.’ The minister acknowledged that: ‘Certain returnees were placed into waist restraint belts when their individual risk indicators did not justify such action.’ On this removal, nothing had changed in the approach to the use of restraints.

Escorts are provided with a range of equipment that is intended to make use of force as safe as possible when, according to a competent risk assessment, it is required. What we found at this inspection was pre-emptive and excessive use of restraints that was indicative of poor operational practice and inadequate management.

On the evidence of this inspection, it would seem that operational practice is still falling short of the standards aspired to by the minister in response to the IMB’s concerns in 2017. Clearly, some senior-level intervention is required in order to ensure that the situation is rectified without delay. We will inspect more removals over the coming year, and it would clearly be a matter of serious concern if those being removed from the United Kingdom continue to be subjected to unjustified use of force.

Peter Clarke CVO OBE QPM
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

March 2018

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1 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the member states by a third country national or a stateless person.

2 The IMB does not publish individual reports on these flights, but publishes an annual report summarising findings of all charter flight observations over the reporting year. Its last annual report is available at: https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/imb-prod-storage-1ocod6bqky0vo/uploads/2017/07/IMB-Charter-Flights-2016.pdf
Section 1. Summary

1.1 Eighty escort staff removed 23 people to three European countries on an Airbus A320. The staff briefing at Spectrum House, near Gatwick Airport, emphasised the risks of disruption and the need for vigilance; it focused solely on control and not on detainees’ treatment or welfare. Staff clearly thought they were dealing with a very high risk group. However, the dire warnings they were given were not grounded in evidence. For example, the manifest for Brook House detainees stated that most detainees had no history of being disruptive and presented ‘minor or no risk to successful transfer’.

1.2 Detainees were placed unnecessarily in waist restraint belts and there was an obvious presumption in favour of using the belts. All but one detainee were restrained in a belt before leaving their immigration removal centre (IRC). The remaining detainee had rigid bar handcuffs applied as he resisted boarding the plane. Many detainees were compliant throughout the removal, and restraints in these cases were not necessary, reasonable or proportionate.

1.3 A few detainees resisted removal. Escort staff resorted to force and pain compliance too quickly without sufficient de-escalation. There was an unprofessional approach by some staff towards detainees that involved much shouting at them, both by restraining staff and the person in charge. In one case, an escort stopped filming a use of force incident before the incident had finished. Paramedics checked the detainees who had been restrained by force. In some cases it was not clear if detainees’ failure to follow instructions was deliberate non-compliance or a failure to understand English. Professional interpreters were not present to facilitate communication with detainees, which would have helped to keep both them and staff safe.

1.4 Detainees remained in waist restraint belts for far too long. After take-off, some belts were moved from the secure position (where hands are clamped to the waist) to the restricted position (hands can move freely from the elbow, but arm movement is restricted). Other than this, the use of restraints was not reviewed regularly, and all detainees remained in restraints until disembarkation.

1.5 Some escorts tried to engage with detainees to reassure them, but most did not. A few staff spoke to each other in loud and jocular voices over the heads of detainees, sometimes using disrespectful language about detainees and paying little attention to the effect on them.

1.6 The treatment of the single female detainee was concerning. The detainee was assessed as vulnerable and being at risk of self-harm or suicide. She was transferred in her pyjamas, slippers and dressing gown and a waist restraint belt, despite a lack of evidence that one was required or proportionate. She was distressed throughout the flight. The three female officers escorting her made efforts to engage and reassure her. The detainee was not offered clothing before disembarkation, other than a coat. There were no female officers to receive her in Austria.

1.7 Two paramedics were present throughout the removal. The continuity and quality of health care was satisfactory, but the paramedics inappropriately read all confidential medical notes, rather than on the basis of any specific concern.

1.8 Toilet doors were left ajar while used by detainees, including the woman detainee, regardless of individual risks. On the coaches and the aircraft, staff offered detainees mobile phones, which some used.
1.9 Detainees had little property. One detainee was upset about property left behind on his arrest in Manchester, and a member of staff assured him that this would be followed up. There was no evidence of any actual attempt to follow this up, and the staff member afterwards conceded that it would not be possible.

