Detainees under escort:
Inspection of escort and removals to

Nigeria and Ghana

by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

28–29 July 2015
Glossary of terms

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Fact page

**Departure airport**
Stansted

**Destination countries**
Nigeria and Ghana

**Destination airports**
Lagos and Accra

**Escort contractor**
Tascor

**Number of detainees escorted**
55

**Number of escort staff**
132

**Health care staff**
7

**Length of journey**
18 hours (maximum)
Introduction

Operation Majestic is a regular removal flight to Nigeria, often including an additional leg to Accra, in Ghana. We previously inspected this flight in April 2011 and November 2013. In 2013, I said in the introduction, after noting a few improvements:

‘Many of the escorting staff, especially those in leading roles, had been doing this job for many years. They were, on the whole, calm and confident in carrying out their duties, which went a considerable way towards defusing tensions and allaying some of the immediate fears of detainees. However, some ways of working had become entrenched, for which there was little justification. These included keeping handcuffs on for much longer than necessary; holding detainees by the arm in secure areas; searching in locations without any privacy; denying privacy to detainees using the toilet; and withholding facilities such as pillows, blankets and hot drinks during an overnight flight without regard to evidence of risk in the individual case. There were deficiencies in the recording and communication of information about risk...’

We repeat almost exactly the same points in this report. Experienced escort staff did their core job satisfactorily, and the detainees were on the whole positive about the care that custody officers and health care staff provided; however, waist restraint belts had replaced handcuffs, and officers no longer routinely held detainees’ arms within secure detention centres. There was a risk that waist restraint belts, which were now embedded in practice, were being overused and applied whenever there was any ground for supposing that the person might not cooperate during the boarding of the coach or aircraft. They were used on eight detainees during this operation. When the wrists are in the close position (i.e. tight to the hips) they are almost equivalent to body belts, the most extreme and very rarely used, mechanical restraints available in prisons. Staff now received use of force training. However, steps needed to be taken to ensure the restraint belt was not used without proper justification.

The length of the journey was avoidably extended at both ends of the process. It took four hours to process about a dozen people at an immigration removal centre, which was too long, as was the wait of over an hour after landing at Lagos to disembark from the aircraft, while Nigerian immigration officials conducted interviews in the cramped public space of the passenger cabin. A building for this purpose would have been a benefit in several respects. A member of the British High Commission staff in Lagos provided detainees in need with real help.

The treatment of detainees on these removal operations was reasonably safe and respectful, but it was a concern that a number of issues, which these reports have consistently pointed out, have not been addressed in two years. We are concerned that standards have reached a plateau, and that there appears to be little aspiration to improve further.

Nick Hardwick
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

September 2015
Section 1. Summary

1.1 Fifty-five detainees travelled on the flight, despite the fact that 70 were normally removed during the operation. We were told that the suspension of the ‘detained fast track’ procedure contributed to the lower number.

1.2 Most detainees could rest before the journey, but two had been travelling for a number of hours before boarding the coach. There were unreasonably long delays in detainees boarding coaches at all immigration removal centres (IRCs) and as a result, the flight left one and a half hours late. Staff were courteous and considerate in their reception and searching of the detainees at the IRCs. Some detainees were not allowed sufficient privacy when they used the toilet.

1.3 Staff used persuasion rather than coercion whenever possible. Searching was proportionate, but not always sufficiently private.

1.4 The waist restraint belt was used on eight detainees. While risk factors were used to justify each case, the evidence was sometimes minimal. Physical restraints are only appropriate in response to physical resistance, or in some circumstances passive non-compliance. However, in some cases the belts were used following verbal threats or previous poor behaviour; sometimes they were left on for too long. Some staff were dressed in a way which could have been considered intimidating.

1.5 Three detainees were being monitored for self-harm risks. They received good support, and there was evidence of good care in the IRCs. One man identified as being at risk of self-harm was placed in a restraint belt, although there was no clear evidence of a risk of harm to others. In the latter stages of the flight, some escorting staff slept next to the detainee whom they were escorting.

1.6 Detainees had good access to mobile phones at every relevant stage of the process. They were informed promptly of any change in their circumstances, and the chief immigration officer (CIO) on board took the time to ensure individuals understood their legal position.

