

Report on an announced inspection of

HMP Dhekelia

11 – 12 November 2010

by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

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Printed and published by:
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons
1st Floor, Ashley House
Monck Street
London SW1P 2BQ
England

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Introduction

HMP Dhekelia is the small, multi-functional prison for the Sovereign Base Areas (SBA) in Cyprus. The establishment is managed by the SBA Police Force under the command of the Chief Constable, David Kelly, who commissioned this independent inspection to assess progress since our last visit in 2004. The prison is a unique facility and can be required to hold remand and sentenced male and female prisoners, as well as immigration detainees. There is currently no upper limit to how many can be held and there were six sentenced prisoners at the time of our inspection.

The inspection was conducted using our standard methodology, but adjusted to the particular nature of the facility. This report follows the standard structure of our inspection reports and looks at the four tests of a healthy prison: safety, respect, purposeful activity and resettlement.

HMP Dhekelia was an essentially safe and secure place. There had been some improvements in procedures since our last visit, although positive outcomes were essentially achieved through personalised and supportive care by staff. Thus, while early days were sensitively managed, risk assessments were basic and there were few adequate recording systems to enable quality assurance and strategic oversight. Close staff supervision ensured that there was little scope for bullying. Those at risk of self-harm were well cared for. In our view, the limitations of the establishment meant that it was only safe to house a maximum of eight prisoners at any one time.

The living accommodation was tired, but access to basic amenities was very good. Staff interacted well with prisoners but, with such small numbers, informality was the norm and ensuring appropriate boundaries remained a challenge for managers. Food was plentiful and healthcare satisfactory, although clinical governance required improvement. Prisoners came from a range of backgrounds and nationalities and, while individual needs were well catered for, a more sophisticated approach to diversity was needed. We were pleased to learn of the formal policy decision of the Administration no longer to hold immigration detainees at HMP Dhekelia. We were also of the view that the prison was not a suitable location for children. If, in exceptional circumstances, there was a requirement to hold women, providing them with a safe and adequate regime will pose an immense challenge to managers.

Prisoners spent plenty of time unlocked but purposeful activity was limited and prisoners spent most of their time on recreational activities. However, staff had made commendable efforts to introduce work opportunities outside the prison for long-term prisoners, together with some access to education and a small amount of vocational activity.

There remained little resettlement activity at HMP Dhekelia, although public protection issues were now better managed and efforts were made to ensure the maintenance of family ties. There was no sentence planning, few reintegration services and little scope to reduce offending behaviour. While this was understandable given the size of the facility, the disparate nature of prisoner's backgrounds and wide range of likely discharge locations, this remained an area on which managers needed to focus.

HMP Dhekelia had improved since our last visit. It is now an essentially safe and decent facility, making the most of its limited resources. In a number of areas, particularly resettlement, policies and procedures remain limited but staff do their best to address the

needs of the small, yet disparate, prisoner population. Overall, the progress made has been significant.

Nick Hardwick
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

January 2011

Background

The sovereign base areas (SBAs) in Cyprus cover an area of 98 square miles. The bases consist of Akrotiri in the west and Dhekelia in the east. Both are situated on the southern coast of Cyprus and are some 60 miles apart.

Both SBAs include various military locations, with approximately 6,600 service and UK-based civilian personnel and their dependants. SBAs also host a resident Cypriot population of approximately 10,500.

In accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Establishment and Sovereign Base Ordinance, SBA Police (SBAP) has primacy in all policing matters within these areas.

SBAP is led by the chief constable, who is responsible to the administrator. He is chief officer for good order throughout the force, and responsible for the efficient administration and governance of the force. The chief constable is supported by a deputy chief constable, and a small administrative support team at the Force headquarters. The chief constable is also the designated prison governor. Policing of the prison has full-time resources of one sergeant and 11 constables. Depending on the number of prisoners, officers permanently engaged on prison duties are supplemented by response officers based elsewhere in the SBAP.

HMP Dhekelia is a small, multi-purpose detention facility. It was built in 1955 and, at the time of the EOKA disturbances, initially held detainees. It later formed part of a military camp. It was closed for renovation in 1995-1996 and opened as HMP Dhekelia in 1997. In recent years it has been required to hold remand and sentenced adult prisoners, both male and female, and also men, women and children detained under immigration law. However, since the opening of a temporary Holding Centre that is an annexe to Dhekelia Police Station, a policy decision was made that persons suspected of being illegal immigrants would not be held in HM Prison Dhekelia. The Holding Centre will be used to hold such persons while they are processed before being handed over to the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) under the memorandum of understanding that exists between the RoC and the SBAs. This will normally be within 24 hours but may be longer if detained over the weekend. In any event, such persons will be handed over to the RoC as soon as possible. Dhekelia has no certified upper limit of prisoners and detainees. Appendix I shows the throughput of prisoners over the last five years. At the time of the inspection, the facility held six sentenced prisoners.

This inspection of HMP Dhekelia took place on 11 and 12 November 2010. It was the second inspection by HMI Prisons, the previous inspection having been carried out in October 2004. The inspection was commissioned by the chief constable, David Kelly, MBA, MCIPD, and was conducted by Fay Deadman (team leader) and Martin Kettle (inspector). The prison was inspected against our published criteria and tests of a healthy prison but with full recognition of the unique context of HMP Dhekelia.

Healthy prison tests

- HP1 All inspection reports focus on the conditions and treatment of prisoners, based on the four tests of a healthy prison that were first introduced in this inspectorate's thematic review *Suicide is everyone's concern*, published in 1999. The criteria are:
- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| Safety | prisoners, even the most vulnerable, are held safely |
| Respect | prisoners are treated with respect for their human dignity |
| Purposeful activity | prisoners are able, and expected, to engage in activity that is likely to benefit them |
| Resettlement | prisoners are prepared for their release into the community and helped to reduce the likelihood of reoffending. |
- HP2 Under each test, we make an assessment of outcomes for prisoners and therefore of the establishment's overall performance against the test.
- **outcomes for prisoners are good against this healthy prison test.**
There is no evidence that outcomes for prisoners are being adversely affected in any significant areas.
 - **outcomes for prisoners are reasonably good against this healthy prison test.**
There is evidence of adverse outcomes for prisoners in only a small number of areas. For the majority, there are no significant concerns. Procedures to safeguard outcomes are in place.
 - **outcomes for prisoners are not sufficiently good against this healthy prison test.**
There is evidence that outcomes for prisoners are being adversely affected in many areas or particularly in those areas of greatest importance to the well-being of prisoners. Problems/concerns, if left unattended, are likely to become areas of serious concern.
 - **outcomes for prisoners are poor against this healthy prison test.**
There is evidence that outcomes for prisoners are seriously affected by current practice. There is a failure to ensure even adequate treatment of and/or conditions for prisoners. Immediate remedial action is required.

Section 1: Safety

- 1.1 Prisoners benefited from individual care during their journey to the prison and on arrival. New procedures to help prisoners settle in ensured that they were monitored and supported during the first week of custody, but formal risk assessments were lacking. Although there was no formal induction, prisoners were quickly told what they needed to know and received suitable support during the early days. Self-harm was rare and bullying or intimidation among prisoners did not appear to be a problem. Staff had a good level of awareness of prisoners who were experiencing problems but record keeping and information sharing were inadequate. Basic security procedures were in place. Good relationships underpinned dynamic security and had helped to inform security decisions which appropriately balanced security and welfare needs.
- 1.2 We had previously been critical of the lack of formal safety policies and various procedural weaknesses. In consequence, our assessment had been that the prison was not performing sufficiently well in relation to safety. There had been some basic policy development and the introduction of some proportionate procedures. Managers at Dhekelia considered that individual care and supervision were more important than complex systems and we agreed with this approach. However, individual record keeping and risk assessment needed improvement to support this model. Following this inspection, we consider that outcomes for prisoners were now reasonably good in relation to this healthy prison test.

