State of Policing
The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales

2017

Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary
State of Policing – The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2017

Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary

Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 54 of the Police Act 1996
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Foreword

This is my report to the Secretary of State under section 54 of the Police Act 1996. It contains my assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of policing in England and Wales, based on the inspections we carried out between March 2017 and March 2018.

This year’s report follows a similar structure to that of previous years.

Part 1 contains my assessment of the state of policing in England and Wales. In making my assessment, I have drawn on the inspections we carried out over the last year, as well as the findings and reports of other organisations, and other information and analysis available to me.

Part 2 provides an overview of the findings of the inspections we carried out between 24 March 2017 and 31 March 2018, including a summary of our PEEL inspections.

Part 3 sets out the full list of our inspections and other work in the year in question.

The results of our individual inspections enable an assessment of the performance of individual forces, or a more general assessment of performance in specific areas of policing. This report, and Part 1 in particular, gives my assessment of the state of policing in England and Wales. I hope that people, including the public, who hold policing to account will draw on the overall conclusions in this report just as much as they draw on the specific conclusions we have reached for each force.

Some of the themes in this year’s report, such as a lack of long-term planning and the fragmented use of technology, echo those I have highlighted in previous years. I also take this opportunity to comment on the crisis in child and adolescent mental health services, which is storing up problems that the police will have to deal with in the future.
Frontline officers and staff
One theme that has been present throughout all my State of Policing reports is the hard work, dedication to duty and conspicuous bravery of frontline officers and staff. Officers such as Constable Keith Palmer GM make the ultimate sacrifice to protect others; and their families live with their loss for ever.

PEEL
Our work inspecting police forces continues. This reporting period has seen the third complete round of PEEL (police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy) inspections.

These inspections consider the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces, and assess their legitimacy (how they behave and treat people). We are changing how we carry out PEEL inspections and 2017 marks the last round of PEEL in its current form. We have always planned to reduce the intensity of inspections of well-performing forces and we will now move to a model of integrated PEEL assessments.
Integrated PEEL

From 2018, we will carry out integrated PEEL inspections once a year in each force. We will use the information we hold about each force to focus our inspection on the areas we think present the greatest risks to the public. We are currently finalising the design of the assessments.

PEEL will still be the basis for our comprehensive analysis of the performance of each police force in England and Wales. The judgments and reports will continue to provide regular, easy-to-understand assessments of the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces. Comparisons with PEEL assessments from previous years will still be possible.

There is more detail about our integrated approach, as well as an explanation of some minor changes we have made to the way we carried out the latest round of PEEL inspections, later in this report.
**Force management statements**

Force management statements (FMSs) form part of the integrated PEEL assessment and we have recently given police forces templates and guidance for producing them. We will use the information in the statements when deciding the scope and scale of fieldwork we need in each force as part of our PEEL inspections.

Because they are forward-looking statements, FMSs will also help us, and police and crime commissioners, assess how well forces are planning and preparing for future demand. We will continue to develop FMSs over the next three years. I am grateful for the constructive comments we have already received as part of our consultation process. I am particularly grateful for the comments from chief officers and I welcome any further comments they, and anyone else, may have.

**Public inquiries and joint working**

Alongside our inspections, we have contributed to two public inquiries: the Anthony Grainger Inquiry and the Undercover Policing Inquiry. We will continue to contribute to these inquiries and support them in any way we can.

I thank the many other organisations and inspectorates we have worked with over the past year. As ever, they have made an invaluable contribution to our work and I look forward to working with them again in the future.

**Preparing to handle police super-complaints**

We have been preparing for our role in the new system for handling police super-complaints. This system will give bodies designated by the Home Secretary a way to raise concerns about features of policing that they believe significantly harm the interests of the public.

There are already super-complaints systems in the financial and commercial sectors to protect the interests of consumers. But, until now, there has not been a comparable system in policing. The new regime is likely to start this year.
In July 2017, our remit was extended to include inspections of fire and rescue services in England.

HMI Michael Cunningham

In December 2017, HMI Michael Cunningham QPM left the inspectorate after more than three years’ highly distinguished service as the Inspector of Constabulary with primary responsibility for the forces in the Northern region. He also led much of our national work, in particular the efficiency part of the PEEL programme, and made very significant contributions to our workforce development.

Mike Cunningham is now the chief executive of the College of Policing, a role he already fills with great distinction. His loss at the inspectorate is deeply felt; the advantages to the College and the police service, and therefore the public, are and will continue to be equally great.

His work at the inspectorate was of the highest order and considerable public benefit, and he has my warmest thanks for all he did. I look forward to years yet of close and valuable collaboration and public service in his new role.

Becoming HMICFRS

In July 2017, our remit was extended to include inspections of fire and rescue services in England, and HMIC was renamed Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS). This marks the beginning of another important chapter in our organisation’s 162-year history.

We are drawing on our experience of inspecting and reporting on police forces to develop a framework to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the 45 fire and rescue services in England. Our fire and rescue inspection programme and framework was approved by the Home Secretary in April 2018. I will cover the results of the programme in a separate ‘State of Fire and Rescue’ report in due course.

This has been a year of significant change for our organisation and we have achieved much. As ever, it is our HMIs and staff who deserve the real credit. It is my great privilege to work with such a loyal, dedicated, expert and diligent group of people, and they have my thanks and admiration for all they do, for policing and for the public.

Sir Thomas P Winsor
Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary
Our website
www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/

256,472 users on the website – an increase of over 60,000 on last year

Top 5 reports (non-PEEL):
- Crime Data Integrity for Leicestershire, North Wales, West Midlands
- Crime Data Integrity for Hertfordshire, Lancashire, South Wales
- Crime Data Integrity for Durham, North Yorkshire, Thames Valley
- Stalking and Harassment
- Modern Slavery

We present information about police forces’ performance (known as the PEEL assessments) in an interactive and accessible way

Page views

Efficiency
9 November 2017 – 17,067 views

Legitimacy
12 December 2017 – 10,073 views

Effectiveness
22 March 2018 – 22,315 views
Part 1: Overview
Overview

Over the last year we have, as ever, found many examples of police officers and staff doing excellent work. They do so in the face of often very difficult conditions, and we all owe them a heavy and enduring debt of gratitude.

On the whole, the inspections we have carried out during the past year show that the effectiveness and efficiency of the police service are improving. This is to the credit of all those who work in policing.

Generally, forces have made progress on the recommendations we have made and most can show efficiency improvements. This is important because, while policing budgets have been protected more than in some other public-sector organisations, forces still face difficult financial pressures.

I am pleased that the police service has responded well to the recommendations we made last year. It will, of course, take time for some of the changes to take effect and to translate into better services for the public, but overall this is encouraging.

Policing is often complex and very demanding, and that state of affairs will continue. Those difficulties are intensified and aggravated by failures of some forces to assess future demand and capability properly and efficiently, and to make plans accordingly. Forces also need to improve their work with other organisations to prevent crime over the long term.

The police’s cultural strength is also the source of one of its weaknesses

I came into this job with enormous respect and admiration for frontline police officers and staff, and the work they do every day. That respect and admiration is stronger now than it ever has been.

Time and again, our inspectors speak to frontline officers who keep going under very difficult circumstances, every working day. I believe that the greatest cultural strength of
the police – as well as courage, dedication, professionalism and resilience – is the can-do, will-do attitude; the never-say-no attitude; the get-it-done-when-others-won’t attitude; the not-turn-away attitude.

We all benefit greatly from this. We may even take it for granted from time to time. But my tenure as Chief Inspector of Constabulary has shown me that the police service’s cultural strength is also the source of one of its most persistent weaknesses.

Because frontline police officers and staff can be relied on to ‘get the job done’ (in the process, often adeptly navigating their way through organisational weaknesses), there is less pressure on leaders to bring about much-needed change. So the changes policing needs – to make sure the service is ready for its current and future challenges – are happening too slowly, and on too modest a scale.

There are no excuses for the shortcomings I routinely see in the police’s planning, demand management and resource deployment. In too many forces, officers and staff who are eager and determined to help the public are frustrated by inefficiency, unnecessary bureaucracy, and antiquated and malfunctioning systems. This would not be acceptable in many other organisations in the public sector and the private sector. It should not be acceptable in the police.

Time and again, our inspectors speak to frontline officers who keep going under very difficult circumstances, every working day.
It is true that there are aspects of police work that set forces apart from most organisations. In some ways, the police service is unique. But there is also a great deal that running a police force has in common with running other types of organisation. Leaders, whether in police forces, hospitals, large corporations, small businesses or the learned professions, should create the conditions that enable staff to achieve their organisation’s objectives in the most effective and efficient way.

When measured against the standards of the best organisations, some senior leaders in policing have a great deal to do.

**The welfare of officers and staff is crucial**

The welfare of officers and staff in police forces is of first importance.

It is vital to the officers and staff themselves; to the leaders of forces, and those who hold them to account; and to the public, who rely on the police to keep them safe.

I mean welfare in its widest sense. I mean it in physical terms: officers face physical risks every day because of demand, their workloads and the nature of the work they are doing. In many cases, they also face the risk of injury or assault – sometimes severe or life-threatening.

I also mean welfare in terms of officers’ and staff members’ mental health: the severe stresses that come not only from the pressure of the job and the workload, but also from the most appalling things officers must face in their working lives.

I do not only mean the angry and dangerous man, armed with a weapon; or the reckless or even murderous driver of a vehicle; or the person in mental health crisis, endangering their own life or the lives of people nearby. I also mean serious road traffic collisions; sudden deaths and suicides, sometimes of young people; people who have died in fires or by violence of all kinds. The person who died alone, whose body was not found for a long time; the cot death; the most unspeakable crimes against children; the list goes on and on.
These things have profound and lifelong effects on the police officers and staff who have to deal with them. It is inevitable that they will take those experiences home, and they will live with them for ever.

We must determine whether forces properly assess and deal with the effects of these things on the mental health and welfare of officers and staff. Do they understand the knock-on effects on their loved ones when they have dealt with a motorway smash, or cut down the body of a teenage girl who has hanged herself in despair and then had to tell her parents? When they lie awake, unable to forget what they have seen, and withdraw into depression and worse, their families suffer too.

It is vital that forces have adequate systems for assessing these things, and giving people the support they need. This matters not only in human terms for the officers and staff themselves, and their families; on a more systemic level, it matters to the effectiveness and efficiency of the force.

It is vital that forces have adequate systems for giving people the support they need.
If a police force’s most important assets – its people – are under undue strain, whether in terms of workload or the nature of the work they do and the effects of that work on them, the force’s ability to serve the public is compromised.

Of course policing can and should be made more efficient. That is something all officers and staff, at all levels, know well. But it becomes much more difficult to improve efficiency if officers and staff are impaired, physically or mentally, and often both.

Forces need to make better long-term plans

Increasing demand and decreasing resources mean that some aspects of policing are still under stress. I am pleased to say that most police forces in England and Wales have risen impressively to the financial challenges they face, and most are investing more effort in planning for the future. But the scope and scale of their plans vary significantly.
In any organisation with limited resources, failing to plan properly will lead to poor outcomes. For the police, failing to plan properly will compromise public safety.

In the face of significant pressure, marginal improvements are not enough. I am concerned that many forces still do not have investment plans or effective governance structures that will significantly change the way they operate. Too many forces still make planning decisions without properly understanding how demand for their services is likely to change.

A small number of forces are still using reserves to shore up the way they currently operate. This is a short-term strategy that, if it works at all, can only last until the money runs out. At that point, if nothing else changes, these forces will have fallen even further behind and will have less time to make the changes they need.

In contrast to this short-term approach, the best managers in the best forces invest time in planning not just one year ahead, but over three or four years ahead, and beyond. These forces use all the information available to them to make informed decisions about how they will need to operate in the years to come. They then make plans so that their workforces and other assets are fit and ready.

This approach should not be the exception; it should be the rule.

**Force management statements will help forces plan for future demand**

No well-managed enterprise can be fully efficient and effective without a good enough evidence-based prediction of future demand. It needs this to recruit the right people, develop the skills of its workers, exploit the power of new technology, develop new ways of working and improve efficiency.

As part of our inspection process, we now require forces to send us information they use as part of their planning process, in the form of a force management statement. In March this year, we sent template force management statements and guidance to forces.
This is the first year of a three-year project to develop force management statements, which included a 12-week consultation. I am grateful to all those who participated in the consultation, particularly chief officers and police and crime commissioners, whose input was invaluable. We have listened carefully and, acting on the feedback we received, we have made changes to this year’s templates.

We have simplified the templates and made them easier to use. In this first year, forces will tell us how they measure demand and assess capability, and what that process tells them about what they need to do in the next four years. Within the broad parameters of the template, it is up to chief officers to explain how things are and will be in their forces, and how they have arrived at those conclusions.

What we have not done is make this just about today. Force management statements are all about the future, starting from the present. We know that accurately forecasting demand is not easy, but it is necessary and too many forces have neglected it for too long.

**Police forces need a better understanding of the demand they face**

It is important that forces, and the public, have a clear and comprehensive understanding of the true levels of demand for policing. This is true at the best of times, but it is even more important in the current context of limited budgets and changing demand.

To be effective, police forces need to manage the demand they face. But forces cannot manage demand properly without a clear understanding of how much there is, or what form it takes. In many cases, it is troubling how little forces know about demand – particularly demand that comes from hidden crime, such as so-called honour-based violence and modern slavery.

In contrast, the best forces have carried out sophisticated analysis to identify where they are most likely to find under-reported or otherwise hidden demand. This means they make better decisions about how to use their resources.
It may seem counter-intuitive to spend time and money uncovering even more demand, but it is important for two reasons.

First, this hidden demand is not an abstract concept. It represents real people in trouble; these are victims of crime who need help from the police.

Second, there is little demand that stays hidden for ever; forces will almost always need to respond to it eventually. It is far better to uncover and respond to hidden demand early, rather than wait until demand has escalated, or its severity has intensified. The widespread and shocking abuse of children in Rotherham, which stayed hidden from view for many years, is a powerful example of this.

We need an open, public debate about demand

Once forces understand the real scope of the demand – crime and non-crime, latent and patent – they face, they can make better decisions about how best to tackle it. I encourage forces to manage and prioritise their response to demand, but they must take care not to manage demand in a way that undermines public confidence.

Given that police forces do not have unlimited resources, we cannot expect them to meet all the demand that we might want them to. This means chief officers must make choices about how to respond to each type of demand. It is important that the public understand those choices – and the reasons behind them – so they can have fair expectations and confidence in the police.
Almost a quarter of forces are not meeting enough of their demand or are managing it inappropriately.

Some forces are not meeting enough of their current demand

Last year, we were concerned that a small number of forces were struggling to meet demand and were artificially suppressing it. Some forces were going as far as downgrading the severity of calls from the public to justify a slower response; I am pleased to say that this year we found less evidence of this.

But there is now a new problem. Although forces are no longer suppressing demand to the same extent, they are not managing it all properly, either. Almost a quarter of forces are not meeting enough of their demand or are managing it inappropriately. In some cases, forces are putting vulnerable people at serious risk of harm.

In some forces, we found that staff were holding thousands of emergency calls in queues, largely because officers were not available to respond to them. In some cases, officers were not actively reassessing the urgency of the calls during the delay.

Many, although not all, forces use telephone investigations to respond to some types of demand efficiently. There is not necessarily anything wrong with this; telephone investigations have the potential to give victims of crime a prompt and efficient service. But forces must not use telephone investigations as simply a cheap way of dealing with a case. They need to be properly allocated, well supervised and only used in appropriate cases. Of the telephone investigations we inspected over the last year, roughly one third were of poor quality and nearly half were not supervised properly.
Demand can be unpredictable

Changes in demand emerge in different ways – some are unexpected and sudden, others are expected and gradual.

We have recently seen the fine examples of forces responding extraordinarily well to terrorist attacks, co-ordinating the actions of armed and unarmed officers in a way that saved lives and inspired confidence and admiration. The Metropolitan Police Service, City of London Police, British Transport Police and Greater Manchester Police, working with their colleagues across the other emergency services, have much to be proud of. We know from research we carried out with Ipsos MORI that public confidence in the police to protect them during a terrorist incident has increased markedly since 2016.\(^1\)

Crimes such as terrorist attacks, and major incidents such as the fire at Grenfell Tower, create unpredictable and extreme demands which will always stretch resources, however good a force’s plans are. The tragedy at Grenfell Tower involved a crime scene in the most difficult and dangerous of environments, recovering and identifying 71 bodies, dealing with families and friends desperate for information about their loved ones, and a complex investigation under the gaze of the media. The police could have foreseen none of this 24 hours earlier.

Similar demands arose from the terrorist attacks – Manchester’s especially, given that 14,000 people attended the concert that night and ten of the 22 people killed were young people, the youngest only eight years old. Inevitably, the scale, speed, complexity and risks associated with incidents of this kind mean there will be lessons to be learned from the emergency response. But we should never lose sight of the fact that the police, and others, chose to stay in the Manchester Arena foyer to help casualties, despite knowing there was every possibility of a second explosion.
Some demand can increase gradually

Fraud – once a relatively low-volume, niche crime – is now a high-volume, common crime. Much of it is carried out online and against vulnerable victims. Many frauds are recorded; many are not investigated.

Then there is cyber-crime. Offences that were unimaginable a few years ago are now commonplace; they are carried out on an industrial scale and, in some instances, threaten major disruption to society.

Working with the National Crime Agency and other bodies, the police are adapting to the demands that fraud and cyber-crime create. However, these crimes are often technically complex and international. This creates more, if not unexpected, demands for the police. We intend to look more closely at the police response to these crimes.

It is vital that police record crime accurately

We know from our Crime Data Integrity inspections that the police are getting better at recording crime. But too many forces are still not doing it accurately enough.

In October 2014, we finished the most extensive and comprehensive inspection ever carried out into crime recording. At that time, we found that almost one in five crimes was not being recorded – an indefensible 19 percent of crimes were not even getting on the books. The position in the case of rape and other sexual offences was even worse: one in four was not recorded.

One of our recommendations was that, for the purely administrative act of recording a crime, what the complainant said should be assumed to be correct. The crime would be recorded, and that would trigger the obligation to investigate. Immediately after the crime has been recorded, investigators must proceed with an entirely open mind.

Those who are victims of crime, and those who say they are victims, are entitled to have their complaints taken seriously, and to have them properly investigated. In all cases, once the investigation has begun, the police must proceed promptly and find and evaluate the evidence.
The evidence may support a complaint and it may not; a few who claim to be victims may be untruthful or there may be no evidence apart from the word of the accuser. What matters is that the police must proceed professionally and objectively, without bias, fear or favour. During an investigation, there is, and should be, no presumption of guilt on the part of the accused. Police officers have not been told to believe the complainant throughout the investigation. They have only been required to record crime on an assumption of truth – an assumption which ends immediately after the crime record has been made and before the investigation has begun.

If a complaint of crime is not recorded, in almost every case it will not be investigated, the complainer will not receive services she or he is entitled to, the perpetrator (if there is one) will be free and may go on to re-offend, and justice will be denied.

Crime recording is the springboard to investigation; it has to be done properly. If the police later determine that no crime was committed, they must, under the crime-recording rules, take it off the books.

Those making valid complaints must have confidence in the police taking them seriously. And so their reports of crime must be recorded so that objective investigations are carried out.
Public confidence in the police depends on their being conspicuously fair to everyone – accuser and accused alike.

Eight hundred years since Magna Carta, it should not be necessary now to remind anyone of Article 40: “To no-one will we sell, deny or delay justice.” Justice is fairness. Public confidence in the police depends on their being conspicuously fair to everyone – accuser and accused alike.

