

# PEEL: Police effectiveness 2017

An inspection of the Metropolitan Police Service



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## Force in numbers



### Calls for assistance

Incidents per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2017

Metropolitan Police Service

**416**

England and Wales

**282**



### Anti-social behaviour

Anti-social behaviour (ASB) incidents per 1,000 population 12 months to 31 March 2017

Metropolitan Police Service

**31**

England and Wales

**31**

Change in ASB incidents 12 months to 31 March 2016 against 12 months to 31 March 2017

Metropolitan Police Service

**+13%**

England and Wales

**-0.05%**



### Crime (excluding fraud)

Crimes recorded per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2017

Metropolitan Police Service

**89**

England and Wales

**77**

Change in recorded crime 12 months to 30 June 2016 against 12 months to 30 June 2017

Metropolitan Police Service

**+6%**

England and Wales

**+14%**



## Crime outcomes\*

Charged/summonsed

Metropolitan Police Service

10%

England and Wales

10%

Evidential difficulties: suspect identified but victim does not support action

Metropolitan Police Service

11%

England and Wales

13%

Investigation completed but no suspect identified

Metropolitan Police Service

53%

England and Wales

48%



## Domestic abuse

Domestic abuse incidents per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2017

Metropolitan Police Service

17

England and Wales

15

Domestic abuse as a percentage of all recorded crime (excluding fraud) 12 months to 30 June 2017

Metropolitan Police Service

10%

England and Wales

11%



## Organised crime groups

Organised crime groups per 1 million population as at 1 July 2017

Metropolitan Police Service

100

England and Wales

47

\*Figures are shown as proportions of outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017. For further information about the data in this graphic please see annex A.

## Risk-based inspection

HMICFRS adopted an interim risk-based approach to inspection in 2017 in order to focus more closely on areas of policing where risk to the public is most acute.<sup>1</sup> Under this approach, not all forces are assessed against every part of the PEEL effectiveness programme every year. The Metropolitan Police Service was assessed against the following areas in 2017:

- Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour;
- Investigating crime and reducing re-offending;
- Protecting vulnerable people;
- Tackling serious and organised crime; and
- Specialist capabilities.

Judgments from 2016<sup>2</sup> remain in place for areas which were not re-inspected in 2017. HMICFRS will continue to monitor areas for improvement identified in previous inspections and will assess how well each force has responded in future reports.


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<sup>1</sup> Full details of the interim risk-based approach are available from the HMICFRS website: [www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/2017-peel-assessment/#risk-based](http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/2017-peel-assessment/#risk-based)

<sup>2</sup> The 2016 effectiveness report for the Metropolitan Police Service can be found on the HMICFRS website: [www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/publications/peel-police-effectiveness-2016-metropolitan](http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/publications/peel-police-effectiveness-2016-metropolitan)

## Effectiveness overview

### Judgments

Overall effectiveness 2017  Requires improvement

Question	Grade	Last inspected
Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour	 Good	2017
Investigating crime and reducing re-offending	 Requires improvement	2017
Protecting vulnerable people	 Requires improvement	2017
Tackling serious and organised crime	 Good	2017
Specialist capabilities	Ungraded	2017

### Summary

The Metropolitan Police Service requires improvement in keeping people safe and reducing crime but in general its performance is better than in 2016.

Since our 2016 effectiveness inspection the force has made progress in some areas, and HMICFRS is pleased to see that efforts have been made to ensure that improvements have been made throughout the force. However, further action is needed in several areas, set out below, in order to provide the public with an effective service.

The force invests significantly in local policing and has a good understanding of its communities. However, although we found some good examples of officers and staff using problem-solving techniques to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour, there is little evaluation to enable them to learn from previous experience and improve their effectiveness.

The force needs to improve its approach to investigating crime and reducing re-offending. It is struggling to fill a large number of detective vacancies, despite the use of some innovative recruitment methods. This shortfall in officer numbers is having a detrimental effect on the quality of criminal investigations.

The force must also improve the way it protects vulnerable people. Officers and staff are aware that ensuring they respond appropriately to them is a priority; improvements have been made to the way the force deals with vulnerable victims of crime, particularly in relation to domestic abuse. However, the force must improve how it works with other agencies to safeguard victims.

The force has responded well in the areas for improvement relating to serious and organised crime which HMICFRS identified in 2016. It has improved its understanding of serious and organised crime and manages organised crime groups well, involving teams across the force and working in collaboration with local partners, for instance other policing authorities, HM Revenue & Customs and the National Crime Agency. The force is proactive in the way it prevents serious and organised crime. It works with victims to prevent repeat crimes against them, and also with potential perpetrators to divert them from criminality. It has some innovative approaches to improving its management of organised crime. The organised crime advisors in the borough-based teams are a significant and innovative investment for the force.

The Metropolitan Police Service has the necessary arrangements in place to fulfil its national policing responsibilities and for initial response to an incident requiring an armed policing response. It has regularly tested and evaluated its response through several exercises and actual deployments and has a comprehensive understanding of the six threats specified in *The Strategic Policing Requirement*.

# Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour



Good

## Prioritising prevention

The Metropolitan Police Service is good at preventing crime and anti-social behaviour. The force places a clear priority on its prevention, and is investing significantly in dedicated staff and officers working in neighbourhood teams. The force has set out its vision for crime prevention in a document entitled *Prevention first for London*. It is being aligned with the new neighbourhood policing model under the ‘strengthening local policing’ programme and will be linked to the modern crime prevention strategy<sup>3</sup> and the *Policing Vision 2025*<sup>4</sup>. However, we found that very few of the officers and staff we spoke to had heard of the force’s current crime prevention strategy, though some made reference to the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) police and crime plan and the local priorities that are set by ward panels.

The force has in place dedicated ward officers (DWOs) and police community support officers (PCSOs) who are deployed to defined areas. The force is investing in training for neighbourhood policing. The majority of neighbourhood officers will be trained by summer 2018. HMICFRS found evidence that staff are enthusiastic about the quality of this training, but the cancellation of courses due to major incidents and the departure of some trainers has slowed the pace of provision. There are approximately 1,900 officers (DWOs and PCSOs) requiring this training, which is a principal component in the force’s prevention strategy. Nearly 90 percent of these officers have completed the first stage of the training successfully.

The force has a structured approach to problem solving, using the SARA model (scanning, analysis, response and assessment). Officers are provided training in this area as part of the neighbourhood training course.

The benefit of the significant investment that the force is making in local policing would be strengthened through a stronger evaluation of its processes, its team effectiveness and what police activity works. The force needs to improve in this area so that it can be sure that the public are getting the most effective and efficient

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<sup>3</sup> The Home Office modern crime prevention strategy is available from: [www.gov.uk/government/publications/modern-crime-prevention-strategy](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/modern-crime-prevention-strategy)

<sup>4</sup> The National Police Chiefs’ Council and the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, working with the College of Policing, staff associations and the National Crime Agency, have drafted a vision for policing in 2025 that sets out why and how the police service needs to transform. It is called *Policing Vision 2025*.



service possible. We found that while dedicated ward officers (DWOs) and dedicated ward PCSOs (DWPCSOs) are seldom removed from their wards except to provide support for major events, when demand is outstripping capacity schools' officers may be taken away from their duties during school holidays to support response teams or events such as Notting Hill Carnival.