Courts and escorts

- 1.3 Prisoners were usually conveyed to the establishment one at a time which required an escort service of two police officers: a driver and an escorting officer. Prisoners were handcuffed to the escorting officer until they were inside the prison when handcuffs were removed. We were told that it was unusual for more than one prisoner to be escorted at the same time, but the number of escorting officers would be increased accordingly, if required.
- 1.4 Journey times to the prison were short and prisoners we spoke to said they had no complaints about the way they had been treated by the escorting staff. The most recent arrival said that the police officers who had brought him to the prison had been sensitive to his anxiety and had reassured him by explaining what to expect on arrival at the prison.
- 1.5 Prisoners did not take their property or cash with them when they went to court, but if they were released at court, they were brought back to the prison by staff to collect their personal belongings.

Reception

- 1.6 New arrivals were given a rub-down search. Strip-searching was not a routine procedure for new arrivals, but staff carried out a strip-search if they had concerns that the prisoner was concealing an illicit item. We were told that strip-searching was rarely carried out and there was no evidence that prisoners had put themselves or others at risk by bringing in prohibited items. However, we were concerned that searching decisions were not based on a proper risk assessment. Reception procedures developed since the previous inspection did not include criteria for strip-searching or the requirement for risk assessment and there was no record or monitoring of searching procedures to ensure consistency and fairness in decision making.

- 1.7 Late arrivals were rare. Prisoners usually arrived during the day and received a good level of personal attention from the sergeant. In his absence, new receptions were dealt with by the most senior member of staff on duty and good staffing levels ensured that, regardless of the time of arrival, reception procedures were not rushed. Private interviews took place in a small office which helped to put prisoners at their ease. A prisoners interview form was completed which included a section on welfare needs. Our examination of all the files indicated that this section contained very little information and the interview form provided an inadequate record of the interaction between the member of staff conducting the interview and the prisoner (see also first night section).
- 1.8 A standard checklist had been introduced to ensure that the prisoner's immediate needs were dealt with. This included a drink and a free telephone call if the prisoner had been unable to make a call before leaving court.
- 1.9 New arrivals did not receive medical screening on arrival and most did not see a doctor until the following day (see also healthcare section).
- 1.10 New arrivals were encouraged to make a telephone call to arrange a telephone card as soon as possible, so that they could make calls whenever they wished. They were able to receive incoming calls straightaway.
- 1.11 Basic rules and entitlements were explained to the prisoner by the reception officer and set out in a booklet entitled 'Rights and Obligations of Prisoners', which was provided to each new arrival. The booklet was available in Greek and Turkish but no other languages. We were told that an interpreter was available from the garrison to go through the booklet with a new arrival who did not speak those languages sufficiently well. All the prisoners we spoke to confirmed that a member of staff had gone through the rules and entitlements with them and one prisoner said that the reception officer had taken time to read the information to him slowly so that he could take it in.
- 1.12 New arrivals were offered a shower after the reception procedures had been completed. They were usually able to join other prisoners and staff for the next scheduled meal but a meal could be sent for from the garrison, if necessary. Hot and cold drinks were freely available and prisoners could help themselves from the dining room.

Recommendations

- 1.13 Reception procedures should include clear, risk based criteria governing the different levels of searching procedures. Decisions should be recorded.
- 1.14 Arrangements should be made to have the 'Rights and Obligations of Prisoners' booklet translated into the prisoner's preferred language of a new prisoner as soon as possible so that it is equally accessible to all prisoners as a reference document.

First night

- 1.15 Reception procedures included a written risk assessment based on a brief questionnaire which asked the prisoner about previous self-harm, learning difficulties and/or disabilities and any medical conditions, including mental health. The risk assessment also recorded aspects of the prisoner's behaviour, such as whether they had ever been restrained, and concluded with an assessment of the prisoner's suitability to share a cell. Since prisoners were never required to share a cell, the risk assessment process seemed to be irrelevant. Of more relevance would

have been an assessment on how well the prisoner was likely to cope with custody and mixing with the existing group of prisoners.

- 1.16 The officer in charge used the risk assessment to decide if the prisoner needed a standard level of supervision on their first night in custody or constant supervision by an allocated member of staff. All new arrivals were placed in a cell with a camera for the first seven days. A 'prisoners settling-in form' was completed for all prisoners. In this staff recorded their observations about the new prisoner at the end of each shift, that is three times a day for the first week. This was a good initiative for the assessment of risk and need for new arrivals and for ongoing monitoring. However, it was limited in scope as it did not fully address all aspects of risk to, and presented by, the prisoner, nor was there a review at the end of the seven-day period to assess whether ongoing support was required.
- 1.17 The documentation that we examined did not reflect the extent of the evident work carried out by staff to support newly arrived prisoners during their first week in custody. Observations were very limited and frequently simply reported 'quiet, no problems' or 'calm and cooperative'. Such comments did not generate confidence that interaction with new arrivals had taken place, although we were assured by prisoners that it had.

Recommendation

- 1.18 **The prisoner's risk assessment documentation should be developed to include an assessment of how well the prisoner is likely to cope with custody, his/her immediate welfare needs and the level of support required, and the potential risk to themselves and to others. This should be reviewed before the end of the first week.**

Induction

- 1.19 There was no formal induction programme. However, there was rarely more than one new arrival at a time and they received an individual induction to the prison which covered all the essential things they needed to know. This included an introductory talk by a member of staff and a tour of the prison. A copy of the daily regime was provided together with details of how to make a complaint, apply for a visit and make and receive telephone calls. Staff and other prisoners were available to answer questions in the days that followed so that prisoners were able to absorb information at their own pace.
- 1.20 New arrivals were able to associate with other prisoners following completion of their reception and induction. The two long-term prisoners held at the time of the inspection took on an informal induction and peer support roles. New arrivals we spoke to had found this helpful, but the boundaries of the role were unclear and the way that the two prisoners carried out this role was not monitored by staff. There were signs that the peer supporters were, intentionally or otherwise, setting themselves apart from other prisoners and we were concerned that this might become intimidating, rather than supportive, if left unchecked.

Recommendation

- 1.21 **Prisoners who are used to offer peer support to new arrivals should have a clearly defined role and be properly supported and monitored by staff.**

Bullying and the protection of vulnerable prisoners

- 1.22 Close daily contact with all prisoners ensured that staff usually knew how prisoners were interacting and quickly became aware of any tensions that arose. Prisoners that we spoke to said they would speak to staff if they had any problems with other prisoners that they could not sort out themselves, although they said such instances were rare.
- 1.23 Staff related an account of an over-zealous approach by one of the long-term prisoners who had been given the task of allocating prisoner work. The concerns had been addressed, but it had highlighted the risks associated with giving prisoners responsibilities without good supervision and support (see also induction section). In such a small community, a 'pecking order' will inevitably develop if left unchecked.
- 1.24 Complex anti-bullying policies and procedures were not warranted but good record keeping and information sharing in a consistent format (as already described) was required to assist in identification of potential as well as actual bullying. This would ensure that staff were better informed about the nature of the problem and better equipped to tackle the perpetrator quickly, measure change and ensure the ongoing safety of the victim.