1.7 Physical conditions on the coaches and the aircraft were satisfactory, with adequate and appropriate food and drink, but hot drinks were only available for staff during the flight. Detainees’ property was generally dealt with appropriately and staff were on the whole helpful and positive in their dealings with detainees. However, some staff spoke to each other excessively loudly over the heads of detainees, without sufficient regard to how that might have affected detainees.

1.8 Eleven women boarded the coach at Yarl’s Wood. Their privacy, for example, when using the toilet, was not always respected, and at Stansted a woman was escorted by two men holding her arms, which she clearly found uncomfortable.

1.9 All detainees received an information sheet at the outset of the coach journey, providing them with contact details for any complaints about the escort contractor Tascor, but no other details were available and there was no information at all about how to make a complaint about Home Office staff.

1.10 IRC and Tascor health care staff liaised sufficiently well and detainees received good health care during their journey. Flight paramedics inappropriately read all confidential medical notes.
1.11 Detainees could obtain some information about returning to Nigeria and Ghana. Nigerian and Ghanaian officials accompanied the flight, although they did not speak to detainees. Those who needed it received some practical help through the British High Commission and other agencies. The CIO on board the flight also provided them with useful information.

1.12 The disembarkation process at Lagos led to long delays. Nigerian immigration officials conducted individual interviews at the front of the plane; many took a long time, and there was no confidentiality. At Accra, detainees left the aircraft promptly and immigration procedures took place on the ground.
Section 2. Background

2.1 All inspections carried out by HM Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP) contribute to the UK’s response to its international obligations under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). OPCAT requires that all places of detention are visited regularly by independent bodies – known as the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) – which monitors the treatment of and conditions for detainees. Escorts are included in this remit. HMIP is one of several bodies making up the NPM in the UK.

2.2 The aircraft was chartered by the Home Office directorate of immigration enforcement, and Tascor was the escort contractor. Detainees were collected from four immigration removal centres (IRCs) – Brook House, Colnbrook, Harmondsworth, Tinsley House and Yarl’s Wood. The flight carried 55 detainees: the intention had been to remove 70 people. Forty-four travelled to Lagos and 11 to Ghana, one of whom was to be escorted onwards to Gabon. Managers said the suspension of the ‘detained fast track’ process was the reason for the drop in the number of reserves. Custody officers were properly accredited, confident and familiar with their duties. Inspectors handed out cards providing detainees with details if they wished to contact HMIP after reaching their destination. No responses were received to date.

2.3 The operation was inspected from the point at which detainees were collected from the IRCs. Two inspectors travelled on the flight, which left Stansted at 1am, landing in Lagos at approximately 7.20am and Accra at 10.45am (all times GMT). The longest journey time, from embarkation on the coach at the IRC to disembarkation at Accra, was 18 hours. The records of the three previous flights to West Africa in April, May and June 2015 were also examined for this report. The number of detainees on those flights was respectively 71, 66 and 53.
Section 3. Safety

Expected outcomes:
Detainees are escorted in safety and due regard is given to individual needs and risks. Removals are conducted in accordance with law. Security and good order are maintained through proportional operational arrangements and force is only used as a last resort.

3.1 Most detainees had had time to rest before the journey, but two had spent many hours in a small van before boarding the coach. It took too long to transfer detainees from the immigration removal centre (IRC) to the coaches at several centres. Detainees were treated courteously during the handover process and searching was proportionate. Detainees’ privacy was not always respected, especially in the case of female detainees. Waist restraint belts were used on eight detainees, one for eight hours, and not always for appropriate reasons. Those at risk of self-harm were supported and monitored reasonably well, but some escorts were asleep during the latter part of the flight.

Preparation and departure from removal centres

3.2 Most detainees had been at the IRC from which they departed for at least two nights before the flight. Four men and a woman had travelled from Maidstone to Colnbrook the previous day. Two detainees had travelled on the day of their removal from Morton Hall IRC in Lincolnshire, arriving in a small van that had been contaminated with their urine (we could not determine why); they were held in the van for several hours before being moved straight to the coach, which was unacceptable treatment. One detainee was brought to Harmondsworth from Dover IRC; he had refused to comply when an in-country escort had attempted to transfer him two days previously. Colnbrook IRC helpfully facilitated a last-minute visit with family from whom a detainee was going to be separated as a result of his removal.

