

# PEEL

## Police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy 2018/19

An inspection of Warwickshire Police



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# What this report contains

This report is structured in four parts:

1. Our overall assessment of the force's 2018/19 performance.
2. Our judgments and summaries of how effectively, efficiently and legitimately the force keeps people safe and reduces crime.
3. Our judgments and any areas for improvement and causes of concern for each component of our inspection.
4. Our detailed findings for each component.

## Our inspection approach

In 2018/19, we adopted an [integrated PEEL assessment](#) (IPA) approach to our existing PEEL (police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy) inspections. IPA combines into a single inspection the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy areas of PEEL. These areas had previously been inspected separately each year.

As well as our inspection findings, our assessment is informed by our analysis of:

- force data and management statements;
- risks to the public;
- progress since previous inspections;
- findings from our non-PEEL inspections;
- how forces tackle serious and organised crime locally and regionally; and
- our regular monitoring work.

We inspected all forces in four areas:

- protecting vulnerable people;
- firearms capability;
- planning for the future; and
- ethical and lawful workforce behaviour.

We consider the risk to the public in these areas important enough to inspect all forces every year.

We extended the risk-based approach that we used in our 2017 effectiveness inspection to the efficiency and legitimacy parts of our IPA inspections. This means that in 2018/19 we didn't inspect all forces against all areas. The table below shows the areas we inspected Warwickshire Police against.

<b>IPA area</b>	<b>Inspected in 2018/19?</b>
Preventing crime and anti-social behaviour	Yes
Investigating crime	Yes
Protecting vulnerable people	Yes
Tackling serious and organised crime	Yes
Firearms capability	Yes
Meeting current demands	Yes
Planning for the future	Yes
Treating the public fairly	Yes
Ethical and lawful workforce behaviour	Yes
Treating the workforce fairly	Yes

# Force in context

	Warwickshire rate	England and Wales rate
<b>999 calls per 1,000 population</b> 12 months ending 31 March 2019	138	175



	Warwickshire rate	Most Similar Forces rate
<b>Recorded crime per 1,000 population</b> 12 months ending 30 September 2018	71	66

## Warwickshire workforce

	FTE in post on 31 March 2019	FTE in post on 31 March 2014	Percentage change
Police Officer	817	802	2%
Police Community Support Officer	79	95	-16%
Police Staff	643	559	15%

	Warwickshire spend	England and Wales spend
<b>Spend per head of population</b> 2018/19 projection	£168	£192

# Overall summary

	<b>Effectiveness</b>		<b>Last inspected</b>
	Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour	 Good	2018/19
	Investigating crime	 Requires improvement	2018/19
	Protecting vulnerable people	 Good	2018/19
	Tackling serious and organised crime	 Good	2018/19
	Armed response capability	Ungraded	2018/19
	<b>Efficiency</b>	 <b>Requires improvement</b>	<b>Last inspected</b>
	Meeting current demands and using resources	 Requires improvement	2018/19
	Planning for the future	 Inadequate	2018/19


	<b>Legitimacy</b>	 <b>Good</b>	<b>Last inspected</b>
Fair treatment of the public	 Requires improvement	2018/19	
Ethical and lawful workforce behaviour	 Good	2018/19	
Fair treatment of the workforce	 Good	2018/19	

## How does the force compare with similar forces?

We compare Warwickshire Police's performance with the forces in its most similar group (MSG). MSGs are groups of similar police forces, based on analysis of demographic, social and economic factors. [For more information about MSGs, see our website.](#)

Warwickshire Police's MSG forces are Wiltshire Police, Devon and Cornwall Police, West Mercia Police, Suffolk Constabulary, Gloucestershire Constabulary, Cambridgeshire Constabulary and North Wales Police. We haven't yet inspected Devon and Cornwall Police, Cambridgeshire Constabulary and North Wales Police as part of IPA 2018/19, so use their graded judgments from our previous PEEL assessment for comparison.

**Figure 1: Pillar judgments for Warwickshire Police, compared with forces in its MSG**



## HM Inspector's observations

I have concerns about the performance of Warwickshire Police in keeping people safe and reducing crime, and, in particular, serious concerns about the force's efficiency. In view of these findings, I have been in regular contact with the chief constable, because I do not underestimate the challenges ahead.

The force is good at preventing crime and tackling [anti-social behaviour](#). The neighbourhood teams understand community issues and work well with other agencies to resolve local problems. The force has improved how it protects [vulnerable people](#). It works closely with partners to ensure that it [safeguards](#) victims.

But it needs to improve the way it investigates crime and how swiftly it brings offenders to justice. I am concerned that crimes are not always allocated to appropriately trained staff, and that they are not investigated thoroughly enough or supervised effectively.

The force currently provides many of its services through an alliance with West Mercia Police, an arrangement that will end in October 2019. I am concerned that there is no certainty as to how it will provide these services in the future. Warwickshire Police has a good understanding of the demands for its services but needs to fully anticipate future pressures. It is vital that a clear plan for a new operating model is developed quickly to ensure that all policing services to its communities are maintained.

The force continues to uphold an ethical culture and promote standards of professional behaviour well. However, it needs to make sure that training in relation to legislative powers, such as the use of force by officers, is maintained.

I commend the progress that Warwickshire Police has made in some areas and will continue to monitor the force's progress in areas where improvements are still needed.



**Wendy Williams**

HM Inspector of Constabulary

# Effectiveness



# Force in context

	Warwickshire proportion	England and Wales proportion
<b>Proportion of officers in a neighbourhood or response function</b> in post on 31 March 2019	43%	40%

## Victim-based crime per 1,000 population

12 months ending 30 September 2018

	Warwickshire rate	Most Similar Forces rate
<b>Violence against the person</b>	21	22
<b>Sexual offences</b>	2	3
<b>Theft Offences / Robbery</b>	32	25
<b>Criminal damage and arson</b>	8	9

## Crime Outcomes

12 months ending 30 September 2018

	Warwickshire proportion	England and Wales proportion
<b>Proportion of crimes where action was taken</b>	11%	13%
<b>Proportion of crimes where suspect was identified</b>	47%	46%
<b>Proportion of crimes where victim did not support police action</b>	29%	23%

## Outcomes for crimes flagged as domestic abuse

12 months ending 31 March 2018

	Warwickshire proportion	England and Wales proportion
<b>Charge/summonsed</b>	11%	16%
<b>Evidential difficulties: suspect identified; victim does not support</b>	64%	49%

# How effectively does the force reduce crime and keep people safe?



## Good

### Summary

Warwickshire Police is good at preventing crime and tackling [anti-social behaviour](#) (ASB).

The force has a new neighbourhood policing strategy. It has professionalised the role of its safer neighbourhood teams, which work well with partner organisations. We note that a joint initiative recently won a national Tilley award.

The force is good at protecting the public from crime. It uses a wide range of orders in this respect.

The force needs to improve the quality of its investigations. This is a cause of concern. It needs to have the right structures, staffing and skills in place to investigate crimes effectively. It also needs to make sure that it allocates crimes to staff who have had the right training. We note that the force has made strenuous efforts to clear backlogs in its investigative processes. It is also recruiting a substantial number of investigators.

The force needs to improve its approach to catching criminals and resolving investigations. It also needs to put solid processes in place so that it prioritises those suspects who cause the most harm.

The force is good at protecting [vulnerable people](#). The workforce understands hidden harm and looks for signs of it. The force always aims to attend reports of domestic abuse in person. It is good at managing sex offenders.

The force is good at tackling [serious and organised crime](#) (SOC). SOC and [county lines](#) criminality are prioritised because vulnerable people and communities are affected by criminals who transition in from other policing areas. The force is proactive in its approach to organised crime groups (OCGs), gangs and networks. As well as identifying those who are at risk of becoming involved in SOC, it tries to steer them in a more positive life direction.

## Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour



### Good

Warwickshire Police prioritises crime prevention. It consults the public when setting neighbourhood priorities. And it understands the threats that its communities face.

The force is good at protecting the public from harm. Its safer neighbourhood teams work well with partner organisations, such as local authorities, housing associations and those who support victims of crime, most notably in a successful initiative to address begging in Leamington Spa.

The force uses preventative tactics well to tackle crime. It also uses a wide range of orders. It should record partners' use of powers, tactics and inventions.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### Prioritising crime prevention

Warwickshire Police prioritises crime prevention. It has 33 dedicated safer neighbourhood teams, giving good coverage across its communities.

Safer neighbourhood teams focus on problem solving and early intervention in response to community needs. This approach aims to reduce demand on resources and prevent repeat problems.

The force has a new neighbourhood policing strategy. Its local policing model comprises four building blocks: understanding communities; engaging with communities; prioritising and tasking; and problem solving. Officers have enough time to focus on problem solving, with [chief officers](#) giving leadership.

The force is expanding problem-solving training beyond neighbourhood teams. Although the approach is yet to become widespread, we spoke to detectives who use problem-solving approaches in their work. Throughout 2018, leaders hosted events to engage partners in this work.

The force has professionalised the role of safer neighbourhood teams. It has trained all staff in problem solving. And it uses [continuing professional development](#) (CPD) and training days to share learning. Staff are committed to both problem solving and crime prevention.

The force does not routinely deploy neighbourhood officers to non-emergency incidents that are unrelated to their community problem-solving role.

Safer neighbourhood teams do not retain the responsibility for investigating crimes, nor do they attend incidents that are unrelated to their core community-focused role. Neighbourhood officers are appropriately involved in responding to force-wide risks, such as SOC.

A dedicated tactical lead holds officers to account for their activity, as do problem-solving advisers, a performance management framework, local managers, and tasking and co-ordinating processes. These arrangements give the force oversight of prevention activities.

The force sets neighbourhood priorities through public consultation. Neighbourhood teams manage these, alongside the force's strategic priorities. Public consultation on these priorities takes place through quarterly forums (which are particularly important for those who do not use social media), and also internet-based voting. Safer neighbourhood team activities are then reported back to communities through social media and the forums.

These methods identify community priorities for the next quarter and are just one part of the scanning stage of the force's problem-solving approach. Scanning is an essential component of the national OSARA (Objective, Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) problem-solving model. By having 'problem solving at the heart of everything we do', the force makes sure that it understands the scale of the threats facing its communities.

### **Protecting the public from crime**

The force is good at protecting the public from harm.

The force has a good understanding of community needs using area beat profiles. These profiles include information about population, demographics and deprivation levels, together with crimes, intelligence, offenders and incidents. Officers check these profiles regularly to help them understand the threats facing their communities.

Beat profiles have helped the force to identify an emergent Portuguese community. They have also been used to inform work with Eastern European communities. The profiles contain some partnership information from councils, including housing and census data. However, the force and local authorities report that information sharing remains an area that needs further development. This is also the case when tackling SOC, as detailed later in this report.

The force uses [SARA](#) (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) as its problem-solving model. All safer neighbourhood team officers and [staff](#) (and their managers) have been trained in SARA, and have follow-up CPD.

Officers are encouraged to share effective practice through problem-solving co-ordinators and at development days. Supervisors keep problem-solving plans under regular review. Co-ordinators quality assure them to identify good practice.

SARA provides a common language, together with a framework, for police and partners to understand threats and put long-term solutions in place. Supervisors and co-ordinators review, score and assess each problem-solving plan to make sure that its aims are met. These reviews also identify learning. Co-ordinators record this learning in the 'what works' section of the problem-solving system. This system includes toolkits and examples of good practice.

Safer neighbourhood teams gave us many examples of working with partners, such as local authorities, housing providers and charities, to tackle problems. These ranged

from drug use and knife crime to ASB and homelessness. Earlier this year, one partnership problem-solving initiative, which addressed begging in Leamington Spa, won the neighbourhood category Tilley Award. (The Tilley Awards celebrate problem-orientated projects that have achieved success in resolving issues faced by the community, police and partners.) The initiative offered insight into the reasons why people give money to those who beg.

The force makes appropriate use of preventative tactics to tackle crime and ASB. In late 2018, the force convened a civil interventions board to improve the use of court and civil orders. The work of this group was incorporated into problem-solving governance arrangements, led by the assistant chief constable (ACC).

Civil order applications often require multi-agency support. Harm hubs co-ordinate them to improve consistency and expertise. These hubs include problem-solving co-ordinators, licensing and ASB specialists.

The force uses a wide range of orders. But it may not be recording where partners have used their powers, tactics and interventions. Members of the harm hub teams reported difficulties in securing support from the Crown Prosecution Service to apply for [criminal behaviour orders](#). To help address this, a barrister has given advice to the hubs to improve the standard of applications. This expertise helps to make the hubs an effective community safety resource.

The force has been working with colleagues from Durham Constabulary and the [College of Policing](#) to improve its approach to prevention and problem solving. The force's work with Durham has enabled it to benchmark its progress against the national strategy for problem solving.

The force evaluates plans before it closes them, in order to identify learning and to try to quantify any resulting demand or financial savings. (For example, the force's use of dispersal orders in Leamington Spa reduced ASB reports by 30 percent.) The force is developing a comprehensive problem-solving evidence database against which to test and evaluate its future prevention activity.

These activities demonstrate the force's commitment to continuous improvement in this area.

## Investigating crime



### Requires improvement

Warwickshire Police requires improvement in the way it investigates crime.

At times, the force does not have enough capacity and capability to cope with investigative demand. This adversely affects the service it gives to the public. The force keeps victims waiting too long to see an officer, and it takes too long to investigate some crimes. Sometimes, the force tasks response officers with investigating more complex crimes. It also has substantial investigator vacancies that it is working to fill. It needs to improve the quality of its investigations.

Supervisors admitted that they cannot adequately supervise the high number of crimes that officers on their teams are responsible for. This view was borne out by our review of a sample of crime files: more than half had ineffective or no supervision.

