

Detainees under escort:
Inspection of escort and removals to

Pakistan

by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

30 June–1 July 2015

Glossary of terms

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Fact page

Departure airport

Stansted

Destination country

Pakistan

Destination airport

Islamabad

Escort contractor

Tascor

Number of detainees escorted

33

Number of escort staff

67

Health care staff

4

Length of journey

16 hours (maximum)

Introduction

Operation Monroe is a regular removal flight to Pakistan which we inspected once before in December 2013. On that occasion we noted some positive features, which it was good to see had been sustained during this inspection - the operation was generally carried out calmly and safely, most staff interacted well with detainees and detainees were dealt with swiftly and courteously when they arrived in Islamabad.

Detainees' treatment and conditions had also improved since the previous inspection. All staff had now received specialist training on use of force within the confined spaces of a coach or aircraft. None of the staff displayed an inappropriate attitude either when they spoke to detainees or in the way they behaved. Detainees were kept informed about the process and in one immigration removal centre they received particularly good help to prepare for removal. Overall this was a well-ordered, good-tempered operation.

However, few improvements had been made to a number of issues to which I drew attention to after our last inspection. In that report I said 'It is almost inconceivable that in any other area of HM Inspectorate of Prisons' work we would find staff in charge of detainees at an identified risk of self-harm in a state of such exhaustion that they cannot avoid falling asleep.' In 2013, some staff fell asleep almost as soon as they sat down in the coach; in 2015, no one slept on the coach, but after a couple of hours in the aircraft many escorts were asleep beside their charges.

Staff still depended entirely on other detainees to interpret for those without good English. It was unacceptable that, at a time when many detainees felt their future hung in the balance or when so much was uncertain, they should have been unable, in confidence, to understand what was said to them or say what was important to them.

Approaches to security and control, while measured and not excessive overall, remained unduly indiscriminate in some respects. Restraints, whenever applied, were still only ever removed after the take-off period, and detainees' arms or wrists were still routinely held at certain points (although slightly less often than previously); unlike in other custodial contexts, such hands-on measures were not subject to an individual risk assessment.

We have not previously had to focus on the coaches used for transfers to the airport. On this occasion there was a series of mechanical breakdowns, which made everything more difficult for staff and detainees alike.

During this removal operation, detainees were removed in a reasonably decent and efficient manner, by staff who did a professional job. But that picture was still marred by too many avoidable weaknesses.

Nick Hardwick
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

September 2015

Section 1. Summary

- 1.1** This flight carried 33 detainees, about half the usual complement. A court decision leading to the suspension of the 'detained fast track' process was said to be a major reason for the drop in numbers. One woman was on the flight. The longest journey time was 16 hours.
- 1.2** All of those being removed had been at the immigration removal centre (IRC) from which they had departed at least 48 hours before leaving. No reserve detainees were identified for the flight, although staff reported that reserves were normally in place. The process of handing over detainees from IRC staff to escorting staff was carried out calmly and on the whole thoroughly. It was especially thorough at Tinsley House, where a member of immigration enforcement staff met with all those being removed before the process started to answer any questions and explain what would happen.
- 1.3** Searching was proportionate. There were regular removal flights to Islamabad, and all staff were familiar with the process. However, on coaches, toilet doors were held slightly ajar, although handcuffs were now not usually jammed into the opening as had been the custom previously. All staff had been on the Home Office training specifically for removal flights. In general, staff did not touch detainees as they walked from reception to the coach within the IRCs. A waist restraint belt was used on the female detainee, on the basis of a risk assessment. The belt was kept on until after take-off, which was too long in view of the fact that she was compliant and cooperative throughout the process. Force was only used in a few other cases: detainees' arms were held in the less secure transit area at Stansted; their wrists were held while they were being taken to a seat on the aircraft; and one IRC staff member placed his hand in the small of detainees' backs to guide them to the coach. In the three previous Pakistan flights, force had been used once and the waist restraint belt six times.
- 1.4** Two detainees were monitored for self-harm risks. The assessment, care in detention and teamwork (ACDT) process for detainees at risk of suicide or self-harm was carried out effectively. Relevant information was not always easily available: the risk assessment on the person escort record form for one detainee on an ACDT did not indicate what specific risk factors might have existed.
- 1.5** Staff had all had a reasonable break since their last period of duty, and none fell asleep on the coaches or during the initial stages of the flight. On the aircraft, security staff and others walked the aisles frequently, offering to relieve any staff who might have been tired. The flight left at 11.40pm, and by 3am some staff were dozing beside the detainee for whom they were responsible without being relieved.
- 1.6** Detainees had good access to mobile phones and could call lawyers or family and friends. Staff took care to ensure that court decisions were implemented whenever detainees were notified of one, but notification letters were in English only.
- 1.7** The coaches were unsatisfactory: on one, the toilet did not work; on another, the air-conditioning failed (this was the hottest day of 2015 to date); and there was no hot water for drinks on another. Detainees from the coach without air-conditioning were moved to the one with no toilet.
- 1.8** Staff talked with detainees courteously and constructively. The great majority quickly established a good rapport with the person whom they were escorting. Staff were appropriately informal.