Not recording crime accurately has other consequences too – for the police and for those who hold them to account. Without accurate crime records, it is harder to judge how well each force is performing against the first Peel principle: preventing crime.

Not only that, without accurate records, police forces cannot use predictive tools to help inform their planning. Using these tools to analyse crime data can reveal patterns of criminal behaviour, including where it is occurring and how severe it is. If the crime data the tools rely on are inaccurate, forces miss out on a vital opportunity to become more efficient.

The police need a better understanding of their role in the criminal justice system

Police basic training may be enough for officers in their earliest years in the service. But the demands associated with preventing, detecting and prosecuting crime mean that all officers must keep up and build on their skills during their service.

That includes their knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals and essential details of criminal law, including the rules of evidence and procedure.

Police officers need a better understanding of the role they play in the criminal justice system. They need to have a sound appreciation of how what they do, or do not do, will be examined – and may be challenged – in court. They need to be able to understand, anticipate and predict the course of a prosecution so they do not make avoidable mistakes in the investigation.

When police have this ability, the integrity of criminal cases, and the chances of a successful and just conviction, or a plea of guilty to an appropriate charge, improve markedly.
Equally, accusations which are false or for which there is insufficient evidence are more likely to be flushed out, and the wrongly accused can be relieved and public money and time saved.

However, at the moment, constables do not usually receive sufficient and specific training in this area. As almost all police officers begin and end their careers as constables, this is unsustainable.

This year, we have seen the high-profile collapse of a series of criminal trials because police (and others) failed to comply with the disclosure rules, which require the defence to be given material which undermines the prosecution or may help the defence. Any miscarriage of justice is a tragedy – for a victim who is denied justice or an accused who is wrongly convicted. These cases strike at the very heart of our legal system and leave our confidence in it severely shaken. They damage people's lives.

No-one should have to wait months or years for the police and prosecutors to realise a case is unsound, and to drop it. Justice must be timely; delayed, it is denied.

Take the example of a man wrongly accused of a sexual offence, where there is no evidence against him but the word of his accuser. There is material on a digital device, now in the hands of the police, which he believes shows the accusation is false and that he is innocent. Because of delays in the police getting the material from the device, it might take a long time for the true picture to emerge.

During this delay, the accused's life is effectively on hold; indeed, it might well be getting a great deal worse. He – and others close to him – will suffer while the police wait to obtain and then analyse the data on the device. Anxiety and fear that something will go wrong will mount up; his job or business will suffer; his social and professional relationships will be under strain and may break; he may endure severe financial hardship; his mental health may deteriorate; if he is a student, his ability to concentrate on his studies and do his best in his exams will be severely impaired. Months later, the police realise the accusation was false and drop the investigation. In the meantime, the accused has become any miscarriage of justice is a tragedy – for a victim who is denied justice or an accused who is wrongly convicted.
It is not uncommon for the police to seize computers containing terabytes of material, which they then have to interrogate.

a victim not only of a false accusation but of severe delays on the part of the police to see that it is false; but no-one can give him back what he has lost. That too is an injustice, and it is an avoidable one.

It is vital that the police have both the training and the resources they need to avoid these problems. The timeliness of the interrogation and analysis of digital devices, and the quality of training and supervision of officers in establishing the strength or weakness of a case, must improve considerably.

As these collapsed cases and a recent joint inspection\(^3\) show, there are demands that the police, working with other parts of the criminal justice system, must address. Officers need up-to-date skills and knowledge to do so.

The main Act of Parliament that governs disclosure is the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. The world has changed a great deal since it was enacted. In the years that followed, the rise in the volume of digital material created in criminal investigations has been enormous. It is not uncommon for the police to seize computers containing terabytes of material, which they then have to interrogate. It is essential that the police establish and bring into operation the most efficient and effective systems for rapidly interrogating and analysing digital devices, so these vast quantities of data can be properly and quickly assessed. Having people read thousands, sometimes tens of thousands, of pages of data from a single mobile phone will never be sustainable, and no force should assume it ever will be. I return to the issue of artificial intelligence and machine learning later in this Part.

As Sir Brian Leveson said in his 2018 Criminal Cases Review Commission Annual Lecture: “The disclosure process, if it is to be carried out effectively, requires expertise, time and money. All require effective funding.”

It is also imperative that the College of Policing intensifies its work in relation to the link between the police’s systems for training, development and competency and the regime for pay and reward.
The rise of serious violence means the police must use their powers fairly and proportionately

The last year has seen a significant increase in serious violence, and not only in London, where knife crime in particular is making regular news headlines.⁵

Some young people are dying on our streets because they believe, wrongly, that carrying a weapon will protect them. Around the time of the 2011 riots, the Labour MP for Tottenham, David Lammy, spoke about “a Grand Theft Auto culture that glamorises violence; a consumer culture fixated on the brands we wear, not who we are and what we achieve; a gang culture with warped notions of loyalty, respect and honour.” That same culture, combined with hopelessness, poor education and a lack of father figures, could be leading young people, and young men in particular, to engage in criminality, including serious violence.

The Government, police and public all recognise that the police need to use their stop-and-search powers. They are a legitimate tactic to reduce violent crime and take knives and other weapons from those who carry them on our streets.
However, over the years, stop and search has not been without controversy; every community has a strong and long-held interest in how the police use it. Five years ago, we found “disturbingly low levels of supervision” and other major problems, which led to the Government creating the Best Use of Stop and Search scheme. Things have improved since then, but in last year’s State of Policing report, I noted that not all forces were complying with the scheme. This year, we have seen sustained improvement in how forces record reasonable grounds for stop and search, but it varies across the country how effectively forces record, monitor and scrutinise how they use these powers.

The rise in serious violence means the police need to use the powers Parliament has given them for these purposes. Public support is fragile but there are good indications that it is improving; for example, the use of body-worn video cameras leads to more accountability and fewer complaints.

There are also good examples of forces taking determined, high-profile action to tackle specific types of crime, such as the Metropolitan Police’s response to moped crime and acid attacks. This shows that the force can work flexibly when it needs to, giving an appropriate response to new trends.

**We need a concerted effort to prevent crime**

It takes time to develop and deploy new tactics. Forces need to think ahead and make sound assumptions about how they must change. Early warning of new trends is important, not just to give forces time to plan, but also to help forces stop trends forming in the first place.

It is not only police forces that are responsible for preventing crime. We need a concerted effort from all public authorities – and increasingly from private-sector organisations – to tackle the causes of crime and disorder, long before an emergency response becomes necessary. This philosophy, which is evident across many aspects of police work, is a prominent and valuable feature of the Government’s strategies for tackling terrorism, serious organised crime, extremism and, now, serious violence. I strongly endorse this approach.
Early intervention must be given much higher priority. For example, there is so much that needs to be done to help troubled families; reduce parental conflict; support children’s emotional and cognitive learning; develop young people and divert them from offending; make the child protection system more effective; and treat mental illness and addictions.

If society does not give adequate and timely support to those who desperately need it, the chaotic lives they endure will lead them to become victims of crime or offenders. All too often, they become both. The work of institutions such as the Early Intervention Foundation is therefore vitally important.

Preventing crime is not only about tackling its causes. We also need to do what we can to make ourselves safer. Initiatives such as SafetyWorks! in Northumbria are taking a rounded view of this problem. SafetyWorks! promotes safety through a range of interactive scenarios for young people and community groups. These include actions that keep people safe, such as installing smoke alarms and dealing with bogus callers. They also include activities designed to deter children from littering, committing anti-social behaviour, trespassing on the railway, starting fires and becoming victims of grooming.

If public bodies do not work together to tackle problems properly, at an early stage, before they escalate into criminality and disorder, they are simply storing up more severe problems for the police and the rest of society.

**Public services must work together to support children**

The need for public-sector organisations to work together is particularly acute when it comes to children’s and adolescents’ mental health. We all know that prevention is always better than cure – this applies to children’s mental health even more than it does in other areas. To paraphrase Frederick Douglass, the 19th-century social reformer, it is easier to build strong children than to repair broken adults. Early intervention and prompt, adequate and effective treatment are essential.
Reports and studies have repeatedly shown that poor mental health care will often lead to offending. The factors that affect children’s mental health are complex and no single person or organisation can control them all. But if we do not act to support children early on, the problems that can develop are more complicated to address, not just for the NHS and the education system, but also for the police and the wider criminal justice system. These points have been emphasised very recently by others.10

Reports and studies have repeatedly shown that poor mental health care will often lead to offending. The Government’s Green Paper makes an explicit link between children with conduct disorders and later delinquency and criminality: children with conduct disorders are 20 times more likely to end up in prison than the general population.

A 2014 report by the British Medical Association11 made similar links and pointed out that young people in young offender institutions, secure children’s homes and secure training centres rarely thrive. Once problems have been allowed to reach this stage, helping children becomes more costly and less effective.

There are many people in the criminal justice system who should not be there. They are there because social or economic disadvantage, injustice or brutality led them there – perhaps via a route which involved poverty, truancy, illiteracy, physical, sexual or emotional abuse, teenage pregnancy, failed relationships, mental illness, or drug or alcohol addiction. Often, it is several of the above; it can be all.
They may also be there because of their complex needs or vulnerabilities; in these cases, police custody suites become places concerned with health and social care, not criminal justice.

A more effective police response to children experiencing mental health problems is of course welcome. But too often, this response is to treat a symptom which might have been less severe – or entirely absent – had there been better and earlier recognition of its underlying causes and action to tackle them.

There is much research on the correlation between adverse childhood experiences, the increased risk to children’s mental and physical health, and their increased vulnerability to child abuse and exploitation. These links should be identified and understood at the earliest possible stage, so that each child receives the right support. This means timely and targeted support, with all the agencies and organisations charged with protecting and promoting the wellbeing of children working together closely.

The police are laying some foundations for this. Our single-agency child protection inspections are finding a significant change in the way police understand and treat vulnerability. Officers and staff (with the encouragement of senior leaders) are increasingly starting to look past the anti-social behaviour or other misdemeanour of a child and ask, ‘What is causing this behaviour?’ – and, crucially, ‘What can I do about it?’

However, this is by no means consistently the case; and our inspections also still find some other problems again and again. We do not underestimate the complexity of this work, nor the difficulty of working with often very troubled children, but progress must be faster and surer. In 2011, Professor Munro’s review of children’s services12 described a situation where practitioners had become overly preoccupied with doing things right (i.e. complying with a process) as opposed to doing the right thing.
We still see this in police forces. Decisions about risk and exchanging information with other agencies can be about managing demand, not mitigating risk. Senior leaders review numbers of child protection cases, but do not always assess the quality of the decisions officers and staff are making. Too often, investigations involving children are allocated to teams and individuals without the skills or experience to manage them. And children are not always kept informed about their investigations or consulted about decisions made on their behalf.

Culture also has an important part to play. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the case of children who are detained in custody. It is universally accepted that a police custody suite is not the right place for a child. This is not to say that children should not be arrested, or alleged crimes should not be investigated. However, often children who are suspected of an offence (and whose behaviour may be very hard to handle) are not recognised as vulnerable. Their behaviour is described and seen as a deliberate and calculated choice. While that may be true, they are likely to have had several adverse experiences which have driven them to those choices. However, very few referrals for safeguarding support originate from police custody.

There are no easy fixes. There needs to be a relentless focus on improving outcomes for children, as quickly and cohesively as possible.

We have a collective obligation to work together to protect children from problems leading to or arising from poor mental health. I echo the call from the Care Quality Commission for those who commission health, social care and criminal justice services to work together more closely and pool their resources where necessary.

There will always be situations where someone in crisis needs a rapid response from the emergency services. But too often our public services are failing to work together to prevent the crisis in the first place.

It is universally accepted that a police custody suite is not the right place for a child.
Policing very often deals with society at its lowest ebb - either because people are at their most frightened and vulnerable, or behaving at their worst. But blue lights should not have to flash for someone to get the help they need in time.

**Technology can both harm and help vulnerable people**

The raw power of the worldwide web can be an agency of fear as well as freedom. Technology enhances much of our daily lives. It also intensifies severe threats to the most vulnerable people in society, including children.

For instance, the pressure to be active on social media makes it impossible for some children to escape bullying. When bullies can pursue children into their homes and even into their bedrooms, the pressure can be unbearable and lead to lifelong damage and, sometimes, tragically, to children ending their lives.

The Care Quality Commission has highlighted concerns about online bullying. It also raised concerns about children and young people accessing inappropriate websites, such as those that may promote eating disorders, self-harm and other harmful behaviours, even suicide.

But the Care Quality Commission also makes the important point that technology can be part of a solution. For example, many children prefer to use websites, online forums or apps for support with their mental health rather than seeking help from professionals. And some services are starting to harness this trend by developing age-appropriate online information about mental health for children and young people.

**Technology raises complex issues for the police**

The ease with which we can generate, access and move data about ourselves brings a new set of rights and responsibilities, many of which are still developing. It is not always possible to foresee the problems that might arise from the use (or misuse) of a particular technology. But we need to try.
As a society, we need a better understanding of the role of individuals and the state in regulating behaviour online, and how much privacy we think is reasonable. The speed with which new technologies are developed and adopted means we may also need to accept that views on this will differ greatly between generations.

There is a handful of very large companies with a highly dominant influence over how the internet is used. In too many respects, their record is poor and their reputation tarnished. The steps they take to make sure their services cannot be abused by terrorists, paedophiles and organised criminals are inadequate; the commitment they show and their willingness to be held to account are questionable. It should come as no surprise if this leads to the establishment and ever-tightening of internet regulation, to compel responsible and proportionate actions which these companies could voluntarily take today.

There are already examples of private firms developing technology with the express intent of making it impossible for law enforcement agencies to intercept communications, or gain access to devices containing relevant information. Protecting personal data and communications from eavesdroppers is a legitimate concern. But there are very few legitimate reasons in democratic countries to prevent properly-operated law enforcement agencies, with appropriate judicial oversight, from getting access to communications and other data. The wide availability of impenetrable end-to-end encryption services has made life easier for terrorists, paedophiles and organised criminals, and harder for law enforcement.
How we generate and use personal data also raises questions of trust, brought into sharp focus by the revelations about Cambridge Analytica. In England and Wales, as in other parts of the world, the police use personal data to prevent and detect crime, especially serious organised crime and terrorism.

If, with a lawful search warrant, the police seize a drug dealer’s address book, or a terrorist’s notes on bomb-making, the public are supportive. But they seem less supportive of the police having access to mobile phone records or other forms of personal data, despite their value as evidence in crime and terrorism cases. The police have to understand why the public are reluctant to trust them with their data; the public have to understand why the police need it. The police deserve that trust.

The police need to harness the power of technology – particularly artificial intelligence and machine learning

In recent years, several forces have made commendable advances in developing and using technology. But, in too many respects, others are still playing catch-up.

Used properly, technology can make policing far more efficient and effective. But technology is not improving the efficiency of police forces at the same rate as in other organisations. In part, this is because the police are still not acquiring the right technology. What concerns me more and more is the fact that police are not exchanging information effectively enough between, or even within, forces and the different types of technology they use do not interact well enough with each other.

I have said far too many times that police ICT is, in too many respects, outdated, inadequate and weak. ICT departments are still too disconnected from other parts of their forces. Senior officers often think of ICT as a procurement function, rather than an integral part of strategic planning. In 2014, we said that “the current situation in relation to the development and use of ICT in the police service is unsatisfactory and its causes must be tackled”. This has not improved anywhere near enough.

The wide availability of impenetrable end-to-end encryption services has made life easier for terrorists, paedophiles and organised criminals, and harder for law enforcement.
The lack of progress is frustrating, because there is real potential for technology, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, to make the police more effective and efficient. If the police are going to be able to prevent and detect crime in the future – particularly technology-enabled crime – they need to invest now in the technology and training to do so.

The police could and should use AI far more to analyse the huge amounts of data held on digital devices. This will undoubtedly help prevent the kinds of disclosure mistakes that lead to trials collapsing, particularly in cases of rape and other sexual assaults. And it will accelerate justice for accuser and accused.

There are already some good examples of forces starting to harness this technology. The Metropolitan Police are developing plans to use AI to identify images of child abuse, with the effect of greatly speeding up the processing of the material and its reliable use in prosecutions. By having machines do this extraordinarily distressing work, the force also helps reduce the risk of officers suffering psychological trauma. Police in Durham are working on a predictive AI system to help officers decide whether a suspect should be kept in custody. And there are other instances of worthwhile advances.
At a national level, the National Law Enforcement Data Programme, run by the Home Office, is bringing together the main national computer systems, including the Police National Computer and the Police National Database.

But, compared with the enormous capability and potential of AI, this is rudimentary, and the police could and must do much more. The opportunity here is not only to get machines to do faster what the police already do. It is also to use technology to achieve police objectives in ways we have not even thought of yet, and might never.

Instruments and technology exist today which can process information far faster, more efficiently and more reliably and effectively than any human could. But, even more significantly, the capability exists now to devise ways of learning – of machines thinking for themselves – which no person has ever achieved, and perhaps no person ever could.

Preventing, investigating and determining the causes of crime all involve numerous complex factual permutations, unpredictable human behaviour and random as well as intended events. This is the perfect field for the application of smart computers of the kind I have described. Of course, this technology costs money. But if the police invest now, working with the experts who have created and are developing these capabilities, this powerful technology has the potential to make them more efficient, and achieve huge advances in public safety and security, and timely justice.

It is time the police raised their eyes from digitising what they already do (important as that is), to see and develop the means to achieve what they cannot and may never otherwise be able to do.

**Police in Durham are working on a predictive AI system to help officers decide whether a suspect should be kept in custody.**

**We are giving the police a network code to help them use technology more effectively**

When it comes to ICT, the need to work together at a national level is clear. We are developing a network code to help the police establish common operating standards. This type of mechanism is not a new idea and we are drawing on models already in use in other essential public services.
This is important, because the police collect data on all sorts of things: for example, people, such as victims, suspects and offenders; places, such as crime scenes, road junctions and addresses; and objects, such as stolen goods, weapons and vehicles. But the police do not currently collect this data in a sufficiently standardised way. This means that the police cannot always easily exchange information with each other, which could lead to them missing opportunities to detect and prevent crime.

The report we published this year on the National Police Air Service (NPAS) is an example of what can happen in a bad model of collaboration. Under that agreement, the level of service given to each force and the financial contributions needed in return were negotiated separately and directly between NPAS and the collaborating forces. This led to a view that collaboration arrangements necessarily create ‘winners and losers’.

For any collaboration to be successful, there must be enough in it for both sides. Otherwise, it ceases to be a collaboration and becomes a good deal for some forces at the expense of others. The network code has at its heart the principle of enduring mutual benefit and the objective of perfect, affordable technological co-operation.

The police service needs to develop more of a culture of national co-operation

The network code is important, but of course it is not the whole solution.

Police forces are not competitors of one another, and the public need forces to pool their expertise to be as efficient and effective as they can be.

It is good that partnerships and collaborative approaches are now common in policing; these arrangements take many different forms. There are some impressive local and regional collaborative arrangements between forces, local authorities, health authorities, fire and rescue services, charities and other organisations.
For example, OneCall in Northumbria brings 20 different services together in one building. Anyone who is worried about the welfare of a child or adult can call one number and have their call dealt with by someone from the right agency. Before OneCall, there were 42 different ways of contacting the agencies involved. The new system not only gives the public a better service, it also helps agencies become more efficient by working more closely together. This is a commendable achievement which should be adopted throughout the country.

I am encouraged that, this year, more forces were clear about the benefits they derived from collaborative work. This is important, because the aim of collaboration is not to work together for its own sake, but to improve efficiency and give the public a better service.