The force has made efforts to clear backlogs in its investigative workload. Now it needs to make sure that [body-worn cameras](#) are both available to, and consistently used by, officers to secure early evidence. And it must work harder to pursue justice when victims do not support a prosecution.

The force has good processes for managing wanted suspects who are listed on the [Police National Computer](#) (PNC). It also has effective processes to manage foreign national offenders. Among other measures, it now needs to put processes in place to understand and prioritise effectively those suspects who represent the most harm to the public. Furthermore, it needs a better understanding of its performance in relation to suspects who are [released under investigation](#) (RUI). It also needs to improve its levels of compliance with [disclosure](#) obligations.

### **Cause of concern**

The force does not have the capacity or capability to investigate crime effectively and this is affecting the service being provided to the public. There are failings in the way that crimes are being investigated.

### **Recommendations**

To address this cause of concern, we recommend that within six months the force should:

- improve how it responds to reports of crimes, allocates them, (ensuring investigations are allocated to appropriately trained and supported officers) and that it reviews this allocation appropriately throughout the investigation;
- ensure regular and active supervision of the quality and progress of investigations. This supervision should be properly recorded;
- improve its ability to retrieve digital evidence from mobile phones, computers and other electronic devices quickly enough to ensure investigations are not delayed;
- take steps to better understand the data relating to its crime outcomes and put actions in place to ensure that it is effectively pursuing justice on behalf of victims;
- improve its understanding of suspects released under investigation and the management of those released on bail;
- introduce consistent processes to effectively manage the risk posed by suspects who are under investigation but have not yet been arrested or circulated as wanted on the PNC; and
- introduce effective arrangements to ensure it complies fully with its disclosure obligations.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### **Investigation quality**

Currently, the force does not have the structures, staffing and skills it needs to investigate crime effectively. Nor does it always allocate crimes to appropriately trained staff.

'Omnicompetent' detectives, rather than teams of specialist and generalist investigators, investigate a range of different crime types. This approach is intended to increase both investigative capacity and capability. The model requires investigators to have the skills and accreditation necessary to investigate a broad range of crime types effectively.

However, the model has not been fully implemented. We found examples of officers investigating more complex crimes without the training and accreditation to do so confidently. Response officers were carrying complex cases, such as fraud, with multiple lines of enquiry that their core role prevented them from investigating effectively.

Some investigators lack the necessary training and accreditation for specialist investigations (such as those involving children and serious sexual offences). And those with the necessary training are not routinely compiling the required portfolio of evidence that is necessary to obtain formal accreditation. The force lacks sufficient mentors to support newly trained officers in their development. The force also has a large number of vacancies in investigator roles. These will only begin to be filled as recruitment plans take effect.

Some officers were struggling to manage their workloads. And some investigations dated back many months. Inspectors found cases that had exceeded statutory time limits for bringing a suitable charge.

The force has made significant efforts to clear backlogs at various stages in the investigative process. It has cleared allocation backlogs in the investigation management unit (IMU), so that cases are now assigned promptly. The telephone investigation unit is effective in its management of less complex cases. Incident progression teams (IPTs) swiftly manage some activities in the earlier stages of investigations. The force has reviewed investigation workloads in some parts of the county, so that officers and staff only follow up the most appropriate lines of enquiry. There has been learning for both supervisors and staff that is now being shared. The workload review has substantially reduced investigative caseloads in some, but not all, areas. Staff report that digital forensic backlogs contribute to lengthy investigative delays. In some cases, these delays can be up to 12 months.

The force's action plan sets out how it will develop its investigative model, incorporating learning from the earlier caseload review. Investigator recruitment includes [Police Now](#) opportunities (whereby the force directly recruits new officers to train them as detectives). These opportunities are proving to be popular with prospective candidates. The force's commercial partner is also reviewing investigative demand. This review will give leaders the evidence they need to make decisions on further improvements in this area. However, wider changes brought

about by the termination of the strategic alliance between Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police need to be resolved first. These changes are explained in greater detail later in this report. Some of these changes include decisions about offender management, harm hubs and the investigative command structure. The force's 'Evolve' project team is managing the programme of work relating to the alliance termination, so that changes are appropriately scheduled and interdependencies managed effectively. The work of the Evolve team is explained later in this report.

Despite the force's dip-sampling, training and reviews, there were poor standards of supervision of investigations. Supervisors marked case reviews as completed but gave little meaningful direction for officers to act on. In our review of crime files, we found that only 22 out of 60 investigations had been the subject of effective supervision.

In 16 of those investigations, we found evidence that the investigation was not effective. In two cases, we raised issues that needed immediate attention. Supervisors and staff spoke of workload and demand pressures. They said these affected their ability to investigate all cases in as timely and effective a manner as they would wish.

Investigators and response officers understand the importance of early evidence gathering. Both report the transfer of good-quality investigation handover packages between departments. (A handover package is the collection of information, such as statements, lines of enquiry and other evidence, that is passed from one team to another during an investigation.)

The force's use of body-worn video is not good enough to secure early evidence, despite policies encouraging its widespread use. The inconsistent use of this equipment is an obstacle. This and other factors (such as early arrest and effective support to victims) can influence investigative outcomes.

The force has carried out research to understand investigative outcomes. It has used the findings to make improvements in areas such as the use of outcome 16 and arrest in domestic abuse cases. (Outcome 16 is one of several crime outcomes introduced in April 2014.) According to this framework, every crime that the police record will, eventually, get a police outcome. Outcome 16 relates to those cases recorded as having evidential difficulties despite a named suspect being identified. In Outcome 16 cases, the victim does not support (or withdraws support for) police action. This can be for a variety of reasons such as delays in the investigation, lack of support to the victim, or loss of victim confidence in the investigative process. The force is continuing its work on improving its investigative outcomes.

Our crime file review, conducted in late 2018, identified that the force fails to pursue justice appropriately when victims do not support a prosecution. The force acknowledges that it needs to do more in this area.

The force has improved officers' understanding of evidence-led prosecutions. It has done this through training and raising awareness. We found examples of improved performance in this area. We also found that officers understand the [Code of Practice for Victims of Crime](#) and the importance of victim contact. But inconsistent recording practices mean that officers are not capturing victim updates on force systems in a

way that the force can then analyse and understand them. Therefore, the force cannot be confident that investigators are updating victims appropriately in all cases.

There is little performance information available at the individual investigator level. Team-level information is also limited. This makes it difficult for the force to show that its investigations are prompt and effective, and secure the best outcomes for victims. However, victim feedback is largely positive, notably in areas such as telephone investigation, domestic abuse and hate crime.

### **Catching criminals**

The force's approach to catching criminals and resolving investigations requires improvement.

The force has good processes for circulating wanted suspects on the PNC. It also has a daily accountability process at detective chief inspector (DCI) level.

The force has among the lowest numbers of wanted suspects who are registered on the PNC in England and Wales.

Neighbourhood beat profiles include details of offenders who have been arrested in the last 72 hours. These profiles also give intelligence updates about those who represent the greatest harm to the public. Officers and staff know who is wanted, and they pursue suspects diligently.

Either the investigating officer or local supervisor manages those suspects who are not shown as wanted on the PNC. The force cannot confidently report on the numbers of non-PNC suspects sought, nor the level of risk or vulnerability presented by this cohort.

The force has no consistent processes in place to make sure that it prioritises effectively those non-PNC suspects who represent the greatest risk to the public. And it is not collating this information force-wide. This additional information could give useful indicators in other areas. It could show whether, for example, the force is progressing higher-risk investigations expeditiously and whether it is effectively managing higher-risk suspects (such as perpetrators of rape and domestic abuse) in all areas. The absence of such data means that the force does not pursue such suspects as effectively as it should.

The force has an effective process for managing foreign national offenders. The crime system auto-populates the wanted foreign national referral process at the [criminal records office](#). A member of staff in the force intelligence bureau (FIB) is responsible for this work. However, the process relies on officers entering the correct data during the custody booking-in process. The FIB's single point of contact sometimes (but not always) takes corrective follow-up action.

The workforce has an appropriate level of awareness of foreign national offender arrangements.

The force has suitable governance and oversight in place. It uses pre-charge [bail](#), primarily in higher-risk cases. However, officers reported a reluctance to apply for pre-charge bail or to seek the authority to extend bail, even for higher-risk cases. Instead, they preferred to use RUI legislation.

The force has yet to put in place performance arrangements to make sure that it complies with national guidelines on the use of bail and RUI. Performance arrangements would allow it to better manage investigations and supervisor reviews. It would help the force to meet both statutory and victim expectations. It would also improve the force's own understanding of crime outcomes. The force has worked to raise awareness, and staff do understand bail legislation. The force has also developed processes to help it better manage RUI.

The force's disclosure training mostly takes place through online training with the National Centre for Applied Learning Technologies (NCALT). Uptake is high. The force has also introduced a one-day disclosure training course. However, we found varying levels of understanding of disclosure. Supervisors lacked knowledge of the disclosure process. Criminal investigation department (CID) teams have few disclosure-trained officers. There is no central quality assurance to make sure that disclosure obligations have been effectively discharged. For officers, queries from the Crown Prosecution Service are the main source of feedback about disclosure shortcomings. This means that the force is unlikely to be complying fully with its disclosure obligations.

The force is reviewing its crime performance. It is seeking to remove barriers to better investigative outcomes. One such example is the improved use of the [THRIVE](#) risk-assessment tool in the control room. (THRIVE stands for threat, harm, risk, investigation opportunities, vulnerability of the victim and the engagement level required to resolve the issue.)

The force is aware of its investigation problems and is working to address them. It has appropriate governance in place to support these improvement activities.

## Protecting vulnerable people



### Good

Warwickshire Police is good at protecting vulnerable people. Its emphasis on vulnerable people is apparent in its strategic assessment, its control strategy and its vision.

Officers work effectively with partners to identify and [safeguard](#) vulnerable people. But technical issues prevent a force-wide understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability.

The force carries out effective risk assessments when responding to incidents. It needs to make sure that as many callers as possible receive an appropriate and timely response.

The force needs to review older domestic abuse cases to make sure that it is managing them effectively. And it needs to use pre-charge bail to better safeguard victims of domestic abuse.

### Areas for improvement

- Improvements must be made to the quality of incident risk reassessments when deployment delays occur, so that safeguarding support can be prioritised. This action should be addressed promptly.
- The force should implement the necessary processes to share information with schools in relation to children affected by domestic abuse incidents, to ensure information is shared as quickly and effectively as possible.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### Understanding and identifying vulnerability

The force uses the College of Policing's definition of vulnerability. The force's emphasis on vulnerability is clear and evident in both its latest strategic assessment and its control strategy. Chief officers promote awareness of vulnerability. The force's vision is 'Protecting people from harm'. Officers and staff showed a clear understanding of vulnerability. The force's systems and processes reinforce this.

Officers gave several examples of working with local partners to proactively identify and safeguard vulnerable people. These included visits to schools, and businesses such as hotels, as well as speaking to taxi drivers and pub door staff to educate them about recognising the signs of vulnerability, exploitation and hidden harms.

Following our 2017 inspection, the force reviewed its approach to domestic abuse as part of a wider vulnerability improvement plan. The force holds frequent forums to review its progress against its strategic priorities, and to assign resources to them. These forums are known as tasking meetings. The force also analyses data to understand specific risks (such as hate crime, SOC, and child exploitation).

Partnership strategic assessments, and research funded by the [police and crime commissioner](#) (PCC), help the force to understand risk. However, the force is hindered in developing a comprehensive force-wide understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability by technical issues involving data retrieval.

Comprehensive beat profiles and effective partnership problem-solving activities go some way in enabling the force to address technical weaknesses. These approaches help the force to identify areas of greatest need, and to target problem-solving interventions accordingly.

Hidden harm, such as child sexual exploitation (CSE) and modern-day slavery and human trafficking (MSHT), feature in the force's control strategy.

The force's central multi-agency team works to identify potential victims of criminal or sexual exploitation. The force has hosted several partnership problem-solving events, promoting public and partner awareness of hidden harm. It has also identified and [mapped](#) its first modern-day slavery OCG.

Response and neighbourhood staff understand hidden harm, and actively look for signs. The force has given 'look beyond the obvious' training so that staff can identify hidden vulnerability. Officers can access a vulnerability handbook on their handheld mobile devices via the force's intranet. The force is also giving 'domestic abuse matters' training to all. The force's proactive team conducts patrols and works with neighbourhood officers in key areas to generate intelligence about county lines vulnerability.

Control room staff use the THRIVE model to identify vulnerable victims and manage risk. Staff are trained in its use. They can access prompts that the system gives for a range of higher-risk scenarios (such as incidents involving missing persons, firearms or mental health issues). Staff also make effective use of other police and intelligence systems to identify the main threats relating to each incident. Supervisors regularly review call and incident logs to check that all risks have been properly identified. Despite these measures, a recent audit by the force showed that only 49 percent of incidents had an adequate THRIVE assessment.

Although the force command and control system cannot automatically flag repeat and vulnerable victims, it can store a location-based marker to help identify them. This method is often used for repeat victims of domestic abuse, or where a potential threat to life exists. The force makes appropriate risk assessment and grading decisions.

Although control room staff do not work alongside mental health agencies, they can call a 24/7 advice line when dealing with people in crisis. But this can lead to delays, which means that officers spend excessive periods dealing with incidents that might be better resolved by mental health services. The force is introducing new methods later in 2019, as explained elsewhere in this report.

### **Responding to incidents**

The force responds effectively to emergency incidents. And it carries out effective risk assessments. The force assesses callers' needs based on the THRIVE model.