## **Understanding communities**

The Metropolitan Police Service has a good understanding of the communities it serves, what matters to them, and the threats and risks they face. It uses a range of methods to obtain feedback and intelligence, which help it to keep this understanding up to date. These include a public attitude survey, a user satisfaction survey, ward profiles, and specific 'problem profiles'<sup>5</sup> which provide detailed analysis of particular crime types across the capital. The capital's size and the diversity of its communities mean the differences between police boroughs in London is more marked than in any other police force.

HMICFRS found some good examples of how officers work closely with their local communities, involving them in setting local priorities and problem solving. Officers also provide communities with information including, for example, the promotion of a 'you said, we did' campaign and of a road speed reduction initiative. The force uses social media, local press, public meetings and work with the local Members of Parliament to engage with the public. A good example of such work is Operation Makesafe, a child sexual exploitation initiative which focuses on engagement with and raising awareness among the public. Officers from one borough held a youth congress to engage with young people from the area.

DWOs and DWPCSOs are assigned to work only in their specific neighbourhoods, where they operate alongside the community and other local partners to identify and solve crime problems. The force works hard to maintain a good understanding of its very diverse communities. It uses local neighbourhood profiles to understand better its communities and the crimes being reported. These profiles, and its local partnerships, allow it to identify and react to any community tensions. There are good recent examples of the force taking early action to address rising community tension, for instance in respect of a local park in Croydon.

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<sup>5</sup> A problem profile is intended to provide the force with greater understanding of established and emerging crime or incident series, priority locations or other identified high-risk issues. It should be based on the research and analysis of a wide range of information sources, including information from partner organisations. It should contain recommendations for making decisions and options for action.

## **Tackling crime and anti-social behaviour**

The force uses an adequate range of tactics and interventions to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour, though the effect of this work would be further improved if it evaluated the success (or otherwise) of the various initiatives and activities in a more consistent manner.

In addition to its problem-solving activity the force makes good use of the wider powers available to help tackle crime and anti-social behaviour, as well as working with partner organisations. One borough command has introduced an innovative joint process with the local authority to ensure that collective resources are deployed efficiently and partnership working is effectively managed. This ensures that effort is not duplicated and the appropriate authority leads on each individual problem.

However, despite widespread examples of individual officers and local teams engaging well with their communities and making good use of joint preventative activities, the overall force approach is unstructured and inconsistent. Our 2016 effectiveness report highlighted as an area for improvement the evaluation of early intervention work to ensure that learning about what works can be shared throughout all London boroughs. The force has made only limited progress in this. It has introduced a more structured approach to problem solving, known as SARA, alongside a centralised IT system to record activities, but we found that frontline staff were not always aware of the existence of such initiatives.

Examples of the force evaluating some of its problem-solving activity include the pan-London MetTrace project. This is an ambitious initiative to reduce burglaries, with the goal of visiting as many as one in seven London residents (440,000 homes over three years) to provide advice on how to protect their homes and property, as well as giving them free security marking kits to identify their property readily if stolen. The project has been monitored and the results regularly reviewed. London has seen a saving of 60,000 police hours, with 440,000 security marking kits distributed since 2015. But such monitoring is not widespread; there is little evidence of the force routinely evaluating problem solving and preventative policing, and sharing good practice. For example, the force does not know how many times it has used anti-social behaviour powers and it does not collect information about the activities officers carry out at a local level. The force was unable to provide these data in advance of the inspection. As a result the force has limited opportunity to know which of its activities lead to the best outcomes and so to allow it to focus and improve the services it provides to the public.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force should ensure that the structured and consistent problem-solving process it is implementing to enable it to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour more effectively is fully understood and used by its officers and staff.
- The force should routinely evaluate and share effective practice, both internally and with partner organisations, continually to improve its approach to the prevention of crime and anti-social behaviour.

# Investigating crime and reducing re-offending



Requires improvement

## Initial investigation

The force's initial investigation of crimes requires improvement. This is mainly due to a lack of consistency in the way it responds to incidents. The assessment of how incidents are graded was found in the main to be appropriate. However, we found some cases where the grading assigned to incidents was incorrect: for example, some incidents we examined were assigned a 'Grade 2' response (within 15 minutes) when a 'Grade 1' response (immediate) would have been appropriate. In the majority of cases we reviewed police attended within the target time for the grading of the incident, but there were some cases where the response to incidents graded at the lower level of 'Significant/Priority' took longer than the target of one hour to attend.

The force does not always respond to calls promptly, and during our inspection we found this to be particularly a problem in the pathfinder boroughs (boroughs where the force is trialling its new operating model, bringing groups of two or three separate boroughs together into single policing commands). After the inspection, performance in this area in the pathfinder boroughs has improved and they are now at a similar level of performance to non-pathfinder boroughs. We also found that opportunities to gather evidence are sometimes missed during the vital first hours of an investigation. HMICFRS reviewed 90 case files of recent investigations. In the majority of cases investigation was effective and the process of call handling was good. However, in ten of the files we reviewed we found that not all investigative opportunities had been taken. As a result, potential opportunities to bring offenders to justice are being overlooked. In some cases we looked at there was limited or no supervision evident.

The force's response to fraud is effective, and reports of fraud are assessed and investigated appropriately by officers from the specialist team Operation Falcon. There are presently 300 staff in the Falcon team, of whom 160 work on reactive fraud investigations. In addition, there is a complex fraud team, and four fraud hubs are located in boroughs. All fraud teams meet monthly with the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB)<sup>6</sup> to agree who is best placed to investigate, and to consider what resources are needed. HMICFRS found evidence of good victim care in fraud cases.

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<sup>6</sup> The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau is a police unit based at City of London Police responsible for gathering and analysing intelligence relating to fraud and financially-motivated cyber-crime.

The force has invested significant resources in its telephone and digital investigation unit (TDIU). However, we found that there is no common standard of training for staff working in the unit and many had not received any training in crime prevention. Consequently, the crime prevention advice given to victims is inconsistent and dependent on the officers' previous experience.

## **Investigation quality**


The force needs to improve the quality of its investigations. Its investigative capacity is not sufficient, and against its own establishment of staff the force requires an additional 1,199 detectives to meet the significant demand it faces. This shortage is affecting its ability to conduct investigations of crime effectively. The force has a plan in place to address this shortfall; this includes an innovative measure to recruit directly into detective posts. In the pathfinder boroughs response officers are now required to take on the investigation of the cases to which they respond where these are simple, whereas previously they handed over the investigation after the initial response.

When the new way of working was first introduced, many response officers did not have the necessary investigation skills, as these had not been required in their previous roles. This resulted in officers spending longer on investigations. When the force explored this in more detail, it found that some response officers and their supervisors lacked the confidence required to decide, in line with the force's crime assessment policy, whether or not to pursue a case. The force is addressing this by taking a phased approach to introducing investigations into the response teams in the non-pathfinder boroughs, so as to build officers' experience and confidence and improve the quality of investigations over time. Changes have also been made to the sergeants' course so that sergeants are better able to advise and support their officers with their investigations.

