

Detainees under escort:
Inspection of escort and removals to

Pakistan

by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

10 –11 December 2013

Glossary of terms

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Printed and published by:
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons
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30–34 Kingsway
London
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Fact page

Departure airport

Stansted

Destination country

Pakistan

Destination airport

Islamabad

Escort contractor

Tascor

Number of detainees escorted

66

Number of escort staff

124

Health care staff

3

Length of journey

18.5 hours (maximum for first detainees to be collected from an IRC)

Introduction

This report refers to a charter flight removal to Pakistan of 66 detainees, supervised by 124 staff. The removal was well organised and completed with little incident. However, too many of our findings replicated those at previous inspections, particularly those in relation to the dignity of detainees. Staff also had little awareness of important inquiry findings that should have been cascaded down to them following the death of a detainee during a scheduled flight removal in 2010.

The generally experienced escort team managed the removal safely. However, some staff persisted in using control techniques that were more likely to escalate tensions than promote calm behaviour. It was hard to understand why the escorts had still not been provided with training on use of force in confined environments such as aircraft, some two and a half years after we first made that recommendation.

The condition of staff is relevant to the experience of detainees and we noted that many of the contracted staff were exhausted. It is almost inconceivable that in any other area of HM Inspectorate of Prisons' work we would find staff in charge of detainees at an identified risk of self-harm in a state of such exhaustion that they cannot avoid falling asleep. Individual staff should not be blamed for this; management systems needed development and risks had not been properly assessed and mitigated.

Despite impressive care and concern shown by individual escort staff, detainees were not treated with enough decency in the removal process. Generally efficient procedures did not amount to respect for detainees who, it seemed to us, were seen as commodities to be delivered rather than as vulnerable individuals deserving of individual attention. Most staff behaved appropriately but others were unprofessional and inappropriate. For example, some staff engaged in juvenile behaviour and swore in the hearing of detainees, seemingly oblivious to the effect this might have. It was also unacceptable that detainees who were already undergoing a stressful situation were not told of an initial three-hour flight delay that was known days before, nor given any information during a further 3.5 hour delay on the plane. No interpreting services were provided, despite obvious need. This created avoidable anxiety for everyone concerned.

We were pleased to find that, unlike our findings at some other overseas escort inspections, the reception of detainees was courteous and quick. Embassy oversight and welfare support were available immediately on arrival, and we saw no evidence of mistreatment. More respectful treatment of detainees throughout the removal process and better overall support and management of escort staff are key challenges that should now be addressed.

Nick Hardwick
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

June 2014

Section 1. Summary

- S1 This difficult logistical removal operation involved a total of 66 detainees being collected from four immigration removal centres (IRCs). A total of 124 staff were on board the flight, including a 10-person security team, three managers, three health care staff and a chief immigration officer (CIO), who was in overall charge of the removal. The number of staff on board was proportionate and sufficient to safeguard security. Overall, the removal was well organised by Tascor and Home Office managers, and was completed with little incident.
- S2 Not all escort staff explained processes to detainees clearly at the IRCs. Some provided useful information about the support that was available at each stage of the removal, including the welfare assistance that was provided in Islamabad. Some staff were exceptionally engaged with detainees throughout the removal, giving useful information about what was happening to them, and demonstrated a commendable level of decency and respect.
- S3 On collection at IRCs, it became evident that most detainees had not been told that the removal had been put back by three hours, despite the fact that this information had been known by the Home Office for several days. During a further 3.5-hour delay before take-off, there was no announcement to detainees to inform them of what was going on. Some were very agitated and anxious as a result.
- S4 There were inconsistent practices between the different escort teams, depending on which IRC they attended. Some used unnecessary compulsion to take detainees from the search area to the coach, even though it was in a secure area and detainees were compliant. At some IRCs, staff removed watches, belts and jewellery from detainees, regardless of individual risk factors.
- S5 There was still no specialised training for staff in use of force in confined spaces such as aircraft and coaches, although we were told that such training was due to be rolled out in 2014. There were no problems of order or control. Passive handcuffs (used on detainees who are not aggressive) were used in one case, but for too long, given that the detainee remained calm throughout.
- S6 Most operational staff had little awareness of recent important findings by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman and Coroner in relation to the death of a detainee, Mr Jimmy Mubenga, on a scheduled flight in 2010. None remembered any information or training on the issues raised in these reports.
- S7 Staff occasionally took on successive removals with as little as 12 hours' rest between jobs. By the time that detainees disembarked in Islamabad, some staff had been at work for more than 20 hours, and there was insufficient planning to manage rest breaks properly. Some staff had fallen asleep as soon as they boarded the bus to the airport. During the flight, staff who were responsible for a detainee considered to be at risk of self-harm had also fallen asleep.

