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<td><strong>ACPO</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ADR</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Association of Chief Police Officers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Annual Data Requirement</strong></td>
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<td><strong>APP</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ARLS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>anti-social behaviour</strong></td>
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<td><strong>attended crimes</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Authorised Professional Practice</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Automatic Resource Location System</td>
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<td>balanced budget</td>
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<td>baseline</td>
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<td>beat policing</td>
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<td>benchmarking</td>
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<td>blue light services</td>
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<td>borderless deployment</td>
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<td>business support</td>
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<td>budget top slicing</td>
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<td>cadet</td>
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<td>category 62</td>
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<td>central funding</td>
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<td>centralisation</td>
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<td>chief officer</td>
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<td>collaboration</td>
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<td>collateral demand</td>
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<td>College of Policing</td>
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<td>community policing</td>
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<td>community support officer</td>
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<td>continuous improvement</td>
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<td>contract renegotiation</td>
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<td>control room</td>
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<td>corporate services</td>
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<td>cost base</td>
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<td>cost control</td>
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<td>cost model</td>
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<td>council tax</td>
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<td>council tax precept (or police precept)</td>
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Crime Survey for England and Wales  
a quarterly independent survey of crime commissioned by the Office for National Statistics, involving the collection of information about people’s experience of crime from several thousand households in England and Wales; formerly known as the British Crime Survey  

CSEW  
Crime Survey for England and Wales  

cyber-crime  
offences committed by means of communications technology; these fall into one of two categories: new offences such as offences against computer systems and data, dealt with in the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (for example breaking into computer systems to steal data); and old offences committed using new technology, where networked computers and other devices are used to facilitate the commission of an offence (for example, the transfer of illegal images)  

demand  
in the context of this report, the amount of service that the public and other organisations require of the police; the police carry out a wide range of interventions in response to this demand including preventing disorder in towns and city centres, protecting vulnerable people and property, responding to crises, stopping crime and anti-social behaviour as it happens, and apprehending and bringing offenders to justice  

diversity  
political and social policy of promoting fair treatment of people of different backgrounds or personal characteristics; the Equality Act 2010 specifies nine protected characteristics in this regard: gender, age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage or civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, and sex and sexual orientation  

economies of scale  
cost advantages that larger organisations or operations obtain by virtue of their size, because the cost per unit of output will decrease with increasing size as fixed costs are spread out over more units
East Midlands Special Operations Unit (EMSOU) is a regional entity, or unit, comprising police officers, staff and resources from across the five East Midlands police forces; the primary purpose of the unit is to disrupt the activities of organised crime groups operating in that area and to investigate the most serious crimes affecting the East Midlands region.

Expenditure is the payment of cash or cash equivalent in exchange for goods and services, including pay.

The finance department is part of an organisation that manages money, including the preparation and presentation of accounts and the provision of financial information to managers.

A finance director is a senior employee of a police force with responsibility for and functions in relation to its finances.

Flexible working pattern is a way of working which is designed and operated in a way which suits the needs of the worker in question, for example, being able to work specified hours of the day or work from home.

FOI stands for freedom of information.

Forensic evidence is evidence obtained by the application of scientific methods (for example, DNA evidence).

A freedom of information request is a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

A front counter is a front office in a police building which is open to the general public, where people can have face-to-face contact with police officers and police staff in that building for the purpose of giving information to the police or receiving attention or services from the police.

Front line refers to those members of police forces who are in everyday contact with the public and who directly intervene to keep people safe and enforce the law.
FTE

full time equivalent

unit that indicates the workload of a worker in a way which enables comparisons to be made between the workloads of workers engaged in the same and different functions; for example, a full time equivalent (or FTE) of 1.0 means that the person is equivalent to a full-time worker, whereas an FTE of 0.5 indicates that the worker is part-time (working half the time of a full-time worker in this case)

functional model

approach to policing in which policing services, for example response policing, are provided across the whole force area, without regard to internal geographical boundaries

funding gap

amount of money a police force needs to save to ensure its planned expenditure matches its forecast income

geographical policing

approach to policing in which policing services are provided across a particular geographical area

GRE

gross revenue expenditure

total expenditure for the force (see also net revenue expenditure)

he/him/his/she/her

the use of the masculine gender includes the feminine, and vice versa, unless the context otherwise requires

HR

human resources

department responsible for the people in the organisation; its principal functions include: recruitment and hiring of new workers; their training and continuous professional development; and their benefits and performance

ill-health retirement

early retirement of a police officer on the ground that the police officer in question is permanently disabled in relation to the performance of his duty
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>inflation</td>
<td>progressive increase in the general level of prices bought about by an increase in the amount of money in circulation or demand rising faster than supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intelligence department</td>
<td>to provide support to police officers and police staff in relation to the prevention and investigation of crime; the information in question includes information in relation to the people who are committing crimes and information about premises and vehicles linked to crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrated offender management</td>
<td>approach adopted by different public sector organisations (including local authorities, the police and the probation service) working together to manage persistent offenders who commit high levels of crime or cause damage and nuisance to communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interoperability</td>
<td>ability of one police force’s systems and procedures to work with those of another force or forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>integrated offender management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lean process improvement</td>
<td>approach used to enhance existing business performance by improving systems and eliminating waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local policing team</td>
<td>team of police officers, PCSOs and police staff working in neighbourhoods to keep local communities safe; the teams often comprise neighbourhood policing teams and response teams, and sometimes investigation teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>locally-raised funding</td>
<td>funding raised through council tax as opposed to central funding received from the Home Office in the form of an annual grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASH</td>
<td>multi-agency safeguarding hub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>multi-agency safeguarding hub</td>
<td>entity in which public sector organisations with common or aligned responsibilities in relation to the safety of vulnerable people work; the hubs comprise staff from organisations such as the police and local authority social services; they work alongside one another, sharing information and co-ordinating activities to help protect the most vulnerable children and adults from harm, neglect and abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Decision Model</td>
<td>risk assessment framework, or decision making process, adopted as a single national decision model for police in authorised professional practice, which has six elements to help police officers and staff make sound policing decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national policing requirement</td>
<td>police forces’ capacity and contribution, capability, consistency and connectivity required to counter the threats specified in the Strategic Policing Requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natural wastage</td>
<td>reduction in the number of workers of a police force occurring when workers leave their jobs and are not replaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neighbourhood policing</td>
<td>activities carried out by neighbourhood teams primarily focused on a community or a particular neighbourhood area, also known as community policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neighbourhood policing team</td>
<td>team of police officers and PCSOs who predominantly patrol and are assigned to police a particular local community; teams often comprise specialist officers and staff with expertise in crime prevention, community safety, licensing, restorative justice and schools liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net revenue expenditure</td>
<td>total expenditure of an organisation minus earned income; earned income includes income from other public sector organisations, sales, fees, charges and rents, special police services, reimbursements and interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>non-pay budgets</td>
<td>financial provision for expenditure on capital assets and the acquisition of goods and services required by a police force other than labour, including expenditure on premises, vehicles, transport, consultancy and information and communications technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-pay savings</td>
<td>amount of savings that come from non-pay budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRE</td>
<td>net revenue expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office for National Statistics</td>
<td>the UK’s largest independent producer of official statistics and the recognised national statistical institute for the UK; it is the executive body of the UK Statistics Authority, established by the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on-line reporting</td>
<td>system for the reporting to the police of non-urgent crimes or incidents by means of the internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONS</td>
<td>Office for National Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operational support</td>
<td>functions or departments in a police force which support police officers and staff in frontline roles, such as intelligence departments which provide assistance for investigations and scientific support which assist in relation to forensic evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operating model</td>
<td>the way in which a police force is organised in terms of its structure and the processes it has adopted and operates in order to achieve its objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operational resilience</td>
<td>capacity of a police force to withstand increases in demand or to be able to respond effectively to increasingly complex demands for services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outsourcing</td>
<td>contracting out to a third party of a business process, for example the management of facilities or the provision of services concerned with human resources or finance</td>
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<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>overheads</td>
<td>expenses that are necessary for the continued operation of the business, but cannot be associated directly with the individual products or services being offered, for example, rent, electricity and telephone bills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overtime</td>
<td>payment for work which is additional to the normal working hours of a police officer or police staff member; in the case of police officers, the rates and conditions vary according to the amount of notice which is given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partner agencies</td>
<td>public sector entities, such as those concerned with health, education, social services and the management of offenders, which from time to time work with the police to attain their common or complementary objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership</td>
<td>co-operative arrangement between two or more organisations, from any sector, who share responsibility and undertake to use their respective powers and resources to try to achieve a specified common objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pay freeze</td>
<td>management instrument by which the organisation in question does not increase workers’ pay for a period of time</td>
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<tr>
<td>pay savings</td>
<td>amounts of money saved in police officer and staff salaries when roles are abolished or when levels of pay are reduced</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>police and crime commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCSO</td>
<td>police community support officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDR</td>
<td>Performance and Development Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance and Development Review</td>
<td>assessment of an individual’s work performance by his line manager, usually an officer or police staff manager of the immediately superior rank or grade</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEEL assessment</td>
<td>HMIC’s police efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy (PEEL) assessment; a new annual programme of all-force inspections that will report on how well each force in England and Wales provides value for money (efficiency), cuts crime (effectiveness), and provides a service that is legitimate in the eyes of the public (legitimacy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFI</td>
<td>Private Finance Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>place of safety</td>
<td>residential accommodation provided by a local social services authority under Part III of the National Assistance Act 1948; a hospital as defined by [the Mental Health Act]; a police station; an independent hospital or care home for mentally disordered persons; or any other suitable place the occupier of which is willing temporarily to receive the patient (defined in section 135(6) of the Mental Health Act 1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>police and crime plan</td>
<td>plan prepared by the police and crime commissioner which sets out his police and crime objectives, the policing which the police force is to provide, the financial and other resources which the police and crime commissioner will provide to the chief constable, the means by which the chief constable will report to the police and crime commissioner on the provision of policing, the means by which the chief constable’s performance will be measured, and the crime and disorder reduction grants which the police and crime commissioner is to make, and the conditions to which such grants are to be made; the police and crime commissioner’s police and crime objectives are his objectives for the policing of the area, the reduction in crime and disorder in the area, and the discharge by the police force of its national or international functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>police authority</td>
<td>statutory predecessor of the police and crime commissioner; abolished by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 with effect from the commencement of the powers of police and crime commissioners in November 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>police and crime commissioner</td>
<td>elected entity for a police area, established under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, responsible for securing the maintenance of the police force for that area and securing that the police force is efficient and effective; holds the relevant chief constable to account for the policing of the area; establishes the budget and police and crime plan for the police force; appoints and may, after due process, remove the chief constable from office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>police community support officer</td>
<td>uniformed non-warranted officer employed by a territorial police force or the British Transport Police in England; established by the Police Reform Act 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>police officer</td>
<td>individual with warranted powers of arrest, search and detention who, under the direction of his chief constable, is deployed to uphold the law, protect life and property, maintain and restore the Queen’s peace, and pursue and bring offenders to justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>police station</td>
<td>police building which is wholly or mainly for the use of police officers and staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>priority-based budgeting</td>
<td>financial technique that allocates an organisation’s resources in line with its priorities and enables the organisation to identify opportunities to reduce costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private finance initiative</td>
<td>technique of public sector procurement from the private sector in which the public sector procures goods or services from the private sector over a prescribed period (frequently 20 years or more) in a manner which leaves the risk of ownership and efficient operation of the project facilities with the private sector supplier; the technique is designed to achieve improved value for money through a focus on whole-life costing and increased risk transfer to the private sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>preventive policing</td>
<td>technique or practice in policing which is designed to prevent crime rather than react to crime after it has been committed</td>
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<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>private sector partnering</td>
<td>practice or process in which a central or local public sector body enters into and implements co-operative arrangements with a private sector body in relation to the provision of goods or services</td>
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<td>problem solving</td>
<td>process used in policing in which police forces systematically identify and analyse crime and disorder problems, develop specific responses to individual problems, and subsequently assess whether the responses have been successful</td>
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<tr>
<td>process re-engineering</td>
<td>business management process which focuses on the analysis and design of workflows and processes within an organisation (also known as business process re-engineering)</td>
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<tr>
<td>procurement</td>
<td>acquisition of goods or services from an external supplier</td>
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<td>productivity</td>
<td>ratio of outputs against inputs</td>
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<tr>
<td>protective services</td>
<td>services provided by police forces (often by several police forces working together) in the response to the most serious crimes, such as drug and people trafficking, kidnap, murder, extortion, counter terrorism and domestic extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reactive policing</td>
<td>policing practice whereby the police respond to calls for help</td>
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<tr>
<td>recruitment freeze</td>
<td>management instrument by which the organisation in question does not recruit new workers, and includes the practice of not replacing those who have left</td>
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<tr>
<td>recuperative duties</td>
<td>duties assigned to a police officer of a nature which place on him physical demands which are lower than those required for the full duties of a police officer, for the purpose of allowing him an opportunity to restore himself to full health</td>
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redundancy

legal state of affairs in which an employee is dismissed because his employer either no longer is engaged in the business in which the person in question was employed, no longer carries out that business in the place in which he is employed, or no longer needs him to carry out work of a particular kind.

referendum
democratic mechanism in which voters declare their preferences for or against a specified proposal.

Regional Intelligence Unit
regional policing unit that gathers intelligence from more than one police force area, producing a comprehensive intelligence picture across a region.

Regional Organised Crime Unit
regional policing unit that provides capacity and capability to investigate serious and organised crime in more than one police force area.

Regulation A19
regulation of the Police Pensions Regulations 1987 which permits a local policing body to retire officers if it considers their retention is not in the general interests of efficiency and provided they have the requisite period of service to attain a defined pension entitlement; generally, officers in respect of whom Regulation A19 can be used will have served 30 years and will be at least 48 years old.

legislation to ensure that covert investigatory powers are used in compliance with Article 8, European Convention on Human Rights (the right to respect for private and family life); the statute requires that authorisations are both necessary and proportionate to one of the legitimate aims permitted by Article 8(2), European Convention on Human Rights, which permits interference by a public authority with privacy.

reserves
monies set aside for specific future costs (e.g. estates) or generally held to meet unforeseen or emergency expenditure.
<table>
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<tr>
<td>response or patrol officer</td>
<td>police officers assigned to deal with emergency and priority calls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response time</td>
<td>time in which a 999 call should be attended; the National Call Handling Standards define a call for service and assist the call-handler in determining how a call is graded, and therefore the type of response required, and how quickly the call should be attended; responses are prioritised as: emergency; priority; scheduled; and no attendance, with forces setting their own target response times; typically, an emergency response will have an attendance time within 15 or 20 minutes, while a priority call must be attended within an hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restricted duties</td>
<td>duties assigned to a police officer of a nature which place on him physical demands which are lower than those required for the full duties of a police officer; the decision to place an officer on restricted duties is taken after an assessment of the officer’s condition by a medical practitioner or an occupational health professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revenue expenditure</td>
<td>amount of money spent by an organisation on general operating costs such as wages, rent, insurance, heating and maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIU</td>
<td>Regional Intelligence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>road shows</td>
<td>series of presentations led by the chief constable and chief officer group, where the workforce is consulted and informed about future plans and invited to contribute ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROCU</td>
<td>Regional Organised Crime Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>safer schools partnerships</td>
<td>co-operative arrangement between a school or group of schools and the police to work together to keep young people safe, reduce crime and the fear of crime and improve behaviour in schools and their communities; this usually involves a police officer or police community support officer working in a school or a number of schools on a full-time or part-time basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scientific support</td>
<td>expertise and technical support functions including crime scene investigators; the management of serious crime scenes; the fingerprint bureau; and photography and mapping units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondment</td>
<td>temporary transfer of an employee from one role or occupation to another; this is often done to meet a short-term need for fewer or more workers, to improve the skills or experience of the seconded worker, or to enable the seconded worker to improve the skills or experience of other workers at the place of the secondment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shared access point</td>
<td>location where police services are provided at a non-police location (for example, in a local authority building or a supermarket)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shared services</td>
<td>services provided by a division or department of an organisation to more than one other part of that organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shift pattern</td>
<td>rota of working hours designed to ensure that police resources meet demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>special constable</td>
<td>part-time volunteer unpaid police officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spending review</td>
<td>government process carried out by HM Treasury to set firm expenditure limits and, through public service agreements, establish the principal improvements that the public can expect from these resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
spending round process operated by HM Treasury in which resources are allocated to government departments for the period of one year; it is then for departments to decide how best to manage and distribute this spending within their areas of responsibility

SPR Strategic Policing Requirement

staff association association of employees or police officers that performs some of the functions of a trade union, such as representing its members in negotiations or other dealings with management on matters of pay, conditions of service or discipline, and that may have other social and professional purposes

stakeholder person, group or organisation who is or may be affected by a force’s actions or who has an influence on a force’s actions

strategic alliance arrangement where two or more organisations co-operate to produce goods or provide services, both contributing resources

Strategic Policing Requirement document issued by the Home Secretary under section 37A of the Police Act 1996 which sets out what, in her view, are national threats, and the appropriate national policing capabilities to counter those national threats; national threats are threats (actual or prospective) which are threats to national security, public safety, public order or public confidence of such gravity as to be of national importance, or threats which can be countered effectively or efficiently only by national policing capabilities; the national threats currently specified are terrorism, organised crime, public disorder, civil emergencies and large-scale cyber incidents

transformation fundamental change in how a business is conducted to take it to a substantially different level of efficiency or effectiveness
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>under spend</td>
<td>spending less than budgeted for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>value for money</td>
<td>the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of a given activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>value for money profiles</td>
<td>data sets relating to the cost, performance and activity of police forces; the profiles show how forces are spending money, the services they provide and how the associated costs and performance levels compare with other forces and over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>victim-based crime</td>
<td>police-recorded crime in respect of which there is a victim; the victim could be an individual, an organisation or a corporate body; this category includes violent crimes directed at a particular individual or individuals, sexual offences, robbery, theft offences (including burglary and vehicle offences), criminal damage and arson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>victim satisfaction</td>
<td>measurement of how content a victim is with the contact he has had with the police and the action the police have taken; this includes victims of burglary, vehicle crime and violent crime; the figures concerning victim satisfaction specify the percentage of victims who are satisfied with the service provided by the police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vulnerable</td>
<td>condition of a person who is in need of special care, support or protection because of age, disability or risk of abuse or neglect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Winsor reforms

reforms to the pay and conditions of service of police officers and police staff recommended in the Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions (Parts 1 and 2), Thomas P Winsor, HMSO, London, March 2011 and March 2012, Cmd 8024 and 8325; the reforms referred to are the recommended reforms which have been implemented; it should be noted that some reforms have been or are to be implemented in ways modified by agreement in the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales or the Police Negotiating Board, or after determination by the Police Arbitration Tribunal; the report containing the recommendations was commissioned by the Home Secretary in October 2010; some recommended reforms (such as those concerned with compulsory redundancy of police officers) have not been implemented; some reforms have required legislation, but most have been implemented by secondary legislation or by determination of the Home Secretary.

workforce

in relation to an organisation, the people who are employed by that organisation; in the case of the police, it includes police officers, even though they are holders of the office of constable and therefore not employees of their police forces; it also includes police community support officers and police staff.

workforce strategy

overall approach by the management of an organisation to maximising the performance of its workforce.

3G (third generation)

third generation of technology for mobile telecommunications.
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Summary
In the October 2010 spending review, the Government announced that central funding to the police service in England and Wales would be reduced in real terms by 20 percent in the four years from March 2011 to March 2015.\(^1\)

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary’s (HMIC’s) Valuing the Police Programme has tracked how forces have planned to make savings to meet this budget requirement. We published findings on this in July 2011, June 2012 and July 2013.\(^2\)

This report, in the final year of the spending review, concerns how forces have managed the considerable challenges to make savings so far. In order to consider this, we asked three questions:

- To what extent is the force taking the necessary steps to ensure a secure financial position for the short and long term?
- To what extent has the force an affordable way of providing policing?
- To what extent is the force efficient?

To answer these questions, HMIC collected data and savings plans from the 43 Home Office-funded forces in England and Wales; surveyed the public to find out whether they had noticed changes to the service they receive from the police as a result of the cuts; and conducted in-force inspections in all 43 forces. We interviewed chief constables, police and crime commissioners and the chief officers responsible for finance, organisational change, human resources and performance in each force, and held focus groups with other officers and police staff. The full inspection methodology is attached at Annex A.

HMIC has made a judgment as to the extent to which each force provides value for money in the context of current spending constraints. We have rated each force in one of the following categories:

- outstanding;
- good;
- requires improvement; or
- inadequate.

This report continues the work of previous Valuing the Police inspections. As the spending review period draws to a close, it highlights a number of difficulties and risks that police forces, like many organisations in the public sector, are likely to face as the era of austerity extends beyond the 2015/16 spending review period.

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This report is the last in our Valuing the Police Programme. HMIC is now moving towards new all-force annual inspections, called the PEEL (police efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy) assessments\(^3\). We will continue to consider the extent to which police forces provide value for money, but will do so in future in the context of an overall inspection of police efficiency and effectiveness.

**Main findings**

- **HMIC finds it impressive that police forces in England and Wales have risen to the challenge of austerity.** In the last four years, they have balanced their books and found almost £2.53bn worth of savings. In doing so, they have protected their front line crime-fighting capacity as best they can; reorganised themselves to be more efficient; and continued to provide an effective service to the public. Considerable credit must be given to leaders in the service who have managed this immense organisational change, as well as to police officers, police staff and PCSOs who continue to work hard to provide a reliable and valued service to the public.

- **HMIC has judged some forces as having an outstanding response to the spending review (Avon and Somerset, Norfolk, Lancashire, Staffordshire and West Midlands). The vast majority (35 forces) have been judged as having a good response.** Despite these positive findings, there are, however, a small number of forces that require improvement (Bedfordshire, Gwent and Nottinghamshire) in their response to the spending review. There continues to be more that forces can do to learn from each other.

- **The response to the funding challenge has not been without adverse effects on some important areas of policing.** HMIC has growing concerns, in particular, that neighbourhood policing risks being eroded in some places. The police workforce plans reduce by over 34,000 people by March 2015; this means that over the spending review period, three posts in every 20 would have been removed. Forces are restructuring and reconfiguring how they carry out their work in order to protect but not preserve the front line. However, reductions of this magnitude have an adverse effect on the amount of work that can be done to prevent crime and protect the public.

- **Collaboration between forces, public and private sector organisations remains patchy, fragmented, overly complex and too slow.** Since 2013 there has been a slight increase in the amount of savings that forces plan to achieve by working collaboratively. With some notable exceptions, the pace, breadth and depth of collaboration remains disappointing. A less fragmented, more structured approach to effective working between forces or between forces and other organisations is required. In particular, there is now a pressing need for greater clarity as to which policing services are best provided by forces at the local, regional or national level.