1.10 The plane arrived at and departed from each location on time, and disembarkation processes were orderly. Detainees were given information on how they could phone the ‘Speak Freely’ helpline, but they could not formally complain about the Home Office’s immigration directorate.
Section 2. Background

2.1 All inspections carried out by HM Inspectorate of Prisons contribute to the UK’s response to its international obligations under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). OPCAT requires that all places of detention are visited regularly by independent bodies – known as the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) – which monitors the treatment of and conditions for detainees. Escorts are included in this remit. HM Inspectorate of Prisons is one of several bodies making up the NPM in the UK.

2.2 The Home Office’s immigration enforcement directorate chartered the aircraft. Capita plc was the escort contractor through its escorting arm, Tascor.

2.3 The operation was inspected from the point at which 11 detainees were collected from Colnbrook and 12 detainees from Brook House immigration removal centres (IRCs). Two inspectors monitored the initial staff briefing at Spectrum House, Gatwick.

2.4 Two coaches - one from Colnbrook and one from Brook House - and seven vans carried detainees to the airport; the vans carried individual detainees who were assessed as being potentially disruptive. Twenty-two men and one woman left the IRCs and were removed to the third countries; none were taken off the operation as a result of last minute cancellations. The longest journey time was from Brook House. The first detainee boarded a coach at Brook House at 1.15am and the last at 3.35am (all times GMT). The Brook House coach arrived at the airport at 4.30am. At Colnbrook, the first detainee was placed on the coach at 2am. The coach left Colnbrook at 4.20am and arrived at the airport at 5.27am. Detainees started to be taken from the coach on to the aircraft at 5.45am. By 6.40am, all detainees had boarded the aircraft and it took off an hour later at 7.40am.

2.5 Two inspectors travelled on the flight, which arrived at Toulouse Airport, France, at 8.55am. At 10.15am the flight took off and landed at Vienna Airport, Austria at 12 noon. The aircraft took off at 1.25pm and landed at Sophia Airport, Bulgaria at 2.40pm. We examined records of two previous third country unit flights for this report. We also had access to a report from the Independent Monitoring Board (IMB), our colleagues in the UK’s National Preventive Mechanism, who routinely monitor charter removals. The report detailed a third country removal to Germany in June 2017, when all 30 detainees being removed were placed in waist restraint belts. The IMB was concerned enough to write to the immigration minister about the blanket approach to restraint, and shared the letter and response with us (see Introduction to this report).

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3 The IMB does not publish individual reports on these flights, but publishes an annual report summarising findings of all charter flight observations over the reporting year. Its last annual report is available at: https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/imb-prod-storage-1oc96d6bqky0vo/uploads/2017/07/IMB-Charter-Flights-2016.pdf
Section 3. Safety

Expected outcomes:
Detainees are escorted in safety and due regard is given to individual needs and risks. Removals are conducted in accordance with law. Security and good order are maintained through proportional operational arrangements and force is only used as a last resort.

Preparation and departure from removal centres

3.1 Managers briefed all staff involved on the removal at Spectrum House, near Gatwick Airport, beginning just after midnight. Inspectors were later told that detainees on the flight were ‘extremely volatile’, and this was reflected in the briefing and the approach to safety and security. Managers strongly emphasised the risk of disruptive behaviour. Staff were to be vigilant because Biggin Hill airport, an insecure location, was being used for the first time. Managers said that the previous Third Country Unit (TCU) flight to multiple destinations had been ‘lively’. It was anticipated that there would be considerable use of force. Advice was given on the need for records to be made of this, and person escort records (PERs) to be completed in detail. One manager said: ‘Tonight we don’t mess around. If you do, you may well get hurt.’ Staff appeared to pay close attention to what was being said.