- I.9** The female detainee was treated with courtesy, and was accompanied at all times by female escorts. However, staff did not sufficiently ensure she was kept separate from the men.
- I.10** Most detainees spoke English well. For the few who did not, staff relied on other detainees to interpret, which was not always satisfactory. A few escorting staff on the coaches spoke Urdu or Punjabi, but none of them were on the aircraft.
- I.11** Most of the detainees were observing Ramadan. Some supervising officers encouraged colleagues to support them appropriately, but there was no clear guidance in the initial staff briefing. The fasting period ended at 9.22pm and resumed at 2.30am. No advance planning had taken place and supervising staff had extensive discussions about what should be done. In the event, cabin staff provided plenty of food, offering further supplies throughout the period when detainees were breaking the fast, which the smaller than expected number of passengers made possible.
- I.12** All detainees received an information sheet at the outset of the coach journey, providing details of whom to contact if they had any complaints about the escort contractor Tascor. No other details were available and there was no information at all about how to make a complaint about Home Office staff. Health care was reasonable.
- I.13** All detainees also received a *Coming Home to Pakistan* booklet. This provided them with information about WELDO, a non-governmental organisation in Pakistan offering short-term support on arrival. Nevertheless some detainees were anxious about what would happen to them when they arrived.
- I.14** On arrival, detainees were taken in buses to the terminal building, where they were processed in an open terminal. They were treated with courtesy, and a British embassy official greeted them and answered any questions. WELDO staff were waiting to welcome them and provide practical assistance.

Section 2. Background

- 2.1** All inspections carried out by HM Inspectorate of Prisons contribute to the UK's response to its international obligations under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). OPCAT requires that all places of detention are visited regularly by independent bodies – known as the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) – which monitors the treatment of and conditions for detainees. Escorts are included in this remit. HM Inspectorate of Prisons is one of several bodies making up the NPM in the UK.
- 2.2** This was the second charter flight to Pakistan that we inspected. The aircraft was chartered by the Home Office directorate of immigration enforcement, and Tascor was the escort contractor. Detainees were collected from four immigration removal centres (IRCs) – Colnbrook, Brook House, Harmondsworth and Tinsley House. One female detainee was taken from Colnbrook in a separate van. Staff we spoke to said they were detention custody officers certified under part 8 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.
- 2.3** There were 33 detainees on the flight, far fewer than the originally planned 70. A few days before the flight, a court ruling had led to the suspension of the 'detained fast track' process. We were told that this had resulted in a reduction in the number of people who could be removed.
- 2.4** The entire process was inspected – from the point at which detainees were collected from the IRCs, to arrival in Islamabad. Two inspectors travelled on the flight, which took off from Stansted at approximately 11.40pm. It landed in Islamabad at approximately 7.20am (11.20am local time). The longest journey time, from embarkation on the coach at the IRC to disembarkation at Islamabad, was 16 hours. The records of the three previous flights to Islamabad in April, May and June 2015 were also examined for this report. The number of detainees on those flights was respectively 44, 70 and 70.