- S8 Too many points raised at previous inspections remained unaddressed, especially those relating to the respectful treatment of detainees. Our overriding impression was that the vulnerabilities of detainees were not sufficiently central to the removal operation. For example, a few staff had conversations with each other over the heads of detainees, played with their mobile telephones on the coach, swore loudly or engaged in juvenile behaviour. Detainees were not systematically told that they would be filmed on parts of the removal, or the reasons for this.
- S9 Detainees were regularly referred to by their “manifest number” (i.e. passenger list number) rather than by name. When they used the toilet on the coach or the aircraft, the door was wedged open with handcuffs. On the flight, they were offered different, and less food, than was given to staff; and no official interpreting was provided during any part of the journey. Managers did not act in a supervisory capacity, and generally sat at the front of the plane, out of sight and earshot of most staff and detainees.
- S10 The CIO provided a surgery on board the plane for detainees who wanted to see him, and checked for any last-minute judicial reviews as soon the plane touched down. The processing of detainees by the authorities in Islamabad was courteous and quick, and they were treated appropriately by receiving staff. A British embassy official oversaw the arrival and took questions from detainees. The voluntary welfare organisation, Weldo, provided detainees with both immediate reintegration assistance and ongoing welfare support.

Section 2. Background

- 2.1** All inspections carried out by HM Inspectorate of Prisons contribute to the UK's response to its international obligations under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). OPCAT requires that all places of detention are visited regularly by independent bodies – known as the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) – which monitors the treatment of and conditions for detainees. Escorts are included in this remit. HM Inspectorate of Prisons is one of several bodies making up the NPM in the UK.
- 2.2** This was the first charter flight to Pakistan that we had inspected. The aircraft was chartered by the Home Office Directorate of Immigration Enforcement, and Tascor was the escort contractor. Detainees were collected from four immigration removal centres (IRCs) – Colnbrook, Brook House, Harmondsworth and Yarl's Wood, which primarily holds adult women. One detainee was taken to Stansted separately in a small van because he had been resistant at Colnbrook and it was suspected that he might be disruptive. Staff that we spoke to said that they were detention custody officers certified under Part 8 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.
- 2.3** The entire process was inspected from the point at which detainees were collected from the three male IRCs, and all detainees were then included in the inspection, from their arrival at Stansted Airport to arrival at Islamabad. Two inspectors travelled on the flight, which took off from Stansted at approximately 5am GMT, some 3.5 hours later than the planned departure time, as a result of foggy conditions. It landed in Islamabad at approximately 12pm (5pm local time), about seven hours later. The records of three previous flights to Islamabad were also examined for this report.

Section 3. Safety

Expected outcomes:

Detainees are escorted in safety and due regard is given to individual needs and risks. Removals are conducted in accordance with law. Security and good order are maintained through proportional operational arrangements and force is only used as a last resort.

3.1 *The ratio of escort staff to detainees was appropriate. Escort staff made efforts to put detainees at their ease at immigration removal centres. Some detainees had not been informed of delays, causing avoidable stress. The removal operation was well organised, with no significant incidents occurring. Some escorts applied unnecessary light-touch compulsion in secure areas. One detainee on the flight had handcuffs applied for too long, and we found similar cases in the records of other flights. Staff had no training in accredited techniques for use of force on an aircraft. Those at risk of self-harm were generally well looked after but staff fell asleep while caring for them. Detainees were not systematically told that they would be filmed on parts of the removal, or the reasons for this.*

