

# PEEL: Police effectiveness 2017

An inspection of Merseyside Police



March 2018

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ISBN: 978-1-78655-548-9

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## Force in numbers



### Calls for assistance

Incidents per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2017

Merseyside Police

**312**

England and Wales

**282**



### Anti-social behaviour

Anti-social behaviour (ASB) incidents per 1,000 population 12 months to 31 March 2017

Merseyside Police

**39**

England and Wales

**31**

Change in ASB incidents 12 months to 31 March 2016 against 12 months to 31 March 2017

Merseyside Police

**+1%**

England and Wales

**-0.05%**



### Crime (excluding fraud)

Crimes recorded per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2017

Merseyside Police

**82**

England and Wales

**77**

Change in recorded crime 12 months to 30 June 2016 against 12 months to 30 June 2017

Merseyside Police


**+12%**

England and Wales

**+14%**



## Crime outcomes\*



## Domestic abuse



## Organised crime groups



\*Figures are shown as proportions of outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017. For further information about the data in this graphic please see annex A.

## Risk-based inspection

HMICFRS adopted an interim risk-based approach to inspection in 2017 in order to focus more closely on areas of policing where risk to the public is most acute.<sup>1</sup> Under this approach, not all forces are assessed against every part of the PEEL effectiveness programme every year. Merseyside Police was assessed against the following areas in 2017:

- Protecting vulnerable people; and
- Specialist capabilities.

Judgments from 2016<sup>2</sup> remain in place for areas which were not re-inspected in 2017. HMICFRS will continue to monitor areas for improvement identified in previous inspections and will assess how well each force has responded in future reports.

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<sup>1</sup> Full details of the interim risk-based approach are available from the HMICFRS website: [www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/2017-peel-assessment/#risk-based](http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/2017-peel-assessment/#risk-based)

<sup>2</sup> The 2016 effectiveness report for Merseyside Police can be found on the HMICFRS website: [www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/publications/peel-police-effectiveness-2016-merseyside](http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/publications/peel-police-effectiveness-2016-merseyside)

## Effectiveness overview

### Judgments

Overall effectiveness 2017  Good

Question	Grade	Last inspected
Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour	 Good	2016
Investigating crime and reducing re-offending	 Good	2016
Protecting vulnerable people	 Good	2017
Tackling serious and organised crime	 Outstanding	2016
Specialist capabilities	Ungraded	2017

### Summary

Merseyside Police is good at keeping people safe and reducing crime. During the last year the force has been through a period of change in the way that it provides its services and continues to prioritise how it protects vulnerable people.

In 2017, HMICFRS found that the force is good at protecting vulnerable people and supporting victims, which is consistent with our findings in 2016. We found that officers and staff had a strong awareness and understanding of the importance of vulnerability. The force's call handlers have empathy and understanding, but the force needs to give them guidance on the identification of mental health problems and general vulnerability, in order to inform correct assessment.

The response provided is generally good. Officers take the required safeguarding actions at incidents and make referrals to other organisations for further action and support. We did note, however, an increase in the use of a delayed response to some domestic incidents through the use of scheduled appointments. The force needs to review this. The force is good at allocating and supervising complex cases, including rape, using trained detectives, but is not always consistent for less serious investigations. The force is aware it needs to be more consistent in the identification, prompt allocation and supervision of these investigations from beginning to end.

The force's triage car service is a secondary police response, which uses police officers supported by mental health nurses to deal with incidents that involve members of the community who have mental health problems. This is well-established and the force has carried out detailed evaluation of the process and its benefits. The force's partnership working is strong, strategically and operationally. Its early help hubs have significant potential. They identify problems before they reach a crisis, and reduce demand in the long term. The force has established relationships to safeguard vulnerable victims, but needs to implement a solution to allow the effective surveying of victims of domestic abuse. Its use of powers to protect victims of domestic abuse is very positive.

Merseyside Police has the necessary arrangements in place to fulfil its national policing responsibilities, and to respond initially to an attack requiring an armed response.