Conclusion

Above all, the brave and committed men and women who serve at the frontline of policing need their leaders, in policing and politics, to deal with all the things I have highlighted. That means getting ahead of demand; collaborating with each other and other bodies to prevent crime and deal with its causes; exploiting advances in technology; and giving early intervention the emphasis and resources it deserves.

By doing this, they will give frontline officers and staff the best prospect of keeping people safe and achieving timely justice. The public deserve nothing less.

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Part 2: Our inspections
Our PEEL inspections

In 2017, we made our third complete PEEL assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the 43 police forces in England and Wales. As part of the PEEL programme, we assess and make graded judgments about how well each police force keeps people safe and reduces crime.

The PEEL programme consists of three pillars: effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy.

Effectiveness assesses whether each police force is providing the right services and how well those services work. It considers the range of the force’s responsibilities, such as cutting crime, protecting the vulnerable, tackling anti-social behaviour, and dealing with emergencies and other calls for service.

Efficiency assesses whether the way each force provides its services represents value for money. It also considers how well the force understands and matches its resources and assets to the demands for its services, both in the present and in planning for the future.

Legitimacy assesses whether each force operates fairly, ethically and within the law. This includes how the force treats both the people it serves and its workforce.

Our PEEL assessment also examines how well each of the 43 English and Welsh forces understands, develops and shows leadership.
The operating context

The challenge of providing services throughout an entire police force area is affected by many things. These include the area’s size, geography, road network and, most importantly, the people who live, work and spend time there. Police and crime plans – established by local policing bodies – contain statutorily mandated local priorities, and chief constables must have regard to them. Taken together, these and other factors are often called the operating context.

We take account of the operating context for each force, and we recognise that differing operating contexts create different needs for policing.
**HMIs’ assessments**

At the end of the PEEL year (in this case, in March 2018), HM Inspectors of Constabulary produce a rounded annual assessment of each force, drawing on the PEEL assessments and other sources of information. We call these the HMIs’ assessments and we publish them on our website.¹

We also publish national summary reports for each pillar of the PEEL programme, as well as supplementary reports on significant themes, such as leadership.

**Understanding our graded judgments**

It is important to emphasise that police forces aren’t in competition with each other. Inevitably, some people will want to re-order our graded judgments into a form of league table. But representing the breadth and complexity of police performance, while taking account of the operating context, needs a more sophisticated approach.

Similarly, it is important to read beyond the headlines and consider the reasons why some forces have been graded more highly than others. The nuances are in the individual force reports on our website.²
A change to how we run PEEL inspections from 2018

We are moving to an integrated approach to our PEEL inspection and monitoring of police forces for 2018/19 and beyond. This will build on our established PEEL inspections and bring our inspection fieldwork together with our monitoring activity.

We will be able to make an even better assessment of forces thanks to the information they give us in their force management statements. This information will give us a wider view of how well prepared forces are to meet future demands.

We will also update our evidence more often through monitoring, to help forces improve their service. We are establishing an online, publicly-accessible register which will enable us and others to track forces’ progress with our recommendations. It will also enable police and crime commissioners to record their comments on inspection reports, including their responses to our recommendations.

The main features of Integrated PEEL Assessments (IPA) will be:

- a single set of questions that covers all three PEEL pillars;
- just one period of inspection fieldwork for each force in the IPA inspections cycle (which will be risk-based);
- for most forces, fewer days of inspection than with the split approach we had before (for high-risk forces, the number of days could be greater);
- extra evidence from force management statements, which we will use in our risk assessments and our final judgments;
- three tranches of fieldwork (13–15 forces per tranche);
- single rather than multiple reports for each force; we will publish the reports in batches after each tranche;
- alongside each batch of force reports, a thematic report that draws out emerging or recurring themes;
- monitoring of each force’s performance between each tranche, drawing on all the available evidence; and
- risk assessments for each force, which we will update three times a year; this will minimise the fieldwork we need to do.
## PEEL judgments table

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<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>How well does the force understand demand?</td>
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### Force Specifics

- **Avon and Somerset**: Not Inspected | Good | Good | Requires Improvement | Good
- **Bedfordshire**: Requires Improvement | Requires Improvement | Requires Improvement | Good
- **Cambridgeshire**: Not Inspected | Requires Improvement | Not Inspected | Requires Improvement |
- **Cheshire**: Good | Not Inspected | Good | Requires Improvement |
- **Cleveland**: Good | Not Inspected | Requires Improvement | Not Inspected |
- **Cumbria**: Not Inspected | Good | Requires Improvement | Not Inspected |
- **City of London**: Good | Not Inspected | Good | Requires Improvement |
- **Devon and Cornwall**: Good | Requires Improvement | Good | Requires Improvement |
- **Derbyshire**: Not Inspected | Not Inspected | Good | Not Inspected |
- **Dorset**: Not Inspected | Not Inspected | Good | Not Inspected |
- **Dyfed-Powys**: Not Inspected | Good | Requires Improvement | Not Inspected |
- **Durham**: Not Inspected | Not Inspected | Good | Not Inspected |
- **Essex**: Good | Not Inspected | Good | Requires Improvement |
- **Gloucestershire**: Requires Improvement | Requires Improvement | Good | Requires Improvement |
- **Greater Manchester**: Not Inspected | Requires Improvement | Not Inspected | Requires Improvement |
- **Gwent**: Not Inspected | Not Inspected | Requires Improvement | Requires Improvement |
- **Hampshire**: Not Inspected | Good | Requires Improvement | Not Inspected |
- **Hertfordshire**: Not Inspected | Good | Requires Improvement | Not Inspected |
- **Humberside**: Good | Requires Improvement | Requires Improvement | Not Inspected |
- **Kent**: Not Inspected | Good | Requires Improvement | Not Inspected |
- **Lancashire**: Not Inspected | Good | Requires Improvement | Not Inspected |
- **Leicestershire**: Not Inspected | Good | Good | Not Inspected |

### Improvement Levels

- **Improved**
- **Unchanged**
- **Declined**
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<th>How well is the force planning for demand in the future?</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>To what extent does the force treat all of the people it serves with fairness and respect?</th>
<th>How well does the force make sure that its workforce behaves ethically and lawfully?</th>
<th>To what extent does the force treat its workforce with fairness and respect?</th>
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STATE OF POLICING

PART 2: OUR INSPECTIONS
## PEEL judgments table continued

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**Effectiveness**
- Improved
- Unchanged
- Declined

**Efficiency**
- Requires Improvement
- Good
- Outstanding
- Requires Improvement
## Legitimacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How well does the force use its resources?</th>
<th>How well is the force planning for demand in the future?</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Since 2016</th>
<th>To what extent does the force treat all of the people it serves with fairness and respect?</th>
<th>How well does the force make sure that its workforce behaves ethically and lawfully?</th>
<th>To what extent does the force treat its workforce with fairness and respect?</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
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Changes since last year

Across all three pillars of the PEEL programme, we graded most forces the same in 2017 as in 2016.

After the terrorist attack in Manchester on 22 May 2017, we agreed with Greater Manchester Police that we wouldn’t carry out a full inspection. We carried out a limited inspection of the force, but we didn’t make a graded judgment for the efficiency and legitimacy pillars. We have excluded Greater Manchester Police from the efficiency and legitimacy charts on these pages.

The **effectiveness** pillar had the largest movement in grades: we graded nine forces higher than the previous year; five forces got a worse grade.

For the **efficiency** pillar: the grades for 32 forces stayed the same, four got better and six got worse. For the **legitimacy pillar**: the grades for 32 forces stayed the same, four got better and six got worse.

No forces received different grades in 2017 in all of the three pillars. Of the 25 forces that received different grades this year, most (16) only received a different grade in one pillar.
# PEEL 2017: Summary of grades for each pillar

## Effectiveness
We graded one force (Durham) as outstanding, 30 as good, 12 as requiring improvement and none as inadequate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outstanding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Requires improvement</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inadequate</td>
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## Efficiency
We graded two forces (Durham and Thames Valley) as outstanding, 30 as good, 10 as requiring improvement and none as inadequate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2015</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Requires improvement</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

## Legitimacy
We graded one force (Kent) as outstanding, 35 as good, six as requiring improvement and none as inadequate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Requires improvement</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inadequate</td>
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</table>
PEEL: Effectiveness

We considered the same question in the 2017 police effectiveness inspection as in the last two years: how effective are the police at keeping people safe and reducing crime?

We considered five areas:

– how well the police prevent crime and tackle anti-social behaviour;
– how well the police investigate crime and catch criminals;
– how well the police protect vulnerable people;
– how well the police tackle serious and organised crime; and
– how well the police use their specialist capabilities (for example, firearms capabilities).

Our findings

Overall, most forces are still effective at keeping people safe and reducing crime. Over two-thirds of forces are still performing at a good standard and one force is still outstanding. Slightly more forces got better than got worse.
However, we are concerned that, in a minority of forces, the service is overwhelmed in some aspects of policing. These forces need urgently to put measures in place to make sure they are protecting vulnerable people well enough. Otherwise, the lives of vulnerable people could be at risk.

**How well do the police prevent crime and tackle anti-social behaviour?**

We have longstanding concerns about local policing being eroded and we have been tracking this throughout our PEEL inspection process. We are pleased there has been some improvement in this area.

In 2017, we graded 34 forces as good at preventing crime and anti-social behaviour, four more than in 2016. We saw some forces changing their approach to neighbourhood policing to make sure they have enough officers and police community support officers (PCSOs) dedicated to preventing crime, engaging with communities and tackling anti-social behaviour.

We found it commendable that since 2016, nearly half of all forces have increased or maintained the number of staff assigned to neighbourhood policing. This was despite an overall 8 percent decrease in spending dedicated to this

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How effective is the force at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm and supporting victims?</th>
<th>How effective is the force at tackling serious and organised crime?</th>
<th>Overall judgments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outstanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
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<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not inspected</td>
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area (see figure 1). We also saw evidence of forces being creative in how they make sure local officers are visible and accessible enough to members of the public.

Figure 1:
Net revenue expenditure (NRE) on neighbourhood policing per head of population, 2016/17

However, some of the concerns we highlighted in 2016 are still there.

- Some forces still don’t understand well enough to what extent their officers and PCSOs are being taken away from their local policing duties to handle immediate tasks elsewhere.

- There are still inconsistencies in tackling local problems in a structured way and using approaches the police service knows are effective.

- Despite having a range of powers they can use to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour, officers are using them less than in 2016. In too many cases, in forces that use these powers, we didn’t find a sound rationale or clear evidence base to justify using them.
How well do the police investigate crime and catch criminals?

Responding in an emergency is the public’s first priority for the police. In 2016, over 65 percent of the members of the public we surveyed rated this as the top priority (surpassing tackling crime and terrorism). In 2017, this had increased to over 67 percent.

Our 2017 inspection gave rise to some substantial concerns about how some forces respond to those contacting the police, particularly vulnerable people. This was both in terms of failing to respond promptly and appropriately, and what happens when an officer is in attendance. Just over a quarter of forces aren’t meeting enough of their demand as promptly as we would expect, or are managing demand inappropriately.

Examples of failing to meet or appropriately manage demand include:

- thousands of emergency calls being held in queues, largely because officers were not able to respond to them; and
- officers not actively reassessing these emergencies during the delay.

Given the level of risk involved, we asked these forces to examine their practices immediately to make sure they are keeping victims safe.
The initial response

Our inspection also revealed some problems when officers do respond to calls for service from the public, particularly vulnerable people. Although attending officers generally identify when victims are vulnerable, understand how to keep them safe and assess the level of risk appropriately, we saw some weaknesses in the initial response.

It is encouraging that nearly all forces have invested in body-worn video technology. This is an important tool for collecting initial evidence. However, not all forces have a clear policy on how and when to use it. We also found other areas of the initial investigation where forces aren’t seizing all opportunities to look for evidence. In too many cases, officers don’t do house-to-house enquiries or identify witnesses. Forces should also do more to look for evidence on smartphones, tablets and other devices.

A shortage of investigators

Last year, we reported that there was a national crisis in the severe shortage of investigators. We recommended that the police service gain a better understanding of the scale of the problem and should draw up a coherent set of plans to meet the need. We are pleased that police leaders, through the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC), are working with the College of Policing to address this problem.

Despite these efforts, the shortfall is considerable at the moment. Forces report that they have 17 percent fewer investigators than they need (though the picture isn’t the same for all forces – see figure 2). This amounts to a shortfall of over 5,000 investigators in England and Wales (as reported in July 2017), and there aren’t enough trainee investigators to make up for this. Forces need to take more action, working with the NPCC lead on investigative resilience, to make sure they have enough investigative capacity.
Many investigations depend on retrieving evidence from digital devices like smartphones, tablets and computers if prosecutions are to succeed. In 2016, we found 16,000 digital devices were still waiting to be examined. In 2017, we found that more forces had invested in facilities for investigators to download digital evidence more easily; others had contracted this out to the commercial sector. Overall, forces have reduced the backlogs we found in 2016 by 17 percent.

People wanted in connection with crimes need to be found quickly to protect the public, reassure victims and maximise the chance of a successful investigation. People who are wanted for offences may well keep causing harm until they are caught. This year, we still had concerns about the extent to which all forces were pursuing and tracking down wanted people.
How well do the police protect vulnerable people?

We are encouraged by the improvements we are seeing in how forces identify and support victims of crime and vulnerable people. In most forces, we saw an improvement in the attitudes of frontline staff, who are now better trained and supported in dealing with vulnerable people. This means they are more able to deal with vulnerable people effectively.

This year, we graded 23 forces as being good at working with vulnerable people. When we first introduced graded judgments in 2014, only 12 forces achieved this grading.

This improvement is all the more commendable because it is taking place in the face of dramatic increases in demand on the police (see figure 3). Domestic abuse crimes now stand at half a million a year, an 88 percent increase from June 2013. Sexual abuse offences have doubled since 2013 and the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children estimates there are, on average, 152 cases of child abuse per day.

Figure 3:
Police-recorded crime by offence in thousands, per quarter, 2010 to 2017

While it is encouraging that many forces are improving how they keep vulnerable people safe, we are disappointed that almost half of forces (19) require improvement. Thirteen of
these forces have struggled to improve their performance over the three years of our effectiveness inspections and still haven’t managed to achieve a good grade.

We are still concerned about the limited capacity some forces have to manage the risk posed by the most dangerous offenders, such as registered sex offenders (RSOs). In 2017, as with the previous year, we found some forces struggling to assess the level of risk RSOs pose and to manage that risk effectively. Throughout England and Wales, the police have yet to assess the risk represented by 3,300 RSOs; this is an 18 percent increase from last year.

Mental health
This year, we considered for the first time in a PEEL inspection how well police forces respond to vulnerable people with mental health problems. We considered how well the police work with health and social services to:

- identify people with mental health problems when they first contact the police; and
- respond to people with mental health problems (often people who are in crisis and may need to be detained for their own safety).

This has allowed us to develop our understanding of how the police treat people with mental health problems. It will help us make a more in-depth examination of this issue in future inspections. Our initial findings are positive.

To make sure frontline staff are aware of their responsibilities to those with mental health problems, all forces include mental health training in their annual training programmes for officers and staff. We found frontline staff are confident in identifying people who might have mental health problems when they first contact the force, skilled at assessing their needs and professional at helping people in crisis.

Forces are also working alongside mental health practitioners when responding to people with mental health problems; for example, having a mental health practitioner in the response car. Where this is happening, forces are identifying more incidents involving people with mental health problems. They are also finding solutions for people in mental health crisis more quickly.
We still have concerns about the extent to which police officers keep domestic abuse victims safe.

It is a credit to police forces that they have invested significant time and resources in supporting vulnerable people with mental health problems. The mental health professionals we spoke to were overwhelmingly positive about the care frontline officers give.

**Domestic abuse**

We have pledged to inspect forces every year on their handling of domestic abuse until the service victims receive from the police is of a consistently high standard across England and Wales.

We are pleased that, as with broader support for all vulnerable victims, forces are improving overall. When we surveyed people working with victims of domestic abuse, 63 percent felt the police response to domestic abuse had improved since we published *Everyone’s Business: Improving the Police Response to Domestic Abuse* in 2014.

We are also seeing more forces working with other agencies to support victims and their families. This year, 33 forces have information-sharing arrangements with schools to support children who witness domestic abuse, a 50 percent increase since last year.

However, despite these positive developments, we still have concerns about the extent to which police officers keep domestic abuse victims safe and bring their offenders to justice. Police officers can:

- arrest a suspect to protect the victim;
- use civil orders to prevent the suspect staying at the family home;
- bail a suspect after arrest with conditions while continuing an investigation; and
- collect enough evidence to charge the suspect with an offence.

In too many forces, police officers aren’t doing these things well enough. We will examine this further in our specific report on domestic abuse.
How well do the police tackle serious and organised crime?

The nature and scale of organised crime is changing rapidly and has in many cases become global. Tackling it needs effective action at different levels of law enforcement. Broadly, this is something the police forces working with regional organised crime units (ROCUs) do well. We graded most forces (38 in total) as good. Of the 16 forces we inspected in 2017, six had got better.

To tackle serious and organised crime effectively, forces need to understand which groups pose the highest threat, risk and harm to their communities. Forces’ understanding of this threat continues to improve. The police service assesses the criminal intent and capability of an organised crime group (OCG) through a process called mapping. We have found in previous years that forces do this inconsistently, which means there can be no reliable overall understanding of the threat. This is partly due to the limitations of the mapping system itself.

Our inspection this year found forces were applying the mapping principles more consistently. Also, forces are identifying an increasing number of OCGs involved in less traditional types of crime, such as modern slavery. The National Crime Agency has conducted a comprehensive review of mapping and improved the current approach. But it still needs to do more work to develop a more sophisticated model.
Forces are increasingly working with other agencies and local bodies to tackle serious and organised crime.

**Prevention needs more focus**

We have seen positive developments in how forces tackle serious and organised crime:

- forces are increasingly working with other agencies and local bodies to tackle serious and organised crime;
- neighbourhood policing teams are more aware of OCGs in their local areas; and
- forces are liaising better with ROCUs and other specialists at regional and national levels.

We are still concerned that forces are less able to prevent serious and organised crime than to pursue serious and organised crime groups.

Individual forces have patches of promising work to prevent serious and organised crime. But these can often be localised initiatives which aren’t publicised effectively within the forces. Some forces still lack an overall strategy and a clear lead to make sure they are co-ordinating and sustaining work to prevent serious and organised crime.

Some offenders keep re-offending despite the efforts of law enforcement agencies or the risk of being prosecuted. There are several things forces can do to stop these people re-offending, but the police service doesn’t co-ordinate or record them consistently enough.

**How well do the police use their specialist capabilities (for example, firearms capabilities)?**

We found that most forces have a good understanding of the firearms threats they face. We also saw areas of good practice. We are communicating these to the service to help all forces strengthen their threat assessments.

Some forces have also received extra funding to increase their armed capacity. These forces have made more armed response vehicles available to help them respond to attacks swiftly and effectively.
Most forces can show they are getting more efficient.

PEEL: Efficiency

We considered the same question in the police efficiency 2017 inspection as in the last two years: how efficient are the police at keeping people safe and reducing crime?

We focused on three areas:
- how well the police understand the demand for their services;
- how well the police use their resources; and
- how well the police plan.

Our findings

We found a broadly positive picture. Most forces can show they are getting more efficient. Although forces face considerable difficulties, our positive findings show they have made a substantial effort.