The force does not deal with domestic abuse incidents by telephone, but always aims to attend such reports in person. A review of incidents showed that not all callers had received an appropriate or timely response, potentially putting victims at risk of further harm. Some incidents that call handlers initially graded as needing a prompt response (priority 2) were not attended within agreed timescales. Supervisors' incident log entries tended to explain the delay rather than reassess the risk.

In our 2017 inspection, we raised as an area for improvement the problem of risk reassessment when attendance delays occur. Our 2019 inspection found that this remains an area of weakness for Warwickshire Police. The force must take swift action to make sure that risk reassessments are consistent and effective, particularly for higher-risk incident types.

The force has worked to improve officers' understanding of the importance of thoroughly risk-assessing reports of domestic abuse. Officers use [domestic abuse, stalking and harassment \(DASH\) risk assessments](#) to assist them with this process.

All DASH assessments are completed face to face. Supervisors review every DASH assessment. The controller cannot close any relevant control room incident until a DASH assessment has been completed. Harm assessment units (HAUs) use these risk assessments to share information with partners, such as schools and social services. HAUs report that the quality of completed assessments is good. Daily management meetings (DMMs) feature updates on any DASH assessments that are missing or that fall below the required standard. This focus has substantially improved quality. While some supervisors comply with these robust scrutiny requirements, others regarded the focus as a disproportionate use of their time. DASHs are completed for 95 percent of domestic-related crimes and incidents.

Some partners have adopted the DASH template for consistency with police processes.

HAUs carry out background checks on receipt of DASH forms. Cases involving children are referred to children's (or education) services, to raise awareness that a child has been involved in a domestic abuse incident. The force is not, however, part of the [Operation Encompass](#) scheme. This is a scheme that facilitates the exchange of information between police and schools when a child may have been affected by domestic abuse, so that additional support can be provided. The CSE/missing persons team is co-located with children's services partners. This makes referrals straightforward. High-risk domestic abuse cases are referred to the domestic abuse risk officer (DARO). The harm investigation team, staffed by [PIP2](#)-trained investigators (or those who are working towards PIP2 accreditation in line with the College of Policing guidelines), investigates most medium and high-risk domestic abuse crimes. The CID investigates those involving serious injury or sexual offences.

The force does not have a [mental health triage](#) arrangement in place at present. As a result, officers sometimes spend a lot of time managing the response to people experiencing mental ill health who might be better served by professionals from other sectors. The force is working with the Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership NHS Trust, clinical commissioning groups and the Warwickshire Cares: Better Together Board to implement a triage service. Since our inspection, the force has secured NHS Executive Board approval to implement an out-of-hours triage service. This will be introduced in August 2019.

Officers have a good knowledge and understanding of the [Police and Criminal Evidence Act Code G 2012](#), which concerns statutory powers of arrest. The force DMM reinforces the need for positive action at domestic abuse incidents.

Since early 2018, the force has had a 12-point domestic abuse action plan in place.

Over a two-year period, the arrest rate has improved from 8 percent to 32 percent, and is now a little above the England and Wales rate, while the charge/summons rate has fallen to slightly below the England and Wales rate.

Despite this focus, we found domestic abuse cases that pre-dated the domestic abuse DMMs with limited progress made on them. The force should review older domestic abuse cases to make sure that officers are managing them effectively. The force cannot provide data on the use of [voluntary attendance](#) for suspect interviews.

The multi-agency harm hub oversees an integrated victim management approach. This approach co-ordinates effective police and partner support for people who have mental health needs. Safer neighbourhood teams have a good understanding of this process. This understanding avoids duplication of effort, and makes sure that effective, long-term safeguarding and preventative solutions are put in place. Beat profiles capture this activity, enabling good organisational awareness. However, there is no mental health representative within the [multi-agency safeguarding hub](#) (MASH). Officers also spoke of difficulty in engaging child mental health services. Officers report that the threshold at which mental health professionals will become engaged appears to be particularly high in Warwickshire.

### **Supporting vulnerable victims**

Response officers manage standard and medium-risk domestic abuse investigations. They are also responsible for safeguarding. Safer neighbourhood teams visit medium-risk victims and advise them about available support. Response officers also check compliance with bail and other orders, and update risk management plans (RMPs). RMPs are effective.

The force takes what it calls an 'integrated victim management' approach to support the most vulnerable victims. This involves police working with (and co-ordinating the activity of) any relevant partners, such as housing, mental health services and charities. We found examples of this integrated approach offering co-ordinated partnership care to victims. Working with integrated victim management colleagues, the harm investigation team manages medium and high-risk investigations involving vulnerable people. The CID deals with those involving grievous bodily harm or sexual offences. The CID also safeguards victims (along with relevant victim support partners). Response teams carry out welfare checks on victims, too.

The force makes appropriate use of [domestic violence protection notices \(DVPNs\)](#) and [domestic violence protection orders \(DVPOs\)](#). It produces tasking plans for each type of order. Welfare checks are allocated through force briefings. The tasking plans include details of prohibitions, warnings and photographs.

A dedicated civil orders single point of contact presents applications and breaches at court. This helps to secure high success rates in court. Any new DVPN is alerted automatically through force systems to the single point of contact, and to supervisors and managers in the harm hub.

The force can readily report on the number of applications made. But it cannot confidently report on breaches. The social media campaign #SpaceToBreathe also raises awareness of some of the safeguards that are available to support victims of domestic abuse. The force has effective processes in place for the 'right to ask' and 'right to know' schemes, also known as [Clare's Law](#). The force has no processing backlogs.

Officers have a good understanding of pre-charge bail and RUI. But some officers report that the force's management of bail and RUI is ineffective. Officers question the benefit of pre-charge bail when conditions are rarely checked and breaches have little consequence.

While the force aims to use pre-charge bail for all high-risk domestic abuse cases, this does not always happen. The force cannot report confidently on the levels of RUI, despite monthly custody sergeant follow-ups. Currently, it is reviewing all 'live' RUI cases.

The harm hub makes more consistent use of pre-charge bail to safeguard the highest-risk victims of domestic abuse. The length of time it takes to obtain a charging decision can, however, pose a challenge to continued bail extensions and enforcement.

The force has an effective county-wide MASH process. Although education, housing and mental health are not co-located, suitable arrangements are in place for joint discussions and decisions.

The HAU is the force's contribution to the aac. It was established two years ago and is now well integrated into the MASH. The HAU reviews all reports where vulnerability is a factor. It checks partner systems to make sure that all risks are identified and managed. DAROs are also based in the MASH. There are minimal backlogs and staff move flexibly between roles to manage changes in demand.

Some social care partners reported that too many single-agency social care visits take place. This is due to a lack of CID resources, even when thresholds are met. Staff have the skills for their roles and there is evidence of further professional skills development taking place too. All officers spend some time in the MASH to raise their awareness and understanding of the work in this area. MASH team members also give force-wide training and briefings.

ICT systems in the MASH allow for the tasking and sharing of information between partners. Every month, two [multi-agency risk assessment conferences](#) (MARACs) take place (one in the north and one in the south of the county). MARACs bring together social care workers and other domestic abuse professionals to develop support programmes. The harm hub's detective inspector chairs the MARACs. All high-risk domestic abuse cases (involving those who are at risk of serious harm or murder) are referred to the MARAC. The MARAC also reviews some standard and medium-risk cases, to prevent their escalation. The force is considering a daily video conference MARAC. This would give early and co-ordinated safeguarding support while a suspect is in custody and should lead to improved levels of victim engagement.

The force surveys a variety of victim groups, with a view to improving its services. Those surveyed include victims of domestic abuse, hate crime, violent crime, rape and burglary. Their experience is considered from initial call through the investigation to the criminal justice process. Surveys often highlight further issues experienced by victims, so that these can be tasked.

The alliance's multi-agency strategic and tactical serious sex offences groups include a sexual assault referral centre, and health and independent advocates.

In June 2018, a victim satisfaction group was established by the force. This group carried out a victim survey to help improve victim services. A rape and serious sexual offences working group also looks for good practice and opportunities to improve services. There are, however, no formal feedback processes to which partner agencies can contribute. The force uses lessons learned to inform training and service changes. This leads to improvements in levels of victim satisfaction.

The force's management of sex offenders is effective. The ratio of offenders to offender managers results in achievable caseloads. Offenders are risk assessed promptly using the [active risk management](#) (ARMS) risk-assessment process. Trained offender management officers schedule and conduct visits to offenders at regular intervals.

There is a backlog in the completion of ARMS risk assessments that are the responsibility of the probation service. This backlog consequently makes the risk assessments completed by the force less comprehensive than they could be. Offender managers are trained in risk assessment, managing sexual offenders and violent offenders, and investigation. The force's offender managers carry an investigative workload involving cases where new images or other evidence have been discovered during their regular visits to registered sex offenders (RSOs). Neighbourhood officers can access information about RSOs through the force's briefing system. During our inspection, they showed an appropriate awareness of RSOs in their areas.

The force is effective in its approach to identifying those who share indecent images of children online. It also shows a proactive approach to reducing this threat. It takes on other investigations that might appear to be low risk (because of the type of image), but which involve a high-risk individual (such as those with professional access to children).

The force has seen improved use of court and civil orders since setting up a civil interventions board. The ACC chairs the board. A review of cases shows that the force makes appropriate use of ancillary orders and other powers to protect the public.

## Tackling serious and organised crime



### Good

Warwickshire Police is good at tackling SOC. It understands the threat posed by this type of crime and holds daily threat identification meetings. Partners that participate in serious and organised crime joint action groups (SOCJAGs) need to share information more readily with the force.

The force prioritises work on county lines. The county of Warwickshire is impacted by county lines from other policing areas. The force is also active in tackling OCGs, gangs and networks.

The force is proactive in seeking to prevent SOC by helping those who might otherwise become involved in it. It works with partners to protect vulnerable people, and to offer interventions and support.

The force's Operation Impression aims to educate all schoolchildren in the county about the dangers of knife crime.

### Areas for improvement

- The force should ensure that lead responsible officers (LROs) maintain up-to-date management plans for all active organised crime groups as part of a long-term, multi-agency approach to dismantling these groups. LROs should adopt a balanced approach across the 'four Ps' framework (pursue; prevent; protect; prepare), and they should have a good understanding of available tactics.
- The force should continue to improve its understanding of the impact of its work on serious and organised crime across the 'four Ps'. It should also make sure that it learns from experience to maximise its disruptive effect on this criminal activity.
- The force should enhance its approach to the lifetime management of organised criminals to minimise the risks they pose to local communities. This approach should include routine consideration of ancillary orders, as well as the powers of other organisations, and other tools to deter organised criminals from continuing to offend.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### Understanding threats

Warwickshire Police has a good understanding of the threat posed by SOC. It uses the MoRiLE ([management of risk in law enforcement](#)) process every six months to assess the various types of organised crime as part of its strategic assessment cycle. The force's intelligence requirement details the level of threat that is presented by different types of SOC.

SOC and county lines are recognised as force and community safety partnership priorities. Local and force tasking processes focus on control strategy priorities, intelligence gaps and newer areas of risk. These include MSHT, county lines, CSE and [urban street gangs](#) (USGs).

The force holds a daily threat identification meeting. At this meeting, officers review demand over the past 24 hours, consulting cross-border and regional intelligence units to fully understand threat, harm and risk.

The work of CSE and missing persons teams has considerable crossover with SOC, and the criminal exploitation of children. For example, the CSE team worked with hotels and B&Bs as part of the multi-agency 'something's not right' campaign. This led to a hotel licence suspension, child abduction warning notices and other work to

safeguard 'at risk' young people. The force also briefs community safety and other partners about newer threat areas, so they know what signs to look for.

In January 2019, the force published two updated [SOC local profiles](#). Each profile outlines local problems and issues. While they include some local authority and other partnership data, the profiles note that some agencies are still reluctant to share data.

Community safety partners chair the SOCJAGs. These groups inform and use these profiles to help identify and manage OCGs. The groups also have action plans. When necessary, joint action group members put separate tactical partnership arrangements in place when a more rapid response is needed to a threat. The joint action groups' plans and minutes reflect the fact that partners work well together. But the minutes too frequently state that 'no information was received from partners'. All partners should commit to promptly addressing this weakness.

The force makes effective use of a range of sources to develop its understanding of threats. It reflects newer threats (such as cybercrime) in the control strategy and police and crime plan, and offers training and partnership work. But the force has no analytical capability for cyber-dependent crime.

The force carries out traditional intelligence collection and open source research. It uses communications data and shares intelligence with SOCJAG members. It co-locates its local intelligence units with neighbourhood teams. This facilitates the tasking and briefing of intelligence needs. The FIB is well connected with the [regional organised crime unit](#) (ROCU) and other surrounding forces. The force's daily threat identification meeting includes the dedicated source unit. This way, decision makers know about daily intelligence needs. And they can effectively work with intelligence assets.

The force is involved in the county lines intelligence collection matrix. This is led by the National County Lines Coordination Centre, which profiles all active lines on a monthly basis. The force uses this information to map county lines and brief officers through tactical tasking and coordinating groups (TTCGs). The TTCGs provide a good forum for the force to maintain contact, and exchange relevant intelligence, with ROCU colleagues. The force has seconded an analyst into the regional organised crime threat assessment team, to help it better understand available intelligence. These arrangements help the force, and SOCJAG partners, to understand the threats posed by SOC.

The force has effective OCG management processes. The organised crime group management unit (OCGMU) reviews all active OCGs and instigates activity according to national guidelines. The unit acts as the point of contact with the regional organised crime threat assessment team. This team also approves the archiving of OCGs.

The force proactively identifies new OCGs, gangs and networks. This informs the force's tasking process. The force promptly maps all OCGs. It has 16 mapped OCGs, which equates to 28.3 mapped OCGs per million population (April 2018 data). The force also records the impact of 5.3 USGs per million population (September 2018 data).