Section 3. Safety

Expected outcomes:

Detainees are escorted in safety and due regard is given to individual needs and risks. Removals are conducted in accordance with law. Security and good order are maintained through proportional operational arrangements and force is only used as a last resort.

- 3.1** *Detainees had time to rest before their removal, and were treated courteously during the handover to escort staff. Searching and other aspects of security were generally proportionate, but not always based on an individual risk assessment. Use of force was restricted to 'guiding holds' and a waist restraint was used in one case, on a female detainee. The two detainees at risk of self-harm were supervised properly on the whole, but risk assessments were not all sufficiently clear and there were still some problems with escorting staff sleeping. Access to legal advice was reasonable.*

Preparation and departure from removal centres

- 3.2** All detainees had been at the immigration removal centre (IRC) from which they departed for at least two nights before the flight, which meant none of them were exhausted from a recent journey. No reserve detainees had been identified for the flight. Staff told us that this was very unusual, and that reserves were still identified on other occasions, including for the preceding three Operation Monroe flights.
- 3.3** Those at Tinsley House IRC in particular were thoroughly prepared for the flight. An immigration enforcement official saw them on the morning of the day of their departure, to explain the process and answer any questions. Just before departure, each of them had a private conversation with a member of Tinsley House staff to check whether they had any concerns before they were handed over to escort contractor staff.
- 3.4** At all IRCs, the 'coach commander' greeted detainees by name, shook their hand and explained what would happen. At Brook House, this officer asked each person if they were fasting for Ramadan, and if so, noted this on the front of the person escort record (PER).

Good practice

- 3.5** *Both Home Office and IRC staff at Tinsley House met with detainees individually and in a group to inform them of the process and to answer any questions before removal began.*

Security, order and rules

- 3.6** Searching was proportionate and staff searched detainees tactfully, engaging the person in informal conversation. Detainees were not searched a second time on arrival at Stansted, as on previous operations: they were only searched if X-ray portals indicated this was necessary. Detainees were discreetly filmed during the embarkation process, but the reasons for this were not explained unless a detainee questioned it.
- 3.7** The number of staff was set at 1.62 per detainee, and as detainees were withdrawn from the flight, staff stood down accordingly. Staff were calm and confident in their roles; flights on

this route were frequent and they understood the procedures in detail. As on previous inspections, security measures were disproportionate only when the chief immigration officer (CIO) spoke individually with detainees. At least four officers (sometimes more, with no apparent relation to risks) surrounded the detainee as they sat with their seat-belt fastened, the CIO leaning over the seat in front to speak with him.

- 3.8** When the toilet on the coach was working, the allocated member of staff usually kept their hand or a booklet in the door to stop it from being locked from inside. The same precaution applied on the aircraft. Staff tried to ensure maximum privacy, and generally did not keep the door open with a pair of rigid handcuffs as they had previously; however, the arrangement was still unsatisfactory.

Recommendations

- 3.9** **Only the minimum number of staff for security and safety should be positioned around a detainee.** (Repeated recommendation 3.14)
- 3.10** **Unless an individual risk assessment indicates otherwise, detainees should be able to use the toilet in complete privacy.**

Good order and behaviour management

- 3.11** There were no issues in maintaining order throughout the operation. One PER read 'Disruptive on transfer', but provided no further information on the nature of any risk (see paragraph 3.21 and recommendation 3.25).