The quality of victim contact during criminal investigations is generally good. Investigations are increasingly pursued even where the victim does not support police action. In the 12 months to 30 June 2017, 11 percent of investigations finalised by the Metropolitan Police Service were assigned the outcome where the suspect has been identified, but there were evidential difficulties and the victim does not support police action. This is an increase by 2 percentage points (since the 12 months to 30 June 2016); however, this is still below the England and Wales rate of 13 percent. The inspection team found no evidence of investigations being cut short when victim support is not forthcoming, and the proportion of all investigations where action is taken (such as a charge or caution) is 15 percent – broadly in line with other forces in England and Wales.

The force has an effective system and process for examining digital devices, such as mobile phones and computers, for evidence in support of investigations. At the time of the inspection, there was no delay or backlog in the examination procedure.

**Figure 1: Proportion of investigations where action was taken, by force, for offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017<sup>7,8</sup>**



Source: 2016 and 2017 Home Office Outcomes Data

For further information about this data, please see annex A

## Reducing re-offending

The force’s overall response to re-offending requires improvement, although some aspects of its approach to offender management are good. The force uses arrest powers appropriately to protect victims and secure evidence, and its arrest rates are in line with other forces’. The force works well with Border Force, and refers a higher proportion of arrested foreign nationals to Immigration Enforcement<sup>9</sup> than any other force in England and Wales. Immigration officers work with the force and are regularly based at some police stations. All arrested foreign nationals automatically have their data sent to the UK’s national criminal records office.

<sup>7</sup> Investigations where action was taken includes the outcome categories of Charged/Summonsed, Taken into consideration and Out-of-court (formal and informal).

<sup>8</sup> Suffolk Constabulary was unable to provide 2017 crime outcomes data. Dorset Police was unable to provide 2016 crime outcomes data. Therefore figures for England and Wales will differ from those published by the Home Office. For further information about this data, please see annex A.

<sup>9</sup> Part of the Home Office, Immigration Enforcement is responsible for preventing abuse, tracking immigration offenders and increasing compliance with immigration law. It works with partners such as the police to regulate migration in line with government policy, while supporting economic growth.

However, the force's performance in promptly circulating and managing those wanted persons registered on the police national computer (PNC) is inconsistent and requires improvement. We reviewed five files where the suspect had been circulated as 'wanted' on the PNC. In only one of these cases was any action recorded on the force's emerald warrant management system (EWMS), which indicates that the force may be missing opportunities to bring some offenders to justice. The number of 'wanted' records on the PNC per 10,000 population in the Metropolitan Police Service area is high compared with other forces in England and Wales, including those serving large cities. In July 2017, the force figures were more than double the England and Wales rate (22 per 10,000 population, compared to 10 per 10,000 population for England and Wales). This represents an increase of 12 percent in the number of 'wanted' records by the Metropolitan Police Service since August 2016.

The force is good at reducing re-offending among the most prolific and harmful criminals in London. It had 3,425 offenders on its integrated offender management (IOM) programme as at 1 July 2017. Since 1 July 2016, there has been a slight increase (1 percent) in the numbers being managed in this way. Figures provided by the force indicate that 44 percent of those on the IOM programme reoffended in the 12 months to 30 June 2017. This is higher than the England and Wales rate of 37 percent. In addition to the formal IOM programme, there is a variety of other specific schemes which seek to manage problem offenders to prevent them reoffending. Examples of such schemes include: an initiative, known as Operation Dauntless, targeted at repeat domestic abuse offenders; the management of gang members using local borough gangs teams; and the identification through Operation Alambadi of dangerous people who pose a risk of sexual harm so that they can be managed by dedicated officers.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force should ensure that all evidence is retrieved at the first opportunity in order to maximise the likelihood of investigations being concluded successfully.
- The force should continue to seek to increase the number of qualified detectives in order to improve the quality of its investigations.
- The force should ensure that those who are circulated as wanted on the police national computer are swiftly located and arrested.

# Protecting vulnerable people and supporting victims



Requires improvement

## Identifying vulnerability

Since the HMICFRS effectiveness inspection in 2016, the Metropolitan Police Service has improved its ability to identify vulnerable people, but more still needs to be done. The force uses the College of Policing definition of vulnerability,<sup>10</sup> and has a strategy for safeguarding vulnerable adults which makes clear the police and partnership responsibilities to share information. The workforce now has a better understanding of vulnerability, which officers and staff are able to identify at the initial point of contact.

The force has introduced an internal communications campaign to raise awareness of the importance of the police role in safeguarding vulnerable people. The campaign focuses particularly on child sexual exploitation, gangs, missing children and child abuse. However, we found that frontline staff had a limited understanding of modern slavery, which means it is less likely to be identified. In addition, there is no evidence of the use of a standardised triage system, such as THRIVE<sup>11</sup>, to assess threat, risk and harm when people contact the force. A structured approach is used for specific incidents such as domestic abuse and rape cases, but in other cases we found that the force needs to improve its ability to identify and assess risk at the initial point of contact. The force told us that implementation of THRIVE as its standard risk assessment tool is imminent.

Limitations in the force's IT system mean that repeat victims can only be identified through telephone numbers (not names and addresses), so if they call using a different number the system does not automatically alert the call taker that the caller has been a previous victim and therefore may be at greater risk. The force recognises this as a weakness, and call handlers ask all callers if anything similar has happened before and if there are any health or welfare issues that they need to have considered.

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<sup>10</sup> The College of Policing defines vulnerability as follows: A person is vulnerable if, as a result of their situation or circumstances, they are unable to take care of or protect themselves or others from harm or exploitation.

<sup>11</sup> The threat, harm, risk, investigation, vulnerability and engagement (THRIVE) model is used to assess the appropriate initial police response to a call for service. It allows a judgment to be made of the relative risk posed by the call and places the individual needs of the victim at the centre of that decision.



## Initial response


The force's initial response to incidents involving vulnerable people is generally good. However, we found that risk assessments in domestic abuse cases are often inaccurate despite the recent introduction of a review process. As a consequence some victims of domestic abuse may not receive the correct response or appropriate support. Initial safeguarding is also inconsistent. The force recognises that it needs to improve initial safeguarding for domestic abuse victims, and this is highlighted in the force's domestic abuse action plan. As with identifying vulnerability, there was no evidence of the use of a standardised triage system such as THRIVE to assess threat, risk and harm. However, it was evident that structured templates and question sets were used for domestic abuse and rape cases incidents. As with identifying vulnerability, the force told us that implementation of THRIVE as a standard risk assessment tool is imminent.

The force has provided body-worn video cameras to all operational staff, and this has been positively received by frontline staff. Body-worn video camera evidence is being used to support prosecutions in cases where victims are unwilling to give evidence themselves; as a result, more offenders can be brought to justice. The force works well with its partner organisations to supply effective longer-term support to victims.