Unlike some forces, Warwickshire Police does not routinely count USGs within its OCG numbers. Most mapped OCGs are involved in drugs supply. Recently, the force mapped the first OCG linked to MSHT in the region. The number of OCGs that the force has mapped is lower than the rate across England and Wales (35 OCGs per million population). But the force manages the significant impact from OCGs that travel from other force areas, and that are involved in CSE, county lines and serious acquisitive crime (acquisitive crime involves an element of theft).

The force identifies its intelligence needs through organised crime group management (OCGM) meetings, and through force and local TTCG meetings. These needs are then tasked through line managers to local officers to action. The OCGMU gave good examples of the safer neighbourhood teams providing intelligence that helped the force to identify and tackle OCG activity. (For example, the teams' identification of new groups led to mapping, operations and arrests.) Response officers also spoke of briefings about OCGs in their patrol areas, and of supervisors tasking them to get intelligence. Officers showed an awareness of the risks relating to SOC. And they gave us operational examples. This indicates that relevant local, regional and partner resources support efforts to tackle SOC.

The force is impacted by county lines from other policing areas (known as 'imported' lines). The National County Lines Coordination Centre's monthly national reports on OCGs and county lines often refer to dated information. The FIB then has to contact other forces directly, to get the latest information on lines that affect Warwickshire.

The force has started to use the drug harm matrix to score county lines and identify gaps. In Warwickshire, there are 18 active lines, two of which are linked to USGs and two to OCGs. The ROCU reviews all high-threat groups. These processes help the force to better understand and tackle county lines.

### **Serious and organised crime prevention**

The force works to prevent SOC, and to identify those who are at risk of being drawn into it. The PCC funds youth diversionary schemes, such as the Dame Kelly Holmes Trust programmes, to empower young people to lead more fulfilling lives. The force uses a matrix of indicators to identify those who would most benefit from such schemes. Safer neighbourhood team officers and other professionals can also nominate people for them.

The force runs operations with relevant partners, such as housing and social care, to protect vulnerable people who are at risk of [cuckooing](#). ('Cuckooing' is the process of establishing a base from which to deal drugs, as part of county lines criminality. The base is established in the home of a vulnerable person or local drug users. Drug debt, threats and violence may be used as coercion.) These operations offer support, including substance misuse referrals.

The force works with partners, such as the youth offending team and Barnardo's, to offer interventions and support to young people who are at risk of being drawn into SOC. Police schemes (including the cadets and the youth academy) also target young people who may be at risk. The force is introducing Operation Impression, a knife crime initiative, to all schools in Warwickshire.

The OCGMU has developed a database to capture all methods of diversionary activity, intervention and support. There are good examples of prevention activity across the force. The director of intelligence and problem-solving co-ordinators are exploring how to tailor prevention activities to address SOC risks in specific areas. This tailoring will enable the force to better understand the effectiveness of prevention activities and their impact on SOC.

The FIB works with the regional prison intelligence team to disrupt OCG members who are in prison. No OCG nominals are registered on the [lifetime offender management](#) scheme. But the alliance has one person on the programme and the [LRO](#) knows that nominations can be suggested for the scheme. The offender manager unit monitors the activity of SOC nominals, both in prison and upon release.

The OCG portal encourages LROs to consider a range of orders. But there is little evidence of LROs using orders to control SOC offenders. There are no [serious crime prevention orders](#) (SCPOs) or gang injunctions in force. However, there is evidence of their consideration, and the OCGMU was writing three SCPO applications at the time of our inspection. The force reports that SCPOs and gang injunctions are proving difficult to secure.

The force cannot give an overview of all the orders that it is using to prevent SOC. But it does have plans in place to develop a database of orders. This will incorporate organisational learning about what works.

The force regularly communicates with the public about SOC, as well as organised crime operations and county lines investigations. It communicates through traditional and social media, and community messaging. It has hosted partnership events to raise awareness of SOC and to develop a force brand, called 'Protect', to communicate key messages.

The force communicates with victims directly, or through schools, community groups and other forums. Its communications include coverage of days of action (high-profile operations involving enforcement and prevention activities), and the results of successful prosecutions. The force consults relevant partner agencies, such as community safety partners, on joint media strategies. It has publicised partnership use of closure orders in order to discourage others from involvement in organised crime. Such communications help the public to be vigilant, and to prevent SOC.

### **Disruption and investigation**

The force's disruption and investigation of SOC are effective. A shared ACC governs the alliance's agenda on SOC. The alliance's director of intelligence also provides support. The Warwickshire ACC contributes governance of local SOC activity.

The force has identified SOC as a control strategy priority. It has well-established strategic and tactical partnership arrangements in place. SOCJAGs have a partnership chair, although their work is still heavily police led. Nevertheless, these groups are active and well attended. They give good direction and oversight of partnership activity to tackle SOC.

The force is good at managing OCGs. The TTCG and OCGMU offer effective forums for the management of OCG threats. OCGs are prioritised and tasked through these forums using OCG scoring, MoRiLE assessment and professional judgment. County lines are prioritised using similar methods, together with assessment against the drugs harm matrix. The force contributes data to the national county lines intelligence collection process. From this, it creates a monthly county lines operational profile.

One LRO manages all the OCGs for the force, except those that are subject to investigation by the SOC unit. The LRO is the DCI who heads up both the offender management unit and proactive teams. The LRO is held to account by the senior responsible officer (SRO). This is the detective superintendent responsible for safeguarding, offender management and investigations.

Both officers inform the tasking, OCGM and DMM processes to ensure effective management of SOC issues. While there is potential for OCG demand to outstrip LRO capacity, support is available for the LRO from colleagues who can deputise in this role. Both the LRO and SRO are relatively new to their posts, and neither have had structured training. They have accessed development through the alliance's director of intelligence, and from other forces and the ROCU. They have also attended alliance and partnership events. The LRO is responsible for managing effective 'four P' plans, with support from other colleagues who are responsible for completing the actions detailed in the plan.

The whole workforce can access the alliance-wide OCGM intranet. This holds all relevant information about OCGs, including the 'OCG on a page' briefing document, 'four P' plans and intelligence. There is a standard template for 'four P' plans. The LRO assesses actions within the plans using a 'red, amber, green' colour scheme to show progress.

The consistency and quality of 'four P' plans varied across several Warwickshire OCGs. Several plans were not completed on the standard template. Nor were actions rated according to the colour scheme. This may indicate that a single LRO does not have enough capacity to meet the OCG demands facing Warwickshire Police.

Despite this, the investigation of OCGs is suitably varied and considers an appropriate range of tactical options. These range from covert ROCU-level capabilities to low-level problem solving and disruption.

The force is currently running one operation in collaboration with the ROCU. The more local aspects of the operation are being dealt with at neighbourhood policing and SOCJAG partnership level. The force has limited covert surveillance capability, and the threshold at which it can access more specialist ROCU support is very high. This may lead to some missed opportunities to collect covert intelligence. However, the allocation of finite force and regional resources to operations is decided at covert asset management meetings, according to the value of such tactics in any given operation. And the LRO knows how to access covert and overt tactical options.

The force uses financial investigation and intelligence to remove assets from OCGs. It actively identifies county lines risks and takes effective measures to reduce their impact on vulnerable people. Neighbourhood teams are also involved in managing county lines and OCGs. Threats to life feature as a priority in threat identification meetings and DMMs.

The force records disruptions using national guidelines. The OCGMU manages disruptions. Officers can tell the central team about disruptions by email and through the OCGM site. The force does not review intelligence or crime systems to identify activity linked to OCGs that may amount to disruptions so it may be missing some of these.

The force records 0.8 disruptions per OCG, which is one of the lowest rates in England and Wales. It scrutinises disruptions with the OCGM and the ROCU. It should be noted that both the ROCU and the SOC unit are claiming disruptions of Warwickshire OCGs that are being tackled by these units.

There is little evidence that the force analyses the impact of its activity on OCGs across the 'four Ps'. Some learning is shared at a local level through the fortnightly SOC and LRO meeting, the OCGMU and the TTCG. But the force has no central repository in which to record what works, or to capture corporate learning. However, the force refreshes MoRiLE scoring after operational activity, so that it can reassess and reprioritise threat.

The LRO plans to develop a database of what works as part of the repository for SOC orders. Recently, the force recruited a new lead for organisational learning who will guide the force in the development of a range of learning opportunities. These will include lessons learned from what works in tackling SOC.

## Armed policing

We have previously inspected how well forces provide armed policing. This formed part of our 2016 and 2017 effectiveness inspections. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the UK and Europe have meant that the police service maintains a focus on armed capability in England and Wales.

It is not just terrorist attacks that place operational demands on armed officers. The threat can include the activity of OCGs or armed street gangs and all other crime involving guns. The [\*Code of Practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons\*](#) makes forces responsible for implementing national standards of armed policing. The code stipulates that a chief officer be designated to oversee these standards. This requires the chief officer to set out the firearms threat in an [\*armed policing strategic threat and risk assessment\*](#) (APSTRA). The chief officer must also set out clear rationales for the number of armed officers (armed capacity) and the level to which they are trained (armed capability).

## Understanding the threat and responding to it

Warwickshire Police operates joint arrangements with West Mercia Police to provide armed policing as part of the strategic alliance. These arrangements are likely to terminate when the alliance between the two forces comes to an end.

The force has an adequate understanding of the potential harm facing the public. The force's APSTRA, which is currently jointly compiled with West Mercia Police, conforms to the requirements of the code and the [College of Policing guidance](#). The APSTRA is published annually and is accompanied by a register of risks and other observations. The [designated chief officer](#) reviews the register frequently to maintain the right levels of armed capability and capacity.

However, we identified an area last year where the APSTRA could be improved. The assessment does not include an analysis of how quickly [armed response vehicles](#) (ARVs) respond to armed incidents. This is important to determine because it provides an indication of whether or not the force has sufficient armed officers to meet operational demands. It is disappointing that the force's APSTRA still doesn't contain this information. It is a shortcoming that we expect the force to address.

All armed officers in England and Wales are trained to national standards. There are different standards for each role that armed officers perform. The majority of armed incidents in Warwickshire are attended by officers trained to ARV standard. However, incidents sometimes occur that require the skills and specialist capabilities of more highly trained officers. We found that Warwickshire Police currently has good arrangements in place to mobilise specialist officers should their skills be required. On these occasions, the force is reliant on its current and effective collaboration arrangements with West Mercia Police to provide this capability. Additional support can also be drawn upon from the regional counter-terrorist unit. It is now working to develop alternative arrangements for the future.

## Working with others

It is important that effective joint working arrangements are in place between neighbouring forces. Armed criminals and terrorists have no respect for county boundaries. As a consequence, armed officers must be prepared to deploy flexibly in the knowledge that they can work seamlessly with officers in other forces. It is also important that any one force can call on support from surrounding forces in times of heightened threat.

The current arrangements in place with West Mercia Police mean that the standards of training, armed deployments and command of armed operations are consistent in both forces. Armed officers can deploy rapidly and effectively in both forces. However, the existing arrangements are due to end with the termination of the strategic alliance. The force must ensure that it has sufficient armed policing capabilities, ARV officers and access to specialist officers to meet the threats set out in the APSTRA. It is essential that future plans continue to adequately safeguard the public from firearms threats. The force is revising its APSTRA to make an accurate assessment of its future requirements. This includes how best to work with other forces in the region, and the counter-terrorist unit, in the future. We will monitor this carefully.

Our inspection also examined how well prepared forces are to respond to threats and risks. Armed officers in Warwickshire Police are trained in tactics that take account of the types of recent terrorist attacks. Also, Warwickshire Police has an important role in designing training exercises with other organisations that simulate these types of attack. We found that these training exercises are reviewed carefully so that learning points are identified and improvements are made for the future.

In addition to debriefing training exercises, we also found that Warwickshire Police reviews the outcome of all firearms incidents that officers attend. This helps ensure that best practice or areas for improvement are identified. Additionally, this knowledge is used to improve training and operational procedures.

It is important that, at the start of each shift, ARV officers are provided with up-to-date information that is relevant to their role. They can then have a positive effect in disrupting the activity of OCGs and other armed criminals. We found that, on most occasions, ARV officers are provided with up-to-date information enabling them to use their patrols to good effect.

# Efficiency



# Force in context

	Warwickshire spend	England and Wales spend
<b>Spend per head of population</b> 2018/19 projection	£168	£192

## Spend per head of population by category

2018/19 projection

	Warwickshire spend	England and Wales spend
<b>Visible frontline</b>	£61	£65
<b>Non-visible frontline</b>	£48	£62
<b>Frontline Support</b>	£17	£17
<b>Business support</b>	£36	£41
<b>Other</b>	£5	£8

# How efficiently does the force operate and how sustainable are its services?



## Requires improvement

### Summary

Warwickshire Police requires improvement in how it meets demand and uses resources.

Currently, the force shares many services with West Mercia Police. These include major crime investigations, business support services (including HR, finance, fleet and estates) and specialist services. It will be particularly important for Warwickshire Police to fully understand the demands on these services.

As both forces exit the alliance, there is no certainty as to how they will provide these services in the future. It is vital that adequate provision is maintained to enable them to meet demand.

Warwickshire Police is inadequate at planning for the future.

Warwickshire Police has a good understanding of the demands on its services but needs to fully anticipate future demand pressures. We are concerned that its important work to gain this understanding may be interrupted as the force's relationship with West Mercia Police changes.

Given the substantial change to its operating model, the force should consult the public about its post-alliance planning.

By 8 October 2019, when the alliance will terminate, Warwickshire Police must have plans in place to maintain the full range of public services, especially in areas of highest risk.

## Meeting current demands and using resources



### Requires improvement

Warwickshire Police requires improvement in meeting current demands and using resources.