3.3 There were long and, in some cases, avoidable delays in the early stages of the process. At Harmondsworth, there were 36 planned transfers on the day of the flight, as well as eight releases – these held up preparations for the flight. There was also a considerable delay when a detainee scheduled to fly climbed a fence to resist going. At Colnbrook it took four hours to board 13 people on the first coach; some detainees were on the coach for over four hours before it left, although some were allowed off to use the toilet in the IRC. One of the reasons for the delay was a mistake in identification; a man was taken through the process to the point of almost boarding the coach when, after following up his protestations, it was confirmed that his name differed by one letter from the name of the person on the list. As a result, the second coach from Colnbrook, which could not enter the IRC until the first had left, did not have time to take all of the detainees on the list and three were left behind in order to avoid further delay. Despite this, the flight left 1.5 hours later than scheduled.

3.4 At Brook House, it took so long to process 11 detainees that some were on the coach for four hours before it departed. At Yarl’s Wood, the first detainee boarded the coach at 5.10pm, but it did not leave until 8.40pm. Person escort records contained little information about detainees’ risks; for example, one at Brook House simply said ‘uncooperative’. As a result, staff’s risk assessments were based very largely on how detainees appeared at the time.
3.5 An IRC officer at Harmondsworth took great care to explain matters to those being removed. At Colnbrook and Yarl’s Wood IRC, Tascor staff were courteous and explained processes carefully to detainees; a Tascor officer introduced himself to each detainee and shook their hand.

Recommendations

3.6 Tascor managers should eliminate unnecessary delays in the handover process by improving procedures and training staff.

3.7 The time spent by detainees on a coach should be monitored, and alternatives found to holding them for long periods on a vehicle. (Repeated recommendation 3.6)

3.8 Escort documentation should clearly indicate to staff the specific risk factors that need to be managed. (Repeated recommendation 2.37)

Security, order and rules

3.9 Searching following handovers from the IRC was proportionate and staff explained each step in the process in advance to avoid any unnecessary apprehension or misunderstanding. When the broken blade from a disposable razor was found in a detainee’s pocket at Brook House, of which he claimed to have no knowledge, staff satisfied themselves there was no grounds for suspecting risk of harm to him or others, and did not strip-search him. Detainees were only searched again at Stansted Airport if X-ray portals indicated this was necessary. Detainees were discreetly filmed during the embarkation process.

3.10 On the coach, the escorting officer usually wedged their handcuffs in the toilet door to stop it from being locked from the inside. The same precaution applied on the aircraft. Staff tried to ensure maximum privacy, but the arrangement was unsatisfactory.

3.11 Some women detainees travelled in the same coach as men, but a reasonable degree of separation was maintained. At Yarl’s Wood a female escort officer went into the toilet with each detainee, saying it was to prevent secretion of dangerous items. This was inappropriate, and the practice stopped when we raised it as an issue.

Recommendation

3.12 Unless an individual risk assessment indicates otherwise, detainees should be able to use the toilet in complete privacy.

Good order and behaviour management

3.13 A male detainee stripped to a pair of shorts and covered his torso with baby oil. Staff did not overreact: they persuaded him to walk to the van in which he was to be transported. He was taken not to the terminal at Stansted but directly to the foot of the aircraft steps. At this point he resisted and was restrained (see paragraph 3.22).

3.14 Rub-down searching was generally carried out as discreetly as possible, but generally in a public area. At Yarl’s Wood those outside (including men) could see into a room used for searching women, despite the use of a screen. The waist restraint belt was used on eight detainees; not all of them were failing to comply with the removal (see section on use of
force). At least four officers – often more – hemmed in each detainee without specific regard to the risk posed while the chief immigration officer interviewed them on the aircraft.

3.15 Some staff slept while on one-to-one escort duty in the latter part of the flight.

Recommendations

3.16 Searching in the IRC should take place in privacy.

3.17 Only the minimum number of staff for security and safety should be positioned around a detainee, based on individual risk assessment. (Repeated recommendation 2.23)

3.18 Staff should not sleep while they are responsible for the personal supervision of a detainee.

Use of force

3.19 All staff had received Home Office training on escorting detainees safely, and most had been on a refresher course following their initial training. Officers leading detainees to the coaches within the secure area of the IRC did not touch them.