- **Changes are required if forces are to be supported in achieving further substantial cost reductions in the future.** There is no immediate end in sight to the era of austerity. Some forces are planning, sensibly, on the assumption that they will be

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required to save at least the same amount again in the next spending review period\textsuperscript{4}. As budgets continue to be constrained severely, it is inevitable that opportunities for further savings and efficiencies will be fewer, and achieving them will be more difficult. There is scope for further substantial savings to be achieved by the vast majority of forces. But consideration must now be given to how funding will be allocated in the future and how that funding supports more efficient arrangements for local, regional and national policing services. Continuing to administer substantial cost reductions in the next spending round in the same way as this one is likely to place the viability of some forces in jeopardy within the next three to five years.

\textbf{Now is the time for a considered and open debate about how policing is best funded and organised in the future.}

\section*{Rising to the financial challenge}

Police forces in England and Wales continue to balance their books and attempt to minimise the effect of cost reductions on the services that the public receives. Forces told us that over the four years of the current spending review (2011/12 – 2014/15) they need to save £2.53bn and that they have developed savings plans to achieve 96 percent of this savings figure. The outstanding gap will be met by deploying £107m of reserves.

Forces have worked hard to prioritise savings in goods and services (such as supplies, uniforms, estate and vehicles) while seeking to protect officer and police staff posts. Twenty-nine percent of planned savings over the spending review period come from these non-pay costs, although they make up approximately 20 percent of the overall policing cost base.

\section*{Reducing workforce}

Despite the appreciable savings in goods and services, the scale of funding reductions means that forces have reduced the size of their workforces considerably so far, and further reductions are anticipated during the remainder of this financial year. By March 2015, the total police workforce (officers, staff and PCSOs) plan to reduce by 34,400 since March 2010\textsuperscript{5}. There are planned to be 16,300 fewer police officers than in 2010. These plans estimate that by March 2015 there will be 127,500 police officers in England and Wales – below the number of police officers more than a decade ago. The forces’ workforce plans – the level of staff reductions they need to balance the budgets – are broadly in line with last year’s projections. This shows that the plans are stable and generally sound. Some fluctuations are understandable as plans have developed and as the scale of the savings required has increased.

Since our 2013 report, HMIC has, however, found a considerable change in the planned reduction in police community support officers (PCSOs). Whereas last year forces told

\textsuperscript{4} The scale of the future cuts and how they will be distributed across the public services has yet to be determined. HMIC is not pre-empting future Spending Review settlements, but recognising prudent planning by most forces.

\textsuperscript{5} HMIC measures workforce reductions from March 2010 as this is the year when the majority of forces began to reduce their numbers in anticipation of the spending review announcement.
us that they planned to reduce PCSOs by 17 percent between March 2010 and March 2015, the planned reduction over the same period is now 22 percent. This means that an additional 700 PCSO posts will be lost beyond the 2,900 previously anticipated. While we understand that all forces are making difficult choices as to where the cuts should fall, this accelerated reduction in PCSO posts adds to HMIC’s growing concern that neighbourhood policing is being eroded. The already thin blue line in our communities is narrowing still further.

It is important that over the spending review period, forces continue to communicate and work with their workforces as the changes take place. Evidence shows that substantial change is more likely to be implemented successfully where the workforce is properly involved and consulted throughout.6

A number of other problems flow from the substantial reductions in the workforce. Most significant of these is the limited scope that policing leaders have to be able to shape their workforce in order to meet the 21st century challenges that the service faces. The skills and capabilities of the police workforce require immediate attention. New and emerging threats (such as cyber-crime), together with modern ways of working (such an increased emphasis on working with other public sector organisations), require officers to have a different range of skills and abilities, for example, effective negotiating and influencing skills.

The profile of the police workforce in terms of rank mix and diversity (such as gender and black and minority representation) has remained largely unchanged over the period of the spending review. Many forces have had limited opportunities to recruit new staff. Some have made a concerted effort to increase the number of black and minority ethnic police officers, but this is hampered by the recruitment freeze in many places. With the current tools chief officers have to recruit and release people, police forces will not be able to become representative of the communities they serve or to keep pace with a changing society for years, possibly decades. The future prospects for recruitment, promotion and progression based on the current workforce plans are extremely limited. Many forces told us of the concerns they have about a static and ageing workforce. HMIC shares these concerns.

Protecting the front line and neighbourhood policing

As we reported last year, police forces are working hard to protect the front line from the effects of the cuts over this spending review period. Despite this, between March 2010 and March 2015, the total number of people (officers, staff and PCSOs) working on the front line is planned to reduce by approximately 14,900 (a decrease of eight percent) and the number of officers on the front line is planned to reduce by approximately 8,500 (a decrease of seven percent). However, the proportion of officers and staff on the front line will increase as deeper cuts are made elsewhere. Thus, by March 2015 the proportion of the workforce (officers, staff and PCSOs) on the front line is planned to increase from 74 percent to 78 percent and the proportion of police officers on the front line is planned to increase from 89 percent to 92 percent.

Many forces have made material changes in how they are structured and organised in an

effort to achieve the necessary reductions in workforce while seeking to protect their crime-fighting capacity on the front line. In last year’s report we described, in some detail, the steps that forces have taken to reshape and remodel their organisations. Also, we raised our concerns about the potential erosion of neighbourhood policing, the cornerstone of British policing. We have seen further evidence of this erosion in this year’s inspection; as a result, our concern in this area is growing. Although forces have worked hard to protect neighbourhood policing, we have seen the workload and remit of neighbourhood teams broadening still further and higher than anticipated reductions of PCSO numbers.

The leaders of the police service recognise the value of neighbourhood policing. But in the face of continuing cuts now and in the next spending review period, many have told us that their police service could become increasingly reactive (with a focus on responding to 999 calls and investigating crime) rather than preventing and reducing crime.

Forces’ ability to prevent crime and reduce demand will be seriously undermined if their neighbourhood teams are materially eroded. The service must guard against a vicious circle emerging which involves less preventive activity, more reactive policing responses and spiralling demand. It is extremely important that action is taken now to prevent this from happening.

Maximising efficiency: potential for further gains

Forces’ approaches to securing better value for money have evolved and matured over the four years of the spending review. Early on in the spending review period, the focus for forces was on balancing budgets, freezing recruitment, buying cheaper or fewer goods and services, tightening up on discretionary spend and requiring the same cost reductions across all budgets (regardless of the importance of the specific area of policing). A considerable proportion of forces are only now starting to consider how to improve the productivity of their officers by identifying and analysing demands on their time. This should enable forces to manage better and meet the demand for policing services. HMIC’s forthcoming report on making better use of police time will consider some of these issues in more depth.

Some forces have impressive plans aimed at considerably reducing demand on policing services and solving problems when officers and staff first come into contact with the public. The best examples are where forces are doing all or most of the following:

- working to intervene early, with partner organisations such as social services, health and education to prevent crimes being committed in the first place;
- targeting activity at a range of problems linked with offending and repeat offending;
- trying out innovative ways of responding to people with particular needs or vulnerability, for example mental health issues, who come to the attention of the police; and
- new evidence-based methods for predicting where crime is most likely to happen and putting in place a visible preventive presence in so-called crime ‘hot spots’.

Information technology has enormous potential to enable systems and processes to be automated; to provide officers with better information; and to support them in performing more tasks and activities while remaining visible to their communities. Last year we reported
that the standard of police IT was lamentably poor and was a source of considerable frustration to frontline officers. Our report included a recommendation to the Police IT Company to work urgently with forces and police and crime commissioners. Progress has been slow. The Police IT Company has yet to have an appreciable effect on improving the extent to which police IT provides value for money and improves the operational capability of the frontline officer.

The pockets of notable practice, where forces are reducing demand and increasing the productivity of their officers, are encouraging. But this approach is not being embraced systematically by all forces. This must change if forces are to be able to reduce costs further without diminishing the service that they provide to the public.

As well as the workforce, structural and organisational changes that we have seen, many forces are also changing their style of policing, with an enhanced focus on the quality of service that the public receives. To support this change, forces are reviewing how they measure and assess the success of their own performance in cutting crime and keeping people safe.

In 2010, the Home Secretary made it clear to police forces in England and Wales that their priority was to cut crime, not to chase performance targets. To this end, the Home Secretary removed central targets and performance standards. Since this announcement, forces have started to move away from a crude target-driven performance measurement culture where officers are held to account for short-term improvements in the recorded crime statistics. Our inspections have found that forces have replaced the prescriptive, target-focused approach with one that encourages police officers and staff to focus on prevention and on the quality of the service. Our inspection evidence suggests that, to be effective, such an approach requires at least the following things to be done:

- supervisors must ensure that officers and staff have a good understanding about their objectives and responsibilities on their shift or tour of duty;
- supervisors must continue to hold staff and officers to account for their actions;
- forces need good data, information and intelligence about their local area relating to a range of issues (for example, views from a range of victims on the service they have received), crime types, victims and known offenders.

If this approach is to succeed, there needs to be a fundamental shift in police behaviour, where the emphasis is on officers using their discretion and taking personal responsibility to help solve the crimes that harm communities.

If any of these components is absent, there is a risk that frontline officers will not understand the new approach to making sure that the public are well served. In some forces, despite police leaders signalling that the organisation must move away from the old ‘performance culture’, middle managers are simply continuing to work in the old ways which they understand and feel comfortable doing. This leads to confusion among frontline officers as to what is actually required of them, which is unhelpful to the public. Many forces are struggling with the new approach, and there would be considerable value in them learning from each other.

Collaboration with other organisations

Last year, HMIC described progress on collaboration⁸ as deeply disappointing. This year, we are seeing an improvement in the extent to which collaboration is supporting forces’ savings plans. Since last year, the level of planned savings that forces have identified through collaboration from 2010 until 2015 has increased from seven percent to 10 percent of the overall savings requirement.

However, one year on, there are still a number of forces who have not seized the opportunity to work with others to make themselves more efficient and to achieve economies of scale. Whilst there are now 22 forces which are expecting to achieve 10 percent or more of their savings through collaboration, there are still 21 forces for which this figure is 10 percent or less. Although there has been acceleration in collaborative activity following strong encouragement and exhortation by HMIC and the Home Office, the pace is still slow.

Last year, HMIC said that exhortation was not enough to promote collaboration. We asked all forces and police and crime commissioners to review their collaboration plans. We also expressed the view that the Home Office should review the incentives it provides to encourage collaboration. Since then, we have seen the strengthening and deepening of some collaborations, but we have seen others stall. The collaboration picture has become more complex and fragmented as forces and police and crime commissioners are encouraged to collaborate with a range of different partners: for example the Police Innovation Fund⁹ supported force-to-force collaboration; blue light collaboration (collaboration with the fire service) and working with other local services, such as local authorities.

Extensive collaboration is not materialising in the majority of forces, and only a few are achieving substantial savings. For example, only 10 forces plan to save 20 percent or more of their savings requirement by this means. Nor is collaboration leading to the development of the most effective regional and national policing capability. Over the last year, we have seen little evidence of new collaborative working that builds on and enhances the current regional and national arrangements, with a few notable exceptions.

There is an improved regional approach in some areas to managing serious and organised crime (and in some cases major crime). This has largely been achieved by additional funding, strong leadership by chief constables and relatively consistent policing practice associated with specialist areas of policing. But improved regional collaboration in these specialist areas is the exception rather than the norm. There needs to be a more systematic approach by government, police forces and police and crime commissioners to the organisation of policing at a regional and national level so the police service is placed in the

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⁸ HMIC defines collaboration as “all activity where two or more parties work together to achieve a common goal, which includes inter-force activity and collaboration with the public and private sectors, including outsourcing and business partnering.”

⁹ The Police Innovation Fund in 2014/15 is worth £50m and funded through a top slice in police main grant. It “provides police and crime commissioners with the opportunity to submit bids on initiatives that will promote collaboration, including with other forces, emergency services, criminal justice agencies and local government, and improve their use of digital working and technology in order to deliver sustainable improvements and efficiencies in the way their police force operates in future.” See: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-vote-office/December%202013/16%20December/16.%20HO%20-%20Police%20Funding.pdf
best possible position to meet future threats to the safety of our citizens and communities in the context of reducing budgets.

**Continuing austerity**

There is considerable variation in how police forces are funded and in the way in which the spending review reductions affect individual forces. In 2013/14, forces’ spend ranged from the equivalent of £99 for each person in one force area to £271 (excluding national functions) for each person in another. The extent of funding reductions varies considerably between forces: the required savings over the spending review period range from 10 percent to 28 percent of total force expenditure.\(^\text{10}\) Having planned to achieve £2.53bn savings over the four years of this spending review period, some forces are planning on the basis that they will have to find the same savings again over the next four years. This is a prudent decision and HMIC is concerned to find several instances where forces are not adopting this approach.

Forces vary considerably in size; the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and the City of London Police are at the extreme ends of the scale with the MPS having 39 times more police officers than the City of London Police. The second largest force, West Midlands Police, has nine times more officers than the second smallest force, Warwickshire. Different-sized forces face different challenges in making cost savings, for example:

- in larger forces, it may be more difficult to maintain a consistent service across the force in straitened economic times, and the changes required to manage the spending reductions may be more complex to achieve;
- in smaller forces, there are fewer officers to draw on to respond to unexpected events and a greater level of fixed overheads, and opportunities for economies of scale are more limited; and
- in larger forces and those with more collaborative working, there may be greater opportunities for career progression, and this may therefore attract a higher calibre of staff with specialist skills (whether that is in operational policing or organisational support such as procurement).

There are a number of small forces with a low cost base but with a large geographic spread or high levels of public demand for policing services, for example high overall crime levels or particular problems with serious and organised crime.

Based on our assessment over the last three years, it is unlikely that collaboration alone will provide the means by which the savings likely to be required over the next spending review period will be achieved. Limited options to make savings will inevitably drive some forces to make deeper cuts into neighbourhood policing, and they may struggle to respond to unexpected events (for example, public order problems such as rioting or demonstrations or major crime such as multiple murders or kidnaps).

Forces have calculated that they will need to save a further £656m in the coming financial year of 2015/16. If this pattern of savings continues into the next spending review period

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\(^{10}\) These savings are “real” savings in as much as they include other inflationary pressures the force has to manage such as increases in pay.
(starting in 2016/17), if reductions continue to be applied to forces in the same way and if efficiencies in the national policing model fail to materialise, then HMIC has substantial concerns about the ability of some smaller forces to withstand the anticipated budget reductions while maintaining an effective service to the public in three to five years’ time.

The time is now right for an open and constructive debate across policing so that the fundamental aspects of how policing is organised and resourced in the future can be examined. Experts from across the police service should have the opportunity to contribute their views on and to develop a range of options for:

- how, and the extent to which and the respects in which, police forces should operate with one another, including on a local, regional and national basis and the extent to which policing functions should be performed locally, regionally or nationally;
- how, and the extent to which and the respects in which, public services, of which policing is one, should co-operate;
- the ways in which police forces receive funding (both locally and nationally), having particular regard to the facilitation of the achievement of the objectives of police and crime plans, the freedoms and flexibilities in this respect available to police and crime commissioners, and possible reforms to the policing allocation formula; and
- the nature and extent of available financial and other incentives for improved efficiency and effectiveness in policing.

This debate should take place quickly. If it does, and if this leads to a longer-term blueprint for the police service which supports, more effectively, individual forces in meeting the demands of continuing austerity, then the public will be better served and better protected.
Recommendations
Improving savings plans

Recommendation 1

Not later than 30 September 2014, each of the three forces with an overall assessment of ‘requires improvement’ should:

(a) carry out an urgent review of its savings plan; and

(b) provide to its police and crime commissioner and HMIC a comprehensive and detailed plan which specifies the sufficient steps it will take to remedy the failures and other shortcomings which have led to the assessment in question.

Those steps may include, but should not be limited to:

(i) a comprehensive assessment and understanding of current demand;

(ii) developing and implementing an affordable organisational model (often referred to as the force’s operating model); and

(iii) assuring themselves that the model for policing can respond to the assessed demand that the force faces.

Note: Upon receipt of the action plan, HMIC will assess it and conduct a re-inspection of the force to determine progress. The re-inspection will be completed by 1 November 2014. The findings of each re-inspection will be incorporated into HMIC’s PEEL assessment, which will be published in November 2014.

Recommendation 2

Not later than 30 September 2014, each of the three forces with an assessment of ‘requires improvement’ in respect of not more than one of the three principal areas of this inspection should:

(a) carry out a review of its plan in respect of the area in question; and

(b) provide to its police and crime commissioner and HMIC a comprehensive and detailed plan which specifies the sufficient steps it will take to remedy the failures and other shortcomings which have led to the assessment in question.

Those steps may include, but should not be limited to:

(i) developing detailed plans for achieving savings for the next financial year that can be implemented within the required timescale; and

(ii) developing options for savings beyond this spending review with an understanding of how these may affect the service they provide to the public.

Note: Upon receipt of the action plan, HMIC will assess it and incorporate its findings into HMIC’s PEEL assessment, which will be published in November 2014.
Recommendation 3

Not later than 30 September 2014, the Chief Constable of each force that has a savings plan which fails to assume that the level of year-on-year funding restrictions from 2015/16 will continue at the same rate as those in the current spending review period should:

(a) review the force’s savings plans in that respect;

(b) consult his or her police and crime commissioner and HMIC on the amendments which he or she considers are necessary to remedy that failure; and

(c) after taking into consideration such representations as may be made in that respect by the police and crime commissioner and HMIC, amend the plans so as to ensure that the failure in question is remedied.

Improving savings from collaboration with other organisations

Recommendation 4

Not later than 15 October 2014, each of the 20 forces which plan to achieve less than 10 percent of their savings in the current spending review period from collaboration should:

(a) review its plans for increasing savings from collaboration with other organisations (in the public, private and voluntary sectors) in 2015/16 and 2016/17;

(b) consult its police and crime commissioner and HMIC on the amendments to which it considers are necessary or expedient to improve the level of savings from collaboration to the greatest extent reasonably practicable; and

(c) after taking into consideration such representations as may be made in that respect by the police and crime commissioner and HMIC, provide its police and crime commissioners and HMIC with amended collaboration plans that specify, in detail, the steps it will take in those financial years to improve its level of savings from collaboration to the greatest extent reasonably practicable.

Note: HMIC will incorporate its findings in relation to the amended savings plans into HMIC’s PEEL assessment, which will be published in November 2014.
Developing a longer-term approach – a national blueprint for policing

In the light of the achievements of the police service in reducing costs in the current spending review period, and the likelihood that savings to substantially the same extent will be required in the next spending review period, there should be a constructive debate in relation to how policing should be reformed so as, to the greatest extent reasonably practicable, efficiently and effectively serve the public in respect of the prevention of crime and anti-social behaviour, the maintenance and restoration of order and the apprehension and successful prosecution of offenders.

The debate should consider all relevant factors, including:

(a) how, and the extent to which and the respects in which, police forces should operate with one another, including on a local, regional and national basis;

(b) the extent to which policing functions should be performed locally, regionally or nationally;

(c) how, and the extent to which and the respects in which, public services, of which policing is one, should co-operate, including on a local, regional and national basis;

(d) the ways in which police forces receive funding (both locally and nationally), having particular regard to the facilitation of the achievement of the objectives of police and crime plans, the freedoms in this respect available to police and crime commissioners, and possible reforms to the policing allocation formula; and

(e) the nature and extent of available financial and other incentives for improved efficiency and effectiveness in policing.

The debate should be convened by HMIC. In this respect, a group should be established so as to include the College of Policing, police and crime commissioners, chief constables, bodies representative of police officers and police staff, national and local government, experts in the financing of policing and academics and organisations in fields relevant to crime prevention and the criminal justice system.

It should lead to the production of a range of options for a national blueprint for policing in austerity.

The group’s report should be published on Thursday 4 June 2015.
Introduction
The efficiency and effectiveness of the police depend on forces having the resources they need to prevent crime, catch criminals and keep communities safe. When the 20 percent reduction to the central Government funding grant was announced in October 2010, HMIC committed to inspecting the forces’ responses, and the effect this is having on the service they provide to the public, as part of our remit of inspecting the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces in England and Wales.

This report contains the findings of the fourth year of valuing the police inspections, with data collected and forces inspected between March 2014 and June 2014.

The inspection was designed to answer three principal questions and to make judgments against each of these questions:

- **To what extent is the force taking the necessary steps to ensure a secure financial position for the short and long term?** Are there savings plans in place to reduce costs in line with budget reductions, and are they realistic? To what extent has the force considered what the future savings requirement may be and how best to achieve this?

- **To what extent has the force an affordable way of providing policing?** What are the planned police officer, PCSO and police staff reductions and what effect has this had on the forces’ workforces and how is this effect being managed? How has the force restructured to protect frontline services? To what extent is the force using collaboration and partnership working to achieve savings?

- **To what extent is the force efficient?** To what extent has the force maximised its efficiency by understanding, managing and meeting its demand? How does technology support police officers to be more productive? What level of service is being provided to the public and how does the force measure this?

The judgment criteria for all three of these questions can be found on HMIC’s website ([www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk)). All forces have been given a graded judgment against each of the three principal questions and an overall judgment on how well the force has responded to the spending review and provides value for money. Further detail of individual force performance can be found at Chapter 7 and individual scores for each force can be found at Annex B.
Chapter 1: The financial challenge for forces
The scale of the challenge

Police forces in England and Wales have been required to find substantial savings every year since the spending review announcement in 2010. Police forces told us they must save an estimated £2.53bn between 2010/11 and 2014/15. Forces have plans in place to save £2.42bn of this amount. This savings requirement has risen steadily each year since HMIC carried out its first annual value for money inspections. In 2011, police forces estimated that they needed to save a total of £2.11bn between March 2011 and March 2015. By 2013, this had increased to £2.42bn over the same period.

This increase has been caused by further adjustments made to central government grants and the restrictions introduced on an annual basis on how much forces can raise through the council tax precept without triggering a referendum.

Figure 1: Changes in total estimated savings requirement (based on estimates provided by force in March 2014), for March 2011, March 2012, March 2013, March 2014 and March 2015

Forces have relative certainty as to the level of savings that they will need to find in 2015/16. Based on the data that forces have returned to HMIC, forces are estimating that the national savings requirement in 2015/16 is approximately £656m - just over a quarter of the amount that forces have had to find in the current spending review period. Although funding beyond 2015/16 will be the subject of a future spending review process, the Chancellor was clear at Budget 2014 that austerity would continue into the next Parliament. Therefore it would be

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14 Annex C sets out a summary of police funding and police financial planning.
prudent for forces to assume that they will have to make annual savings of at least this value over the next four years.

**Required savings**

The savings requirement for individual forces (as a percentage of 2010/11 gross revenue expenditure) varies considerably. For one force at the lower end of the savings requirement, it amounts to 10 percent of its 2010/11 gross revenue expenditure (GRE), and for a force at the top end, it amounts to 28 percent.

**Figure 2: Estimated savings requirement as a proportion of 2010/11 gross revenue expenditure (GRE) by force**

There are several factors that contribute to this variation, but the principal factor is the extent to which forces are reliant on central government grant as opposed to the level of council tax precept income that they can raise (see Annex C: Police funding in England and Wales for a fuller explanation of these terms). Forces that rely heavily on central government funding have to make proportionately greater savings over the spending review period.