Self-harm and suicide prevention

- 1.25 Incidents of self-harm were very rare. The sergeant in charge of the prison could only recall one prisoner in recent memory who had self-harmed by superficial scratching. The prisoner had been subject to constant monitoring by staff to prevent him from further self-harm and to act as a constant source of support to him.
- 1.26 There were no specific procedures for monitoring prisoners who self-harmed. The self-harm and suicide prevention guidance produced since the previous inspection merely described reception procedures and related risk assessments (see reception and first night sections) and immediate action to be taken following an incident of self-harm or a death in custody. This would have been a proportionate approach but it was undermined by the weaknesses previously described in the assessment procedures.
- 1.27 Staff had not received any formal training in the prevention of self-harm. However, they actively and routinely checked on all prisoners daily and there was evidence that staff were alert to mood changes or signs of potential distress. One file that we examined included an entry that the prisoner had been observed on camera to be sleeping more than usual and as a consequence staff had checked with him to ask if he had any problems that he wanted to discuss. It was discovered that he had been worrying about his daughter who was pregnant and he did not have any telephone credit to make contact with her. Staff subsequently facilitated a telephone call.
- 1.28 Prisoners confirmed that they were told to ring their cell bell if they had any problems or if they were just feeling low, and they confirmed that they would have no hesitation in doing so. They also reported that staff responded very quickly to cell bells.
- 1.29 However, staff generally did not record the detail of the action they took to support prisoners who were vulnerable or struggling to cope with imprisonment, although there were a few noteworthy exceptions.

- 1.30 Recording systems did not encourage staff to record their observations and share relevant information. There was a 'significant events' log but this did not serve to inform staff fully about day-to-day issues relating to the prisoner's care. A daily observation log would have been much more useful for all prisoners, particularly for prisoners who were being monitored more closely because staff had concerns about them (see also section on bullying and protection of vulnerable prisoners).
- 1.31 Neither a detailed policy nor complex procedures were required to manage the issues on the scale that occurred in the prison. However, adherence to a simple system was needed to ensure that prisoners who had been identified as needing additional monitoring or extra support were managed safely and consistently.

Recommendations

- 1.32 The care of individual prisoners who have been identified as at risk of self-harm or in need of additional support should be agreed with specialist input, such as health care, as appropriate. This should be properly recorded and regularly reviewed.
- 1.33 The level of monitoring of prisoners at risk of self-harm should be determined by a risk assessment which is regularly reviewed.

Good order

Security and rules

- 1.34 A set of security instructions, described as a 'Contingency Plan' (January 2006), had been developed since the previous inspection. This contained contingency plans for emergency situations and covered tool security, key security, communications monitoring, visits, prisoner movement and hostage negotiation. The hostage negotiator list had last been updated in February 2006.
- 1.35 There was no security intelligence system. Although the intelligence department at Dhekelia police station handled such matters in relation to prisoners, managers said that there was no regular flow of information between the prison and that office. Staff had not been trained to submit written information on issues which might relate to security. Consequently, security intelligence was not collated or analysed as a basis for assessments of risks, patterns and trends. The reliance on members of staff knowing the prisoners and sharing information informally left gaps in communication and the potential undermining of security in the medium term.
- 1.36 There was an informal arrangement for cell doors to be locked at night except in hot weather. Prisoners found the heat and the smell from the toilets very uncomfortable when the doors were shut for long periods. At the time of the inspection, the weather was exceptionally warm for the time of year and all cell doors remained open at night. In fact, staff told us that cell doors had not been locked at night for over a year. This arrangement was subject to risk assessment and authorisation by the superintendent, but it placed considerable responsibility for maintaining order on the very few staff on duty at night. We were told that there had been discussions about fitting gates to the cells, enabling free flow of air while maintaining cell security, and we agreed that this offered a potential solution to the problem.

- 1.37 The expectations of behaviour were set out in the 'Rights and Obligations' document given to all new arrivals, and prisoners felt that the expected standards of behaviour were reasonably clear and consistent.

Recommendations

- 1.38 A system should be introduced for the written submission and analysis of security information.
- 1.39 Cells should be adequately ventilated, so that decisions on whether they should be locked can take full account of risk as well as decency.

Housekeeping point

- 1.40 The security instructions should be reviewed and updated annually.

Disciplinary procedures

- 1.41 Discipline was governed by the Sovereign Base Area's Prisons Ordinance 1971, as amended by Ordinances 2 of 1985 and 14 of 2005. A list of potential charges was defined in this body of law and there was proper legal provision for disciplinary procedures. The list of charges, as noted in the previous inspection, was unusually long and in many instances brief and difficult to define, for example malingering. These appeared not to have been used because staff felt confident to manage challenging behaviour using their interpersonal skills. A prisoner had recently smashed a telephone in the staff office and staff had not resorted to disciplinary procedures but had appropriately responded to the behaviour as an act of frustration, based on their knowledge of the individual's background and stress. Recommendations in the previous report about the training and competence of staff conducting disciplinary hearings had been satisfactorily addressed, although such hearings had not occurred.

The use of force

- 1.42 A detailed policy statement on the management of violent prisoners had been issued in March 2009 with appropriate emphasis on anticipation and de-escalation. It also included instructions for use of the unfurnished cell, which could only be used on the authority of the superintendent of prisons.
- 1.43 Policy and guidance had been issued in April 2009 on use of personal protective equipment including riot helmets and shields, quick-cuffs, incapacitant sprays and batons. It should be noted that HMI Prisons consider that incapacitant sprays should not be deployed in custody in anything other than the most extreme circumstances and only after full health and safety appraisal. Staff received annual refresher training on physical safety, including physical restraint in the custodial setting, which fulfilled a recommendation in the previous report.
- 1.44 In reality, there were no recorded incidents involving physical restraint and staff could not recall an occasion when a prisoner had had to be physically restrained.

Segregation

- 1.45 The cell set aside for segregation purposes was a stark, unfurnished room, with a plinth and mattress. It had no sanitation or natural light and there were ligature points. It had a camera so that prisoners located there could be monitored by staff. This cell was primarily for the temporary confinement of prisoners who were violent or refractory, but it had not been used for this purpose in recent years. No log or other recording system existed for use of this cell.

Recommendations

- 1.46 Segregation and the use of unfurnished accommodation should be authorised in writing by a senior manager.
- 1.47 Full records of the use of the unfurnished cell should be kept, including staff observations, and agreed actions to ensure that the prisoner is returned to normal location as quickly as possible.

Housekeeping point

- 1.48 The number of prescribed disciplinary charges should be reduced and the charges defined clearly.

Section 2: Respect

- 2.1 The prisoners' living environment had suffered noticeable wear and tear since the previous inspection. Funds for essential basic equipment requiring replacement were provided by prison staff and this was inappropriate. Prisoner access to showers and telephones was very good. Most prisoners confirmed our observations that prison staff treated them decently. Maintaining appropriate boundaries in a small setting with low numbers remained an ongoing management task. Prisoners had plenty to eat, ample choice and the quality of the food was good. Complaints were generally dealt with informally and this was appropriate in most cases but a system for confidential complaints was lacking. The prison accepted prisoners from across the full range of diverse groups. Policy statements had been introduced to cover different diversity strands but some groups were not included. In practice, staff made good efforts to meet the diverse needs of prisoners. Prisoners were content that their religious needs were met. Staff had dealt sensitively with foreign nationals. Prisoners had good access to health care but not all had had an initial screening. Procedures to maintain health records confidentially and keep medicines safely needed to be improved.
- 2.2 Previously we highlighted a lack of attention to diversity and religious needs. Food was said to be in need of improvement. Prisoner/staff relationships and health care were good. On balance, little had changed in this area since the previous inspection and we considered that outcomes for prisoners remained reasonably good in relation to this healthy prison test.