3.20 The waist restraint belt was used on five detainees who did not actively resist removal. In each case the wrist strap was in the ‘restricted’ position, where the detainee had reasonably free movement. The restraints were not used in response to physical resistance or non-compliance but on the basis of verbal threats or previous poor behaviour. One detainee, for example, had been threatening to resist the removal. Another was subject to assessment, care in detention and teamwork (ACDT) monitoring for detainees at risk of suicide or self-harm. The log recorded use of the belt ‘as a preventive to Mr A causing any harm to himself or staff’. While harm to others might have been a legitimate reason, it was not acceptable to use restraints in order to prevent detainees from harming themselves; they should only be used when someone is physically resisting staff, or where a detainee needs to be carried because of passive non-compliance.

3.21 In several cases the belts were left on longer than necessary because they might have been needed to carry the person onto the aircraft. However, staff generally failed to remove them as soon as the person was in their seat.

3.22 Staff physically restrained three detainees using ‘control and restraint’ techniques, leading in one case to use of a restraint belt and leg straps on a detainee who was non-compliant and shouted at staff at Brook House. None of these active uses of force was inappropriate or disproportionate, as the detainees were physically non-compliant in each case, and they had had sufficient opportunities to comply. The leg straps were removed on arrival at Stansted. ‘Guiding holds’ (where a detainee’s arm and elbow are held) were used on all detainees at Stansted, regardless of their individual escape risk, and in one case a female detainee was held by men (see paragraph 4.9). Escort staff de-escalated situations skilfully, for example, when dealing with a detainee who had stripped to a pair of shorts and covered his torso with oil. The man resisted being taken out of the van at the airport, and staff restrained him in a prone position (lying face down) on the ground at the foot of the aircraft steps. The restraint belt was in the close position, with the wrists held tight to the belt. However, the belt was not removed until after take-off; he was in it continuously for eight hours, which was inappropriate. He was examined several times by a paramedic and was given an ice pack to help reduce the swelling to his wrist caused by the wrist restraints.
3.23 During each of the previous three removal operations to Nigeria and Ghana, the waist restraint belt had been used: on two detainees on 20 January, six on 24 March and two on 28 July. The justification for several of these uses was not explicit in the records, and so it was not clear whether every effort had been made to encourage compliance before enforcing removal in this way.

Recommendations

3.24 **Escorts should not hold detainees' elbows when escorting them through secure areas, and should do so in less secure areas only on the basis of an individual risk assessment.** (Repeated recommendation 2.16)

3.25 **Physical restraints should be applied only when necessary to control the detainee, and only for as long as they are needed for safety or to effect removal.**

Bullying and intimidation

3.26 Most escorting staff were dressed informally and appropriately. Several members of the security team (a group of staff who were not responsible for one-to-one escorting but who carried out searches, supervised the transition from coach to plane, and oversaw safety and order on the aircraft) were dressed in combat trousers and black boots, which was potentially intimidating. This was especially noticeable when several of them stood around a detainee during the Tascor search process at Colnbrook IRC (see housekeeping point 4.7).

Emotional distress and self-harm

3.27 Three detainees were being monitored for self-harm risks. The ACDT process was carried out effectively and support was good. One of the three, aged 49, was placed in a waist restraint belt until he was on the aircraft, with wrists in the restricted position (see section on use of force). He had been on an ACDT almost continuously for six months in Colnbrook and Brook House. Extremely thorough documentation included records of 26 multidisciplinary case reviews in that time. A second detainee was placed on self-harm monitoring as a result of missing six consecutive meals in the IRC. The third was a 25-year-old man who said that he had come to the UK aged 10 and had never been back to Ghana, to which he was now being returned. He said that he had a partner and two-year-old daughter in the UK, and had been very anxious to see his daughter.

3.28 At Yarl’s Wood, the handover of information to escorting staff about the detainee who had missed meals was good. The woman was taken to Stansted in a separate van, and was treated with consideration. Most Tascor staff completed the person escort record forms well, making frequent entries; some went into helpful detail on the mood of the detainee and what they said.

Legal rights

3.29 The deputy manager of the immigration enforcement team at Yarl’s Wood helpfully updated the detainees on the condition of their case, and resolved some issues, for example about money.
3.30 All detainees were advised during reception that they would have access to a company mobile phone on the coach to call legal advisers or family or friends, and all of them could make calls both on the coach and at the airport until shortly before take-off. Detainees could keep key legal documents with them on the journey, and Home Office staff updated them promptly on any changes. Some appeared uncertain about what their solicitors were doing on their behalf. During his surgery (see paragraph 5.4), the CIO took time to check that detainees understood the position of their legal case.