Over the spending review period through to March 2016 there will be a small but subtle shift between the balance of central government funding and the amount of funding raised through local taxation. In 2010/11, on average, 70 percent of forces’ funding was from central government – remaining the same in 2013/14. It is forecast to be 78 percent in 2014/15 and 76 percent 2015/16. This overall shift in funding is important as it affects the level of savings that forces have to make.

Forces that rely on funding from other public sector organisations – for example, local councils which fund PCSO posts – may need to make more savings should these organisations decide to withdraw their funding. Like the police, other local organisations are subject to their own funding pressures and many have considered withdrawal of all or part of this funding to support their own savings plans.
We have also seen an increase in the range of savings requirements applicable to the 43 forces. In 2011, the savings requirement for the four years of the spending review ranged from eight percent to 23 percent of GRE with an England and Wales average figure of 17 percent. This year, it ranges from 10 percent to 28 percent of GRE, with an England and Wales average of 18 percent. This widening variation is in line with and linked to the increased variation in the extent to which forces rely on the government grant. In 2010/11, the funding mix ranged from 52 percent government grant in one force to 85 percent government grant in another (a difference of 33 percentage points). For 2014/15, the funding mix ranged from 46 percent government grant in one force to 85 percent in another (a difference of 39 percentage points). Figure 3 below shows the variation in 2014/15 for reliance on the government grant.

Figure 3: Reliance on central government funding by force (% 2014/15)

Force savings plans

HMIC is confident that the savings plans developed by forces are realistic and achievable. This finding is based on:

- HMIC’s analysis of the quality and soundness of the plans for existing savings and the financial assumptions that underpin this finding; our analysis is discussed in more detail below;
- the track record forces have in under-spending against agreed budgets which goes beyond the savings that have been needed; and
- the approaches forces are taking to manage budgets and control expenditure.

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15 Cleveland was unable to provide data for this graph, see Annex A for more information.
However, just as every force has to find a different amount of savings, they also have different scopes and options for making these savings. This chapter explores some of this variation in more detail.

**Income: central grant**

The police were given a four-year settlement in October 2010 which equated to a 20 percent reduction in the central government funding over the spending review period. However, due to adjustments such as the Community Safety Fund being treated in the same way as Police Main Grant (rather than being ring-fenced) and additional top slices being taken (such as the Police Innovation Fund), the savings requirement for the police has grown. The level of central government funding for policing for 2014/15 was reduced by 5.75 percent in real terms from the 2013/14 baseline. This was a greater reduction than first announced in the 2010 spending review and placed additional pressure on forces to make increased savings.

**Income: council tax precept**

Force areas raise extra money to pay for policing through the council tax precept. This is called the police precept and is included in every council tax bill. The level of police precept is set locally every year. Before November 2012, this was a decision made by the police authority. Setting the precept is now the responsibility of the police and crime commissioner. In England there are constraints on how much can be raised through the precept without triggering a referendum. In 2014/15 an increase of two percent or above the previous year’s precept amount would have triggered a local referendum to approve this increase. (This does not apply in Wales where council tax is a matter for the Welsh Government.) HMIC’s data establish that over the period of the spending review and into 2015/16, the average level of precept raised has decreased or is planned to decrease.

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17 Under provisions in the Localism Act 2011, local authorities, fire authorities, and police and crime commissioners in England are required to determine whether the amount of council tax they plan to raise is excessive. This is done using a set of principles defined by the Secretary of State, and approved by the House of Commons. For the 2014/15 financial year, the principles stated that billing authorities could not raise their council tax by more than 2 percent without holding a referendum. Capping in Wales is dealt separately by the Welsh Government.
At the start of the spending review in 2010, the government announced that although there would be a 20 percent reduction in central government grant in real terms, this would equate to a 14 percent reduction in real terms (if police authorities chose to increase the council tax precept at three percent). This was the level that was forecast by the Office of Budget Responsibility which was created to provide an independent and authoritative view of the UK’s finances. Throughout the spending review, the precept increase has remained below two percent (England and Wales average).

Police and crime commissioners in England have been offered a council tax freeze grant from central government each year from 2011/12 to 2014/15. This means that if they do not increase the tax burden on their communities through raising the precept, they receive a separate grant which has varied in value (and has not always then been included in the base budget for the next year). In 2014/15 this was equivalent to a one percent increase in the precept level. Where the police authority and subsequently the police and crime commissioner has chosen to accept the council tax freeze grant over a period of successive years, there is a need for prudence in considering the effect of the potential removal of these grants in the future. There is potential for a significant gap in the revenue base of the force which needs carefully to be factored into any future plans.

Expenditure: inflation

In 2012/13, some forces made higher-than-average financial assumptions about the rise in inflation. This is for a variety of reasons: some forces remain prudent about these assumptions so as to avoid an unexpected financial gap opening up later in the year as a result of overly optimistic assumptions; other forces have specific inflation levels factored into their contracts. For example, a cleaning contract may include a specified increase each year to reflect increasing staff costs.

Use of reserves

The limited use of reserves in the earlier years of this spending review period to fund change proposals was considered reasonable provided forces maintained prudent levels. Some forces have used their reserves skilfully, enabling them to smooth the path into longer-term cost reductions. Others have achieved higher levels of savings than necessary in a financial year, enabling them to increase their reserves and thus better to manage reductions in subsequent years. However, an overreliance on reserves in the final years of the spending review period may indicate that a force is operating beyond its means and at an unsustainable level (particularly given the scale of further cuts in the next spending round in 2015/16 and likely continuing reductions in the next spending review period).

Many forces intend to use small levels of reserves to bridge their funding gaps in 2014/15, and forces reported to us they plan to still have a total of £1.52bn of reserves in 2014/15. While some of this will be earmarked for specific projects, it is expected that forces will use additional reserves to fund the remainder of their funding gaps to achieve balanced budgets.

Track record in under-spending

Most forces told us that they had saved more money than they needed to each year. As a result, they had not spent their entire budgets and this had allowed them to increase their reserves. These reserves could then be applied to one-off investments (such as new technology) and help to manage future cuts in spending. The majority of forces (37) told us they were predicting an under-spend in 2013/14 which in total was planned to be approximately £350m.
The fact that forces are still over-achieving their savings targets year-on-year gives HMIC confidence that they will balance their budgets and implement their savings plans this year.

Approaches to budgeting and financial control

HMIC considered the effectiveness of forces' financial controls. We looked at how forces develop their savings plans, how they match workforce reductions with cost reductions, and how they monitor their budgets to ensure they achieve the required savings. We saw numerous examples of excellent work in finance departments. Increasingly, financial planning is no longer the preserve of ‘the finance people’. Instead, finance departments work effectively with other relevant departments such as human resources and the teams responsible for managing change in the organisation (often corporate development or organisational development). Financial planning and monitoring is now far better integrated into ‘business as usual’ for the most senior officers in the police forces than it was in the earlier years of the spending review period.

Some forces have had to manage financial controls against a backdrop of increased complexity, such as those forces which are undertaking extensive collaborations (see Chapter 4). For example, West Mercia and Warwickshire Police (who work together and are in what is called ‘a strategic alliance’) have established a new finance system. This allows them to work across two separate forces that historically have had separate IT systems and policies and practices in financial management.

Factors which affect a force’s ability to identify cost savings

As we have already shown, forces have had different levels of savings they need to make, and they have adopted various approaches in order to make the necessary cuts in expenditure. The ease with which forces can identify cost savings depends on a number of factors including the following:

- the force’s level of spending per head of population. There is wide variation in this as shown at Figure 5. The forecasted GRE for England and Wales was £235 per head during 2013/14 (with forecasts for £231 per head in 2014/15 and £228 in 2015/16). Those forces spending less than others will find it more difficult to identify savings from their budgets;
- the balance between police staff and police officers within the force. Police officers cannot be made compulsorily redundant. Forces with relatively high proportions of officers have less flexibility to reduce their workforces and hence have less scope to reduce their pay budgets;
- the size of the force. Larger forces generally have more scope for internal efficiency measures (for instance, merging units doing similar work), whereas smaller forces do not; and
the level of reserves. Those with a high level of reserves can use them to fund the savings they need to make, for example, funding staff redundancies or managing the impact of large in-year financial reductions.

Figure 6: Estimated expenditure (GRE) per head of population

Working with police and crime commissioners

A force’s approach to managing its financial savings is dependent on the policing priorities set for each force by the police and crime commissioner and also the overall demand for policing services in that area.

HMIC found that there are good reporting arrangements in place between forces and police and crime commissioners. This means that forces provide regular information, usually on a monthly basis, to the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC). The information is clearly presented, makes assumptions that both the force and the OPCC share, and provides an appropriate level of detail. There are still a small number of forces where the two posts of force finance director and chief financial officer for the OPCC is carried out by one individual. HMIC does not consider this to be the most appropriate approach. Forces should consider how best to make sure that these roles are filled by different individuals so as to avoid any conflict of interest.¹⁹

All forces have prioritised the implementation of the police and crime commissioner’s police and crime plan. In some cases, the police and crime commissioner’s priorities may determine the way in which the force can make savings. For example, the police and crime plan may have a commitment to maintain officer or PCSO numbers at certain levels.

Conclusion

HMIC is confident that forces have well thought-out plans to reduce their costs and manage their expenditure. Forces' responses to the constant pressures to make savings have been broadly positive. In the final year of the spending review, the majority of forces have planned their budget reductions well and have achieved the savings they have needed to make. HMIC considers that reasonable financial assumptions underpin the vast majority of forces' financial strategies. Although the required savings that forces have to make has risen from £2.11bn in 2011 to £2.53bn in 2014, forces' plans have continued to develop in a satisfactory way.

All forces have a track record of making more savings that they need at some point in the spending review. This has helped many forces make additional contributions to their financial reserves. All forces have plans in place to achieve their savings requirements in 2014/15; all forces have plans in place to make most of the savings required for 2015/16.
Chapter 2: How forces are making the savings
For all forces, the majority of spending is on staff and pay costs. Considerably less (an average 20 percent) is spent on non-pay costs such as estates, IT, vehicles, utility bills, equipment and supplies. Forces have had to make savings of £2.53bn during the four-year spending review; considerable reductions in staff numbers were inevitable. This chapter sets out workforce reductions that will be made during this spending review period and the effect that this has had on police officers and staff. It also outlines how forces have focused their efforts on reducing those costs which do not relate to pay, in order to protect police officer and police staff jobs.

Pay and non-pay savings

HMIC found that there is significant variation across the individual forces in terms of the split of pay and non-pay savings. Savings plans for 2014/15 identify:

- **66 percent** of savings from pay costs, including by restructuring force operating models and cutting departmental budgets to reduce the size of the workforce; and
- **34 percent** from non-pay costs: reducing spend on goods and services.

Where forces have not identified ways to make sufficient reductions overall in spending, they have used their reserves to bridge the gap.

**Figure 7: Proportion of estimated planned savings from pay and non-pay over the spending review period**

forces continue to reduce non-pay costs effectively, and there has been a concerted effort in forces to review all non-pay areas of expenditure in order to minimise the need to reduce police officer and staff numbers (although in some cases non-pay expenditure will help support more effective and efficient working).
Chapter 2: How forces are making the savings

Non-pay savings

Some forces made efficiency savings in their non-pay budgets early in the spending review period. This has left them with less scope to make additional savings at this later stage. In an attempt to identify further areas in which to cut costs, several forces have used external auditors or accountants to review their spending plans and to assist with non-pay cost reductions.

Forces have identified a range of areas where they can make non-pay savings. As with last year, the most common areas are:

- Contract renegotiation: all forces told us they are continuing to review and renegotiate existing contracts, with a view to bringing together multiple contracts with the same supplier. An example is the renegotiation of the forensics contracts across the five East Midlands forces.

- Collective procurement: forces are identifying procurement opportunities for items such as police vehicle fleets and protective equipment like body armour. Increasingly, they are buying using standard procurement frameworks, many of which are mandated by government. In addition, 25 forces collaborate on their procurement functions.

- Controlled purchasing: forces continue to tighten controls on discretionary expenditure through approved purchasing for some items such as office equipment, stationery, and travel and subsistence. All forces have put in place rigorous procedures for the approval of large items of expenditure such as IT equipment, whereas everyday items such as stationery can only be selected from a list of approved items on a restricted on-line catalogue. For example, in Humberside Police, changes to the stationery budget have reduced expenditure by over 80% from £103,000 in 2009/10 to £17,000 in 2013/14.

- Reconfiguration of estates: forces continue to identify estates for sale and disposal, to obtain one-off savings. Forces are moving away from older dilapidated premises which are costly to maintain, and are looking at the options for sharing premises. For example, the Metropolitan Police Service provides contact points in buildings such as libraries and hospitals, as well as traditional police stations, for public drop-in sessions. Cleveland Police is adapting the way staff work to minimise the need for desk space and to introduce the use of ‘hot-desking’. All forces have reviewed how often police buildings are actually used by the public, and most are then taking informed decisions on whether they need all their police stations, public access points such as front counters and custody suites. Greater Manchester Police accommodate 1,100 administrative and support staff in a building with space for 500 desks. They were able to design, develop and introduce shared desk working for 97 percent of HQ employees. All employees can now work from home or other Greater Manchester Police buildings. Closure and disposal of surplus estate have reduced operating costs by £3m and the force expects to benefit from a further £1.2m year-on-year saving from

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20 There are three national frameworks that have been mandated for police use under the Police Act 1996 (Equipment) Regulations 2011 which were made using the powers in section 53(1) and (1A) of the Police Act 1996. These frameworks are for national vehicles, general patrol body armour and the Sprint II framework mandated for purchase of Commoditised IT hardware and Commercial “off the shelf” software. Other frameworks can be used by the police but are not mandated.
a reduction in business rates, energy and maintenance costs. As a result, the force is on its way to reducing its office estate by 30 per cent by 2015, and reducing estate costs.

- Fleet management: most forces are reviewing their fleets to identify opportunities to reduce the number of vehicles or to replace more expensive specialist cars with cheaper ones. Forces are also considering collaborating with one another in this area. For example, Greater Manchester Police and Manchester City Council are sharing vehicle servicing with one another, with the future prospect of sharing vehicles and Humberside Police are looking for opportunities to collaborate with Humberside Fire and rescue on a vehicle workshop.

- IT savings: many forces have reviewed their IT infrastructure and have identified ways to streamline processes and make innovative use of new technology. In addition a one-off investment in replacing cumbersome and outdated systems will result in lower maintenance costs which will provide savings each year.

Police staff and officers are acutely aware of the financial constraints in which they operate, and this is leading them to change their own behaviour in a number of ways. For example, West Yorkshire Police have reduced non-pay costs through comparing their costs with other comparable forces, by making use of HMIC’s Value for Money profiles. This has enabled them to introduce changes to bring their own force into line with forces which are achieving better value for money.

HMIC recognises that sometimes there is a need to increase non-pay costs such as IT equipment to achieve greater efficiency or a higher quality service to the public. In some cases, non-pay reductions may be counter-productive. For example, estates reconfiguration including station closures may compromise public access to the police and may reduce the visibility of police officers in towns. Similarly, some forces have found that centralising custody suites has led to increased travelling time for police officers. This means that during these periods police officers are not available to patrol the streets and keep the public safe. In general, HMIC considers that forces, sensibly, are balancing the need to identify cost reductions with these broader considerations.

**Savings in pay**

Forces plan to save £1.7bn from pay over the spending review period. They have adopted a range of approaches including: continued pay restraint; reductions in overtime; and the implementation of the Winsor reforms. However, the vast majority of savings in pay will come through reductions in police staff, police officer and PCSO posts.

As HMIC has tracked the planned changes to the workforce throughout this spending review period, we have used March 2010 as our starting point or baseline. At this point, most forces began to prepare for this era of austerity by introducing a freeze on recruitment.

In March 2010, the total police workforce (police officers, PCSOs and staff) for England and

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Wales stood at 243,900. This year, forces have told us that their projected total workforce for March 2015 (the end of this spending review period) will be 209,500. This is a decrease of 14 percent, or 34,400 fewer people, as the following table illustrates:

**Figure 8: National workforce reductions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>England and Wales</th>
<th>March 2010 FTE (actual)</th>
<th>March 2015 FTE (planned)</th>
<th>Total change (planned)</th>
<th>Percentage change (planned)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police Officers</td>
<td>143,700</td>
<td>127,500</td>
<td>16,300</td>
<td>-11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police staff</td>
<td>83,200</td>
<td>68,700</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>-17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCSOs</td>
<td>16,900</td>
<td>13,300</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total workforce</td>
<td>243,900</td>
<td>209,500</td>
<td>34,400</td>
<td>-14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: these figures are rounded and may appear not to add up.

As Figure 8 shows, the police workforce has reduced over time, slightly more sharply in the early years of the spending review. In March 2014, the total workforce was reported to be 209,500 (see Figure 12). This means that forces had already reduced their staffing numbers down to the required levels for this spending review period. In fact, some forces now have too few staff and are likely to be recruiting so that they can achieve the full complement of officers, staff and PCSOs by the end of this financial year. Because of how the workforce statistics are measured, the March 2014 figure is a snapshot of full-time employees, and so will not count those vacant posts (which may be the subject of a current recruitment campaign) or those currently filled by short-term contract workers. The March 2015 figure we describe throughout this report includes all posts which are funded throughout the year.

**Figure 9: Changes in total workforce over the spending review period**
Over the course of the spending review period, forces have changed the ways in which they have achieved the necessary workforce reductions. In the early years, most forces adopted a relatively crude (but understandably pragmatic) approach of not replacing staff when they left the force. This meant that while the numbers of staff in the organisation decreased, there was little or no control over the profile of the remaining workforce, and specifically over whether forces had the right number of people with the right mix of skills and experience.

Forces have now become more sophisticated in their approach to achieving workforce savings; many have sought to reorganise themselves and have moved people within their organisations to where they are needed most (often within new structures). Forces are also increasingly trying to ensure that the skills and capabilities of their workforces match the demands the organisations face in responding to different types of crimes and meeting the needs of different victims and communities.

Forces have been hampered significantly in their ability to create organisations that are fit for the 21st century because they cannot rapidly change the size of their police officer workforce. (Police officers cannot be made compulsorily redundant.) Despite these constraints, forces have been made more efficient by:

- gradually removing senior management posts to reduce expensive overheads;
- centralising business support functions; and
- reducing the number of support staff and administrators.

This year, HMIC has seen in the majority of forces a trend emerging to adopt a more comprehensive and sophisticated approach to workforce planning. We found that forces are now taking a more extensive range of factors into account when planning their future workforces. These factors include:

- Succession planning - making sure that people with specialist skills are replaced when they leave with others who have the same skills.
- Recruitment planning - tied to a better understanding of police officer retirement ages.
- Organisational risk assessment - increasing posts and skills in areas where there is the greatest potential for harm if under-resourced, for example public protection (which deals with areas such as child sexual exploitation and domestic abuse).
- Talent management – identifying individuals with particular skills and capabilities within the organisation early on, and nurturing and developing them.
- Training and skills audit – identifying gaps in training and skills so as to ensure that all officers are equipped with the skills they need for 21st century policing.
- Training officers to carry out multiple tasks – preparing officers to manage multiple responsibilities in teams (such as investigation of crimes such as vehicle crime and burglary as part of a neighbourhood team).

**West Yorkshire** launched a Talent Management Programme in January 2014. The new talent management model aims to develop individuals rather than focussing on promotion alone. The programme has been widely communicated to all members of the workforce and

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23 Workforce planning is the process by which a force ensures that it has the right number of people with the right skills in the right places at the right times to attain the short and long-term objectives of the organisation.
includes a “talent support scheme”, allowing individuals to be nominated or self-nominate. Each individual is on the programme for three years, with 60 joining each year. The focus of the programme is on professional (specialist) development, promotion development and general continuous individual development. A mentor or coach is also assigned for the duration of the course.

Workforce reductions force by force

The planned workforce reductions vary considerably. One force anticipates a 24 percent reduction in its workforce over the spending review period while, at the other end of the scale, just one force anticipates an increase (albeit of only one percent). Reasons for this variation include: the scale of the savings requirement for the force; the force’s historic funding arrangements; the extent to which savings can be found from non-pay costs; and the comparative cost of the workforce.

Figure 10: Estimated planned workforce reductions between March 2010 and March 2015 force by force (as of March 2014)

Workforce reduction

The pace at which forces are reducing their workforces is slowing as the spending review progresses. This is shown in Figure 12. This was to be expected; when the spending review settlement was first announced, reductions in the police grant were planned at four percent in 2011/12 and five percent in 2012/13, with smaller reductions of two percent and one

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24 Cleveland and Lincolnshire show sizeable staff reductions of 35 and 33 percent respectively some of which relate to their outsourcing arrangements.
percent in the final years. So a higher level of savings was required initially and therefore greater levels of workforce reduction.

Figure 11: Estimated planned workforce reductions in March 2012, March 2013, March 2014 and March 2015 compared to 2010

31 March 2012 (actual)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full-time equivalent</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police officers</td>
<td>-9,600</td>
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<td>Police staff</td>
<td>-11,900</td>
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<td>PCSOs</td>
<td>-2,500</td>
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<td>Total workforce</td>
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31 March 2013 (actual)

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<th>Cumulative percentage</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Police officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police staff</td>
<td>-13,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCSOs</td>
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<td>75%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total workforce</td>
<td>-30,500</td>
<td>89%</td>
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</table>

31 March 2014 (actual)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Full-time equivalent</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police officers</td>
<td>-15,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police staff</td>
<td>-15,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCSOs</td>
<td>-3,900</td>
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<td>Total workforce</td>
<td>-34,800</td>
<td>101%</td>
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31 March 2015 (planned)

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<th>Number</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Police officers</td>
<td>-16,300</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police staff</td>
<td>-14,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCSOs</td>
<td>-3,600</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total workforce</td>
<td>-34,400</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The role of volunteers in the police workforce

All forces have plans in place to increase the number of special constables and volunteers. Many police and crime commissioners have been instrumental in encouraging this as they see that a volunteer workforce is an important part of maintaining police visibility and making sure that there is a strong connection between the police, the public and the communities they serve. Forty of the police and crime plans include a focus on specials and volunteers.

In 2010, there were 15,500 special constables in England and Wales; by 2015 this is expected increase to 22,300 (an increase of some 44 percent). Figure 12 shows a gradual increase from 2010 to 2012, followed by a small decrease in special constable numbers over the last two years. Police forces are planning a considerable increase this year.

Figure 12: Estimated change in special constable headcount over the spending review period

Due to the recent dip in numbers there may be a risk that this planned increase will not be achieved. In addition, some forces told us they struggle to retain special constables. The majority of forces are reviewing their current approaches to how they recruit and deploy volunteers and special constables. Plans do not simply focus on increasing the numbers recruited; thought is now being given to improving the effectiveness of special constables and making sure that use is made of the skills they bring from their employment, for example, using a special constable who may be an accountant and who has specialist financial skills to support economic crime cases. This is important if the recruitment of special constables (and other volunteers) is to bring additional capabilities to forces.