Policing is now more complex and the police deal with more complicated types of crimes. Although the police haven’t suffered reduced budgets as much as some other public-sector organisations, forces still face difficult financial decisions.⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How well does the force understand demand?</th>
<th>How well does the force use its resources?</th>
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<tr>
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⁴ Policing is more complex due to increased demands and dealing with more complicated crimes.
In 2017, we graded two forces as outstanding for efficiency, 30 forces as good, ten forces as requiring improvement and no force as inadequate. (We didn’t grade Greater Manchester Police after the terrorist attack at Manchester Arena.) We graded two more forces as requiring improvement than in 2016.

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<th>How well is the force planning for demand in the future?</th>
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<th>Overall judgments</th>
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How well do the police understand the demand for their services?

To be efficient, police forces must understand the demand for their services. They need to understand what sorts of incidents people will report, and what the police need to do to prevent crime. They must also understand the crimes and other unlawful activities that are hidden or are less likely to be reported (for example, modern slavery and child sexual exploitation).

Almost every force understands the current demand for its services. The best forces collect a range of information to help them understand trends. They also use other people’s research, in areas like protecting children and vulnerable adults, to predict demand for services when their own data isn’t enough. Other forces should do the same, rather than just focusing on general crime types. From 2018, force management statements will help forces take a sound and sustainable approach to understanding future demand for their services.

Police forces should be able to identify and reduce unnecessary work, and find more efficient ways of working. They must also decide their priorities and how to respond to them. They should be able to show this process didn’t mean they overlooked any of the demand for their services.

The governance arrangements for police change programmes aren’t usually as effective as they could be at helping forces achieve as much as they can from them. In 2017, however, we saw some excellent examples of strong governance arrangements. Through these arrangements, forces found processes that weren’t efficient and improved them. It is important that these arrangements don’t cause the police to suppress demand for their services.

How well do the police use their resources?

Police forces have only so many resources for the increasingly complicated job they do. They must make sure they use these as well as possible.
The most valuable and complex resource of every police force is its people. In most cases, the pay bill is well over 75 percent of the force’s budget. So improving the force’s efficiency and effectiveness is mainly linked to the quality of officers and staff, their skills, how they work, and how well they are trained and supervised.

Because of the changing nature of crime and disorder, and the advances of modern technology, the skills officers and staff needed in the past won’t, in many cases, be the skills they will need to tackle the demands of the future.

**Numbers**
The number of people in the police is going down at the same time as crimes such as modern slavery and cybercrime are making policing considerably more complex.

**Figure 4:**
**Percentage of actual and planned workforce change from 2011 to 2021**

The solid lines in figure 4 show the percentage reductions in the numbers of police officers, PCSOs and police staff since 2011. The dotted lines show the changes planned to 2021. By then, there are expected to be around 13 percent fewer police officers, 35 percent fewer PCSOs and 18 percent fewer support staff than in 2011.
Collaborations

No public-sector budget is unlimited. All public-sector services must try to meet as much demand as they can, to an acceptable standard, making efficient use of the resources they have.

Protecting the public, including preventing crime, isn’t the responsibility of the police alone; every citizen has an obligation to every other. In the same way, other public authorities can often be most effective in preventing crime and disorder, safeguarding vulnerable people and diverting others from offending.

As well as collaborations with other forces, the police can, must and do work with others: for example, public authorities concerned with education, health, housing, children’s and adult services. They also work with charities and other voluntary organisations, and fire and rescue services. When they work well, these arrangements are impressively efficient and effective, to the enormous benefit of the public. They are to be commended and encouraged.

In 2017, we were pleased to find that forces were increasingly appreciating the value of their collaborative work, and intensifying their efforts to improve it further.

Skills

We are still concerned that few forces have done enough to understand fully what skills their people need. Although more forces have started to audit the skills they need in specific roles, most aren’t doing enough to understand, develop or recruit the new skills they need now and in the future.

For example, many forces have now carried out a skills audit of their workforces. But often these focus on specific operational skills (for example, public order skills, self-defence and first-aid training, detective skills, firearms training and driver qualifications). As a result, training and recruitment also tend to focus on these skills.
Resource decisions

More forces use risk-based models to decide which calls from the public to deal with first. In too many respects, some forces still fail to match their resources effectively enough to demand.

Many forces use their resources flexibly. However, we still haven’t seen many examples where forces have enough analysis to understand the effect of some of their choices. For example, they must understand what will happen if they move people from one area of the force to support another area at times of peak demand or crisis.

How well do the police plan?

Forces plan to make savings of approximately £0.9 billion in the next five years. The majority plan to invest some of those savings to improve their services.

The forces that best understand trends in current demand are best able to predict future demand. We found that the best forces use predictive technology to analyse a wide variety of data. However, too many forces still rely on very general assessments, or assume that current demand will stay more or less the same.

Forces know they must take account of growing public expectations and developments in technology. But many forces aren’t planning well enough to meet the constant developments in these areas.
Most force plans set out a clear vision for the direction the force will take. Almost all forces have changed how they operate as a result of years of austerity, and will change further to meet future budgets and public expectations. However, too many still don’t have plans that are innovative enough to significantly change how they operate to meet the demand of the future. Of even greater concern are those forces that aren’t planning on making any significant changes in this respect.

It can be very difficult for some forces to build enough momentum to change, and pausing to assess opportunities can be tempting. However, inevitably, forces that don’t act will struggle in future. The pace of wider change in society and technology is so rapid that a force that doesn’t change will fall behind.

Our recommendations

We said forces needed to take urgent action in two areas.

Workforce skills

Not all forces recognise well enough the important connection between demand and capability. Most forces are improving their understanding of current demand. Their understanding of future demand, and the skills and capabilities their people will need to meet it, is getting better. But they still need to do more.
The College of Policing is doing some work to support this; for example, recognising expert skills by developing new ‘advanced practitioner’ roles. Chief constables, with the support of the College of Policing, should assess the skills and capabilities the police will need over the next five years and show how they plan to recruit and develop the right people. These plans should take into account how demand is changing and likely shifts in public expectations.

**Digital transformation**

We have said regularly over the last few years that, in too many respects, police information and communication technology is outdated and of poor quality. It often fails to connect people within an individual police force, let alone across all forces in England and Wales or with other public-sector organisations.

Forces must do more to develop digitally-enabled services. They must use technology to change the way they operate rather than just replicate paper-based systems online.

Almost all forces are doing some work in this area, but this is often hampered by the skills their people have. This problem needs urgent attention.

Several national programmes have been set up to improve the systems. However, our evidence is of a fragmented picture at local level. Local forces’ systems don’t always work together. In some cases, different systems within individual forces aren’t linked, which creates unnecessary work.

There is also more frustration at the lack of practical direction and support at national level. In too many forces, there are pockets of digitally-enabled services that have been developed in isolation, rather than as part of a coherent plan.
STATE OF POLICING

PART 2: OUR INSPECTIONS

To what extent does the force treat all of the people it serves with fairness and respect?

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>England and Wales</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outstanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requires improvement</td>
<td>8</td>
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How well does the force make sure that its workforce behaves ethically and lawfully?

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<th>Category</th>
<th>England and Wales</th>
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<tr>
<td>Outstanding</td>
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<td>Good</td>
<td>34</td>
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Overall, the police forces of England and Wales are good at treating the people they serve fairly and with respect.

PEEL: Legitimacy

When we assess forces’ legitimacy, we assess to what extent they operate fairly, ethically and within the law. In particular, we assess how forces treat people. These things are essential to maintaining public support and co-operation, which are the cornerstone of the British model of policing by consent.

This year, we considered:

– how well workforces understand unconscious bias;
– how forces scrutinise and use coercive powers;
– how forces handle complaints; and
– whether police workforces are treated fairly and respectfully.
Our findings

Overall, our assessment was positive. We graded one force as outstanding, 35 forces as good, six forces as requiring improvement and none as inadequate. (We didn’t grade Greater Manchester Police after the terrorist attack at Manchester Arena.) This was largely consistent with our overall legitimacy judgments in 2016.

Do forces treat all the people they serve fairly and with respect?

Overall, the police forces of England and Wales are good at treating the people they serve fairly and with respect. We were pleased to find that police leaders see the value of this, and are encouraging the same attitude in their workforces.

Although there is still more to do, forces are increasingly training their officers and staff in communication skills and how to avoid unconscious bias. This aims to improve the way officers and staff interact with the public and enhance the public’s view that they are treated fairly and with respect.

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<tr>
<th>To what extent does the force treat its workforce with fairness and respect?</th>
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STOP AND SEARCH

Workforces generally have a good understanding of how to use coercive powers fairly and with respect. But how effectively forces record, monitor and scrutinise how they use these powers varies across the country and, in some cases, this must improve.

Many forces are getting better at monitoring how they use stop and search powers, including regularly examining data on ethnicity and age. But few have all the data they need. That makes it difficult for them to show a good enough understanding of how they are using these powers, and how this might affect local people and communities. We are particularly concerned that black people are over-represented in stop and search figures (see figure 5), and that most forces can’t explain the reasons for this well enough. For example, in 2016/17 black people were more than eight times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people.

**Figure 5:**
Likelihood of different ethnic groups experiencing a stop and search in England and Wales compared with white people

Our assessment of stop and search forms found that drug searches involving black people were less likely to result in police finding drugs than those involving white people or other ethnic groups. This suggests that using stop and search on black people might be based on weaker grounds for suspicion than white people, particularly where drugs are concerned. So it is vital that the service explains and justifies this or makes changes.
Forces need to do more to show the public that there is a sufficient link between using stop and search, and tackling local and force priorities.

**Use of force**

In April 2017, the NPCC introduced a national recording requirement for the use of force. This includes firearms, Tasers, batons, handcuffs, leg restraints, spit-guards, incapacitant spray, and control and restraint techniques. The new requirement aims to make sure the use of force is monitored and analysed at local and national levels, to check if it is being used unfairly or inappropriately, and to highlight good practice to help protect officers.7

We found that 35 forces were complying with the new requirement (see figure 6). Of the other eight forces, six weren’t yet fully compliant because of IT problems, but were in the process of resolving this. However, two forces were choosing not to comply. These forces are less able to understand what type of force they use, how, why and to what effect. We urge the forces that aren’t already complying with the requirement to do so.
Too many forces had external scrutiny groups that don’t represent the diversity of their local communities well enough.

The Home Office’s Centre for Applied Science and Technology, the NPCC, the College of Policing and other interested parties need to give more thought to how effective, safe and legitimate it is to use spit-guards. Forces and the public would benefit from national guidance that encourages police to use them safely and proportionately.

**External scrutiny of use of force and stop and search**

We found that the vast majority of forces used one or more forms of external scrutiny. These arrangements aim to challenge forces and give them independent advice. How effective they are varied from force to force, but we found evidence of good practice.

However, too many forces had external scrutiny groups that don’t represent the diversity of their local communities well enough, including a lack of young people or other groups who are likely to have lower levels of confidence in the police. Some force scrutiny groups are chaired by members of the force, and so could be seen as not independent enough. Others have had the same members for some time, or their members don’t have the knowledge and skills they need to scrutinise and challenge forces effectively and confidently.

Other forces couldn’t give us compelling evidence that they were responding effectively enough to challenges external scrutiny had raised, or communicating about what they had done in response, either to members or wider communities.
These factors are likely to limit how effective external scrutiny can be. They give forces fewer opportunities to understand, reassure and learn, and to treat the people they serve even more fairly and respectfully.

How well do forces make sure their workforces behave ethically and lawfully?

Overall, the police forces of England and Wales are good at making sure their workforces behave ethically and lawfully. We were pleased to find more forces are intensifying their focus on ethics as part of their decision making, and that this is featuring in training and guidance across forces.

Complying with national vetting policy

Some forces still haven’t put right their shortcomings in complying with national vetting policy. After our 2016 inspection, we recommended that, within six months, all forces not already complying with current national vetting policy should have a good enough plan in place to do so, and should have started to implement it. We also recommended that, within two years, all members of the police workforce should have received at least the lowest level of vetting clearance for their roles.

During this year’s inspection, we assessed progress in these forces. Of the 30 forces we re-inspected, we found 23 had adequate plans to reduce vetting backlogs, which we assessed as being achievable by December 2018. The lack of progress in the rest is still cause for concern. Unvetted officers and staff pose a significant risk to forces’ integrity.
Dealing with complaints

Force handling of complaints is a mixed picture. We carried out a file review of 1,038 public complaints. Overall, we found forces were reasonably good at giving the complainants the initial and final information they needed. But we also found 114 cases (11 percent) where we felt complainants needed more support. We were disappointed to find that these files showed forces had given appropriate support in only 68 of these 114 cases (60 percent). Some forces need to do more to inspire public confidence in the complaints system.

We reviewed 1,035 complaint and misconduct case files that we thought might contain allegations of discrimination that forces had missed, to assess how promptly and routinely forces are responding. We were pleased to find that only 32 (3 percent) contained allegations of discrimination that forces had missed. We also reviewed 422 discrimination complaint files and were pleased to find that 364 cases (86 percent) had been handled satisfactorily in line with the relevant guidelines.

However, forces failed to refer 43 percent of the misconduct cases we assessed that should have been referred to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (formerly the Independent Police Complaints Commission).\(^8\)
To what extent do forces treat their workforces fairly and with respect?

Most police forces of England and Wales are good at treating officers and staff fairly and with respect. But nearly a third of forces need to improve here. We found forces are making improvements in response to concerns, and they generally handle grievances well. However, leaders need to do more to show their people that they have acted effectively to address their concerns to improve fairness at work.

Creating more diverse workforces

We were also pleased to find that forces are still making progress on getting their workforces to reflect the diversity of local communities better. Many forces have created more representative workforces through recruitment; in particular, addressing under-representation of black and minority ethnic (BAME) officers and staff. The percentage of officers joining the police service who are from BAME backgrounds increased from 5.2 percent in 2006/07 to 6.5 percent in 2016/17 (see figure 7).

Figure 7:
Percentage of police workforce from BAME backgrounds compared with England and Wales population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>BAME</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Not Stated</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>93.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/17</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales population (2011 Census)</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>86.0%</td>
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Source: Home Office 2017
However, we are not seeing this diversity higher up. The recruitment and promotion figures may be following a similar trajectory, but they are still well below those in the wider community. As of 31 March 2017, only 3.7 percent of senior officers were from the BAME community.

Meanwhile, women made up 29 percent of all officers and only 24 percent of all senior officers.

**Looking after people’s wellbeing**

A happy and healthy workforce is likely to be more productive, because people take fewer sick days and are more committed to what they do. We found police leaders across England and Wales still prioritise and promote wellbeing. They support individual, team and force-wide wellbeing needs through senior leadership, governance processes, plans, accreditation and learning.

Officers and staff from most forces recognised that their leaders were taking action to improve wellbeing, although there is more to do before workforces feel the benefits more widely.

We were encouraged to find that most forces now regularly do some sort of analysis of wellbeing data, including sickness data and staff survey results. This helps them identify patterns and trends, shape wellbeing plans and act to address concerns.
Some forces showed they were targeting support for wellbeing at people and groups most in need. But most could still do more. Wellbeing support still varies, and many supervisors still lack confidence in identifying and supporting people with wellbeing concerns.

Managing and developing individual performance
We have said before that over three-quarters of forces didn’t have processes for managing individual performance that were fair and effective enough. This year, we asked forces to give us data on the percentage of the workforce who had gone through an annual performance review process in the 18 months from 1 August 2015 to 31 January 2017.

Eight forces couldn’t give us this data, 14 forces had completion rates of less than 50 percent, and only 10 forces had completion rates of 80 percent or more. Only three forces could say that all their officers and staff had been through a performance and development review process in that period.

We found that many forces are planning for, or establishing, new processes and software to address some of the problems we found last year, in line with College of Policing guidance. For example, we were pleased to find that, in some forces, chief officers were leading reviews of individual performance processes.
Abuse of position for a sexual purpose

When police officers and staff abuse their position for a sexual purpose, it has a devastating effect on the lives of victims. It also corrodes trust and confidence in the police. In December 2016, we recommended that all police forces in England and Wales have plans in place to look for intelligence on potential abuse of position for a sexual purpose.

In our 2017 review of this issue, we found that most forces still have work to do. We asked forces to give us their plans by 31 May 2017. We found:

- eleven plans didn’t contain enough information;
- fifteen forces had plans but had not yet started implementing them;
- fifteen had plans in place and had started implementing them; and
- two already had all elements in place.

We will carry out a full inspection of this and other elements of police legitimacy in 2018. This gives forces another opportunity to show they have understood how important this issue is, and to make progress.

There has also been work on this issue at a national level. It is part of the NPCC national strategy, and the Independent Police Complaints Commission has changed its referral criteria. There is also guidance from the College of Policing. We believe forces have all the information they need to get this right, so we expect to see improvement at our next inspection.
STATE OF POLICING
PART 2: OUR INSPECTIONS

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Police leaders are committed to fair and ethical treatment, both of the workforce and the public.

PEEL: Leadership

Leadership, both as a skill and as a way of thinking, is important at every level of policing; it doesn’t just apply at the most senior levels. So we inspect leadership in ranks and grades. We acknowledge that good leadership has a range of styles.

Through our inspections, we are assessing how forces develop and show good leadership throughout policing, not just whether senior members of the workforce are good leaders. For example, we consider whether the workforce feels able to challenge senior leaders, contribute ideas and suggest new ways of working. This is a sign of a culture in which officers and staff feel empowered.

This year, our inspection of leadership across the three PEEL pillars covered:

- fair and ethical leadership;
- diversity and innovation;
- workforce development; and
- whether leaders are taking effective action.
Fair and ethical leadership

An essential part of police leadership is being a role model for treating the public respectfully and making fair decisions. This is also known as procedural justice.

In any organisation, it is important that leaders are seen to be fair in how they treat people, and that they are open to challenge. It is also important for police leaders to show openness, accountability and fairness. Our main findings were:

– police leaders are committed to fair and ethical treatment, both of the workforce and the public. But they could improve how they communicate and disseminate information to their workforces;
– forces should treat the development of frontline officers’ approach to ethics and values as a priority; and
– most police leaders said they were open to challenge from their workforces. But the extent to which workforces are confident in their leaders in this respect varies a great deal.
Setting an example

Until relatively recently, policing has been heavily focused on operational leadership. Forces have started to broaden their focus to include other aspects of their role, such as organisational development.

Part of that change is an increasing emphasis on ethical behaviour. The Code of Ethics\textsuperscript{14} provides a guide for principles and standards of behaviour. Leaders should be showing the values the code promotes, setting an example for their workforces. The code is now well understood in almost all forces.

We found that, in all forces, leaders recognise the need to treat people fairly and respectfully and understand why it is important.

Our IPSOS MORI survey of public views of policing in England and Wales\textsuperscript{15} showed that 59 percent of people agree the police in their local area treat people fairly and with respect.

Promoting an ethical culture

We found good evidence that most forces are developing and promoting an improved culture of ethical decision making.

We saw that leaders in most forces have processes and systems in place to help them make ethical decisions and that the workforce generally use these forums to talk about ethical problems. But we found less evidence that leaders were communicating these decisions openly enough to the workforce.
Being open to challenge
As well as establishing an ethical culture, leaders in policing should be fostering an environment where communication goes both ways. People should feel they can challenge their leaders, and leaders should be asking for feedback in a meaningful way.

Most police leaders said they were open to challenge from their workforces. But the degree to which the workforce has confidence in leaders in this respect varies considerably.

Overseeing cultural change – diversity and innovation
This part of the inspection was about how forces are leading cultural change in policing.

We considered whether leadership teams were creating and maintaining a culture of innovation: one that accepts change to adapt.

We looked for evidence of the kind of cultural change we expect to see in well-performing forces. We explored how forces were improving their approaches to workforce wellbeing (physical and mental health) and fair processes for promotion, and whether they were following the recommendations of national bodies.