3.2 Staff were told that there were a lot of violence markers and, repeatedly, if they were not careful they could get hurt. While it was appropriate to highlight the possibility of disruption, the warnings about violence were generally not based on evidence. According to the manifest for Brook House detainees, most detainees (seven) had not previously been disruptive and presented ‘minor or no risk to successful transfer’. Five detainees had previously shown disruptive behaviour, although such behaviour was not described in the risk summary and there was no reference to any being violent towards or assaulting staff. Indeed, one escort when justifying using force to restrain a detainee wrote in his report, ‘I was told we were taking back 23 very disruptive detainees which most had a history of violence [sic].’ Managers used depersonalising language to describe detainees, briefing that ‘disruptives will be loaded on to the coach’, which would go directly on to the tarmac at the airport.

3.3 The briefing contained no guidance on welfare issues, such as the stresses detainees might be under and why, the importance of treating people decently, and giving detainees the opportunity to make telephone calls. Management of staff was inadequate; one officer told us that this was his first such flight and that while he had received training, he was not clear on his duties.

3.4 Escorts arrived at Brook House immigration removal centre (IRC) at 12.45am. No detainees had been placed in the centre’s separation unit before removal, indicating that the centre did not perceive a high risk of non-compliance. Detainees arrived in reception and were each greeted by the ‘coach commander’, the officer in charge of the coach. He politely explained what was happening. Detainees who brought up legal issues were told that this was beyond his control, but that a phone would be available for them to contact their lawyers from the coach. The escorting team had not been given any information on detainees who did not speak English. The coach commander did not use interpreters, and communication with at least two detainees was ineffective. Rub-down searches were carried out in a separate room. The two staff carrying out searches were polite and engaged well with detainees. However, the door to the search room was open and, at times, two or three staff were standing outside in sight and close proximity.
3.5 At Colnbrook, the process was less orderly, and staff were poorly briefed and showed little sensitivity or respect to detainees. The searching area was insufficiently private; a group of staff stood around the small search area unnecessarily. Up to 25 people crowded into the reception area, and not all were involved in tasks. One paramedic compromised medical confidentiality by discussing a detainee’s medical notes in the open reception area. Escorts stood too closely to detainees, invaded their personal space, used unnecessary guiding holds in secure areas and talked over detainees rather than to them. Some detainees could not speak English but we heard staff say, ‘They all speak English really’ and ‘They all know what they are doing’.

3.6 Several detainees from both removal centres were placed in vans rather than on the coach because they were considered a risk. At the airport, most of the detainees on the coach were escorted off without any difficulties. This was managed reasonably well and staff seemed to be aware of what they should be doing.

Security, order and personal safety

3.7 Waist restraint belts were used excessively. Coach commanders made what they described as ‘dynamic risk assessments’ before the use of such belts. In the event, all but one detainee was fitted with a belt. The detainee without a belt was placed in rigid bar handcuffs as he entered the aircraft, but he had started to resist boarding. Belts were used on detainees who were compliant throughout and who the Home Office considered to present little or no risk (see paragraph 3.2). For these detainees, the risk assessment consisted merely of asking them whether they wished to go to the third country, whether they were happy to do so, or whether they had any problems about going. If they said they did not wish to go, this was considered on its own to be sufficient justification for the use of restraints, which was an incompetent approach to risk assessment. There was a clear presumption in favour of using the waist restraint belts. One searching officer said to a detainee, ‘Everyone today is getting this belt on’.

3.8 At Brook House, one compliant detainee was placed in waist restraint belt after a coach commander had not been able to communicate at all with him. The commander said that the belt was being used as a precaution since risk could not be assessed but that they would try and use an interpreter later. He said, ‘We haven’t got the luxury of a long-winded phone call now [i.e. to a telephone interpreter], we’ll sort it out on the coach.’ However, no such attempt was subsequently made.

3.9 At Colnbrook, the coach commander introduced himself as detainees came into reception, and they were asked if they understood what was happening and then told they were going on a flight. They were not all told where they would be going. They were asked if they wanted to go and if they said ‘no’ they were immediately told they would be put in a waist restraint belt. No detainees spoke fluent English, and there were many staff around, with lots of noise. Waist restraint belts were applied to 10 of these detainees, but the passive restraint and use of force paperwork did not always provide sufficient justification for their use.