The demand on the force in this area is increasing. The number of active domestic abuse cases increased by 44 percent between 1 July 2016 and 1 July 2017. Despite this increase in demand, domestic abuse cases are generally allocated to appropriate investigators, with suitable investigatory strategies being followed.

The rate of arrest for domestic abuse offences can provide an indication of a force's approach to handling domestic abuse offenders. Although for the purpose of this calculation arrests are not linked directly to offences, a high arrest rate may suggest that a force prioritises arrests for domestic abuse offenders over other potential forms of action (for further information, please see annex A). HMICFRS has evaluated the arrest rate alongside other measures during our inspection process to understand how each force deals with domestic abuse overall.

**Figure 2: Domestic abuse arrest rate (per 100 domestic abuse-related offences), by force, in the 12 months to 30 June 2017<sup>12,13</sup>**



Source: 2016 and 2017 HMICFRS data return, 2016 and 2017 Home Office domestic abuse crime data<sup>14</sup>

For further information about this data, please see annex A

## Mental health

The force understands its role in supporting people with mental health conditions, though there is room for improvement. Officers have a good understanding of their responsibility to protect these vulnerable people. There are three separate control rooms taking calls from the public across the 32 London boroughs that make up the force area. To ensure a consistency of response, staff in the control rooms use structured question sets to identify the most appropriate police response. Questions

<sup>12</sup> Durham, Lancashire, Warwickshire and West Mercia forces were unable to provide 2017 domestic abuse arrest data. Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Durham and Gloucestershire forces were unable to provide 2016 domestic abuse arrest data.

<sup>13</sup> North Yorkshire Police was unable to provide comparable domestic abuse arrest data. Therefore, it has been removed from the graph. For further information, please see annex A.

<sup>14</sup> The Home Office has provided HMICFRS with data on domestic abuse-related offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017. These data are more recent than those published by the Office for National Statistics.

are designed to identify vulnerable people and any mental health risks, so that this information can be factored in to the decision as to the right response. Officers attending can be prepared with the right information about both the nature of the incident and the needs of the people involved. However, as a result of the scale and complexity of partnership arrangements with the NHS across London, there are inconsistencies in the clinical support available to officers who have specific concerns about the mental health of anyone they are dealing with, depending on which area of London they are working in.

A formal mental health triage service, known as street triage, is available in nine of the 32 boroughs. The aim of street triage is to enable mental health professionals to provide 'real time' advice to police officers 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

A dedicated and direct 24-hour telephone advice helpline is available. Officers can call and speak to mental health professionals to obtain advice, background information on known individuals, and information about the availability of places of safety. In some of the remaining boroughs, officers have access to a mental health crisis line which also offers advice to police. The force is keen to reduce this disparity of service and is working to ensure consistency across all the boroughs. The force reports that all nine mental health trusts want to be involved in partnerships with the force.

The availability of mental health advice and mental health triage nurses across London is inconsistent. In South West London mental health nurses work from the borough 'grip and pace' centres during late shifts and night shifts and are available to attend incidents as well as provide advice to officers. The grip and pace centres are situated in each borough. They are mini operation centres for each borough. They manage many issues, including emerging threats and risks, urgent resourcing issues, urgent intelligence, and force mobilisations.

There are three funded mental health nurses who are paid for by the local mental health trust in North East London and support the force in managing individuals who are vulnerable. Police officers and staff in Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster have access to specialist advice on the telephone. In all other boroughs the officers contact their local hospitals on an ad hoc basis. The central mental health team works with the NHS and mental health trusts across London to achieve a consistency of triage services across the force and to evaluate which model is most effective for London. Around 45 incidents per month involve the River Thames, many of which involve people with mental health problems. The NHS has funded a full-time mental health nurse to work with the marine policing unit to address this issue and reduce demand. No evaluation has taken place to assess the impact of any of these initiatives.

Internally, the force has established a central mental health team and a network of borough mental health liaison officers across the force area. There is one liaison officer for each borough; this is a voluntary role which can be filled by any member of

staff or officer, and is undertaken in addition to normal duties. The purpose of a borough mental health liaison officer is to be the single point of contact for mental health issues. The borough mental health liaison officers meet regularly with the central team to maintain and update their understanding of the problems and share good practice. This is a good approach, but we found that response and neighbourhood teams did not generally understand the role and responsibilities of the borough mental health liaison officers, and that officers confused their role and that of the mental health co-ordinators who are NHS staff working within mental health premises. These co-ordinators work closely with social workers in dealing with people detained under the Mental Health Act 1983.

## **Investigating crimes involving vulnerable people**

The force needs to improve the quality of investigations involving vulnerable victims. The file review found that out of 20 cases reviewed with a vulnerable victim, all 20 were allocated to the most appropriate team, but the shortage of detectives within specialist teams is resulting in officers carrying high workloads (15 – 20 cases per officer in Sutton community safety unit, for instance, compared with 10 – 15 at the same time in 2016). As a result, the investigations are sometimes delayed and there is a lack of supervision. There is no training plan in place for these teams to ensure they maintain the skills and expertise needed. The approach to victim care is generally good, and there is evidence of victims being kept up to date with the progress of their case. There is generally a good understanding of the importance of victim personal statements in building a prosecution case and the statements reviewed were of a good standard. However, understanding of the timing of the victim personal statements was inconsistent, with some officers taking them at the time of the incident and others at a later stage. The force should consider raising awareness in this regard to ensure consistency.

We identified in our 2016 inspection that the force was failing to make full use of wider powers available to it which could help in its efforts to prevent domestic abuse and protect victims. The force is now beginning to understand when it is appropriate to use domestic violence protection notices (DVPNs) and domestic violence protection orders (DVPOs)<sup>15</sup>. The force has historically favoured the use of restraining orders in domestic abuse cases, but these only apply to cases where a perpetrator is arrested and charged and then found not guilty. The force needs to improve its officers' understanding of when the use of DVPOs is appropriate and required, and ensure that officers understand which tool is appropriate. There is also

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<sup>15</sup> DVPNs may be issued by an authorised police officer to prevent a suspected perpetrator from returning to a victim's home and/or contacting the victim. Following the issue of the DVPN the police must apply to magistrates for a DVPO. The DVPO will be granted for a period of up to 28 days.

limited use of 'Clare's Law'<sup>16</sup> disclosures. In the 12 months to 30 June 2017, 121 disclosures were made under the scheme. The force needs to be more proactive in these disclosures; it is currently reliant on responding when people exercise their 'right to ask', with very limited disclosure under 'right to know'. It is disappointing that more progress has not been made in using these wider powers, especially in the light of the rising levels of domestic abuse crime.

We found little, or no, input from local teams into the management of sex offenders in the community. This was also an area for improvement in our 2016 inspection, and little progress has been made. Dedicated ward officers are not routinely aware of registered sex offenders in their ward, partly because they are expected to search for this information on the force intranet (which in any case inspectors found had last been updated six months previously) rather than being briefed. As a result, neighbourhood officers have little or no involvement in the proactive management of sex offenders, and when interviewed they did not know who the local sex offenders were. This is not good enough.