Our main findings were:
- force leaders need to do more to make sure support to improve workforce wellbeing is accessible;
- forces need to work with the College of Policing to improve their processes for choosing people to promote; in a large number of forces, the workforce didn’t always feel the processes for identifying and selecting talent were fair and/or legitimate; and
- in most forces, leaders are promoting innovation from within the workforce, listening to the workforce, accepting challenge, taking feedback and giving it themselves.

Force leaders need to do more to make sure support to improve workforce wellbeing is accessible.
Identifying and acting on wellbeing concerns

Broadly, while police leaders (generally senior leaders) are good at understanding and promoting the benefits of wellbeing, forces still need to do more to identify and act on wellbeing concerns. Staff at all ranks need to understand wellbeing is important. But sergeants need the clearest understanding of what they can do to improve workforce wellbeing because they have the most direct contact with frontline officers, as well as management responsibilities.

In the Police Federation for England and Wales’ annual pay and morale survey,\textsuperscript{16} nearly two-thirds (60 percent) of officers said their personal morale was low. This was nearly five percentage points higher than last year. As many as 85 percent attributed this to the way the police as a whole were treated. This shows how important it is to understand workforce wellbeing and for managers and leaders at all levels to be able to identify and act on concerns.

There is still a lot of room for improvement in how effectively police leaders identify and prevent workforce wellbeing problems. We found many examples where committed police leaders had set up well-intentioned initiatives that various members of the workforce didn’t know about or use.

We also saw a discrepancy between senior managers’ positive long-term objectives for wellbeing and middle managers’ ability to think about and tackle wellbeing problems. In many cases, this was because officers and staff didn’t feel they had time to engage in wellbeing initiatives or discussions.

It is critical that when police leaders are promoting wellbeing, the workforce believes they are doing it meaningfully and legitimately, and that leaders support wellbeing actively.
Workforce development

We considered the work police leaders are doing to keep up and increase leadership capability in their forces. We assessed how well they planned strategically and built capability in the workforce fairly, and in a targeted way.

This element of our inspection was mostly about workforce development, including whether forces are taking advantage of new opportunities for selecting and developing talent. This area is vitally important for the continued capability of police leaders. Our main findings were:

– most forces need to do more to understand the skills and capabilities of leaders within the workforce, as they are not using this information effectively for succession planning;
– forces need to make better use of performance and development reviews; only three forces (out of 43) could prove that, between 1 August 2015 and 31 January 2017, all officers and staff had been through a performance and development review process; and
– forces need to be better at identifying talent, promoting diversity and planning effectively for the future; to do this, they need to understand the future needs of the force.
Many force leaders couldn’t give teams the time and space they needed to plan strategically, innovate or, in some cases, make sound decisions.

Taking effective action
For the first time in our inspection of police leadership, we focused on how effective leadership is in terms of crime prevention (how effective the force is at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe) and protecting vulnerable people (how effective the force is at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims).

There are principles of good leadership that apply to both these areas of policing. These include:

– giving the workforce a clear sense of purpose;
– giving teams the right skills and capabilities, and enough time, to do their jobs effectively;
– delegating appropriately; and
– being accountable for their decisions.

We found some leaders working to a high standard and taking commendable steps to give the public a good service in both crime prevention and protecting vulnerable people. In particular, we have seen improvements in leadership on the latter, although there is still much more to do.

Our main findings were:

– force leaders are generally giving their workforces clear information about what they expect from them in terms of crime prevention and protecting vulnerable people; but leaders still face some difficulties in making sure their workforces have the capacity and capability to carry out the work; and
– many force leaders couldn’t give teams the time and space they needed to plan strategically, innovate or, in some cases, make sound decisions – particularly in terms of crime prevention.
Our child protection inspections

National child protection

We started the national child protection inspection programme in April 2014. By the end of March 2018, we had published inspection reports on 20 police forces. We had also gone back to visit 16 of those forces to assess their progress against the recommendations we had made. As well as this, at the request of the Home Secretary, we published quarterly reports in 2017 on the Metropolitan Police Service’s progress, because our 2016 inspection of that force had revealed such serious failings.

Nationally, the police’s senior leaders and staff are clearly committed to improving the protection of vulnerable children. When we went back to police forces we had inspected, we found that every force had made some progress in achieving better results for children who were at risk of harm.
How the police treat vulnerable children

We continue to see improvement in how the police treat children who may be experiencing mental health problems. The number of children taken to a police station instead of to a hospital, when they need to be taken to a “place of safety”, has gone down significantly.

However, children are still being unnecessarily held in police stations when they have been charged with a criminal offence and denied bail. It is almost always best for a child to be taken elsewhere (unless, for example, the weather is extremely bad). The local authority is responsible for this. In rare cases – for example, if a child is likely to do serious harm to others – there might be a need for secure accommodation.

Police forces understand that they shouldn’t be holding children in police stations. We found some evidence of forces using alternative options, such as bail, more effectively. However, we found that appropriate accommodation wasn’t always available. This meant that children were often held in police stations, which goes against the relevant code of practice.

Children at risk

We found that, in too many respects, the police don’t recognise or evaluate risk to children well enough. Forces usually deal with straightforward cases of child abuse and neglect promptly and efficiently. However, complex investigations are often less effective and can be badly delayed.

We found that sometimes officers and staff haven’t had extra training before they carry out complex investigations. They don’t always have the necessary skills and experience to investigate effectively or to make appropriate plans to protect the child.
Children who go missing

We found that the police need to respond better when a child goes missing or is absent from home. The police often gave priority to initial efforts to find the child. But, too often, they didn’t then take opportunities to intervene early or make long-term plans with other agencies to protect the child.

We also found that officers didn’t always understand that children who regularly go missing from home might be at risk of being groomed for sexual abuse. This showed that the police didn’t always fully understand how much children are at risk of being sexually exploited.

Updates on the Metropolitan Police Service child protection inspection

Between February and May 2016, we inspected the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to assess how effective its arrangements to protect children were. We found fundamental problems in the way the MPS understood and responded to child abuse and sexual exploitation. These problems were putting children in London at risk.

After we published the report in December 2016, the Home Secretary commissioned us to publish quarterly updates on how well the MPS was carrying out our recommendations. In February 2018, we published the fourth and final of these updates.

Overall, we found that, despite the scale and complexity of the difficulties, the MPS had made some progress in a number of areas since our initial report. This included putting in place new structures, training and appointing a senior leader with overall responsibility for child protection in the force. However, many of the improvements were recent at the time of the inspection, so hadn’t yet had an effect.

The MPS has much more to do to make sure it keeps up its focus and momentum on giving children in London a better service. For that reason, we intend to go back to the MPS at least once next year to establish to what extent they have improved. We will also seek clear evidence that the new safeguarding structures are effective.

Officers didn’t always understand that children who regularly go missing from home might be at risk of being groomed for sexual abuse.
Support for learning

We are committed to helping forces improve how they protect children in England and Wales. We work closely with the College of Policing and the NPCC to make sure the findings from our inspections help forces learn.

We do this by contributing to national training and improvement plans. We provide tailored learning events and support to develop training. These help the forces we have inspected to focus on our findings and keep up the momentum to improve.

Where we have used this approach, we have started to see police forces work more constructively with us. We also see a better understanding of the problems we have found and (most importantly) better outcomes for children. We keep reviewing how we inspect to make sure our findings help forces learn and improve.

Because of positive feedback and the improvements we have seen, we now run quarterly learning events for the forces we haven’t yet inspected (or inspected some time ago). These events allow police leaders and the other organisations they work with to hear from survivors of abuse about their experiences of the police. That powerful context helps forces consider how they can tackle difficult problems successfully.
Changes we are making to our national child protection inspections

We are nearly halfway through our national child protection inspection programme.

We are reviewing:

– how we inspect, to take into account new and emerging risks to children – these include the exploitation of children across county lines (where they are often used to transport and sell drugs),19 the growth of offending online and abuse by people in a position of trust;

– how we choose which forces to inspect, so we can find and promote good practice more effectively; and

– how we can reflect the fact that local tripartite safeguarding arrangements (health, the police and the local authority) will replace local safeguarding children’s boards during 2018.

We consult with our external reference group on any significant proposed changes to how we inspect.

Joint targeted child protection inspections

By the end of March 2018, we had carried out joint in-depth inspections focusing on child sexual exploitation, children living with domestic abuse and children at risk of neglect in 17 local authority areas.

The findings showed there can be effective joint work to support children at risk of sexual exploitation, domestic violence and neglect. But agencies could do more to make sure all children and young people get consistently good support in all areas. Poor practice by some professionals and agencies means that some children at risk of exploitation and abuse still don’t get the response they need quickly enough.
We started this programme of focused child protection inspections in 2016. We carry them out jointly with Ofsted, the Care Quality Commission and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation. These inspections test how effective the partnership arrangements between police, education, health and social services are at helping children in need of protection.

In these inspections, we consider how all agencies together:

– respond to child abuse, neglect and exploitation as soon as they come to light;

– make sure their assessment, planning and decision making on notifications and referrals are high quality and effective;

– protect children and young people at risk of different types of harm;

– support and care for children looked after away from their families, and those leaving this care;

– lead and manage this work; and

– make sure the local safeguarding children’s board is effective.
Too little is done to prevent domestic abuse in the first place, and to repair the damage it causes afterwards.

Children living with domestic abuse

In September 2017, we published a report on the findings of the six inspections of the multi-agency response to children living with domestic abuse.

The report strongly recommended a new approach to tackling domestic abuse – one that focuses more on prevention and repairing the long-term damage to child victims. Individual agencies can tackle these complex problems but, because there is so much domestic abuse, they can’t succeed alone. All parts of the public sector need to work together on this.

We found that social workers, the police, health professionals and other agencies, such as youth offending teams and probation services, are often doing a good job to protect victims. But too little is done to prevent domestic abuse in the first place, and to repair the damage it causes afterwards.

The report established that:

- professionals have made progress in responding to the large number of cases of domestic abuse; however, domestic abuse is a widespread public health issue that needs a long-term strategy to reduce how often it happens;
- while there is much good work to protect children and victims, there is far too little work to prevent domestic abuse and repair the damage it causes;
- work with families often takes place in reaction to individual crises; keeping children safe over time needs long-term solutions;
- because there is a focus on immediate crises, agencies too often only consider the people at immediate risk; agencies don’t always consider the right things and, in particular, aren’t focusing enough on the abuser;
- it still isn’t clear how agencies can share information with each other without breaking the rules on protecting personal data; and
- the definition of harm and the understanding of whose rights come first should be more consistent.
Next steps

Child sexual exploitation will still be an in-depth theme for 2018, with a focus on the link to children’s exposure to gangs. In particular, we will consider the problems of criminality and exploitation across county lines.

A small number of inspections in 2018 will investigate the theme of children living with domestic abuse. The focus will then move on to the multi-agency response to children at risk of sexual abuse in the family.

We are also working with colleagues from the Welsh education and social care inspectorates to develop an integrated inspection programme. Still in the early stages of development, the programme will assess the effectiveness of partnership arrangements to protect children in Wales.

Youth Offending Services

We carry out joint inspections of Youth Offending Services (YOSs) with Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation (HMI Probation). YOSs are multi-agency teams, co-ordinated by local authorities, which aim to reduce offending by young people. They deal with some of the most vulnerable young people in society.

Police forces have a statutory responsibility to support YOSs, and to share information with them. We inspected six force areas to assess how well the police were carrying out these responsibilities.
We found that the police are generally committed to preventing young people from re-offending. However, in some cases, they could do more to share information with other agencies. This happens most effectively when police officers work within YOS arrangements or local youth offending teams, alongside other staff. We were also concerned that some police officers working in YOSs hadn’t had enough training in multi-agency public protection arrangements and how to respond to child sexual exploitation.

Together with HMI Probation, we are now revising our joint inspection programme, and will start using a new methodology in 2018/19. Changes will include a formal assessment of how the agencies involved in YOSs work together, and a new system that will grade YOSs from ‘outstanding’ through to ‘inadequate’.

**Out-of-court disposals**

Preventing children from starting to offend, or from getting into the habit of offending, is good for potential victims and good for the children themselves. It also saves the considerable costs of these offences.

With HMI Probation, we carried out a joint inspection of one aspect of the prevention work carried out by YOSs: the use of out-of-court disposals. The police can use these to deal with children who have committed low-level offences without taking them to court.
Our findings
This is not a soft option for children, as people sometimes think. We found YOSs often did good and effective work. They make it less likely that children will offend again and help them change their lives for the better. However, with some specific changes, this work could be better still. More children could benefit, as well as local communities and society as a whole.

People generally see the work to divert children from going into the criminal justice system as a success. Our inspection supports that view. But it is difficult to prove, because there is little monitoring. We only know that far fewer children have gone into the criminal justice system over recent years.

We were pleased to find most areas had schemes for out-of-court disposals that were better than the minimum requirements set out in government guidance, and sometimes much better. In terms of how they were planned and how they operated, the schemes linked well to other local initiatives to prevent children from offending.

We found relationships and joint working between YOSs and the police were good everywhere. Increasingly, decisions on what should happen to a child are taken jointly. These decisions take into account the YOS’s knowledge of the child.

The future
We understand this work is a priority for the Government, as it has been for previous administrations. It is in everyone’s interests to make sure it continues, is effective and improves the life chances of children.
Our specialist thematic inspections

Harassment and stalking

We carried out a joint inspection with Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, assessing how the police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) tackle stalking and harassment. This was the first inspection to focus on this area. We published the inspection report, *Living in Fear: the Police and CPS Response to Harassment and Stalking*, on 5 July 2017.  

Harassment and stalking crimes can devastate lives. Many victims suffer over a long period; many are very vulnerable, having experienced domestic abuse or left coercive and abusive relationships. Digital technology and social media mean it is now much easier for perpetrators to harass and stalk their victims.

Figure 8:
Recorded harassment and stalking offences, 2010/11 to 2016/17

Source: Office for National Statistics recorded crime statistics
Our findings

We found that the police and the CPS often fail to recognise fully when harassment and stalking are taking place. Our report recommended that the police service should improve the way it records these crimes. We also recommended that the police shouldn’t use police information notices22 to make alleged perpetrators aware that what they are doing might constitute an offence. This is because we found strong evidence that police were using them inappropriately and inconsistently.

We also considered the benefits of stalking protection orders. The Government introduced these measures in December 2016, with the intention of protecting stalking victims at the very earliest stages of an investigation. Our report welcomed the new approach, but also found that some victims of harassment are left unprotected. Stalking protection orders will only work if the police service gets better at recognising when these crimes are taking place.
Disclosure

Disclosure of evidence is an important part of a fair trial. The prosecution must disclose all material evidence in its possession for or against the accused. That includes evidence that weakens its case or strengthens that of the defence.

On 17 July 2017, after a joint inspection with Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, we published a thematic report on disclosure (Making it Fair: A Joint Inspection of the Disclosure of Unused Material in Volume Crown Court Cases). This report found many problems with the way the CPS and the police manage the disclosure process in the Crown Court. Among other things, we found that, in too many respects:

– police didn’t have enough knowledge and training about disclosure;
– the CPS wasn’t challenging the police enough on poor disclosure practice;
– the CPS wasn’t giving the police enough advice or direction on how to respond to defence statements;
– the police and CPS weren’t communicating with each other effectively enough; and
– there was some evidence of a culture of accepting poor disclosure practices within the police and CPS.

The inspection found that these problems often led to cases being delayed or failing. The report made nine recommendations about how to improve the disclosure process. These included introducing disclosure champions in forces, who could give officers expert advice on the process. We also made recommendations aimed at helping the police and the CPS communicate better.
A number of cases that failed because of disclosure problems featured prominently in the media during December 2017 and January 2018, including two CPS London rape prosecutions (R v Liam Allan and R v Isaac Itiary). The Justice Minister, Dominic Raab, described the cases as ‘deeply worrying’. The Metropolitan Police Service responded by launching a review of disclosure practices in rape and serious sexual offence cases.

While it tends to be big cases that attract publicity, our inspection showed that disclosure failures lead to the collapse of many volume crime trials across England and Wales every week.
Police air support

The NPCC (National Police Chiefs’ Council) asked us to carry out an inspection of police air support, including helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft and drones. This was after concerns from some police forces about how effective and efficient the national arrangements for police air support were.

Our inspection included information from all 43 police forces in England and Wales, as well as interviews with senior and frontline officers from 32 forces.

Our findings

Overall, we concluded that police leaders urgently need to change the air support service. This was because of:

- the low and inconsistent support the National Police Air Service (NPAS) gives police forces;
- financing difficulties;
- the lack of an up-to-date strategy for police air support; and
- weaknesses in governance.
In particular, we urged police leaders to consider the option of replacing the existing NPAS collaboration agreement. This would allow them to put better arrangements in place within the next three years.

**How police use the air service**

We learned that, over the last ten years, the number of police airbases had halved and the number of aircraft had reduced by a third. Although this had reduced costs, we found that savings had mostly come from cutting the service to forces rather than making it more efficient.

We found that how much forces used the NPAS varied a great deal (see figure 9). While the proximity of NPAS bases played a part here, there were clearly other factors at work too. We recommended that the NPCC analyse them to establish the reasons for these differences.

**Figure 9: Requests for air support, per 1,000 population, by force in 2016**

Source: Data given to us by NPAS in January 2017
Response times

We also found that, although a few forces got a quick response from NPAS, many didn’t.

On average, it took more than 30 minutes to respond to a crime taking place that didn’t involve an immediate threat to life. In over 40 percent of cases, police forces cancelled the call for support because the incident was over before an NPAS helicopter could arrive.

NPAS met its response time targets. But this was because the targets were too lenient and calls that didn’t result in an aircraft attending weren’t included in the assessment of response time. On average, it took more than 10 minutes to despatch an aircraft to the most urgent calls and almost 22 minutes to despatch an aircraft to a crime in action.

Contributing to the costs

We found that it also varied considerably how much forces contributed to the costs of NPAS (see figure 10).

The method for calculating force contributions led to people in one force area paying 5p a year per head towards police air support, whereas in another force area people paid £1.98 – nearly 40 times as much.
Figure 10: Percentage of 2016/17 net revenue expenditure (NRE) spent on NPAS, by force

Source: Data given to us by NPAS in January 2017 and Police Objective Analysis estimates 2016/17

NPAS’s investment strategy was to use capital funding to upgrade aircraft it already had, rather than buy new ones. Because of this approach, a number of aircraft were nearing the end of their working lives, without established plans and funding for acquiring new ones.

Evaluating the benefits of drones

Our report highlighted that, although most forces had bought drones, no force had rigorously evaluated the benefits of using them.

As a result, the police service hadn’t developed a common view on their relative merit as a form of police air support. There is a risk that the service won’t have the evidence it needs to capitalise on the developments in drone capability that the Government anticipates in the coming years.
Modern slavery and human trafficking

In the UK, today and every day, thousands of men, women and children who are victims of modern slavery and human trafficking are degraded and dehumanised.

These crimes are complicated. Cases may involve one or more offenders or victims. They may be national or international. They may be organised or opportunistic. They can take place in both rural and city areas, in places as different as nail bars and construction sites. They can involve domestic servitude or the trafficking of children for sexual exploitation.

Our findings

It is vital that police forces are aware of the signs that these harmful and frequently hidden crimes are being committed, so they can tackle them appropriately. In this inspection, we examined how the police in England and Wales deal with modern slavery and human trafficking, including how they use the powers in the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

We found clear evidence at national and regional levels that people wanted to improve how the police respond to modern slavery and human trafficking. Some forces – Greater Manchester Police in particular – are, commendably, leading the way on this. They show how commitment and dedication to dealing with this type of crime can produce effective results.

