



Promoting improvements
in policing to make
everyone safer

PEEL: Police effectiveness 2016

An inspection of City of London Police



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Introduction

As part of our annual inspections of police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL), Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) assesses the effectiveness of police forces across England and Wales.

What is police effectiveness and why is it important?

An effective police force is one which keeps people safe and reduces crime. These are the most important responsibilities for a police force, and the principal measures by which the public judge the performance of their force and policing as a whole.

To reach a judgment on the extent of each force's effectiveness, our inspection answered the following overall question:

- How effective is the force at keeping people safe and reducing crime?

To answer this question HMIC explores five 'core' questions, which reflect those areas of policing that we consider to be of particular interest and concern to the public:¹

1. How effective is the force at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe?
2. How effective is the force at investigating crime and reducing re-offending?
3. How effective is the force at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims?
4. How effective is the force at tackling serious and organised crime?
5. How effective are the force's specialist capabilities?

HMIC's effectiveness inspection assessed all of these areas during 2016. More information on how we inspect and grade forces as part of this wide-ranging inspection is available on the HMIC website (www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/). This report sets out our findings for City of London Police.

Reports on the force's efficiency, legitimacy and leadership inspections are available on the HMIC website (www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/peel-assessments/peel-2016/city-of-london/).

¹ HMIC assessed forces against these questions between September and December 2016, except for Kent Police – our pilot force – which we inspected in June 2016.

Force in numbers



Calls for assistance

Calls for assistance per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2016

City of London Police England and Wales

61

240



Crime (excluding fraud)

Crimes recorded per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2016

City of London Police England and Wales

13

68

Change in recorded crime 12 months to 30 June 2015 against 12 months to 30 June 2016

City of London Police England and Wales

-3.8%

+7.8%

Change in recorded crime for the 5 years to the 12 months to 30 June 2016

City of London Police England and Wales

-21.0%

-3.4%



Crime outcomes*

Charged/summoned

City of London Police England and Wales

14.2%

12.1%

Evidential difficulties: suspect identified but victim does not support action

City of London Police England and Wales

3.8%

10.6%

Investigation completed but no suspect identified

City of London Police England and Wales

50.2%

47.4%

*Figures are shown as proportions of outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016.



Anti-social behaviour

Anti-social behaviour incidents per 1,000 population 12 months to 31 March 2016

City of London Police England and Wales

2

31

City of London Police England and Wales

3

34



Domestic abuse

Domestic abuse calls for assistance per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2016

City of London Police England and Wales

0.4

16

Domestic abuse as a percentage of all recorded crime (excluding fraud) 12 months to 30 June 2016

City of London Police England and Wales

2.0%

11.1%

Domestic abuse as a percentage of all recorded crime (excluding fraud) 12 months to 31 March 2015

City of London Police England and Wales

1.5%

10.0%



Organised crime groups

Organised crime groups per million population as at 1 July 2016

City of London Police England and Wales

235

—



Victim satisfaction rate

Victim satisfaction with the overall service provided by the police 12 months to 30 June 2016

City of London Police England and Wales

88.9%

83.3%

City of London Police's organised crime groups data per million population are not comparable with other forces due to size and its wider national remit. For further information about the data in this graphic please see annex A.

Overview – How effective is the force at keeping people safe and reducing crime?

Overall judgment²



Good

City of London Police is good at keeping people safe and reducing crime. The force has an effective approach to investigating crime and protecting vulnerable people,³ particularly victims of domestic abuse. However, improvements are required in how it approaches preventing crime and anti-social behaviour and – in a change from our findings in last year's assessment – how it tackles serious and organised crime. Our overall judgment remains the same as last year.

Overall summary

How effective is the force at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe?



Requires improvement

How effective is the force at investigating crime and reducing re-offending?



Good

How effective is the force at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims?



Good

How effective is the force at tackling serious and organised crime?



Requires improvement

How effective are the force's specialist capabilities? **Ungraded**

Overall, the effectiveness of City of London Police is good. However, improvement is required in some important areas.

The force needs to improve how it prevents crime and tackles anti-social behaviour. Although it analyses national intelligence to identify and respond to economic crime, low volumes of local intelligence impair its development of a wider understanding of

² HMIC judgments are outstanding, good, requires improvement and inadequate.

³ A vulnerable person is someone who is in need of special care, support or protection through their age, disability, or because they have been subjected to repeated offences, or are at high risk of abuse, for example.

threats across all communities. We found no routine use of a structured problem-solving⁴ model or assessment of the effectiveness of problem-solving activities.

The force is good at investigating crime and reducing re-offending. It allocates appropriate resources to calls for service, and its initial investigations are effective. Subsequent investigations are generally conducted effectively by suitably trained staff, supported by specialist functions. Although the improvement plan is still to be implemented, the force has responded positively to previous HMIC comments on integrated offender management.

The force is good at protecting those who are vulnerable and supporting victims. Its initial response to vulnerable victims is effective, and officers and staff have a good understanding of vulnerability, enabling them to identify and protect vulnerable people. Improved flagging of vulnerability on records would enhance this further. The force investigates effectively offences involving vulnerable victims. It also works well with other organisations to support victim safety.

The force's approach to tackling serious and organised crime and managing organised crime groups requires improvement. We found a sophisticated understanding of the threat from economic crime and a structured process to assess the threat from serious and organised crime. However, this would be improved by increased local intelligence and data from other organisations.

The force has good specialist capabilities and effective arrangements to fulfil its national responsibilities. Appropriate arrangements are in place to deal with major incidents. An extensive armed policing strategic threat and risk assessment provides a thorough understanding of the threat from firearms.

⁴ A term used in policing where forces systematically identify and analyse crime and disorder problems, develop specific responses to individual problems and subsequently assess whether the response has been successful.

How effective is the force at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe?

The police's ability to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour and to keep people safe is a principal measure of its effectiveness. Crime prevention is more effective than investigation, stops people being victims in the first place and makes society a safer place. The police cannot prevent crime on their own: Other policing organisations and organisations such as health, housing and children's services have a vital role to play. Police effectiveness in this matter therefore depends on their ability to work closely with other policing organisations and other interested parties to understand local problems and to use a wide range of evidence-based interventions to resolve them.


How much crime and anti-social behaviour is there in the City of London?

Although police-recorded crime is by no means a complete measure of all of the demand for calls on its service that a force faces, it does provide a partial indication of performance across all forces. Crime rates are reported as the number of crimes per 1,000 population in each force area to enable comparison between areas. Total recorded crime is made up of victim-based crime (crimes involving a direct victim such as an individual, a group, or an organisation) and other crimes against society (e.g. possession of drugs). In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, the majority of forces (39 out of 43 forces) showed an annual increase in total police-recorded crime (excluding fraud). This increase in police-recorded crime may have been affected by the renewed focus on the quality and compliance of crime recording since HMIC's 2014 inspection of crime data in all forces across England and Wales.

In 2010 the Home Secretary set a clear priority for the police service to cut crime. Figure 1 shows how police-recorded crime has changed over the longer term. When compared with the 12 months to 30 June 2011, police-recorded crime (excluding fraud) for the 12 months to 30 June 2016 has decreased by 21.0 percent in City of London compared with a decrease of 3.4 percent across all forces in England and Wales.

Over this same period, victim-based crime decreased by 11.2 percent in City of London, compared with a decrease of 0.5 percent for England and Wales as a whole.

Figure 1: Police-recorded crime rates (per 1,000 population) in City of London, for the five-year period to 30 June 2016



Source: Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

More recently, when compared with the previous 12 month period, police-recorded crime (excluding fraud) in City of London decreased by 3.8 percent for the year ending 30 June 2016. This is compared with an increase of 7.8 percent across all forces in England and Wales over the same period.

The rate of police-recorded crimes and incidents of anti-social behaviour per head of population indicates how safe it is for the public in that police area. Figures 2 and 3 show crime rates (per 1,000 population) and the change in the rate (per 1,000 population) of anti-social behaviour in City of London compared with England and Wales.

HMIC used a broad selection of crime types to indicate crime levels in the police force area during the inspection. We are not judging the effectiveness of the force on police-recorded crime rates only. The figure below shows police-recorded crime rates in the force area for a small selection of crime types.

Figure 2: Police-recorded crime rates (per 1,000 population) in City of London, for the 12 months to 30 June 2016


Rates per 1,000 population	City of London Police	England and Wales
Recorded crime (excluding fraud)	13.0	68.2
Victim-based crime	10.8	60.4
Sexual offences	0.2	1.9
Assault with injury	0.9	7.0
Burglary in a dwelling*	0.5	8.1

* The rate of burglary in a dwelling is the rate for 1,000 households, rather than population

Source: Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

Figure 3: Percentage change in the rate of anti-social behaviour incidents (per 1,000 population), by force, comparing the 12 months to 31 March 2016 with the 12 months to 31 March 2015



Source: Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

In the 12 months to 31 March 2016, City of London Police recorded 2 incidents of anti-social behaviour per 1,000 population. This is 24 percent fewer incidents per 1,000 population than the force recorded during the previous 12 months. In England

and Wales as a whole, there were 8 percent fewer incidents per 1,000 population in the 12 months to 31 March 2016, than were recorded during the previous 12 months.

How effectively does the force understand the threat or risk of harm within the communities it serves?

It is vital that forces have a detailed understanding of the communities they serve in order to protect them from harm. This understanding should include those communities which may – for a variety of reasons – need the police to work differently to understand their requirements, for example migrant communities, elderly people or groups which might be mistrustful towards the police. A good understanding of what matters to these communities helps the police to gain their confidence and create safer neighbourhoods for citizens.

In order to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour, police forces need to understand the threat and risk faced by communities. Forces must also operate a model of local policing in which police officers and police community support officers (PCSOs) have sufficient time for community engagement, visible targeted foot patrols and working with other policing organisations and other interested parties to promote resolutions that protect communities and prevent crime. Successfully undertaking these three activities leads to crime reduction and increased public confidence.

Does City of London Police understand the risk posed to its communities?

City of London Police has a dedicated communities team. The principal roles of the team are to provide a visible policing presence, engage with the public and provide reassurance and confidence in local policing. The size of the team has decreased over the last year, with the number of PCSOs reduced from 52 to 16. However, on a positive note, we found that the remaining officers and PCSOs are rarely taken away from their principal roles. PCSOs are used in accordance with national guidance.

In relation to complex and national economic crime, City of London Police has a good understanding of the threat of risk and harm within the residential, business and transient⁵ communities it serves. The force is the national policing lead for economic crime and its economic crime directorate works with local and national businesses and individuals to address fraud. As part of its national responsibilities, the force is responsible for both Action Fraud, the national fraud and internet crime-reporting centre, and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau. These play a lead role in collaborating with national and international partner organisations in analysing intelligence to identify and respond to complex and emerging threats from economic crime.

⁵ Non-residents visiting or working in the City of London.