Environment and relationships

Accommodation and facilities

- 2.3 The main cell accommodation consisted of six rooms off a sizeable communal area. The cells were bare and rudimentary. Steel furnishings and sanitary ware showed signs of wear and were impossible to keep fully clean. However, prisoners kept their cells as clean and tidy as they could and none of them had any complaints about the standard of accommodation.
- 2.4 The communal area was air conditioned, but the system did not extend to the cells when their solid steel doors were shut. The heat in the cells during the hot months was extreme (see section on security and rules). In the cell area there was a small association room, which was in a poor state of decoration, with six chairs of which two were past repair. The six male prisoners in residence justifiably said that there was not enough space for them all to watch the television in reasonable comfort.
- 2.5 There was a caged exercise yard off the cell area, with a basketball net and balls which had been provided in response to prisoner requests. The open communal area, which had dirty walls at one end, contained 20 mattresses piled up for use in the event of a large influx of remand prisoners. Such influxes had occurred on many occasions in 2008. Between February and July 2008 group sizes, usually over one night only, had varied between four and 29 which had put unsustainable pressure on the running of the prison. However, following changes to remand arrangements for illegal immigrants (see paragraph five of Background and section on foreign nationals), such influxes of large numbers had ceased.
- 2.6 A discrete area, separated from the main cell area by the staff office and a lockable gate, was designated as female accommodation which had been used on one or two occasions. In the

female area, there was one normal cell and an unfurnished cell, which was referred to as a safer cell (see section on segregation).

- 2.7 In the absence of women prisoners, this area was being appropriately used at the time of the inspection to house an older man, to provide him with a quieter and more private environment.
- 2.8 No notices were displayed in the living areas and, although prisoners had been encouraged to paint some walls, which had improved the appearance of some areas, there was potential to use their skills more. The outside areas had been planted and watered in the past, but this activity had been scaled back. Some managers said this had resulted from national water restrictions, others that it reflected a loss of interest on the part of prisoners. The grounds were largely bare and dusty at the time of the inspection.
- 2.9 Staff told us that it was difficult to secure replacements for even the most basic equipment, such as a kettle. Staff contributed to a monthly fund and paid for small items themselves. This was not an appropriate solution and had the potential to militate against the important task of setting and maintaining appropriate boundaries between staff and prisoners (see section on relationships).

Clothing and possessions

- 2.10 Prisoners were permitted to wear their own clothes and laundry facilities were good. Clothes were available for issue to any prisoners who did not have sufficient. There were no standard prison-issue clothes, but an emergency supply of RAF issue clothing was kept in case of need. Bedding and towels were washed centrally and prisoners were content with the standard of linen provided.

Hygiene

- 2.11 There were two showers in the main cells building and an ablutions block in the work and recreation area. It contained five showers and two self-contained bathrooms. The shower bases were kept as clean as possible, but the surface was somewhat worn and stained; curtains had been fitted, but these were very badly stained. The walls and ceiling had been recently repainted and were in good condition.

Recommendations

- 2.12 The cells should be deep cleaned regularly.
- 2.13 The prison should not hold more than eight prisoners.

Housekeeping points

- 2.14 The living environment should be brightened with displays or artwork.
- 2.15 The disintegrating chairs in the association room should be replaced.
- 2.16 Essential equipment to maintain the prison and minor appliances should be replaced when necessary.

Mail and telephones

- 2.17 Prisoners received little mail and the arrangements for handling it were satisfactory (but see section on legal rights). The published policy for telephone calls allowed a free call of one hour a month if a prisoner received no visits. However, there was appropriate flexibility and if a prisoner had no money to call their family, a free telephone call would be given. We observed extra free calls being given to a prisoner to enable him to arrange for a fine to be paid, which was in line with published policy. Prisoners could also receive incoming calls. An officer answered all calls and passed the phone to the prisoner if satisfied that it was a legitimate call. These calls were booked. During the inspection, we observed a prisoner in low mood being approached by staff having checked the register to find that he had made no telephone calls for a few days. The prisoner had not requested a call but he was offered a free call, which was gladly accepted. This was an appropriate example of positive prisoner care.

Staff-prisoner relationships

- 2.18 Prisoners had slightly differing views on the quality of their care and the diligence of staff, but they were generally positive about relationships. One prisoner said: 'When I first came here, some staff were not good; but now they are all OK. Some are lazy about responding to requests; they just refer me on to someone else.'
- 2.19 A prisoner serving one month said that the prison was in every way better than he had expected: 'I feel like I am not in prison. The staff are always willing to give help and most speak Turkish. Sometimes I feel down – especially because it is the first time ever that I shall miss the feast of Ramadan Bairam with my family. But I can speak to the staff and they are helpful.' Another prisoner who had difficulty with reading and writing said that staff were always ready to help him if he needed to complete a form and that some staff were 'more like friends'.
- 2.20 Deployment practice in the Sovereign Base Area (SBA) police force was to allocate some members of staff principally to prison duties for a period of several months, so that they developed skills and personal knowledge of the individual prisoners. The staff group comprised one sergeant and 11 constables. The usual staffing complement at the prison consisted of one sergeant who acted as the gatekeeper and officer in charge of the prison and, depending on the number of prisoners, a designated number of officers permanently engaged on prison duties supplemented by response officers based on the eastern Division of the SBA as required. At the time of the inspection, the staffing complement was one sergeant and four constables for the early and late shifts and one supervisor with two cell keepers for the night shift. This staffing ratio allowed a good level of interaction between staff and prisoners at all times.
- 2.21 Some officers had spent substantial, although intermittent, periods on prison duty over a number of years and took pride in their ability to establish good relationships with prisoners. These staff spoke articulately of the balance that they needed to strike between becoming acquainted with the small prisoner group over many nine-hour shifts and the need to maintain a professional distance and objectivity. They spoke of the satisfaction which they derived from learning to support and guide prisoners while keeping boundaries clear. The fact that they also worked shifts on police duties in the community, and that other officers worked occasional shifts in the prison, was useful in preventing an inward-looking culture from developing in the prison. Training had been given to the staff on prison duties and prison staff demonstrated good people management skills which they had developed from their generic police duties. This resulted in a staffing strategy which was generally appropriate and effective, although

checks and balances against too much subjectivity and informality needed to be effectively implemented.

- 2.22 There was no personal officer scheme. Staff and managers believed that each of the regular members of staff knew all the prisoners well, so that such a system would not add value. Subject to the strengthening of recording procedures previously described, we accepted this view.