3.10 Detainees in waist restraint belts were not allowed to walk freely throughout the entire journey, even to go to the toilet on the aircraft. Two escorts held on to the wrist handles at each side of the detainee.

3.11 Eight detainees resisted attempts to remove them, leading to force being used on them. Pain compliance was used on five detainees when escorts were unable to gain control of them in other ways. Staff responses were mixed, and sometimes rushed and improvised, with too much shouting at the detainee by restraining officers and the person in charge. Restraint was
disorganised with too many staff involved and no one in overall control. Officers made insufficient efforts to de-escalate situations. An escort stopped filming a use of force incident before the incident had finished.

3.12 Staff could not be sure that detainees understood instructions during restraint because no interpreter was present. A coach commander shouted at one detainee, ‘If you don’t release, I’ll put pain through your jaw.’ It was unclear whether the detainee understood the command. Escorts inflicted pain, and the detainee was carried off the coach and on to the plane.

3.13 Handling resistant detainees up the aircraft steps was very difficult. Waist restraints were placed in the secure position (hands clamped to the waist) as detainees boarded the plane. In one case, a man was carried up the narrow aircraft steps with limbs flailing. The situation was rescued by a member of the security team\(^4\) who insisted that the escorts stop and gain control before trying to move further.

3.14 At Brook House, a detainee became disruptive and centre officers tried to calm and reassure him. Escort staff applied pain using rigid handcuffs, which was justified in the circumstances as the detainee was trying to bite them. However, the detainee spoke little English and it was unclear if he understood everything that was said to him when force was used.

3.15 The aircraft waited on the tarmac at Biggin Hill airport for an hour after all the detainees had boarded. This showed that escorts had time that could have been used to negotiate and reason with detainees before initiating force. There were no further incidents after the aircraft pushed back for take-off.

3.16 We reviewed the paperwork on the two previous TCU charter flight removals, which showed similar concerns to those discovered on the inspected flight. In most of the cases we reviewed, the paperwork provided insufficient justification for use of waist restraint belts, handcuffs or pain compliance. There was very little evidence of compliance being tested so that applied restraints could be removed at the earliest point. For example, escorts did not assess detainees’ demeanour or mood, ask detainees how they would react if the restraint was removed or, indeed, remove the restraint while having a team of escorts ready to reapply it if necessary.

Recommendations

3.17 All escorting staff should be briefed effectively about their duties, including accurate and balanced information on risk and welfare issues, such as the stresses detainees may be under.

3.18 Staff should only use force against people under escort as a last resort. Any use of physical force, waist restraint belts or handcuffs should be planned and sequenced, and limited to situations where it can be justified. Restraints should be removed at the earliest opportunity. Escorts should behave in a professional, calm and measured way at all times.

3.19 Use of force incidents should be filmed in their entirety.

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\(^4\) A small group of more experienced escorts who help to assess and manage risks, and oversee the use of restraints and force.
Section 4. Respect

**Expected outcomes:**
Detainees are escorted in decent physical conditions and individual needs are addressed. Detainees are treated with humanity and respect.

**Physical conditions and property**

4.1 Many detainees spent a long time on the coaches and vans before they were moved on to the aircraft. Almost as soon as the coach journey began, they were provided with refreshments, and also offered hot drinks. Physical conditions on the aircraft were satisfactory, with adequate and appropriate hot and cold food and drink available during the flight, including vegetarian, vegan and gluten-free options. Detainees were not offered pillows or blankets.

4.2 Escorts kept toilet doors ajar on coaches and the plane when detainees used them, including for the woman detainee. This was not based on individual risk assessment and was an unnecessary intrusion into privacy.

4.3 Detainees generally had very little property. Escorts and centre staff clearly labelled and secured valuables and property. Detainees who spoke English could raise concerns about their property. One detainee was upset about property left behind on his arrest in Manchester. Although a member of staff assured him that this would be followed up, he afterwards conceded to inspectors that it would not be possible.