# Protecting vulnerable people and supporting victims



Good

## Identifying vulnerability

Merseyside Police is generally good at identifying vulnerability. The force continues to use a clear definition of vulnerability that is understood by the workforce and has strategies in place to guide staff in supporting adults at risk and members of the community who have mental health problems. All the officers and staff we spoke to during the inspection displayed a consistent understanding of vulnerability and the importance the force places upon it. The force demonstrated a good understanding of the scale and nature of vulnerability in its area. The force's daily management meeting reviews any incidents involving vulnerability. To be consistent, however, the force should include domestic abuse incidents in its agenda. We found strong evidence of established partnership working, and the force produces good analytical assessments, which it shares with local authorities and other organisations such as mental health trusts and through its early help hubs,<sup>3</sup> to address vulnerability in its communities. The force is proactive in looking for hidden vulnerability. This was clear in its current operations to tackle, for example, human trafficking of Vietnamese people (used in drug cultivation) and of Romanian women (exploited for prostitution).

We found the force's call handlers to be empathetic and responsive to callers' requirements. When needed, they deployed an immediate response to vulnerable victims, while gathering further information and giving advice to the victims. Call handlers have access to a range of standard operating procedures for calls relating to sexual offences and domestic incidents. Although these provide guidance for call handlers, so that victims' vulnerability in these incidents is correctly identified and recorded, there is a lack of guidance on general vulnerability and mental health problems. Call handlers use THRIVE<sup>4</sup> and the National Decision Model<sup>5</sup> to

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<sup>3</sup> Early help hubs are intended to identify, at an early stage, problems and concerns of vulnerable individuals before they reach a crisis, which in the long term should help to reduce demand on all agencies.

<sup>4</sup> THRIVE is a structured assessment based on the levels of threat, harm, risk and vulnerability faced by the victim, rather than simply by the type of incident or crime being reported in order to help staff determine the appropriate level of response to a call.

<sup>5</sup> The National Decision Model (NDM) is specific to policing. It provides a consistent framework in which decisions can be examined and challenged, both at the time and afterwards. It is composed of six main elements: the police Code of Ethics (which is central to the decision); gathering information; assessing threat and risk; considering powers and force policy; identifying options; and taking action and reviewing what happened.



structure assessments. In HMICFRS' 2016 effectiveness inspection, we found that there was a need for the force to provide initial threat, harm and risk awareness training to its public enquiry staff, to improve initial investigation and evidence-gathering. This year we were pleased to see that specific training had been given to 34 out of its 38 staff.

During our pre-inspection work we found some inconsistent recording of structured risk-assessments, vulnerability and supervision of incidents, which would then have had a negative impact on some investigations and safeguarding. By the time of our inspection, recording standards within the force control room had improved on the incidents we looked at, but the force does need to ensure that this continues to be consistent. The force can identify repeat callers through the 'Call Assist' system when callers use the same address or phone number. This provides access to a full range of information to assist in the assessment of the call. It is automatic, and pushes information to call handlers to aid their assessment. Call handlers have access to force intelligence and crime systems for further information.

The force uses a graded deployment structure, which consists of immediate, priority (within the hour) and scheduled responses. During our inspection, we listened to a sample of calls in the force contact centre. This showed that in the majority of cases call handlers had identified vulnerability at the first point of contact and had identified the appropriate response. Although the force states it takes every opportunity to implement positive action and appropriate safeguarding measures for victims of domestic abuse, force data showed it was scheduling a notable amount of domestic incidents for an appointment at a later time or date. The force clarified that, on the vast majority of occasions, scheduled appointments are arranged at the request of the victim or to coincide with the victim's availability to see the police. This means that officers might not see the victim until some time after the incident, and in some cases, not until several days later. The force stated that to ensure governance is exercised over this process, and risk appropriately managed, that these incidents are reviewed by the scheduled incident or crime demand supervisors who are able to send the incidents back to the force contact centre for prompt deployment if appropriate.

The force assesses incidents that require a scheduled appointment as low-risk, but there can be inherent risks through the delay in speaking to the victim in person, in not taking positive action and in being unable to make referrals to partner agencies for support. Strong governance is needed to ensure that domestic abuse crime victims allocated to investigators do not encounter delays in being seen and investigated. The force needs to satisfy itself that delaying its actual response to domestic incidents is not exposing vulnerable victims to risk.