Northamptonshire Police has plans to increase the number of special constables three-fold to 900 by 2016 to increase the visibility of police officers. The force reports that to date, it has reached an establishment of 350 - at the beginning of the project the force had 280 special constables. The average hours performed by each officer in 2014 are in excess of 25 hours per month compared with 16 hours per month in January 2012. Special constables are now being deployed in a wide range of disciplines of policing. As well as undertaking traditional activities such as neighbourhood patrols, special constables are also being deployed into specialist roles such as cyber crime, prisoner investigation and roads policing.
In order to meet recruits’ needs, the force has adapted its training options to include distance learning that includes an innovative online programme, an intensive summer camp scheme and a degree qualification with the University of Northampton, alongside a more traditional weekend and evenings approach.

Many forces are using volunteers, and special constable and cadet schemes, as potential ways into recruiting police constables. These schemes are also a way of increasing the diversity of the workforce and achieving greater numbers of female and black and minority ethnic police officers. Special constables tend to be more representative of the communities they serve (see the later section on police diversity).

National changes to the workforce profile

The percentage reductions in staff and officers over the spending review period differ as between different categories: there is a planned 11 percent reduction in the number of police officers, compared with a planned 17 percent reduction in police staff and a planned 22 percent reduction in PCSOs. But because of the varying numbers of people in each category in absolute terms, the estimated overall ratio of staff and officers has remains broadly unchanged from March 2010 – as Figure 13 demonstrates.

Figure 13: Estimated planned changes to the workforce profile between March 2010 and March 2015 (as of March 2014)
Diversity in the police workforce

Women make up 39 percent of the entire workforce, whereas only 28 percent of police officers are female. Similarly, as at 31 March 2014, people from minority ethnic\textsuperscript{26} backgrounds represent six percent of the entire workforce but make up only five percent of police officers. There has been a failure to improve this position in relation to both gender and ethnicity over the course of the spending review period, as the percentage of female officers and those from minority ethnic backgrounds was the same in 2010/11.

Many forces are now recruiting staff and officers. It is likely that there will only be a limited window of opportunity to do so given the continuing era of austerity. Forces must take this opportunity to consider how their workforces can better reflect the diversity of the communities they police as this unrepresentative picture has remained unchanged for too many years.

Some forces are taking active steps to make improvements in this important area of workforce planning. West Midlands Police, the Metropolitan Police Service and Bedfordshire Police have carried out recruitment campaigns to target under-represented communities. In the West Midlands, members from different minority ethnic communities sit on selection panels to improve public confidence in the selection process.

Some forces have limited the pool for recruitment of police officers to their existing PCSOs or special constables who better represent the diversity of local communities. Forty-five percent of PCSOs are women and nine percent of PCSOs are from minority ethnic backgrounds. Thirty-two percent of special constables are female and 11 percent are from minority ethnic backgrounds. The representation of both women and black and minority ethnic people is much higher for special constables and PCSOs than it is for police officers.

Forces told HMIC that they are reconfiguring their workforces by taking out chief officer and supervisory posts and removing specific ranks. We were also told that the span of control\textsuperscript{27} for supervisors is increasing. The ratio of constables to sergeants varies from force to force, from just over 3:1 to 6:1 as at 31 March 2014. In order to reduce management costs and increase the individual responsibility and discretion of frontline officers, many forces have chosen to focus reducing supervisor posts.

Despite these assertions by forces, the overall workforce profile of police officers and staff has not changed appreciably over the past four years (as shown in figure 14). Neither has there been a significant change in the ratio of the number of constables to sergeants (moving from 5.1 constables to one sergeant as at 31 March 2010; to just under five constables to one sergeant as at 31 March 2014).

\textsuperscript{26} Minority ethnic includes the following ethnic groups: mixed; Asian or Asian British; black or black British; and Chinese or other.

\textsuperscript{27} How many individual officers report into one supervisor; for example a neighbourhood sergeant may supervise six constables.
Figure 14: Police officers by rank (FTE) for March 2010 and March 2014

31 March 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full-time equivalent</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief officers</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief superintendents</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents</td>
<td>1,031</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief inspectors</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspectors</td>
<td>7,242</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>23,103</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>109,713</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 March 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full-time equivalent</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief officers</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief superintendents</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief inspectors</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspectors</td>
<td>5,930</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>19,767</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>99,107</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Staff associations expressed their concerns about the pressures on some officers, in particular at superintendent and chief superintendent ranks. Concerns related to both how the force would respond to operational requirements and the substantial increases in individual workload. The number of officers at these ranks has reduced by 25 percent with the loss of 379 officers from March 2010 to March 2014.

Legislation such as the Regulatory Investigative Powers Act 200028 requires a superintending ranked officer to carry out specific functions. These ranks are also required to command specialist operations such as firearms and public order operations and to act as senior investigating officers (where their significant experience and training is required). There is therefore a growing risk that forces’ operational effectiveness could be impaired if there are further significant reductions in the number of officers at this level of seniority in some forces. It is important that forces fully assess and understand the operational effect that their workforce plans have on their front line officers.

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Recruitment, promotion and future prospects

There has been some limited recruitment in most forces but in the longer-term, the opportunities for promotion and progression are likely to reduce further and the workforce will become increasingly static. Many chief officers expressed their concern that they face the prospect of an ageing workforce, with limited scope for recruitment; limited options for officers to leave the service early; and an increasing retirement age. HMIC did not have the opportunity or the necessary information to test this concern thoroughly. It does, however, need considering as forces continue to work within the constraints of austerity.

Managing the changes to the workforce

In this chapter, we have highlighted the sizeable planned reductions in the police workforce over the spending review period from March 2010 to March 2015, the majority of which have already occurred. The next section considers how this change in the workforce is being managed by leaders within a force. Whilst strong leadership is required at every rank and level, the inspection has focused in particular on senior officers at chief constable, deputy chief constable and assistant chief constable and assistant chief officer level (the “command team”).

Workforce well-being

Pressure on budgets has meant that forces have had to consider the productivity of their workforces. One means of doing this has been to improve their management of staff sickness as they strive to reduce sickness absence (often in the context of the increased demands they are placing on their staff as the overall numbers of posts reduce). We have seen some good examples of forces managing sickness better to ensure a more productive workforce, while also recognising that constant change is introducing stresses on the workforce which require attention. For example, Staffordshire Police has changed its approach on reducing sickness: instead of focusing on managing absence, it now seeks to support a return to work. In addition the force has commissioned its own ‘in house’ physiotherapy service which is available to all staff, making access to treatment very simple and again contributing to reducing time taken off work.

However, as the size of the workforce has reduced, workloads have increased, and police officers and police staff have greater uncertainty in terms of job security. Concerns were raised with us on our inspections that this could have an adverse effect on the health and wellbeing of individual staff and officers.

There has been a greater proportionate reduction in police staff numbers than in police officer numbers. Staff associations and trade unions have expressed their concerns, for example, that staff feel under pressure to come into work when they are ill due to worries that sickness absences will count against them when applying for posts during future restructurings.

Forces need to strike a balance between managing sickness in order to improve the productivity of the workforce, and managing the health and wellbeing of their staff. In some
cases, forces need to invest in occupational health provision to ensure the right support and advice are given to individuals and that the service is provided in a timely manner to enable people to return to work as quickly as possible.

**Leadership and working with staff to implement change**

The reductions in funding to policing have brought about continuous change across all forces. Forces have recognised that positive leadership and involving staff are important factors in the successful implementation of change. Research shows that change programmes are more successful when staff are actively involved in change that affects them.²⁹

Police leaders have risen to the challenge that this era of austerity has posed. There are now fewer chief officers as proportion of the overall workforce than there were in March 2010. However, over the course of the spending review period, successive HMIC inspections have found that leaders have developed a better understanding of how to lead change, and their skills in financial management have matured; chief officers now consider routinely the wider resourcing implications when making decisions on how best to carry out operational policing.

The period from March 2010 to March 2014 has been one of fundamental change in policing. There are 34,800 fewer people now working in the service. Most forces have been through a period of organisational change and significant restructuring. There have been substantial changes to the workload, remit and working patterns of staff, as well as changes to pay and conditions. The cumulative effect of these changes has created difficulties in respect of staff morale and goodwill. As these changes occur, it is important that forces recognise the importance of working with the existing values held by those that work in the police service, for example, the strong sense of vocation. They must also try and address the concerns that are being voiced by their workforces. There have been several positive examples of this:

- **Avon and Somerset Police** have recognised the need to change the existing ways of working, to give staff a greater level of discretion. The force has carried out extensive consultation with staff regarding the implementation of a new structure within the force. One element of this was ‘Invent the future’. The force’s change team spent two days from 6am until midnight in each local policing area, to increase their awareness of the change programme and gather their views, concerns and ideas. The team found several issues with the current approach including lack of effective mobile data, disagreements between teams over their respective remits, and chasing targets resulting in adverse behaviours. All of these were addressed in the new approach. Interactive seminars have been used, inviting comment from staff and officers on how the force will structure policing services in the future.

- **Staffordshire Police** has developed several initiatives to improve staff motivation. These include ‘innovation days’ to hear ideas from officers and staff on how to improve wellbeing; open days for the public to provide an opportunity for staff to let the public

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know what the police do and to engender a feeling of pride; and the introduction of ‘wellbeing champions’ who listen to views and concerns of staff to understand the overall mood of the organisation and then implement changes where needed. The aim is to re-establish the family feel of Staffordshire Police following considerable workforce reductions. The staff survey this year has seen a 57 percent response rate and the force now have an action plan drawing on 180 staff suggestions to date. The introduction of these initiatives has seen more difficult and challenging questions coming forward from staff.

• Lancashire Police have implemented ‘The Buzz’ which is an online communication tool to encourage openness from staff and officers. Staff and officers are able to pose a question (with regards to rules of engagement) which is posted on a blog, with no moderation. Colleagues are then able to review these and comment, expressing their views in relation to the topic, an example being a recent strand on wellbeing which attracted 5,500 views. Feedback from the workforce to date is very much ‘glad you are listening’, with an overall feeling that senior staff are making the effort to respond.

Many police staff and officers told HMIC that they understood the need for change. But our inspections found that there are wide differences across forces (and sometimes within forces) in relation to how staff and officers feel about that change. Some feel that goodwill and morale have diminished and that operational achievements will be jeopardised if further cuts are made. However, where we have seen strong leadership and a comprehensive programme to consult and involve staff and officers, the workforce feels more positive about the future.

Conclusion

During the four-year spending review, forces have prioritised reducing their non-pay costs when purchasing goods and services such as fleets of police vehicles and protective equipment like body armour. However, the level of savings required means that reductions in the police workforce are unavoidable and significant. HMIC recognises that, in most cases, forces have done whatever they can to minimise their reductions in workforce and to protect as many officer and staff jobs as possible.

During the last year, whilst most forces have had consistent plans to reduce their workforces, they are now planning to lose more PCSOs than previously anticipated. However, many characteristics of the police workforce have remained largely unchanged as the spending review has progressed. As set out in this chapter, these include the workforce mix, the diversity of police officers and the proportions of police officers at different ranks. The leadership of the service will struggle to make further material changes in these areas without additional flexibility in how they are able to manage their workforces.

HMIC recognises there has been strong leadership across the service and saw that many chief officers have ‘taken their workforces with them’ during this period of unprecedented change. We have seen excellent examples of staff involvement in the changes in forces and attention to staff wellbeing. However, chief officers will need to continue to work hard to maintain staff morale. Continuing communication and the involvement of staff in how change is designed and implemented is vital to this.
Chapter 3: Reshaping the structures and the organisation of police forces
HMIC has tracked the reduction in police spending and the consequent changes to workforces over this spending review period. In our previous reports, we have described how forces have reshaped themselves in order to be able to achieve these reductions while maintaining their crime-fighting capacity. Last year, we reported on how forces were protecting the front line and how they were reshaping their services to the public. In this chapter, we highlight noticeable changes in forces’ approaches to policing in austerity since then.

HMIC has tracked how budget reductions are having an effect on front line numbers. HMIC defined the policing front line in its 2011 report, *Demanding Times*, as “those who are in everyday contact with the public and who directly intervene to keep people safe and enforce the law.”

As illustrated by Figure 15, we use three groups to analyse the division of resources within forces:

- **Operational front line.** This includes those patrolling neighbourhoods, responding to 999 calls, policing roads and protecting vulnerable people.
- **Operational support.** This includes those providing intelligence to support investigations and scientific support to process forensic evidence.
- **Business support.** This includes those staff working in human resources, information technology, facilities management, training, finance and procurement. These are areas of the organisation without which the force could not operate efficiently, but they are not operational policing functions.

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While it is important that forces protect their crime-fighting capacity, this does not (of course) mean that a force could or should have its entire workforce in frontline roles. To have a functioning and effective police force, parts of the organisation need to provide both operational and business support to the front line.
Number and proportion of the total workforce in frontline roles

Between March 2010 and March 2015, forces plans to reduce their frontline workforce by 8 percent (14,900 posts). However, forces are reducing operational support by 27 percent (7,900 posts), and business support by 24 percent (7,700 posts).

Figure 16: Estimated planned changes to workforce between March 2010 and March 2015 broken down by operational front line, operational support and business support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>England and Wales</th>
<th>31 March 2010 actual</th>
<th>31 March 2015 planned</th>
<th>Planned change</th>
<th>Planned % change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational frontline workforce</td>
<td>178,100</td>
<td>163,100</td>
<td>-14,900</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational support workforce</td>
<td>29,500</td>
<td>21,600</td>
<td>-7,900</td>
<td>-27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business support workforce</td>
<td>32,100</td>
<td>24,400</td>
<td>-7,700</td>
<td>-24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: these figures are rounded and may appear not to add up.

Thus, while the number of frontline officers, staff and PCSOs has fallen in absolute terms, the proportion of the workforce in frontline roles is expected to increase from 74 percent in March 2010 to 78 percent in March 2015 because of the deeper cuts made elsewhere in the workforce, as figure 17 shows.
Forces are continuing to protect their front lines by cutting harder into business support and operational support roles and increasing the proportion on the front line. However, due to the scale of the overall workforce reductions, police forces will still need to cut some frontline roles, and the number of officers and staff on the front line is falling. The front line is thus being protected but not preserved.

Since last year, the planned reduction in the operational support workforce has grown. Last year, forces planned to reduce that workforce by 20 percent by 2015. Now forces plan to reduce their operational support workforce by 27 percent by 2015. This can be largely attributed to a change in the Metropolitan Police Service’s plans. In the last 12 months, the Metropolitan Police Service has revised its plans to increase the reduction of operational support roles over the period of the spending review in order to achieve its savings earlier.
Changes to the proportion of total workforce on the front line: force by force

Once again, there is considerable variation between forces in the planned changes to the workforce on the front line, as figure 18 shows. The greatest planned reduction in frontline workforce numbers is 24 percent.

Figure 18: Estimated planned changes to the total workforce on the front line: force by force
Police officers in frontline roles

Forces are planning to reduce the numbers of police officers in business and operational support roles in order to protect frontline roles.

**Figure 19: Estimated planned changes to police officers on the front line March 2010 to March 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>England and Wales</th>
<th>31 March 2010 (actual)</th>
<th>31 March 2015 (planned)</th>
<th>Planned change</th>
<th>Planned % change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational frontline police officers</td>
<td>125,800</td>
<td>117,200</td>
<td>-8,600</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational support police officers</td>
<td>10,900</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>-3,500</td>
<td>-32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business support police officers</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>-2,300</td>
<td>-47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: these figures are rounded and may appear not to add up.*

These plans mean a proposed increase in the proportion of police officers carrying out frontline activity from 89 percent in March 2010 to 92 percent by March 2015, as shown in figure 20.
Figure 20: Planned police officer front line profile for March 2010 and March 2015

- Police officer FTE March 2010: 89%
- Police officer FTE March 2015: 92%
Numbers and proportions of police officers on the front line force-by-force

While the national figures show a seven percent reduction in the number of police officers on the front line, three forces - the Metropolitan Police Service, Thames Valley Police and Surrey Police, are planning to increase their officer numbers on the front line.

**Figure 21: Planned changes to the number of police officer in front line roles between March 2010 and March 2015, by force (as of March 2014)**

Forces plan to have from 90 percent to 97 percent of officers in frontline roles by March 2015, as figure 22 demonstrates.
Reshaping services

The commitment to protect the front line has, to a great extent, shaped how police forces have remodelled their organisations. In *Policing in Austerity: Rising to the Challenge* published in 2013, we set out how police forces were reshaping and reconfiguring to adjust to smaller budgets and workforces. We saw a range of different responses and commented on the fact that the level of change and innovation varies considerably between forces. In March 2014, HMIC published a compendium of examples showing how forces were meeting the financial challenge. It focused on describing the changes forces have made to manage budget reductions, moving from short-term cost reductions (such as recruitment freezes), to longer-term solutions (such as redesigning the force).

This built on commentary in earlier HMIC reports such as *Adapting to Austerity*, published in July 2011, where we first summarised the principal approaches forces were taking to reduce costs in the three areas of workforce efficiency (pay and conditions, shift pattern reviews and changing the mix of officers and staff); process improvement (reducing bureaucracy, changing processes for areas such as how a crime is investigated or a call from a member of the public is managed), and achieving economies of scale (collaboration between forces, restructuring in forces and working with the private sector).

HMIC’s inspection this year found that there is now much less variation between forces in terms of the steps taken to achieve their savings than when we reported on this in 2011.

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A good case study is the extent to which all forces have considered and implemented any structural change to centralise some functions and reduce overheads to save costs. As figure 23 illustrates, in 2011 almost a third of forces had not considered whether they needed any structural change to how local policing services were configured to achieve economies of scale (described as “new BCU/policing model”), for example by centralising local human resources, finance, facilities management and performance management support or reducing the number of separate geographic policing areas and therefore the number of supervisors.

Figure 23: Taken from Adapting to Austerity (see glossary for definition of terms)

As figure 24 shows by 2013 some 35 forces had carried out such a restructure, five had it planned, two had it under consideration and one had no plans to restructure.
This year, HMIC observed that all forces had undertaken at least one major restructure of this kind (and for many it has incorporated all functions of the force, such as business support and operational support). Those forces that had not embarked on major change at the beginning of the spending review period had the opportunity to do so later. Those that had focused on structural change early on have spent the latter period of the spending review improving processes to enhance productivity, for example how 999 calls are answered and officers are despatched to an emergency through sending the nearest available unit or by sending officers out on their own (rather than in pairs) so they cover a larger area in a community.

We asked senior police leaders responsible for change programmes which techniques and approaches they had used to achieve their savings. Their answers revealed that there has been a strong emphasis on how they were changing the structures of their forces in relation to functions such as local policing, protective services (frontline policing), operational support and business support. This reinforces HMIC’s observations on successive inspections. Many forces told us they had aligned resource to demand; for example, officers responding to 999 calls have shift patterns which mean they are available when forces are at their busiest. They had also focused on reducing non-pay costs such as procurement and estates, which echoes our inspection findings.
We then asked senior leaders to rank their proposed approaches for how they would meet the challenges of further austerity. This exercise shows a shift in thinking, with a much stronger emphasis on collaboration, better use of IT and reducing demand for policing services through managing initial 999 calls more effectively (call management) and having their workforce available when they are needed most (resource alignment). Whilst some senior leaders were considering another structural change for their forces others were attempting to shrink their workforce within the existing structure.
Conclusion

Forces have endeavoured to protect the front line. The greatest proportion of workforce savings have been made from business and operational support. The scale of the cuts is such that the front line has seen reductions of over 17,000 people in the spending review period. There is evidence that forces are changing their structures to maximise their crime-fighting capabilities. However, as budgets reduce further, protecting the front line will get harder and there is risk that the frontline capacity and capabilities of forces will also reduce.

The vast majority of forces have restructured their entire organisation, and at the very least, have started some initial demand analysis (as described earlier). Forces have told us that in order to respond to future budget reductions there will, in future, need to be a greater emphasis on collaboration; better information technology; and a better ability to identify and reduce the demand for policing services. We will examine all these areas in the next two chapters.
Chapter 4: Collaboration and partnering
HMIC’s definition of collaboration is “all activity where two or more parties work together to achieve a common goal, which includes inter-force activity and collaboration with the public and private sectors, including outsourcing and business partnering.”

Collaboration provides opportunities for police forces to provide services more efficiently and effectively as budgets continue to reduce.

In last year’s report, _Policing in Austerity: Rising to the Challenge_, HMIC concluded that the picture on collaboration was deeply disappointing. We found that the pace of change was too slow, with only a minority of forces (18) achieving more than 10 percent of their savings through collaboration.34

Historically, the main driver behind collaboration was the desire to improve the resilience, capacity and capability of specialist policing functions. Such functions required relatively small numbers of specially trained officers and staff, and were usually used relatively infrequently. Collaboration was also often used to mitigate risks and threats spanning more than one force area. Examples included counter-terrorism and organised crime functions, such as activity to tackle drug supply. These collaborations were assisted by funding from the government, for example, to build regional capability to tackle serious and organised crime.

Since 2012, during the period of austerity, the nature of collaboration has shifted, with forces increasingly using it as a method to achieve economies of scale.

**How forces collaborate**

There is a range of ways in which forces are now collaborating.

1. **Collaboration between forces** remains the most common. This is because all forces have already collaborated on some of their specialist operational frontline services. In some cases, forces have built on these existing relationships and broadened the collaboration to include other areas of policing in operational or support areas.

2. Increasingly, forces are collaborating with other **locally-based public sector organisations**. For some forces, this work has been stimulated or given greater impetus by the election of the police and crime commissioners. There are both benefits and disadvantages to this approach. The most obvious benefit is that such collaboration allows for consolidation of services within a particular geographic area, and can strengthen the working together between local partners (examples include the police and the fire service sharing control rooms). However, there is a risk that shared services may not integrate effectively because the businesses they support are so different. Some elements of policing support services (for example, the duty management system which supports the 24/7 staffing of forces) are highly police-specific.

3. The forces’ response to austerity has also given rise to a few, larger value, **partnerships with the private sector**. The police worked with the private sector in advance of the spending review (for example, by outsourcing custody provision, 34 _Policing in Austerity: Rising to the Challenge_, HMIC, July 2013, page 81. Available from [http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/policing-in-austerity-rising-to-the-challenge.pdf](http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/policing-in-austerity-rising-to-the-challenge.pdf)
and by using private finance initiatives to support the building of new headquarters, custody suites or training facilities). More extensive private sector collaboration is now taking place: for example, in Cleveland Police and Lincolnshire Police, business support services as well as control room and criminal justice services are provided by the private sector working with the force.

Analysis of the current picture for collaboration shows that the majority of forces are now working with other forces in some areas of activity, particularly in specialist policing work such as firearms training and major crime investigations. Our inspections also found that most forces had an appetite for more collaborative working with local authorities. In a small number of forces, including Cheshire, Hertfordshire, Kent and Merseyside, some staff are already in the same building or co-located with other local organisations such as the fire service or local authorities. In total, approximately two-thirds of forces indicated they were already working with other local partners or were considering initiating such an approach. A smaller number of forces were considering how the private sector could be engaged in innovative ways to support cost savings.