However, at a local level the force lacks a full understanding of the threat and risk to the communities it serves. This is primarily a consequence of the lack of local intelligence collected by the force. Officers and staff are not routinely submitting intelligence, and at the time of our inspection there was an average of just 16 intelligence submissions per day from across the entire force. The lack of intelligence is compounded by a lack of engagement with and intelligence provision from partner organisations. This was evident in the development of the force's serious organised crime local profile⁶ and its strategic risk assessment.⁷ Despite the force submitting numerous requests to its 40 main partner organisations for intelligence and information to inform the documents, a response was only received from four of them. As a consequence, the data in both documents are almost entirely generated from the police. This limits the force's development of a broad understanding of threats. The effective gathering of intelligence from officers and partner organisations is therefore an area in which the force requires improvement.

How does City of London Police engage with the public?

The force has a good plan for engaging with the public. The plan covers five principles of community engagement:

- access for all;
- making it count;
- working with partners;
- promoting innovation; and
- getting involved.

We found numerous examples of the force's communities team responding promptly to local concerns and dealing with them before they escalated. At a strategic level, the force engages with the business community in several settings.

The force is generally proactive in its use of social media. It has more than 60,000 followers on Twitter. However, we were told that this communication was often one way, with the force's corporate communications department not routinely engaged in publicising how the force had responded to the public's concerns.

⁶ A local profile is a report that outlines the threat from serious and organised crime within a specific local area.

⁷ Police forces are required to produce an annual strategic threat and risk assessment (STRA). The STRA will be reviewed every six months, but as a living document it should be monitored, reviewed and updated on a regular basis to ensure it remains current.

How effectively do force actions and activities prevent crime and anti-social behaviour?

Effective forces use a range of options to prevent crime, tackle anti-social behaviour and keep people safe. They use structured approaches to solving local problems which aim to rid communities of criminal and anti-social behaviour. They also use a range of legal powers and specific tactics which vary depending on the situation. HMIC expects forces to review their activity as well as other sources of evidence in order to improve their ability to protect people over the long term.

Does the force have a problem-solving approach?

The force has adopted the scanning, analysis, response, assessment (SARA)⁸ problem-solving model, and we were told that it has trained a number of officers and staff in this problem-solving approach. However, we found that the model is neither widely understood nor consistently applied by officers or staff. We spoke to officers of all ranks across all of the force's directorates and found only isolated evidence of compliance with the SARA model. The majority of officers and staff lack understanding of the problem-solving approach and how to apply it. Furthermore, the majority of the small number of problem-solving plans provided to us did not follow the SARA model and, importantly, were not subject to routine supervisory review, scrutiny or assessment. It was also disappointing to discover that the force has not addressed the adverse comments in HMIC's 2015 effectiveness report⁹ about the lack of a system to record problem-solving plans and activity in relation to specific victims, offenders and locations.

Neither a problem-solving culture nor the use of the SARA model are a routine part of everyday practice across the force. City of London Police recognises that this is an area for improvement and is seeking to address the situation. The force has developed and published documents which explain the SARA process to staff and provide practical advice on how to use it. It is also currently reviewing its training provision in relation to problem solving.

⁸ An acronym for scanning, analysis, response, and assess. The process is aimed at identifying legal and ethical solutions to policing problems such as anti-social behaviour.

⁹ *PEEL: Police effectiveness 2015 – An inspection of City of London Police*, HMIC, February 2016. Available at: www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/publications/police-effectiveness-2015-city-of-london/

Does the force use effective approaches and tactics to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour?

The force works with other organisations to deploy a range of tactics and interventions to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour within the City of London. For example, officers in the economic crime directorate work with trading standards and other interested parties to prevent City of London business addresses being used for investment fraud. At a local level, community team staff provided examples of how they work with homeless charities and local mental health teams to respond to the complex needs of vulnerable people sleeping rough within the force area.

Working with the City of London Corporation, the force has used its powers under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 to implement a late-night levy.¹⁰ This has generated approximately £300,000, which the force has used to fund policing initiatives focused on the city's night-time economy to improve public safety.

Does the force use evidence of best practice and its own learning to improve the service to the public?

The force does not make routine use of the SARA model and, as a consequence, does not routinely assess the effectiveness of its activities. The force has recognised this and is seeking to improve the situation. It is committed to developing a central repository of problem-solving plans to help disseminate good practice across the force.

Summary of findings



Requires improvement

City of London Police requires improvement in its approach to preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe. At a national level, the force and its national and international partner organisations analyse intelligence effectively to identify and respond to complex and emerging economic crime trends and patterns. However, at a local level there are a number of issues that inhibit the force's understanding of the threat and risk to the communities it serves. The low volume of intelligence coming into the force both from its officers and staff and from its main local partner organisations has a serious effect on the force's understanding of threats across all its communities. This is an area in which the force requires improvement.

¹⁰ The late night levy enables licensing authorities to raise a contribution from late-opening alcohol suppliers towards policing the night-time economy. For more information, see:

www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/98126/late-night-levy.pdf

The force can demonstrate good use of tactics and interventions to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour, particularly in relation to protecting victims from fraud and its management of the night-time economy. However, its workforce does not routinely use a structured problem-solving model to address issues and does not routinely assess the effectiveness of its activities.

Areas for improvement

- The force should improve its approach to collecting and analysing intelligence – including intelligence from its main partner organisations – to provide a detailed understanding of its communities.
- The force should adopt a structured and consistent problem-solving process to enable it to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour more effectively.

How effective is the force at investigating crime and reducing re-offending?

When a crime occurs, the public must have confidence that the police will investigate it effectively, take seriously their concerns as victims, and bring offenders to justice. To be effective, investigations should be well planned and supervised, based on approved practice, and carried out by appropriately-trained staff. In co-operation with other organisations, forces must also manage the risk posed by those who are identified as being the most prolific or dangerous offenders, to minimise the chances of continued harm to individuals and communities.

How well does the force bring offenders to justice?

Since April 2014, police forces in England and Wales have been required to record how investigations are concluded in a new way, known as ‘outcomes’. Replacing what was known as ‘detections’, the outcomes framework gives a fuller picture of the work the police do to investigate and resolve crime and over time all crimes will be assigned an outcome. The broader outcomes framework (currently containing 21 different types of outcomes) is designed to support police officers in using their professional judgment to ensure a just and timely resolution. The resolution should reflect the harm caused to the victim, the seriousness of the offending behaviour, the impact on the community and deter future offending.

Outcomes are likely to differ from force to force for various reasons. Forces face a different mix of crime types in their policing areas, so the outcomes they assign will also vary depending on the nature of the crime. Certain offences are more likely to be concluded without offenders being prosecuted; typically these include types of crime such as cannabis misuse. If this type of crime is particularly prevalent in the force then it is likely that the level of ‘cannabis/khat¹¹ warning’ outcomes would be greater. Other offences such as those involving domestic abuse or serious sexual offences, are unlikely to result in a high usage of the ‘cautions’ outcome.

The frequency of outcomes may also reflect the force’s policing priorities. For example, some forces work hard with partners to ensure that first time and low-level offenders are channelled away from the criminal justice system. In these areas locally-based community resolutions are likely to be more prevalent than elsewhere.

It is also important to understand that not all of the crimes recorded in the year will have been assigned an outcome as some will still be under investigation. For some crime types such as sexual offences, the delay between a crime being recorded and

¹¹ A plant native to Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, the leaves of which are frequently chewed as a stimulant. The possession and supply of khat became a criminal offence in England and Wales in 2014.

an outcome being assigned may be particularly pronounced, as these may involve complex and lengthy investigations.

Figure 4: Proportion of outcomes assigned to offences recorded in City of London Police, in 12 months to 30 June 2016, by outcome type^{12,13}

Outcome number	Outcome type / group	City of London Police	England and Wales
1	Charged/Summonsed	14.2	12.1
4	Taken into consideration	0.1	0.2
	Out-of-court (formal)	5.8	3.2
2	Caution - youths	0.1	0.4
3	Caution - adults	5.1	2.3
6	Penalty Notices for Disorder	0.6	0.6
	Out-of-court (informal)	3.0	3.6
7	Cannabis/Khat warning	1.7	0.9
8	Community Resolution	1.3	2.8
*	Prosecution prevented or not in the public interest	0.8	1.8
	Evidential difficulties (victim supports police action)		
15	Suspect identified	3.6	8.3
	Evidential difficulties (victim does not support police action)	6.5	13.8
16	Suspect identified	3.8	10.6
14	Suspect not identified	2.7	3.2
18	Investigation complete – no suspect identified	50.2	47.4
20	Action undertaken by another body / agency	0.0	0.6
21	Further investigation to support formal action not in the public interest	0.0	0.1
	Total offences assigned an outcome	84.2	91.3
	Not yet assigned an outcome	15.8	8.7
	Total	100.00	100.00

*Includes the following outcome types: Offender died, Not in public interest (CPS), Prosecution prevented – suspect under age, Prosecution prevented – suspect too ill, Prosecution prevented – victim/key witness dead/too ill, Prosecution time limit expired

Source: Home Office crime outcomes data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

¹² Dorset Police is excluded from the table. Therefore figures for England and Wales will differ from those published by the Home Office. For further details see annex A.

¹³ ‘Taken into consideration’ is when an offender admits committing other offences in the course of sentencing proceedings and requests those other offences to be taken into consideration.

In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, City of London Police's use of 'out-of-court (formal)' was among the highest in England and Wales. Its use of 'evidential difficulties (victim supports police action)' was among the lowest in England and Wales. However, any interpretation of outcomes should take into account that outcomes will vary dependent on the crime types that occur in each force area, and how it deals with offenders for different crimes.

How effective is the force's initial investigative response?

The initial investigative response is critical for an effective investigation. From the moment victims and witnesses make contact with the police the investigative process should start, so that accurate information and evidence can be gathered. It is important that forces record evidence as soon as possible after a crime. The longer it takes for evidence-recording to begin, the more likely it is that evidence will be destroyed, damaged or lost. Recording this evidence is usually the responsibility of the first officer who attends the scene. After the officer has completed this initial investigation the case may be handed over to a different police officer or team in the force. This process must ensure that the right people with the right skills investigate the right crimes.

Control room response

City of London Police has robust processes to enable it to respond appropriately to reported incidents. Staff within the force control room are effective at gathering evidence at first contact and ensuring that appropriate resources are allocated to the initial investigation. The force has invested in its workforce, and is currently running a modular training programme about the threat, harm, risk, investigation, vulnerable and engagement (THRIVE)¹⁴ model to all call handlers. All incident logs are monitored by a control room supervisor to ensure appropriate responses. In addition, the force's performance and events team provides a second level of oversight for the allocation of resources to all incidents of anti-social behaviour and domestic abuse. The team assesses the action taken by those in the control room in relation to such incidents and, where particularly good or poor performance is identified, feedback is provided to the supervisor for the attention of the call handler. If required, additional training can be given.