Applications and complaints

- 2.23 There was a complaints book, but staff were not aware of it. Only four or five complaints had been recorded in the years 2005 to 2009 and one in 2010 to date. When we asked staff how they responded to a complaint, they all spoke of dealing with it straightaway themselves or referring it to the sergeant, writing a note of it on the whiteboard in his office if he was not there. Prisoner issues had occasionally been recorded in the 'information book', a running briefing and handover log. All complaints logged in the complaints book had been responded to and resolved by the sergeant. Prisoners had also sometimes written to senior managers, including the administrator of the SBA, and had received replies. There was no confidential complaints process and one or two prisoners indicated to us that they believed that staff were sometimes inclined to ignore or stifle complaints. Such a system was needed to increase prisoner confidence but also to enable managers to discern any patterns or trends, for example recurrent issues or complaints about particular members of staff.
- 2.24 Applications were dealt with informally which was appropriate, but there was no central log to maintain an audit trail or to monitor patterns or trends.
- 2.25 The degree of independence of monitoring by the Prison Board appeared to have been strengthened since the previous inspection. They met three times a year. Only the Board chair visited unannounced from time to time to hear issues and complaints raised by prisoners and to follow them up. The other three members did not visit regularly. The Board had been established by the Prison Law of 1971, but its role and responsibilities, including the submission to the administrator of a regular report on the prison, were not clearly defined.

Recommendations

- 2.26 **A confidential complaints system should be introduced. Forms should be produced in the main languages and there should be an appeal process.**
- 2.27 **The administrator should agree clear terms of reference for the Prison Board, including the expected frequency of visits and the submission of a regular report on the prison.**

Legal rights

- 2.28 A policy had been issued in March 2009 requiring legal correspondence to be treated as confidential, envelopes to be opened only in the presence of the prisoner and letters and documents not to be read by staff. There was still no system for marking envelopes as privileged, but on receipt of a letter with a solicitor's details on the envelope, the prison manager checked with the Criminal Justice Unit that the firm was genuine. Prisoners had no complaints about staff inappropriately reading their legal correspondence.
- 2.29 A legal advice file was held in the main office, with contact details for solicitors in the area.

- 2.30 Prisoners said that they had good access to legal advice, although they criticised the quality of service from certain law firms.

Faith and religious activity

- 2.31 A small, carpeted prayer area had been added in response to a recommendation at the previous inspection in a room which also housed the two computers and the table-tennis table. A Muslim prisoner held at the time of the inspection was content with the arrangements which had been made for his diet and religious observance. A Muslim chaplain had visited two other prisoners and had offered to visit again, but the prisoners had declined to see him. A list of religious ministers available to visit on request was displayed in the visits room. We were told that a prisoner had been allowed to attend worship, under escort, at a local Greek Orthodox church in 2009.

Diversity

- 2.32 Policies had been published in March 2009 covering the care and treatment of disabled prisoners, race relations and foreign national prisoners (see below), and these were given to all prisoners as part of their induction. There were no policies on older prisoners, sexual orientation or gender.

Recommendation

- 2.33 Existing policies on the various aspects of diversity should be incorporated into a single document which also includes attention to the needs of older prisoners, gender issues and sexual orientation.

Race equality

- 2.34 A policy statement on race equality had been issued. While the low numbers of prisoners did not allow for use of statistical tools for monitoring treatment by ethnicity, the keeping of central records was needed.
- 2.35 There was still no formal system for making a complaint about an incident believed to be racially motivated. One prisoner raised with us the issue of discriminatory behaviour towards him by other prisoners and staff on the basis of race, although he had made no formal complaint. He found it more comfortable on the whole not to try to associate with other prisoners, but to keep himself occupied on his own. His judgement was that any discrimination was based on ignorance rather than malice, but it showed clearly that the issue of discrimination merited attention.

Recommendations

- 2.36 Central records of events should be kept, enabling managers to discern any evidence of differential treatment of prisoners of different ethnic groups.
- 2.37 A formal system should be developed for prisoners and staff to report in confidence to a designated senior manager alleged racially motivated incidents or discriminatory treatment. Managers should be required to investigate and respond.

Foreign nationals

- 2.38 A brief policy on foreign national prisoners had been issued in March 2009. It covered anti-discrimination measures and provision for visits from consular officials and 'from any other national or international authority whose object is to defend their interests or from persons who contribute to the easing of the specific problems created by their detention and particularly from persons who speak their mother tongue'.
- 2.39 If prisoners' home country was outside Cyprus, managers and staff established contact with embassies and other government agencies to seek practical support for the foreign national prisoners, such as materials in their own language. They had also pursued with vigour any options for repatriation, taking full account of the wishes of the prisoners themselves.
- 2.40 Illegal immigration had been a serious issue for the SBA areas, partly because of the length of accessible coastline in those areas. During the first half of 2008, up to 42 trans-Mediterranean migrants at a time had been apprehended and held for one or more days in the prison (see section on accommodation). We were assured that this policy, which caused severe difficulty for a prison built for up to eight prisoners, had ceased and that there were now arrangements to accommodate such detainees in the local police station, if numbers were low, or in a building vacated by 16 Flight of the RAF if there was a large number. However, the continued storage of 20 mattresses suggested to us that there could be occasions when they would be used for the detention of immigration detainees, possibly for large numbers, which was inappropriate even for short periods.

Recommendation

- 2.41 **HMP Dhekelia should not be used for the temporary holding of suspected irregular migrants, unless remanded to custody. The total population should not exceed eight prisoners.**

Children and young people

- 2.42 In 2004 a young person aged 17 had served a two-month sentence in the prison. No person under the age of 18 had been held since that time, although this was fortuitous rather than as a result of policy change. The prison was not a suitable environment to mix adult prisoners with young people under the age of 18.

Recommendation

- 2.43 **Young people under the age of 18 should not be held at HMP Dhekelia.**

Gender

- 2.44 All staff acknowledged that there were severe difficulties in holding women at HMP Dhekelia. The female area (see section on accommodation) was separated from the men's cells, but it contained the unfurnished cell so that a violent or recalcitrant male prisoner would be directly next to the cell occupied by a woman. Apart from a small, bare, caged exercise area, there were no separate facilities for women, so if men and women were held simultaneously, each would have to be locked in their cell area in turn while the other used facilities for cooking and eating, work and recreation. It was only practical to hold one woman in the prison in the one

ordinary cell allocated for female use, which effectively meant solitary confinement for female prisoners.

- 2.45 Plans were well advanced to use a house (formerly married quarters) in a small group of houses next to the prison, as a daytime base for any future female prisoner. This was a welcome initiative which provided the best option for managing a woman prisoner at HMP Dhekelia, although night accommodation remained problematic. Managers had drawn up a contingency plan to ensure that arresting officers and prison staff were well prepared to detain a woman humanely.

Recommendation

- 2.46 There should be a management strategy for women prisoners, including an appropriate regime and the use of discrete facilities for work and recreation.

Health

- 2.47 Prisoners did not always receive basic health screening before they were locked up on their first night. This frequently did not take place until the following working day, which was a particular problem for prisoners who arrived on Friday. Staff said that they could request a visit from the duty doctor if they thought there was a need, but they were not qualified to make that assessment.
- 2.48 Although there were no regular visits from health care professionals, there was timely and easy access to community health services when required, including mental health support and hospital appointments. Prisoners had good access to other specialists, for example the dentist. We were told of one prisoner who had been flown by helicopter to Larnaca to receive dental treatment that was not readily available locally. One new arrival told us that he was surprised to find that he was to be given an early appointment to see a dentist when a minor problem was discovered during his health screening.
- 2.49 The storage of medical files and medicines in the staff office was unsatisfactory. Medical records were kept on an open shelf and medicines were kept in an unsecured cupboard. Prison officers administered prescribed medication from the pharmacy's screw-top containers, recording the issue of the medication in the prisoner's medical file.