## Initial response

Merseyside Police generally provides a good initial response to most vulnerable people. Officers who attend domestic incidents are expected to use body-worn video cameras, as directed by force policy. They make good use of the force's vulnerable persons referral forms (VPRF1s), with scrutiny from the force contact centre to check that forms are submitted. In 98 percent of cases, these forms are now submitted electronically, which has improved standards. Experienced officers at the multi-agency safeguarding hubs (MASHs)<sup>6</sup> assess the forms, and actions are shared among partner agencies. The VPRF1 forms contain risk-assessments for domestic incidents. Force policy is clear that these should be completed at the scene, and we found good awareness of this on the part of officers. However, the force recognises that this might not always happen in some circumstances, and that it needs to ensure there is strong scrutiny to ensure that all assessments are completed in person.


We examined a sample of VPRF1 forms and found that immediate safeguarding actions had been undertaken and that the local policing teams are then involved with the continuing safeguarding of vulnerable victims within the community. The force's policy is that if the case is one of domestic violence, or there is a restraining order, officers will arrest. However, if safeguarding is in place, and there is no necessity to arrest, then officers will rely on voluntary attendance. This means that people attend police stations voluntarily, to be interviewed under caution. It is notable that the force's arrest rate for domestic abuse has reduced by 23 percent in the 12 months to 30 June 2017 compared with the 12 months to 30 June 2016. For every 100 domestic abuse-related offences recorded by Merseyside Police in the 12 months to 30 June 2017, some 45 arrests were made in the same period (in line with the England and Wales rate). The reasons for this reduction are to be reviewed by the force.

The rate of arrest for domestic abuse offences can provide an indication of a force's approach to handling domestic abuse offenders. Although for the purpose of this calculation arrests are not linked directly to offences, a high arrest rate may suggest that a force prioritises arrests for domestic abuse offenders over other potential forms of action (for further information, please see annex A). HMICFRS has evaluated the arrest rate alongside other measures during our inspection process to understand how each force deals with domestic abuse overall.

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<sup>6</sup> A MASH co-locates principal safeguarding agencies to better identify risks to children (and in some areas, vulnerable adults), and improve decision-making, interventions, and outcomes. A MASH enables the multi-agency team to share all appropriate information securely, and ensures that the most appropriate response is provided to effectively safeguard and protect the individual.

**Figure 1: Domestic abuse arrest rate (per 100 domestic abuse-related offences), by force, in the 12 months to 30 June 2017<sup>7, 8</sup>**



**Source: 2016 and 2017 HMICFRS data return, 2016 and 2017 Home Office domestic abuse crime data<sup>9</sup>**

**For further information about this data, please see annex A**

We found that victims of rape or serious sexual offences are not, at the point of first contact, offered a choice of a male or female officer to attend. However, we were reassured to find that officers (both male and female), trained in dealing with such offences, would be supporting the subsequent investigations.

<sup>7</sup> Durham, Lancashire, Warwickshire and West Mercia forces were unable to provide 2017 domestic abuse arrest data. Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Durham and Gloucestershire forces were unable to provide 2016 domestic abuse arrest data.

<sup>8</sup> North Yorkshire Police was unable to provide comparable domestic abuse arrest data. Therefore, it has been removed from the graph. For further information, please see annex A.

<sup>9</sup> The Home Office has provided HMICFRS with data on domestic abuse-related offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017. These data are more recent than those published by the Office for National Statistics.

## Mental health

Merseyside Police has a good ability to identify and support people with mental health conditions. The force understands its mental health role, and its partnership arrangements work well. A senior responsible officer scrutinises data to monitor performance and this information is shared with local authorities and clinical commissioning groups to manage and reduce demand. A quarterly pan-Merseyside partnership meeting has the objective of improving the patient experience. In partnership, the force runs a well-established triage system, in which mental health workers operate alongside patrol officers in order to deal with incidents involving people who have mental health problems.

In the force contact centre, call handlers demonstrated an ability to send an immediate response when this was needed to deal with mental health incidents. However, the force does not yet have a standard operating procedure to help call handlers to identify general vulnerability, and vulnerability that might be linked to mental health problems. All mental health incidents are tagged, enabling triage crews to identify them easily, and are then subjected to secondary review by the force's triage car crews. The triage crews look for other opportunities to provide interventions and referrals, with action plans being used for high-demand users. This is an innovative problem-solving technique. Although specialist training has been limited to the triage car officers, we found that online training packages had been provided to frontline officers, with aide-memoires and guidance. Further training is planned. We spoke to some of the force's partners and found overwhelming praise for the force's frontline officers' approach to mental health.