¹⁴ THRIVE is a structured assessment based on the levels of threat, harm, risk and vulnerability faced by the victim, rather than simply by the type of incident or crime being reported, in order to help staff determine the appropriate level of response to a call.

How well do response officers investigate?

HMIC found that the force is conducting effective initial investigations and that investigators identify appropriate lines of enquiry. Officers were able to explain in detail the golden hour principles¹⁵ and understood the need to secure best evidence at the scene of crime. The force also ensures that forensic and detective support is available on a 24-hour basis. This means that the best available evidence is secured and retained to support investigations effectively. The force assesses and allocates investigations effectively and ensures that investigators are appropriately supported. Because the force handles a relatively low volume of crime, its daily management meeting has the capacity to review the vulnerability and risk caused by each crime reported in the previous 24-hour period and, in conjunction with the force's crime management unit, to ensure the crimes are allocated to the most appropriate team.

The force has policies to ensure that crimes are investigated by the right people with the right skills. We found that in most cases this was effective. The force's crime screening, allocation and finalisation policy provides clear guidance on which offences should be investigated by uniform officers and which should be investigated by specialist investigators. The allocation of crimes is overseen by the crime management unit. At a local level, crimes which occur in high volumes, such as criminal damage, are allocated to response and community team officers. Detectives in the criminal investigation department are assigned investigations into more complex or serious crimes. Cases of child protection, neglect and abuse, domestic abuse, forced marriage, hate crime, so-called honour-based violence, rape, sexual assault and stalking are all allocated to specialist investigators in the public protection unit (PPU). As the national policing lead for fraud, the force also has a national and specialist fraud investigation capability. All the force's investigators are appropriately trained and accredited to the correct level of the professionalising investigation project.¹⁶ Those with specialist responsibilities are required to attain additional qualifications.

¹⁵ The golden hour is the term used for the period immediately after an offence has been committed, when material is readily available in high volumes to the police. For more information, see:

www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/investigations/investigation-process/?s=golden+hour+#golden-hour

¹⁶ The aim of the professionalising investigation project (PIP) is to ensure that staff are trained, skilled and accredited to conduct the highest quality investigations. The PIP structure involves a series of levels: PIP level 1 – priority and volume crime investigations; PIP level 2 – serious and complex investigations; PIP level 3 – major investigations; and PIP level 4 – strategic management of highly complex investigations. For more information, see: www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/investigations/introduction/#pip

How effective is the force's subsequent investigation?

Every day police forces across England and Wales investigate a wide range of crimes. These range from non-complex crimes such as some burglary and assault cases through to complex and sensitive investigations such as rape and murder. HMIC referred to national standards and best practice in examining how well forces allocate and investigate the full range of crimes, including how officers and staff can gather evidence to support investigations. These include the more traditional forensics, such as taking fingerprints, as well as more recently developed techniques like gathering digital evidence from mobile telephones or computers to find evidence of online abuse.

Quality of the investigation

HMIC found that investigations undertaken by specialist departments are generally well supervised. Line managers are able to demonstrate their involvement in investigation plans, providing oversight and direction to staff. However, this was less evident in volume crime¹⁷ investigations. Several investigations that we reviewed did not contain any evidence of supervision by immediate line managers. We commented on this issue in our 2015 effectiveness report. This remains an area for improvement for the force.

Support to investigations

The force's investigative support functions are effective. The force can investigate crime scenes at all times and has a clear policy that lists the types of offences which crime scene investigators must attend in order to preserve and retrieve forensic evidence. The force can also examine digital evidence effectively through its hi-tech crime unit. This unit conducts forensic examination of digital devices, attends crime scenes where appropriate and provides advice and support to investigating officers over the phone. In more serious or complex cases, staff from the unit perform the role of crime scene manager¹⁸ for the recovery of digital evidence. When this occurs, they participate in investigation briefings and the development of digital forensic strategies.

The force has invested in eight mobile phone kiosks (to download mobile phone data) and digital triage systems located around the force area. These enable frontline officers to identify and preserve evidence held on mobile telephones, without them having to be submitted to the unit for forensic examination. This assists in the force's management of the demand for the services of its hi-tech crime unit.

¹⁷ Any crime which, through its sheer volume, has a significant impact on the community and the ability of the local police to tackle it. Volume crime often includes priority crimes such as street robbery, burglary and vehicle-related criminality, but can also apply to criminal damage or assaults.

¹⁸ The crime scene manager is the leader of the crime scene investigation team and the principal decision maker for forensic issues.


The hi-tech crime unit currently estimates its backlog of lowest-risk cases to be approximately two to three months. HMIC is satisfied that the unit can prioritise effectively the cases that involve high-risk victims (such as those who are vulnerable) and provide a fast service for them.

Supporting victims

The new outcomes framework introduced in 2014 includes some outcomes where there were evidential difficulties,¹⁹ which had not previously been recorded. This was to gain an insight into the scale of crimes that the police could not progress further through the criminal justice process due to limited evidence. Furthermore, these outcomes can be thought of as an indicator for how effective the police are at working with victims and supporting them through investigative and judicial processes, as they record when victims are unwilling or unable to support continued investigations or when they have withdrawn their support for police action.

¹⁹ Evidential difficulties also includes where a suspect has been identified and the victim supports police action, but evidential difficulties prevent further action being taken.

Figure 5: Percentage of 'Evidential difficulties; victim does not support action' outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, by force^{20,21}



Source: Home Office crime outcomes data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

For all offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, City of London Police recorded 6.5 percent as 'Evidential difficulties; victim does not support police action'. This compares with 13.8 percent for England and Wales over the same period. However, it should be noted that not all of the offences committed in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 were assigned an outcome and consequently, these figures are subject to change over time.

City of London Police keeps victims well informed about the progress of investigations. Good victim care was evident in the majority of the cases we reviewed. The officers and staff we spoke to clearly understood why victim care is important and were aware of their responsibilities under the national *Code of*

²⁰ Percentages of evidential difficulties can be affected by the level of certain types of crime within a force, such as domestic abuse related offences.

²¹ Dorset Police is excluded from the graph. Therefore, figures for England and Wales will differ from those published by the Home Office. For further details see annex A.

*Practice for Victims of Crime.*²² In HMIC's 2015 effectiveness (vulnerability) report²³ for the force, we identified shortcomings in how the force used victim personal statements²⁴ and identified this as an area for improvement. The force has responded positively to this issue to improve its compliance with the code. However, during the course of this inspection, we continued to find some officers who were either unaware of the need to offer a victim personal statement at the same time as taking the initial statement or chose to offer the opportunity to give such a statement at a later date. This requirement of the code is important because it gives victims an opportunity to describe the wider effects the crime has had upon them, express their concerns and indicate whether or not they require any additional support. The force should continue with its efforts to raise awareness of and compliance with this requirement.

How effectively does the force reduce re-offending?

We assessed how well the force works with other policing authorities and other interested parties to identify vulnerable offenders and prevent them from re-offending, and how well it identifies and manages repeat, dangerous or sexual offenders.

How well does the force pursue suspects and offenders?

The force is effective at proactively managing those who pose a risk to the public. At the time of the inspection, City of London had 290 suspects recorded as wanted on the Police National Computer (PNC); this equates to 0.73 per 1,000 population. Officers we spoke to during our inspection were knowledgeable about the force policy for circulating wanted persons on the PNC. Where a suspect is identified, but not apprehended, the force places a wanted/missing marker on the PNC within a very short time. In order to do this, an investigator must obtain the authority of an inspector, who will satisfy him or herself that sufficient local enquiries have taken place before circulation is authorised. However, HMIC identified some, albeit limited,

²² All police forces have a statutory duty to comply with the *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime*, which sets out the service victims of crime can expect from all parts of the criminal justice system. The code states that all victims of crime should be able to make a personal statement, which they can use to explain how the crime has affected them. Victims should also be kept updated about the progress of their case. Available at:

www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254459/code-of-practice-victims-of-crime.pdf

²³ PEEL: Police effectiveness 2015 (Vulnerability) – An inspection of City of London Police, HMIC, December 2015. Available at: www.justiceinspectories.gov.uk/hmic/publications/police-effectiveness-2015-city-of-london/

²⁴ A written record of the impact of the crime on the victim, which the victim can choose to make at the same time as a witness statement, to explain in his or her own words the effect of the crime; may be read aloud at any court hearing and/or considered before sentencing.

examples on the force's crime-recording system where offenders had been circulated on the PNC without apparent follow-up enquiries. The force should satisfy itself that its PNC review process is sufficiently robust to ensure that individuals do not remain circulated on the system inappropriately.

We found appropriate provision in the force's custody offices to record and manage foreign national prisoners. The force's electronic custody system ensures that custody staff identify detainees who are not UK citizens and that appropriate identity checks, such as those with the ACRO Criminal Records Office (ACRO),²⁵ are conducted.

How well does the force protect the public from the most harmful offenders?

In our 2015 effectiveness report for City of London Police, we commented that:

“The force does not have a formal integrated offender management programme (IOM)²⁶ in place. Partnership resources, for example those of the probation service, which would be required for a co-located integrated offender management model, are not available within the City, while many, if not all, of those whom the force would identify for management live outside its boundary.”

We identified this as an area for improvement for City of London Police. The force has responded positively. It has developed a strategy to adopt, in full, the Metropolitan Police Service's offender management model and create a City of London Police offender management panel. The force's chief officers have agreed the strategy and progress is being made to implement it. Although this is a welcome development, integrated offender management will remain an area for improvement for the force until it has fully implemented the strategy.

There are relatively low numbers of dangerous and sexual offenders living in City of London Police's force area. The force has effective resources in its PPU to manage such individuals. Some of these individuals are subject to multi-agency public protection arrangements known as MAPPAs,²⁷ where the force works closely with partner organisations and other police forces to assess and manage any risk posed.

²⁵ ACRO Criminal Records Office manages criminal record information and is able to receive/share information with foreign countries in relation to foreign offenders arrested within the United Kingdom.

²⁶ Integrated offender management brings a multi-agency response to the crime and re-offending threats faced by local communities. The most persistent and problematic offenders are identified and managed jointly by partner agencies working together.

²⁷ Multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPAs) are in place to ensure the successful management of violent and sexual offenders. Organisations involved include the police, probation trusts and prison service as responsible bodies. Other organisations may become involved, for example, the Youth Justice Board will be responsible for the care of young offenders.

Summary of findings



Good

The force is good at investigating crime and reducing re-offending. Those working in the force control room are effective at gathering evidence at first contact and ensuring that appropriate resources are allocated to calls for service. The force also conducts effective initial investigations, with officers able to identify appropriate initial lines of enquiry. This means that the best available evidence is secured effectively and retained to support investigations.

The force has effective crime allocation policies which ensure that investigations are generally conducted in a thorough manner by suitably trained staff. Investigators are appropriately accredited and those who have specialist responsibilities are required to attain additional qualifications. In addition, the force's investigative support functions, such as crime scene investigators and the hi-tech crime unit, are effective. However, the force needs to review the level of supervision provided by immediate line managers in the investigation of volume crime. Supervisors need to be aware of the force's expectations and be sufficiently equipped to meet them.