Preparation and departure from removal centres

- 3.2** The flight was originally scheduled to carry 85 detainees but 66 made the journey after cancellations, which were mainly due to last-minute legal challenges or health issues.
- 3.3** A number of detainees had been transferred to the collection IRCs one or two days before the flight. Detainees were not routinely held in separation units but the conditions that some experienced were restrictive, especially those held in the bleak last days unit at Colnbrook. One man told us that he had been shocked to move from the relatively open environment of Haslar IRC to the Colnbrook last days unit, where he had been locked in a cell for most of the day before removal.
- 3.4** The flight departure time had been put back by three hours some days earlier as a result of a change to landing permissions at Islamabad. However, this information had not been relayed to all detainees, despite the fact that it had been known for several days. One man said that he was keen to return to Pakistan and had been anxious that he had been left behind when the escorts had not arrived to collect him at the expected time. When we asked IRC staff if they had informed detainees of the delay, they told us that they had not been informed themselves. There was a further 3.5-hour delay on the plane before take-off as a result of foggy conditions. There was no announcement to inform detainees of the situation. Person escort records (PERs), which were completed for all detainees, indicated that some had become agitated as a result of the lack of information.
- 3.5** There was no 'reserve' list (detainees not booked to fly but who would be put on the flight if another detainee was not be able to go) but reserves had been used on previous flights. Reserve detainees were taken through normal removal procedures and had said their goodbyes, before being returned to detention. This practice lacked humanity and was unacceptable.
- 3.6** There were initially insufficient staff at Colnbrook to take all of the detainees who had been booked for the flight; the coach commander called the Tascor base at Heston and an extra officer was mustered to assist with the journey to the airport. Records of previous flights to Islamabad showed that a shortage of staff at the point of collection was a persistent problem that had resulted in detainees expecting, and in some cases wanting, to fly being left behind.

- 3.7** The coach commanders at each IRC read the relevant paperwork for each detainee, greeted them by name, shook hands with them and explained what would happen next (see section on positive relationships). The first detainees boarded the coaches at around 5.30pm. Each was seated next to a window, with a detainee custody officer (DCO) taking the aisle seat. The officers welcomed each detainee and offered them a Tascor information booklet on resettlement (see section on preparation for reintegration).
- 3.8** Many escorts were already tired at the start of the removal. One escort told us that he had returned from a European escort the night before; another said that he had returned from a long-haul flight the previous night and apparently had asked not to travel on the Islamabad flight. Another escort fell asleep as soon as the coach left one of the IRCs, and soon after take-off at least two-thirds of escort staff on the flight were asleep, including those who were supposed to be supervising detainees at risk of self-harm (see section on emotional distress and self-harm). Staff could take ad hoc breaks to use the toilet or stretch their legs but there was no arrangement to give them regular breaks and ensure that each detainee was supervised by an alert member of staff. By the time the flight had landed in Islamabad, most staff had been on duty for more than 20 hours and could not reasonably have been expected to remain awake.

Recommendations

- 3.9 Detainees should be kept informed of delays throughout the removal process.**
- 3.10 The system of using reserves should cease and there should be sufficient staff for each removal.**
- 3.11 Senior managers should ensure that staff are able to undertake their duties effectively and safely at all times while they are responsible for the care of detainees, especially when they are caring for detainees with an identified risk of self-harm.**

Security, order and rules

- 3.12** The removal operation was well organised and handled efficiently by staff. The ratio of escort staff to detainees was approximately 1.6 to one, which was reasonable. This did not include the three managers or the 10 people in the experienced security team, which included use-of-force instructors. On the plane, all detainees were seated with one or two escorts by the side of them, and the security team provided support to DCOs as required.
- 3.13** Some unnecessary security practices persisted (see section on use of force). At Stansted Airport, many of the escort staff stood around as detainees were moved through the searching area, and it was not clear why most of them could not have gone to the adjacent lounge area both to rest and to avoid unnecessary overcrowding. There were other examples of crowding; for example, during searching at Harmondsworth and during the immigration surgery on board the plane, when up to six staff stood around perfectly calm detainees as they spoke to the immigration officer.

Recommendation

- 3.14 Only the minimum number of staff for security and safety should be positioned around a detainee.**

Good order and behaviour management

- 3.15** Clear explanations of expected behaviour during the journey were given at IRCs, and there were no incidents during the coach or plane journeys. Some staff carefully explained to detainees exactly what was happening to them and continuously communicated during the removal process. We saw particularly good practice by a member of Tascor staff at Colnbrook who systematically explained to all detainees the welfare support that they could obtain on arrival in Islamabad. Others were polite but more brusque. Detainees were given a thorough rub-down search at each IRC before leaving.
- 3.16** Detainees were filmed while boarding the aircraft to ensure that any incidents were captured, but were not told that this was going to happen or why. Some were concerned at the use to which the footage would be put.
- 3.17** All the managers tended to sit at the front of the plane, out of sight and earshot of most staff and detainees, and had numerous other responsibilities. They did not monitor what was happening in the aircraft. The CIO dealt with paperwork and engaged with detainees during the flight (see paragraph 5.4) but performed no staff monitoring function.