The force has three triage cars, which operate seven days a week to respond to mental health incidents and provide a high quality of care to patients at the scene. The crews also provide telephone advice to other officers and review all force mental health incidents. Every officer we met on inspection had nothing but praise for the triage car service and its effectiveness. The project's performance is continually scrutinised and refined. We were pleased to see evidence that the force had carried out detailed evaluation of its triage car service through a structured review, with actions set to make future enhancements.

## Investigating crimes involving vulnerable people

The force generally conducts its complex investigations involving vulnerable victims to a good standard. It has invested in specialist mental health investigator roles, and has four specialist detective posts working within mental health establishments to help with investigations and to support vulnerable victims and families. We found that detectives' workloads were acceptable and the force supported their welfare. The allocation of more complex investigations (including rape) to the correct level of experienced and trained detectives is consistent, and these investigations receive meaningful supervision. This is not always the case, though, for less serious cases.

We reviewed a sample of such investigations before our inspection and found some omissions in both investigation plans and meaningful supervision, with missed evidential opportunities. At the time of our actual inspection, we found good investigations in the detectives' cases we looked at, but the force needs to ensure consistency, especially with less serious cases, in order to improve outcomes for all its victims. It was positive to see that the force leadership had already commissioned a review of investigation standards. The force allocates its investigations based on a scoring model. For less serious cases, this model is not functioning precisely. Supervisors have to intervene and reallocate some investigations. The force needs to resolve this, so that vulnerable victims do not encounter delays in investigations.

Merseyside Police makes positive use of the available powers to protect victims of domestic abuse. The force made increased use of domestic violence protection notices (DVPNs) and orders (DVPOs) in the 12 months to 30 June 2017 compared with the 12 months to 30 June 2016<sup>10</sup> and is able to evidence consistent monitoring of breaches and enforcement, which was pleasing to see. Two specialist officers take the applications to court for consistency, and local policing teams follow up if breaches subsequently occur. The force's use of Clare's Law continues to be in line with that of other forces.<sup>11</sup> The force's domestic abuse charge rate has declined compared to 2016 by some 23 percent, but still remains higher than the England and Wales rate. An effect of scheduling of incidents of domestic violence can be the withdrawal of support by the victim after the passage of time. We found that the force's use of 'outcome 16', where the suspect is identified but there are evidential

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<sup>10</sup> Domestic violence protection notices (DVPNs) may be issued by an authorised police officer to prevent a suspected perpetrator from returning to a victim's home and/or contacting the victim. Following the issue of the DVPN, the police must apply to magistrates for a domestic violence protection order (DVPO). The DVPO will be granted for a period of up to 28 days.

<sup>11</sup> Clare's Law, or the domestic violence disclosure scheme, has two functions: the 'right to ask' the police about a partner's previous history of domestic abuse or violent acts; and the 'right to know' – police can proactively disclose information in prescribed circumstances.

difficulties and the victim does not support further action, was above the England and Wales rate. The force leadership was aware of this and had already commissioned an end-to-end review of its domestic abuse processes.

We found that the force does not currently survey victims of domestic abuse, and at present is relying on feedback from independent domestic violence advisors. By limiting the data in this way, the force is not ensuring consistent corporate learning.

## **Partnership working**

Merseyside Police has well-developed relationships with partner organisations, such as local councils, the NHS, and charities, enabling it to support vulnerable people and address the needs of victims. The force has established five multi-agency safeguarding hubs (MASHs), in which officers and staff work in the same buildings as other organisations. We visited three of these and found them to be effective. All VPRF1 referrals are assessed and actions devised within these MASHs, and the close sharing of information provides a rich picture to address vulnerability. The Liverpool MASH has a significantly higher incoming volume of work than the other hubs. An evaluation of the potential redistribution of workloads among these MASHs could be beneficial.

In addition, an established multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) process is in place. A MARAC meeting shares information about the highest-risk domestic abuse cases between the police and other specialists, including local independent domestic violence advisors who support victims. We found the MARAC process to be accepted practice. The force's development of its early help hubs has significant potential to focus on vulnerability in communities and to reduce demand for police and partner agencies.

The force proactively uses specialist software to monitor offenders who access and share indecent images through internet use. We examined the system and found it to be used to its capacity, with evidence of the force acting promptly in response to offences identified. The force is now using the ARMS risk-assessment process,<sup>12</sup> and works closely with the probation service to manage registered sex offenders.