Last year, HMIC reported that by 2014/15 an estimated £182m of planned savings by means of collaboration had been identified by forces over the spending review period. This equates to seven percent of the savings gap. This differed substantially between forces, with some forces showing one percent or less of their savings being achieved by collaboration (North Yorkshire, Derbyshire, and Devon and Cornwall), whilst Warwickshire and West Mercia indicated that their strategic alliance had enabled them to achieve over 75 percent of their respective spending review savings.

This year we again considered the extent of collaboration in each force, and the extent to which collaboration is contributing to the force’s savings requirements. We collected data from all forces to answer these questions.

In order to assess the extent to which forces are collaborating, HMIC measured what proportion of the overall force budget (net revenue expenditure or NRE) will be spent on areas of the business that are carried out collaboratively. The data collected (see Figure 27) show that this proportion has increased over the spending review period, demonstrating the progress forces have made in increasing the ambition of working more with other forces, public sector local partners and the private sector.

### Footnotes

35 The administrative support to put together files for the crown prosecution services or processing Fixed Penalty Notices.

36 NRE is used to avoid duplication caused by cross charging agreements between forces inherent in collaborative arrangements.
This is a broadly positive picture which demonstrates that the extent of collaboration is increasing overall. However, there is considerable variation between forces as shown in Figure 28 and Figure 29.
Figure 28: Map showing variation in the extent of collaboration across police forces in England and Wales in 2014/15
Savings from collaboration

HMIC monitors and reports progress on collaboration because it offers the opportunity to achieve efficient and effective policing. In our report last year we explained how collaboration improved efficiency through (for example): the reduction and sharing of overheads; the ability better to match demand; and, the ability to keep staffing levels (and non-staff overheads) proportionately lower. We also outlined how collaboration improves effectiveness through (for example): generating greater specialist proficiency and capability; increasing resilience; and, reducing risk through interoperability.\(^{37}\)

We have seen examples across the country of collaboration which forces report raise the quality of service provision (for example, providing a joint major investigation team, a more expert response to high profile multiple murders). Forces which collaborate are able to attract higher-calibre individuals into specialist fields, have access to better training facilities, and can increase the level of expertise through joint investment in training.

This year, HMIC has again considered the extent to which savings from collaboration are contributing to the overall savings gap. The percentage of savings achieved through collaboration is currently projected at 10 percent by 2014/15, which is a welcome increase. There were still substantial differences between forces, with some forces showing one percent or less of their savings being achieved by collaboration (West Midlands, Merseyside, Sussex, and Devon and Cornwall). However, the number of forces saving 10 percent or more is now 22 forces, which again shows some progress is being made.

As we have set out in this report, forces derive other benefits from collaboration apart from financial savings. Many forces told us about increased resilience and effectiveness, but few could consistently articulate the service improvements that are achieved through collaboration.

### Barriers to collaboration

HMIC understands that collaborating is complex, requiring effort and investment, and forces have had a finite ability to support large amounts of change in a short period of time. Collaboration can have an adverse effect on staff (for example they may have to travel over larger distances). In addition, larger forces can generate significant internal economies of scale before further external collaboration is necessary or desirable. Thus, many forces have chosen an approach which means they are focused on ensuring they are as efficient as possible internally before collaborating. For some forces, geography is also an inhibitor, as collaborative working on operational policing requires physical proximity (for example, roads policing or armed response vehicles).

These are all valid reasons why some forces find it harder to collaborate than others. But the evidence gathered in this and previous inspections shows that while barriers to collaboration do exist, some forces have overcome them. As we found last year and as reinforced by our inspection activity this year, technical issues (such as incompatible IT systems, different terms and conditions for staff, and different budgeting systems and approaches) increase the complexity of achieving positive outcomes through collaboration but they can be overcome. The most important things to get right include:

- **A shared vision and commitment between the leaders of the forces and the police and crime commissioners:** progress has been most rapid and extensive when partners have committed in advance to a high degree of collaboration, and
then worked out where it will bring the most benefits. The strategic alliance between Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police is a good example of this, as is the Bedfordshire Police, Hertfordshire and Cambridgeshire Constabulary collaboration. The chief constables and police and crime commissioners of Devon and Cornwall and Dorset Police Forces have also demonstrated such leadership and commitment in their consideration of a proposed strategic alliance.

- **Accepting that there will need to be negotiation, and a degree of compromise from both parties**: joint decision-making in areas where the service is provided collaboratively is a new approach for senior leaders who are accustomed to command and control in a single force. Service provision in terms of cost, quality and approach will be different in each force before collaboration, and decisions will need to be made on harmonising the approach. In some instances, the change may not achieve considerable savings for both parties, or may favour one local model over another; but sometimes acceding to this will be in the interests of the collaboration overall and in the wider public interest.  

### Prospects for further collaboration

The position on collaboration continues disappointing, although there has been some improvement since last year. However, it is concerning that the national picture is becoming increasingly fragmented and complex with extremes in variation to approaches to the collaboration agenda. Paradoxically, it is the complex and high risk areas of police work (such as serious and organised and major crime) which have seen the greatest levels of working together. The picture also shows a greater number of force to force collaboration by smaller to medium sized forces. Larger forces have had more opportunities to make internal economies of scale.

The influence of police and crime commissioners has added another layer of complexity in some cases. In some cases, police and crime commissioners have promoted force-to-force collaborations. Others have not promoted, or have even reversed collaboration between forces in favour of collaborations between other local organisations. Such local collaborations (particularly across ‘blue light’ services) have been encouraged and incentivised by central Government.

The Government has sought to encourage collaboration by strengthening the statutory requirements relating to collaboration and by using the Police Innovation Fund to incentivise collaborative approaches.

**The Police and Social Responsibility Act 2011 amended the Police Act 1996 and “place[d] new duties on chief officers and policing bodies to keep collaboration opportunities under review and to collaborate where it is in the interests of the efficiency or effectiveness of their own and other police force areas. This is a**

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39 Blue light services - police, ambulance and fire and rescue service.

stronger duty than the previous one for police authorities, who were required only to support collaboration by their own forces. The duty requires chief officers and policing bodies to work together to review opportunities to collaborate, to engage with their prospective collaboration partners and to make a judgement as to whether those opportunities present the best option available. Where collaboration is judged to be the best option, they must collaborate. Another difference from the previous arrangements is that where collaboration would provide the best outcome for another police force or group of forces, then a chief officer or policing body should pursue it - even if they do not expect their own force to benefit directly itself. This is designed to ensure that collaboration takes place wherever it is in the wider public’s best interest.”


HMIC is of the opinion that despite the statutory duty, the potential incentive of the Police Innovation Fund, and the continued scrutiny of HMIC the current national position on collaboration is unsatisfactory. Collaboration is complex. It requires significant management effort to be put in, vested interests to be overcome, and a minimum of four people (two chief constables and two police and crime commissioners) to share a vision and approach. A degree of compromise is therefore necessary on all sides. It is becoming increasingly complex for individual forces to navigate their way through this landscape with no overall coordination and little guidance as to the required, or desirable, long-term direction to be taken.

HMIC visited Police Scotland, a single police service created as a result of one of the biggest reforms in the Scottish public sector since devolution. The Scottish First Minister announced plans for legislation to create a single police service (from eight separate police forces) for Scotland in September 2011. Eighteen months later, the single police service commenced. The reform had three objectives:

1. To protect and improve local services, despite financial cuts, by stopping duplication of support services and not cutting the front line.
2. To create more equal access to specialist support and national capacity – such as murder investigation teams and firearms teams – where and when they are needed.
3. To strengthen the connection between police services and communities by:
   - Creating a new formal relationship with all 32 local councils
   - Creating opportunities for more locally elected members to have a formal say in police services in their areas
   - Better integrating with community planning partnerships.

The Scottish experience shows that with clear direction, results can be achieved in a very short space of time. Some lessons can be learned from this approach, although clearly the context in Scotland is very different to that in England and Wales, so it is very difficult to draw direct comparisons. The timeline in Figure 31 shows the time period and steps taken to develop a strategic alliance between two English forces through negotiation and consensus compared to the Scottish experience of merging eight forces.
Conclusion

Last year we concluded that progress on collaboration was deeply disappointing and we are pleased that forces and police and crime commissioners have worked hard to improve the progress this year. Whilst this progress is welcome, it is not of the magnitude necessary to meet the requirements of future austerity. HMIC has highlighted that there is considerable potential here for savings. However, this potential is currently far from being fully exploited. The police and crime commissioners have also influenced this agenda with an emphasis in some areas on collaborations within the locality and, in some cases, a political mandate against private sector partnerships which can constrain collaborative working across forces.

Last year we stated that there needed to be a fundamental rethink about how to provide higher quality, lower cost services through collaboration. To date, this has not happened. We have asked all forces to review their plans and the Home Office to review the incentives for collaboration. This has not led to the fundamental shift which is now needed. It is time for Government, with police and crime commissioners and senior police leaders, to consider this issue again and we recommend how this should be addressed in Chapter 8.
Chapter 5: Taking steps to maximise efficiency
With funding cuts have come workforce reductions. In order to manage these reductions while trying to maintain or improve services to the public (and minimise the impact on remaining staff), forces have reshaped their organisations.

The aim of this type of restructuring has been to allocate resources more efficiently. For example, forces have moved from separate crime squads (such as vehicle crime squads and burglary squads) to a local crime investigation team (often physically located near the custody building so they can access suspects for interview). This should result in less duplication, greater economies of scale, and fewer handovers. Another example of allocating resources more efficiently is restructuring shift patterns so more officers are available when there are an increased number of 999 calls (there are clear patterns of when 999 calls are made).

Forces now have to try and make sure that officers and staff are working in such a way that allows fewer people to provide at least as good as, if not an improved service while meeting changing crime threats (for example cyber enabled crime such as online fraud and online indecent images, online child abuse) and changing requirements of victims and broader communities. Forces need to ensure that their officers are productive and they need mechanisms to understand and incentivise this. HMIC has carried out a more extensive and in depth review of how officers spend their time, attend incidents and carry out policing activity which prevents crime. We will report on this in greater detail later this year.

Understanding demand

The way in which demands for services are understood and dealt with remains variable between forces. There are still too many forces that only assess the demand for their service by reference to the number of emergency calls they receive from the public. This is an important measure of demand, but it only gives a partial insight into the full range of demands on police time. While all forces analysed their demand early on in the spending review period, this analysis focused primarily on analysing 999 calls and changing shift patterns accordingly. Some forces have not updated their analysis for some time, or have not extended it to all areas of police work. In addition, not all forces have used this information to understand what is causing the demand on their services and how best to address this. However, we did see examples of effective working in this area.

- A number of forces have identified the top ten sources for demand in their local areas, and are targeting resources to provide visibility and prevent future offending. Other forces have looked at the top ten sources of repeat demand (often supermarkets with high levels of shoplifting) and are taking steps to deal with the issues they raise and prevent the need for them to call as far as possible.
- Greater Manchester Police has developed a simulation model to help it understand the effects of changes to demand and resources. The force researched the amount of time taken by officers to deal with certain types of crimes. It then used this understanding to anticipate demand and allocate resources more efficiently.

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This allocation has been followed up with field work to evaluate how effective it is, and is reviewed annually to ensure it stays relevant.

- A number of forces have recently undertaken a comprehensive assessment of demand over a set period, most commonly a week, to help them understand the effect of the demand on their workforces and how it can be better managed.

A better understanding of demand means it can be better reduced and managed. For example, Avon and Somerset identified the total demand from the public and partners, and subsequently identified the times when there were too many or too few resources. This included an assessment of every single call for service and requirement of the force in a 24-hour period last August. This analysis included assessing the full effect of each call for service and identified the appropriate resource needed to complete it. This understanding allowed the force to allocate its assets and co-ordinate processes more efficiently.

The College of Policing is supporting a range of work across forces to better understand better the picture of current and changing demand.

There are a number of steps which forces can take. Many have focused on reducing demand by getting their response right the first time, to avoid effort spent on returning to deal with the same problem that was not resolved the first time round but could have been. Others are applying tactics to stop repeat or further demand such as burglaries through the intelligent deployment of resources. A good example preventing further demand is “cocoon watch”, where houses in the immediate vicinity of a burglary are alerted and additional policing is directed to that area. This approach was developed as there is strong evidence to suggest that someone is at a greater risk of burglary once he or she has already been burgled or live next door to house that has been burgled.42

**Working with local partners**

Working with local partners in sectors such as health, social services, housing, environmental health, probation and the voluntary and community sector continues to be an area of prime importance. In our section on collaboration we considered how working with partners can reduce costs - for example, by sharing a business support functions with local authority partners (as Avon and Somerset Constabulary do). Working with local partners can also prevent and reduce crime by improved management of offenders and support to victims (both of whom can have complex needs, requiring a range of services). Our inspections, however, revealed that the levels of joint working that had been achieved has been variable.

An example of a well-established approach to working with local partners is the multi agency safeguarding hubs (MASH) scheme. This scheme enables children and vulnerable adults to receive appropriate care from a number of different organisations including education, health, housing and social care, while avoiding duplication in contact they received from these organisations and unnecessary disruption to lives.

We observed some good examples of forces working with other local organisations. Greater Manchester Police are undertaking a variety of schemes, including a pilot scheme in Oldham providing officers with access to mental health professionals, linking with Stockport

psychiatric department to train response officers and concluding agreements with care homes on how they, and the force, can work together. Staffordshire Police has developed a number of partnerships including a sexual assault referral centre in addition to MASH and integrated offender management (IOM) hubs. It is also involved in the strategic Safer Staffordshire partnership with other public services. Lancashire Police was able to provide evidence of strong working with the county council, and has adopted some principles (known as early action principles) which outline how it will work with partners.

A number of forces reported that other public sector organisations were finding it difficult to cope with the spending reductions in their own budgets. Forces told us there is a risk that other services stop providing an adequate service and the police are required to step in as the ‘service of last resort’. Forces told us that this is a particular concern in respect of the ambulance service. Because ambulances attending emergencies may have a different set of priorities or response times to the police, police officers have, as a last resort, taken injured people to hospital in the back of a police car.

Several forces demonstrated innovative work in relation to mental health with some having qualified mental health professionals working with response officers in order to enable prompt and appropriate care to be provided to those who need it. The forces have taken different approaches to how to link with mental health professionals, with some opting for placing them in response cars with officers to attend at the scene (such as in Leicestershire). Other forces, such as Hampshire, have worked with local mental health trusts to arrange for staff with specialist knowledge to work in the control room in order to use their expertise as soon as a call comes to assist with coordination. These approaches have led to improvements in the quality of response as well as cutting down on the time taken to deal with cases, meaning that appropriate care is available sooner.

However, for all the progress that has been made, there are still obstacles for forces to overcome in relation to working with other organisations. In order for the public to benefit, every force should have a coherent strategy for how best to work with local agencies. This strategy must have clear aims and measurable results. In some areas, local structures make matters more complicated (for example multiple local authorities or health trusts in one police force area). Police and crime commissioners have the potential to influence the direction of the force in how it works with other organisations and, by building up strong and effective relationships, can help make sure that partnerships work well.

Providing the workforce with the necessary skills for improved productivity

In order to meet the challenges set by the period of austerity, many police officers and staff have moved away from specialist policing roles. Increasingly, they are expected to carry out a variety of roles rather than confining their skills to one particular area. For example, neighbourhood policing officers may have to investigate crimes, and may be responsible for supporting and safeguarding vulnerable victims of domestic abuse. All officers attending incidents will need to carry out effective initial investigations and identify vulnerability. This approach has developed as, given the financial constraints, there is less scope to have a large number of specialist units which may only be busy at certain times. Having a more
flexible multi-skilled workforce helps to build resilience, as if one officer is absent, roles can be covered by a number of officers.

However the new approach is one that needs to be supplemented with good training and officers need the support of their managers if they are to be effective. Previous inspections have uncovered some weaknesses in core policing areas such as file preparation and initial investigation.\(^43\) For officers to be productive and effective they require new skills to meet the ever changing threats and to keep abreast of the scale and pace of change in technology. HMIC understands that, as a response to austerity, many training budgets have been reduced and training departments scaled back. Police forces and the College of Policing must consider how the skills of officers and staff can best be developed with reducing costs.

**Improved technology**

It is vital that investment in information technology is well managed and that value for money is achieved. Good use of technology can make officers more productive and efficient and, increasingly, up-to-date technology is essential in order for officers to do their jobs properly.

As HMIC has continued to report, for example in “Taking Time for Crime” (2012) and “Policing in Austerity: Rising to the Challenge” (2013),\(^44\) overall the police use poor and outdated technology. This has a negative effect on the ability of the workforce to do their job. HMIC concluded in the “State of Policing: the Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2012/13” that “too many police forces are only just catching up with commercial organisations” in terms of the technology which supports their frontline workforce.\(^45\)

Across all forces, information technology is limiting efficiency. Some forces are in the early stages of rectifying this, with early yet promising signs from the strategies now in place from the Metropolitan Police Service and Cambridgeshire. The collaboration between Avon and Somerset Constabulary, the local authorities and private sector partner IBM, has given the force a high level of technology to enable its business support function to work more efficiently.

Mobile data is an area identified by many forces as holding the potential to free up the time of frontline officers. Many attempts to issue early generation hardware to officers appear to have been unsuccessful, with reported incidents of officers choosing not to use the hardware provided in order to save time and projects failing to achieve value for money.\(^46\)

Now more advanced technology is available at a reduced cost, and Surrey and

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Sussex Police have had positive feedback from their officers following a recent trial of new handsets.

The consideration of police IT merits a substantive inspection in its own right; we will be reporting in greater detail on the current position on police IT and prospects for future changes later this year.

**Performance management**

Many forces have put an emphasis on giving police officers and staff greater discretion, and are keen to reduce bureaucracy to help them do their jobs better. However, this can be difficult to achieve when tightening budgets mean that the inclination of some supervisors has been to exert greater control over staff and allow less freedom rather than more. Our inspections have found that while many forces described an approach based on increased discretion for officers, they struggled to articulate what this meant in practice. Where police leaders have failed to set clear expectations as to what ‘policing with discretion’ actually means, frontline officers can be confused as to what they are actually supposed to do. This can lead to inappropriate and inconsistent services being provided to victims.

Lancashire has seemingly been successful in introducing a style of policing that gives greater discretion to police officers and staff in how they deal with the public. Officers and staff are told that there is no crime they cannot deal with provided that they follow a simple and logical approach to making policing decisions, drawing on the current accepted practice known as the National Decision Model. Officers and staff report that this helps them to deal with problems in a common sense way, and that victims are satisfied with this approach.

Almost all forces indicated that they are moving away from a performance approach driven by targets to a performance model where it is up to the discretion of the officer on how best to achieve good results for the public. This is often described by staff as ‘doing the right thing’ in terms of the victim. The approach is welcomed, but the means by which forces determine the quality of the results for the public is often unclear. It is not easy to measure success where the emphasis is on the quality of the service to the public, whereas it is easy to adopt a somewhat cruder method of assessing performance which simply involves counting the reduction in the number of crimes committed over a period of time. It is important that forces develop means of gauging the success of their quality-based approach so they can assess how effectively they are meeting the needs of the public.

In a number of forces the aspiration of leaders to remove targets (moving the organisation on from a target driven performance culture) is not translating into an operational reality. Many local supervisors continue to use performance targets (usually relating to the number and types of crime in their area) as a means of managing the performance of their staff instead of assessing the quality of the outcome in terms of the service to the public. To secure the cultural change in their forces that they say they want to see, chief officers must communicate their expectations clearly to all officers and staff and take steps to check that the changes are being implemented properly.

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For a full description of the National Decision Model please see the glossary.
Conclusion

The financial reductions of the spending review are resulting in forces considering and trying new approaches. HMIC has found that forces have made some innovative changes to reduce demand and improve their productivity. However, a more systematic approach to sharing the best way of doing this (supported by the College of Policing) is needed. In addition, there is a need for a better understanding of how new approaches to performance management translate into something which is understood and can be implemented by frontline officers.

In particular, the issue of defining and measuring police productivity must be considered. In order for forces to be able to achieve further funding reductions, they will need to work hard to reduce demand still further. HMIC will report on many of these areas in more detail later this year, in particular considering the role that technology could play in enabling officers to be more productive. As HMIC has pointed out in its value for money reports, and as other research shows, technology can improve police efficiency. However, poor, outdated and unconnected technology is a substantial barrier to such improvement.

Chapter 6: Effect of the changes to the service on the public
When forces take steps to balance their budgets, in doing so they must aim to maintain or improve the service they provide to the public. It is important that, wherever possible, changes do not impact on forces’ ability to cut crime, and that the changes are understood and accepted by the public. The public’s perception of the police is central to wider issues of legitimacy. Legitimacy is very important as it encourages people to obey the law and helps the police to fight crime, not just by freeing up resources by reducing crime but also through the assistance of the public in detecting crime (around half of crimes are detected with assistance from the public).

It is therefore important that the approaches forces take over the spending review period ensure that they still provide services in a way that builds confidence and satisfaction. As HMIC has inspected how forces have balanced their books, it has considered the extent to which the service provided:

- **Is visible** – the public consistently tell us that it is important that they see a visible and easily identifiable police presence patrolling their communities. Research has shown that a visible police presence addressing the issues of greatest community concern (e.g. a targeted foot patrol when implemented alongside getting communities involved and problem solving) can improve confidence in the police.

- **Is easy to access** – it is vital that police services can be accessed where and when citizens and communities need them.

- **Is responsive to need** – the police response should be one that meets the needs of the public. Research tells us that response time is an important factor and that satisfaction is driven by responding in a time which the victim considers reasonable, but also by the actions the police take when they respond and how the victim is kept informed of progress.

- **Keeps people safe** – this is a fundamental part of the mission of policing.

HMIC continues to have a particular interest in the changes taking place in neighbourhood policing. Neighbourhood or local policing teams are a critical element of the police force for engaging with the public to build confidence, by determining local priorities and taking action. Neighbourhood teams provide information, intelligence and detailed local knowledge which can support the force in meeting a range of its policing priorities, for example, tackling urban street gangs and disrupting organised crime groups.

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A visible police presence

A visible policing presence in neighbourhood and communities is as important as positive contact between the police and the public, and has consistently been shown to influence public confidence. The value placed by the public on visibility is demonstrated by the findings of the Crime Survey for England and Wales where high visibility was associated with a positive rating of the police. In HMIC’s all-force public survey, when asked which forms of communication would make them feel safer in their local area, just over half of respondents said that face-to-face interaction with a police officer on patrol would make them feel safer. Just under half of all respondents said an interaction with a PCSO on patrol would also make them feel safer.

HMIC understands that there is a significant level of policing activity that is not visible to the public. Tackling serious and organised crime, protecting vulnerable people and combating the increasing levels of online crime, for example, require people with specialist and technical skills, rather than solely community-based beat constables. Often these specialists are not visible, operating in plain clothes or utilising covert methods of policing. Nevertheless, publicly visible policing is crucial to delivering an effective local service.