Recommendations

- 3.18 Escort staff should tell detainees early in the removal process that they are going to be filmed, and explain the reasons why and how the footage will be managed.**
- 3.19 Removals should be routinely monitored by one or more senior members of staff who do not normally work with escort teams.**

Use of force

- 3.20** At Brook House and Harmondsworth, staff appropriately allowed detainees to walk to the coaches, which were in secure areas, accompanied by two or three officers. However, at Colnbrook, escorts grasped all detainees by the arms, even though they were also in a secure area and the detainees were compliant. This practice was not necessary to maintain control and undermined the positive rapport that staff tried to create with detainees; it surprised and in some cases upset detainees, who did not expect to have hands laid on them. At the more insecure environment at Stansted, two officers held detainees by the arms, with two others closely escorting them to the checking-in area. During the search by airport staff, all detainees had their outstretched arms held aloft by escort staff, which was disproportionate and unnecessary.
- 3.21** Staff said that they were trained in control and restraint techniques each year, and those we spoke to were aware of the risks of positional asphyxia. But they had received no specialised training on use of force in the confined space of an aircraft or coach. We were told that such training had been developed and was due to be rolled out in 2014.
- 3.22** Only one detainee was not entirely cooperative before the flight. He offered no violent resistance but would not move unaided, complaining of a severe pain in his neck. He was brought to the IRC departure area in a wheelchair. He was seen both by IRC and Tascor health care staff and considered fit to fly. He was then taken to a separate, smaller vehicle for the journey to the airport as it was feared that he might resist. On arrival at Stansted, he was placed in passive handcuffs (used on detainees who are not aggressive) as staff had judged him to be a risk, although it was not clear from the available paperwork why this was necessary, given that he was still calm and that there were a large number of staff at the

terminal. He remained in passive handcuffs for just over two hours. He was compliant on board the aircraft but his handcuffs were removed only after he had made several requests. All detainees were calm and orderly throughout the flight.

- 3.23** There had been four recorded incidents resulting in the use of restraints during the previous three charter flights. We received documentation relating to three of them. The use of restraints had been appropriate in each case we reviewed but in two cases the handcuffs had been kept on for too long.
- 3.24** In August 2013, a man in the Colnbrook IRC separation unit was presented to Tascor escorts already in handcuffs, which had been applied to the rear. He had a history of disruptive behaviour and was refusing to leave his cell. He physically resisted attempts to move him and refused to engage with staff, resulting in leg restraints being applied. Tascor staff moved his handcuffs from the rear to the safer front position during the journey to the airport. The detainee then refused to walk to the aircraft and was carried on, still in leg and hand restraints. In total, his leg restraints remained on for about three and a half hours, and handcuffs were removed after five hours and 20 minutes. He was described as being silent but calm on the plane, but his handcuffs were in place for another one hour and 45 minutes after take-off. Leg restraints were removed 20 minutes after take-off. The detainee remained calm throughout the remainder of the flight and disembarked without incident.
- 3.25** In October 2013, a married couple was due to be removed from Yarl's Wood. However, according to incident reports, the woman had not taken prescribed blood pressure medication and was considered unfit to fly. The Home Office gave authority for the man to be removed separately. He became extremely upset at this news and insisted that either they be removed together or both remain at the IRC together. He became aggressive and hit out at staff, who applied both handcuffs and leg restraints to move him. The man became calm during the journey to Stansted and was given the opportunity to speak to his wife on the telephone, whom he said had also calmed down and accepted the situation. His leg restraints were removed after 45 minutes but, despite the fact that all staff reports showed that he was completely compliant after his initial outburst, his handcuffs were not removed for seven hours and 40 minutes, shortly after the plane had taken off.
- 3.26** The paperwork that we saw had been completed reasonably well but escorts did not define laying on of hands or even passive restraints as a 'use of force'. Paperwork was not completed to justify laying of hands on detainees and there was minimal recording of use of passive restraints. Health care staff examined all detainees on whom restraints had been used, and the only recorded injury in the current or previous flight was redness and grazing to the wrist of one man.
- 3.27** Apart from some of the security team, most staff had little knowledge of the findings and recommendations of the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman and the Coroner in relation to the death of Jimmy Mubenga, who died after a sustained use of force on a scheduled flight.