Child care and protection

3.31 There were no children on the flight. Escorting officers had received basic child protection training during their initial and annual refresher training.
Section 4. Respect

Expected outcomes:
Detainees are escorted in decent physical conditions and individual needs are addressed. Detainees are treated with humanity and respect.

4.1 The physical conditions in which the detainees travelled, and the facilities offered, were adequate in most respects. Staff were positive and polite in their dealings with detainees, and most took care to establish a good rapport early in the journey, although at times some loud jocularity among staff was not in tune with the mood of most detainees. Female detainees were not always kept separate from men, or escorted by female staff. The complaints process was not consistent. Health care was sound, but all medical notes were opened and read.

Physical conditions

4.2 The coaches were all clean and in good order with air conditioning and access to a toilet. Sandwiches, fruit, snacks and bottles of water were offered to detainees shortly after they set off from the IRCs; the range of items available was appropriate. Staff made a point of handing out the food to detainees before eating some of the same food themselves. Hot drinks were provided on the coaches once they had arrived at Stansted. During the flight hot drinks were available for staff, but not for detainees. Detainees could not use the pillows or blankets that were available for passengers on the aircraft.

Recommendation

4.3 Unless an individual risk assessment indicates otherwise, detainees should be able to consume hot drinks and obtain pillows and blankets during flights.

Property and clothing

4.4 Property was handled thoroughly and appropriately, except at Yarl’s Wood, where detainees’ property was spread on the floor to be sorted out, for lack of suitable tables. At Colnbrook, staff allowed two brothers who were being removed to exchange shoes from their property and sit together on the coach.

4.5 All detainees could note down key phone numbers from their personal SIM card before they were temporarily removed from them for the journey. They could wear belts, but jewellery was removed. They could keep paper money with them, but not coins. Detainees who had only a polythene bag for their possessions received a proper travelling bag at the IRC.

Positive relationships

4.6 Staff spoke to detainees courteously and positively, establishing a good rapport in most cases. On the whole they reacted well to a few detainees who were very distressed and argued emphatically for long periods about their removal. Some escort staff talked overly
Section 4. Respect

Inspection of escorts and removals to Nigeria and Ghana

loudly over the heads of detainees on a coach, and during the screening process at Stansted. Detainees received reasonably good care on the coaches.

Housekeeping point

4.7 All staff involved in the escorting process should avoid behaviour or clothing that detainees could consider disrespectful or intimidating.

Diversity

4.8 Eleven women were brought from Yarl's Wood IRC, three of whom had their removal cancelled. Each of the women said that they had been given at least a week’s notice of the removal. One female detainee was brought from Colnbrook. She travelled in the same coach with the men, which meant if she had used the toilet her privacy would have been breached given the practice of holding the toilet door ajar.

4.9 A female detainee was brought into the terminal from the van in which she had travelled to Stansted, with a male officer holding each arm and a female officer behind. She clearly felt uncomfortable and was trying to shake the men’s hands off her, although she did not show any indication of trying to escape. At take-off, this detainee became very distressed; female staff surrounded her, but were restrained and polite in their responses to her, and helped her to become calmer.

4.10 All detainees appeared to speak English confidently; however, staff did not ask about their ability to speak English, and there was no interpreter available. Staff said they would use telephone interpretation if a detainee could not speak English, although it would not have been available on the aircraft.

Recommendation

4.11 Female detainees should be kept separate from unrelated male detainees at all times.

Complaints

4.12 Complaint forms were not available on several coaches. All detainees received the ‘Speak freely’ information sheet at the outset of the coach journey, providing contact details for any complaints about Tascor, which they might wish to submit after their arrival. However, on the aircraft many detainees did not know how to make a complaint, and many no longer had the information sheet. One detainee filled in a complaint form on the coach about a phone he said was missing from his property. Detainees did not receive any information about how to make a complaint about Home Office staff.

Recommendation

4.13 Detainees should be told how to make complaints or submit comments about Home Office or escort staff during or after the removal.
Health

4.14 Liaison on health issues between the IRC and health care staff supplied by medical service provider IPRS Aeromed was good. All health care staff were registered paramedics with at least five years’ experience in emergency work. They said they had had a week’s notice of the list of passengers and information about health issues, and had been able to follow up on any issues arising from the information. At Colnbrook there was no formal handover between IRC health care staff and the escort paramedic, but they did liaise on the day of the removal as issues arose.