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55 HMIC carried out two public surveys. One was a national telephone survey (referred to as the national survey) and the other an online survey with respondents in each force area (referred to as the all-force survey). Full details of both surveys can be found in the methodology, including the limitations of regarding the results of these surveys as being truly representative of the general population, or comparable over time.
The proportion of police officers and PCSOs in visible functions has changed considerably in a number of forces:

**Figure 32: Change in proportion (percentage point change) in police officers and PCSOs in visible roles, by force for March 2010 to March 2014**

The reductions in officers and PCSOs are starting to be noticed by the public. For example, in the Crime Survey for England and Wales, the proportion of adults who reported seeing a police officer on foot patrol in their local area at least once a week fell from 38 percent in 2011/12 to 34 percent in 2012/13. This finding follows a trend of increased visibility until 2009/10 followed by a period of stability. Our all force survey found that a third of respondents noticed fewer officers patrolling than last year, although almost half noticed no change.

Even with fewer officers and PCSOs there are a numbers of ways in which forces can maximise their visibility to the public. Technology can keep police officers out of the station. Good intelligence and knowledge of local communities can ensure that patrol patterns take officers into the right areas to provide higher levels of reassurance or to help prevent repeat victimisation. Demand analysis and matching shift patterns can ensure that officers are available and visible at the busiest times. The same number of officers can provide greater coverage of a particular area if they patrol on their own rather than in pairs. Working with local partners can maximise the visibility of all enforcement resources in an area, for example council wardens, traffic wardens and environmental health officers. How the force chooses to engage with the public can also enhance its visibility. For example, Durham Constabulary holds public meetings in a local branch of McDonalds rather than in a town hall.
Accessing police services

HMIC considered how easy it was for the public to access police services. This needs to take account of the fact that our surveys demonstrate that tolerance among respondents for the closure of police stations and front counters remains low. Our all force survey showed that 61 percent of respondents would never support the closure of their front counter and this percentage remains static from last year. The survey shows 31 percent (± 1 percent) of respondents in 2014 said that they thought telephone contact was an acceptable alternative method of contact to front counters. This compares with 29 percent (± 1 percent) in 2013. Provision at a shared location such as a library or supermarket was an acceptable alternative in almost half, 48 percent (± 1 percent) in 2014, which was in broadly in line with last year’s figure.56

However, as set out earlier in this chapter, forces are having to make difficult choices to protect frontline workforce and officer roles. For many forces, considerable savings can be made by selling police stations or reducing opening hours of front counters. In some cases, this will mean the public will have to access police services in different places or in different times. Some forces have carried out analysis to identify under-used police stations and have located alternative shared provision. In many forces police and crime commissioners have worked with the force and consulted with the public on this issue.

Forces told us that they have or are planning to close 22057 police stations between 2010/11 to 2014/15. Whilst they were planning to reduce front counters in police buildings by 380, there will be 322 alternative access points in non-police buildings where policing services can be accessed (so over the spending review period there will be a net loss of 100 front counters).58 Examples of these alternative access points include the following:

- West Yorkshire Police has opened a new station at Normanton which has a number of partner organisations in the same building, including animal control and accommodation for victims and witnesses.
- Cumbria Police are moving to a model which provides face-to-face services from public places such as supermarkets or premises in busy high streets, with an aim of easier access and a more consistent standard of service.

All forces have some level of online presence (for example a website). However, the options available for the public to interact with forces online and the level of importance the forces place on communication differ, to a large degree, between forces. In 2014, 3 percent (± 1 percent) of respondents said they would use social media to report a crime, this compares to 2 percent (± 1 percent) in 2013. Eleven percent of respondents (± 1 percent), in 2014, said they would use social media to find information about their force. This compares to 8 percent (± 1 percent) of respondents in the previous year. This year, 45 percent (± 1 percent) of respondents stated that they would not use social media for contacting the police at all.59

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56 Ibid.
57 Excluding the Metropolitan Police Service.
58 These accessibility figures exclude Essex, Kent, Warwickshire, West Mercia, Dorset and Cleveland.
59 These results must be interpreted with caution given the overall sample size for the survey.
Our inspections revealed that too few forces, so far, have implemented online crime reporting or provided the public with the ability to follow the progress of their case online. A small number of forces appeared still to rely primarily on telephone contact and offered very little else for the public beyond a basic information website. The ease of access has always been important, but as society changes and more communication with the public moves online the police service must keep pace with these changes.

HMIC investigated the online options available to the public. As can be seen from Figure 33, some services were well-provided for online whereas others (such as reporting a crime or anti-social behaviour) had an online service in only a minority of forces.

**Figure 33: Services provided online by forces**

The position regarding the reporting of hate crimes, where forces have a statutory duty to provide an anonymous reporting mechanism, is better, 42 out of the 43 forces are complying with their statutory obligations.

The ability to provide intelligence online is almost as widely available, with 40 forces offering this option. A few do this on their own website, but the vast majority direct reports via a third party such as Crimestoppers[^60] which can pass the information on to the relevant police force.

All forces offered the ability to make a complaint online, whether directly through their website or via email. The vast majority also provide the ability to comment on the quality of service that is received. All but three forces offer the ability to make freedom of information (FOI) requests online, with over two-thirds directing FOI requests to be made via email.

All forces now have a Twitter account and only one does not have a Facebook account to provide information and to communicate with the public.

[^60]: [https://crimestoppers-uk.org/](https://crimestoppers-uk.org/)
A small number of forces have developed a dedicated application (an “app”) to enable communication on the move for the public.

Responding to need

As we did last year last year, we tested the respondents’ tolerance to different types of police responses through our national survey. Respondents expected many of the situations put to them to be dealt with by the police face-to-face, while in some situations there was a general acceptance that the matter could be sorted out over the phone. The expectations of police attendance were found to be lower than last year, which may show that the respondents have adjusted their mind-set (although this may be a temporary reduction). The proportion of respondents who expected an immediate response and face-to-face attendance on the part of the police for particular scenarios were as follows:

- 66\% if they heard cries for help from next door (compared to 78 percent last year);
- 40 percent if they were the victim of a garage burglary and there was the opportunity to gather evidence (compared to 49 percent last year);
- 31 percent if they were the victim of a minor assault, although uninjured (compared to 43 percent last year);
- six percent if youths were congregating near their home, acting boisterously but not committing any crime or being otherwise problematic (compared to 12 percent last year); and
- five percent if they reported the theft of a mobile phone which occurred 15 minutes earlier (compared to seven percent last year).

HMIC asked forces for data on their response times over the past 12 months against any targets they may have set themselves. Five forces\(^{62}\) advised that they do not keep any data on response times or they do not have targets for response times.

Thirty-eight forces provided data for response times for emergency calls and of these 16 have a different response time for urban and rural settings (typically they have a target of attending within 15 minutes for an urban area, and 20 minutes for a rural area). Fifty percent of these forces are now meeting their own target response times for urban and rural areas less frequently than they were at the beginning of the spending review period.

For the remaining 22 forces which have a single target for emergency calls, 14 forces are now meeting their own target response times less frequently than they were at the beginning of the spending review period.

Given the variation in and incompleteness of the data it is difficult to draw firm conclusions. However, HMIC is concerned that there appears to be a deterioration in the police’s response to emergency calls in an appreciable number of forces.

61 HMIC carried out two public surveys. One was a national telephone survey (referred to as the national survey) and the other an online survey with respondents in each force area (referred to as the all-force survey. Full details of both surveys can be found in the methodology, including the limitations of regarding the results of these surveys as being truly representative of the general population, or comparable over time.

62 Derbyshire, Gwent, Humberside, Northamptonshire and Surrey.
This issue will be considered in greater detail in our forthcoming report on making better use of police time.

**Keeping people safe by preventing and reducing crime**

An HMIC inspection later this year will make a more in-depth assessment of how effective the police are at reducing crime. It will look beyond the picture painted by the national data on recorded crime and will consider the overall effectiveness of the police in keeping the public safe. It will consider the views of the victims or crime and will make an assessment of how well forces deal with hidden crime. This includes crime which is typically underreported. For example, domestic violence is underreported for a range reasons including, in many cases, because of the control exercised over the victim by the perpetrator. Hidden crime also includes crimes which have shifted from being committed in a physical location to the online environment. At the moment on-line fraud is considerably underreported.

It is important to assess whether the steps forces are taking to balance the books are compromising their crime fighting ability. Last year we found that forces were rising to the challenge of austerity, reducing costs while continuing to drive down crime and keep victim satisfaction high. HMIC has separately reported on how forces are recording crime, and this has raised some material concerns.63

Both police recorded crime and crime reported through the Crime Survey for England and Wales continue to fall. The latest figures from the Crime Survey for England and Wales estimates that there were 7.5 million crimes against households and resident adults, the lowest estimate since the survey began in 1981. Figure 33 shows that whilst recorded police crime has fallen in most forces in England and Wales the extent to which it has done so varies considerably. Several factors must be taken into account such as the relative starting point of the force and its crime recording practices.64

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64 Ibid.
There have been different rates of reduction in certain crime types as set out in Figure 34. In the case of sexual offences, an increase in recorded crime may well be (in one sense) a positive thing, as more victims are coming forward increasingly confident that the police can support them.

However, more recently there are signs of increasing upward pressures in some offence types. For example, the rate of recorded shoplifting increased by seven percent in the 12 months to March 2014 compared to the previous 12 months, an increase which some consider to be an “austerity” crime (due to unemployment and increased cost of living) although another explanation is the change of approach in how supermarkets and other retail outfits are tackling shoplifters.
Victim satisfaction

Victim satisfaction is an important measure and can be influenced both by how an officer behaves towards a victim (greater concern shown to victim correlates to greater likelihood of satisfaction) and by the extent to which the police meet the expectation of the victim (where police meet or exceed expectations about investigative activities satisfaction is more likely).\textsuperscript{65}

The long-term trends show that the percentage of victims who are satisfied with the overall service from police continues to rise gradually, and (at 85 percent\textsuperscript{66}) now sits almost three percent higher than it did in March 2010. The satisfaction ratings for all forces in England and Wales are shown in Figure 36 and remain high, with some forces such as Wiltshire, Metropolitan Police Service and the City of London showing distinct improvement since last year.\textsuperscript{67}

**Figure 36: Percentage of victims satisfied with the overall service provided by the police, by force, for 12 months to March 2014**

The England and Wales figure is estimated to range from 85.0% to 85.5%.


\textsuperscript{66} This result has a confidence interval of plus or minus 0.2 percent, see the “about the data” section for further information.

\textsuperscript{67} User satisfaction surveys only ask questions of a sample of victims, so where forces’ survey results are relatively similar it is not possible to say for sure that overall satisfaction rates in those force areas are different. Statistical analysis can, however, identify those forces where it is highly likely that the satisfaction levels of all victims of the crimes the survey covers are above or below average.
The long-term trends as reported by ONS\(^{68}\) indicate that overall while those who are “fairly satisfied” with the police has remained steady over time (currently 34 percent), and those who are “very satisfied” has risen by 12 percentage points from 26 percent 2007/08 to 38 percent in 2012/13. There has been a corresponding drop in those who are “not satisfied” with the way that police handled their issue - this figure has fallen by 15 percent to 26 percent over the same period. This is a positive result for the police. However the ONS has also reported that the extent to which adults think the police are doing a good job (a broader confidence measure) shows a slight levelling off following year-on-year increases and stood at 61 percent in 2012/13.

These data demonstrate a broadly positive picture, but with potential cracks appearing in relation to some crime types such as shoplifting, the levelling off in overall confidence and the reduction in visibility as referred to above. There are also a number of risks which may jeopardise future performance and accordingly future public satisfaction, including the following:

- with a reduced workforce, there is less flexibility and ability to respond quickly to any rapid increase in demand, and to sustain this over a period of time;
- much work to reduce and prevent crime is conducted with partner organisations, many of whom are also subject to significantly reduced budgets. Forces are reporting they are having to pick up extra work, as the provider of last resort, a need to fill gaps in service caused by reduced partner resources, for example the ambulance service or mental health. The effect of this “collateral demand” is described further in the next chapter; and
- changes in the local and neighbourhood policing structures could represent risks to continued strong performance.

**Neighbourhood policing**

Last year we commented that some forces had chosen to make savings by broadening the remit of neighbourhood policing teams to include tasks traditionally carried out by response officers or investigators. We were concerned that this would potentially have a detrimental effect on the level of service the public received from the police, and that neighbourhood policing risked being eroded in some places.

Neighbourhood policing is normally conducted by a team of police officers and PCSOs who spend most of their time on patrol and are assigned to police a particular local community. The teams often involve specialist officers and staff with expertise in crime prevention, community safety, licensing, restorative justice and schools liaison. Neighbourhood policing teams can be used to focus on the places which, and the people who, create the most demand for the police, with an emphasis on preventive problem solving (specific crime types and problems are analysed and specific response implemented). Evidence shows that this can lead to sustained reductions in crime and anti-social behaviour.\(^{69}\) Problem solving is often conducted by different organisations working with local people, for example youth

\(^{68}\) Chapter 1: Public Perceptions of the Police, and Police Visibility, 2012/13 ONS
workers can be part of an approach to tackle ASB amongst young people to ensure that they can access other support services.

Positive working between the police and the public can improve public satisfaction, trust and confidence, and compliance. Neighbourhood policing teams are often the only police resource with the day-to-day visibility required to reassure and build confidence in our communities.

Last autumn, we conducted a review to get a better understanding of the extent to which forces are continuing to carry out neighbourhood policing. Across the sample of six forces we visited, we found a strong commitment from chief constables and police and crime commissioners to neighbourhood policing as a means of achieving effective policing. This commitment was supported in all forces through the allocation of dedicated resources and a recognition that neighbourhood policing is at the heart of service provision and cutting crime.

Our fieldwork this year has confirmed the commitment of forces to neighbourhood policing. Between March 2010 and March 2015, forces in England and Wales have increased the size of their neighbourhood workforce by eight percent at a time when workforce reductions have been made elsewhere. However, the means by which forces implement neighbourhood policing continues to evolve, and this overall increase masks considerable variation. Most forces retain distinct neighbourhood policing teams, but in many cases these teams have been given a broader remit of supporting response calls or investigations or both. Data shows that as of 31 March 2014, forces had anything between three percent and 37 percent of the total workforce in neighbourhoods, suggesting very different configurations of neighbourhood teams.

Neighbourhood teams may be set up differently in different areas. For example in a large rural area it may be appropriate for neighbourhood teams to be more mobile and to be sent to emergency calls. Neighbourhood teams may look larger in terms of resource, but have a much wider set of responsibilities. However, when we carried out focus groups with officers and staff during our research, we came across a number of examples where neighbourhood teams were given larger remits and this had led to tensions. Neighbourhood officers were responding to 999 calls, guarding crime scenes or doing the paperwork associated with crime investigations rather than engaging with their communities and working with partners to tackle local priorities.

Many forces acknowledge that they will have to make future savings in the area of neighbourhood policing should austerity continue. Some forces have already moved in this direction. For example, Hampshire has worked to develop a new model to ensure that while the number of neighbourhood policing officers will decrease, the number of hours worked in neighbourhood policing activity for prevention and working with the public will increase as a result of reduced abstractions.

Merseyside has given neighbourhood teams a clearer direction of work with a targeted approach for example on prevention activity.

With neighbourhood police officers increasingly expected to respond to 999 calls and investigate crimes, PCSOs are being asked to conduct a larger proportion of preventive activities.

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policing, with police officers in coordination roles. This must be set in the context of greater reductions in the number of PCSOs across England and Wales. In 2012, forces told us they were planning on average to cut 10 percent of their PCSOs between March 2010 and March 2015. Last year the estimate was a 17 percent cut, and this year we were told that PCSOs will be cut by 22 percent. These figures add to our concern about the ability of forces to carry out neighbourhood policing. In some forces we heard that the increasing number of tasks and responsibilities of PCSOs was reducing their ability to work with communities.

**Figure 37: Planned percentage change in PCSO/CSOs (FTE) from March 2010 to March 2015**

Last year we raised concerns that the broadening remit of neighbourhood policing teams risked damaging the level of service provided to the public. This year’s further planned reduction of PCSOs nationally adds to our concerns about the erosion of neighbourhood policing.

Forces remain committed to neighbourhood policing, but many are beginning to feel the strain with police officers increasingly being taken out of neighbourhood policing to perform response and investigative functions elsewhere. PCSOs are taking on more roles and responsibilities, but with continuing reductions in numbers, this may be to the detriment of working with communities and some PCSOs are also being used for reactive or enforcement activity. A recent research report PCSOs as Paraprofessionals of Policing: findings and recommendations from a research project found PCSO activities also included: scene guarding, road closures, detaining suspects or young people, giving fixed penalty notices and responding to low level emergencies.

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71 Welsh forces have received additional funding from the Welsh Government to invest PCSOs or CSOs.  
72 A recent research report PCSOs as Paraprofessionals of Policing: findings and recommendations from a research project found PCSO activities also included: scene guarding, road closures, detaining suspects or young people, giving fixed penalty notices and responding to low level emergencies.
demand will help forces to achieve more efficient neighbourhood policing. But forces should remain alert to the threat posed to crime prevention and working with communities should resources be scaled back too far.

**Conclusion**

As HMIC reported last year,\(^73\) the changes that forces are making remain within public tolerance and crime continues to fall. A further HMIC inspection will consider how effectively all forces cut crime. However, there are some signs that there is an increase in particular crime types, the previous improvements in public confidence may be levelling off, and the public are reporting seeing fewer officers in their communities.

Although we welcome the commitment the service has demonstrated to preserve this vital and fundamental component of our policing model, we remain concerned about the potential erosion of neighbourhood policing. It takes time to build confidence: incremental improvements in confidence at a national level have occurred over a period of almost ten years.\(^74\) The risk is that continuing austerity may put neighbourhood-based proactive and preventive policing in jeopardy. If that happens, the hard-won prize of community confidence could be lost.

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Chapter 7: Police performance in adapting to austerity
During HMIC’s inspections we considered how well each force provided value for money. This issue was considered with reference to three supporting questions:

- To what extent is the force taking the necessary steps to ensure a secure financial position for the short and long term?
- To what extent has the force an affordable way of providing policing?
- To what extent is the force efficient?

We scored the performance of each force against these questions using the following four grades:

- Outstanding
- Good
- Requires improvement
- Inadequate

This assisted us in reaching a judgment, using the same grades, for how well each force provides value for money.

Forces have adapted to austerity in a variety of ways, and their performance has varied in how they have responded to this challenge. Since last year, more forces are displaying a stronger response and it is encouraging that we have not had to rate any force as ‘inadequate’.

A number of characteristics have contributed to force successes in providing value for money, and there are some common features in high performing forces (see below). Despite this positive picture, there are some areas that still require improvement across almost all police forces. Most notable among these is information technology.
A summary of the forces’ overall performance, shown against their level of challenge is shown in the table below.

**Figure 38: Summary of force performance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Overall performance</th>
<th>Requires improvement</th>
<th>Inadequate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Comparatively difficult challenge | Avon and Somerset  
Lancashire  
West Midlands | Cambridgeshire  
Cleveland  
Devon and Cornwall  
Dorset  
Greater Manchester  
Hampshire  
Humberside  
Lincolnshire  
Merseyside  
Metropolitan Police Service  
Northumbria  
South Yorkshire  
Sussex  
Warwickshire  
West Mercia  
West Yorkshire | Bedfordshire  
Gwent  
Nottinghamshire |
Some forces have experienced a more difficult challenge than others. While the relative scale of the spending requirement itself is one important factor, other factors may increase the difficulty of making the required cuts to spending. These include: the size and density of the population; the geography of the force area; how much money it currently spends (how efficient it is already); and, the complexities it faces in policing the local area, for example, high crime levels, high risk crime (such as serious and organised crime) or a large geographical area with a poor transport infrastructure.
Characteristics of forces who are outstanding performers

Forces rated as ‘outstanding’ display a number of common characteristics contributing towards their ability to achieve value for money. All ‘outstanding’ forces were able to demonstrate that they had taken recent steps to understand and reduce their demand. This means they had a sophisticated and in-depth knowledge of what generated work for their officers, for example, when they were busiest, any particular areas that generated more calls for service or demands on their officers’ time. Most had used this detailed knowledge to develop a new way of organising their policing services.

For example, Avon and Somerset conducted a comprehensive assessment of demand. Validating findings against three years of data, it assessed which demand was dealt with better by partners and identified additional demand created through failure to resolve matters at the first opportunity. The force combined this with a clear understanding of which posts in the organisation were critical roles, such as roles that required specialist skills or manage particularly high-risk areas of the business, such as protecting vulnerable people.

Many forces are developing how they work with other public sector bodies. They want to prevent people from becoming victims of crime, stop potential offenders causing crime, and make sure that police officers can be best directed in using the skills and powers they have to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour.

West Midlands is designing a long-term partnership with a private sector company - its “Innovation and Integration partnership”. This partnership will be self-funding and requires the private sector partner to work with force to deliver a savings target over five years.

Norfolk has used its collaboration work with Suffolk Constabulary to achieve a large proportion of its savings requirement, although the recent decision not to proceed with plans to work together on a contact and control room highlights the importance of having a range of options, as indeed Norfolk had, and not relying on only one approach.

Staffordshire has developed an innovative approach to collaboration with Staffordshire County Council. A strong demonstration of this commitment is the approach that the force and county council are taking to drive efficiencies using their combined estate. The estate of both organisations will be contracted out to the private sector; a large-sized contract will be more attractive to the market and gaining a competitive deal for the public.

Lancashire also has similar plans for working more closely across public services to manage demand better, to provide a more effective response, and to change how services are provided to the public. These plans build on a strong existing partnership with Lancashire County Council.

All ‘outstanding’ forces already have advanced plans for beyond the end of the current spending review. This will enable them to have prepared the programmes necessary to achieve further savings.
Characteristics of forces that require improvement

The three forces identified as requiring improvement do not share a specific shortcoming, although they are all aware of the opportunities they have to improve.

Nottinghamshire was not able to demonstrate that it has invested fully in understanding its demand for policing services. The force is working to identify a means of organising policing services for Nottinghamshire that will enable it meet the savings requirement. At the time of the inspection critical decisions needed to be made rapidly so the force can move from the current organisational structures that it has to one which is affordable in this spending review period.

Gwent last conducted a thorough review of demand in 2009 and used the results from this to restructure the force. Subsequent to this initial restructure there has been a slight modification to how the force is organised. At the time of the inspection, HMIC found limited evidence that the force understood what was creating work for its officers across the organisation and how it should be structured to best respond to this demand.

The simplest way to find savings is to allow officers and staff to leave the force and not replace them. Gwent is managing its savings requirement by reducing its workforce in this way - but this is not an appropriate approach. This, together with the force’s lack of developed plans for achieving a balanced budget in 2015/16 and beyond, is of serious concern to HMIC.