The force has a good understanding of service demands. This is helped by its long-standing arrangement with a commercial partner. The latest adjustments to its operating model include a change in shift patterns, so that more officers are available at times of peak demand, and the introduction of IPTs. However, there are times when the force struggles to meet demand. And it has yet to find the best investigative model to meet its needs.

The imminent end of the force's strategic alliance with West Mercia Police has an impact on shared services, finances and future plans. This is a cause of concern. We are concerned that the full range of public services may be interrupted by the ending of the alliance.

The force must work quickly to gain a full understanding of the cost of services. And it needs to decide how best to operate post-alliance. By October 2019, it must have plans in place to maintain the full range of public services, especially in areas of highest risk.

The force's joint working ethos, and its substantial investment in technology over the next four years, may enable it to reap benefits in the future.

### Cause of concern

The force does not have suitable arrangements in place to make sure it can maintain the full range of public services when its alliance with West Mercia Police ends. There are gaps in its workforce skills assessment and weaknesses in its investigative approach.

### Recommendations

To address this cause of concern, we recommend that the force should immediately:

- put in place plans to maintain the full range of public services by October 2019, particularly in the areas of highest risk;
- expand the skills project work to include an assessment of all skills, not only operational, and potential future skills requirements too, using this assessment to inform workforce planning; and
- conduct a review of the capability and capacity of officers to manage their investigative workload, to better understand investigative demand and the pressures placed upon officers.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### **Assessing current demand**

Warwickshire Police has a good understanding of the demands on its services. A long-standing relationship with a commercial partner means that the force has access to an accurate, up-to-date profile of demand on which to base its operation. This has helped the force to continually refine its operating model. In April 2018, it made its latest adjustments. New features of the operating model include:

- the introduction of new shift patterns, including staggered start times, to make sure that more officers are available at times of peak demand;
- the introduction of IPTs to take pressure off 999/101 responders; and
- the realignment of the force's mobile support unit, known as the operational patrol unit, to local policing areas.

The force also has new procedures for non-urgent calls for service. The IPTs now deal with reported incidents when there is neither a realistic chance of arresting offenders nor a pressing need for officers to attend immediately. This means that response officers have more time to respond to callers who urgently need help. Also, the force assesses that the IPTs now manage 16 percent of its non-urgent response workload. This again frees response officers to be more available for emergency and priority calls.

The IPT function is well organised. It manages more than 500 incidents per month. Staff report that standards of supervision are good and that the IPTs are concluding cases promptly. A survey carried out by the force shows that most callers are satisfied with the service they receive. According to an external review of the force's policing model, officer availability is now better aligned to the demands placed on its services.

### **Understanding factors that influence demand**

Since the force last adjusted its operating model, the improvements to the service it gives to the public are becoming noticeable. But there are undoubtedly times when demand is placing a strain on the force. Sometimes, more incidents need to be completed than the force can deal with. For example, over summer 2018, the force experienced substantial increases in demand. This led to many incidents going unresourced for too long. However, this shortcoming should be considered within the context of the force receiving 79,000 emergency 999 calls and 223,000 101 calls in 2018/19.

Staff also spoke of delays in the IMU in reassigning incidents to officers for investigation, and delays in the quality assurance of cases in the IMU. Problems with the management of investigations were compounded by the force experiencing complications with the introduction of a new crime recording system. We recognise that the force has increased staffing levels, and implemented new procedures, to address this issue. At the time of our inspection, it had cleared investigation allocation backlogs. And an internal review indicated that the position was stable.

During previous inspections, we have reported that the force has been innovative in developing its investigative capacity. The force has discontinued the established practice of having specialist investigative teams. Typically, these included specialist child abuse or sexual offence investigators. Successful investigations of this nature depend on the force having constructive working relationships with social care workers and other professionals who support [vulnerable victims](#). The force's specialist investigators developed these relationships well. However, in common with other forces, reported crimes of this nature have grown rapidly in number. To increase capacity to meet this additional demand, the force is training detectives to be 'omnicompetent'. Its rationale is that omnicompetent investigators can carry more diverse workloads without being confined to a specialist area of expertise.

There were mixed views among detectives about the success of omnicompetence. Some of the workforce expressed a preference to keep specialisms, while others expressed support for multi-skilled detectives. It was clear to us that, at some police stations, officers felt overworked. We heard from officers and supervisors who were spending time off duty working remotely on laptops in an effort to manage their workload. We also found examples of officers investigating crime types for which they had not been trained. Officers were not always guaranteed access to experienced colleagues or supervisors. Their access to mentors was also limited.

The force is making efforts to fill its current investigator vacancies. The [PCC](#) has also approved an increase in detective numbers. This will be funded by an increase in council tax contributions from residents of Warwickshire.

This is good news for the force. But it needs to determine the best investigative model for its operational requirements. We understand the force's commercial partner is soon to begin analysing its investigative workload, to help inform this decision.

### **Working with others to meet demand**

We have previously reported the benefits of Warwickshire Police's strategic alliance with West Mercia Police. As a result of this arrangement, £35m of savings have been made across the alliance, because the two forces have shared many services. These savings include baseline savings on the vehicle fleet.

At the time of our inspection, the two forces shared police support services. This delivers savings in mainstream business functions such as human resources (HR) and finance. The sharing has made critical areas of business, such as homicide investigation, much stronger. This is because the forces are better placed jointly to manage surges in demands on their services. The forces also share services that are not geographically tied to a particular locality. Such services include armed policing, traffic patrols and dog support units.

However, the future of these services is now uncertain because the alliance is due to end in October 2019. This is a cause of concern, particularly given that the principles of collaboration and joint venture (including in the interests of efficiency) have become well founded in both forces.

In July 2019, we revisited Warwickshire Police to inspect its preparations for the end of the alliance. During that revisit, we were concerned that its plans may not secure all necessary services from October 2019 onwards. The executive team has considered eight possible collaboration business cases with West Mercia Police. But none will be progressed.

Warwickshire Police is in negotiation with other forces in the region for the provision of a range of collaborated services, including its firearms capabilities.

Despite force investment in transition planning, we are concerned that the full range of public services may be affected by the end of the alliance.

The future of strategic joint working arrangements is unclear. But the force does have a range of successful local joint ventures in place with other partners. For example, it works well with other organisations to support vulnerable victims. [MARACs](#) meet frequently to consider the longer-term needs of domestic abuse victims. There is good evidence of local staff supporting domestic abuse victims. Police and community support officers (PCSOs) were aware of victims in their local areas and supported them. When other vulnerable people become known, the force makes referrals to multi-agency harm hubs where a range of other organisations can consider their needs. We recognise that the force plays an important role in making these joint arrangements work effectively.

The force knows that investigations involving vulnerable people can only be successful if victims are effectively [safeguarded](#). The force has a pivotal role in co-ordinating the activity of other organisations in support of victims. It is yet to accurately assess the demand that this places on its resources. That assessment will form part of future evaluation, in conjunction with the force's external business partner.

The force has identified the location of missing people as placing a substantial demand on patrol teams. Working alongside its CSE teams, the missing persons team focuses on tackling the underlying causes of people going missing. Both teams work with partners to reduce the instances of people going missing, particularly those who go missing repeatedly. This approach helps to address the risks and vulnerabilities that missing people face.

### **Innovation and new opportunities**

The force has an established track record of investing in transformational change. Recently, the change team recruited from the technology sector, in order to improve the infrastructure on which the force's future information and communications technology (ICT) developments will depend.

The force also works with external organisations to improve its service to victims. It is expanding the principles of MARAC victim care to include other vulnerable victims and those who are at risk of harm. The force calls this 'integrated victim management'. Teams are based in three multi-agency harm hubs within the county. The hubs have a safeguarding remit. Their investigation teams are responsible for reports involving vulnerable victims, such as domestic abuse and hate crime cases.

## Investment and benefits

There is a clear link between the force's ambition, its investments and the benefits it seeks. The alliance's transformation programme has been at the core of these improvements. For several years, the force's vision to digitise the front line, modernise services and make the estate fit for the future has been central to its financial planning. For example, over the course of the current mid-term financial plan, the force has committed to public sector borrowing to upgrade its estate and modernise technology.

However, not all the alliance's change and improvement programmes are running smoothly. There have been delays in the realisation of benefits that were anticipated from ICT transformation. The forces have stopped work on the planned integration of operating systems (involving telephony, communications and records management) across Warwickshire and West Mercia. Warwickshire Police has found the infrastructure on which the new crime and intelligence database rests to be substandard. This infrastructure is being rectified as part of a capital funding allocation over the next four years. Also, there has been a change from the original plans to streamline call handling procedures and reduce overheads in the West Mercia and Warwickshire control rooms. As a result, the force will not make all the intended savings. Long-established shared call handling services will also end due to the alliance terminating.

## Prioritising different types of demand

The force decides its priorities as part of an annual planning cycle, after researching the threats and risks it faces. It produces this research in a nationally recognised format known as a strategic assessment. The risks are then subject to a secondary assessment using the [MoRiLE](#) risk matrix. This enables the force to assess threats against its available capacity and capability, in order to address them.

Using MoRiLE, the force identified its 2018/19 priorities as:

- CSE and abuse;
- [SOC](#);
- organised acquisitive crime;
- domestic abuse; and
- people being seriously injured or killed on roads.

The force's tasking meetings review its progress against its strategic priorities and assign resources to them. The force does not only hold tasking meetings at a strategic level. It also holds them in policing areas, in order to address community problems. Local staff share information effectively with external organisations, encouraged by increased awareness of problem solving across police and community safety partners. Information sharing helps to develop beat profiles, which means that officers and PCSOs can establish a better picture of emerging problems in their areas. These profiles are considered at weekly neighbourhood tasking meetings, where local staff meet with council and charity support workers to find joint solutions to support vulnerable people. We saw an example of the force working with housing authorities to support tenants who were at risk of [cuckooing](#).

## Assigning resources to demand and understanding their costs

Warwickshire Police has made steady progress in calculating the benefits of both its investments and the alterations it makes to its services. For example, it can assess how much more efficiently frontline staff can work by accessing force databases on tablets and other mobile devices. By using these devices, officers no longer have to return to fixed work stations to enter data and retrieve information. The force acknowledges difficulties with the ICT infrastructure and with poor signal strength in some rural areas. Mobile solutions will become increasingly important for the force as more applications become available on devices.

Services shared within the alliance model are predicated on a financial split of 69 percent (West Mercia) and 31 percent (Warwickshire). This division reflects a pro rata share of the total funding that is available to both forces. However, there is no accurate record of the additional costs incurred by one force as a result of supporting the other. This is for several reasons. Tracking the exact time that officers spend in the other force is difficult; the precise cost of that time and associated overheads are not known; and making these calculations has not been a priority for either force.

The decision by West Mercia Police to terminate the alliance has highlighted the importance of understanding the cost of services when forces enter into collaborative arrangements. This is something that Warwickshire Police is currently working on. Few forces are totally reliant on stand-alone services. A full understanding of the cost of services will be important to both forces as they determine how best to operate after the alliance ends. The transition team in Warwickshire Police has developed a [zero-base budget](#) model against which to benchmark its future options. But the timescales for implementing these options are dwindling.

## Workforce capabilities

Recently, the force completed a skills project to accurately assess the composition of its current workforce. The project made reference to future demand, to help inform recruitment programmes. For example, additional demands will be placed on the force's training unit. This is because an increasing amount of police training will be subject to nationally accredited standards.

Primarily, the skills work focused on current operational skills. It did not include non-operational skills or future skills requirements (operational or otherwise). A full understanding of current and future demand requires an assessment of all skills and potential future skills needs.

We looked carefully at the force's detective capacity, because other forces have found it difficult to recruit for detective roles. The force has substantial numbers of detective vacancies, particularly since increasing the budgeted size of its investigator workforce. However, it has a plan to fill these that includes using [Police Now](#) detective recruitment. Following negotiations with the [College of Policing](#), the force has compressed the detective training modules in order to accelerate the accreditation process for those who are interested in a career as a detective.

Recently, the force conducted a leadership audit, cross-referencing its internal findings with the College of Policing Leadership Charter ([\*Guiding Principles for Organisational Leadership\*](#), College of Policing, 2017). The audit has helped to inform the force's leadership development programme. It is introducing this programme for all officers and [staff](#) from superintendent and equivalent upwards. Those taking part in the programme can access coaching support and attend career development events.

Throughout 2019, the force is also carrying out a workforce behaviours assessment as part of adult safeguarding training. This will help the force to better understand the sorts of behaviours that its workforce typically presents when supporting victims, managing investigations or dealing with suspects. It will help to establish a behaviour profile of the organisation and for individual departments. This will then inform learning and development priorities for the future.

The force has made progress in implementing programmes to identify future leaders. Its new talent management scheme, linked to the MAX programme (maximising contribution and potential), will enable a more structured approach to force-wide development. This is explained later in this report.

### **More efficient ways of working**

The force has sophisticated change plans in place to make best use of technology, collaboration and more efficient ways of working.

The force invests in, and prioritises, its transformation change programme. It has established six workstreams over recent years. The workstreams focus on a hi-tech control room, which it is soon to open, as well as the design of local policing, support services, ICT architecture and mobile devices.

The change programme is, and continues to be, critical to the force's plan to achieve £6.4m of savings over the next three years. A good example is the way the force has changed its local policing design – first in line with budgetary restraints following reductions in public sector spending, and now in terms of growth as more council tax revenue becomes available.

At the time of our inspection, the programme's workstream relating to the future of its support services was almost ready for implementation. This is known as the services to policing (STP) project. It has involved analysis of 21 support services, including HR, and legal and procurement services. In total, the force has analysed 347 of its activities to reveal how processes can be improved and savings made. The proposal included consolidating the services into a single business directorate, with potential alliance savings amounting to £12m over three years.