**Respectful treatment**

4.4 Treatment was reasonably courteous but some staff were flippant. We observed one good example of engagement where an escort asked a stressed detainee, ‘Let’s have a chat and you can tell me what you are thinking’. He subsequently offered reassurance by explaining in some detail what would happen on the escort. However, only a few escorts tried to talk with detainees in this way. A few staff spoke to each other in loud and jocular voices over the heads of detainees. One escort loudly said to another that the detainee she had been allocated, ‘tried to be a bit of an arse but soon realised there was no point’.
Case study  Treatment of the woman under escort

The treatment of the lone woman on the removal was concerning. The Home Office had recognised her as an adult at risk at level 2, she was supported through suicide prevention measures (ACDT), and an immigration removal centre (IRC) doctor had submitted a rule 35 report on her behalf shortly before removal. Throughout the removal she was anxious and tearful.

She was the last person to be transferred from Colnbrook. We observed IRC detainee custody officers (DCOs) wake her up in her room to tell her she was being removed. She refused to get dressed and was taken to reception in her pyjamas, slippers and a dressing gown by two male and two female DCOs, including walking a short distance outside in very cold temperatures. The DCOs spoke to her respectfully but did not explain the implications of not getting dressed. Once in reception, the DCOs again asked her to get dressed but she said she did not want to fly.

She was handed over to the overseas escorts in the Colnbrook reception. An escort asked her if she wanted to go to Austria. When she said she did not want to go, she was placed in a waist restraint belt - according to the escort, ‘for her own safety’. She remained in the belt until she got off the plane in Austria. She was told that she would be able to speak to her solicitor in the van, but she pointed out that, ‘it’s 4 in the morning, my solicitor is at home’. An escort asked for the detainee’s coat to be retrieved from her property. Although the officer managing property shouted, ‘She has categorically stated she is not getting dressed’, her coat was found. No spare clothing was made available for the detainee to change into on the aircraft. She was transferred from the centre to the airport in a van rather than on the coach with other detainees.

The woman boarded the plane accompanied by three female escort staff. She was distressed during the flight but some staff tried to support her. The detainee did not know what airport she was going to. One of the escort staff found out for her and informed the chief immigration officer that the detainee wanted to speak to him. He spoke to her for about 20 minutes and tried to reassure her. A paramedic provided her prescribed medication when required, and notes were made in her ACDT document. Shortly after touchdown in Vienna the waist restraint belt was removed, she put on her coat over her pyjamas and walked on her own to the aircraft exit. She was not met by any female staff from the Austrian immigration authorities or police.

4.5 The continuity and quality of health care were satisfactory. The two paramedics on the aircraft observed detainees during the flight, and issued medication to the three detainees on prescribed medication. They also checked detainees on whom force had been used. Pain relief was available and given when needed. However, the paramedics inappropriately read all confidential IRC medical notes on the detainees rather than on the basis of any specific concern. Medical notes and medication were handed over to the receiving immigration authorities. The paramedics had access to a basic paramedic kit and emergency drugs if needed. One of them took considerable care with a detainee for whom a rule 35 report had been completed by an IRC doctor, giving evidence of torture in Sudan. The paramedic ensured that the man understood that he was not being removed to Sudan but to France.

4.6 Professional interpreting was not used to communicate with detainees who spoke no English and understood very little. Mobile phones were offered, and used by some detainees. All detainees were given a ‘Speak Freely’ information sheet on how to make a complaint about Tascor staff. There was no information provided on making complaints about the Home Office immigration enforcement directorate.

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5 Level two of the three risk levels means that there is evidence from a professional or official documentation indicating that the individual is or may be an adult at risk.
6 Notification to Home Office immigration and enforcement if a detainee’s health is likely to be injuriously affected by detention, including if they may have been the victim of torture.
Recommendations

4.7 Detainees being removed from the country should be held on a coach for the shortest time possible.

4.8 Diligent efforts should be made to locate and retrieve detainees’ missing property before their removal, and forward property to detainees removed without it.