The force has responded positively to previous HMIC comments regarding its approach to integrated offender management. However, its response still requires implementation and therefore the force should continue to consider this as an area for improvement.

Areas for improvement

- The force should ensure that there is regular and active supervision of investigations to improve quality and progress.
- The force should ensure that its integrated offender management programme is implemented consistently across all areas.

How effective is the force at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims?

Protecting the public, particularly those who are most vulnerable, is one of the most important duties placed on police forces. People can be vulnerable for many reasons and the extent of their vulnerability can change during the time they are in contact with the police. Last year HMIC had concerns about how well many forces were protecting those who were vulnerable. In this section of the report we set out how the force's performance has changed since last year.

Has the force improved since HMIC's 2015 vulnerability inspection?

The force has responded positively to and made progress in the areas for improvement identified in HMIC's 2015 effectiveness (vulnerability) report. It has established an action plan which it is currently implementing.

The areas for improvement were as follows:

"The force should improve the consistency and frequency of training delivered to ensure all staff have an awareness and understanding of identification of vulnerability of victims particularly at the initial point of contact."

The force has now ensured that all training is co-ordinated and provided by its central training unit. It has embarked on a comprehensive training programme which includes child sexual abuse awareness training for all staff, threat, harm, risk, investigation, vulnerability, and engagement (THRIVE) training, and domestic abuse training.

"The force should improve the identification of the vulnerability of victims during investigations, by ensuring staff complete the necessary processes on the crime-reporting system."

The force has taken considerable steps to ensure that vulnerability is identified during the course of investigations. These include the introduction of a vulnerability assessment framework to assist officers and staff in identifying vulnerability in members of the public with whom they have contact, and a comprehensive risk assessment which is mandatory and includes questions to identify vulnerable or intimidated victims.

However, as part of this inspection, HMIC dip-sampled a number of crime files being investigated by the public protection unit. While victim vulnerability was identified correctly in the body of the crime report, only a small number of the cases had vulnerable victim markers or flags attached to them. This inhibits the force's ability to quantify vulnerability within its force area. Although the force has responded positively with a number of interventions, such as publicity campaigns, this remains an area for improvement.

"The force should reassure itself that in relation to the use of victim personal statements it is fully compliant with its duties under the *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime*."

The force has taken steps to increase awareness of the requirements of the code. These include awareness training and victim personal statement reminders on the force crime-recording system. However, during the course of this inspection, we still found some officers who were either unaware of the need to offer a victim personal statement at the same time as taking the initial statement, or chose to offer the opportunity to give such a statement at a later date. This requirement of the code is important because it gives victims an opportunity to describe the wider effects the crime has had upon them, express their concerns and indicate whether or not they require any additional support. The force should continue with its efforts to raise awareness of and compliance with this requirement.

"The force should improve the response to children at risk of sexual exploitation by ensuring its understanding of the scale and nature of the issue is developed; this will better inform its preventative and investigative response and frontline staff should have an appropriate level of knowledge of the factors to identify cases and understand how to respond."

To ensure the force understands the scale and nature of the issue of child sexual exploitation a problem profile was commissioned by force intelligence bureau analysts in March 2016. At the time of our inspection, the report was due to be published in October 2016. The production of this report, which was in draft form at the time of our inspection, is a positive development and will inform the force's preventative and investigative response.

How effectively does the force identify those who are vulnerable and assess their level of risk and need?

In order to protect those who are vulnerable effectively forces need to comprehensively understand the scale of vulnerability in the communities they police. This requires forces to work with a range of communities, including those whose voices may not often be heard. It is important that forces understand fully what it means to be vulnerable, what might make someone vulnerable and that officers and staff who come into contact with the public can recognise this vulnerability. This means that forces can identify vulnerable people early on and can provide them with an appropriate service.

Understanding the risk

City of London Police has an adequate understanding of the scale and nature of vulnerability in its local area. The force has a low proportion of domestic abuse cases as a percentage of all recorded crime due to the small residential population. In response to an area for improvement we identified in our 2015 effectiveness (vulnerability) report, the force has conducted a problem profile of child sexual abuse to develop its understanding of the issue. The production of this document, which was in draft form at the time of our inspection, is a positive development and will inform the force's preventative and investigative response. The force is currently reviewing its domestic abuse problem profile and is actively improving its response to victims of domestic abuse. It has a domestic abuse action plan which is subject to regular oversight and scrutiny by a chief officer. Each element of the plan is the responsibility of a named individual who is required to provide regular reports on the status of each action. The action plan is accompanied by a public document which provides communities with an update on developments.

City of London Police identifies and assesses vulnerability and risk effectively at initial response. The force has adopted the following definition of vulnerability used in the Department of Health document entitled *No Secrets: Guidance on developing and implementing multi-agency policies and procedures to protect vulnerable adults from abuse*:

“A person aged 18 years or over who is or may be at risk of abuse by reason of mental or other disability, age or illness and who is or may be unable to take care of him or herself, or unable to protect him or herself against significant harm or exploitation.”²⁸

²⁸ *No secrets: Guidance on developing and implementing multi-agency policies and procedures to protect vulnerable adults from abuse*, Department for Health, 2015. Available from: www.gov.uk/government/publications/no-secrets-guidance-on-protecting-vulnerable-adults-in-care

The force thus recognises mental health issues as a cause of vulnerability, and is taking steps to protect people suffering from mental illness. At a senior level, the force works with local health service providers to help improve the response from all organisations to those suffering from mental health issues. The force has established a vulnerability steering group to examine all aspects of vulnerability, including mental health. The group, which is attended by both police and partner organisations, is chaired by a chief officer. Its agreed purpose is to ensure that there is effective co-ordination and delivery of services by the force to protect from harm those people who are vulnerable and to ensure that effective safeguarding measures are in place, by working closely with partner agencies.

City of London Police identifies repeat and vulnerable victims effectively at first contact. Call handlers use a THRIVE²⁹ process to assess risk and identify vulnerable victims, and the force's command and control systems highlight where victims with the same telephone number or address have previously contacted police. However, the force's systems do not identify repeat callers by name. This is a potential gap in the force's ability to identify a repeat caller should they change address or, more likely, change their telephone number. The force also has a database of vulnerable individuals, called 'Pegasus', which control staff use to inform their assessment of vulnerability. As part of our inspection, HMIC dip-sampled a number of crime files being investigated by the public protection unit (PPU). Although victim vulnerability was identified correctly in the body of the crime report, only a small number of the cases had vulnerable victim markers or flags attached to them. This inhibits the force's ability to quantify vulnerability within its force area. HMIC highlighted this issue in our 2015 effectiveness (vulnerability) report for City of London Police and, although the force has responded positively with several interventions, this remains an area for improvement for the force.

The force has a number of systems and processes in place to ensure that it consistently responds appropriately to incidents involving vulnerable people, based on its assessment of vulnerability and risk at initial point of contact. All incidents which are identified within the command and control system as involving domestic abuse, missing children, vulnerable victims or repeat victims of anti-social behaviour can only be closed by the control room supervisor. Supervisors are also able to upgrade the urgency of the response to the incident, if required. As previously referred to in this report, the force has established a performance and events team which provides a second level of oversight for the allocation of resources to all incidents of anti-social behaviour and domestic abuse. In relation to such incidents, the team assesses the actions of control room staff and, where any particularly good or poor performance is identified, feedback is provided to the control room supervisor

²⁹ THRIVE is a structured assessment based on the levels of threat, harm, risk and vulnerability faced by the victim, rather than simply by the type of incident or crime being reported, in order to help staff determine the appropriate level of response to a call.

for the attention of the relevant staff. If required, additional training for staff is arranged.

Forces define a vulnerable victim in different ways. This is because there is not a standard requirement on forces to record whether a victim is vulnerable on crime recording systems. Some forces use the definition from the government's *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime*,³⁰ others use the definition referred to in ACPO guidance³¹ and the remainder use their own definition.

City of London Police uses the government's *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime* definition of a vulnerable victim, which is:

“You are eligible for enhanced entitlements under this Code as a vulnerable victim if:

- (a) You are under 18 years of age at the time of the offence, or
- (b) The quality of your evidence is likely to be affected because:
 - 1) You suffer from mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983;
 - 2) You otherwise have a significant impairment of intelligence and social functioning; or
 - 3) You have a physical disability or are suffering from a physical disorder”

Data returned by forces to HMIC show that in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, the proportion of crime recorded which involves a vulnerable victim varies considerably between forces, from 3.9 percent to 44.4 percent. City of London Police was one of five forces that were unable to provide vulnerable victim data.

How effectively does the force initially respond to vulnerable victims?

The initial work of officers responding to a vulnerable person is vital, because failure to carry out the correct actions may make future work with the victim or further investigation very difficult. This could be the first time victims have contacted the police after suffering years of victimisation or they may have had repeated contact with the police; either way, the response of officers is crucial. The initial response to a vulnerable victim must inspire confidence that the victim’s concerns are being taken seriously as well as provide practical actions and support to keep the victim

³⁰ *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime*, Ministry of Justice, 2013. Available from www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254459/code-of-practicevictims-of-crime.pdf

³¹ The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) is now the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC). *ACPO Guidance on Safeguarding and Investigating the Abuse of Vulnerable Adults*, NPIA, 2012. Available from: www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/major-investigation-and-public-protection/vulnerable-adults/

safe. The officer should also assess the risk to the victim at that moment and others in the same household, and collect sufficient information to support the longer-term response of the force and other partner organisations.

Do officers assess risk correctly and keep victims safe?

Frontline officers and staff in City of London Police are aware of the definition of vulnerability adopted by the force, and are able to identify vulnerability and respond appropriately to the needs of vulnerable people. To assist its workforce, the force has comprehensive policies in place, including for incidents involving adults at risk of domestic abuse, which include a checklist of mandatory actions that responding officers must complete when conducting an initial investigation of such incidents. When attending reports of domestic abuse, officers are required to complete DASH³² risk assessments. We found that the force has a robust quality assurance process which ensures that DASH forms are completed correctly and that the level of risk is correctly identified.

The force takes immediate action to safeguard individuals at initial response in an effective manner. We found that officers were aware of the need to highlight on force reporting systems any vulnerability in relation to individuals they encounter. This information is then available to be shared within the force and with partner organisations to support safeguarding. One example of this relates to vulnerable adults or children coming to the notice of the police. Where an officer encounters such an individual, they are required to complete a form to record information about the person. The force's public protection unit (PPU) collates these forms; this ensures that appropriate safeguarding actions have been taken and identifies what further action, including that by partner organisations, may be required. The force also has processes in place to respond appropriately to incidents of missing and absent people. The force has a very low residential population and there are no children's care homes within the City of London. Consequently, the force receives few reports of missing or absent people. Despite this, the force is aware of the level of risk in such incidents and has a clear policy that missing children should never be recorded as absent. We found that this policy is widely understood and applied by the workforce.