Recommendations

- 2.50 All new arrivals should routinely have a health screen before they are locked up for the first night in custody.
- 2.51 Medical records should be retained confidentially.
- 2.52 Systems for administration of medicines should be reviewed, within the normal clinical governance of SBA health services, to ensure that medicines are handled safely and securely and that there is safe pharmaceutical stock management and use.

Incentives and earned privileges

- 2.53 A published incentives and earned privileges (IEP) scheme was included in the information given to each prisoner. It prescribed differentials between the different levels in respect of number of visits, entitlement to wear own clothes and lock-up times. In fact, staff were unaware of the IEP system, it was not being implemented on any level and the different privilege levels appeared never to have been used. Some staff said that they would occasionally use the 'threat' of reduction in allowance of visits or telephone calls to bring into line prisoners who were not complying with the regime, but they also said that they had never had to put such threats into action.

Recommendations

- 2.54 Prisoners should not be threatened with informal punishments. The incentives and earned privilege scheme should be properly utilised to encourage good behaviour.
- 2.55 Withdrawal of access to telephones or visits should not be used or threatened as punishment.

Services

Catering and access to private purchases

- 2.56 The quality and quantity of food were very good. Religious diets were provided for and prisoners could make drinks for themselves throughout the day. Food was brought from the main garrison kitchens: at main meals there was a choice of several hot dishes, salads and a good range of other items. Prisoners were able to eat communally in their kitchen and dining room and most did so. One complained that 'the food is OK at first, but it is monotonous and too dry', and some complained that there was an excess of meat dishes. The meals that we sampled were appetising and nutritious.
- 2.57 The kitchen, which was freely accessible to the prisoners during the day, contained a cooker, two fridges and a microwave. Prisoners had only been permitted to reheat the food provided, but during the inspection they were given, and welcomed, the opportunity to cook for themselves. This was a positive change, particularly in view of the restricted range of activity available to prisoners.
- 2.58 Prisoners were able to request purchases from a local shop from their own funds and staff facilitated this. Records and receipts were kept, the system worked well and appropriate safeguards were in place to prevent its misuse.

Section 3: Purposeful activity

- 3.1 Time out of cell remained very good but prisoners were often not purposefully occupied. Prisoners could spend as much time in the open air as they wished when unlocked. Recreational activities were adequate. Some prisoners spent their time during the day reading or playing computer games but the choice of available books was very limited. There was no supervised and controlled access to the internet to encourage educational activities. Staff had commendably tried a number of initiatives to introduce education and employment opportunities for longer term prisoners but those held for short periods were not so well catered for.
- 3.2 Previously we said that the prison was not performing sufficiently well in relation to this healthy prison test. We highlighted good time out of cell which had been sustained, but very limited education and employment provision. The latter had improved. Following this inspection we considered that outcomes for prisoners were now reasonably good in relation to this healthy prison test.

Time out of cell

- 3.3 Prisoners spent plenty of time out of their cells: 15 hours a day unlocked except on Sundays and holidays when they were unlocked at 9am instead of 8am. Lock-up times were flexible when there was a reason to extend it in the evenings, for example permission had been given to stay unlocked later to watch a football match.
- 3.4 Recreational facilities were limited but encouraged by staff and there was good interaction between prisoners and staff to use what was available, such as table tennis. The small multi-gym was adequate to meet the needs of prisoners who had an interest in keeping fit. However, the equipment was not regularly checked for safety purposes. Some prisoners enjoyed using the computers to play games.
- 3.5 Access to the fresh air was unlimited during periods of unlock and prisoners spent time in the garden areas reading or talking to each other and staff. There were also exercise yards for prisoners who wished to use them and one yard had recently been equipped with a basketball net and basketballs and footballs were provided.
- 3.6 However, prisoners were often aimless and much of the time that they spent unlocked was not purposeful.

Housekeeping point

- 3.7 PE equipment should be regularly checked by a qualified person and necessary maintenance carried out to ensure safety.

Employment

- 3.8 All prisoners were expected to keep the communal areas clean as well as their own cells and all spent some time each day undertaking domestic tasks collectively and individually. All prisoners were also able to work in the gardens and the prison had previously supplied seeds

and plants which enabled prisoners to grow and then cook their own vegetables. Staff told us that prisoners' interest in gardening had declined and the grounds were not as attractive or well kept as described in the previous report. We were told that national restrictions on the use of water for maintaining gardens had added to the general lack of attention to the gardens and general areas surrounding the prison.

- 3.9 Various ad hoc building projects had been undertaken in the prison to improve the environment. Some areas had been repainted and some concrete paths had been laid in the small garden area. Opportunities for short-term or remanded prisoners to work within the confines of the prison were nevertheless limited and they were paid the same daily allowance regardless of the activity they engaged in.
- 3.10 The longer-term prisoners fared better. A work programme had been established for the two long-term prisoners held at the time of the inspection using their skills as professional builders within different areas of the garrison. This had occupied them for two days each week but had very recently been extended. A new longer-term programme working on improvements to the local scout camp was about to start. This programme would occupy both long-term prisoners for four days each week.
- 3.11 Prisoners had complained about the levels of pay that they received for the work they did, since it was not compatible with the wage that was paid to prisoners in the Republic. At the time of the inspection the prison paid the prisoners 35cents each day compared with 3 or 4 euros a day in the Republic. During the course of the inspection, an increase was agreed in the wage to be paid to prisoners at Dhekelia equivalent to that paid to prisoners in the Republic.

Education and training

- 3.12 Staff were sensitive to the needs and wishes of prisoners; they had been very creative and resourceful in their efforts to provide a decent regime since the previous inspection. In particular, the attempts that had been made to meet the educational and employment needs of the two long-term prisoners were commendable. This had included securing the services of an English teacher, an IT teacher and a mechanic, together with a car to work on. Only the IT teacher had retained the prisoners' interest.
- 3.13 The prisoners had made good progress and gained some useful accredited skills working with the IT teacher. At the time of the inspection, they were working on their second CLAIT (computer literacy and information technology) course, having completed five modules.
- 3.14 The useful development work, which had provided the longer-term prisoners with a range of opportunities based on a simple assessment of their needs, had not been replicated with short-term prisoners. There were no education or training opportunities on offer at the time of the inspection for prisoners on remand or serving short sentences. The IT teacher told us that she was able to offer modules of training suitable for short-term prisoners but such options had not been considered thus far.

Recommendation

- 3.15 **Opportunities should be sought for short-term prisoners to benefit from education and training provision that meets their individual needs.**

Library

- 3.16 The choice of books in the library was limited and the stock was very old. One prisoner who spent most of his time reading in the gardens told us: 'I could read two books a day but I read slowly so that I don't get through them too quickly'.
- 3.17 There was no visiting library or links with the garrison library to meet specific requests from prisoners who might want a book in their own language or reading material of specific interest to them, including in support of individual study they might want to undertake. The IT teacher had informally facilitated some requests from the long-term prisoners to obtain resources such as dictionaries from the garrison library to support their IT studies. The introduction of a formal arrangement was needed so that all prisoners could benefit from this service.
- 3.18 There was no access to the internet, despite good levels of staff supervision at all times.
- 3.19 Staff tried hard to offer some variety and stimulation in reading material that was available. When a Bulgarian prisoner was held for a lengthy sentence, staff contacted the Bulgarian Embassy to ask for reading material and for a visit from an Embassy representative. Unfortunately, no help was forthcoming.
- 3.20 Staff offered their own newspapers and magazines to prisoners on a daily basis and families were permitted to bring in reading material. During the inspection, staff quickly provided crosswords for a new arrival who had said on arrival that he enjoyed them.