4.9 Escorts should ensure that detainee removal is as dignified as possible. Detainees should be handed over to receiving authorities in suitable clothing.

4.10 The Home Office should request that receiving countries provide female officers to receive women detainees.

4.11 A detainee’s medical records should only be opened and read when there is evidence of a cause for concern.

4.12 Escort staff should be informed in advance of detainees who do not speak English, so that they can consider the need for professional interpreters. Interpreters should always be in attendance if the use of force is anticipated.
Section 5. Preparation for reintegration

Expected outcomes:
Detainees are prepared for their arrival and early days in the destination country.
Any unacceptable behaviour in destination countries is appropriately challenged.

5.1 Many detainees were unaware of the precise date and time of the flight. All had been served a notice that outlined a period in which they could be removed, but some only became aware of the exact time when they were woken in the middle of the night.

5.2 Even though all detainees had previously spent some time in the destination countries, it was remiss that they were given no written information about the countries or what they might expect during their early days after arrival.

5.3 Disembarkation at the destinations was smooth and straightforward. Detainees were walked one by one down the aisle to the aircraft door, accompanied by two escorts. The woman detainee was the exception; her waist restraint belt was removed at her seat. Members of the security team removed the waist restraint belt from all the detainees before handing them over to the authorities of the receiving countries. Eight detainees disembarked in France, 10 in Austria and five in Bulgaria. Medication and medical notes were handed to the receiving authorities.

5.4 Unlike on other charter flight removals, the Home Office chief immigration officer did not hold a surgery to answer detainees’ questions. He told us this was because detainees were not being returned to their countries of origin but to third countries instead. He did spend about 20 minutes speaking with the woman detainee, but other detainees may have had questions that he could usefully have answered during the flight.

Recommendations

5.5 Detainees being removed to a third country should be given information about the destination country, including the help available to those without means to support themselves or without family and friends in that country. Such information should be given in advance of the removal, and detainees helped to contact sources of support and advice.

5.6 Detainees being removed should be offered an opportunity to speak to a chief immigration officer during the flight.
Section 6. Summary of recommendations

Recommendations

To the Home Office

6.1 The Home Office should request that receiving countries provide female officers to receive women detainees. (4.10)

6.2 Detainees being removed should be offered an opportunity to speak to a chief immigration officer during the flight. (5.6)

Recommendations

To the Home Office and Tascor

6.3 Escort staff should be informed in advance of detainees who do not speak English, so that they can consider the need for professional interpreters. Interpreters should always be in attendance if the use of force is anticipated. (4.12)

6.4 Detainees being removed to a third country should be given information about the destination country, including the help available to those without means to support themselves or without family and friends in that country. Such information should be given in advance of the removal, and detainees helped to contact sources of support and advice. (5.5)

Recommendations

To Tascor

6.5 All escorting staff should be briefed effectively about their duties, including accurate and balanced information on risk and welfare issues, such as the stresses detainees may be under. (3.17)

6.6 Staff should only use force against people under escort as a last resort. Any use of physical force, waist restraint belts or handcuffs should be planned and sequenced, and limited to situations where it can be justified. Restraints should be removed at the earliest opportunity. Escorts should behave in a professional, calm and measured way at all times. (3.18)

6.7 Use of force incidents should be filmed in their entirety. (3.19)

6.8 Detainees being removed from the country should be held on a coach for the shortest time possible. (4.7)

6.9 Diligent efforts should be made to locate and retrieve detainees’ missing property before their removal, and forward property to detainees removed without it. (4.8)

6.10 Escorts should ensure that detainee removal is as dignified as possible. Detainees should be handed over to receiving authorities in suitable clothing. (4.9)

6.11 A detainee’s medical records should only be opened and read when there is evidence of a cause for concern. (4.11)
Section 7. Appendices

Appendix I: Inspection team

Colin Carroll  Team leader
Francesca Cooney  Inspector
Deri Hughes-Roberts  Inspector
Maureen Jamieson  Health care inspector
Martin Kettle  Inspector