Use of force

- 3.12** All staff had received Home Office training on escorting detainees safely, and most had also been on a refresher course. Officers leading detainees to the coaches within the secure area of the IRC did not touch detainees, except in a few cases. Staff said they had been trained to use the 'guiding hold' (holding a detainee's arm and elbow) but preferred not to do so in secure areas. At Brook House an officer gently placed his hand in the small of each detainee's back to get them to walk to the coach. There was no indication that this was necessary.
- 3.13** All detainees were held by both elbows while boarding the aircraft, and by one or both wrists while being taken to their seat on the aircraft. The former was justified by staff on the basis that the runway area was insecure, and the latter on the basis that speed of movement was vital. No individual risk assessment was carried out, nor were these hands-on measures recorded.
- 3.14** Waist restraint belts, with Velcro fastenings and fabric wrist restraints attached to a belt with adjustable straps, were available on all coaches. One of these belts was used on the single female detainee. Risk assessments showed that she had resisted removal on two previous occasions, and medication she had received appeared to make her feel unsteady; the belt was used primarily in case staff needed to carry her (the belts have handles at the hips, which are intended to help facilitate safe carrying). The wrist straps were kept at their loosest setting, which enabled her to move her arms almost completely freely.
- 3.15** The belt was removed after take-off once the seat belt sign was switched off. Since the detainee had been completely compliant throughout the process and the purpose of the belt

was to help the woman board the aircraft, there was no good reason for keeping it on once she was on the aircraft. Staff told us that removal of the waist restraint belt could only be authorised by the head of the security team.

- 3.16** During the previous three Pakistan flights, force had been used once when IRC staff brought a detainee to the handover point in arm locks; a waist restraint belt was also applied. Waist restraint belts were used on six other occasions on these three flights.

Recommendations

- 3.17** **Escorts should not lay hands on detainees without a specific cause, justified in writing in each individual case.** (Repeated recommendation 3.28)
- 3.18** **Physical restraints should be applied only for as long as they are needed for safety or to effect removal.** (Repeated recommendation 3.30)

Bullying and intimidation

- 3.19** Escorting staff were dressed informally. The only aspect of their appearance that could have been intimidating was that most of them had handcuffs visibly attached to their belts. This was partly because the weather was warm and they were in shirtsleeves. Those allocated to the security team of 10 officers were reasonably discreet in their supervision duties. A Tascor operational manager accompanied the flight to supervise practice and offer supervising officers support if they needed it.

Housekeeping point

- 3.20** Staff handcuffs should, where possible, be concealed from view when not in use.

Emotional distress and self-harm

- 3.21** Two detainees were being monitored under the assessment, care in detention and teamwork (ACDT) process for detainees at risk of suicide or self-harm. In one case, the degree of interaction between the escort and detainee was very limited, however, this was because of the disengaged demeanour of the detainee. Escort staff made detailed, appropriate records on the ACDT form. However, the risk assessment for this detainee simply read 'ACDT – mental health issues', which did not provide a member of staff escorting him with sufficiently useful information; reading through a large ACDT folder would have been the only way of gleaning the necessary information. The health section in the risk assessment had not been completed. The ACDT form for this detainee showed that support at Campsfield House and Brook House was good; 11 case reviews took place during this period, one of them attended by a member of immigration staff.
- 3.22** Another detainee on an ACDT had been in the UK for 15 years. His mother was very ill in hospital in the UK. He had been taken to see her in hospital from Morton Hall IRC on 24 June. Observations had been increased to half-hourly on 25 June because of his distress about his mother. He said he knew no one in Pakistan.
- 3.23** Escort staff stayed awake throughout the coach journeys. All of them said they had had enough rest time since their previous tour of duty. The flight left at 11.40pm; during the first part of the journey, security team staff moved up and down the aircraft offering to relieve

any colleagues who requested it, or who were falling asleep. By 3am several escort staff were sleeping next to the detainee whom they were supervising. Many of the detainees themselves were sleeping or watching a film by this time, and members of the security team were always standing where they could see all detainees' heads over the seat backs. Nevertheless, the purpose of having an individual escort for each detainee was frustrated when that escort was sleeping.