However, the termination of the alliance will affect the proposal's implementation. Of more concern is the fact that Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police will no longer share support services.

While the work will be beneficial to future planning, the alliance termination substantially changes the benefits anticipated by this joint venture. Now, each force must promptly implement its own support service arrangements by the date on which the alliance ends, if disruption to the public and the workforce are to be avoided.

## **Working with others**

The force has committed to investing in business change. It has productive working relationships with external business consultants. The STP project identified potential savings. This is a good example of how professional expertise is helping the force to operate efficiently within financial constraints.

During the course of successive PEEL inspections, we have reported on the maturing of the alliance's transformation programme. This transformation has ranged from the early benefits of economies of scale (such as £100,000 yearly savings from standardised fleet procurement) to digitising frontline services. Prior to the announcement of the termination, the alliance was planning to implement large-scale ICT replacement programmes. These innovative programmes are now uncertain.

Despite the alliance termination, Warwickshire Police has a joint working ethos. This ethos is evident as much in the force's operational policing as in how it organises business support. At all levels, there are good examples of the force's commitment to working with local organisations to give the public better services and to protect vulnerable people. The force's preparations for the future include exploring collaborations with other forces in the region.

For example, the force's joint work with the Leamington Town Centre Partnership and a charity organisation, the Client Vital Interest Action Group, has been decisive in reducing the public's fear of crime caused by begging and rough sleeping. The force has shifted its emphasis away from enforcement to one that aims to give homeless people opportunities to rebuild their lives (for example, by giving them access to drug treatment and mental health support). According to an evaluation, levels of homelessness have lowered in the town. The force's contribution to the scheme has been nationally recognised.

## **Using technology**

As part of its alliance arrangements, the force has had ambitious, transformative plans to make best use of technology in order to modernise its services. Its vision has been to digitise frontline policing and integrate operating systems. The force's aim has been to improve the service it gives to victims of crime and others who need its help.

The ICT transformation programme has suffered setbacks. In common with other forces, Warwickshire Police has experienced problems in the implementation of the new crime and intelligence record management system. An example of this is that frontline officers are finding it hard to use a computer application that assembles prosecution case files. The force has reverted to using a legacy file-builder system to prepare for an accused person's first court appearance. The need for certain details to be entered onto the new record management system is proving to be time-consuming and inefficient.

Also, according to a recent force review, the ICT network architecture is not stable enough to support either the new operating system or other systems that the force wants to introduce.

A further complication is the termination of the alliance. For instance, both forces were due to have a new state-of-the-art command and control operating system implemented in their control rooms. Both forces must now revise their plans for this area and these plans remain uncertain.

Despite these setbacks, we recognise what the force has achieved in relation to technology improvement. For example, officers have access to force systems through mobile tablets and they also use [body-worn video](#) to help gather evidence. These will soon be replaced with next-generation devices. Also, the force's £7.7m investment in ICT over the next four years is likely to reap benefits in the future.

## Planning for the future



### Inadequate

Warwickshire Police's planning for the future is inadequate.

As it defines its new, post-alliance operating model, the force must develop an accurate understanding of future demand pressures. The force recognises this. It needs to fully understand the demands on those services it currently shares with West Mercia Police. It is of paramount and immediate importance to assure the continuation of these services beyond 8 October 2019.

There is little evidence of the force consulting the public about its post-alliance planning. Given the substantial change to its operating model, the force should ask the public for its views, including on areas of new or continued collaboration.

Financially, we expect both forces to maintain public services and economies of scale, to avoid increased costs and to keep their overheads to a minimum.

Currently, Warwickshire Police is growing its workforce. Its investment in people should bring future benefits. But it must make sure that it maintains its recruitment and training capability if it is to achieve its recruitment aims. It also needs to better understand the skills of its workforce.

### **Cause of concern**

The force has not yet defined how all of its services to the public will operate in the future, nor has it agreed a smooth transition to a future operating model. And it has not consulted with the public on these important matters.

### **Recommendations**

To address this cause of concern, we recommend that the force should immediately:

- clearly define its new operating model, ensuring all operational and support services are affordable and fit to protect the communities of Warwickshire;
- agree arrangements with West Mercia Police to secure a smooth transition to its future operating model, ensuring no disruption to public services; and
- the force should improve its arrangements both to consult with the public about business planning and to feed back on changes made to service delivery as a result of such consultation.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### **Assessing future demand for services**

The force has assessed the future demands for its services. With support from its commercial partner, the force has made statistical projections of crime trends and calculated the likely volume of calls for service in the future. These projections form part of the work of the transformation programme for both Warwickshire and West Mercia forces. The data is now being used by both forces in the redesign of their operating models. As the force rebuilds a future operating model, it is important for it to maintain its understanding of current demand, and to develop an accurate understanding of future demand pressures.

The force recognises that its understanding of future demand is incomplete. Many operational pressures are the consequence of factors that are more complex than just the number of 999/101 calls the force receives and the amount of crime that is committed. Many investigations of crime involve detailed work with other professionals (for example, children's services or domestic abuse support workers), to safeguard vulnerable people. It is difficult to quantify what these commitments will mean for the staffing levels that the force needs. But they are an essential feature of its services. The force has plans to complete its assessment of what staffing it will need post-alliance. But we have concerns that it is unlikely to be able to maintain service provision and implement these plans by October 2019. The force must do more to understand and meet future demand.

It will be particularly important for Warwickshire Police to fully understand the demands on the services that it currently shares with West Mercia Police. These principally include major crime investigations, business support services (including HR, finance, procurement, estates and fleet) and the specialist services previously mentioned in this report.

In 2012, when the forces established their alliance, they agreed to share the workloads in these areas (rather than divide them up). As both forces start the transition out of the alliance, there is no certainty as to how they will run these services in the future. It is important for both forces to understand the consequences of the separation. It is of paramount and immediate importance to assure the continued and uninterrupted provision of these services to the public. Both forces have set up transition teams to address this problem. This could be helped by better communication between the two forces.

### **Understanding public expectations**

The PCC's public engagement work helps to inform police and crime plan priorities. These priorities are explicit in force plans. A good outcome of community engagement is the force's decision to relocate an operational base to improve public access to police services.

Middle and senior managers carry out both formal and informal community engagement activity. But the force does not always record this. Therefore, it is not always clear how this activity has influenced decision making within the force.

More positively, we found a direct link between force priorities and the PCC's public consultation before setting the council tax. This has led to force investment decisions in areas such as rural policing and other frontline services. In areas where council tax contributions have led to investment in priorities, the PCC holds the force to account to make sure that it increases staffing levels.

The force has spoken to staff about post-alliance arrangements. But there was little evidence of it carrying out public consultation to inform its post-alliance planning. Such a substantial change to its operating model should be suitably informed by the public's views.

At both local and operational levels, there are good examples of officers using Twitter and Facebook to interact with the public. Social media posts have included appeals for witnesses, and invitations to join the cadets and the [citizen's academy](#). This work was also supported by the force's press and publicity unit.

The force runs awareness campaigns about issues such as wanted suspects, road safety and SOC. Local policing commanders told us that working with the public is an implicit part of community policing. This was evident in the way that they agreed locally identified priorities, put them into practice, and kept communities up to date. However, this engagement was only short to medium-term. The force should do more to engage the public in its longer-term planning.

### **Prioritising**

The force closely aligns business and financial planning. It relies on a nationally recognised model to assess threats and risks, and sets priorities in a control strategy.

The control strategy includes reference to the PCC's priorities. It features domestic abuse, the exploitation of children and acquisitive crime as primary objectives for frontline staff.

The force has a structured approach to aligning resources to its priorities. At monthly, high-level review meetings (known as tasking meetings), it considers its performance in relation to control strategy priorities. It assigns additional resources to any area of operational pressure. The force replicates these meetings in local policing areas, providing appropriate analysis. In this way, the force monitors its priorities properly and redirects resources to address operational concerns.

During tasking meetings, the force also considers locally identified priorities. Force analysts provide quarterly performance data to assist local commanders. The analytical department also predicts trends in some areas of demand and crime over forthcoming months. This enables the force to adjust its operations in readiness.

### **Future workforce**

The force is growing its workforce and has agile recruitment plans in place. The PCC has pledged to increase staffing levels in exchange for a rise in residents' council tax contributions.

The alliance has maintained its capacity to recruit and train officers and staff, even during a time of financial austerity. The force can adapt this capacity effectively. It is currently recruiting 85 constables, ten PCSOs and five members of police staff to support investigations.

The force also recruits through national initiatives. The [direct entry inspector programme](#) has attracted high numbers of applicants from diverse backgrounds. The force has used the Police Now scheme for neighbourhood policing. This scheme has also attracted substantial numbers of detective applicants. The force's plans must make sure that this recruitment and training capability is maintained, if it is to achieve its recruitment aims.

In all forces, we have looked carefully at capacity among the detective workforce. This is because there is a national shortage of detectives. In turn, this shortage affects the quality of service that forces can give to victims.

Recently, Warwickshire Police has increased its detective workforce to more than 150, to help it meet demand. However, approximately 20 percent of these positions remain vacant while it works to fill these roles. It will take the force considerable time to fully implement streamlined development, recruit direct entrants through the Police Now programme, appoint transferees and free up officers from elsewhere in the force to move into detective vacancies.

### **Finance plans**

In 2010, the government began its restraint on public sector spending. Since then, the force has established a good track record in financial planning. It has done this alongside West Mercia Police as part of the strategic alliance.

Since 2010, the alliance has made savings of £35m from the combined Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police revenue budget of approximately £300m. Warwickshire Police's current mid-term financial plan strikes a good balance between further savings and areas of investment. As previously mentioned in this report, the PCC has increased the council tax precept contribution. This is based on an increase

in contribution of £24 per Band D household. This has been an important factor in reversing the force's cuts and recruitment freezes. The force's total officer workforce strength is now scheduled to increase to record numbers compared with recent years. This news has brought a mood of optimism to the force.

In line with force priorities, the PCC has approved growth in these areas: patrol, neighbourhood policing, offender management, child exploitation teams, digital media investigators, rural crime and the CID.

Alongside this growth, the force has identified a savings requirement of £6.4m from a base budget of £98.2m. Current plans indicate that it was to secure more than £4m of these savings from efficiencies identified in the alliance's transformation programme. This means that budgets are forecast as being balanced until 2020/21. A minor drawdown on [reserves](#) is scheduled for 2019/20.

However, the scale of savings that the alliance has achieved is now overshadowed by the alliance's imminent termination, as are Warwickshire Police's future savings plans. This is a cause of concern. To date, there remains no clear business case for West Mercia's decision to end the alliance in October 2019. The forces have not explored the underlying causes constructively. And they have not done enough to settle differences and seek opportunities for co-operation. This has caused relations to deteriorate between the forces. Sections 22A and 23A of the Police Act 1996 set the framework for police collaborations. These sections place a statutory duty on chief constables and PCCs "to collaborate in the interest of efficiencies and effectiveness of their own and other police force areas" ([Statutory guidance for police collaboration](#), Home Office, 2012).

Home Office guidance states that forces should terminate a collaborative arrangement within an agreed notice period. (The notice period for Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police is agreed at 12 months, within which time they must agree an exit strategy.) The guidance sets out a presumption that the withdrawal from collaborative arrangements should be subject to negotiation.

Collaboration remains a positive option to allow forces to share resources and to continue to drive efficiency and savings. The financial challenge remains and, with the added uncertainty of the nation's economy and the continual change to policing and crime trends, the need to share resources and knowledge is even more relevant than before. With the imminent termination of the alliance, Warwickshire Police is in a difficult position. Many forces are dependent on joint working with others to provide effective services. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the force has not yet succeeded in agreeing a phased exit from alliance arrangements. Joint working has previously enabled Warwickshire Police to operate sustainably within its available budget. It has also enabled both forces to make necessary savings. But now, the end of the alliance means uncertainty for the savings plans that underpin the financial forecasts in both forces. This includes the STP project, on which a sizeable proportion of future savings was predicated.

The STP project aimed to bring support services into a single business directorate, as part of the alliance's transformation programme. The project held much promise. It had been developed by a commercial partner, and the predicted savings were evaluated by comparison against other public sector and commercial organisations.

A similar position existed for a programme to secure closer working between the control rooms in each force. Again, this has been a long-standing project. Benefits included a state-of-the-art joint operating system (scheduled to be implemented for both forces this year), as well as reduced supervisory overheads, integration with other force databases, better customer care facilities and more capacity to answer and respond to 999/101 calls.

In previous reports, we recognised the programme as good practice. It was intended to make call handling services more efficient and robust. This is an area where many forces face pressures as demand for policing services grow. However, the forces must now substantially revise the benefits of these change programmes and potentially make alternative arrangements.

Another area of contention is armed policing. Like many other forces, both Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police share [ARV](#) and specialist firearms capabilities because of the considerable costs of training, overheads and facilities such as firing ranges and armouries. The training facilities have been based in Worcester for several years, in the interests of cost savings.

Despite the impending termination of the alliance, both forces are free to renegotiate collaborative arrangements and to continue to offer services jointly. Alternatively, Warwickshire Police could find a different organisation to work with, or it could choose to provide this service in-house. The force has indicated a desire to continue to collaborate with others.

Since West Mercia Police notified Warwickshire Police that it was terminating the alliance, Warwickshire Police has mapped its future structures as a stand-alone entity. This exercise in rebuilding recognises the benefits of joint working and includes a range of other options for sharing services. Warwickshire Police has had to work rapidly and diligently to define its future options. However, there is still great uncertainty about how transition plans will improve the way that either force operates in the future.

Until the forces have detailed plans about how they will operate in the future, we cannot assess and report upon the degree to which we consider that their services will be efficient, effective and sustainable.