The force is aware that in order to protect the public it needs to make better use of neighbourhood teams in its overall management of sex offenders. It has introduced a project, Operation Beat, to improve the communications between specialist officers and ward policing teams in respect of high-risk registered sex offenders living in local communities. However, we found an inconsistent understanding of Operation Beat among staff, and most were unable to identify the dangerous offenders and sex offenders in their area. Consequently the force continues to lose opportunities for these staff to contribute to the management of such offenders, and to minimise the risk they pose to the community.

## **Partnership working**

The force has a clear understanding of who is responsible for safeguarding victims of domestic abuse at all levels of risk. Its community safety units are specialist teams responsible for investigating domestic abuse crimes as well as the safeguarding of individuals in the community. There are good working relationships between these teams and partner agencies such as local authorities, health authorities and third sector organisations to ensure the appropriate support is in place for the victims and their families.

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<sup>16</sup> Clare's Law, or the domestic violence disclosure scheme, has two functions: the 'right to ask' the police about a partner's previous history of domestic abuse or violent acts; and the 'right to know' – police can proactively disclose information in prescribed circumstances

The force plays a major role with partner organisations in the multi-agency safeguarding hubs (MASHs)<sup>17</sup>, which means that it can develop effective partnership safety plans for both victims and offenders who require support. Some 30 MASHs cover the Metropolitan Police Service area. The force also has a well-established multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) process in place. A MARAC is a meeting where information about high-risk domestic abuse cases is shared with partners. As mentioned above, there has been an increase in the domestic abuse cases being reported, and 33 high-risk cases per 10,000 adult females have been referred to the MARAC by the Metropolitan Police Service in the 12 months to 30 June 2017; this represents an increase of 6 percent compared to the 12 months to 30 June 2016. The England and Wales rate of referrals to the MARAC is 35 cases per 10,000 adult females. However, we still found high-risk cases that would have benefited from being discussed at MARAC but were not being referred. In such cases, the ability to work with partners and share data and information is significantly reduced. This results in a reduced level of service to victims.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force should improve its initial assessment and response to incidents involving vulnerable people by ensuring that staff working in call handling understand and apply consistently the THRIVE decision-making model.
- The force should ensure that response officers become more proficient at completing risk assessments at initial response, and provide sufficient supervisory oversight to prevent opportunities to safeguard vulnerable victims from being missed.
- The force should ensure that response officers are aware of the range of safeguarding options available at initial response to protect vulnerable victims.
- The force should improve the quality of investigations involving vulnerable people, ensuring that the workloads of specialist investigators are manageable at all times and that such investigations are subject to regular and active supervision.
- The force should review its use of DVPOs, DVPNs and Clare's Law to ensure that it is making best use of these powers to safeguard victims of domestic abuse.

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<sup>17</sup> A multi-agency safeguarding hub (MASH) is a location in which staff from the police, local authority and other safeguarding agencies share data, research and decision making about local children and adults who are vulnerable; the purpose is to ensure a timely and joined-up response for children and vulnerable adults who require protection.

# Tackling serious and organised crime



Good

## Understanding threats

In 2016 HMICFRS found that the Metropolitan Police Service required improvement in how it tackled serious and organised crime. This year we found that the force had responded well to the areas requiring improvement. The force has a good understanding of both emerging and traditional serious and organised crime threats. It assesses and prioritises these effectively, using a structured process which includes a MoRiLE risk assessment<sup>18</sup> and the GRITS matrix (a system for tracking gang activity).

The force recognises that understanding communities is an integral part of understanding serious and organised crime, and that effective disruption of serious and organised crime activity makes communities safer. It has used intelligence from a wide range of sources, including neighbourhood teams and partner agencies, to develop three serious and organised crime local profiles<sup>19</sup> which influence joint activity and ensure that resources are used as effectively and efficiently as possible to tackle specific crime types. This is an improvement since our 2016 inspection.

Information is shared effectively with wider partners including the regional organised crime units (ROCU)<sup>20</sup> in England and Wales, the National Crime Agency and international organisations. The force is also assisting with the understanding of serious organised crime threats regionally, nationally and internationally.

The appointment of organised crime advisors within the force, based in each of the three pilot boroughs (Lewisham, Camden and Islington) is innovative, as it provides

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<sup>18</sup> MoRiLE: the 'management of risk in law enforcement' process developed by the National Police Chiefs' Council. This tool assesses the types of crimes, which most threaten communities and highlights where the force does not currently have the capacity or capability to tackle them effectively.

<sup>19</sup> A local profile is a report that outlines the threat from serious and organised crime within a specific local area. As a minimum, local profiles should be produced at force level but it may be decided that it would be most effective for them to cover even more localised areas (for example, in larger forces these might be at local authority, borough operational command unit, basic command unit (BCU) or community safety partnership (CSP) level).

<sup>20</sup> Regional organised crime units (ROCU) provide police forces with access to a standardised range of 'capabilities' to help them tackle serious and organised crime. These capabilities encompass specialist areas such as undercover policing, surveillance and cyber-crime investigation. The regional provision of these capabilities can reduce or remove the need for forces to maintain specialist capabilities of their own, many of which are expensive to maintain and only required on relatively rare occasions.

a link between specialist teams and those officers, and is evidence of a significant change in the approach towards identifying and tackling organised crime groups through local policing teams. When interviewed, local officers demonstrated an understanding of the signs of serious and organised crime<sup>21</sup> within the community and how they would pass that information on to other departments in the force.


Once organised crime groups (OCGs) have been identified, the force assesses them promptly and comprehensively, using a nationally standardised OCG 'mapping' process and MoRiLE risk assessment process. The force follows national guidance by systematically reviewing all mapped OCGs at specified intervals, prioritising them effectively and archiving them appropriately if they have been dismantled or are no longer active. A new internal disruption panel for OCGs demonstrates good governance, and systematic reviews of all OCGs within intervals set by national guidance. This was an area for improvement for the force in 2016, but the work is now undertaken routinely and effectively. The number of OCGs per 1 million population at 1 July 2017 in the force area was 100. This has increased 21 percent from 83 OCGs per 1 million population at 1 July 2016 and indicates that the force is taking more active steps to identify and assess organised crime groups.

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<sup>21</sup> Serious and organised crime is when serious crime is planned, co-ordinated and conducted by people working together on a continuing basis. Their motivation is often, but not always, financial gain.



**Figure 3: Rate of organised crime groups (OCGs) per 1 million population, by force, as at 1 July 2017<sup>22</sup>**



**Source: 2016 and 2017 HMICFRS data return**

**For further information about this data, please see annex A**

## Disrupting and investigating serious and organised crime

The Metropolitan Police Service has a robust approach to both investigating and disrupting serious and organised crime. Although the force itself is not within a regional organised crime unit (ROCU), it works effectively as an active partner with neighbouring ROCUs, and helps them to tackle OCGs which commit crimes outside London, for example, ‘county lines’ gangs. (County lines gangs are organised drug-dealing networks expanding – often from cities into towns in surrounding counties – in order to exploit new markets and avoid police detection. These groups use mobile phones to sell drugs, and their activity is often violent.)