Recommendations

- 3.28** Escorts should not lay hands on detainees without a specific cause, justified in writing in each individual case.
- 3.29** All escorting staff should receive full accredited training for the use of force in any situation which may arise, especially on board an aircraft.
- 3.30** Handcuffs and other forms of physical restraint should be applied only for as long as they are needed for safety or to effect removal.

3.31 All staff should be made aware of lessons from relevant inquiries and investigations.

Bullying and intimidation

3.32 Detainees had little opportunity to mix with each other after collection from IRCs, and were under close supervision throughout. This limited any potential for bullying between them. The generally good attempts by Tascor staff to put detainees at their ease was undermined to some extent by the unnecessary control measures (see sections on security, order and rules, and use of force). We gave a number of detainees our contact details to inform us of any mistreatment by staff that we may not have witnessed; we received no such reports.

3.33 Most staff dressed informally and did not appear intimidating, although some wore their handcuffs prominently on their clothing, which was unnecessary and led one detainee to be concerned that everyone would be handcuffed during the flight.

Emotional distress and self-harm

3.34 Assessment, care in detention and teamwork (ACDT) self-harm monitoring forms were used for detainees at risk and staff were aware of the two detainees subject to them. These forms were completed appropriately, with frequent entries. However, staff supervising one detainee subject to an ACDT fell asleep during the flight (see section on preparation for departure).

Legal rights

3.35 Staff on each coach loaned detainees a mobile telephone if they needed one to contact a legal representative. Those who requested telephones received them fairly quickly.

3.36 The CIO made telephone calls to his office before departure and immediately on landing, to ensure that each person's removal was still authorised and that no last-minute injunctions had been received.

Child care and protection

3.37 There were no children on the flight. Escorting officers had received basic child protection training during their initial and annual refresher training.

Section 4. Respect

Expected outcomes:

**Detainees are escorted in decent physical conditions and individual needs are addressed.
Detainees are treated with humanity and respect.**

4.1 *Coaches were clean. Detainees were not allowed to close toilet doors. They were offered different, and less, food than staff. Hot drinks, pillows and blankets were not offered to detainees on the aircraft. Most staff built a good rapport with the detainees assigned to their care. Some staff swore or engaged in immature behaviour, with little regard to the impact on detainees. Health care staff were available throughout the journey.*

Physical conditions

- 4.2** Most detainees were transported in coaches that were clean and well equipped. When they used the toilet on the coach and the aircraft, they were not allowed to shut the door, which was normally held open with handcuffs. Toilets were clean but on one coach detainees had to ask for toilet paper and the dispenser had no soap in it.
- 4.3** Food and cold drinks were given regularly on the coaches and on the aircraft. No hot drinks were given to detainees on the aircraft, regardless of individual risk, although some staff went to the serving points to get hot drinks for themselves. This was ostensibly for reasons of safety but was an unnecessary blanket prohibition, given that all detainees on the flight were compliant. Hot airline meals were provided during the flight. However, detainees received different, and less, food than was given to staff; for reasons that were not clear to anyone we asked, none of the detainees was offered the two salads that accompanied staff meals. Detainees were not allowed pillows and blankets during the journey.

Recommendation

- 4.4** **Unless individual risk assessment indicates otherwise, detainees should be able to use the toilet with full privacy, obtain pillows and blankets and consume hot drinks during flights.**

Housekeeping points

- 4.5** Staff should ensure that toilet paper and soap are available in toilets.
- 4.6** Detainees should be offered the same quantity of food as staff.

Property and clothing

- 4.7** At some IRCs, staff removed watches, belts and jewellery from detainees, regardless of individual risk factors. Detainees were not allowed to travel with their telephones but they were offered the use of Tascor mobile telephones if they wished to make any calls. Property was placed in large check-patterned plastic bags that were zipped and sealed. A detailed property record was maintained to address any complaints about property.

- 4.8** Most detainees had property in an appropriate bag, but at Colnbrook some detainees left the centre with their belongings in see-through plastic bags as staff had insufficient large holdalls. One man was concerned about the state of his clothes and how he would look on meeting his family. Colnbrook staff obtained clean clothes for him and he was able to change into them before the flight.