Overall, however, we found that the police urgently need to identify victims much more consistently and effectively. People in contact with the police are not always recognised as victims of these crimes, so they stay in the hands of the criminals who exploit them. Others are arrested as offenders or illegal immigrants. While the police have a duty to refer people to immigration and the criminal justice system, they should always consider whether these people may be victims themselves.
We reviewed current and recent cases of modern slavery and human trafficking in ten police forces. We had serious concerns about the quality of investigations. The police are winding up some investigations too early, with lines of enquiry still available. In some cases, police did not even speak to victims and witnesses.
As a result of these failings, victims are left unprotected. Offenders are not brought to justice, leaving them free to continue to exploit people as possessions.

Too much police work in this area consists only of reacting, and shows little understanding of the nature and scale of modern slavery and human trafficking. We were disappointed to find that some frontline officers didn’t consider modern slavery a problem in their force area.

We were also concerned that some neighbourhood officers said they didn’t discuss modern slavery and human trafficking with local communities. This was because they didn’t think the public were either interested in, or sympathetic to, victims of these crimes. Police forces must do much better, both with their own staff and with their communities, to improve people’s awareness and understanding of these abhorrent crimes.

**National Crime Agency response**

We found that the National Crime Agency (NCA) and forces need to share intelligence about modern slavery and human trafficking more consistently and immediately. We are encouraged by recent changes in the NCA, and accept that there have been more since our inspection fieldwork. But at the time of our inspection, forces didn’t always recognise that these changes were happening.

We also found that there were opportunities for the NCA to give information and intelligence more quickly to forces to let them respond effectively to victims in their areas. We found evidence of this in our audit of police case files. Since this kind of crime crosses borders, it is crucial that there are good relationships and effective co-ordination at national, regional and local levels.
The future

Overall, we found that there has been some progress and major developments in operations and strategy both during our inspection and afterwards. But the police service still has much to do to develop an effective, coherent and consistent response to modern slavery and human trafficking. Our inspection identified the problems and established a starting point for the police to address them.

Counter-terrorism

During 2017, we carried out the second inspection of our three-year counter-terrorism inspection programme. The inspection took place before the terrorist attacks in London and Manchester in spring and summer 2017.

The inspection focused on the immediate police response to a terrorist attack; in particular, the first few hours of a marauding terrorist (firearms) attack (MTA/MTFA). We wanted to answer the question: how well prepared is the police service to respond effectively to a terrorist attack? We considered the command and control arrangements in place and how well forces and the Counter-Terrorism Network were working together.

We assessed documents and interviewed staff in 19 police forces, including 16 local forces and three national forces (the Ministry of Defence Police, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the British Transport Police).
**Forces' planning and preparation**

We were particularly interested in local forces’ plans and preparations for their response to an MTA/MTFA.

In this inspection, we assessed whether forces had done all they could reasonably be expected to do. We wanted to know if their planning and preparation minimise the risks and make an effective response as likely as possible.

In our report, we recognised that planning alone doesn’t guarantee an effective response. We analysed the preparations for command and control, and the supporting infrastructure that forces would rely on in responding to a terrorist attack.

**Our recommendations**

We made recommendations at national, regional and force levels. Because of the sensitive nature of counter-terrorism work and legal constraints in place to protect national security, we didn’t publish the report.

**Police response to the Manchester and London attacks**

It is clear that the Metropolitan Police Service, City of London Police, British Transport Police and Greater Manchester Police responded very quickly and decisively to the attacks, which happened after our inspection; an independent report on the emergency service response to the Manchester attack praised the remarkably fast deployment of armed officers.26

The fact that armed and unarmed officers were so effectively co-ordinated shows that the forces had prepared well. From each of these incidents, there are also lessons to be learned to make the police response more effective.
Our specialist rolling inspections

Crime data integrity

The police must take crime data integrity (CDI) very seriously. If the police fail to record crime accurately, victims and their communities might not get justice. The safety of the public might also be put at risk.

In April 2016, we started a new programme to inspect all 43 forces in England and Wales on how they record crime. The programme builds on our 2014 crime-recording inspection. This found that, at a national level, the police failed to record 19 percent of the crimes reported to them.

Our CDI inspection programme

Our inspections cover several areas:

– how accurately the police record crime overall;
– how accurately the police record violence and sexual offences;
– how accurately the police record reports of rape;
– how well victims of domestic abuse are treated; and
– how accurately the police record modern slavery crimes.

We sample some reports that have gone to specialist police departments dealing with vulnerable victims to see if the reports of crime have been recorded. We also examine cases where the police have decided to amend crime reports to show that no crime has been committed.
Our findings

So far, we have found most forces are determined to get crime recording right. This is so that the force has a clearer understanding of the criminality affecting its communities. The force can then respond more effectively to demand and to what the victims of crime need.

Some forces are already recording crime accurately. We found that, where this is the case, systems and processes work well, leadership is good and oversight is effective.

But, overall, we are finding too many forces aren’t recording crime accurately and are complying inconsistently with crime-recording standards. In some forces, this needs improving significantly and urgently.

This isn’t just about following a set of rules properly. The police also need to be aware of the problems for victims and communities if they don’t record crime well. Only then will the victim’s voice carry the weight it deserves.
Accuracy of crime recording

We published the findings of our CDI inspections of 20 police forces. These have shown that the police still have problems with accuracy, despite the commitment and dedication of senior police leaders and many officers and staff.

We produced weighted estimates of overall crime-recording accuracy. The combined recording accuracy for all reported crime in the 20 forces we have inspected so far was 85.9 percent (see figure 11); for violent offences it was 80.8 percent, and for sexual offences 91.5 percent. The results for the 20 forces we have inspected so far show they need to get even better at this.

Figure 11: Overall crime-recording accuracy by force

Source: HMICFRS CDI inspections
Note: Forces are displayed in the order in which we carried out the inspections. The overall crime-recording accuracy is displayed as a range for each force. The middle line is the central estimate within this range.
What works

The spread of results in figure 11 shows that some forces do record crime accurately. This isn’t the result of any one factor. The factors that have the most beneficial effect are leadership, strong supervision and quality assurance, and skilled people. Having a crime registrar who is scrupulously objective and has a strong influence over local crime-recording decisions is particularly helpful.

Strong supervision improves standards. In Durham Constabulary, two inspectors must agree before police officers or staff can close a crime-related incident without creating a crime record. This makes sure victims who report a crime will almost certainly have a crime recorded. It means victims are more likely to be referred to victim support organisations, and investigations are more likely to take place. Victims and communities are then more likely to get justice.

Where forces have good systems to identify when crimes aren’t being recorded properly, and a way of providing feedback to officers and staff, standards will improve. Merseyside Police has developed a system that identifies which officers and staff aren’t recording crimes accurately. The force uses this information, together with other information such as the quality of prosecution files submitted by officers and staff, to improve standards and performance. Again, this makes sure more victims will have their crimes recorded and will be more likely to achieve justice.
**Problem areas**

**Appointment systems**

Where forces record crimes when they are reported rather than later, standards of crime recording are better.

We have found problems with crime recording in forces that use appointment systems. When there is a delay between the original report and an officer speaking to the victim, the police may not record the crime. Victims can become disillusioned because of the delay and distance themselves from the process. The police can then close the original report without any further contact with the victim.

Forces that use appointment systems need to make sure crimes are recorded properly and victims get the level of service they deserve.

**Rape**

We are still finding some reports of rape going unrecorded.

In 2015, the Home Office introduced a new category for recording complaints of rape. When a complaint of rape is made, the police must record that complaint as a crime. That rule applies when the person making the complaint says he or she is the victim, and when someone else makes the complaint.

An example of the latter case is when a friend or relative of the alleged victim makes the report. In some of these cases, the alleged victim can’t be found or denies that a rape has taken place. In those cases, we found that the reports aren’t always recorded.

In July 2016, there was a further change in the way rape is recorded. If there is a complaint of rape involving more than one alleged offender, the police must record a separate crime for each. We found police forces were slow to implement this change.
There are strict rules about cancelling any reported crime of rape. People responsible for cancelling these crimes must be qualified, and they can only do it if extra, verifiable information leads them to do so. An example of this would be where the report is proved to be false. We have found that, in most cases, forces follow these rules.

Modern slavery
Since July 2015, police forces have been expected to record all modern slavery crimes. Modern slavery and human trafficking are often hidden, with victims being from different cultures. We have found that police forces don’t always understand the offences under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and their responsibilities to record them all.

Domestic abuse
We have found that forces still have a problem with recording domestic abuse crimes.

The reasons for this are complex and include the sometimes controlling and coercive relationship between the victim and abuser. Nevertheless, forces must make sure victims of domestic abuse, who are among the most vulnerable of victims, get the best possible service. This starts with accurately recording complaints of crimes committed against them.

Pressure not to record
Formally recording every report of crime is an important step in protecting victims and making sure they get the service they are entitled to. In 2014, there was widespread public concern that pressures on the police to reduce crime and solve the crimes that did take place were affecting the quality of the data the police recorded. Concerns included suggestions that these pressures affected decisions on whether to record something as a crime.

In our 2014 report, we found there was pressure not to record a crime in some forces. In our latest round of inspections, we saw a welcome improvement. Officers and staff are clear they no longer feel under any pressure to help meet performance targets by minimising the number of crimes they record.
**Next steps**

We intend to inspect the remaining 23 forces to build a better understanding of the factors that affect how accurately forces record crimes. We aim to find what works well and assess how well forces have implemented the recommendations from our 2014 crime-recording inspection report.

**Custody inspections**

We are one of 21 statutory bodies that make up the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM). The NPM strengthens the protection of people in detention through independent monitoring. As members of the NPM, we carry out inspections jointly with Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons (HMI Prisons). We are expanding our 2018/19 inspection programme to include Terrorism Act custody suites.

We also continue to contribute to the wider work of the NPM, particularly relating to vulnerable people. We have improved our approach to inspections, in response to recommendations made by a former Lord Advocate during a review of deaths and serious incidents in police custody.30

Between March 2017 and the end of March 2018, we published ten reports after unannounced inspections of police custody suites.

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**Between March 2017 and the end of March 2018, we published ten reports after unannounced inspections of police custody suites.**
We carry out follow-up visits to forces one year after their inspection. During these visits, we found that some forces are developing comprehensive action plans to improve their custody services and address our recommendations. If we find forces not making enough progress, we take this into account when deciding which forces to inspect each year.

**How police treat detainees**

Our inspections show that custody officers treat most detainees respectfully. On the whole, officers and staff assess and manage risks well. Most detainees, particularly children and vulnerable adults, receive good care while in custody. Some forces have invested in their custody facilities to give detainees a better environment.

However, the problems that concerned us the most last year are still there. We were still finding potential ligature points\(^{32}\) in most of the custody suites we visited. The lack of capacity in other agencies has led to little improvement in outcomes for children and people with mental ill-health. This is despite the willingness of the police, health services and local authorities to work together.

Forces have made some progress. Fewer people are being detained under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983. This is because forces are diverting people into the healthcare system rather than taking them to custody suites.

Working with other agencies to minimise the time children spend in custody has also improved. In some forces, monitoring work with these agencies is creating a better understanding of how long children are detained for, why this is the case, and how they can minimise detention time.

**Children and people with mental ill-health**

The police need to work with other agencies better to improve outcomes for these groups. We welcome efforts to divert people away from custody and into the healthcare system. But in many forces, this means officers are spending time away from their main duties, waiting at healthcare facilities.
When people with mental ill-health commit an offence, there is limited support for officers to find an alternative to arrest and custody. Some forces have triage arrangements that involve mental health professionals offering advice and help. These arrangements are making a substantial and valuable difference. Many officers told us these arrangements help them avoid arrest and custody for very vulnerable people. But not all forces have them in place.

The custody sergeants we speak to say they try to minimise the time children spend in custody. In general, police officers try to avoid bringing children into custody at all. Despite this, many children who enter custody are still being held overnight. This is generally because there are ongoing investigations, or because officers are waiting for support from appropriate adults.³³

When the police have charged a child with an offence and refused bail, the child should be moved to suitable accommodation. Local authorities have a statutory duty to take responsibility for these children, but in practice they are rarely moved. In some cases, children need secure accommodation, but there is a shortage across the country. This means children stay in custody when they should be in more suitable accommodation.

**Forces need to improve in several areas**

There are several areas where forces have made little progress since our last annual report.

The police aren’t always complying fully with various aspects of the relevant Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) Code of Practice. This sets out the requirements for the detention, treatment and questioning of suspects in police custody by police officers.³⁴ In particular, inspectors aren’t always reviewing detention to make sure it is still appropriate and that detainees understand their rights and entitlements.
Few of the forces we inspected reliably monitor data on the ethnicity or other characteristics of people going into custody.

In most forces, performance management arrangements for custody aren’t sufficiently effective. We found inaccurate data, gaps in information and a lack of scrutiny. This makes it hard for forces to assess how well they are doing and where they need to improve.

These problems also apply to the use of force on detainees. Most forces have got better at collecting data about this because of new requirements of the Home Office and the NPCC. However, there are limited internal governance arrangements in place to make sure force is being used appropriately, or that data about the use of force is accurate. Some forces can’t say for sure that their officers’ use of force is always proportionate.

Few of the forces we inspected reliably monitor data on the ethnicity or other characteristics of people going into custody. Even when forces gather some of this information, there is little evidence to show they are using it to make sure detainees are treated fairly, or to identify and address any over-representation of particular groups.

It is disappointing that forces have made such limited progress to improve outcomes for detainees or address problems we raised last year.
Our specialist inspections of non-Home Office forces

The ACRO Criminal Records Office

The ACRO Chief Executive Officer invited us to inspect ACRO’s use of the Police National Computer (PNC). The inspection focused on three areas:

- ACRO’s compliance with the PNC Code of Connection;36
- its compliance with the PNC Code of Practice;37 and
- how efficiently and effectively it uses the PNC.

We found that ACRO complied with most aspects of the PNC Code of Connection, and that all the necessary certification was up to date. ACRO was auditing how its staff use the PNC. However, it wasn’t auditing to the same standard how staff use other databases containing data downloaded from the PNC.

We found ACRO complied with the relevant sections of the PNC Code of Practice, but we found the Code to be seriously out of date.

We found that ACRO uses the PNC effectively and efficiently. Members of staff were fully trained and they were working to a high standard. The ACRO workforce was well motivated and was giving UK police forces a vital and cost-efficient service.
Our recommendations
In our report, we recommended that ACRO:

– improve its audit processes;
– monitor its IT systems better; and
– develop and test a business continuity plan.

We also recommended that the Home Office update the PNC Code of Practice.

Members of staff were fully trained and they were working to a high standard.
British Transport Police

In October 2016, the Under Secretary of State for Transport commissioned us to inspect the efficiency, legitimacy and leadership of British Transport Police. We used the methodology set out in our spring 2016 PEEL all-force inspection programme.

We focused on three areas:

- how efficient the force is at managing its resources;
- how legitimate the force is in the way it treats its workforce and the public; and
- how well the force understands, develops and shows leadership.

**Efficiency**

We found the force has a limited understanding of the current and future demand for its services. It does have plans in place to reorganise its resources, and has clear processes for prioritising its activities. But at the time of the inspection, the force wasn’t matching its resources well enough to the demand it faces.

The force doesn’t have a consistent process in place to manage projects or assess how successful they were. The force also needs to improve its planning; at the time of the inspection, it didn’t have a medium-term financial plan established for the period to 2021.
We found the force’s IT needs upgrading significantly and urgently. It should quickly put in place a clear, realistic and costed IT plan to address this, with robust systems to monitor the IT plan and track its progress. The force doesn’t have good enough plans to reduce costs or to improve its services as a result of any savings it makes.

**Legitimacy**

The force works hard to make sure it treats all the people it serves with fairness and respect. It asks for feedback from the communities it serves in a range of ways, including surveys, text messaging, a mobile app and social media. It analyses the feedback and uses it to give the public a better service.

New recruits and special constables receive good training based on the force’s values, ethics and professionalism. The workforce was aware of the Code of Ethics and the force’s values. Security vetting for staff was up to date at the time of the inspection, but the force’s vetting policy wasn’t in line with current national guidance.

The force is clear about what constitutes acceptable behaviour and reinforces this to its workforce. Officers and staff are confident about reporting concerns to their supervisors. The force doesn’t have a formal assessment of the risks of corruption or a comprehensive plan for controlling those risks. At the time of the inspection, the force was in the very early stages of developing a policy on the abuse of position for a sexual purpose.

The force treats its workforce with fairness and respect. It uses a range of methods to understand what affects the workforce’s perceptions of fair and respectful treatment. The force takes good care of all its people and has invested in this significantly. Officers and staff felt there was a firm commitment to their wellbeing, and that they could get support if they needed it.

**Officers and staff are confident about reporting concerns to their supervisors.**
The force recognises that a diverse workforce is important.

Leadership
Supervisors receive good training and understand their responsibilities towards their staff’s welfare. The force uses a good range of techniques to develop leadership capability among its staff. It accepts that it doesn’t yet fully understand which leadership skills are lacking among its staff and has introduced a new personal development review process to address this.

The force recognises that a diverse workforce is important. It has developed programmes to encourage more diverse groups of people in middle management to seek out leadership positions. However, the force needs to think about how diversity in other areas (for example, experience, skills or management style) could enrich its leadership teams.

Preparing to transfer British Transport Police's Scottish operations to Police Scotland
With HMIC Scotland, we also considered how well British Transport Police was preparing to transfer its Scottish operations to Police Scotland. There was no detailed and authoritative business case which sets out the benefits, disadvantages or costs of the transfer to Police Scotland. This was because the decision to transfer the British Transport Police’s functions in Scotland was entirely political.

We found that the force has only recently done some limited planning to prepare for the transfer. This was partly because British Transport Police and Police Scotland had only recently been invited to the Joint Programme Board. (This was set up in January 2016 and co-chaired by the Department for Transport and the Scottish government to prepare for the devolution of railway policing.)

British Transport Police has started to cost its support for the transfer. In corporate areas such as ICT, the force has given some basic thought to separating the computer network in Scotland from the wider British Transport Police network. The force has taken a similar approach to the force-wide plan to provide body-worn video cameras. However, the force has further work to do in considering the impact of the transfer on its estate strategy.
The force needs to work with all the parties involved in the transfer to resolve some critical issues, including:

- the pension arrangements and terms and conditions of transferring staff;
- identifying which assets and liabilities will be transferred;
- renegotiating and renewing funding through Police Service Agreements; and
- operational policing integration and cross-border co-operation.

British Transport Police and the British Transport Police Authority must communicate effectively with staff who will be affected by the transfer. With the support of the Joint Programme Board, they should also develop and put in place a communications and engagement plan for the transfer.
There was a significant backlog of cases waiting to go to the serious crime analysis section.

National Crime Agency specialist operations

In 2017, we published our inspection report on the NCA’s specialist operations centre, crime operational support and serious crime analysis section.

Our findings

We found there was strong demand for the services these teams provide. But there was a significant backlog of cases waiting to go to the serious crime analysis section. There were also large numbers of historic cases in that section waiting for input and analysis.

We saw a lack of registered intermediaries (who are there to help communicate with vulnerable witnesses during criminal proceedings). There was an urgent need for more so the NCA could meet requests for support.

The NCA needed to address backlogs of requests made to the national injuries database team and historical cases that were waiting to be added to their database. The team was also relying on yearly placement students to maintain the Operation Marshall database, which meant a lack of continuity.