We will continue to scrutinise how the forces are offering services in the future. We expect them to maintain public services and economies of scale, avoid increased costs and keep overheads to a minimum. These factors are essential to making sure that both forces continue to invest optimally in frontline services.

We also expect both forces to work together as they make the transition to their new operating models. Too much of the forces' planning to define their futures has been done in isolation. This approach fosters mistrust, prevents joint solutions from being found and may be detrimental to the service the public receives.

## Leadership and workforce development

The people service's directorate is committed to developing a workforce that is fit to meet the demands of the future. Previously, both forces progressed workforce development as part of their alliance arrangement. However, this is an area where Warwickshire Police's investment in its people should bring future benefits. Progress has been made alliance-wide since we last inspected this area.

Historically, the alliance has developed the 'top 40' and 'top 140' programmes. These programmes developed [senior officers](#) and members of staff through workshops on topics such as organisational development and [unconscious bias](#).

Warwickshire Police has also introduced a personalised leadership development programme. This is modelled on the national assessment centre for senior officers and members of staff. It gives those taking part access to personality profiling techniques and coaching. It is for chief inspector, superintendent and chief superintendent ranks, and police staff equivalents.

At more junior levels, career development is less well advanced. But the force has a suitable plan in place. Line managers are using a talent management programme to assess competence at this level. This is giving greater insight. It also helps to signpost staff to development opportunities (such as secondments). And it identifies those who have leadership potential. These initiatives are new and will need time to become fully part of routine practice through 2019.

Despite these improvements, the force has yet to develop a full understanding of the skills of its workforce. It has a limited register of the current skills and competencies of police officers. But this does not extend beyond the operational training that officers need for their role (such as driving skills). Officers and staff may have other valuable skills and qualifications. The register also lacks an assessment of the skills that may be needed to meet future policing demands. This is an area the force should explore to make sure that it is making best use of the full range of talents within its workforce, and to ready itself for the future.

### Ambition to improve

We recognise the progress that the force has made in modelling its services for the future. With some certainty, the force can set out the capacity it needs to meet the demand placed on its services by the public.

These planning certainties are due to both the force's analysis of demand (which forms part of the transformation programme) and its ongoing assessments of staff workload. Also, the [chief officer](#) team has a clear vision of the future operating model. The force is committed to 'being cost effective, working with external organisations, supporting national and regional police priorities, as well as making the force a great place to work'.

Collaborations help police forces maintain the full range of services they need to operate effectively. In 2012, when the alliance began, the force had its reasons for choosing to share certain functions with West Mercia Police. Those reasons are as relevant today as they were then. The force recognises this, although the position in which the force now finds itself has not been entirely within its control. We understand

that it will use its model of future services to negotiate joint ventures with other organisations and other forces in the interests of effectiveness and efficiency.

The force's substantial investment in readying itself for a post-alliance future shows the scale of the work still required to implement effective arrangements.

We will only be able to assess whether the force's services are affordable, and fit to protect its communities, when its new operating model has been clearly defined. It is incumbent on both forces to agree arrangements for a smooth transition to their future operating models to minimise the disruption to public services. The lack of clarity in these areas, as we approach October 2019, is a cause of concern. So both forces will be subject to further scrutiny and reporting.

# Legitimacy



# Force in context


## Comparison of Warwickshire workforce ethnicity with local population

as of 31 March 2019




	Warwickshire proportion	Local population proportion
<b>Black, Asian and minority ethnic</b> as % of those with stated ethnicity	5.7%	7.3%
<b>White</b> as % of those with stated ethnicity	94.3%	92.7%
<b>Not Stated</b> as % of total	3.4%	

	Warwickshire proportion	England and Wales proportion
<b>Proportion of female officers in post</b> as of 31st March 2019	31%	30%



**Stop and search by ethnicity**  
12 months ending 31 March 2018



# How legitimately does the force treat the public and its workforce?



## Good

### Summary

The force values working with communities. It uses this engagement to make decisions at both local and strategic levels. The force works with [independent advisory groups](#) (IAGs) to build trust. These groups make sure that officers and staff are aware of equality and diversity issues. The force uses community messaging well. But few members of the workforce have had specific communications skills training.

The force has updated its policies on use of force and stop and search. It now needs to make sure that use of force training is up to date for relevant members of the workforce. We note that not all officers have access to [body-worn video](#) equipment.

The force also needs to make sure that training in the use of coercive powers, including stop and search, is up to date. And it needs to work with partners to understand the underlying causes of disparities in its use of stop and search.

The force is good at behaving ethically and lawfully. It maintains an ethical culture. It has an effective approach to tackling corruption. It should continue to promote awareness among its workforce, including supervisors, of the risks of [abuse of position for a sexual purpose](#).

The force is good at treating its workforce fairly. It needs to make sure that its assessment, development and management of officers and [staff](#) are consistent, with good supervision and performance management in all – rather than only some – areas.

## Treating the public fairly



### Requires improvement

The force needs to improve some elements of public treatment.

The force's work with communities informs its decisions about local priorities and activity, as well as some decisions at a strategic level. It works well with IAGs and communicates well with communities. But few members of the workforce have received specific communications skills training. And the force does not give frontline staff bespoke training to help them communicate effectively.

The workforce's training in both use of force and stop and search needs to be timely and up to date. Current systems do not ensure that the workforce is trained well enough in use of force. The force could also use the IAG network to scrutinise its use of force.

#### Areas for improvement

- The force should review its arrangements for training, monitoring and independently scrutinising how force is used.
- The force should ensure that all relevant officers and staff have in-date personal safety training.
- The force should review the training of effective communication techniques to best equip the workforce with the necessary skills to achieve its community engagement ambitions.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### Treating people fairly and respectfully

The force's leaders value working with communities. This work helps shape decisions, particularly about local priorities and activities. It also influences some strategic level decisions: the force's rural crime initiative resulted from such engagement.

IAGs support this work. The deputy chief constable (DCC) plans to visit IAGs during 2019. The IAGs are diverse, representative of local communities and include a new youth IAG. The force has built trust with these groups. And it is confident about sharing challenges with them. IAGs train new staff to raise awareness of equality and diversity issues.

The force works with communities in a range of ways, including visits to care homes, schools and other forums. Police and partnership events focus on the make-up of communities and how to best meet their needs. Teams run beat surgeries and work with communities that are hard to reach through ambassadors or by visiting places that people frequent.

The force uses community messaging widely. It publishes details of its neighbourhood teams to enable direct contact. The force's use of a WhatsApp group in Stratford-upon-Avon helped that community to become part of the solution to local [ASB](#) problems.

Volunteers within neighbourhood teams connect with communities through social media and help to shape local priorities in this way. The 10-week citizens' academy explains policing services to participants. Some have gone on to volunteer through the special constabulary or as members of IAGs.

Alongside an existing [NCALT](#) package, a new instructor has been giving [unconscious bias](#) training since October 2018. Uniformed officers, members of the CID and people in key roles, such as the [professional standards department](#) (PSD), have taken part in this training. Personal safety training also incorporates unconscious bias training.

Officers and staff have said that training encourages their improved awareness of [vulnerabilities](#), and that RMPs now include more references to vulnerability. Officers spoke of a change in the force's culture and language.

Few people spoke of having received any specific communications skills training. Specialist interviewing for children and vulnerable victims, and domestic abuse training, both include elements of communications skills training for investigators. And officer safety training involves de-escalation and conflict resolution techniques. But frontline staff do not receive tailored training in effective communications skills.

## Using force

Warwickshire Police has recently updated its use of force policy. Officer safety training includes use of force, proportionality and recording. It is delivered in line with the [College of Policing](#)'s syllabus. Officers and staff in frontline roles should receive training in the correct use of force once a year. The force confirms, however, that 10 percent of its officers are out of date with their safety training. And not all officers know when their training validity expires.

Line managers should risk-assess these officers at the start of every shift, to determine whether or not they should be on patrol. Currently, systems do not make sure that the workforce is sufficiently well trained in the use of force. Officers whose training is out of date are at increased risk of using techniques inappropriately or ineffectively.

According to force policy, officers must complete a use of force reporting form every time force is used. Supervisors should then audit these forms. However, the force cannot be confident that officers always complete the necessary report. And few frontline officers reported receiving any feedback from a supervisor about their use of force. Officers told us that some forms are not being completed for instances of compliant handcuffing and when multiple officers use force on one person.

Officers should also use body-worn video when they use force so that supervisors can review footage. But not all officers have access to body-worn video equipment.

An inspector dip-samples around 15 percent of body-worn video recordings of use of force. But the force does not review or dip-sample custody video footage. This would give valuable information about how officers use force. It would also be a way for the force to check that forms have been submitted.

The force scrutinises officers' use of [Taser](#) for compliance with policy. The service improvement board, chaired by the DCC, provides high-level governance, considers trends and oversees the dip-sampling process. However, this forum is strategic in nature, with a broad agenda. As a result, it relies on exception reporting by a dedicated inspector and an internal scrutiny group to alert it to risk in this area. The force is reviewing internal scrutiny and governance arrangements in preparation for the imminent end of the alliance.

The force publishes a range of data, and gives information on its website, about use of force. This includes its response to a freedom of information application about its use of Taser.

A strategic IAG member also sits on the panel of the service improvement board. But the force does not use the wider IAG network to scrutinise its use of force. Independent scrutiny is an important element of police legitimacy. This is a missed opportunity. The force also does not publish any lessons learned on its use of force.

### **Using stop and search powers**

Recently, the force updated its stop and search policy. Training is in line with national guidance. The force includes training as part of annual officer safety training sessions, which include role play through scenarios. Given that many officers' safety training is out of date, the extent and currency of stop and search training is in question.

Nevertheless, officers value their stop and search training when they receive it. It helps them to understand how to use [stop and search powers](#). Supervisors endorse all electronic stop and search records to show they are satisfied, among other details, with the sufficiency of the grounds that were recorded to justify the action. Supervisors have been trained to oversee the use of this coercive power.

We reviewed a representative sample of 217 stop and search records in order to assess the reasonableness of the recorded grounds. We found that 91 percent of those records contained reasonable grounds. Our assessment is based on the grounds recorded by the searching officer and not the grounds that existed at the time of the search.

In our [2017 legitimacy report](#), we recommended that all forces should:

- monitor and analyse comprehensive stop and search data to understand reasons for disparities;
- take action on those; and
- publish the analysis and the action by July 2018.

We found that Warwickshire Police has complied with some elements of this recommendation. The force identifies and monitors the extent to which searches

where nothing was found differ between people from different ethnicities. But it does not specifically identify if the item that was searched for was found. And it does not do this across different types of searches (including separate identification of [find rates](#) for drug possession and supply-type offences).

It is not clear that the force monitors enough data to identify the prevalence of possession-only drug searches. Also unclear is the extent to which such searches align with local or force-level priorities.

We reviewed the force's website and found a clear explanation of the factors affecting the disproportionality rate. But there is no clear mention of the analysis that the force has carried out to understand and explain reasons for disparities in different search types or different ethnicities. There is also no clear mention of any subsequent action that the force has taken.

Since June 2018, an inspector has reviewed every stop and search record, giving officers individual feedback. The force reports that this has helped improve consistency and quality. It has also helped to reduce the frequency with which officers need such feedback.

The force monitors its use of stop and search powers at quarterly strategic and tactical level meetings. The meetings feature performance data to identify trends and review outcomes. The data includes comparisons with West Mercia Police and other similar forces. Monitoring shows a reduction in the number of stop and search forms that are returned to officers. It also shows an improvement in quality. However, monitoring does not explore how the use of stop and search has affected crime levels or the community.

The force believes that unconscious bias training will help it to address ethnicity disparities in the use of stop and search. It has published an analytical report proposing reasons for the disparities. Such reasons include the use of stop and search powers to target specific criminal groups.

The stop and search database allows additional information to be recorded, so that analysts can identify searches that are conducted as part of a specific, named operation. The database can then be used to provide further insight into those operations that show high levels of disparity. IAGs welcome the contextual insight that this information brings to the data. But there is no evidence that the force is working with other partners to understand and take a long-term approach to tackling the underlying causes of such disparities. Without such work, current training and analysis will only go some way to achieving meaningful improvements in this area.

In February 2019, the force launched a youth independent advisory group. The first session focused on stop and search, including practical scenarios and role play. The four local IAGs review stop and search data (including find rates and ethnicity data). IAGs also scrutinise six stop and search incidents selected from a list that the force has given them. The IAGs consider whether the grounds were reasonable in each case.

The force publishes stop and search information on its website. It has also published a relevant freedom of information request and its related result. It invites scrutiny through the ride-along scheme to increase community understanding of police work.

## Ethical and lawful workforce behaviour



### Good

Warwickshire Police makes sure that its workforce behaves ethically and lawfully. It maintains an ethical culture, and shares and discusses ethical dilemmas with officers and staff. Force leaders act as role models and [chief officers](#) have worked hard to improve performance in this area.

The force has an effective approach towards tackling corruption, although it is reliant on the limited analysis that is available from the [anti-corruption unit](#) (ACU). All members of the workforce need to be aware of the risk of abuse of position for a sexual purpose.

#### Areas for improvement

- The force should ensure that its counter-corruption unit has enough capability and capacity to tackle corruption effectively and proactively and that it can fully monitor all of its computer systems, including mobile data, to proactively identify data breaches, protect the force's data and identify computer misuse.
- The force should continue to improve knowledge and understanding across the workforce of the abuse of position for a sexual purpose.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

#### Maintaining an ethical culture

Warwickshire Police is good at maintaining an ethical culture. The force has circulated the [Code of Ethics](#). Officers and staff have signed to confirm their understanding of the code.