The force also has plans to improve further its efforts, jointly with partners across London, to tackle serious and organised crime. Inspectors observed a number of operational command tasking processes; these complement each other and feed into the overarching force tasking process. The overarching process is complicated because of the scale of the force and the nature of the problems it faces; however,

<sup>22</sup> City of London Police has been removed from the graph as its organised crime group data are not comparable with other forces due to its size and its wider national remit. For further information, please see annex A.

the Metropolitan Police Service has recognised this and is introducing a change programme to make it more effective. The establishment of the London serious and organised crime partnership group (LSOCPG) in September was a positive step. The governance of this will be shared between the Mayor's Office for Police and Crime (MOPAC), the force, and other partner organisations. The force is driving the innovative use of modern slavery powers to assist partners when dealing with the 'county lines' gangs.

Dedicated ward officers are aware at a local level of organised criminality, and have some involvement in its prevention and disruption. This was an area for improvement for the force in 2016, and some progress has been made. However, the force has to ensure that its local officers remain briefed about local organised criminality to ensure that they are used effectively. The force has a good relationship with surrounding regional organised crime units and works effectively with them to deal with cross-border criminality around 'county lines.'

Lead responsible officers (LROs) with appropriate skills are assigned to take responsibility for tackling individual organised crime groups over the long term. They are accountable for developing and implementing comprehensive and effective plans based on the national 'four Ps' structure (pursue, prevent, protect and prepare). The force's annual assessment of the principal risks facing its communities clearly identifies serious and organised crime as a force-wide priority. There are clear, well-documented, plans setting out the force's response under each of the four Ps and listing activity under nominated leads from each department. Lead officers are given comprehensive briefings by senior intelligence analysts; they are provided with tactical options and supported by the senior investigating officer and the newly-appointed organised crime advisors. This was an area for improvement for the force in our 2016 effectiveness inspection and HMICFRS is encouraged that significant progress has been made.

The force uses a range of both overt and covert tactics to disrupt organised criminals. The resources and officers with specialist skills required to tackle serious and organised crime are rigorously assessed and monitored, weekly, fortnightly and monthly, to ensure that the force has the right number of officers with the right skills in the right place to maintain its fight against organised crime. Activity is brought about by organised crime group mapping, formal risk assessment and professional judgment, to ensure resources are continually targeted at tackling the highest risks to the communities. During the inspection, however, inspectors found that internal processes were not routinely identifying and recording the impact of the force's operational deployments. The force recognised that the current recording processes require improvement, and this is addressed within the change programme.

## Preventing serious and organised crime

The Metropolitan Police Service is good at preventing serious and organised crime. The force has taken steps to identify those at risk of being drawn into serious and organised crime and ensure preventative measures are put in place. We found strong evidence that Operation Trident, the force's specialist unit set up to tackle gun crime, communicates regularly and effectively with the public and education partners about serious and organised crime to raise awareness, and reassure members of the communities. The force is good at tackling gang crime and it has designated resources located within some boroughs and an effective diversion programme in place.

Serious crime prevention orders (SCPOs) and ancillary orders are used well by the force to prevent criminals involved in serious and organised crime from offending while in prison or after they are released. The force works effectively with prisons and the integrated offender management scheme to target individuals to prevent their reoffending. The lifetime offender management unit deals with all SCPOs in the force area and effectively manages those subject to lifetime orders relating to serious and organised crime.

An effective referral system ensures that the unit is informed of all SCPO applications. The unit has an effective process to manage these orders. It works closely with the Probation Service. Dedicated staff monitor intelligence systems, included those of other relevant organisations, in order to manage effectively compliance with the orders. Examples were provided of serious offenders being convicted for breaches following work by the unit. The force told inspectors that it has over 100 SCPOs in place. It is very effective in this area of policing.

### Areas for improvement

- The force should develop further its serious and organised crime local profiles, in conjunction with other interested parties, to enhance its understanding of the threat posed by serious and organised crime and inform joint activity aimed at reducing this threat.
- The force should improve its understanding of the impact of its activity on serious and organised crime across the four Ps (pursue, prevent, protect and prepare), and ensure that it learns from experience to maximise the force's disruptive effect on this activity.

## Specialist capabilities

### Ungraded

#### National policing responsibilities

*The Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR)*<sup>23</sup> specifies six national threats: terrorism, cyber-crime, public order, civil emergencies, child sexual abuse and serious and organised crime.

The Metropolitan Police Service has the necessary arrangements in place to ensure that it can fulfil its national policing responsibilities. The force has assessed its capability to respond to the six national threats included in the SPR.

This assessment forms part an annual planning cycle when all of the force's priorities are reviewed. This responsibility rests with a number of chief officers who lead programmes to build the force's capacity in response to its national responsibilities. We found these chief officers to be skilled and experienced in their specialist fields of responsibility. We found this to be an effective means of identifying risks, prioritising national responsibilities alongside local policing objectives, engaging the workforce and developing the skills and experience the force requires.

The force has established a comprehensive programme to test its response to national threats. Training exercises involve other emergency services, local authorities and external organisations with expertise in major incidents and crisis management. The Metropolitan Police Service carefully de-briefs after training exercises and major incidents to identify learning points and ensure its operation is subject to continuous improvement.

In addition, the force frequently tests its ability to mobilise large numbers of officers should any incident escalate beyond local control. These mobilisation exercises involve other forces in the South East of England.

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<sup>23</sup> The SPR is issued annually by the Home Secretary. It sets out the latest national threats and appropriate national policing capabilities required to counter them. National threats require a co-ordinated or aggregated response from police forces, national agencies or other partners. *The Strategic Policing Requirement*, Home Office, March 2015. Available from: [www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/417116/The\\_Strategic\\_Policing\\_Requirement.pdf](http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417116/The_Strategic_Policing_Requirement.pdf)

## Firearms capability

HMICFRS inspected how well forces were prepared to manage firearms attacks in our 2016 effectiveness inspections. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the UK and Europe have meant that the police service maintains a firm focus on armed capability in England and Wales.

It is not just terrorist attacks that place operational demands on armed officers. The threat can include the activity of organised crime groups or armed street gangs and all other crime involving guns. The *Code of Practice on Police use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons*<sup>24</sup> makes forces responsible for implementing national standards of armed policing. The code stipulates that a chief officer be designated to oversee these standards. It requires the chief officer to set out the firearms threat in an armed policing strategic threat and risk assessment (APSTRA). The chief officer must also set out clear rationales for the number of armed officers (armed capacity) and the level to which they are trained (armed capability).

The Metropolitan Police Service has a good understanding of the potential harm facing the public; its APSTRA conforms to the requirements of the code and the College of Policing guidance.<sup>25</sup> The force last reviewed its APSTRA in April 2017. We found that the designated chief officer scrutinises the APSTRA closely. He formally approves its content which includes the levels of armed capability and capacity that the threats require. His decisions and the rationale on which they are based are clearly auditable.

However, HMICFRS considers that the assessment of threat and risk could be improved. Although the Metropolitan Police Service works closely with City of London Police and British Transport Police in the deployment of armed officers in the capital, a joint APSTRA as a single point of reference for the three forces does not currently exist. A joint APSTRA would focus on the entire threat in London and potentially leave the three forces in a stronger position to address it.