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<sup>12</sup> ARMS: active risk management system for sex offenders. This allows officers to prioritise the work that needs to be done to manage the offender effectively in the community, taking into account what is currently happening in the offender's life.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force should ensure that less complex crimes are allocated promptly to investigators with the appropriate skills and accreditation, and ensure consistent supervision to promptly investigate them to a good standard.
- The force should implement a process to obtain feedback from victims of domestic abuse.
- The force should ensure that it accurately records the structured risk-assessments completed by call handlers to identify vulnerability to inform the continuing response, supervision and investigations.

## Specialist capabilities

### Ungraded

#### National policing responsibilities

*The Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR)*<sup>13</sup> specifies six national threats: terrorism, cyber-crime, public order, civil emergencies, child sexual abuse and serious and organised crime.

Merseyside Police has the necessary arrangements in place to ensure that it can fulfil its national policing responsibilities. The force has assessed its capability to respond to the six national threats included in the SPR.

A chief officer has been appointed to lead a programme to build the force's capacity to respond to each threat. We found the programme to be an effective means of engaging the workforce and developing the skills and experience it requires.

The force has established a comprehensive training programme. Training exercises are routinely conducted with other organisations to examine the joint response to civil emergencies and other disasters. As part of the programme, at periodic intervals, the force also checks procedures to mobilise large numbers of officers should a major incident occur.

#### Firearms capability

In our 2016 effectiveness inspections, HMICFRS inspected how well forces were prepared to manage firearms attacks. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the UK and Europe have meant that the police service maintains a firm focus on armed capability in England and Wales.

It is not just terrorist attacks that place operational demands on armed officers. The threat can include the activity of organised crime groups or armed street gangs and all other crime involving guns. *The Code of Practice on Police use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons*<sup>14</sup> makes forces responsible for implementing national standards of armed policing. The code stipulates that a chief officer be designated to

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<sup>13</sup> The SPR is issued annually by the Home Secretary. It sets out the latest national threats and appropriate national policing capabilities required to counter them. National threats require a co-ordinated or aggregated response from police forces, national agencies or other partners. *The Strategic Policing Requirement*, Home Office, March 2015. Available from: [www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/417116/The\\_Strategic\\_Policing\\_Requirement.pdf](http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417116/The_Strategic_Policing_Requirement.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> *Code of Practice on Police use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons*, Home Office, 2003.



oversee these standards. This requires the chief officer to set out the firearms threat in an armed policing strategic threat and risk assessment (APSTRA). The chief officer must also set out clear rationales for the number of armed officers (armed capacity) and the level to which they are trained (armed capability).

Some forces in England and Wales operate joint arrangements with other forces to provide armed policing. Merseyside Police is a force that provides its own armed capabilities; however, it shares training facilities with other forces in the North West of England.

The force has an adequate understanding of the potential harm facing the public. It shares an APSTRA with other forces in the region that determines the forces' training needs. This APSTRA conforms to the requirements of the code and the College of Policing guidance and it was last reviewed in April 2017. However, the purpose of an APSTRA goes beyond the identification of a force's training requirements. HMICFRS would expect to see an assessment of the threats and risks in each force area, with resources in place to address them. For this reason, it would be advisable for Merseyside Police to develop an APSTRA that is bespoke to the Merseyside area; this would give greater assurance that the deployment of armed officers meets local requirements.

A chief officer represents all forces in the region in scrutinising the required levels of armed capability and capacity in the North West of England. We were encouraged to see that he had extended his responsibilities to develop APSTRAs for each of the forces in the region. This will bring greater certainty that the availability of armed officers in each force is sufficient to protect communities. We will monitor these developments in future inspection work in the region.

## Annex A – About the data

The information presented in this report comes from a range of sources, including data published by the Home Office, the Office for National Statistics, inspection fieldwork and data collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales.

Where HMICFRS collected data directly from police forces, we took reasonable steps to agree the design of the data collection with forces and with other interested parties such as the Home Office. We gave forces several opportunities to quality assure and validate the data they provided us, to ensure the accuracy of the evidence presented. For instance:

- Data that forces submitted were checked and queried with those forces where data were notably different from other forces or were internally inconsistent.
- All forces were asked to check the final data used in the report and correct any errors identified.