Recommendations

- 3.24 Senior managers should ensure that staff are able to undertake their duties effectively and safely at all times while they are responsible for the care of detainees, especially when they are caring for detainees with an identified risk of self-harm.** (Repeated recommendation 3.11)
- 3.25 Risk assessments should outline risk factors clearly so that any member of staff escorting a detainee can refer to them easily.**

Legal rights

- 3.26** All detainees were advised during reception that they would be given access to a mobile phone on the coach in order to call legal advisers or family and friends; all detainees could make calls both on the coach and at the airport right up until just before take-off. On one coach at least three company mobiles were being passed around the detainees and there was no restriction on their use. A detainee was also allowed to attempt a call after landing. Detainees could keep key legal documents with them on the journey.
- 3.27** Several detainees were removed from the flight list right up to the last minute after they had been notified that they had permission to apply for judicial review. One detainee received notification at 10.50pm. His property was retrieved from the hold and a van had to be arranged to remove him from the flight; he left the aircraft at 11.04pm. Letters were issued to some detainees during the flight, notifying them that permission to apply for judicial review had been declined. They were in English only; one escort asked another detainee to translate the letter for the person he was escorting.

Child care and protection

- 3.28** There were no children on the flight. Escorting officers had received basic child protection training during their initial and annual refresher training.

Section 4. Respect

Expected outcomes:

**Detainees are escorted in decent physical conditions and individual needs are addressed.
Detainees are treated with humanity and respect.**

4.1 *The coaches developed a number of faults, which made conditions for detainees much worse than they should have been. Food and drink provision was adequate, but arrangements for those observing Ramadan were not sufficiently well planned. Staff established a good rapport with detainees. The woman detainee was not always kept sufficiently apart from the men. There was too much reliance on some detainees to interpret for others. Detainees only had a very limited knowledge of how to make a complaint. Health care was reasonable.*

Physical conditions

- 4.2** Although the travel time from the immigration removal centres (IRCs) to Stansted did not exceed two hours, detainees were on the coaches for much longer; those in the first coach waited there for over two hours at the airport. On one coach there was no provision for hot drinks, and during the journey the toilet stopped working, which meant detainees were transferred to another coach to use the toilet once they arrived at Stansted. The toilet on the Harmondsworth coach did not work at any stage; some detainees were on the coach for four and a half hours. On a third coach, which arrived at Colnbrook, the air-conditioning did not work on a day that was the hottest so far in 2015; detainees were transferred to the Harmondsworth coach. Staff said that some of the coaches that were used had not been supplied by their normal contractor.
- 4.3** Sandwiches, fruit, snacks and bottles of water were offered to detainees shortly after they set off from the IRCs. Staff made a point of handing out the food to detainees before eating the same food themselves. Hot drinks were provided on the coaches once they had arrived at Stansted and on the aircraft. Reasonable but insufficiently well-organised arrangements were made for those who were fasting for Ramadan (see section on diversity).

Recommendation

- 4.4 All coaches should have toilets that work and adequate air-conditioning.**

Property and clothing

- 4.5** One detainee said that he felt cold sitting next to the bulk head of the aircraft. He was told that he could not have a blanket but when he continued to complain, he and his escort were moved to a middle section of seats. Another detainee was given a blanket. The risks presented by the two detainees did not appear to be different. There were sufficient blankets on the aircraft for those who might have needed them.
- 4.6** Most, but not all, detainees could note down key phone numbers from their personal SIM card before they were temporarily removed from them for the journey. One detainee had had his phone confiscated by the police, but he was content that staff at Dover IRC had taken his Pakistan address and would arrange for its return. Detainees were allowed to wear

belts, but jewellery was removed. They could keep paper money with them, but not coins. Detainees who had only a polythene bag for their possessions received a proper travelling bag at the IRC.

Housekeeping point

- 4.7** Subject to a risk assessment, detainees should be able to obtain pillows and blankets during flights.

Positive relationships

- 4.8** Custody officers allocated to supervise individual detainees greeted detainees and made conversation with them in almost all cases. Most staff used first names when they spoke with the detainee whom they were supervising. No member of staff used inappropriate language or behaved inappropriately at any time during the operation.