When a case involving a vulnerable person is transferred to another team or shift, it is the responsibility of PPU supervisors to assure the quality of the accompanying information. This ensures that investigative opportunities have been explored at the earliest opportunity and prevents duplication. Members of the workforce commented to us that the quality of such handovers was generally high. HMIC found good

³² DASH (domestic abuse, stalking and harassment) is a risk identification, assessment and management model adopted by UK police forces and partner organisations in 2009. The aim of the DASH assessment is to help frontline practitioners identify high-risk cases of domestic abuse, stalking and so-called honour-based violence.


evidence that safeguarding issues were identified during the handover process and that relevant information was shared across the force and with partner organisations. This included some evidence of the involvement of officers from the force's community teams, ensuring that they were aware of vulnerable victims of domestic abuse.

The Home Office has shared domestic abuse related offences data, recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, with HMIC. These are more recent figures than those previously published by the Office for National Statistics. These data show that in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, police-recorded domestic abuse in the City of London increased by 29 percent compared with the 12 months to 31 March 2015. This compares with an increase of 23 percent across England and Wales. In the same period, police-recorded domestic abuse accounted for 2 percent of all police-recorded crime in City of London, compared with 11 percent of all police-recorded crime across England and Wales.

The rate of arrest for domestic abuse offences can provide an indication of a force's approach to handling domestic abuse offenders. Although for the purpose of this calculation arrests are not directly tracked to offences, a high arrest rate may suggest that a force prioritises arrests for domestic abuse offenders over other potential forms of action (for further details, see annex A). HMIC has evaluated the arrest rate alongside other measures during our inspection process to understand how each force deals with domestic abuse overall.

In City of London Police, for every 100 domestic abuse related offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, there were 83 arrests made in the same period.

Figure 6: Domestic abuse arrest rate (per 100 domestic abuse crimes), by force, for the 12 months to 30 June 2016³³



Source: HMIC data return, Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

How effectively does the force investigate offences involving vulnerable victims and work with external partners to keep victims safe?

Those who are vulnerable often have complex and multiple needs that a police response alone cannot always meet. They may need support with housing, access to mental health services or support from social services. Nonetheless, the police still have an important responsibility to keep victims safe and investigate crimes. These crimes can be serious and complex (such as rape or violent offences). Their victims may appear to be reluctant to support the work of the police, often because they are being controlled by the perpetrator (such as victims of domestic abuse or child sexual exploitation).

City of London Police investigates offences involving vulnerable victims effectively. Almost all the cases we reviewed which involved vulnerable victims had effective investigations and, in the majority of these, officers had identified and pursued all lines of enquiry. Such cases are investigated by detectives within the PPU. These

³³ Derbyshire, Durham and Gloucestershire forces were not able to provide domestic abuse arrest data. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.

officers receive continuous professional development to maintain their knowledge and skills, and are qualified to the appropriate level of the professionalising investigation project. They have also undertaken appropriate additional training, including the serious sexual assault investigators' development programme, the specialist child abuse investigations development programme, and sexual offences investigation training. We found that arrangements were in place to monitor the investigation caseloads of PPU staff and that supervisors were aware of individual workloads. Supervisors reviewed all investigations being handled by the PPU, ensuring that public protection investigations follow clear objectives and have measurable outcomes. This allows them to make objective decisions and take staff welfare into account when allocating new investigations.

The force contributes well to multi-agency work with partner organisations to safeguard vulnerable victims, despite not having a formal multi-agency safeguarding hub (sometimes referred to as a MASH) arrangement. The force's daily management meetings review all crimes that have been reported within the City of London in the previous 24 hours and are able to ensure that safeguarding actions are prioritised. Furthermore, partner organisations were very complimentary about their relationship with the force and, in particular, the PPU's willingness to engage with them and share information. It was apparent that the vulnerable victims advocate plays an important role in the relationship between the force and partner organisations. The advocate post is funded by the Victim Support charity and incorporates the role of independent domestic violence adviser.³⁴ The advocate is independent from the police, but co-locating the post within the PPU has assisted in developing effective working relationships with partner organisations. City of London Police also works well with other organisations in MARAC³⁵ meetings. The force is represented at all such meetings, which are usually chaired by the detective inspector from the PPU. The meetings have good representation from partner organisations, including the City of London Corporation, housing, health, social services and probation.

³⁴ The main purpose of independent domestic violence advisers (IDVAs) is to address the safety of victims at high risk of harm from intimate partners, ex-partners or family members to secure their safety and the safety of their children. Serving as a victim's primary point of contact, IDVAs normally work with their clients from the point of crisis to assess the level of risk. They also discuss the range of suitable options leading to the creation of a workable safety plan.

³⁵ Multi-agency risk assessment conference(s) are local meetings where information about high-risk domestic abuse victims (those at risk of murder or serious harm) is shared between local agencies.

Victims of domestic abuse

The force is good at supporting victims of domestic abuse. Investigations are managed by appropriately trained investigators who are well supported and supervised. Close working relationships with partner organisations (including through the MARAC) ensure that victims' needs are considered. In addition, a co-located vulnerable victim's advocate, paid for by Victim Support, provides practical and emotional support for victims of domestic abuse.

The force has, in the past, used domestic violence protection orders (DVPOs).³⁶ However, it has not applied for any within the past 12 months. The force is fully aware of the option of using domestic violence protection notices (DVPNs)³⁷ and they remain open for consideration in cases in which there will be no further police action. The force told us that it had not had any case within the past 12 months that fitted the criteria for the issue of such a notice.

In April 2015, the Home Office began collecting information from the police on whether recorded offences were related to domestic abuse. Crimes are identified by the police as domestic abuse related if the offence meets the government definition of domestic violence and abuse.³⁸

The rate of outcomes recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 for domestic abuse offences is shown in figure 7. Domestic abuse crimes used in this calculation are not necessarily those to which the outcomes have been assigned and are only linked by the fact that they both occur in the 12 months to 30 June 2016. Therefore, direct

³⁶ DVPOs are designed to provide protection to victims by enabling the police and magistrates' courts to put in place protection in the immediate aftermath of a domestic abuse incident. Where there is insufficient evidence to charge a perpetrator and provide protection to a victim via bail conditions, a DVPO can prevent the perpetrator from returning to a residence and from having contact with the victim for up to 28 days, allowing the victim time to consider their options and get the support they need.

³⁷ A DVPN is the initial notice issued by the police to provide emergency protection to an individual believed to be the victim of domestic violence. This notice, which must be authorised by a police superintendent, contains prohibitions that effectively bar the suspected perpetrator from returning to the victim's home or otherwise contacting the victim.

A DVPN may be issued to a person aged 18 years and over if the police superintendent has reasonable grounds for believing that:

- the individual has been violent towards, or
- has threatened violence towards an associated person, and
- the DVPN is necessary to protect that person from violence or a threat of violence by the intended recipient of the DVPN.

³⁸ Any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are or have been intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality.

comparisons should not be made between general outcomes in figure 4, where each crime is linked to its associated outcome (for further details see annex A).

Figure 7: Rate of outcomes recorded in 12 months to 30 June 2016 for domestic-related offences in City of London Police³⁹

Outcome type / group	City of London Police	England and Wales
Charged / Summonsed	35.3	23.2
Caution – adults	12.7	5.6
Caution – youths	0.0	0.3
Community resolution	0.0	1.4
Evidential difficulties prevent further action; victim supports police action	0.0	24.1
Evidential difficulties prevent further action; victim does not support police action	11.8	35.4

Source: HMIC data return, Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, City of London Police's use of 'caution – adults' was among the highest in England and Wales in cases with identified domestic abuse. Its use of 'caution – youths', 'community resolution', 'evidential difficulties prevent further action; victim supports police action' and 'evidential difficulties prevent further action; victim does not support police action' was among the lowest in identified domestic abuse cases in England and Wales. However, any interpretation of outcomes should take into account that outcomes will vary dependent on the crime types that occur in each force area, and how it deals with offenders for different crimes.

Summary of findings



Good

City of London Police is good at supporting victims and protecting those who are vulnerable from harm. The force effectively identifies vulnerability and correctly assesses the level of risk and need. It has conducted a problem profile of child sexual exploitation to gain a better understanding of this issue. Officers and staff have a clear understanding of vulnerability and can identify and protect vulnerable people.

³⁹ Dorset Police and Nottinghamshire Police were unable to submit domestic abuse outcomes data. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.

The force's initial response to vulnerable victims is effective. It has processes to identify vulnerable and repeat victims at the first point of contact, and it takes an adequate approach to the assessment of victims' risks and provides an appropriate response. However, the force must improve its use of vulnerability flags within its crime-recording system.

The force investigates offences involving vulnerable victims effectively and works with external partner organisations to keep victims safe. It allocates all cases involving vulnerable victims to its public protection unit (PPU), which investigates offences to an adequate standard. Cases are well supervised and supervisors ensure that investigators have manageable workloads. Despite not having a multi-agency safeguarding hub in the City of London, the force works well with partner organisations to ensure that appropriate safeguarding arrangements are in place for vulnerable people.

Areas for improvement

- The force should improve the identification of the vulnerability of victims during investigations, by ensuring staff complete the necessary processes on the crime-reporting system.
- The force should reassure itself that in relation to the use of victim personal statements it is fully compliant with its duties under the *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime*.

How effective is the force at tackling serious and organised crime?

Serious and organised crime poses a threat to the public across the whole of the UK and beyond. Individuals, communities and businesses feel its damaging effects. Police forces have a critical role in tackling serious and organised crime alongside regional organised crime units (ROCUs), the National Crime Agency (NCA) and other partner organisations. Police forces that are effective in this area of policing tackle serious and organised crime not just by prosecuting offenders, but by disrupting and preventing organised criminality at a local level.

How effectively does the force understand the threat and risk posed by serious and organised crime?

In order to tackle serious and organised crime effectively forces must first have a good understanding of the threats it poses to their communities. Forces should be using a range of intelligence (not just from the police but also from other partner organisations) to understand threats and risks, from traditional organised crime such as drug dealing and money laundering to the more recently-understood threats such as cyber-crime and child sexual exploitation.

City of London Police has a sound strategic understanding of the threat posed by serious and organised crime. The force uses MORiLE⁴⁰ scoring as a structured process to assess the threat and risk from serious and organised crime, and there are processes in place to ensure this assessment is reviewed at appropriate intervals. The assessment also takes account of national threats identified in the National Crime Agency's strategic threat assessment. The force has produced a local profile for serious and organised crime to help it understand the threats facing its communities. However, as has been highlighted previously in this report, despite actively seeking information and intelligence from partner organisations to inform the local profile, this was not forthcoming; only four of the 40 partner organisations contacted responded to the request. Consequently, the local profile is based predominantly on police-generated data and does not provide the more detailed, shared understanding of threats that partnership data could provide.