The source of the data is presented with each figure in the report, and is set out in more detail within this annex. The source of Force in numbers data is also set out below.

### Methodology

#### Data in the report

British Transport Police was outside the scope of inspection. Any aggregated totals for England and Wales exclude British Transport Police data, so will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Where other forces have been unable to supply data, this is mentioned under the relevant sections below.

#### Population

For all uses of population as a denominator in our calculations, unless otherwise noted, we use Office for National Statistics (ONS) mid-2016 population estimates. These were the most recent data available at the time of the inspection.

For the specific case of City of London Police, we include both resident and transient population within our calculations. This is to account for the unique nature and demographics of this force's responsibility.

## **Survey of police staff**

HMICFRS surveyed the police workforce across forces in England and Wales, to understand their views on workloads, redeployment and the suitability of assigned tasks. This survey was a non-statistical, voluntary sample which means that results may not be representative of the workforce population. The number of responses varied between 16 and 1,678 across forces. Therefore, we treated results with caution and used them for identifying themes that could be explored further during fieldwork rather than to assess individual force performance.

## **Ipsos MORI survey of public attitudes towards policing**

HMICFRS commissioned Ipsos MORI to survey attitudes towards policing between 21 July and 15 August 2017. Respondents were drawn from an online panel and results were weighted by age, gender and work status to match the population profile of the force area. The sampling method used is not a statistical random sample and the sample size was small, varying between 300 and 321 individuals in each force area. Therefore, any results provided are only an indication of satisfaction rather than an absolute.

The findings of this survey are available on our website:

[www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/data/peel-assessments](http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/data/peel-assessments)

## **Review of crime files**

HMICFRS reviewed 2,700<sup>15</sup> police case files across crime types for:

- theft from person;
- rape (including attempts);
- stalking;
- harassment;
- common assault;
- grievous bodily harm (wounding);
- actual bodily harm.

Our file review was designed to provide a broad overview of the identification of vulnerability, the effectiveness of investigations and to understand how victims are treated through police processes. We randomly selected files from crimes recorded between 1 January 2017 and 31 March 2017 and assessed them against several

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<sup>15</sup> 60 case files were reviewed in each force, with the exception of the Metropolitan Police Service, West Midlands Police and West Yorkshire Police where 90 case files were reviewed.

criteria. Due to the small sample size of cases selected per force, we did not use results from the file review as the sole basis for assessing individual force performance, but alongside other evidence gathered.

## **Force in numbers**

A dash in this graphic indicates that a force was not able to supply HMICFRS with data or the data supplied by the forces were not comparable.

### **Calls for assistance (including those for domestic abuse)**

These data were collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales. In 2017, the data requested from forces contained a different breakdown of occurrences where the police were called to an incident.

### **Recorded crime and crime outcomes**

These data are obtained from Home Office police recorded crime and outcomes data tables for the 12 months to 30 June 2017 and are taken from the October 2017 Home Office data release, which is available from:

[www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables](http://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables)

Total police-recorded crime includes all crime, except fraud offences, recorded by all police forces in England and Wales. Home Office publications on the overall volumes and rates of recorded crime and outcomes include British Transport Police, which is outside the scope of this HMICFRS inspection. Therefore, England and Wales rates in this report will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Data referring to police-recorded crime should be treated with care, as recent increases may be attributed to the renewed focus on the quality and compliance of crime recording since HMICFRS' national inspection of crime data in 2014.

Suffolk Constabulary was unable to submit 2017 outcomes data to the Home Office due to data quality issues, relating to the changing of its crime recording system to Athena. Therefore Suffolk Constabulary has been excluded from the England and Wales figure.

Other notable points to consider when interpreting outcomes data are listed below.

- Crime outcome proportions show the percentage of crimes recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017 that have been assigned each outcome. This means that each crime is tracked or linked to its outcome. Therefore these data are subject to change, as more crimes are assigned outcomes over time.