The force receives additional Home Office funding as part of a national programme to boost armed capacity in England and Wales. The force has fulfilled its commitment to the programme and has significantly increased the availability of armed response vehicles (ARVs); this was achieved by the target date set for April 2017. The force accomplished this by accelerating the recruitment of ARV officers as well as adjusting shift patterns and paying overtime to increase the number of armed

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<sup>24</sup> *Code of Practice on Police use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons*, Home Office, 2003.

<sup>25</sup> College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice on armed policing, available at: [www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/?s](http://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/?s)

officers. The force has some way to go to reach its full complement of ARV officers; the recruitment programme continues and is scheduled to be completed in forthcoming months.

There can be little doubt that the Metropolitan Police Service's ability to respond to terrorist attacks within minutes and the bravery of the officers involved has saved lives.

## Annex A – About the data

The information presented in this report comes from a range of sources, including data published by the Home Office, the Office for National Statistics, inspection fieldwork and data collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales.

Where HMICFRS collected data directly from police forces, we took reasonable steps to agree the design of the data collection with forces and with other interested parties such as the Home Office. We gave forces several opportunities to quality assure and validate the data they provided us, to ensure the accuracy of the evidence presented. For instance:

- Data that forces submitted were checked and queried with those forces where data were notably different from other forces or were internally inconsistent.
- All forces were asked to check the final data used in the report and correct any errors identified.

The source of the data is presented with each figure in the report, and is set out in more detail within this annex. The source of Force in numbers data is also set out below.

### Methodology

#### Data in the report

British Transport Police was outside the scope of inspection. Any aggregated totals for England and Wales exclude British Transport Police data, so will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Where other forces have been unable to supply data, this is mentioned under the relevant sections below.

#### Population

For all uses of population as a denominator in our calculations, unless otherwise noted, we use Office for National Statistics (ONS) mid-2016 population estimates. These were the most recent data available at the time of the inspection.

For the specific case of City of London Police, we include both resident and transient population within our calculations. This is to account for the unique nature and demographics of this force's responsibility.

## **Survey of police staff**

HMICFRS surveyed the police workforce across forces in England and Wales, to understand their views on workloads, redeployment and the suitability of assigned tasks. This survey was a non-statistical, voluntary sample which means that results may not be representative of the workforce population. The number of responses varied between 16 and 1,678 across forces. Therefore, we treated results with caution and used them for identifying themes that could be explored further during fieldwork rather than to assess individual force performance.

## **Ipsos MORI survey of public attitudes towards policing**

HMICFRS commissioned Ipsos MORI to survey attitudes towards policing between 21 July and 15 August 2017. Respondents were drawn from an online panel and results were weighted by age, gender and work status to match the population profile of the force area. The sampling method used is not a statistical random sample and the sample size was small, varying between 300 and 321 individuals in each force area. Therefore, any results provided are only an indication of satisfaction rather than an absolute.

The findings of this survey are available on our website:

[www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/data/peel-assessments](http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/data/peel-assessments)

## **Review of crime files**

HMICFRS reviewed 2,700<sup>26</sup> police case files across crime types for:

- theft from person;
- rape (including attempts);
- stalking;
- harassment;
- common assault;
- grievous bodily harm (wounding);
- actual bodily harm.

Our file review was designed to provide a broad overview of the identification of vulnerability, the effectiveness of investigations and to understand how victims are treated through police processes. We randomly selected files from crimes recorded between 1 January 2017 and 31 March 2017 and assessed them against several

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<sup>26</sup> 60 case files were reviewed in each force, with the exception of the Metropolitan Police Service, West Midlands Police and West Yorkshire Police where 90 case files were reviewed.



criteria. Due to the small sample size of cases selected per force, we did not use results from the file review as the sole basis for assessing individual force performance, but alongside other evidence gathered.

## **Force in numbers**

A dash in this graphic indicates that a force was not able to supply HMICFRS with data or the data supplied by the forces were not comparable.

### **Calls for assistance (including those for domestic abuse)**

These data were collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales. In 2017, the data requested from forces contained a different breakdown of occurrences where the police were called to an incident.

### **Recorded crime and crime outcomes**

These data are obtained from Home Office police recorded crime and outcomes data tables for the 12 months to 30 June 2017 and are taken from the October 2017 Home Office data release, which is available from:

[www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables](http://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables)

Total police-recorded crime includes all crime, except fraud offences, recorded by all police forces in England and Wales. Home Office publications on the overall volumes and rates of recorded crime and outcomes include British Transport Police, which is outside the scope of this HMICFRS inspection. Therefore, England and Wales rates in this report will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Data referring to police-recorded crime should be treated with care, as recent increases may be attributed to the renewed focus on the quality and compliance of crime recording since HMICFRS' national inspection of crime data in 2014.

Suffolk Constabulary was unable to submit 2017 outcomes data to the Home Office due to data quality issues, relating to the changing of its crime recording system to Athena. Therefore Suffolk Constabulary has been excluded from the England and Wales figure.

Other notable points to consider when interpreting outcomes data are listed below.

- Crime outcome proportions show the percentage of crimes recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017 that have been assigned each outcome. This means that each crime is tracked or linked to its outcome. Therefore these data are subject to change, as more crimes are assigned outcomes over time.

- Under the new framework, 37 police forces in England and Wales provide outcomes data through the Home Office data hub (HODH) on a monthly basis. All other forces provide these data via a manual return also occurring on a monthly basis.
- Leicestershire, Staffordshire and West Yorkshire forces participated in the Ministry of Justice's out of court disposals pilot. This means they no longer issued simple cautions or cannabis/khat warnings and they restrict their use of penalty notices for disorder as disposal options for adult offenders, as part of the pilot. These three pilot forces continued to operate in accordance with the pilot conditions since the pilot ended in November 2015. Other forces subsequently also limited their use of some out of court disposals. Therefore, the outcomes data should be viewed with this in mind.
- Direct comparisons should not be made between general crime outcomes and domestic abuse-related outcomes. Domestic abuse-related outcomes are based on the number of outcomes for domestic-abuse related offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017, irrespective of when the crime was recorded. Therefore, the domestic abuse-related crimes and outcomes recorded in the reporting year are not tracked, whereas the general outcomes are tracked.
- For a full commentary and explanation of outcome types please see Crime Outcomes in England and Wales: year ending March 2017, Home Office, July 2017. Available from:  
[www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/633048/crime-outcomes-hosb0917.pdf](http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/633048/crime-outcomes-hosb0917.pdf)

### **Anti-social behaviour**

These data are obtained from Office for National Statistics data tables (year ending 31 March 2017), available from:

[www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/policeforceareadatatables](http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/policeforceareadatatables)

All police forces record incidents of anti-social behaviour (ASB) reported to them in accordance with the provisions of the National Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR). Forces record incidents under NSIR in accordance with the same victim-focused approach that applies for recorded crime, although these data are not subject to the same quality assurance as the main recorded crime collection.