In its role as national lead force for economic crime, City of London Police has a good understanding of the emerging threats in this area. A combination of a small residential population and the national lead for economic crime means that the force record a higher number of organised crime groups (OCGs) per one million

⁴⁰ The 'management of risk in law enforcement' process, developed by the National Police Chiefs' Council. This tool assesses the types of crimes which most threaten communities and highlights where the force does not currently have the capacity or capability to tackle them effectively.

population compared to other forces. A strategic development unit within the force's economic crime directorate informs the force's understanding of organised economic crime, producing monthly threat assessments based on continuous horizon scanning. There is also some evidence that, outside the economic crime area, the force is taking steps to improve its wider understanding of emerging threats from serious and organised crime. One example of this is in relation to child sexual exploitation, for which the force has produced a problem profile. Within the force intelligence unit, researchers and analysts are assigned to each of the force's control strategy priorities, and the force has created intelligence collection plans to address intelligence requirements proactively. However, as has been highlighted previously, very little intelligence is submitted by officers and staff to the force's intelligence department (an average of just 16 submissions per day in September 2016). The force's ability to draw inferences from intelligence or to identify trends is limited by the lack of a data warehouse to hold historic crime and intelligence information. In the absence of this, it is exceptionally difficult to get data from a range of bespoke systems and into software ready for analysis. Consequently, approximately 80 percent of analysts' time is spent cleansing and collating data.

Despite the difficulties that the force has in obtaining data from some of its main partner organisations, HMIC found evidence that it shares intelligence with a variety of law enforcement and community safety partners. These include: Crimestoppers, London Fire Service, the Metropolitan Police Service, the City of London Corporation and the National Crime Agency. It is able to access intelligence from prisons and has a dedicated prison intelligence officer who receives and circulates intelligence. One source of intelligence that the force could exploit is the Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN).⁴¹ However, we were told by several officers that the force does not make referrals or seek intelligence from this network. Data submitted by the force supports this position. Overall, as a consequence of the above, and the lack of local intelligence previously highlighted, the force's ability to use intelligence to develop its wider understanding of the threat from serious and organised crime requires improvement.

When a police force identifies a group of individuals it suspects may be involved in organised crime, it goes through a nationally standardised 'mapping' procedure. This involves entering the details of the group's known and suspected activity, associates and capability into a computer system, which assigns a numerical score to each organised crime group and places each group into one of several bands which reflect the range of severity of harm the group can cause.

We found that the force maps most OCGs in line with national requirements and generally to a good standard. The force reviews all mapped OCGs at the intervals specified in national guidance. It reminds the lead responsible officers to submit

⁴¹ The Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) is a large network of partners, including all police forces in England and Wales, which shares information about organised criminals.


updates and to re-score their groups when reviews are due. However, HMIC has identified instances where OCGs were not being mapped promptly after identification. In these cases, mapping took place either post-investigation or when investigating teams had requested operational resources. This approach creates a risk that not all OCGs will be mapped and appropriately managed, and means that decisions about which OCGs to investigate are not as well informed as they could be. This is an area for improvement for the force.

We found that knowledge of organised crime was patchy among investigators in the force's criminal investigation directorate. The inspection identified examples where investigators were not identifying potential OCGs and there was a lack of understanding about how to refer possible OCGs to the force intelligence bureau for mapping.

As at 1 July 2016, City of London Police was actively disrupting, investigating or monitoring 235 OCGs per one million of the population. Part of City of London Police's responsibility is national; this means that not all OCGs are based within or have an impact within the force's geographical boundaries. Therefore, the number of OCGs the force has, per one million population, is not directly comparable to other forces.

Forces categorise OCGs by the predominant form of criminal activity in which the group is involved. Although OCGs are likely to be involved in multiple forms of criminality (for example groups supplying drugs may also be supplying firearms and be involved in money laundering), this indicates their most common characteristic. 'Economic crime (including cyber enabled fraud)' was the most common predominant crime type of the OCGs managed by City of London Police as at 1 July 2016. Conversely, 'drug activity' was the most common OCG crime type recorded by all forces in England and Wales.

Figure 8: Active organised crime groups by predominant crime type in City of London, as at 1 July 2016



Source: HMIC data return

Note: Figures may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. For further information about these data, please see annex A

How effectively does the force respond to serious and organised crime?

An effective force will pursue and prosecute offenders and disrupt organised criminality at a local level. The force will use specialist capabilities, both in the force and at regional level, and non-specialist capabilities such as its neighbourhood teams. While it can be complex for a force to assess the success of its actions against serious and organised crime, it is important that the force understands the extent to which it disrupts this crime and reduces harm.

City of London Police's response to serious and organised crime requires improvement. It has structures in place to prioritise activity against OCGs and the force's serious and organised crime board is responsible for overseeing this process. However, the force was unable to evidence the board's effectiveness in improving its response to organised crime. At a tactical level, the force conducts a serious organised crime meeting. The purpose of this meeting is to prioritise intervention against mapped OCGs and to hold to account those officers responsible for investigation and disruption activity (known as lead responsible officers or LROs).

However, HMIC found that in practice the meeting did not prioritise activity. Crime groups were often only identified as a by-product of investigation activity, which was undertaken irrespective of any decisions taken at that meeting.

Central to this problem is the role of the LROs in the force. Interviews with officers designated as LROs revealed that they did not recognise their position and had no awareness of the responsibilities inherent in the role. They saw themselves as senior investigating officers and considered their functions to be those of investigating the crime and arresting, charging and convicting members of the crime group responsible, rather than managing a longer-term approach to tackling the OCG over its active lifespan. Consequently, they gave little or no consideration to other disruptive tactics available, including those in the National Crime Agency disruption manual, or opportunities to prevent other criminal activity by the group.

City of London Police's economic crime directorate, which has national responsibility for economic crime, works with partner organisations to disrupt, dismantle and investigate OCGs. The directorate provided numerous examples of strong partnership working; for example, investigators using innovative techniques to block bank accounts or the closing down of fraudulent websites, thereby removing the opportunity for criminals to commit crime. The economic crime directorate also collaborates well with national and international financial institutions to tackle OCGs. However, this multi-agency approach to organised crime is not replicated in the rest of the force. We found scant evidence elsewhere of a true collaborative approach to dealing with OCGs.

The London regional organised crime unit was disbanded in 2015. In September 2016, City of London Police conducted a self-assessment of the capabilities previously provided by the regional unit. The assessment concluded that the force had retained access to those capabilities either through its own resources or by collaboration with the Metropolitan Police Service. This conclusion has not been tested during the course of this inspection.

HMIC's 2015 effectiveness report on City of London Police identified that the force should improve the awareness of OCGs among neighbourhood teams. The force has taken some steps to increase awareness, and there is evidence of information about OCGs being included in daily briefings. However, there remains an inconsistent understanding of organised crime among frontline officers. Staff from all directorates told us that they were not routinely given tasks to disrupt the activity of these groups. The force could generate considerably more intelligence referrals if frontline officers were assigned tasks relating to OCGs.

As a consequence of the issues highlighted above, City of London Police's activity, outside that relating to economic crime, has limited impact on serious and organised crime. The force uses the national scale for measuring disruptions, but in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, the force recorded just eight major or moderate disruptions

to the 94 OCGs that the force has mapped. This is well below the rate across the police forces in England and Wales and is indicative that the force has only limited knowledge of its impact on serious organised crime.

How effectively does the force prevent serious and organised crime?

A force that effectively tackles serious and organised crime needs to be able to stop people being drawn in to this crime. Many of these people may be vulnerable and already involved in gang and youth violence. It should also be using a range of approaches and powers, such as the 4Ps approach,⁴² to prevent those known criminals continuing to cause harm. HMIC expects a force's approach to prevention to be a significant element of its overall strategy to tackle the harm that serious and organised crime causes communities.

There is no evidence of any specific initiatives used by City of London Police to deter people at risk from being drawn into organised crime. The force does not currently contribute to the Troubled Families programme.⁴³ The force describes the level of gang-related crime within its force area as limited and primarily focused around the City's night-time economy. This involves the use of licensed premises within the City of London by recognised gangs from the wider London area. The force was able to provide some evidence of an effective response to this through its licensing department. However, we were not provided with any examples of initiatives in place targeted at deterring specific individuals connected to organised criminals from becoming involved in gang or youth violence.

HMIC's 2015 effectiveness report on City of London Police made reference to a review that the force conducted in 2015 of its approach to the lifetime management of offenders, and in particular its use of additional orders to the actual conviction (known formally as ancillary orders). At the time, we reported that the force was confident that its approach to such orders would be improved. During the course of this inspection, we have concluded that the force still does not have a robust approach to managing offenders to help prevent and deter organised crime. Lifetime

⁴² The 4Ps are the four components of the government's serious and organised crime strategy. It provides a national framework for tackling serious and organised crime. Developed for national counter-terrorist work, it has four thematic pillars, often referred to as the 4Ps, which can be adapted for other areas: Pursue - prosecuting and disrupting people engaged in serious and organised crime; Prevent – preventing people from engaging in serious and organised crime; Protect – increasing protection against serious and organised crime; Prepare – reducing the impact of this criminality where it takes place.

⁴³ A programme of targeted intervention for families with multiple problems, including crime, anti-social behaviour, mental health problems, domestic abuse and unemployment. Local authorities identify 'troubled families' in their area and usually assign a key worker to act as a single point of contact. Central government pays local authorities by results for each family they 'turn around'.

offender management is not a routine part of the culture of the force and it lacks clear processes for offender management. Although the force has an ancillary orders policy which outlines the range of court orders that can be used to prevent or disrupt individuals' involvement in serious and organised crime, it does not make effective use of such orders to manage offenders. During the 12 months to 30 June 2016, the force did not apply for any travel restriction orders or gang injunctions and does not have a mechanism for recording the number of applications for serious crime prevention orders. Furthermore, the force lacks robust, centralised monitoring arrangements to ensure compliance with ancillary orders. Consequently, this is an area for improvement for the force.

City of London Police communicates regularly with the public about serious and organised crime. The inspection identified many examples of the force providing its communities and at-risk groups with protective security advice about different kinds of serious and organised crime. These include campaigns to raise awareness of the threat of cyber attacks, holiday fraud (such as false villa booking through the internet), investment fraud, and courier fraud. The force has also circulated literature to vulnerable groups that advises them on how to protect themselves from online fraud. The force works with education organisations to make young people aware of the risks and consequences of serious and organised crime. As part of the drugs abuse resistance (DARE) campaign,⁴⁴ schools officers visit the six schools in the City of London to deter students from involvement in organised crime. The force also publicises its successful operations against serious organised crime groups, in order to deter people from engaging in serious and organised crime.