- Under the new framework, 37 police forces in England and Wales provide outcomes data through the Home Office data hub (HODH) on a monthly basis. All other forces provide these data via a manual return also occurring on a monthly basis.
- Leicestershire, Staffordshire and West Yorkshire forces participated in the Ministry of Justice's out of court disposals pilot. This means they no longer issued simple cautions or cannabis/khat warnings and they restrict their use of penalty notices for disorder as disposal options for adult offenders, as part of the pilot. These three pilot forces continued to operate in accordance with the pilot conditions since the pilot ended in November 2015. Other forces subsequently also limited their use of some out of court disposals. Therefore, the outcomes data should be viewed with this in mind.
- Direct comparisons should not be made between general crime outcomes and domestic abuse-related outcomes. Domestic abuse-related outcomes are based on the number of outcomes for domestic-abuse related offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017, irrespective of when the crime was recorded. Therefore, the domestic abuse-related crimes and outcomes recorded in the reporting year are not tracked, whereas the general outcomes are tracked.
- For a full commentary and explanation of outcome types please see Crime Outcomes in England and Wales: year ending March 2017, Home Office, July 2017. Available from:  
[www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/633048/crime-outcomes-hosb0917.pdf](http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/633048/crime-outcomes-hosb0917.pdf)

### **Anti-social behaviour**

These data are obtained from Office for National Statistics data tables (year ending 31 March 2017), available from:

[www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/policeforceareadatatables](http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/policeforceareadatatables)

All police forces record incidents of anti-social behaviour (ASB) reported to them in accordance with the provisions of the National Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR). Forces record incidents under NSIR in accordance with the same victim-focused approach that applies for recorded crime, although these data are not subject to the same quality assurance as the main recorded crime collection.

Incident counts should be interpreted as incidents recorded by the police, rather than reflecting the true level of victimisation. Other agencies also deal with ASB incidents (for example, local authorities and social landlords), but incidents reported to these agencies will not generally be included in police data.

When viewing this data the reader should be aware that Warwickshire Police had a problem with its incident recording. For a small percentage of all incidents reported during 2015-16 the force could not identify whether these were ASB or other types of incident. These incidents have been distributed pro rata for Warwickshire, so that two percent of ASB incidents in the reporting year for 2015-16 is estimated.

## **Domestic abuse**

Data relating to domestic abuse-flagged offences is obtained through the Home Office for the 12 months to 30 June 2017. These are more recent data than those previously published by Office for National Statistics. The Home Office collects these data regularly and requires all forces to record accurately and flag domestic abuse crimes. Domestic abuse flags should be applied in accordance with the Home Office Counting Rules<sup>16</sup> to ensure consistency across forces, and within published data sets.

Data relating to domestic abuse arrests and outcomes were collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales.

Further information about the domestic abuse statistics and recent releases is available from:

[www.ons.gov.uk/releases/domesticabuseinenglandandwalesyearendingmarch2017](http://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/domesticabuseinenglandandwalesyearendingmarch2017)

When viewing this data the reader should be aware that North Yorkshire Police was unable to give the Home Office comparable data on domestic abuse-flagged crimes. The force extracted data for HMICFRS on the powers and outcomes used to deal with these offences by using an enhanced search. This search examined additional factors (such as the victim / suspect relationship) and included a keyword search to identify additional domestic abuse crimes which may not have been flagged. The force used a simpler search, which identified domestic abuse crimes by flagging alone, to extract data it supplied to the Home Office. As North Yorkshire Police's data on domestic abuse are not comparable with other forces, we have excluded the data.

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<sup>16</sup> Home Office Counting Rules are rules in accordance with which crime data – required to be submitted to the Home Secretary under sections 44 and 45 of the Police Act 1996 – must be collected. They set down how the police service in England and Wales must record crime, how crimes must be classified according to crime type and categories, whether and when to record crime, how many crimes to record in respect of a single incident and the regime for the re-classification of crimes as no-crimes.

## **Organised crime groups (OCGs)**

These data were collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales. City of London Police is excluded from the England and Wales rate as its OCG data are not comparable with other forces due to size and its wider national remit.

As at 1 July 2017 City of London Police had recorded 46 OCGs. However during the inspection we found that only six OCGs were within the force's geographical area and the remaining 40 were part of the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau's remit.

## **Figures in the report**

Not all forces' reports will contain all the figures we mention in the sections below. This is because some forces' data was incomplete or not comparable with England and Wales data, and in 2017 HMICFRS undertook risk-based inspections. More details about our risk-based approach can be found here:

[www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/2017-peel-assessment/#risk-based](http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/2017-peel-assessment/#risk-based)

### **Rate of anti-social behaviour (ASB) powers per 1 million population, by force, in the 12 months to 30 June 2017**

These data were collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales. HMICFRS collected data on anti-social behaviour powers, including:

- criminal behaviour orders;
- community protection notices;
- civil injunctions;
- dispersal orders.