Diversity

- 4.9** At the initial staff briefing, it was expected that four women would be collected from Colnbrook. Additional female staff were appropriately allocated to the Colnbrook coach. In the event one female detainee travelled; she was taken from Colnbrook to Stansted in a separate van. Once she was there she was not taken into the terminal to use the toilet, but into another all-male coach, where she used the toilet with a female member of staff ensuring that the door was not entirely shut. She was seated in the rear of the front section of the plane but all the male detainees on the flight had boarded before her. This meant she had to walk through the filled rear section of the plane where she became an object of interest. This could easily have been avoided. Fortunately, because of the clothing she was wearing, it was not apparent that she was in a waist restraint belt. Sanitary products were available. Although female staff interacted with her very positively throughout the journey, the person escort record (PER) form in her case was poor and some key information was missing.
- 4.10** A few officers on the coaches spoke Urdu or Punjabi and could talk with detainees in their own language. However, none of the officers with these languages continued on to the aircraft. As a consequence, escort staff on the aircraft relied on other detainees to interpret for the minority who could not understand or speak English well. For example, the female detainee spoke almost no English. She asked to speak to the chief immigration officer (CIO) on board, but understood little. He gave her a cash card for £500; she did not know what it was and spoke loudly in her language to another detainee about it. This made her potentially vulnerable to pressure or manipulation by the others after arrival. The CIO also used other detainees to interpret for two detainees who did not speak English during his surgery; confidential information could well have been disclosed.
- 4.11** Detainees informed staff that Ramadan fasting would end at 9.22pm and re-commence at 2.30am and escort staff made supervisors aware of this. No plans in advance were made to cater for these detainees and there was little mention of the issue in staff briefings. However, some supervisors encouraged officers to support the detainees in whatever way they could. However, after considerable discussion on the aircraft, the cabin crew served a hot meal as early as possible into the flight and extra portions were offered. Extra meals were also available as the number travelling had dropped significantly. The crew also served a second meal before fasting re-commenced. Detainees were allowed to keep religious items, such as prayers beads, with them.

Recommendations

4.12 Female detainees should be kept separate from male detainees at all times.

4.13 Professional interpretation should be used to enhance communication throughout the removal process. (Repeated recommendation 4.19)

Housekeeping point

4.14 Provision for specific religious or cultural needs, such as Ramadan, should be made clearly in advance.

Complaints

4.15 Complaint forms were not available on several coaches. An officer found a complaint sheet in a van, but it was an IRC form rather than one relating to the escort contractor. All detainees were given 'speak freely' information sheets, available in 16 languages, providing contact details if they wanted to make a confidential complaint about Tascor after their arrival in Pakistan. However, those we spoke with later on in the journey did not know how they might make a complaint, and many no longer had the sheet (one was found in a PER form). Detainees did not receive any information about how to make a complaint about Home Office staff.

Recommendation

4.16 Detainees should be told how to make complaints or submit comments about Home Office or escort staff during or after the removal. (Repeated recommendation 4.21)

Health

4.17 A member of the IRC health care staff at Tinsley House briefed the flight medic in detail, particularly on a detainee who had complex health needs. At Brook House, IRC health care staff did not carry out personal briefings, although the flight medic said that he would insist on a personal briefing if medical notes highlighted any significant issues. One medic said: 'It's like squeezing blood out of a stone sometimes.' One of the staff from IPRS Aeromed (which provided medical services during the journey) examined the female detainee after the waist restraint belt had been removed at the request of the head of the security team.

4.18 IPRS Aeromed staff checked on detainees throughout the flight and handed out tablets to a number of people who felt unwell. Just before arrival in Islamabad, sealed medical notes were given to each detainee, but not all of them understood what the envelope was. One set of medical notes was found with a PER form during the return flight.

Recommendation

- 4.19** There should be a consistent, agreed process for handover of medical information from IRC health care staff to those responsible for health care during the removal.