Summary of findings



Requires improvement

City of London Police's response to tackling serious and organised crime requires improvement. The force uses a structured process to assess threat and risk from serious and organised crime and has a local profile which includes limited partner organisation data. As the national lead force for economic crime, the force has a sophisticated understanding of the emerging economic crime threats. However, the force's ability to use intelligence to develop its understanding of the wider threats from serious and organised crime is hampered by poor intelligence collection and a lack of data from other organisations.

The force maps and reviews most organised crime groups in line with the national standards. However, not all crime groups are mapped promptly after identification. Some mapping took place either post-investigation or once investigation teams

⁴⁴ For more information on DARE, see: www.lifeskills-education.co.uk/about-life-skills-education-cic/

requested operational resources. Lead responsible officers do not understand their role, which means that organised crime groups are not being monitored and disrupted throughout their active lifespan.

The force does not make effective use of ancillary orders to prevent or disrupt individuals' involvement in serious and organised crime. It communicates with the public around serious and organised crime and communities and provides at-risk groups with appropriate protective security advice.

Areas for improvement

- The force should enhance its ability to gather and use intelligence from a range of sources to develop its understanding of serious and organised crime.
- The force should ensure that it maps all organised crime groups promptly following identification.
- The force should ensure that it prioritises activity aimed at tackling organised crime groups effectively in order to protect communities from harm.
- The force should improve its understanding, across the government's national 4P framework, of the impact of its activity against serious and organised crime, and ensure that it learns from experience to maximise the force's disruptive effect on this activity.
- The force should enhance its approach to the lifetime management of organised criminals to minimise the risk they pose to local communities. This approach should include routine consideration of ancillary orders, partner organisation powers and other tools to deter organised criminals from continuing to offend.
- The force should improve its understanding of the impact of its activity on serious and organised crime and ensure that it learns from experience to maximise the force's disruptive effect on this activity.

How effective are the force's specialist capabilities?

Some complex threats require both a specialist capability and forces to work together to respond to them. This question assesses both the overall preparedness of forces to work together on a number of strategic threats and whether forces have a good understanding of the threat presented by firearms incidents and how equipped they are to meet this threat.

How effective are the force's arrangements to ensure that it can fulfil its national policing responsibilities?

The *Strategic Policing Requirement* (SPR)⁴⁵ specifies six national threats. These are complex threats and forces need to be able to work together if they are to respond to them effectively. These include serious and organised crime, terrorism, serious cyber-crime incidents and child sexual abuse. It is beyond the scope of this inspection to assess in detail whether forces are capable of responding to these national threats. Instead, HMIC has checked whether forces have made the necessary arrangements to test their own preparedness for dealing with these threats should they materialise.

City of London Police has a senior management structure modelled around the six national threats identified by the SPR. Individual chief officers and members of the force's senior management team, who have significant experience and knowledge in these areas, have responsibility for developing the force's response to the specific threats. HMIC was pleased to see that the force is developing these responses in conjunction with partner organisations. The force is a member of the London Resilience Partnership. This multi-agency arrangement develops plans for pan-London responses to a range of critical incidents that would result in mass fatalities, such as a terrorist attack, building collapse or other civil emergency. The force also works closely with the Metropolitan Police Service and the British Transport Police to counter national threats. Operation Benbow is a long-standing arrangement with the three forces for joint working across London on major events (such as the Notting Hill Carnival) or dealing with spontaneous public order incidents.

The force is aware of the need to prepare robust business continuity plans. It has developed plans with partner organisations to ensure that it can maintain its control

⁴⁵ The SPR is issued annually by the Home Secretary, setting out the latest national threats and the appropriate national policing capabilities required to counter those threats. National threats require a co-ordinated or aggregated response from a number of police forces. Forces often need to work collaboratively, and with other partners, national agencies or national arrangements, to ensure such threats are tackled effectively. *Strategic Policing Requirement*, Home Office, 2015. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417116/The_Strategic_Policing_Requirement.pdf

room capability should there be an emergency within its own limited number of premises. However, the force has yet to test its full response to, and recovery from, a cyber attack on its information technology systems. The force recognises that this is a gap in its preparedness and intends to start testing its response to a cyber attack incident by conducting a table-top exercise.

The force provided HMIC with many examples of how, in conjunction with partner organisations, it tests its own preparedness to deal with national threats. For example, it has recently tested its plans for a spontaneous counter-terrorism arrest. In addition, working closely with partner organisations, the force took part in an exercise that recreated the effects of a large building collapse, causing significant damage to London Underground infrastructure, train derailments and fatalities. The exercise took place across four days and participating agencies included the emergency services, the military, local authorities, Transport for London, and government departments.

How well prepared is the force to respond to a firearms attack?

Following the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, the government allocated £143 million to the 43 England and Wales police forces to increase their armed capability. This funding has enabled some forces to increase the number of armed police officers able to respond to a terrorist attack. These attacks include those committed by heavily armed terrorists across multiple sites in quick succession, as in Paris. These attacks are known as marauding terrorist firearms attacks. The funding is for those forces considered to be at greatest risk of a terrorist attack. This also has the effect of increasing the ability of the police service to respond to other forms of terrorist attacks (and another incident requiring an armed policing response). Forces have begun to recruit and train new armed officers. This process is due to be completed by March 2018.

The force is alive to its vulnerability as a target for firearms attack and has risk-assessed and responded to that threat. The City of London has invested in the largest infrastructure of automatic number plate recognition protection in the United Kingdom.

The force has completed an armed policing strategic threat and risk assessment which ensures that it has a thorough understanding of emerging threats. The force undertook a review of the assessment in light of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris. This review resulted in recommendations to increase its firearms capability. As a consequence, the force intends to train additional authorised firearms officers. Progress has been made towards the implementation of these plans, and the force anticipates that training for all the additional officers will be completed in early 2017.

In line with its testing arrangements for other elements of the *Strategic Policing Requirement*, the force provided HMIC with examples of its arrangements to test its firearms capability in exercises with neighbouring forces and other agencies. These included plans to test its response to a marauding terrorist firearms attack.

Summary of findings

Ungraded

City of London Police has good specialist capabilities and has effective arrangements to ensure that it can fulfil its national responsibilities. Its senior management structure is modelled around the six national threats identified by the *Strategic Policing Requirement*; chief officers and members of the force's senior management team have responsibility for developing the response to the specific threats and work closely with partner organisations to ensure that effective arrangements are in place to deal with a variety of incidents.

The force understands that it must prepare its own business continuity plans. However, it needs to test its own vulnerability to a significant cyber attack; this is an area for improvement for the force.

The force has an extensive firearms strategic risk assessment which ensures that it has a thorough understanding of emerging threats. It has reviewed this assessment following the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks and intends to train additional firearms officers. The force has made good progress towards the implementation of these plans and anticipates that training for all the additional officers will be completed in early 2017. As a result, the force is considered to be well prepared to respond to a firearms attack.

Area for improvement

- The force needs to test its own vulnerability to a significant cyber attack.

Next steps

HMIC assesses progress on causes of concern and areas for improvement identified within its reports in a number of ways. We receive updates through our regular conversations with forces, re-assess as part of our annual PEEL programme, and, in the most serious cases, revisit forces.

HMIC highlights recurring themes emerging from our PEEL inspections of police forces within our national reports on police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. These reports identify those issues that are reflected across England and Wales and may contain additional recommendations directed at national policing organisations, including the Home Office, where we believe improvements can be made at a national level.

Findings and judgments from this year's PEEL effectiveness inspection will be used to direct the design of the next cycle of PEEL effectiveness assessments. The specific areas for assessment are yet to be confirmed, based on further consultation, but we will continue to assess how forces keep people safe and reduce crime to ensure our findings are comparable year on year.

Annex A – About the data

The information presented in this report comes from a range of sources, including published data by the Home Office and Office for National Statistics, inspection fieldwork and data collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales.

Where HMIC has collected data directly from police forces, we have taken reasonable steps to agree the design of the data collection with forces and with other relevant interested parties such as the Home Office. We have given forces several opportunities to check and validate the data they have provided us to ensure the accuracy of our evidence. For instance:

- We checked the data that forces submitted and queried with forces where figures were notably different from other forces or were internally inconsistent.
- We asked all forces to check the final data used in the report and correct any errors identified.

The source of the data is presented with each figure in the report, and is set out in more detail in this annex. The source of Force in numbers data is also set out below.

Methodology

Data in the report

The British Transport Police was outside the scope of inspection. Therefore any aggregated totals for England and Wales exclude British Transport Police data and numbers will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Where other forces have been unable to supply data, this is mentioned under the relevant sections below.

Population

For all uses of population as a denominator in our calculations, unless otherwise noted, we use Office for National Statistics (ONS) mid-2015 population estimates. These were the most recent data available at the time of the inspection.

For the specific case of City of London Police, we include both resident and transient population within our calculations. This is to account for the unique nature and demographics of this force's responsibility.

Survey of police staff

HMIC conducted a short survey of police staff across forces in England and Wales, to understand their views on workloads, redeployment and the suitability of tasks assigned to them. The survey was a non-statistical, voluntary sample which means that results may not be representative of the population. The number of responses varied between 8 and 2,471 across forces. Therefore, we treated results with caution and used them for exploring further during fieldwork rather than to assess individual force performance.

Ipsos MORI survey of public attitudes towards policing

HMIC commissioned Ipsos MORI to conduct a survey of attitudes towards policing between July and August 2016. Respondents were drawn from an online panel and results were weighted by age, gender and work status to match the population profile of the force area. The sampling method used is not a statistical random sample and the sample size was small, varying between 331 to 429 in each force area. Therefore, any results provided are only an indication of satisfaction rather than an absolute.

The findings of this survey will be shared on our website by summer 2017:

www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/data/peel-assessments/

Review of crime files

HMIC reviewed 60 police case files across crime types for: robbery, common assault (flagged as domestic abuse), grievous bodily harm (GBH), stalking, harassment, rape and domestic burglary. The file review was designed to provide a broad overview of the identification of vulnerability, the effectiveness of investigations and to understand how victims are treated through police processes. Files were randomly selected from crimes recorded between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2016 and were assessed against several criteria. Due to the small sample size of cases selected, we have not used results from the file review as the sole basis for assessing individual force performance but alongside other evidence gathered.

Force in numbers

A dash in this graphic indicates that a force was not able to supply HMIC with data.

Calls for assistance (including those for domestic abuse)

These data were collected directly from all 43 forces. In 2016, the questions contained a different breakdown of instances where the police were called to an incident compared to the 2015 data collection, so direct comparisons to the equivalent 2015 data are not advised.

Recorded crime and crime outcomes

These data are obtained from Home Office police-recorded crime and outcomes data tables for the 12 months to 30 June 2016 and are taken from the October 2016 Home Office data release, which is available from:

www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables

Total police-recorded crime includes all crime (excluding fraud offences) recorded by police forces in England and Wales. Home Office publications on the overall volumes and rates of recorded crime and outcomes include the British Transport Police, which is outside the scope of this HMIC inspection. Therefore, England and Wales rates in this report will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Figures about police-recorded crime should be treated with care, as recent increases are likely to have been affected by the renewed focus on the quality and compliance of crime recording since HMIC's national inspection of crime data in 2014.