Bedfordshire is a small force with a low cost base. It faces some considerable policing challenges in the short-term while endeavouring to plan for the future. The force previously reduced its police officer numbers to a level that put at risk its ability to deliver effective policing and this had a material effect on performance. The new chief constable and the police and crime commissioner recognise this and have plans in place to restore the force’s police strength to safe levels.

HMIC is encouraged that the force leadership has a good grasp and understanding of the issues and areas that need to improve. We found that the force is moving in the right direction and the pace of change is now increasing. Success depends on developing the required plans in detail and speeding up the pace in order to allay any future uncertainties.
Conclusion

As we have set out throughout this report, HMIC’s inspection has found a broadly positive picture in how forces are responding to the challenge of making the cuts and finding the savings required by the spending review. In part, this is to be expected as we are now the final year of the spending review period. Forces have had the time to develop their plans and approaches effectively; to evaluate and adjust their initial approaches; to learn from each other; and to respond to annual inspections carried out by HMIC.

Later this year HMIC will bring together all its judgments it makes about forces in relation to value for money, cutting crime, and on the legitimacy of policing to give an overall assessment of force performance. For those forces that require improvement overall and forces that require improvement in at least one area of the inspection we recommend that the chief constables of these forces urgently review their approaches to the spending review. In Bedfordshire, Nottinghamshire and Gwent, HMIC will conduct a re-inspection, to review progress within six months.
Chapter 8: Living with austerity – the future for forces
In carrying out this inspection, HMIC has focused on how forces have responded to the need to save £2.53bn over the four years of the spending review. However, it has become apparent that managing reducing budgets and identifying ways of reducing costs will be the standard means of operating for all forces for the foreseeable future. The government has confirmed that spending reductions are on-going, beyond the lifetime of this Parliament and forces must plan on this basis.⁷⁵

Therefore, this chapter outlines the progress that forces have made in planning for the spending reductions to come in 2015/16, assesses their approach to planning beyond this period of relative certainty, and starts to explore the possible risks of continuing with the same approach to managing continuing austerity. Careful consideration needs to be given to the question of how we can retain a 21st century policing capability while repeating the cost savings of the last four years.

Planning for 2015/16

With the announcement of 2015/16 funding levels in the June 2013 spending round, all forces have plans in place for efficiency savings. Some are in a good position due to high levels of reserves or because they made additional savings early on in the spending review period, decreasing the effect of reductions in subsequent years.

Over the spending review period, forces estimate that the total savings requirement from 2010/11 to 2014/15 is £2.53bn. Forces told us that their savings requirement for 2015/16 is estimated at £676m. This is almost a quarter of the savings made over the four-year spending review, indicating that budget reductions are continuing at the same pace as they have over the four years. So far, forces have identified £499m of planned savings and are currently assuming that of the remaining funding gap of £220.26m, £97.64m of reserves will be deployed to bridge this. Forces anticipate a total balance in their reserves of £1.26bn at the end of 2015/16.

Forces are planning ahead and assuming that they will need to find further savings during 2016/17 and beyond. All forces assume continuing spending reductions and all identify emerging funding pressures.

Forces have identified a number of risks to their future planning and budgets.

- The unknown levels of reductions after some relative certainty in 2015/16 and the fact that this will not be announced until after May 2015.
- Any changes to the current allocation process (in particular changes to current damping mechanism, see Annex C for a full explanation), which could be an issue for forces depending on the revisions made and their overall effect on force funding.
- The effect of the changes to the introduction of the single tier state pensions from April 2016/17 which will lead to an increase in the national insurance contributions paid by forces.
- Many police and crime commissioners accepted the freeze grant through the years it has been offered. These forces may now face a potential ‘cliff edge’ as having

accepted individual annual freeze grants in successive years, there is a risk that these will be removed at once, leaving a substantial residual gap in force budgets which needs to be factored into planning.

- The extent to which the police and crime commissioners’ ability to raise precept will be constrained (over the spending review period most police and crime commissioners in England have been preventing from increasing their precept by two percent or above unless they held a referendum).
- Further one-off pressures that materialise (for example the number of forces which need to replace outdated IT systems).

**Approaches taken by forces to managing continuing austerity**

Our inspection considered how forces were managing in a time of continued austerity. HMIC expected forces to be developing a range of realistic scenarios about what future funding may look like, and to be starting to develop plans on how best to meet these potential savings requirements. HMIC understands that a lack of certainty about future funding makes this difficult. However, we found that all forces are planning for how they would manage future cuts beyond the spending review, although this planning was at different stages for each force.

While the majority of forces had assumed the budget reductions would continue at a similar level to previous reductions, some have been more optimistic. HMIC has serious concerns if any forces are developing financial plans on the basis that the funding position will improve.

Those forces with the strongest response had developed a number of scenarios for different levels of reduction, and were assessing the resulting range of possible options for future savings and the effect these would have on the service to the public. For many future changes involved working with partners and collaborative work such as that described in Chapter 4 and others were focusing on managing down the demand for police services or increasing the productivity of their officers and staff as set out in Chapter 5.

**Future vulnerability**

Last year, HMIC found that Lincolnshire Police and Bedfordshire Police were particularly vulnerable because of their size, their funding position and the fact that they had already implemented a considerable number of approaches to achieving their savings.

Since our last report, Bedfordshire Police has put itself in a stronger financial position due to the collaboration with Hertfordshire Constabulary and Cambridgeshire Constabulary. This not only brings economies of scale but also allows these three forces to work more efficiently together on transforming their approach to IT and to share effective practices and approaches to change. However, the force still has a limited number of warranted officers to deploy in its neighbourhoods and communities. This remains a concern for HMIC.
Lincolnshire’s position remains financially constrained and despite continued efforts to identify further savings which minimise the effect on the front line, its next step will be to cut back on officers and PCSOs in communities.

We have also considered other forces who are small in terms of both expenditure and officer numbers. Many such forces also cover large geographic areas. Small forces do have some advantages in terms of managing change (for example communication is less complicated as there are fewer numbers of people) and their size may help them to be locally responsive to their communities. But they face a number of significant obstacles in cost-cutting including; difficulty in reducing overheads; difficulty in achieving flexible deployment of their workforce, as a greater number of their officers need to fill fixed roles; and, lacking the size to innovate. Some of the largest forces have been able to trial and evaluate new approaches and can be more attractive to private sector partners due to their scale.

It should not be assumed that forces with higher levels of expenditure can automatically make greater levels of savings. The additional level of expenditure may be necessary to manage the demand faced by the force - for example, because of high levels of crime or particularly serious and complex crime. The geographical size of the area a force has to police also has an effect: the police need to be available to respond should something happen, even if it does not happen very frequently.

Finally, a crude focus on the total number of officers is not the only measure of an effective police force - it is what those officers do that it is most important. However, forces will need a set number of staff and officers to run the basic business. From an operational planning and resilience perspective the number of warranted officers are important, for example, to respond to 999 calls (this can be more challenging over large geographic areas with poor infrastructure), investigate suspects, fulfil a range of statutory requirements, serve warrants, carry out searches, and respond initially to unexpected events (for example major incidences or public order situations). An understanding of at what point there are insufficient numbers to run a basic level of service is still underdeveloped in policing, although many forces are developing more sophisticated approaches to ensuring that they have a better understanding of this operational requirement.

The diagram below considers the size of forces (judged on officer numbers) and the cost of policing per head of population. The small forces have been magnified and there are a cluster of small forces with relatively low cost. HMIC has concerns about the extent to which these forces in particular can continue to withstand further reductions in the same way as they have over the next three to four years.
Note: the axis on this plot are not centred at 0. It is designed to highlight those forces which have a low number of police officers per head of population compared with other forces in England and Wales.

Some of these smaller forces have improved their potential future position and increased their resilience by collaborating with other forces:

- Warwickshire (which also has is one of the highest savings challenge as a proportion of GRE) has developed a strategic alliance with West Mercia.
• Dorset is has plans to develop a strategic alliance with Devon and Cornwall. This is in its early stages and it needs to move at pace to ensure savings are realised within the right time framework, but this is a positive move.

• Bedfordshire, as discussed earlier, has improved its position through collaboration with Hertfordshire and Cambridgeshire.

• Wiltshire and Lincolnshire have collaborated with non-police partners to achieve savings and engage in operational collaboration with police partners in their region.

• Suffolk has a high level of risk and recent changes to its collaboration programme with Norfolk Constabulary puts it at further risk as it moves into the next spending review period.

The long-term prospects for managing reductions

Police forces have responded positively in adapting to the spending reductions and redesigning their operations to continue to provide a good level of service to the public. However, substantial challenges remain for the police and with further funding cuts likely of a similar scale then it seems clear that some forces would struggle to meet their obligations without a radical alteration to how they operate.

There continues to be a noticeable variation between forces in the levels of reductions faced, and in their ability to withstand further reductions. To illustrate this point, HMIC has extrapolated data based on the changes that forces have reported over the last five years. This shows that, should officer reductions continue at the same rate, by 2022 a quarter of forces would have reduced their number of officers by at least 30 percent from a 2010 baseline. At the other end of the scale, broadly one quarter of forces would have reduced their number of officers by 15 percent or less by 2022. It is also likely that a greater number of forces would have the characteristics described in the previous section and would be vulnerable.

There are a number of issues that require serious consideration as forces move from responding to the reductions of the spending review to operating in continued austerity.

The first is how resource is allocated. There continues to be a wide disparity between the proportions of funding that forces receive from central Government and precept (and therefore the effect of cuts over the spending review period) and also a disparity in the level of reserves that forces have been able to build up to cope with unexpected events. Some forces have shown a greater aptitude for managing their finances more prudently than others. However, of those forces who find themselves in a healthy financial position, a number have benefitted from the way that funding is allocated to them which means they are in a stronger financial position and have a smaller funding reduction. It is important that any resource allocation approach does not penalise those forces which, due to good historic management of their finances, have placed themselves in a position to be able to withstand larger cost reductions than other forces.

The current allocation of resources is not according to need. This is for a number of complex reasons. Last year HMIC recommended that the distribution of resources to the 43 police forces in England and Wales should be reviewed.
The second issue relates to how this funding supports **efficiently organised policing services at the local, regional and national level**. Chapter 4 on collaboration demonstrates that once again this is an area where progress is not being made quickly enough. There is great potential for forces to generate savings through collaboration but also to learn from each other thereby improving their efficiency and effectiveness. HMIC acknowledges the difficulties that currently exist in arriving at collaboration by mutual consent and considers that a different approach is necessary, where a clearer national blueprint is developed for policing.

In some areas of policing there has been significant thought given to how best to provide specific functions at a regional level. A good example is the question of how police officer, staff and other assets are best organised to tackle serious and organised crime. Considerable effort has been devoted to developing a regional structure, the Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCs). Other regional structures exist, including Regional Intelligence Units (RIUs) which support ROCs and units to tackle terrorism.

In November, we reported on the collaborative arrangements in the East Midlands. The East Midlands Special Operations Unit (‘EMSOU’) was established in 2002 and now covers serious and organised crime, major crime, intelligence, forensics, and counter-terrorism. HMIC found that this collaboration had realised cost savings. We also reviewed the effectiveness of the serious and organised crime and major crime functions and found these to be effective. HMIC considers EMSOU to be well-established and functioning effectively for the region. Accordingly, it could act as a model for others elsewhere in the country.

Some elements of EMSOU have been created in other areas. Other forces are collaborating in areas such as forensics (both the four of the south west forces, Devon and Cornwall, Avon and Somerset, Wiltshire and Dorset, and those forces in the Yorkshire and Humber region) and major crime (Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire and Cambridgeshire). Finally, whilst the firearm and dog sections are not part of EMSOU, Wiltshire, Gloucestershire and Avon and Somerset now carry out these specialist operations as a tri-force collaboration.

Collaboration is most advanced in these specialist areas of policing. This is because there is a high level of specification as to how such policing is to be carried out. Policing practice in these areas is heavily codified in Approved Professional Practice (APP) and this is matched by consistent national training (often delivered jointly between several forces). HMIC’s report “Strategic Policing Requirement: An inspection of how police forces in England and Wales deal with threats to public order” (2013) reinforces this point as it found the level of consistency of professional practice was generally good in relation to public order, and strongest in the regions where the relevant officers trained together.77

For many of these functions the capacity and capability has been specified by the service. For example there are 12 agreed core capabilities which cover the functions that ROCs should provide for the forces in their region.

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Likewise areas covered by the Strategic Policing Requirement\textsuperscript{78} have had their capability and capacity defined by the National Policing Requirement.\textsuperscript{79}

Given the level of existing regional capability, HMIC recommends that serious consideration be given to how policing functions relating to serious and organised crime, major crime and potentially other specialist areas such as public order, firearms and other operational support functions such as dogs and mounted section are best provided.

It is important that any changes ensure that local policing services remain locally accountable and are able to work in an integrated way with other local public services to respond to the often complex needs of victims and better keep the public safe. We have seen excellent examples of this in those forces which we judge to be outstanding; in these areas police and crime commissioners have been instrumental in making sure this change has happened. A national blueprint must also consider the freedoms and flexibilities police and crime commissioners need in order to oversee the implementation of their police and crime plans in this on-going era of austerity.

**Conclusion**

The police service has responded strongly to the spending review. The service now needs to shift from responding to a one-off budget reduction to living with continuing austerity.

HMIC is concerned that the considerable variation in both the size of forces and their ability to withstand further budget reductions creates a future risk as to whether policing services to the public can be maintained at current levels in some force in three to five years’ time. There are a number of small forces we describe in this chapter who without force-to-force collaboration progressing at considerable speed and depth, are likely to find it very difficult to withstand further budget reductions in that time frame.

Continuing to apply the same level of cuts, distributed in the same way and with the same structures in place, is unlikely to be sustainable for all forces in the longer-term. Their limited options for savings will push them to make deeper cuts to neighbourhood policing and they may struggle to respond to unexpected events (for example, public order issue such as rioting or demonstrations or a major crime such as murder, kidnap or rape).

The time is now right for an open and constructive debate across policing on the fundamental aspects of how policing is organised and resourced in the future.

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\textsuperscript{78} The specific national threats set down in the Strategic Policing Requirement are: terrorism, civil emergencies, organised crime, public order threats and large-scale cyber incidents.

Annex A: About the data
The information presented in this report comes from a range of sources, including inspection fieldwork, data collection from all 43 police forces in England and Wales, and surveys of the public.

This annex explains the origins and background of each of the data-sets that have been analysed by HMIC to support the conclusions in the report, along with any caveats and limitations that should be noted.

Where HMIC has collected data directly from police forces, we have taken reasonable steps to agree the design of those data collections with practitioners from forces, and to verify the data that we have collected, mindful of the work that responding to one-off data collections imposes on forces.

Financial data: overall spending and savings requirements

Supporting chapters 1 and 8, and the individual force reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010/11 actual gross revenue expenditure (GRE) for each force</td>
<td>The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) finance data</td>
<td>Data was collected from forces in 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from central sources (police grant, special and specific grants, national non-domestic rates and revenue support grant)</td>
<td>CIPFA Police Objective Analysis data</td>
<td>Data was collected from forces in summer 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Estimates for 2013/14 for each force for:

- Total expenditure
- Net revenue expenditure
- Total cost of police officers (salary and overtime)
- Total cost of police staff and PCSOs (salary and overtime)
- FTE (full-time equivalent) workforce figures (police officers staff and PCSOs)
Annex A: About the data

For each individual year of the spending review period (2011/12 to 2014/15), actual or planned:
- Savings (and breakdown between pay and non-pay)
- Funding gap (after savings)
- Use of reserves
- Financial assumptions for future years (e.g. precept levels, future changes to police/staff pay, and inflation)

Data Source
HMIC-designed data collection from forces.

Timing
Data was collected from forces in March 2014

HMIC's financial questionnaire to forces

Data verification carried out:
- HMIC carried out checks on the data that forces submitted, and raised queries with forces where, for example, their figures were substantially different from other forces; or from the data they provided to HMIC in 2013; or were internally inconsistent.
- In June/July 2014 all forces were also asked to check the specific final data used to support the analysis, and correct any errors in their figures.

Completeness of the data:
- All forces were able to provide this data, except for Cleveland. It stated that government grants and council tax incomes are a decision for the PCC, not for the force. This means the provided income is under the ‘other’ category for 2013/14 onwards.

Notes on use of this data
- In order to calculate the savings requirement over the spending review period (a measure of the financial challenge faced by forces), we added together the planned savings in each individual year (2011/12, 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15) and the funding gap after savings (2014/15), as provided by forces.
- The outstanding gap is the funding gap (after savings) as provided by forces for 2014/15.
- The savings requirement as a proportion of gross revenue expenditure (GRE) is calculated as the total savings requirement as a proportion of 2010/11 actual GRE.
- Pay data includes salaries and overtime. Total pay costs are based on the salaries
and overtime of officers, police staff and PCSOs and ignores money spent on national policing functions to allow a more meaningful comparison between forces.

- Non-pay data include temporary and agency costs; injury and ill health costs; other employee costs; premises; transport; supplies and services; third party payments; and capital financing.

- Workforce estimates from the CIPFA Police Objective Analysis are based on budgeted FTE posts and, therefore, are different from workforce figures quoted which are based on actual FTEs in post.

- In data relating to reserves, a negative figure denotes an addition to reserves, rather than the use of reserves to close a gap in the budget.

- The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) data is included in the national financial figures.

- Data on overall spending and the savings requirement has been collected on the same basis as for earlier HMIC reports. In addition to this year’s data collection, finance data from last year’s report (Policing in Austerity: Rising to the Challenge, July 2013) has also been used to provide a consistent baseline for 2011/12.
## Workforce data

Supporting chapters 2 and 3, and the individual force reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By force, as at 31 March 2010 and 31 March 2014:</td>
<td>National statistics (published by the Home Office)</td>
<td>Data from the publication on 17 July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Number of police officers (full time equivalents, FTEs)</td>
<td>Additional, non-published, data has been obtained from forces’ Annual Data Requirement (ADR) submission.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Number of police staff including Section 38 designated officers (FTEs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Number of PCSOs (FTEs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Number of special constables (headcount)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Breakdown of officers, staff and PCSOs by role, classified by function – as defined in the Home Office ADR601 data collection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Number of police officers (FTEs) at each rank.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Timing</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>By force, as at 31 March 2014:</td>
<td>National statistics (published by the Home Office)</td>
<td>Data from the publication on 17 July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number of police officers, staff and PCSOs (FTEs) and special constables (headcount) who were female, and who were from a minority ethnic background.</td>
<td>Additional, non-published, data has been obtained from forces’ Annual Data Requirement (ADR) submission.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Numbers of police officers, staff and PCSOs who were recorded as being on recuperative or restricted duties and those on short and medium term sick. Police workforce data published by the Home Office is not broken down to this level of detail and therefore data will not have been through the same levels of scrutiny as other sections of the ADR submission.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Annex A: About the data

#### Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By force, projections for 31 March 2015:</td>
<td>HMIC-designed data collection from forces</td>
<td>Data was collected from forces in March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number of police officers (full-time equivalents, FTEs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number of police staff (FTEs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number of PCSOs (FTEs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number of special constables (headcount)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Breakdown of officers, staff and PCSOs by role, classified as ‘operational frontline’, ‘operational support, and ‘business support’.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### HMIC's workforce questionnaire to forces

Data verification carried out:

- HMIC carried out checks on the data that forces submitted, and raised queries with forces where, for example, their figures were significantly different from other forces, or were inconsistent internally.
- In June/July 2014 all forces were also asked to check the specific final data used to support the analysis, and correct any errors in their figures.
- Data completeness:
- All forces were able to provide this data.

#### Notes on use of this data

- Within this report, police staff includes Section 38 designated officers. There the numbers will not match the headline police staff numbers within national statistics publications, but will match the total numbers published in the supplementary tables associated with the national statistics.
- Two factors mean that projected workforce numbers for March 2015 are not comparable precisely with the 2010 baseline and 2011, 2012, 2013 or 2014 actual workforce figures reported as national statistics, so any projected changes in workforce numbers should be treated as approximate figures. These two factors are:
1. ‘Actual’ workforce data shows the actual number of full-time equivalent officers, staff and PCSOs in post; vacant posts are not included. Forces’ projections for March 2015, however, are for budgeted posts, so will effectively include posts that will be vacant at that point.

2. March 2010 and March 2014 data also includes staff classified under the ‘Other’ ADR function in the total number of officers, staff and PCSOs. This classification includes staff absent from duty due to maternity or paternity leave, on a career break, in full-time education or on suspension, and those staff on long-term leave (sickness, compassionate, special and unpaid). Some forces chose not to include assumptions around the number of ‘Other’ staff in their projections.

- March 2010 baseline and 2014 data for the three categories: ‘operational frontline’, ‘operational support’ and ‘business support’ will not add up to the total workforce size because the ‘Other’ function is not included in the frontline model but is included in the total. When proportions of the workforce in each category are calculated, they are based on the workforce excluding those in ‘Other’.

- Where we used data not published (for example officers on recuperative and restricted duty), the data will not have been through the same levels of quality assurance as other sections of the ADR submission.

- Two ADR returns have been used to compile tables on workforce numbers – ADR502 and ADR601. There may be very small inconsistencies between these two datasets due to the way in which they are collated by forces.

- Data on frontline numbers is not comparable to data published in Policing in Austerity: One year on (2012) due to the revisions to the frontline model. Analysis of frontline numbers and proportions is in any event not comparable with that presented in that report, as there was no data from Cheshire Constabulary and the Metropolitan Police Service. For this report these two forces provided all of the necessary data.

- The number of ‘visible’ police officers and PCSOs is calculated using the following categories from the Home Office ‘ADR 601’ data collection:
  - Response
  - Neighbourhoods
  - Community safety/relations
  - Probationers year 1
  - Traffic
  - Dogs
  - Firearms – tactical
  - Mounted
  - Traffic wardens.
Financial data: collaboration

Supporting chapter 5 in the report, and the individual force reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013/14 net revenue expenditure (NRE) for each force</td>
<td>The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) Police Objective Analysis estimates</td>
<td>Data was collected from forces in summer 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For each individual year of the spending review period (2011/12 to 2014/15):
- Budgeted net spend in collaborative areas
- Net savings, as a cumulative total, from collaboration compared to 2010/11 baseline

HMIC-designed data collection from forces | Data was collected from forces in March 2014 |

HMIC’s collaboration questionnaire to forces

Data verification carried out:
- HMIC carried out checks on the data forces submitted, and raised queries with forces where, for example, their figures were significantly different from other forces, or were internally inconsistent.
- In June/July 2014 all forces were also asked to check the specific final data used to support the analysis, and correct any errors in their figures.
- Completeness of the data:
  - All forces were able to provide this data for 2013/14 and 2014/15
  - Notes on use of this data
    - This data is for spend in collaborative areas presented as spend as a proportion of 2011/12 net revenue expenditure (NRE).
    - Net revenue expenditure is the total cost of policing to the taxpayer; it is calculated as total expenditure minus earned income. Note that HMIC uses a different calculation for net revenue expenditure to that of CIPFA.
    - Planned savings within collaborative areas are presented as cumulative savings to 2014/15 as a proportion of the total savings requirement.
  - Data on collaboration was not collected in exactly the same way as in earlier HMIC reports, and so should not be compared directly. (For example, in earlier reports,
potential as well as actual collaborative activity might have been reported by a force; for this report, only schemes that were included in forces’ medium-term financial plans were counted.)