Incident counts should be interpreted as incidents recorded by the police, rather than reflecting the true level of victimisation. Other agencies also deal with ASB incidents (for example, local authorities and social landlords), but incidents reported to these agencies will not generally be included in police data.

When viewing this data the reader should be aware that Warwickshire Police had a problem with its incident recording. For a small percentage of all incidents reported during 2015-16 the force could not identify whether these were ASB or other types of incident. These incidents have been distributed pro rata for Warwickshire, so that two percent of ASB incidents in the reporting year for 2015-16 is estimated.

### **Domestic abuse**

Data relating to domestic abuse-flagged offences is obtained through the Home Office for the 12 months to 30 June 2017. These are more recent data than those previously published by Office for National Statistics. The Home Office collects these data regularly and requires all forces to record accurately and flag domestic abuse crimes. Domestic abuse flags should be applied in accordance with the Home Office Counting Rules<sup>27</sup> to ensure consistency across forces, and within published data sets.

Data relating to domestic abuse arrests and outcomes were collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales.

Further information about the domestic abuse statistics and recent releases is available from:

[www.ons.gov.uk/releases/domesticabuseinenglandandwalesyearendingmarch2017](http://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/domesticabuseinenglandandwalesyearendingmarch2017)

When viewing this data the reader should be aware that North Yorkshire Police was unable to give the Home Office comparable data on domestic abuse-flagged crimes. The force extracted data for HMICFRS on the powers and outcomes used to deal with these offences by using an enhanced search. This search examined additional factors (such as the victim / suspect relationship) and included a keyword search to identify additional domestic abuse crimes which may not have been flagged. The force used a simpler search, which identified domestic abuse crimes by flagging alone, to extract data it supplied to the Home Office. As North Yorkshire Police's data on domestic abuse are not comparable with other forces, we have excluded the data.

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<sup>27</sup> Home Office Counting Rules are rules in accordance with which crime data – required to be submitted to the Home Secretary under sections 44 and 45 of the Police Act 1996 – must be collected. They set down how the police service in England and Wales must record crime, how crimes must be classified according to crime type and categories, whether and when to record crime, how many crimes to record in respect of a single incident and the regime for the re-classification of crimes as no-crimes.

## **Organised crime groups (OCGs)**

These data were collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales. City of London Police is excluded from the England and Wales rate as its OCG data are not comparable with other forces due to size and its wider national remit.

As at 1 July 2017 City of London Police had recorded 46 OCGs. However during the inspection we found that only six OCGs were within the force's geographical area and the remaining 40 were part of the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau's remit.

## **Figures in the report**

Not all forces' reports will contain all the figures we mention in the sections below. This is because some forces' data was incomplete or not comparable with England and Wales data, and in 2017 HMICFRS undertook risk-based inspections. More details about our risk-based approach can be found here:

[www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/2017-peel-assessment/#risk-based](http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/2017-peel-assessment/#risk-based)

### **Rate of anti-social behaviour (ASB) powers per 1 million population, by force, in the 12 months to 30 June 2017**

These data were collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales. HMICFRS collected data on anti-social behaviour powers, including:

- criminal behaviour orders;
- community protection notices;
- civil injunctions;
- dispersal orders.

Together these powers form the anti-social behaviour (ASB) powers considered in this report.

The Crime and Policing Act 2014 introduced ASB powers which can be applied by both local authorities and the police. The ASB powers data provided in this report covers police data. Therefore, results should be treated with caution as they may not include instances where local authorities exercised these powers.

When viewing this data the reader should be aware of the following:

- Bedfordshire Police, Greater Manchester Police and the Metropolitan Police Service were unable to provide data on anti-social behaviour powers as the data are not held centrally within each force.

- Greater Manchester Police was unable to provide any 2016 ASB use of powers data. Greater Manchester Police intends for its new integrated operational policing system to incorporate recording of ASB powers.
- Suffolk Constabulary was only able to provide data for the southern area of the force in 2017. Therefore its data are excluded.
- The forces highlighted above are not included in the figure or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.
- Gloucestershire, Hertfordshire, Humberside and Merseyside forces were only able to provide partial 2017 ASB use of powers data.
- Gloucestershire Constabulary and Hertfordshire Constabulary were unable to obtain data regarding the number of civil injunctions as their local authorities lead the application of these.
- Humberside Police was unable to provide data on community protection notices and civil injunction notices as its local authorities lead the application of these. The force does not collect data on criminal behaviour orders and dispersal orders.
- Merseyside Police was unable to provide data on dispersal orders as these orders are attached to individual crime files.

**Proportion of investigations where action was taken, by force, for offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017**

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

Suffolk Constabulary was unable to provide 2017 crime outcomes data. Dorset Police was unable to provide 2016 crime outcomes data. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the figure.

Dorset Police was unable to provide 2016 crimes outcome data, because it had difficulty with the recording of crime outcomes for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. This was due to the force introducing the Niche records management system in spring 2015. Problems with the implementation of Niche meant that crime outcomes were not reliably recorded.

**Domestic abuse arrest rate (per 100 domestic abuse-related offences), by force, in the 12 months to 30 June 2017**

Please see 'Domestic abuse' above.

- The arrest rate is calculated using a common time period for arrests and offences. It is important to note that each arrest is not necessarily directly linked to its specific domestic abuse offence recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017 in this calculation. It is also possible to have more than one arrest

per offence. In addition, the reader should note the increase in police-recorded crime which affected the majority of forces over the last year. This may mean arrest rates are higher than the figures suggest. Despite this, the calculation still indicates whether the force prioritises arrests for domestic abuse offenders over other potential forms of action. HMICFRS evaluated the arrest rate alongside other measures (such as use of voluntary attendance or body-worn video cameras) during our inspection process to understand how each force deals with domestic abuse overall.

When viewing this data the reader should be aware of the following:

- Durham, Lancashire, Warwickshire and West Mercia forces were unable to provide domestic abuse arrest data. North Yorkshire Police was unable to provide comparable domestic abuse crime and arrest data, so a rate could not be calculated. Therefore, these forces are not included in the figure.
- Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Durham and Gloucestershire forces were unable to provide 2016 domestic abuse arrest data. Therefore, these forces do not have 2016 data included in the figure.

When viewing domestic abuse arrest data for 2016, the reader should be aware of the following:

- Cambridgeshire Constabulary was unable to provide 2016 domestic abuse arrest data due to a recording problem that meant it could only obtain accurate data from a manual audit of its custody records.
- Lancashire Constabulary had difficulty in identifying all domestic abuse-flagged arrests. This affected 23 days in the 12 months to 30 June 2016. The force investigated this and confirmed that the impact on the 2016 data provided to HMICFRS would be marginal and that these are the most reliable data it can provide.

### **Rate of organised crime groups (OCGs) per 1 million population, by force, as at 1 July 2017**

Please see 'Organised crime groups' above.

Organised crime group data from City of London Police are not comparable with other forces. Therefore, its data are not included in the figure.

For data relating to 2016 the number of OCGs in Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police force areas is a combined total of OCGs for the two force areas. The OCGs per 1 million population rate is based upon their areas' combined population. For the 2017 data Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police force split their OCGs into two separate force areas.