Housekeeping point

- 4.9** Escorts should carry sufficient holdalls for detainees' property.

Positive relationships

- 4.10** Escort staff behaved in a polite manner and some made considerable effort to communicate with the detainees in their care. A number of detainees became less tense and coped better with the stresses of the removal through the efforts of these staff to put them at their ease.
- 4.11** Staff tended to use first names when speaking directly to detainees. At one IRC, the coach commander greeted detainees warmly but usually used their surnames when addressing them, apparently because he did not know which was the first and which the surname for them. This discourtesy would have been easy to avoid with some basic planning. When processing detainees at IRCs and Stansted, talking to other staff and in some written reports, nearly all staff referred to detainees by manifest number alone.
- 4.12** Some staff also failed to convey respect through an insufficient focus on the detainees in their care. A few staff had conversations with each other over the heads of detainees on the coach and plane. Others began playing with their mobile telephones as soon as they boarded the coach. On the plane, a few of the staff, not sitting with detainees but in their hearing, swore loudly during conversations or engaged in juvenile behaviour such as making loud animal noises.
- 4.13** Tascor staff wore obtrusive armbands to hold their ID cards, on which the name was in too small a font for a person to read from a metre away.

Recommendation

- 4.14** **Staff should behave professionally at all times, and have an awareness of their impact on detainees.**

Housekeeping point

- 4.15** Staff should wear easily legible name badges rather than armbands.

Diversity

- 4.16** Escorts received diversity training as part of their initial DCO course, but none remembered any specific input on the particular circumstances, backgrounds and vulnerabilities of detainees.

- 4.17** Detainees could retain religious items and books. No professional interpreters were present at any stage of the removal, despite obvious need in some cases. For example, at the point of searching and processing of detainees in the IRCs, it was obvious that some detainees could not understand what they were being told. We received no evidence of any professional telephone interpreting calls being made on this or the previous three removals. None of the detainees required disability care plans. Women were located in the same part of the aircraft.

Recommendations

- 4.18 Overseas escort staff should receive regular diversity training which includes discussion of the particular circumstances, backgrounds and vulnerabilities of detainees.**
- 4.19 Professional interpretation should be used to enhance communication throughout the removal process.**

Complaints

- 4.20** Some escort staff had complaint forms but others were unaware of the complaints process. The Tascor information booklet contained some information about making complaints but there was no information on complaining about Home Office staff. Although the Home Office complaints policy stated that detainees could make complaints by email after arrival in destination countries, the relevant email address was not provided routinely.

Recommendation

- 4.21 Detainees should be told how to make complaints or submit comments about Home Office or escort staff during or after the removal.**

Health

- 4.22** At the IRCs, detainees' confidential health care records were systematically opened and read, even when there was no valid reason.
- 4.23** Health care staff employed by Taylormade were present at each IRC as detainees were prepared for departure. IRC health care staff provided their counterparts on the escort teams with verbal handovers, but this did not happen at Harmondsworth.
- 4.24** During the flight, three health care staff were available to administer care when needed. There were no significant calls on them during the flight. They checked a detainee's wrists while he was in handcuffs and when they were taken off (see section on use of force).
- 4.25** Each member of the health care team had a full first-aid kit, including a defibrillator. All cabin crew were trained in first aid. Any medication given out during the flight was recorded by the paramedics and in PERs by escort staff.

Recommendation

- 4.26** Detainees' medical records should only be opened with valid justification, in an emergency or when the detainee has consented to this.

Housekeeping point

- 4.27** IRC health care staff should provide escorts with a thorough handover in all cases, and include all ongoing risks.

Section 5. Preparation for reintegration

Expected outcomes:

**Detainees are prepared for their arrival and early days in the destination country.
Any unacceptable behaviour in destination countries is appropriately challenged.**