Recommendation

- 3.21 **Well supervised and controlled access to the internet should be introduced to supplement educational studies and provide a wider range of appropriate recreational activities.**

Section 4: Resettlement

- 4.1 There was a lack of basic structures to reduce the risk of offending on release. This, together with a lack of a basic sentence management process, was particularly important for prisoners who had committed serious offences and were held for long periods. Prisoners with substance use problems were rarely held, but there was a need for contingency provision. Public protection arrangements were satisfactory. Visits were managed flexibly but time limits were harsh for families who had travelled long distances. Important aspects of reintegration planning, such as finance and accommodation, lacked specialist input and the development of partnerships between the prison and relevant community agencies was required.
- 4.2 Previously we said that the prison was performing poorly in relation to this healthy prison test as there was very little reintegration planning, few community links and a lack of offending behaviour work. Very little had changed and the need for well organised sentence and reintegration planning was a particular omission for the two long-term prisoners convicted of serious offences. On the basis of this inspection, we considered that outcomes for prisoners remained poor in relation to this healthy prison test.

Strategic management of resettlement

- 4.3 A resettlement policy had been issued in March 2009 which included provision of a resettlement policy committee to steer resettlement work at Dhekelia. However, there was no such committee in place, and the establishment lacked an agenda to reduce the risk of re-offending. There was a clear need for systems to assess this risk and to identify and address criminogenic needs. This would typically include the assessment of offending history and risk factors, sentence planning and the provision and sequencing of offence-related interventions appropriate to the individual. The requirement for such work was the more pressing since the prison would hold long-term prisoners for some years to come.

Recommendations

- 4.4 **The resettlement policy should be revised so that it reflects and drives forward work to reduce the risk of re-offending.**
- 4.5 **Senior managers should commission and monitor work to develop risk assessment and needs analysis associated with individual sentenced prisoners, and the provision of interventions to address those risks and needs within a simple sentence plan.**

Public protection

- 4.6 A policy on public protection had been issued in March 2009, fulfilling the recommendation made at the previous inspection. Although brief, it covered the relevant areas, and managers and staff were aware of the risks and priorities, particularly in relation to the safeguarding of children and vulnerable people.

Resettlement pathways

Accommodation and finance

- 4.7 Although staff provided help and advice and gave prisoners details of community agencies from which they could seek advice on release, there was no formal provision of specialist advice. Financial worries weighed heavily on at least one of the prisoners held.

Recommendation

- 4.8 Managers should establish partnerships with community agencies which provide help and advice on housing, finance and debt, so that expert support is available to prisoners when needed.

Education, training and employment - *see purposeful activity section*

- 4.9 The work and education opportunities offered to the long-term prisoners paid some attention to developing skills relevant to future employment, notably IT. More needed to be done for prisoners serving shorter sentences.

Mental and physical health - *see section on health services*

- 4.10 Prisoners received a pre-discharge medical check but were not given any information about health services post release.

Recommendation

- 4.11 Prisoners should be given information and assistance to access health and social care services on their release and support in accessing the services if required.

Drugs and alcohol

- 4.12 There was now a policy on substance use, which listed local services such as Kenthea, a faith-based substance misuse service. There had been no requirement for these services to date but structured arrangements for partnership working with specialist agencies were required to enable a quick response if the need arose for such provision in the future.

Recommendation

- 4.13 Managers should establish partnerships with community agencies which provide help and advice on substance misuse issues.

Children and families of offenders

- 4.14 Weekly visits were formally limited to 30 minutes for prisoners who had served less than 12 months and an hour for those who had served longer, although the superintendent frequently

authorised extensions of visits to an hour. These limits, while enshrined in SBA law, seemed arbitrary.

- 4.15 The rules limited visits entitlements to one a fortnight but they also provided for the Superintendent of Prisons to vary this, and made provision for extra visits for foreign nationals and for fine defaulters (to arrange payment of their fines). In practice, discretion was frequently exercised. Prisoners were satisfied with the frequency of visits and with the degree of management flexibility. During the inspection, the limit of three visitors was lifted on the authority of the superintendent to meet a legitimate need.
- 4.16 A prisoner told us: 'I asked for some work and to get paid. I have a wife and two stepchildren who are in a very bad condition outside, not able to receive any benefits. My mother is sick and lives on benefits, she cannot help me, and my brothers and sisters have their own problems. I would like to help my family and have asked many times for a decent rate of pay for work. We have done too many jobs within the prison for no pay. My family come from Limassol to visit me. It's a 100 kilometre journey. I have asked many times to be able to visit them at home. I am not a risk.' Escorted visits outside the SBA area were not usually possible because SBA police had no powers of arrest or detention outside that jurisdiction.

Recommendation

- 4.17 **Visits for convicted prisoners should be of at least one hour's duration and up to two hours or more when families have travelled a long distance or visit infrequently.**

Attitudes, thinking and behaviour

- 4.18 A long-term prisoner told us: 'I am feeling worse every day. Whatever we ask for, no one cares enough to do anything. We are young boys (referring to himself and his cousin, co-defendants) – I made a mistake, I have learned a big lesson and I will never do anything like that again.' Some skilled support was needed to help him cope with and make positive use of his long sentence for a serious crime.
- 4.19 The detention of prisoners for serious sexual offences highlighted the need to address the risk of further offending on release and of behaviour which paralleled the offence in the prison environment in relation to female staff and prisoners. Staff did not have the skills to challenge prisoners on issues of personal responsibility nor to explore victim empathy and the various cognitive and other deficits which might have contributed to the offence.

Recommendation

- 4.20 **Specialist support should be given to long-term prisoners to understand and address personal, behavioural, cognitive and emotional factors involved in their offending behaviour. If specialist resources are not available, staff should receive training in the basic concepts and skills of offending behaviour work.**

Section 5: Recommendations and housekeeping points

The following is a listing of recommendations and housekeeping points included in this report. The reference numbers at the end of each refer to the paragraph location in the main report.

Recommendations	To the chief constable
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First days in custody: reception

- 5.1 Reception procedures should include clear, risk based criteria governing the different levels of searching procedures. Decisions should be recorded. (1.13)
- 5.2 Arrangements should be made to have the 'Rights and Obligations of Prisoners' booklet translated into the prisoner's preferred language of a new prisoner as soon as possible so that it is equally accessible to all prisoners as a reference document. (1.14)

First days in custody: first night

- 5.3 The prisoner's risk assessment documentation should be developed to include an assessment of how well the prisoner is likely to cope with custody, his/her immediate welfare needs and the level of support required, and the potential risk to themselves and to others. This should be reviewed before the end of the first week. (1.18)

First days in custody: induction

- 5.4 Prisoners who are used to offer peer support to new arrivals should have a clearly defined role and be properly supported and monitored by staff. (1.21)

Self-harm and suicide prevention

- 5.5 The care of individual prisoners who have been identified as at risk of self-harm or in need of additional support should be agreed with specialist input, such as health care, as appropriate. This should be properly recorded and regularly reviewed. (1.32)
- 5.6 The level of monitoring of prisoners at risk of self-harm should be determined by a risk assessment which is regularly reviewed. (1.33)

Security and rules

- 5.7 A system should be introduced for the written submission and analysis of security information. (1.38)
- 5.8 Cells should be adequately ventilated, so that decisions on whether they should be locked can take full account of risk as well as decency. (1.39)