4.15 All envelopes containing medical notes were opened. Health care staff explained that they were instructed by their clinical director to open all the envelopes in case there might be any key information that had not been passed on verbally. Medical notes should only be opened with consent; IRC health care staff should verbally pass on any risk information required by health care staff escorting the removal operation.

4.16 The continuity and quality of health care was satisfactory, and the flight medics checked detainees on whom force had been used. The health care staff checked on detainees throughout the flight. Just before arrival at the destination airport, each detainee received their sealed medical notes.

Recommendation

4.17 A detainee’s medical records should be opened and read only when there is evidence of cause for concern.
Section 5. Preparation for reintegration

Expected outcomes:
Detainees are prepared for their arrival and early days in the destination country.
Any unacceptable behaviour in destination countries is appropriately challenged.

5.1 Detainees received some help to resettle in their destination country, although some said they did not know what they were going to do or what would happen to them on arrival. The chief immigration officer (CIO) accompanying the flight offered helpful advice, and a member of staff from the British High Commission gave those in need some practical assistance. There was a very long delay in disembarkation at Lagos airport.

5.2 Booklets ‘Returning to Nigeria’ and ‘Returning to Ghana’ were handed out to some detainees. Two officials from the Ghanaian and Nigerian High Commissions in London monitored the flight, but did not speak to detainees. A detainee had received a £100 grant through Hibiscus, the charity working to support the resettlement of returnees. She said that she did not know what would happen to her back in Nigeria. One detainee was concerned he might be locked up on his return, although most said they had family connections in the country.

5.3 A member of staff from the British High Commission came onto the aircraft at Lagos and arranged support from local agencies for any who were referred because they had no means of support. She ensured that all detainees had somewhere to stay in the short term and enough money for travel to their home area.

5.4 As was routine on these flights, detainees were asked if they wished to speak with the CIO who was on the flight. Each detainee was taken in turn to a seat at the rear of the front section of the aircraft. The CIO dealt thoroughly and courteously with all the questions raised, spending a good deal of time with each person and giving them as much information and advice as possible.

5.5 There were inordinate delays in disembarkation at Lagos. Two and a half hours passed between landing at Lagos and take-off. Nigerian immigration officials came on to the aircraft and carried out long interviews with each individual in the front seats of the aircraft where confidentiality was not possible. Three detainees objected at length to their removal, and the immigration staff showed patience and restraint in response. The situation was eventually resolved by the appearance of a small number of police officers. The officers ushered the remaining detainees off the aircraft, but did not raise their voices or make physical contact.

5.6 The handover between British and local officials was calmer than at the last inspection; there was less tension and staff did not raise their voices. British High Commission staff told us that the delay was due to the fact that the Nigerian authorities did not have facilities to process the arrivals in the airport building; there were plans to build a holding facility so that returnees could leave the aircraft immediately on landing and be processed on the ground. At Accra, detainees left the aircraft promptly and immigration processes took place in the airport.
Recommendation

5.7 The British government should work with the Nigerian government to establish an appropriate reception facility for returnees at Lagos airport.
Section 6. Recommendations and housekeeping points

Recommendation To the Home Office

Preparation for reintegration

6.1 The British government should work with the Nigerian government to establish an appropriate reception facility for returnees at Lagos airport. (5.7)

Recommendations To the Home Office, Tascor and the Centre Manager

Preparation and departure from removal centres

6.2 Tascor managers should eliminate unnecessary delays in the handover process by improving procedures and training staff. (3.6)

6.3 Escort documentation should clearly indicate to staff the specific risk factors that need to be managed. (3.8, repeated recommendation 2.37)

Recommendations To Tascor

Safety

6.4 The time spent by detainees on a coach should be monitored, and alternatives found to holding them for long periods on a vehicle. (3.7, repeated recommendation 3.6)

6.5 Unless an individual risk assessment indicates otherwise, detainees should be able to use the toilet in complete privacy. (3.12)

6.6 Searching in the IRC should take place in privacy. (3.16)

6.7 Only the minimum number of staff for security and safety should be positioned around a detainee, based on individual risk assessment. (3.17, repeated recommendation 2.23)