- 5.1** *Detainees were given a booklet on available resettlement support. The chief immigration officer on the flight answered last-minute questions. The handling of the disembarkation was quick and efficient. All detainees were processed quickly through the airport and this was observed by a British Embassy official. Some detainees required welfare support on arrival. The voluntary organisation, Weldo, was on hand to provide immediate help.*
- 5.2** At the start of the removal, detainees were offered a substantial and helpful booklet entitled, 'Coming Home – Your Guide to Successful Transition', containing contact addresses and advice. Some detainees told us that it was useful, but would have been more helpful if they had received it at an earlier stage.
- 5.3** Some detainees had family who were coming to collect them on arrival but others appeared at a loss. One man had a vague plan to find a hotel in Islamabad and then try to get to Karachi, which was at least a day's bus ride away. Another man, at Colnbrook, complained that he had been locked up for eight hours with no opportunity to iron his clothes or cut his nails in preparation for his return, and was worried that he was going to look bedraggled when he met his family. Detention staff at Colnbrook could not explain why he had not been able to do these things.
- 5.4** Detainees were offered the chance to speak to the CIO on the flight and several took up this offer. The CIO answered their questions courteously and in a straight forward manner (see section on security). He checked his mobile telephone for any last-minute decisions preventing the completion of the removal on arrival in Islamabad. We were told that if any injunctions had been granted, the detainees in question would be brought back to the UK.
- 5.5** On arrival in Islamabad, all detainees were quickly taken off the aircraft. They were treated respectfully and courteously by receiving staff. A senior Pakistani immigration airport manager oversaw the process, as did a British Embassy official, who also took questions from detainees. All detainees were allowed to walk through passport control and we saw no evidence of mistreatment. The voluntary welfare organisation, Weldo, was positioned landside and met detainees as they came through. Weldo was able to provide immediate reintegration assistance and ongoing welfare support.

Housekeeping point

- 5.6** The 'Coming Home' booklet should be given to detainees at the point that removal directions are served.

Section 6. Recommendations and housekeeping points

Recommendation

To the Home Office

Safety

- 6.1** The system of using reserves should cease and there should be sufficient staff for each removal. (3.10)

Recommendations

To the Home Office and Tascor

Safety

- 6.2** Removals should be routinely monitored by one or more senior members of staff who do not normally work with escort teams. (3.19)
- 6.3** All escorting staff should receive full accredited training for the use of force in any situation which may arise, especially on board an aircraft. (3.29)
- 6.4** All staff should be made aware of lessons from relevant inquiries and investigations. (3.31)

Respect

- 6.5** Professional interpretation should be used to enhance communication throughout the removal process. (4.19)
- 6.6** Detainees should be told how to make complaints or submit comments about Home Office or escort staff during or after the removal. (4.21)

Recommendations

To Tascor

Safety

- 6.7** Detainees should be kept informed of delays throughout the removal process. (3.9)
- 6.8** Senior managers should ensure that staff are able to undertake their duties effectively and safely at all times while they are responsible for the care of detainees, especially when they are caring for detainees with an identified risk of self-harm. (3.11)
- 6.9** Only the minimum number of staff for security and safety should be positioned around a detainee. (3.14)

- 6.10** Escort staff should tell detainees early in the removal process that they are going to be filmed, and explain the reasons why and how the footage will be managed. (3.18)
- 6.11** Escorts should not lay hands on detainees without a specific cause, justified in writing in each individual case. (3.28)
- 6.12** Handcuffs and other forms of physical restraint should be applied only for as long as they are needed for safety or to effect removal. (3.30)

Respect

- 6.13** Unless individual risk assessment indicates otherwise, detainees should be able to use the toilet with full privacy, obtain pillows and blankets and consume hot drinks during flights. (4.4)
- 6.14** Staff should behave professionally at all times, and have an awareness of their impact on detainees. (4.14)
- 6.15** Overseas escort staff should receive regular diversity training which includes discussion of the particular circumstances, backgrounds and vulnerabilities of detainees. (4.18)
- 6.16** Detainees' medical records should only be opened with valid justification, in an emergency or when the detainee has consented to this. (4.26)

Housekeeping points

Respect

- 6.17** Staff should ensure that toilet paper and soap are available in toilets. (4.5)
- 6.18** Detainees should be offered the same quantity of food as staff. (4.6)
- 6.19** Escorts should carry sufficient holdalls for detainees' property. (4.9)
- 6.20** Staff should wear easily legible name badges rather than armbands. (4.15)
- 6.21** IRC health care staff should provide escorts with a thorough handover in all cases, and include all ongoing risks. (4.27)

Preparation for reintegration

- 6.22** The 'Coming Home' booklet should be given to detainees at the point that removal directions are served. (5.6)

Section 7. Appendices

Appendix I: Inspection team

Hindpal Singh Bhui
Rosemarie Bugdale
Jeanette Hall

Team leader
Inspector
Inspector