Together these powers form the anti-social behaviour (ASB) powers considered in this report.

The Crime and Policing Act 2014 introduced ASB powers which can be applied by both local authorities and the police. The ASB powers data provided in this report covers police data. Therefore, results should be treated with caution as they may not include instances where local authorities exercised these powers.

When viewing this data the reader should be aware of the following:

- Bedfordshire Police, Greater Manchester Police and the Metropolitan Police Service were unable to provide data on anti-social behaviour powers as the data are not held centrally within each force.

- Greater Manchester Police was unable to provide any 2016 ASB use of powers data. Greater Manchester Police intends for its new integrated operational policing system to incorporate recording of ASB powers.
- Suffolk Constabulary was only able to provide data for the southern area of the force in 2017. Therefore its data are excluded.
- The forces highlighted above are not included in the figure or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.
- Gloucestershire, Hertfordshire, Humberside and Merseyside forces were only able to provide partial 2017 ASB use of powers data.
- Gloucestershire Constabulary and Hertfordshire Constabulary were unable to obtain data regarding the number of civil injunctions as their local authorities lead the application of these.
- Humberside Police was unable to provide data on community protection notices and civil injunction notices as its local authorities lead the application of these. The force does not collect data on criminal behaviour orders and dispersal orders.
- Merseyside Police was unable to provide data on dispersal orders as these orders are attached to individual crime files.

**Proportion of investigations where action was taken, by force, for offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017**

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

Suffolk Constabulary was unable to provide 2017 crime outcomes data. Dorset Police was unable to provide 2016 crime outcomes data. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the figure.

Dorset Police was unable to provide 2016 crimes outcome data, because it had difficulty with the recording of crime outcomes for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. This was due to the force introducing the Niche records management system in spring 2015. Problems with the implementation of Niche meant that crime outcomes were not reliably recorded.

**Domestic abuse arrest rate (per 100 domestic abuse-related offences), by force, in the 12 months to 30 June 2017**

Please see 'Domestic abuse' above.

- The arrest rate is calculated using a common time period for arrests and offences. It is important to note that each arrest is not necessarily directly linked to its specific domestic abuse offence recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2017 in this calculation. It is also possible to have more than one arrest



per offence. In addition, the reader should note the increase in police-recorded crime which affected the majority of forces over the last year. This may mean arrest rates are higher than the figures suggest. Despite this, the calculation still indicates whether the force prioritises arrests for domestic abuse offenders over other potential forms of action. HMICFRS evaluated the arrest rate alongside other measures (such as use of voluntary attendance or body-worn video cameras) during our inspection process to understand how each force deals with domestic abuse overall.

When viewing this data the reader should be aware of the following:

- Durham, Lancashire, Warwickshire and West Mercia forces were unable to provide domestic abuse arrest data. North Yorkshire Police was unable to provide comparable domestic abuse crime and arrest data, so a rate could not be calculated. Therefore, these forces are not included in the figure.
- Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Durham and Gloucestershire forces were unable to provide 2016 domestic abuse arrest data. Therefore, these forces do not have 2016 data included in the figure.

When viewing domestic abuse arrest data for 2016, the reader should be aware of the following:

- Cambridgeshire Constabulary was unable to provide 2016 domestic abuse arrest data due to a recording problem that meant it could only obtain accurate data from a manual audit of its custody records.
- Lancashire Constabulary had difficulty in identifying all domestic abuse-flagged arrests. This affected 23 days in the 12 months to 30 June 2016. The force investigated this and confirmed that the impact on the 2016 data provided to HMICFRS would be marginal and that these are the most reliable data it can provide.

### **Rate of organised crime groups (OCGs) per 1 million population, by force, as at 1 July 2017**

Please see 'Organised crime groups' above.

Organised crime group data from City of London Police are not comparable with other forces. Therefore, its data are not included in the figure.

For data relating to 2016 the number of OCGs in Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police force areas is a combined total of OCGs for the two force areas. The OCGs per 1 million population rate is based upon their areas' combined population. For the 2017 data Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police force split their OCGs into two separate force areas.