6.8 Staff should not sleep while they are responsible for the personal supervision of a detainee. (3.18)

6.9 Escorts should not hold detainees’ elbows when escorting them through secure areas, and should do so in less secure areas only on the basis of an individual risk assessment. (3.24, repeated recommendation 2.16)

6.10 Physical restraints should be applied only when necessary to control the detainee, and only for as long as they are needed for safety or to effect removal. (3.25)

Respect
Section 6. Recommendations and housekeeping points

6.11 Unless an individual risk assessment indicates otherwise, detainees should be able to consume hot drinks and obtain pillows and blankets during flights. (4.3)

6.12 Female detainees should be kept separate from unrelated male detainees at all times. (4.11)

6.13 Detainees should be told how to make complaints or submit comments about Home Office or escort staff during or after the removal. (4.13)

6.14 A detainee’s medical records should be opened and read only when there is evidence of cause for concern. (4.17)

Housekeeping point

Respect

6.15 All staff involved in the escorting process should avoid behaviour or clothing that detainees could consider disrespectful or intimidating. (4.7)
Section 7. Appendices

Appendix I: Inspection team

Martin Kettle  Inspector (team leader)
Gary Boughen  Inspector
Stephen Eley  Health services inspector
Maureen Jamieson  Health services inspector
Appendix II: Progress on recommendations from the last report

The following is a summary of the main findings from the last report (6–7 November 2013) and a list of all the recommendations made, organised under the three broad tests of healthy detention practice. The reference numbers at the end of each recommendation refer to the paragraph location in the previous report. If a recommendation has been repeated in the main report, its new paragraph number is also provided.

Safety

_Detainees are escorted in safety and due regard is given to individual needs and risks._

Recommendations

7.1  A removal should not be started unless all necessary documentation is available. (2.10)
    **Achieved**

7.2  Detainees should not be placed in demeaning paper clothing when they have demonstrated compliance and when under constant supervision. (2.11)
    **Achieved**

7.3  Handcuffs should only be applied as a last resort when all other attempts at de-escalation have failed. (2.12)
    **Partially achieved**

7.4  Escorts should not hold detainees’ elbows when escorting them through secure areas, and should do so in less secure areas only on the basis of risk assessment. (2.16)
    **Partially achieved** (recommendation repeated, 3.24)

7.5  Searching in the IRC should take place away from the reception desk and, if possible, in a separate room. (2.22)
    **Not achieved**

7.6  Only the minimum number of staff for security and safety should be positioned around a detainee. (2.23)
    **Not achieved** (recommendation repeated, 3.17)

7.7  Handcuffs and other forms of physical restraint should only be applied for as long as they are needed for safety or to effect removal. (2.28)
    **Not achieved**

7.8  All escorting staff should receive full accredited training for the use of force in any situation which may arise, especially on board an aircraft. (2.29)
    **Achieved**

7.9  All planned uses of force and all boarding of aircraft by detainees should be filmed by a dedicated and trained DCO. (2.30)
    **Achieved**
7.10 DCOs should be alert at all times when supervising detainees who are distressed, especially if they have an identified risk of self-harm. (2.36)
   Not achieved

7.11 Escort documentation should clearly indicate to staff the specific risk factors that need to be managed. (2.37)
   Not achieved (recommendation repeated, 3.8)

Respect

*Detainees are escorted in decent physical conditions and individual needs are addressed. Detainees are treated with humanity and respect.*

Recommendations

7.12 The time spent by detainees on a coach should be monitored, and alternatives found to holding them for long periods on a vehicle. (3.6)
   Not achieved (recommendation repeated, 3.7)

7.13 Unless individual risk assessment indicates otherwise, detainees should be able to use the toilet with full privacy, consume hot drinks and obtain pillows and blankets during flights. (3.7)
   Not achieved

7.14 Staff should not discuss a detainee or their behaviour in their hearing, or that of other detainees, unless it is necessary for immediate control of a dangerous situation. (3.12)
   Achieved

Preparation for reintegration

*Detainees are prepared for their arrival and early days in the destination country and their arrival is managed as smoothly and constructively as possible.*

Recommendation

7.15 The Home Office should agree with the Nigerian authorities’ protocols for action in case of refusal by a detainee to leave the aircraft at the destination airport. (4.5)
   Partially achieved