The NCA needs to consult more with forces across the UK on what services they need. The Home Office, in conjunction with the NCA, needs to make sure the statutory code of practice for the serious crime analysis section is formally laid before Parliament.
Recommendations and areas for improvement

We made eight recommendations based on these findings. We also recommended that the teams improve in four areas:

- how they record management decisions;
- how they give information to one another;
- their understanding of demand; and
- their feedback process.

Overall, the three teams provide an effective and efficient service. But to meet the needs of present-day policing, they should make a concerted effort to respond to the recommendations and areas for improvement in our report.

The NCA needs to consult more with forces across the UK on what services they need.
Operation Lynemouth started well and had clear governance arrangements.

**Tower Hamlets**

On 21 March 2017, the Mayor of London’s Office for Policing and Crime asked us to inspect Operation Lynemouth. This is a Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) operation into alleged criminal offences during the 2014 mayoral election in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.

The MPS investigated these allegations at the time, and after an election court ruling that declared the election result void. The court found corrupt practices at the elections of both the mayor and the councillors for the 20 wards of Tower Hamlets.

However, there were concerns when there were no criminal convictions after initial MPS investigations. As a result, the MPS set up Operation Lynemouth in 2017, to review and reassess the allegations.

**Our findings**

We were asked to carry out quarterly inspections of the operation and to publish reports of our findings. So far, we have published three reports.

Operation Lynemouth started well and had clear governance arrangements. In most areas, the operation is still making good progress, but it is clear it will take longer than the MPS first thought.

The operation has identified lines of enquiry that weren’t fully considered during the initial investigation, and senior officers will need to decide now how to address them. Pursuing these lines of enquiry will take time and resources.
Royal Military Police

We inspect the investigations that the police forces of each of the three armed services carry out, and report the results to the Secretary of State for Defence. One of these police forces is the Royal Military Police (RMP).

In September 2016, we inspected how effectively the RMP investigates the deaths of British soldiers overseas. These investigations also cover the deaths of civilians who are subject to service law. In particular, we examined how well the RMP supported grieving families throughout the investigations.

How well does the RMP support bereaved families?

According to military policy, bereaved families are victims and they should have access to trained family liaison officers if they need them.

We found evidence of good practice, but we also met families who were critical of the service they had received. We think the RMP could do much more to give bereaved families information, care and support, sensitively and compassionately.

We found the service the Ministry of Defence (MOD) provided to families was inconsistent. It varied depending on the type of death, where the family lived and local military policies.

Our recommendations

We recommended that, to give bereaved families better support, the MOD should:

– revise its procedures;
– check it is consistently complying with them; and
– ask families for feedback about whether the standards are being met.
We also recommended the RMP revise its policy on family liaison officers to match national guidance and training. This is to make sure RMP family liaison officers perform to the same standard as those from Home Office police forces.

**How effective are RMP investigations into overseas deaths?**

We found that, in most cases, the RMP investigates overseas deaths effectively.

However, we were concerned that the RMP didn’t have enough qualified military investigators to deal with more fatalities than it had in recent years. This could cause problems in working promptly and effectively.

We saw little evidence of governance in place for how the RMP, the Royal Navy Police and the Royal Air Force Police work together. The RMP leads most of the decisions about resources, priorities and planning, and the other two forces have limited influence.

The RMP has no formal role (and no explicit statutory powers) to act abroad on behalf of a UK coroner. In our view, this means it does not carry out all its investigations as effectively as it could.
Our recommendations

We recommended that:

– the Provost Marshals (Navy, Army and Royal Air Force) and the MOD should agree governance arrangements for how the service police work together, so they can find opportunities to do so more effectively and efficiently; and

– the MOD should, in consultation with the Chief Coroner, formalise the role of the RMP when acting on behalf of a coroner in investigating overseas deaths.

We also recommended that the RMP should set up a system to monitor performance. This should include:

– how well it supports victims of crime;
– how well it records crime and allocates investigations;
– whether it uses investigative tactics appropriately;
– how well it supervises investigations and assures their quality;
– whether it provides training to national standards; and
– how well it learns from experience.

We made other recommendations about training, learning lessons from cases, and reducing delays.

How effectively does the RMP work with others?

We found that the Provost Marshal (Army) had set up regular high-level meetings and agreements with interested organisations so that there was contact and mutual support. He had also delegated, to the Commanding Officer of the Special Investigation Branch, his authority to investigate overseas deaths and to engage with other interested organisations. These arrangements were generally effective.

RMP investigators generally had effective working relationships with police forces and other parties in countries where the Army was based. But there were some problems about working with other MOD departments.

In most cases, the RMP investigates overseas deaths effectively.
We found the RMP had difficulties in investigating offences where another law enforcement body had jurisdiction. It also wasn’t exchanging enough information with the Defence Safety Authority and there were problems with some of the arrangements with others over informing and supporting bereaved families.

We didn’t find any structured process for professionals outside the RMP to review how independent and effective RMP investigations into overseas deaths are.

Our recommendations

We recommended that:

– the Provost Marshal (Army) and the heads of the Joint Casualty and Compassionate Centre, the defence inquests unit, and the Army bereavement aftercare service, should revise the agreement on how they work together; they should regularly ask families for feedback about the service they receive; and

– the Provost Marshal (Army) should introduce a process for professionals outside the RMP, such as Home Office police forces, to review how independent and effective RMP investigations into overseas deaths are.

Police Service of Northern Ireland

Every year, the Minister for Justice commissions us to carry out an inspection of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). Like our other PEEL inspections, this evaluates the efficiency and effectiveness of the service.

Efficiency

We found that the PSNI had a good understanding of how to manage the demands on its services. Since last year, it has improved the way it gathers information from other agencies, including health services and local councils. It has become more aware of crimes such as human trafficking, modern slavery and domestic abuse. The service also deals with problems specific to Northern Ireland, including cross-border criminality and the illegal trade in abortion drugs.
The service uses this information to help make decisions about how to allocate staff and resources. It generally does this efficiently, using a system called priority-based resourcing. A specialist team, the resource delivery group, helps make sure that the service has enough trained staff to deal with demand. We found that this could be better co-ordinated.

The PSNI is good at planning for future demand. Its workforce, assets and ICT systems are all strong. It works well with a range of other agencies, including: other law enforcement agencies, such as police forces in England, Scotland and Wales, and An Garda Síochána, Ireland’s national police and security service; HMRC and the Revenue Commissioners; and the National Crime Agency.

But its ability to plan is constrained by the short-term, annual nature of funding (and also by the uncertainty caused by the absence of an elected Assembly). Unlike forces in England and Wales, the PSNI can’t build up reserves to fund longer-term projects because it can’t carry forward any savings it makes.

**Effectiveness**

We judged the PSNI to be good at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe. In the year covered by the inspection, recorded crime in Northern Ireland was stable and below the recorded rate for England and Wales. The service works closely with local communities to understand the threats and risks they face.

On anti-social behaviour, the service works well with other organisations to identify problems and respond early.
The PSNI developed an approach to problem solving in which officers are encouraged to use the national decision model\textsuperscript{44} and the problem analysis triangle.\textsuperscript{45} These help them identify problems, and develop and assess potential solutions.

Where the service was using this approach, it was effective, but we found it wasn’t being used consistently. We recommended the service extend the approach.

The PSNI is good at investigating crime and reducing re-offending. The standard of investigations is generally good, especially in more serious or complex cases. We recommended the service improve how it investigates less complex crimes such as theft and burglary. Similarly, the service is good at pursuing suspects who are wanted for serious offences, but could do more in less serious cases.

The service works well with others, including probation, council services and voluntary agencies, to tackle prolific offenders and reduce re-offending. It has good systems in place to manage the threat posed by dangerous and sexual offenders, although increasing demand is putting a strain on resources.

However, the political context the service operates in means some people who work in other agencies are reluctant to support the police openly, for fear of reprisals from dissident elements. This affects the service’s performance in some areas, such as offender management.

### Serious and organised crime

The PSNI is good at tackling serious and organised crime. It has a deep understanding of the threat and risk that serious and organised crime and dissident terrorism pose to the communities of Northern Ireland.

The service works with a wide range of other organisations, including law enforcement agencies throughout Great Britain and in the Republic of Ireland. It has effective processes in place to tackle organised crime groups, and makes good use of serious crime prevention orders to manage the most dangerous offenders. The service also has effective strategies for deterring people from getting involved in terrorism or organised crime.
Our monitoring arrangements

Our monitoring process is a vital part of our work to help forces become more efficient and effective, based on our inspection judgments and other information we have about them. It informs the inspections we do under section 54 of the Police Act 1996.

We routinely scan data and information from a range of sources to see what forces are doing well and what challenges they might face in the future. We also use the data to assess forces’ progress in dealing with any causes of concern. This helps us design and run future inspections – for example, by highlighting where there are particular risks which merit inspection, or enough concerns to affect the timetabling of an inspection. We review all forces regularly as part of this monitoring cycle.

The monitoring phases

We monitor forces in two phases: the Scan phase and the Engage phase.

During the Scan phase, we collect and analyse data and information about forces’ performance. We use data and information from several sources to identify good things forces are doing and potential areas of concern. This also helps us establish if a force is performing poorly or getting worse.

If a force isn’t making enough progress with any areas of concern, we move it from the Scan phase to the Engage phase.

In the Engage phase, we help forces find ways to improve and resolve any areas of concern if they haven’t been able to do so on their own. We also help them get advice and support from other organisations, such as the College of Policing and the NPCC.

Work will carry on throughout 2018, as part of the Integrated PEEL Assessment programme, to incorporate the monitoring process more fully into our inspection activities.
Special grants

Forces should include reasonable contingencies within their policing and budget plans for unexpected events in their areas. But there may be exceptional events that generate unforeseen pressure on a police force.

The threshold for an application for a special grant is normally where the extraordinary expenditure is more than one percent of the force’s net revenue grant from the Home Office. The Home Office criteria also mention cases where the refusal of a special grant might threaten the financial stability of the force or its ability to provide effective policing. In these cases, police and crime commissioners can apply to the Home Office for special grant funding under the Police Act 1996, section 48; the Local Government Act 2003, section 31; or the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, section 170.

The Home Office may refer applications to us to review. We are normally asked to consider whether the resources the force used were reasonable and proportionate to the aims of the operation or investigation, and the risks associated with it. Our reports aren’t published but, based on our findings, Home Office officials advise ministers, who then make the final decision about funding.

In 2017, we produced 11 reports on applications for funding from ten different forces. The applications related to 20 different police operations; they involved major or critical incidents and serious criminal offences, including homicide, sexual assault, missing persons, terrorist attacks and the Grenfell Tower fire.
Part 3: Our reports
420 reports published

Our reports

Between 24 March 2017 and 31 March 2018, we published 420 reports, all of which are available on our website.

As well as our work with the 43 Home Office forces, and the other inspectorates, we carried out various other inspections. These are part of our statutory duties to inspect non-Home Office police forces and certain other law enforcement agencies. We gave our reports for these inspections to the relevant Secretaries of State. These were then published on our website.
Over the next few pages, we have listed our reports, along with:

– a short description of the inspection’s focus;
– if it was a joint inspection, the names of the other inspectorates;
– the publication date; and
– the name(s) of the Inspector(s) of Constabulary responsible for the inspection.
Reports published
24 March 2017 to 31 March 2018

PEEL inspections

**Abuse of Position for a Sexual Purpose**
Inspection of forces’ plans to look for intelligence on potential abuse of position for sexual gain, after our 2016 national recommendation to put these plans in place.

Lead HMI: Mike Cunningham

**Police Efficiency 2017**
Inspection of how well forces understand demand for their service, how well they match their resources to that demand, and how efficient they are.

Lead HMI: Mike Cunningham

**Police Legitimacy 2017**
Inspection of how well forces treat people with fairness and respect, how they make sure their workforces act ethically and lawfully, and how their workforces feel they have been treated.

Lead HMI: Mike Cunningham

**Police Leadership 2017**
National overview, drawn from our 2017 PEEL inspections, of how forces develop and show good leadership throughout all levels of policing.

Lead HMI: Matt Parr
Police Effectiveness and Efficiency – Police Service of Northern Ireland
Inspections of how the Police Service of Northern Ireland makes best use of its available resources and how effective it is at keeping people safe and reducing crime.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Police Effectiveness 2016 – Vulnerability Revisit Inspections
Re-inspection of the four forces we graded as inadequate on vulnerability during our 2016 effectiveness inspection.
Lead HMI: Zoë Billingham

Police Effectiveness 2017
Inspection of how effective forces are at reducing and investigating offending, protecting the vulnerable and tackling serious and organised crime.
Lead HMI: Zoë Billingham
Child protection inspections

Joint Targeted Area Inspections of the Multi-Agency Response to Abuse and Neglect
Inspections of the multi-agency response to abuse and neglect in eight local authority areas, including a focus on responses to children living with domestic abuse.

Joint inspection with Ofsted, CQC and HMI Probation
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

Full Joint Inspections of Youth Offending Work
Inspections of youth offending teams (YOTs) that are considered to have causes of concern. We inspected YOTs in two force areas.

Joint inspection with HMI Probation
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

National Child Protection Inspections
Inspections, revisit inspections and post-inspection reviews of how the police protect children, in seven forces.

Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

The Multi-Agency Response to Children Living with Domestic Abuse – Prevent, Protect and Repair
Overview of six joint targeted area inspections of safeguarding of children affected by domestic abuse.

Joint inspection with Ofsted, CQC and HMI Probation
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

Out-of-Court Disposal Work in Youth Offending Teams
Inspection of how police and youth offending teams deal with low-level offences committed by children without going to court (known as out-of-court disposals).

Joint inspection with HMI Probation
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams
Specialist inspections

Unannounced Inspections of Police Custody Suites
Inspections of police custody, to evaluate strategy, treatment and conditions, individual rights and healthcare of people in custody. We inspected nine force areas.

Published: 28 March 2017 – 6 March 2018
Lead HMI: Dru Sharpling

Joint inspection with HMI Prisons
Inspections of police custody, to evaluate strategy, treatment and conditions, individual rights and healthcare of people in custody. We inspected nine force areas.

Published: 28 March 2017 – 6 March 2018
Lead HMI: Dru Sharpling

Use of the Police National Computer – An Inspection of the ACRO Criminal Records Office
Inspection of how the ACRO Criminal Records Office (ACRO) uses the Police National Computer (PNC). We assessed ACRO’s compliance with the PNC Code of Practice and whether it uses the PNC efficiently and effectively.

Published: 5 April 2017
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Crime Data Integrity Inspections
Inspections of forces’ progress against recommendations we made in our 2014 Crime Data Integrity inspections. We inspected 13 forces.

Published: 15 June 2017 – 15 February 2018
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Operation Lynememouth
Inspections of the Metropolitan Police Service’s reinvestigation of 2014 electoral fraud in Tower Hamlets.

Published: 27 June 2017 – 20 February 2018
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Living in Fear – The Police and CPS Response to Harassment and Stalking
Inspection of the police and Crown Prosecution Service’s response to harassment and stalking crimes. Supplemented by University of Worcester research into victims’ experiences.

Published: 5 July 2017
Joint inspection with HMCPSI
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams
Specialist inspections continued

Published: 18 July 2017
Inspection of how the police and Crown Prosecution Service are complying with their obligations to disclose unused material in criminal investigations and prosecutions.
Joint inspection with HMCPSI
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

Stolen Freedom – The Policing Response to Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking
Published: 24 October 2017
Inspection of the police’s response to the implementation of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 in England and Wales.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

Report on an Announced Inspection of Border Force Customs Custody Suites in England and Scotland
Published: 28 September 2017
Inspection of Border Force customs custody suites, to assess strategy and treatment of people in custody.
Joint inspection with HMI Prisons
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

A Progress Report on the Police Response to Domestic Abuse
Published: 14 November 2017
Inspection of forces’ progress with responding to and protecting domestic abuse victims since our 2014 and 2015 inspections.
Lead HMI: Zoë Billingham

Hate Crime Scoping Study – A Review of the Police Response to Inform Future Inspection Activity
Published: 23 November 2017
Scoping study examining the role of the police in responding to hate crime. This formed the foundation for our hate crime inspection activity, which includes joint work with HMCPSI, and is due to report in summer 2018.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams
Planes, Drones and Helicopters – An Independent Study of Police Air Support
Inspection of the effectiveness and efficiency of the air support the National Police Air Service gives police forces, and how forces collaborate.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

National Crime Agency Inspection
Inspection of the support the NCA’s specialist operation functions give law enforcement in serious crime investigations.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Police Efficiency, Legitimacy and Leadership – An Inspection of British Transport Police
Inspection of the effectiveness, legitimacy and leadership of British Transport Police.
Joint inspection with HMICS
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Inspection of the Royal Military Police’s Investigations into Overseas Deaths
Inspection of the effectiveness of Royal Military Police investigations into overseas deaths of British soldiers and civilians subject to service law.
Lead HMI: Dru Sharpling
Non-inspection publications

**HMIs’ Force Assessments**
Our overall assessments of 43 forces drawing together, for each force, our PEEL assessments, other insights, operating context and HMIs’ future expectations.

Lead HMI: All HMIs

**Public Views of Policing in England and Wales 2016/17**
Results of the second IPSOS Mori survey we commissioned of the public’s views and experiences of local policing.

Lead HMI: Mike Cunningham

**State of Policing – The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2016**

Lead HMI: Sir Thomas Winsor

**Inspection Programme and Framework 2017/18**
HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary’s 2017/18 Inspection Programme and Framework, prepared under Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996.

Lead HMI: Sir Thomas Winsor
HMICFRS Value for Money Profiles 2017
Full profiles of each England and Wales force, giving a comparative analysis of policing activities and highlighting differences in expenditure and performance.

Lead HMI: Mike Cunningham

Published: 16 November 2017

HMICFRS Summary Value for Money Profiles 2017
Summary value for money profiles of each England and Wales force.

Lead HMI: Mike Cunningham

Published: 16 November 2017

Leadership Assessment Research
A report on Plymouth University research into leadership, to inform our inspections of leadership.

Lead HMI: Mike Cunningham

Published: 19 December 2017

Victim Voice Methodology
A report on research by NatCen Social Research into how victims’ experiences could inform our inspections.

Lead HMI: Mike Cunningham

Published: 19 December 2017

Public Views of Policing in England and Wales 2017
Results of the third IPSOS Mori survey we commissioned of the public’s views and experiences of local policing.

Lead HMI: Mike Cunningham

Published: 28 December 2017
References

Part 1: Overview


8. The Early Intervention Foundation is a charity and What Works Centre that promotes the use of effective early intervention for children who might be at risk. Further information available at: [www.eif.org.uk/](http://www.eif.org.uk/)


1. HMI Assessments are available at: www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/peel-assessments/peel-2017/
2. PEEL force reports are available at: www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/
4. In December 2017, the Government announced a £450 million increase in police funding across England and Wales. This is made up of: protecting existing government grants in cash terms; allowing PCCs to raise precept contributions by up to £1 a month for a typical household; an increase in counter-terrorism funding of £50 million; and an extra £130 million to help forces meet unexpected costs (for example, the £9.8 million given to Greater Manchester Police after the Manchester Arena terrorist attack on 22 May 2017, in which 22 people were killed by a suicide bomber).
5. After the attack, we agreed with Greater Manchester Police that we wouldn’t inspect them in early June 2017 as planned. We carried out a limited inspection, which included a series of interviews and visits to operational departments and police stations. This was enough to allow us to assess the efficiency of Greater Manchester Police, but not to go as far as a graded judgment.
7. As of April 2017, the NPCC requires all forces to collect a minimum data set on the use of force. The October 2015 report of the National Use of Force Data Review Project, which led to the requirement, is available on the NPCC website at: www.npcc.police.uk/documents/uniformed/2016/Use%20of%20Force%20Data%20Report%20to%20Home%20Sec.pdf
8. Among the list of allegations forces should refer is a “criminal offence or behaviour which is liable to lead to misconduct proceedings and which, in either case, is aggravated by discriminatory behaviour on the grounds of a person’s race, sex, religion or other status identified in guidance by the Commission”. (IOPC statutory guidance adds to the list age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, religious belief, and sexual orientation.)
9. In line with Home Office workforce statistics, senior officers are officers holding the rank of chief inspector or above.