Segregation

- 5.9 Segregation and the use of unfurnished accommodation should be authorised in writing by a senior manager. (1.46)
- 5.10 Full records of the use of the unfurnished cell should be kept, including staff observations, and agreed actions to ensure that the prisoner is returned to normal location as quickly as possible. (1.47)

Environment and relationships

- 5.11 The cells should be deep cleaned regularly. (2.12)
- 5.12 The prison should not hold more than eight prisoners. (2.13)

Applications and complaints

- 5.13 A confidential complaints system should be introduced. Forms should be produced in the main languages and there should be an appeal process. (2.26)
- 5.14 The administrator should agree clear terms of reference for the Prison Board, including the expected frequency of visits and the submission of a regular report on the prison. (2.27)

Diversity

- 5.15 Existing policies on the various aspects of diversity should be incorporated into a single document which also includes attention to the needs of older prisoners, gender issues and sexual orientation. (2.33)

Race equality

- 5.16 Central records of events should be kept, enabling managers to discern any evidence of differential treatment of prisoners of different ethnic groups. (2.36)
- 5.17 A formal system should be developed for prisoners and staff to report in confidence to a designated senior manager alleged racially motivated incidents or discriminatory treatment. Managers should be required to investigate and respond. (2.37)

Foreign nationals

- 5.18 HMP Dhekelia should not be used for the temporary holding of suspected irregular migrants, unless remanded to custody. The total population should not exceed eight prisoners. (2.41)

Children and young people

- 5.19 Young people under the age of 18 should not be held at HMP Dhekelia. (2.43)

Gender

- 5.20 There should be a management strategy for women prisoners, including an appropriate regime and the use of discrete facilities for work and recreation. (2.46)

Health

- 5.21 All new arrivals should routinely have a health screen before they are locked up for the first night in custody. (2.50)
- 5.22 Medical records should be retained confidentially. (2.51)
- 5.23 Systems for administration of medicines should be reviewed, within the normal clinical governance of SBA health services, to ensure that medicines are handled safely and securely and that there is safe pharmaceutical stock management and use. (2.52)

Incentives and earned privileges

- 5.24 Prisoners should not be threatened with informal punishments. The incentives and earned privilege scheme should be properly utilised to encourage good behaviour. (2.54)
- 5.25 Withdrawal of access to telephones or visits should not be used or threatened as punishment. (2.55)

Education and training

- 5.26 Opportunities should be sought for short-term prisoners to benefit from education and training provision that meets their individual needs. (3.15)

Library

- 5.27 Well supervised and controlled access to the internet should be introduced to supplement educational studies and provide a wider range of appropriate recreational activities. (3.21)

Strategic management of resettlement

- 5.28 The resettlement policy should be revised so that it reflects and drives forward work to reduce the risk of re-offending. (4.4)
- 5.29 Senior managers should commission and monitor work to develop risk assessment and needs analysis associated with individual sentenced prisoners, and the provision of interventions to address those risks and needs within a simple sentence plan. (4.5)

Resettlement pathways: accommodation and finance

- 5.30 Managers should establish partnerships with community agencies which provide help and advice on housing, finance and debt, so that expert support is available to prisoners when needed. (4.8)

Resettlement pathways: mental and physical health

- 5.31 Prisoners should be given information and assistance to access health and social care services on their release and support in accessing the services if required. (4.11)

Resettlement pathways: drugs and alcohol

- 5.32 Managers should establish partnerships with community agencies which provide help and advice on substance misuse issues. (4.13)

Resettlement pathways: children and families of offenders

- 5.33 Visits for convicted prisoners should be of at least one hour's duration and up to two hours or more when families have travelled a long distance or visit infrequently. (4.17)

Resettlement pathways: attitudes, thinking and behaviour

- 5.34 Specialist support should be given to long-term prisoners to understand and address personal, behavioural, cognitive and emotional factors involved in their offending behaviour. If specialist resources are not available, staff should receive training in the basic concepts and skills of offending behaviour work. (4.20)

Housekeeping points

Security and rules

- 5.35 The security instructions should be reviewed and updated annually. (1.40)

Segregation

- 5.36 The number of prescribed disciplinary charges should be reduced and the charges defined clearly. (1.48)

Environment and relationships

- 5.37 The living environment should be brightened with displays or artwork. (2.14)
- 5.38 The disintegrating chairs in the association room should be replaced. (2.15)
- 5.39 Essential equipment to maintain the prison and minor appliances should be replaced when necessary. (2.16)

Time out of cell

- 5.40 PE equipment should be regularly checked by a qualified person and necessary maintenance carried out to ensure safety. (3.7)

Appendix I: Prison population profile January 2005 to November 2010

Convicted prisoners

33 prisoners were held between January 2005 and November 2010. 32 of these were male, of whom one was aged 17.


The sentence lengths are shown in Table 1.

Under 1 month	2
1-2 months	8
3-4 months	12
6-12 months	7

The remaining sentences were 2 years 3 months (GBH), 6 years (rape), 7 years (possession of controlled drugs – but went absence without leave after seven months), 2 years (rape).

Table 1

Sentence lengths in months, Jan 2005 - Oct 2010



Of the index offences, seven related to drugs, nine to immigration (including one of false pretences under this heading), five to violence (of which one was possession of a weapon and threat), two to rape (co-defendants), five to driving (including one refusal to give a specimen of breath), two to public mischief, two warrants of commitment and one stealing.

Index offence	Number
Drugs	7
Immigration	9
Violence	5
Rape	2

Driving	5
Public mischief	2
Warrants of commitment	2
Stealing	1

Prisoners on remand

Between the beginning of 2008 and November 2010, 176 unconvicted prisoners were held. This is a misleading figure, however, since the great majority were held during the first seven months of 2008, when a large number of suspected illegal immigrants, the highest number being 42 at one time, were detained. In fact, only 15 remand prisoners (in addition to convicted prisoners who had served remand time) were held between September 2008 and November 2010. They were in the prison for an average of three days.

The table at Annex A shows the periods of time spent by individuals in the prison, giving a picture of the variation in the number held at any one time. The first table shows all prisoners over a period of just over two years; the second, convicted prisoners from the beginning of 2005.

The offences with which the remand prisoners were charged were:

Illegal immigration	7
Aiding illegal immigrants	2
Stealing	2
Rape	1
Impersonation	1
Stealing	1
Conspiracy	1

All but four of the large number in the preceding period (January to August 2008) were illegal immigrants. The remaining four were accused of stealing.

Nationality

	Convicted	Unconvicted
Bulgaria	1	0
Egypt	1	0
Greek Cypriot	8	4
Iran	1	0
Iraq	0	1
Jordan	2	0
Latvia	2	0
Nigeria	0	3
Pakistan	1	1
Palestine	0	2
Poland	1	0
Romania	3	1
Russia	1	0
Sierra Leone	1	0
Slovakia	1	0
Sri Lanka	1	0

Turkey	1	1
Turkish Cypriot	8	2

Annex A

Fifteen convicted prisoners were held in HMP Dhekelia between July 2008 and November 2010; the time they spent there ranged from under one month to 28 months. The average time they spent in the prison was about seven months, although most (n=5) spent less than a month there, three spent two months, two spent three months and three prisoners spent five months, seven months and 20 months respectively. Two prisoners spent 28 months there.

Seventeen people were remanded in the prison between November 2008 and November 2010; all spent less than one month there.

The graph below shows the total number of prisoners (both convicted and remanded) in the prison in each month from July 2008 to November 2010.