Section 5. Preparation for reintegration

Expected outcomes:

**Detainees are prepared for their arrival and early days in the destination country.
Any unacceptable behaviour in destination countries is appropriately challenged.**

- 5.1** *As at the previous inspection, helpful resettlement information was available in the form of a booklet that all detainees received, and an organisation in Pakistan provided practical support after arrival. The chief immigration officer (CIO) offered advice to anyone who asked for it, although access to him was not easy and lacked confidentiality. Authorities in Pakistan welcomed the detainees in a helpful and courteous manner.*
- 5.2** Each detainee received a copy of the *Coming Home to Pakistan* booklet in English and Urdu. It contained a great deal of useful information, for example, about the services of a non-governmental organisation in Pakistan, WELDO (see paragraph 5.6). Some detainees had said before departure that they did not know what would happen on arrival. One said that he came from Lahore, had never been to Islamabad and did not know how he would travel home. Another was very unfamiliar with Pakistan and was concerned about what to do on arrival. These people would have benefited from having had the information in the booklet well before departure.
- 5.3** As was routine on these flights, detainees were asked if they wished to speak with the CIO who was on the flight. They were asked this a short time into the flight, and the reason for wishing to speak with him; then at 1.15am an officer checked again with each whether they wished to speak with the CIO and why. Each detainee was taken in turn to a seat at the rear of the front section of the aircraft, next to the toilets (something of a thoroughfare). The CIO went over to speak to the female detainee separately. The CIO dealt thoroughly and courteously with all the questions raised, although the lack of interpretation was a problem (see section on diversity).
- 5.4** The CIO issued cash cards to two detainees deemed to be particularly vulnerable and so qualified for support under the European Reintegration Network (ERIN) scheme. Each of them had little English, and it was not clear whether they understood what the card was for.
- 5.5** On arrival, the detainees were disembarked promptly and efficiently. UK and Pakistan officials alike treated them courteously. They were taken in buses to the main terminal, where Pakistan immigration officials and a representative from the British embassy personally welcomed them and allowed them to ask any questions. Staff from an anti-trafficking unit of the Pakistan Federal Investigation Agency spoke to each detainee and asked them to complete a form about any trafficking issues.
- 5.6** Staff from WELDO, which provides immediate services to arriving detainees, were ready to greet detainees once they had passed through immigration. WELDO provided overnight accommodation for those needing it; they took risk factors into account, and had arranged separate accommodation for two men whose past offences indicated they were a possible risk to others. WELDO staff also offered refreshments at the airport as well as mobility aids when needed and help with onward travel on the following day.

Housekeeping point

- 5.7** Detainees should receive the *Coming Home to Pakistan* booklet when removal directions are served.

Section 6. Recommendations and housekeeping points

Recommendations

To the Home Office and Tascor

Respect

- 6.1** Professional interpretation should be used to enhance communication throughout the removal process. (4.13, repeated recommendation 4.19)
- 6.2** Detainees should be told how to make complaints or submit comments about Home Office or escort staff during or after the removal. (4.16, repeated recommendation 4.21)

Recommendations

To Tascor

Safety

- 6.3** Only the minimum number of staff for security and safety should be positioned around a detainee. (3.9, repeated recommendation 3.14)
- 6.4** Unless an individual risk assessment indicates otherwise, detainees should be able to use the toilet in complete privacy. (3.10)
- 6.5** Escorts should not lay hands on detainees without a specific cause, justified in writing in each individual case. (3.17, repeated recommendation 3.28)
- 6.6** Physical restraints should be applied only for as long as they are needed for safety or to effect removal. (3.18, repeated recommendation 3.30)
- 6.7** Senior managers should ensure that staff are able to undertake their duties effectively and safely at all times while they are responsible for the care of detainees, especially when they are caring for detainees with an identified risk of self-harm. (3.24, repeated recommendation 3.11)
- 6.8** Risk assessments should outline risk factors clearly so that any member of staff escorting a detainee can refer to them easily. (3.25)