11. Formerly known as abuse of authority for sexual gain.

12. Before it became the Independent Office for Police Conduct.

13. In response to our inspection findings, the Home Office introduced changes to the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012. These were to include within the mandatory referral criteria abuse of position for a sexual purpose or for the purpose of pursuing an improper emotional relationship. These changes were also reflected in the IPCC statutory guidance to forces.


17. The College of Policing is developing a Policing Education Qualifications Framework which will “support the development of policing as a profession through the provision of a coherent national approach to recognising and raising educational standards in policing”. (For more information, see www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Learning/Policing-Education-Qualifications-Framework/Pages/Policing-Education-Qualifications-Framework.aspx) This will affect both entry and promotion within the police service. We will consider this framework in future inspections.
18. Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 allows a police officer to remove an apparently mentally disordered person from a public place to a place of safety. Although a place of safety can include a police custody suite, these should only be used in exceptional circumstances. It is preferable for the person to be taken directly to healthcare facilities, such as a hospital. *Code of Practice: Mental Health Act 1983*, Department of Health, 2008, paragraph 10.21. Available at: [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130123193537/](http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130123193537/) [http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_084597](http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_084597)


21. After a consultation on stalking in 2011 and an Independent Parliamentary Inquiry into stalking in 2012, new offences of stalking were added in 2012 to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. However, stalking crimes were not recorded in their own category until 2014.

22. This is a notice (there are various forms in use) that police issue after an allegation of harassment. Police information notices have no legal or statutory basis. Because the decision to issue them is purely an operational matter for the police, they could best be described as a tactic to prevent further offending.


24. Under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, the defence team must submit a defence case statement to the prosecutor and the court. Once the defence case statement is submitted, the prosecution and/or investigating officers might need to make further enquiries based on the information. In turn, the prosecution might have to make further disclosures to the defence if new material arises.

25. We excluded City of London Police from this chart because it only made two calls for service in 2016 and because the resident population figure didn’t reflect the volume of people who visit the City each day. We excluded Humberside Police because it only joined NPAS in September 2016, so we didn’t have a whole year’s data.

27. To produce the figures for the 20 forces, we applied simple weighting to the individual force-recorded crime figures.

28. These figures have confidence intervals of: ±0.4 percent for all reported crime; ±0.7 percent for violent offences; and ±0.6 percent for sexual offences. The confidence interval gives an estimated range within which the figures are likely to fall. For example, if an audit found that 85 percent of crimes were correctly recorded with a confidence interval of ±3 percent, we could be confident that between 82 percent and 88 percent of crimes were correctly recorded.

29. A crime registrar is the person in a police force who is responsible for making sure it complies with crime-recording rules. The crime registrar’s responsibilities include training staff in the crime-recording process and carrying out audits to check that the force is complying with all the relevant rules.


31. All our custody inspection reports can be found at: www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/our-work/article/criminal-justice-joint-inspection/joint-inspection-of-police-custody-facilities/

32. A ligature point is a point that could support a noose or other strangulation device. This is a major risk to suicidal detainees.

33. Appropriate adults are responsible for protecting the rights and welfare of a child who is detained by the police. They must be present before various police processes (such as identification procedures) can take place. The appropriate adult may be a parent, guardian or social worker. If no-one matching this description is available, local authorities have a statutory duty to provide a responsible person over the age of 18 to fill the role.


35. In 2006, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) founded the ACPO Criminal Records Office, which became known as ACRO. It is operated by Hampshire Constabulary on behalf of the police service. ACRO’s main roles are to: provide police certificates for people wanting to move or work abroad (foreign governments often need these to make decisions on visa applications); provide international child protection certificates for people wanting to work with children outside the UK (these show whether the person has a relevant criminal history); and co-ordinate subject access requests from members of the public who want to see the information held about them on national police databases.
36. The Code of Connection sets the minimum standards that any organisation wanting to connect to the PNC must adopt and keep up. It is based on standards and guidelines that are mostly about the technical and security aspects of the PNC at a local organisational level. *Home Office PNC Code of Connection Version 3.5, 2013, Part 1.3.*

37. The Code of Practice is a statutory code of practice within the meaning of section 39A of the Police Act 1996. Its purpose is to set achievable timeliness and quality criteria for data that goes onto the PNC. It also promotes good practice to make sure PNC data is robust in the future. *National Centre for Policing Excellence (Centrex), The Police National Computer Code of Practice, 1 January 2005, Parts 25 and 26.*

38. The transfer was due to take place on 1 April 2019 under the Railway Policing (Scotland) Act 2017 but has been delayed.

39. British Transport Police enters into agreements with train and freight operating companies to provide a policing service. These agreements, called Police Service Agreements (PSAs), also require the companies to pay for the service. When, for example, a new rail franchise is awarded by the Department for Transport, the winning company must usually enter into a new or existing PSA with British Transport Police.

40. The specialist operations centre provides a single point of contact for police forces and law enforcement agencies. It consists of four teams: the crime team, which provides advice, investigative suggestions and, if needed, access to the resources of the crime operational support team; the specialist research team, which uses knowledge of investigative policies, good practice, guidance and legislation, to help forces; the witness intermediary team, which receives requests from police officers and prosecutors for support to vulnerable victims and witnesses; and the national injuries database team, which supports serious crime investigations with analysing weapons and wounds, and is available to the police and forensic practitioners.

41. The crime operational support team provides specialist advice and support to senior investigating officers dealing with serious offences and incidents, including murder, rape, child abduction, serious sexual offences and suspicious missing persons.

42. The serious crime analysis section gives analytical support to serious sexual offence and murder investigations in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The team gathers data, in the form of case papers from police forces, about crimes that meet certain criteria. The team analyses the data to provide information that will help investigations.
43. A record of child homicides committed by family members and carers. It includes causes of death, types of injury, suspect and victim details, risk factors involved, lessons learned and experts used.

44. The national decision model (NDM) is specific to policing. It gives a consistent framework for examining and challenging decisions, both at the time and afterwards. It is made up of six main elements: the police code of ethics being central to the decision; gathering information; assessing threat and risk; considering powers and force policy; identifying options; and taking action and reviewing what happened.

45. The problem analysis triangle is a method of analysing three elements of recurrent problems: victim, offender and location. For more information, see: www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/intelligence-management/analysis/#problem-analysis-triangle
Annex A: Police force areas
Annex B: About us

Our history

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary was established in 1856, under the same statute that required every county and borough that hadn’t already done so to set up and maintain a permanent salaried police force (the County and Borough Police Act 1856).

Under the 1856 Act, three Inspectors of Constabulary in England and Wales were appointed. It was their duty to “inquire into the state and efficiency of the police” (section 15). The Act also introduced the concept of annual inspection.

The first Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMCIC) was appointed in 1962, as part of a major package of reforms to improve police governance and expand the role of the Inspectorate.

Our role and influence have evolved over the last century and a half. Most of our current functions are set out in the Police Act 1996 (as amended by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 and the Policing and Crime Act 2017).

We are independent of both the police service and the Government. Both our independence and inspection rights are vested in Her Majesty’s Inspectors, who are Crown appointees (section 54(1), Police Act 1996).

Our statutory responsibilities

Inspecting territorial police forces in England and Wales

We must inspect and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of every police force maintained for a police area (section 54(2), Police Act 1996).

The Secretary of State may at any time direct us to carry out an inspection of a police force in any police area (section 54(2B), Police Act 1996).
From time to time, the Home Secretary may also direct us to carry out other duties to help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the police (section 54(3), Police Act 1996).

The local policing body for a police area may at any time ask us to carry out an inspection of a police force in that area (section 54(2BA), Police Act 1996).

**Inspecting other police forces and agencies**

We also have statutory duties to inspect other police forces and agencies, whose remits are not limited to a particular territorial area. Instead, they police specific areas of infrastructure or particular types of crime. In these cases, we give our report to whichever government body is responsible for what the force or agency does.
We have a duty to inspect:

- Armed Forces Police – Royal Navy, Royal Military and Royal Air Force Police (section 321A, Armed Forces Act 2006);

- British Transport Police (section 63, Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003);

- Civil Nuclear Constabulary (section 62, Energy Act 2004);

- HM Revenue & Customs (section 27, Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, and the Revenue and Customs (Inspections) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/1133));

- Ministry of Defence Police (section 4B, Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987);

- Police Service of Northern Ireland (section 41, Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, subject to appointment by the Department of Justice, Northern Ireland);

- National Crime Agency (section 11, Crime and Courts Act 2013); and

- Customs functions (section 29, Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, and the Customs (Inspections by Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary and the Scottish Inspectors) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/2840)).

In summer 2017, we took on inspections of England’s fire and rescue services, assessing and reporting on their efficiency, effectiveness and people. To reflect this new role, our name changed to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS).
Collaborative working
The long history of collaborative working between the criminal justice inspectorates – of Constabulary, the Crown Prosecution Service, Prisons and the National Probation Service – was enshrined in law through the Police Act 1996.

Schedule 4A to the 1996 Act says that the Inspectors of Constabulary:
– must co-operate with other inspectorates, where appropriate, so they can operate efficiently and effectively (paragraph 4);
– must draw up a joint inspection programme with other inspectorates (paragraph 5); and
– may tell certain other inspectorates not to carry out an inspection, or not to do so in a particular way, if HMCIC believes the inspection would impose an unreasonable burden (paragraph 3).

Publishing reports
We must publish the reports we prepare under section 54 of the Police Act 1996 (section 55(1), Police Act 1996).

We must not publish anything the Inspectors believe would be against the interests of national security or might put anyone in danger (section 55(2), Police Act 1996).

We must send a copy of every published report to the Secretary of State, the local policing body maintaining the police force the report is about, the chief officer for that police force and the police and crime panel for that police area (section 55(3), Police Act 1996).

HMCIC must each year give the Secretary of State a report on our inspections. HMCIC must lay a copy of this report before Parliament (section 54(4), Police Act 1996). The report must include his assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in England and Wales for that year (section 54(4A), Police Act 1996). This is our State of Policing report.
Producing the HMICFRS inspection programme and framework

HMCIC must prepare, consult on and publish an inspection programme and framework (paragraph 2 of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996). He must gain the Home Secretary’s approval of the inspection programme and framework. He must then lay the inspection programme and framework before Parliament (paragraphs 2(2A)–(2B) of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).

Dealing with complaints

Every HM Inspector (HMI) inspecting a police force must make sure he or she stays informed about all complaints and misconduct matters relating to that force (section 15(1), Police Reform Act 2002).

The Policing and Crime Act 2017 allows for a super-complaints system to be set up.

This is a new system which will provide a way to raise systemic problems in policing that significantly harm the interests of the public. The regime will also apply to the National Crime Agency.

Only a body designated by the Home Secretary may make a super-complaint. The Act allows the Home Secretary to make regulations about which bodies may be designated, and the criteria to be applied in making these decisions.

The Act also allows for the College of Policing and the Independent Office for Police Conduct to be involved in super-complaints. Although super-complaints must come to us first, there will be a process – to be set out in regulations – specifying who will deal with them and how.
**Participating in misconduct proceedings**

In misconduct proceedings for chief constables and other senior officers above the rank of chief superintendent, HMCIC, or an HMI he nominates, will sit on the panel for misconduct meetings and misconduct hearings (Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/2632), regulation 26). For all chief officer ranks (including chief constables), HMCIC, or an HMI he nominates, will sit on any police appeals tribunal (Police Act 1996, Schedule 6, paragraph 1).

**Acting as a check on the removal of senior officers**

If a police and crime commissioner is proposing to call on a chief constable or other senior officer to retire or resign, he or she must invite HMCIC to give his written views on the proposed removal. HMCIC must then give his views and the police and crime commissioner must consider them (Police Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/527), regulations 11A and 11B).

The police and crime panel may consult HMCIC before making a recommendation to the police and crime commissioner on dismissing a chief constable (Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, Schedule 8, paragraph 15).

**Our powers**

Amendments made by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 to the Police Act 1996 have strengthened our role as a policing body independent of both the Government and the police. This makes us more fully accountable to the public and to Parliament.

**Access to documents and premises**

The chief officer of police must give Inspectors information, documents, evidence or other things the Inspector needs to carry out the inspection (paragraph 6A of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996). The chief officer must also give Inspectors access to the force’s premises, and to documents and other things on those premises that we need to carry out the inspection (paragraph 6B of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).
Power to delegate functions
An Inspector has the power to delegate any of his or her functions to another public authority (paragraph 1 of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).

Power to act jointly with another public body
We can act jointly with another public body where appropriate, to work efficiently and effectively (paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).

Power to provide assistance to any other public authority
HMCIC may, if he thinks it is appropriate, help any other public authority carry out its role. HMCIC can do this on reasonable terms, including payment terms (paragraph 6 of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).
Who we are

Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary

Sir Thomas Winsor
In October 2012, Sir Thomas was appointed as Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary. He is the first holder of that office to come from a non-policing background.

Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary

Zoë Billingham
Zoë Billingham is Her Majesty’s Inspector for the Eastern Region.

Michael Cunningham
Until January 2018, Michael Cunningham QPM was Her Majesty’s Inspector for the Northern Region. He is now the Chief Executive Officer of the College of Policing.

Matt Parr
Matt Parr CB is Her Majesty’s Inspector for the National and London Regions.

Dru Sharpling
Dru Sharpling CBE is Her Majesty’s Inspector and also sits on the panel of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse.

Wendy Williams
Wendy Williams is Her Majesty’s Inspector for the Wales and Western Region.

Biographies for each of the Inspectors of Constabulary are on our website:

www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/about-us/who-we-are/
How we are accountable

The first Inspectors of Constabulary were appointed under the County and Borough Police Act 1856. The Act required them to inspect and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of most of the police forces in England and Wales.

Our main role hasn’t changed materially since then, except that our remit now covers the 43 forces in England and Wales, and several other forces and agencies. Our main empowering statute is now the Police Act 1996.

There are five Inspectors of Constabulary. They are neither civil servants nor police officers, and are appointed by the Crown for a fixed term of up to five years. That means we are independent of the police, Government, police and crime commissioners (and their equivalents), other agencies in the criminal justice system and all outside parties.
However, independence doesn’t mean a lack of accountability. We are accountable in these ways:

- our statutory duties, enforceable through judicial review or by action for breach of statutory duty;
- our obligation to submit an annual report to the Home Secretary under section 54 of the Police Act 1996; each report must be published and laid before Parliament: section 54(4), Police Act 1996;
- our obligation to lay before Parliament a copy of each inspection programme and inspection framework: Police Act 1996, schedule 4A, paragraph 2(2A)(a);
- written Parliamentary questions;
- our obligation to give written and oral evidence to Committees of Parliament, including the Home Affairs Select Committee, the Public Accounts Committee and any other select committee which may call on us to give evidence;
- our obligation to carry out other duties the Home Secretary directs us to: section 54(3), Police Act 1996; and
- our obligation to comply with the rules of administrative law and the rules of good public administration, enforceable in the High Court by judicial review.

As a public body, we are also subject to the legal obligations imposed on public authorities, including:

- Official Secrets Acts 1911 and 1989;
- Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974;
- Data Protection Act 1998;
- Human Rights Act 1998;
- Freedom of Information Act 2000; and
We have a statutory duty to co-operate with the other criminal justice inspectorates.

How we work with other organisations

We are mostly funded by the Home Office and are accountable to the Home Office for our spending, even though we are neither a subsidiary nor a part of the Home Office.

We have three concordats with others which set out the relationship or working arrangements between us. These are:

– a concordat with the Home Office which explains the material parts of the relationship between our two organisations. The concordat sets out our respective roles, and the responsibilities of the main people involved in running, sponsoring and overseeing our affairs. The concordat is published on our website;

– a concordat with the College of Policing. As we have complementary purposes and different powers by which we aim to achieve those purposes, the concordat sets out our respective roles and responsibilities, and how we work with each other;

– a concordat with the College of Policing and the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The concordat sets out our respective roles and responsibilities, and how we work with each other.

We also have a statutory duty to co-operate with the other criminal justice inspectorates, namely those concerned with the Crown Prosecution Service and the probation and prisons services, and the other named inspectorates set out in paragraph 4, Schedule 4A, Police and Justice Act 2006. Our obligations relating to joint inspections are set out in paragraphs 2–5 of that Schedule and we cover those inspections in this report.
Our regions

The National and London regions’ responsibilities include:

- Metropolitan Police Service
- City of London Police
- National Crime Agency
- British Transport Police
- Civil Nuclear Constabulary
- Ministry of Defence Police
- Armed Forces Police
- Guernsey Police
- Royal Gibraltar Police
- States of Jersey Police
- Isle of Man Constabulary
- HM Revenue & Customs
- others by invitation.
Our purpose, values and objectives

Our purpose is to promote improvements in policing and fire and rescue services to make everyone safer.

Our values of respect, honesty, independence, integrity and fairness are at the heart of how we work. They act as a touchstone to help us make decisions – both as individuals and as an organisation.
Annex C: Peelian principles

1. The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder.

2. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions.

3. Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public.

4. The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force.

5. Police seek and preserve public favour not by pandering to public opinion but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law.

6. Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient.

7. Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.

8. Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary.

9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it.

Sir Robert Peel became Home Secretary in 1822. In 1829, he established the first full-time, professional and centrally-organised police force in England and Wales, for the Greater London area.

His police reforms were based on a philosophy that the power of the police comes from the common consent of the public, as opposed to the power of the state. This philosophy is underpinned by nine principles which have shaped our approach when assessing forces.
We are funded mainly by the Home Office. We also receive funding for inspections commissioned by others (such as the Royal Military Police).

We spend about 82 percent of our funding on our workforce, with the rest spent on travel, subsistence, accommodation and other expenses.

### Expenditure breakdown 2016/17 (£)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure Category</th>
<th>Amount (£)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staffing costs including associates</td>
<td>17.7m</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel and subsistence</td>
<td>2.0m</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveys and inspection services</td>
<td>1.0m</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office expenditure and other costs</td>
<td>0.4m</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>0.3m</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT and telephony</td>
<td>0.3m</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our workforce

Our workforce comprises the Inspectors of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, civil servants, police officers and staff secondees. We also have a register of associate inspectors.

### Staffing breakdown 2016/17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent staff</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police secondees</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-term appointments</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police staff</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from other government departments</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex E: Inspections by force

**24 March 2017 to 31 March 2018**

### Territorial police forces of England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspection Type</th>
<th>Avon and Somerset</th>
<th>Bedfordshire</th>
<th>Cambridgeshire</th>
<th>Cheshire</th>
<th>Cleveland</th>
<th>Cumbria</th>
<th>Derbyshire</th>
<th>Devon and Cornwall</th>
<th>Dorset</th>
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### Child protection inspections

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Promoting improvements in policing and fire and rescue services to make everyone safer

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces and fire and rescue services – in the public interest.

In preparing our reports, we ask the questions that citizens would ask, and publish the answers in accessible form, using our expertise to interpret the evidence and make recommendations for improvement.

We provide authoritative information to allow the public to compare the performance of their police force – and, in future, their fire and rescue service – against others. Our evidence is used to bring about improvements in the services they provide to the public.