Public survey data

Supporting Chapter 6, and the individual force reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public survey (see below for question list)</td>
<td>ICM telephone survey: 1,315 respondents</td>
<td>The survey was carried out in March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public survey (see below for question list)</td>
<td>YouGov online survey: 19,538 respondents</td>
<td>The survey was carried out between 10 March and 21 March 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ICM telephone survey

- To support HMIC’s 2012 and 2013 reports, ICM carried out a telephone survey. Members of the public were contacted and asked questions about their knowledge, tolerance and experiences of the changes forces are making in response to the spending review. An identical survey was carried out in support of this report.

The ten questions that respondents were asked were:

1. Thinking about the last 12 months, what changes, if any, have you noticed to the policing in your area?
2. Thinking about seeing police officers out in the streets in your area, would you say you are seeing them more often, less often or as often as you would have done 12 months ago?
3. Did you know whether or not your local police force has had a cut in the amount of money it gets from the government?

For those who were aware:

4. How did you find out about the reduction in the amount of money your local police force receives from the government?
5. Would you support the closure of the front desk in your local police station in either of the following circumstances?
   - If the building continues to be used by the police after the front counter closes.
   - If the front desk only received a low rate of callers.
6. If your local police station were to close its front counter in the station, which of the following alternatives would you find acceptable?
   • You are able to access front counter services by telephone.
   • Front counter services are provided by police staff at another location e.g. local authority building or in other shared location.
   • You are able to access front counter services online.
   • None of these.

7. I am now going to read out some scenarios, please tell me how, if at all, you might contact the police should this happen to you:
   • Having got off a train 15 minutes ago you find that your mobile phone has been stolen from your pocket.
   • You get up in the morning to find your car bonnet has been badly scratched with the name of a football team.
   • You are a victim of a minor assault, although uninjured, after you ask a dog owner not to allow their dog to foul the street.
   • Groups of local youths regularly congregate nearby your home. They are not committing any crimes but are occasionally noisy and boisterous. They do not intimidate passers-by or are not otherwise problematic.
   • You find that the padlock on your garage has been forced open and your expensive bicycle has been stolen. You see a discarded screwdriver and there are foot-marks on the floor which you suspect belong to the thief.
   • You hear repeated shouting and a female screaming ‘stop’ in a next door flat. This has been ongoing for several hours and it has now gone quiet.

8. Still thinking about these scenarios again, in which would you expect a police officer to come out to you immediately if you contacted them?

9. Do you know what your police force is doing to deal with the cuts in the money they receive from the government?

10. Some police forces use Twitter, Facebook or other social media to communicate with the public. Would (or do) you use social media to do any of the following?
   • Obtain information on what my police force is doing.
   • Obtain information on specific incidents (e.g. if you walk past a crime scene, to find out what’s going on).
   • Provide information or intelligence to the police on a crime.
   • Report crimes.
   • None of these.
   • Not applicable - I do not use social media.
YouGov online survey

- HMIC commissioned YouGov to conduct an online survey to establish an independent perspective of the public’s knowledge, tolerance and experiences to the changes forces are making in response to the spending review.

- This survey was conducted online using the YouGov panel of over 425,000 people. Survey quotas were set to reflect the population of the UK by age, gender, region, social grade and ethnicity, the sample was then selected from the panel. Weightings were applied once the survey had been completed to correct for any non-response bias. Caution needs to be taken in considering the results from this survey as being truly representative of the general population. The survey used a relatively small sample per force through quota sampling. This means there may be some bias in the results reflecting those interviewed rather than the general population.

- There were 19,583 respondents across England and Wales and around 375 respondents per force area (although due to population size, the survey of residents of the City of London was combined with that of the Metropolitan Police Service area).

- The survey was designed to provide individual force results with a confidence interval of, at most, around ±6%. Nationally, the confidence interval is ±1%. Differences to the England and Wales value and to forces’ own values the previous years, may not be statistically significant.

The questions that respondents were asked were:

1. Thinking about the last 12 months, what changes, if any, have you noticed to the policing in your area?

2. Thinking about seeing police officers out in the streets in your neighbourhood, would you say you are seeing them more often, less often or as often as you would have done 12 months ago?

3. How safe do you feel from crime in the area where you live?

4. How safe do you feel from crime in the area where you live compared to two years ago?

5. How often do you see a police officer patrolling where you live?

6. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the level of police officer patrols in the area where you live?

7. How often do you see a police community support officer patrolling where you live?

8. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the level of police community support officer patrols in the area where you live?

9. Do you know whether or not your local police force has had a cut in the amount of money it gets from the government in the last two years?
For those who were aware:

10. How did you find out about the reduction in the amount of money your local police force receives from the government?

11. Do you expect the government to cut your police force’s funding over the next two years?

12. For which of the following reasons, if any, would you support the closure of the front counter in your local police station?
   - If the building continues to be used by the police after the front counter closes.
   - If the front counter only received a low rate of callers.
   - I would never support the closure of the front counter.

13. Imagine your local police station was to close its front counter in the station, which of the following alternatives, if any, would you find acceptable?
   - Front counter services by telephone
   - Front counter services provided by police staff at another location (e.g. local authority building or in other shared location)
   - Front counter services online
   - None of these.

14. In relation to the following scenarios, how, if at all, would you contact the police should this happen to you:
   - Having got off a train 15 minutes ago you find that your mobile phone has been stolen from your pocket.
   - You get up in the morning to find your car bonnet has been badly scratched with the name of a football team.
   - You are a victim of a minor assault (although uninjured) after you ask a dog owner not to allow their dog to foul in the street.
   - Groups of local youths regularly congregate nearby your home. They are not committing any crimes but are occasionally noisy and boisterous. They do not intimidate passers-by or are not otherwise problematic.
   - You find that the padlock on your garage has been forced open and your expensive bicycle has been stolen. You see a discarded screwdriver and there are foot marks on the floor which you suspect belong to the thief.
   - You hear repeated shouting and a female screaming ‘stop’ in a next door flat. This has been ongoing for several hours and it has now gone quiet.

15. Thinking about these scenarios again, in which of the following ways would you expect the issue to be dealt with by the police:
   - Face-to-face by a police officer
   - Over the telephone by a police officer or police staff
• Both face-to-face and over the telephone
• None of these.

16. All police forces have had their funding cut by the government. Do you know what your police force is doing to deal with the cuts in the money they receive from the government?

17. Which of the following, if any, do you know that your police force uses to communicate with the public in your local area?
• Face-to-face interaction with a police officer on patrol
• Face-to-face interaction with a police community support officer (PCSO) on patrol
• 999 emergency telephone response
• 101 non-emergency telephone response
• Police website
• Police pages on social media (e.g. twitter or Facebook)
• Police stations with front counter services
• Clearly identifiable police stations without front counter services
• Shared police access points
• Police community meetings
• Police newsletters/leaflets or articles in local newspapers
• None of the above.

18. And, which of [these] forms of communication, if any, would make you feel safer in your local area?

19. Some police forces use Twitter, Facebook or other social media to communicate with the public. Do you use social media to do any of the following?
• Obtain information on what my police force is doing
• Obtain information on specific incidents (e.g. if you walk past a crime scene, to find out what’s going on)
• Provide information or intelligence to the police on a crime
• Report crimes
• None of these
• Not applicable - I do not use social media
20. Which of the following types of officers [an officer from local police force, or an officer from a ‘joint unit’], if any, do you think are acceptable for dealing with the incident detailed below?

- The officer(s) who turn up and deal with an incident after a road traffic collision on a major road.
- The officer(s) who deal with major or serious crimes such as murder, child abuse or rape investigation.
- The person(s) who attend the scene of a crime and searches for forensic evidence e.g. dusts for fingerprints or takes photographs.
- Although some of the questions that were asked in this online survey were similar to those asked in the 2012 and 2013 telephone surveys, because the survey methodologies are different, the results cannot be compared directly.

Data on accessing police services

Supporting chapter 6, and the individual force reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By force, data on the number of face-to-face access points, for 2009/10 to 2012/13 (actual) and 2013/14 to 2015/16 (projections):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police stations</td>
<td>HMIC-designed data collection from forces</td>
<td>Data was collected from forces in March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front counters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shared public access points with front counters</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>By force, data on the number of advertised opening hours, for 2012/13 (actual) and 2013/14 to 2015/16 (projections):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front counters</td>
<td>HMIC-designed data collection from forces</td>
<td>Data was collected from forces in March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared public access points with front counters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Timing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>By force, whether the following services are available to the public online:</td>
<td>HMIC review of forces’ websites</td>
<td>Review carried out in March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Report a crime</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Report anti-social behaviour</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Make a formal complaint</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provide quality of service feedback</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Make an FOI request</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Report lost property</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• View photograph and contact details for Neighbourhood Policing Team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Identify face-to-face access points and opening times</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provide intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Allow services to be accessed in different languages</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Enable services to be accessed by those whose sight is impaired</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Apply for a firearms licence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ask a question or seek specific information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other services (only those which the public might otherwise visit a police station to access)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other online services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HMIC data collection from forces

Data completeness:

- Not all forces were able to provide historical data or future projections. Where data was not provided for some years, the data was estimated using another year’s data, where that was available.

- Police station numbers:
  1. Cleveland Police was unable to provide historical data, so has been removed from analysis over time.
  2. Cumbria Constabulary was unable to provide projections for 2015/16 and Dorset Police, Essex Police, Kent Police, Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police did not provide projections for 2014/15 and 2015/16.

- Front-counter numbers:
  1. Cleveland Police was unable to provide historical data, so have been removed from analysis over time.
  2. Cumbria Constabulary and Kent Police were unable to provide projections for 2015/16; Dorset Police, Essex Police, Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police were not able to provide projections for 2014/15 and 2015/16 and South Wales Police was unable to provide figures for 2013/14 to 2015/16.

- Numbers of shared access points with front counters:
  1. Cleveland Police was unable to provide historical data, so have been removed from analysis over time.
  2. Cumbria Constabulary and Kent Police were unable to provide projections for 2015/16; Dorset Police, Essex Police, Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police were not able to provide projections for 2014/15 and 2015/16 and South Wales Police was unable to provide figures for 2013/14 to 2015/16.

Notes on use of this data

- A police station has been defined as “a clearly identifiable police building which is solely or predominantly for the use of police officers and staff but does not provide front counter services.” This is designed to capture the visible or ‘blue light’ presence police stations provide within communities even when they do not have front counter services. It does not include buildings which are not clearly identifiable as a police station such as covert or operational/business support buildings.

- A front counter has been defined as “a police building open to the general public to obtain face-to-face access to police services”. Note that if a force closes a front counter, the building will become designated as a police station (under these definitions), if the building itself does not close.

- A shared access point has been defined as “a non-police building open to the general public to obtain face-to-face access to police services. For example shared facilities with council services (e.g. libraries or offices), the fire service or other partners.”
HMIC review of forces’ websites

- The exercise was completed for all forces.
- HMIC staff conducted the review and approached it as members of the public. Each website was searched for up to three minutes when looking for each link. The links needed to be clear and easy to find to be logged as present.
- Report a crime: the original methodology looked for both ‘report a crime’ and ‘report an incident’, and these were contained in Adapting to Austerity: One Year On (2012). These two checks have now been combined as a member of the public would not be likely to make the distinction between a crime and an incident and would just be searching for a way to tell the police something had happened.
- Providing intelligence: although a small number of forces provide a service of their own, most now refer to Crimestoppers. As these links are often easy to find and most likely to be used, this was the primary method recorded.
- Data on online services was collected on the same basis as for Policing in Austerity: One Year On, although as the methodology includes an element of subjectivity, results may not be precisely comparable.

Response time data

Supporting chapter 6 and individual force reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By force, for the financial years 2010/11 to 2013/14:</td>
<td>Data collected during inspection fieldwork</td>
<td>Fieldwork took place between April and June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Police target response time for incidents graded as either ‘emergency’ or ‘priority’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Percentage of incidents graded either ‘emergency’ or ‘priority’ which were attended within the target time set by the force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data completeness:

- There are no national targets for police response times. Most forces have their own local targets, although some forces do not. The forces that either do not have local response time targets or could not provide some or all of this data were:
- Cheshire Constabulary (provided data for 2010/11, but emergency calls only for 2013/14)
• Derbyshire Constabulary
• Gwent Police
• Humberside Police (does not record gather this information)
• Northamptonshire Police (provided data for 2013/14 only)
• North Wales Police (provided data for emergency incidents only)
• Surrey Police (no longer have targets and only the time to attend is recorded)

Notes on use of this data

• There is no national definition of a target response time and in particular around when the ‘clock starts and stops’:
  • Forces can ‘start the clock’ from the time of the call into the force control room; from the time the incident is logged into the force command and control system; or from when an officer is actually deployed to the incident.
  • The ‘clock stops’ when the deployed officer updates the control room that they are ‘at scene’. When the scene is large or perhaps when suspects are moving in a vehicle ‘the scene’ can also vary.
  • Therefore, response time performance cannot be accurately compared between forces. However, if a force’s own definition has not changed over time then changes in that force’s performance against response time targets can give an indication of how the operating model or deployment of officers is changing.

Crime, detections and victim satisfaction data

Supporting Chapter 6, and the individual force reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By force, for the financial years 2010/11 to 2013/14:</td>
<td>National statistics (published by the Office for National Statistics)</td>
<td>Data from the publication on 17 July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Police recorded crime data, for various categories used by the Office for National Statistics to report crime</td>
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### Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By force, for the financial year 2013/14:</td>
<td>National statistics (published by the Home Office)</td>
<td>Data from the publication on 17 July 2014</td>
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<td>• Detections data comprising of charge summons, cautions, fixed penalties, cannabis warnings and taken into considerations for crimes previously recorded.</td>
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<tr>
<td>By force, for the financial years 2010/11 to 2013/14:</td>
<td>Official statistics (published on HMIC’s Crime and Policing Comparator)</td>
<td>Data from the publication on 17 July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Victim satisfaction survey data</td>
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</table>

### Notes on use of the data

**Victim satisfaction surveys:**

- Surveys are carried out by all forces, using a mandatory set of core questions that cover first contact, response and follow-up. Feedback from victims is obtained between 6 and 12 weeks after their initial contact, and is currently either by telephone or postal survey. Eligible respondents include all users aged 16 or over.

- The data includes the views of surveyed victims who have had contact with the police in connection with burglary, vehicle crime and violent crime. The figures represent the percentage of these victims who are (‘fairly’, ‘very’ or ‘completely’) satisfied with the service provided by the police.

- Users are asked for their views on five aspects of the service they received which are:
  1. making contact with the police (ease of contact)
  2. action taken by the police (actions)
  3. being kept informed of progress (follow-up)
  4. treatment by staff (treatment)
  5. the overall service provided (whole experience).

- Because the results are from sample surveys, confidence intervals are reported with the data. These give a range around the survey result within which we can be 95 percent confident that the average response of victims of similar crimes would be, were it possible to survey them all.
As the user satisfaction data is derived from sample surveys, the figures for the percentage of victims satisfied are estimates only. As such, statistical tests have to be applied to calculate whether the satisfaction level in any given force is likely to be different from average, or different from the level reported in earlier time periods (this is called a ‘statistical significance’ test). A ‘statistically significant difference’ (at the 95 percent confidence level) means that the difference is likely to be a real one.

The survey results for Dyfed-Powys and City of London both have confidence intervals greater than 3 percent so should be treated with caution.

Detections:

- Please note that published data on detections also includes those taken into considerations for crimes not previously recorded.

Population data

Supporting various parts of the report and the individual force reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Timing</th>
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</thead>
</table>

Notes on use of the data

- Note that the ‘transient’ population (rather than resident population) is generally used for comparisons for the City of London Police.

Note on use of research evidence

This report draws on existing academic literature and data sources. These were suggested to HMIC by organisations represented on HMIC’s Valuing the Police Reference Group or who acted as expert readers of the report. However, a full or systematic literature review was not carried out.

Full grading criteria are available from HMIC’s website.
Annex B: Summary grading of forces
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>To what extent is the force taking the necessary steps to ensure a secure financial position for the short and long term?</th>
<th>To what extent has the force an affordable way of providing policing?</th>
<th>To what extent is the force efficient?</th>
<th>Overall judgment on the extent to which the force provides value for money</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Avon and Somerset</td>
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<td>outstanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bedfordshire</td>
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</table>
## Annex B: Summary grading of forces

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<td>Metropolitan Police</td>
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<td>Wiltshire</td>
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</table>

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Annex C: Police Funding in England and Wales
Funding to the police comprises the following funding streams:

- Home Office Police Main Grant (allocated through the Police Allocation Formula)
- Home Office Specific Grants (for example, Counter Terrorism Police Grant)
- Funding from the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) or Welsh Government (WG) (from 2013/14 the vast majority of funding provided by DCLG to the police has been transferred to the Home Office and is paid out alongside Police Main Grant)
- A small amount of grant funding from MOJ for commissioning victims services
- Precept (Council Tax)
- Other Income (for example, a local council offering funding for PCSOs or revenue from policing special events like football matches).

As a result of the evolutionary history of police funding, every force’s total income is represented by very different proportions of the different funding streams above. For example:

- one force may have had high increases in council tax for many years, making the proportion of council tax to central funding high by national comparison; while
- another may work alongside a local council that believes strongly in Neighbourhood Policing, and contributes a large amount of funding for additional PCs and PCSOs.

Nationally, the average proportion of funding that comes from each area is as shown in the chart below.

![Average proportion of funding from each area (2014/15)](chart)

- **Central Grants**: 68%
- **Council Tax**: 24%
- **Other Income**: 8%

The central grant (including any dampening) constitutes of the DCLG general grant; WAG general grant; Welsh top-up; Neighbourhood Policing Fund; Counter Terrorism Specific
Annex C: Police Funding in England and Wales

Grant; Council Tax Freeze Grant; PFI grants and the National, International and Capital City Grant (MPS only).

The council tax strand includes only council tax levied locally (this does not include the council tax freeze grant).

The other income strand includes partnership income, income from sales, fees, charges & rents; special police services; reimbursed income and interest.

When a force’s finance department starts to consider what its potential income could be, factors include:

• How much the force will get from central government (central government funding)
• Whether the PCC will increase precept and by how much (precept)
• The rate of inflation on key areas of expenditure such as pay, fuel and utilities
• How much income it is likely to generate
• How much money local partners such as the council will voluntarily contribute
• The amount of unallocated reserves held.

Central Government Funding

The current four year cycle, the Spending Review (SR) period, runs from 2011/12 – 2014/15. The vast majority of central government funding for policing is allocated using a complex relative needs formula known as the Police Allocation Formula (PAF), which takes into account a large number of socio-economic factors such as unemployment, density of bars and pubs and population for each for force.

A Home Office Police Grant Report (and accompanying Written Ministerial Statement) setting out the formal allocations for the next financial year is laid before parliament in February, with a provisional Police Grant Report laid in Parliament the December before that. Overall police funding totals and indicative force-level allocations for as many funding streams as possible were set out for all four years of the SR period in the Written Ministerial Statement that accompanied the 2011/12 Police Grant Report. This, along with subsequent announcements on additional reductions (e.g. following the Chancellor’s Autumn Statement or Budget) is used by forces to develop their assumptions about central funding in their budget planning for future years.

Furthermore, the amount each force is allocated each year is moderated by a process known as ‘damping’. The process smoothes funding levels between years to prevent any force facing an unmanageable change in its funding level.

Finally, some forces experience unexpected events throughout the financial year that they could not have reasonably planned for. Examples would be policing the 2011 summer riots or managing the floods of recent years. In these exceptional circumstances, forces may apply to the Home Office for special financial assistance (known as Special Grant) although payment is subject to Ministerial discretion.

The way in which central funding for policing is allocated (using the Police Allocation Formula and the damping mechanism) is complex. The Home Office is currently carrying out
work to identify ways of improving and potentially simplifying the way funding is allocated. Although this is yet another unknown for forces, it is widely welcomed and acknowledged as necessary.

**Spending Review reductions**

The headline reduction for police central grant was 20% real. This translated into assumed year on year real reductions of 5.6% in 2011/12, 7.6% in 2012/13, and 4.4% in 2013/14.

There are some additional complexities. Firstly, as part of wider Government policy to reduce the number of individual funding streams, the government decided to consolidate a number of police funding streams during the SR10- period. For example from 2013/14, the ring-fenced Neighbourhood Policing Fund has also been rolled into Police Main Grant and from this financial year, the Community Safety Fund has been rolled into Police Main Grant.

In addition, from 2013/14 Local Council Tax Support Grant funding, worth over £400m, has been provided to PCCs. From 2014/15 this amount has been transferred from DCLG to the Home Office to be included in the police settlement.

**Spending Round Reductions**

In June 2013 the Government announced a one year spending round allocation for the financial year 2015/16. For 2015/16 it was announced that central government revenue funding to the police would reduce by £269 million, equivalent to a 4.9 percent real terms reduction from the 2014/15 baseline. However, there remains lack of clarity over whether this 4.9 percent figure will increase as a result of the additional reduction to Departmental budgets that was announced in the December 2013 Autumn Statement.

**Council Tax (Precept)**

Central government funding is the largest source of funding for the police. The police precept component of council tax is the second. Unlike central funding, council tax levels are determined locally, previously by the Police Authority and since November 2012 by the elected Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC), in consultation with their local taxpayers. The local determination of council tax increases has led to wide variations in the proportion of police budgets that come from precept. For example during 2014/15, Surrey’s budget is 50% precept, whereas Northumbria’s is 11%.

In 2011/12, to relieve the financial burden on the public, central government offered a grant equivalent to a 2.5% increase to all English police authorities willing to freeze the council tax precept. This grant is payable in all four years of the SR period. Similar grants have been offered in the subsequent three years.

For 2013/14 English PCCs could not raise their precept level by more than 2% without triggering a referendum. An exception was made for the ten English PCCs with the lowest precept levels. These PCCs only triggered a referendum if they planned an increase of over 2% and over £5.00.
In 2014/15, similar constraints were placed on raising precept (an increase of 2% or more would trigger a referendum) but no flexibility was offered to those PCCs with the lowest precept levels.

### Partnership funding and other income

Local partners from the public, private and third sectors often fund forces independently to provide additional policing services. The most common example is a local council funding additional neighbourhood policing posts, primarily at PCSO and PC level. Forces have long been aware of the short term nature of this funding, and the potential for it be withdrawn at short notice. Public sector partners in particular are also facing budget reductions and funding to external partners is often one of the first cuts to be made. Forces are starting to see the impact of this and are then faced with the decision of funding the posts from their own budget, which creates additional budgetary pressures, displacing posts elsewhere in the force, or losing the posts entirely.

The final source of police funding is income generation. The amount is small but still accounts for around 5%. This is mainly cost recovery from the provision of Special Police Services, such as policing a large football match, with forces recovering less than the actual cost of services they provide. This has remained largely unaffected by the cuts to funding.