Respect

- 6.9** All coaches should have toilets that work and adequate air-conditioning. (4.4)
- 6.10** Female detainees should be kept separate from male detainees at all times. (4.12)
- 6.11** There should be a consistent, agreed process for handover of medical information from IRC health care staff to those responsible for health care during the removal. (4.19)

Housekeeping points

Safety

6.12 Staff handcuffs should, where possible, be concealed from view when not in use. (3.20)

Respect

6.13 Subject to a risk assessment, detainees should be able to obtain pillows and blankets during flights. (4.7)

6.14 Provision for specific religious or cultural needs, such as Ramadan, should be made clearly in advance. (4.14)

Preparation for reintegration

6.15 Detainees should receive the *Coming Home to Pakistan* booklet when removal directions are served. (5.7)

Good practice

6.16 Both Home Office and IRC staff at Tinsley House met with detainees individually and in a group to inform them of the process and to answer any questions before removal began. (3.5)

Section 7. Appendices

Appendix I: Inspection team

Colin Carroll	Inspector
Fionn Gordon	Inspector
Martin Kettle	Inspector
Fiona Shearlaw	Inspector

Appendix II: Progress on recommendations from the last report

The following is a summary of the main findings from the last report (20-21 April 2011) and a list of all the recommendations made, organised under the three broad tests of healthy detention practice. The reference numbers at the end of each recommendation refer to the paragraph location in the previous report. If a recommendation has been repeated in the main report, its new paragraph number is also provided.

Safety

Detainees are escorted in safety and due regard is given to individual needs and risks.

Recommendations

- 7.1** Detainees should be kept informed of delays throughout the removal process. (3.9)
Achieved
- 7.2** The system of using reserves should cease and there should be sufficient staff for each removal. (3.10)
Partially achieved
- 7.3** Senior managers should ensure that staff are able to undertake their duties effectively and safely at all times while they are responsible for the care of detainees, especially when they are caring for detainees with an identified risk of self-harm. (3.11)
Not achieved (recommendation repeated, 3.24)
- 7.4** Only the minimum number of staff for security and safety should be positioned around a detainee. (3.14)
Not achieved (recommendation repeated, 3.9)
- 7.5** Escort staff should tell detainees early in the removal process that they are going to be filmed, and explain the reasons why and how the footage will be managed. (3.18)
Not achieved
- 7.6** Removals should be routinely monitored by one or more senior members of staff who do not normally work with escort teams. (3.19)
Achieved
- 7.7** Escorts should not lay hands on detainees without a specific cause, justified in writing in each individual case. (3.28)
Not achieved (recommendation repeated, 3.17)
- 7.8** All escorting staff should receive full accredited training for the use of force in any situation which may arise, especially on board an aircraft. (3.29)
Achieved
- 7.9** Handcuffs and other forms of physical restraint should be applied only for as long as they are needed for safety or to effect removal. (3.30)
Not achieved (recommendation repeated, 3.18)

- 7.10** All staff should be made aware of lessons from relevant inquiries and investigations. (3.31)
Not achieved

Respect

Detainees are escorted in decent physical conditions and individual needs are addressed. Detainees are treated with humanity and respect.

Recommendations

- 7.11** Unless individual risk assessment indicates otherwise, detainees should be able to use the toilet with full privacy, obtain pillows and blankets and consume hot drinks during flights. (4.4)
Partially achieved
- 7.12** Staff should behave professionally at all times, and have an awareness of their impact on detainees. (4.14)
Achieved
- 7.13** Overseas escort staff should receive regular diversity training which includes discussion of the particular circumstances, backgrounds and vulnerabilities of detainees. (4.18)
Not achieved
- 7.14** Professional interpretation should be used to enhance communication throughout the removal process. (4.19)
Not achieved (recommendation repeated, 4.13)
- 7.15** Detainees should be told how to make complaints or submit comments about Home Office or escort staff during or after the removal. (4.21)
Not achieved (recommendation repeated, 4.16)
- 7.16** Detainees' medical records should only be opened with valid justification, in an emergency or when the detainee has consented to this. (4.26)
Not achieved