For crime outcomes, Dorset Police has been excluded from the England and Wales figure. Dorset Police experienced difficulties with the recording of crime outcomes for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. This was due to the force introducing the Niche records management system in Spring 2015. Problems with the implementation of Niche meant that crime outcomes were not reliably recorded. The failure to file investigations properly meant that a higher than normal proportion of offences were allocated to 'Not yet assigned an outcome'. During 2016, the force conducted additional work to solve the problem. In doing so, some crime outcomes from the 12 months to 30 June 2016 were updated after that date and are reflected in a later period. This makes Dorset Police's crime outcome data inconsistent with that provided by other forces. HMIC has decided not to use Dorset Police's outcome data in the interests of consistency of data use and to maintain fairness to all forces.

Other notable points to consider when interpreting outcome data are listed below and also apply to figure 4.

- For a full commentary and explanation of outcome types please see Crime Outcomes in England and Wales: year ending March 2016, Home Office, July 2016. Available from:
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539447/crime-outcomes-hosb0616.pdf
- Crime outcome proportions show the percentage of crimes recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 that have been assigned each outcome. This means that each crime is tracked or linked to its outcome.
- These data are subject to change, as more crimes are assigned outcomes over time. These data are taken from the October 2016 Home Office data release.

- Providing outcomes data under the new framework is voluntary if not provided directly through the Home Office Data Hub. However, as proportions are used, calculations can be based on fewer than four quarters of data. For the 12 months to 30 June 2016, Derbyshire Constabulary and Suffolk Constabulary were unable to provide the last quarter of data. Therefore, their figures are based on the first three quarters of the year.
- Leicestershire, Staffordshire and West Yorkshire forces are participating in the Ministry of Justice's out of court disposals pilot. This means these forces no longer issue simple cautions or cannabis/khat warnings and they restrict their use of penalty notices for disorder as disposal options for adult offenders, as part of the pilot. Therefore, their outcomes data should be viewed with this in mind.
- It is important to note that the outcomes that are displayed in figure 7 are based on the number of outcomes recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, irrespective of when the crime was recorded. Therefore, the crimes and outcomes recorded in the reporting year are not tracked, so direct comparisons should not be made between general outcomes and domestic abuse related outcomes in this report. For more details about the methodology for domestic abuse outcomes please see explanatory notes below, under figure 7.

Anti-social behaviour

These data are obtained from Office for National Statistics data tables, available from:

www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/policeforceareadatatables

All police forces record incidents of anti-social behaviour reported to them in accordance with the provisions of the National Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR). Incidents are recorded under NSIR in accordance with the same 'victim focused' approach that applies for recorded crime, although these figures are not subject to the same level of quality assurance as the main recorded crime collection. Incident counts should be interpreted as incidents recorded by the police, rather than reflecting the true level of victimisation. Other agencies also deal with anti-social behaviour incidents (for example, local authorities and social landlords); incidents reported to these agencies will not generally be included in police figures.

When viewing this data the user should be aware of the following:

- Warwickshire Police had a problem with its incident recording. For a small percentage of all incidents reported during 2014-15 and 2015-16 it was not possible for the force to identify whether these were anti-social behaviour or other types of incident. These incidents have been distributed pro rata for

Warwickshire, so that one percent of anti-social behaviour in 2014-15 and two percent of anti-social behaviour in 2015-16 are estimated.

- From May 2014, South Yorkshire Police experienced difficulties in reporting those incidents of anti-social behaviour that resulted from how it processed calls for assistance, specifically for scheduled appointments. In November 2016, South Yorkshire Police resolved this problem and resubmitted anti-social behaviour data to Office for National Statistics. HMIC has used corrected data for South Yorkshire Police which are available in the November 2016 release of anti-social behaviour incidents data in the link above.
- Bedfordshire Police resubmitted anti-social behaviour data to Office for National Statistics for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. This was because data had been double counted for the second quarter of the financial year. HMIC has used corrected data for Bedfordshire Police which are available in the November 2016 release of anti-social behaviour incidents data in the link above.

Domestic abuse

Data for domestic abuse flagged offences were provided by the Home Office for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. These are more recent figures than those previously published by Office for National Statistics.

Data relating to domestic abuse arrests, charges and outcomes were collected through the HMIC data collection.

Further information about the domestic abuse statistics and recent releases are available from:

www.ons.gov.uk/releases/domesticabuseinenglandandwalesyearendingmarch2016

Organised crime groups (OCGs)

These data were collected directly from all 43 forces. City of London Police is excluded from the England and Wales rate as its OCG data are not comparable with other forces due to size and its wider national remit.

The number of OCGs in the Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police force areas is a combined total of OCGs for the two force areas. The OCGs per one million population rate is based upon their areas' combined population figures.

OCGs which are no longer active – for example because they have been dismantled by the police – can be archived. This means that they are no longer subject to disruption, investigation or monitoring. From 1 September 2014 to 31 December 2015, forces were given a directive by the National Police Chiefs' Council to suspend archiving, pending a review of OCG recording policy. This directive was removed on

1 January 2016, but resulted in many forces archiving more OCGs than they otherwise would have in the 12 months to June 2016. Therefore, direct comparisons should not be made with OCG figures from previous years.

Victim satisfaction

Forces were required by the Home Office to conduct satisfaction surveys with specific victim groups. Force victim satisfaction surveys are structured around principal questions exploring satisfaction responses across four stages of interactions:

- initial contact;
- actions;
- follow-up;
- treatment plus the whole experience.

The data used in this report use the results to the question relating to the victim's whole experience, which specifically asks, "Taking the whole experience into account, are you satisfied, dissatisfied, or neither with the service provided by the police in this case?"

The England and Wales average is calculated based on the average of the rates of satisfaction in all 43 forces.

Figures throughout the report

Figure 1: Police-recorded crime rates (per 1,000 population) for the five year period to 30 June 2016

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

Figure 2: Police-recorded crime rates (per 1,000 population) for the 12 months to 30 June 2016

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

Figure 3: Percentage change in the rate of anti-social behaviour incidents (per 1,000 population), by force, comparing the 12 months to 31 March 2016 with the 12 months to 31 March 2015

Please see 'Anti-social behaviour' above.

Figure 4: Proportion of outcomes assigned to offences recorded, in 12 months to 30 June 2016, by outcome type

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

The outcome number has been provided to improve usability across multiple publications and is in line with Home Office categorisation.

For these data, we state whether the force's value is 'one of the highest', 'one of the lowest' or 'broadly in line with' all forces in England and Wales. This is calculated by ranking the usage of outcomes and then highlighting the top and bottom 25 percent of forces. All other forces will be broadly in line with England and Wales. However, any interpretation of outcomes should take into account that outcomes will vary dependent on the crime types that occur in each force area, and how the force deals with offenders for different crimes.

This methodology is not comparable with figure 7, so direct comparisons should not be made between the two tables.

Figure 5: Percentage of 'Evidential difficulties; victim does not support action' outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, by force

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

In addition, it is important to understand that the percentages of evidential difficulties can be affected by the level of certain types of crime within a force, such as domestic abuse related offences. The category of evidential difficulties also includes where a suspect has been identified and the victim supports police action, but evidential difficulties prevent further action being taken.

Figure 6: Domestic abuse arrest rate (per 100 domestic abuse crimes), by force, for the 12 months to 30 June 2016

Please see 'Domestic abuse' above.

Derbyshire, Durham and Gloucestershire forces were unable to provide domestic abuse arrest data. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.

The arrest rate is calculated using a common time period for arrests and offences. It is important to note that each arrest is not necessarily directly linked to its specific domestic abuse offence recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 in this calculation. It is also possible to have more than one arrest per offence although this is rare. In addition, the reader should note the increase in police-recorded crime which has affected the majority of forces over the last year (39 out of 43). This may have the effect of arrest rates actually being higher than the figures suggest. Despite this, the calculation still indicates whether the force prioritises arrests for domestic abuse offenders over other potential forms of action. HMIC has evaluated the arrest rate alongside other measures (such as use of voluntary attendance or body-worn video cameras) during our inspection process to understand how each force deals with domestic abuse overall.

When viewing this data the user should be aware of the following:

- Cambridgeshire Constabulary identified a recording issue and that it could only obtain accurate data from a manual audit of its custody records. This means its data may indicate a lower arrest rate. However, at the time of publication this was the most reliable figure the force could provide for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. The force plans to conduct regular manual audits while the recording issue is resolved. HMIC will conduct a further review to test this evidence when more data are available.
- Lancashire Constabulary experienced difficulties in identifying all domestic abuse flagged arrests. This affected 23 days in the 12 months to 30 June 2016. The force investigated this and confirmed that the impact on data provided to HMIC would be marginal and that these are the most reliable figures it can provide.

Figure 7: Rate of outcomes recorded in 12 months to 30 June 2016 for domestic-related offences

Please see ‘Domestic Abuse’ above.

Dorset Police is excluded from our data for the reasons described under ‘Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes’ above.

Nottinghamshire Police has been excluded from domestic abuse outcomes data. The force experienced difficulties with the conversion of some crime data when it moved to a new crime recording system. This means that the force did not record reliably some crime outcomes for domestic abuse related offences. The force subsequently solved the problem and provided updated outcomes figures. However, this makes Nottinghamshire Police’s outcomes data for domestic abuse related offences inconsistent with that provided by other forces. HMIC has decided not to use Nottinghamshire Police’s outcomes data for domestic abuse related offences in the interests of consistency of data use and to maintain fairness to all forces.

In April 2015, the Home Office began collecting information from the police on whether recorded offences were related to domestic abuse. Crimes are identified by the police as domestic abuse related if the offence meets the government definition of domestic violence and abuse:

“Any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are or have been intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality.”

In figure 7, the rate is calculated by the number of each outcome recorded for domestic abuse flagged offences in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, divided by the total number of domestic abuse offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016. The domestic abuse-related crimes used in this calculation are not necessarily

those to which the outcomes have been assigned. Therefore, direct comparisons should not be made between general outcomes in figure 4, where each crime is linked to its associated outcome, and domestic abuse outcomes in figure 7.

For these data, we state whether the force's value is 'one of the highest', 'one of the lowest' or 'broadly in line with' all forces in England and Wales. This is calculated by ranking the usage of outcomes and then highlighting the top and bottom 25 percent of forces. All other forces will be broadly in line with England and Wales. However, any interpretation of outcomes should take into account that outcomes will vary dependent on the crime types that occur in each force area, and how the force deals with offenders for different crimes.

Figure 8: Active organised crime groups by predominant crime type, as at 1 July 2016

Humberside Police was unable to provide the full data for predominant crime types in the time available. Therefore, this force's data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales proportion.

Numbers may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.