The force makes appropriate use of the national decision model, of which the Code of Ethics is a core element. The alliance holds a quarterly ethics panel chaired by the West Mercia DCC, in line with national guidance. Warwickshire Police will now need to establish its own panel in preparation for the end of the alliance.

The ethics panel invites ethical dilemmas from the workforce. It discusses these dilemmas and shares some of them more widely with the force to stimulate discussion and encourage learning. When such dilemmas are shared, there is a high response rate from the workforce, and some people told us that supervisors and colleagues discuss the topics in team meetings. Learning from panel discussions is reflected in changes to working practices. One example is the training that custody staff now receive about the needs of transgender people. The ethics of stop and search also feature in annual officer safety training.

Force leaders act as role models and foster a no-blame culture. Staff commented positively on the visibility and approachability of senior leaders. Chief officers have

redoubled their efforts in this area after feedback provided through a staff survey conducted in 2018. Chief officer roadshows, blogs and other methods encourage open discussion.

The force has introduced a continuous improvement team to promote a learning culture. Recently, the force appointed an organisational learning manager. It is also setting up a 'lessons learned' board. These initiatives are in the early stages of implementation. It is, therefore, too early for us to be able to assess the results.

Often, the force shares [Independent Office for Police Conduct](#) (IOPC) national lessons learned with the appropriate force lead. Maintaining and making these activities routine will help to further promote a no-blame culture, and encourage a learning mindset, across the force.

The force is up to date with the vetting of most of its personnel and there are no backlogs. The force complies with the national Vetting Code of Practice. The number of officers and staff without the minimum security clearance for their roles is substantially lower, and therefore better, than elsewhere in England and Wales. The force has achieved the HMICFRS 2016 vetting recommendation.

However, enhanced vetting is not up to date for a very small percentage of the workforce who operate in the most specialist roles. This means that some people working in relevant departments have not been subject to enhanced vetting and the associated aftercare. The force is addressing this gap with a dedicated team allocated to aftercare arrangements, and plans to bring all officers and staff up to date by February 2020.

The force carries out vetting of its external contractors. It has also arranged for members of the IAGs to take part in appeals processes. This involvement will increase the diversity, scrutiny and transparency of the appeals process.

The force has changed its vetting systems to enable it to monitor the results of its vetting decisions, which means that it can now identify disparities. When recruitment staff identify potentially disproportionate failure rates affecting certain groups of people, the PSD reviews the relevant files. To date, all decision making has been found to be in line with the College of Policing's [authorised professional practice](#) guidance. Effective vetting helps the force to maintain the integrity of its workforce and its information.

The force clarifies and reinforces standards of behaviour through policies, training, workforce discussions and publications. It asks all officers and staff to sign an annual [integrity health check](#). The force reports that this has resulted in increases of 55 percent in business interest applications and 25 percent in reports of notifiable associations.

The force has a review process for business interests. But it does no proactive monitoring unless this is triggered by specific intelligence. Reinforcing and maintaining these standards helps the force to maintain public legitimacy and encourages the public to work with the force to tackle crime and ASB.

## Tackling corruption

Warwickshire Police has an effective approach to tackling corruption.

The force has both a current PSD strategic threat assessment and a control strategy. A people intelligence board reviews analysis and information about potential risks within the force.

Due to the current IT infrastructure, the force cannot monitor some of its IT systems. But it has approved a business case and set aside funds to enable this monitoring when infrastructure improvements allow.

The ACU has a good understanding of its auditing capability. An ACU analyst is developing a proactive approach to the analysis of ICT systems, so that the force can identify officers and staff who may pose a risk of corruption. The absence of technical solutions to monitoring means that the force is very reliant on limited ACU analytical capacity. Competing demands, such as freedom of information requests and for support to management meetings, further reduce analytical capacity. Despite these problems, the force's approach to tackling corruption helps it to uncover and deal effectively with corruption risks. This maintains the force's integrity, and public legitimacy and confidence.

The force views abuse of position for a sexual purpose as a serious corruption risk. It has an effective and comprehensive plan in place to tackle it. Activities include a 'don't cross the line' communications plan, which includes a range of internal and external materials.

The IOPC confirms that the force refers allegations promptly. Recently, the alliance hosted a 'Tackling police corruption in partnership' event. This was well attended by different agencies. The event promoted awareness of the problems caused by corruption and the importance of early reporting to tackle concerns, including the abuse of position for a sexual purpose. Delegates included adult [safeguarding](#) services, probation services, health trusts, a rape and sexual abuse support centre, Women's Aid, a drug and alcohol service, and children's services.

Supervisors receive a presentation from the PSD on warning signs and key indicators, together with a checklist. The monthly PSD bulletin covers notable cases of abuse of position for a sexual purpose. It also reinforces standards and reporting expectations.

Many of the officers and staff we spoke to showed some understanding of the risks of abuse of position for a sexual purpose. Some referred to specific examples of disciplinary action that the force has taken in recent years. But others we spoke to, including supervisors, had no knowledge or understanding of the signs. The force should continue to promote awareness of this important risk.

## Treating the workforce fairly



### Good

Warwickshire Police is good at treating its workforce fairly. But it could do more to raise confidence in the effectiveness of its grievance process.

The force has a vision of a representative workforce by 2025, and it is working to attract more black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) applicants.

The force has a clear focus on workforce health and wellbeing. It prioritises mental health along with physical health. Staff spoke positively about various initiatives that are in place.

The force is working to make sure that its assessment, development and management of individual staff and officer performance are consistent.

### Areas for improvement

- Individual performance reviews and processes for talent identification should be consistently and fairly applied across the workforce. Poor performance should be managed consistently. In this way these processes will be more valued by the workforce.
- Suitable training and support should be provided to supervisors so that they are fully equipped and confident to manage the performance and development of their staff, including effectively managing poor performance and identifying talent. The force should also create sufficient capacity for supervisors to manage performance.
- Promotion and selection processes should be made accessible and transparent to the workforce so that they are perceived to be fair.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### Improving fairness at work

Warwickshire Police is committed to identifying and improving potential unfairness at work. The workforce values this approach.

The force uses a range of formal and informal methods through which leaders can seek workforce feedback and challenge. These include in-person events; 'ask the chief' and chief officer roadshows; webchat and intranet blog events; and command team bulletins. These activities support the force's confidence strategy, which aims to improve both internal and external levels of assurance.

Leaders encourage workforce representatives and staff associations to give feedback and to challenge. Leaders also sit on boards, including the workforce management group (WMG), and the health and wellbeing board. Staff reported good involvement by local policing area command teams too.

The workforce has genuine respect for its senior leaders. Staff feel consulted by them and spoke of a culture that encourages honest feedback and challenge. The force has made improvements as a result of feedback, and these have been communicated to the workforce. The innovations board has resulted in workforce ideas being developed and implemented. One example is the opening of a response base at Stratford-upon-Avon.

A programme of work links wellbeing and demand. This programme has stimulated substantial workforce engagement, which has, in turn, resulted in many changes. As well as process and operational changes, the programme has led to access to sports and fitness and wellbeing support. Workforce feedback on this programme is broadly positive. However, the feedback from response teams is mixed, perhaps because the benefits of such changes are less apparent to them.

Our grievance file review identified that the force's grievance process is well run, with appropriate support provided to those who access it. The workforce is aware of the grievance procedure and feels confident in accessing information about it. But mixed views were expressed about its effectiveness. Some were cautious of using the procedure because of fears that they may be moved or stigmatised. The workforce gave consistent feedback that line managers deal with most workplace grievances. However, unless the force records and appropriately publicises such informal resolutions, this method does little to increase confidence and encourage reporting across the wider workforce. The force has reported a relatively low number of formal grievances in the past year.

The WMG reviews quarterly performance reports to identify fairness issues and trends from grievance processes. The WMG meeting includes representatives from staff associations, who are confident they can highlight workforce concerns.

The force's legal services department reviews legal actions to identify issues of fairness. The people intelligence board also seeks to identify individuals or teams affected by bullying, because this can have a detrimental impact on perceptions of fairness and respect. The force proactively consults the workforce to understand perceptions of fairness. In January 2019, a force survey identified that 81 percent of the workforce believe they are treated fairly. But only 67 percent of respondents reported that decisions affecting them are made in a fair way.

The WMG reviews data on workforce disparities to support the vision of a representative workforce by 2025. The force has used analysis to identify the points in the process where BAME candidates are unsuccessful during recruitment. The analysis shows that, despite representative levels of BAME applications since late 2018 (14 percent of applicants), only one candidate was successfully appointed (3.8 percent of new starters). The force has worked to address this issue through a communications campaign aimed at BAME groups. It has amended selection processes to reduce the opportunity for unconscious bias. And it has run assessment centre workshops, aimed at supporting candidates from under-represented groups.

The force supports workforce members with [protected characteristics](#) who are seeking progression. For example, it makes reasonable adjustments for applicants who have disabilities. Internal support networks give additional support to colleagues from under-represented groups.

The force has used a specialist agency for recruitment to certain staff roles (such as ICT). It has appointed candidates on the basis of their levels of understanding of diversity and inclusion. The PSD has also taken steps to understand and tackle disproportionality. For instance, it has reviewed complaint cases and made changes to HR systems to help identify causes of disparity.

### **Supporting workforce wellbeing**

Force leaders have a clear focus on workforce health and wellbeing. The force's culture encourages and enables staff to discuss and take part in wellbeing initiatives. Strategic and tactical health and wellbeing boards give focus to the health and wellbeing action plan. These boards commission wellbeing initiatives and employee support in consultation with the workforce.

The link made between demand and wellbeing is strong. A dedicated team leads on implementing demand and wellbeing initiatives. It does this in partnership with Coventry and Warwickshire councils, and other partners, during this 'year of health and wellbeing'.

The force participates in accredited programmes and frameworks, including [Blue Light](#) and [Oscar Kilo](#).

The force prioritises mental health alongside physical health. It partners with MIND, the mental health charity, to give support and resources to the workforce. There is good evidence of supervisors and leaders seeing wellbeing as part of their role. Most supervisors offer good wellbeing support.

The force uses a range of information to understand workforce wellbeing. It monitors data in strategic forums. These include the health and wellbeing board, the strategic health and safety committee, the WMG and the strategic attendance management group. Staff associations highlight wellbeing concerns. They also carry out their own consultations and share the results of them.

The force has carried out wellbeing surveys. It also uses other feedback processes, such as the peer support network, to understand wellbeing issues. The [occupational health team](#) monitors trends through its reporting data. The employee assistance programme advises managers about the use of its services. The new wellbeing champions network is attracting many volunteers. The force is training more peer supporters. Staff spoke positively of the initiatives that are in place.

Some staff, particularly in response and CID roles, report that demand prevents their involvement in wellbeing programmes. Recruitment plans aim to strengthen these teams in the future, so that capacity is created to enable them to engage in these programmes.

The force has a range of preventative measures to improve wellbeing. These include health checks and a calendar of events to raise awareness of the importance of wellbeing. Supervisors understand wellbeing and mental health. They have the tools they need to manage their teams effectively, including a stress assessment process that can be administered with team members.

The CID omniscient investigative model has broadened the pool of officers requiring psychological screening. The increased demand and wider pool of officers mean that some officers who are investigating serious sexual offences and child abuse cases have not received psychological screening. Still, the level of occupational health support and the range of preventative measures in place are adequate. This support includes medical advisors, welfare officers, the employee assistance programme and initiatives such as preventative flu vaccinations.

Demand on the occupational health unit is high. Although the waiting time for appointments has increased, in most cases the workforce receives an adequate level of service without excessive delays. The force gives wellbeing support to staff who are absent or subject to misconduct procedures. It manages welfare plans effectively, keeping them updated. Supervisors are aware of their wellbeing responsibilities towards those who are subject to misconduct procedures.

### **Managing performance and development of officers and staff**

Arrangements for the assessment, development and management of the individual performance of officers and staff are inconsistent.

The workforce considers the appraisal process to be beneficial only when seeking promotion. Many spoke of infrequent meetings with their supervisors and line managers. The force monitors PDR completion rates and publishes them on the intranet. The WMG monitors the data.

Few people are subject to poor performance procedures. The workforce spoke of inconsistencies between supervisors in their management of underperforming staff. Some sense that supervisors consciously tolerate underperformance.

We found examples of good supervision and performance management. But this was not the case in all areas. The new MAX programme and talent mapping process aim to improve both appraisal and staff development arrangements. Revised processes seek to improve both the use and value of workforce appraisal and development. However, these initiatives had not been in place long enough for us to assess their effectiveness at the time of our inspection.

Recently, the force has relaunched its [competency and values framework](#). At the time of our inspection, this was due to become part of its promotion and development process. This focus should help to make sure that officers and supervisors complete appraisals, and that officers record appropriate evidence of competency.

The talent mapping process is open to everyone. But the workforce questions whether genuine opportunities can be given to all those who are identified through the scheme. Opportunities include the mentoring scheme, support from the learning and development department, and participation in leadership programmes. The force is also assessing leadership capabilities, behaviours and business skills, starting with police staff leads and chief officers. Its assessment will also include chief inspector to chief superintendent ranks, with more of the workforce being included in due course. The aim of the assessment is to help inform succession planning in connection with talent mapping and development plans.

Staff we spoke to questioned whether talent management will offer fair access to development. They also questioned the fairness of the administration of temporary promotion and other development opportunities.

Leaders recognise that continued work and communication are needed to improve a sense of [procedural justice](#) in development and promotion matters. This work is now being led by the head of people services.

In summer 2018, the force updated its promotion process to better integrate its new approach to talent management.

# Annex A – About the data

Data in this report is from a range of sources, including:

- Home Office;
- Office for National Statistics (ONS);
- our inspection fieldwork; and
- data we collected directly from all 43 police forces in England and Wales.

When we collected data directly from police forces, we took reasonable steps to agree the design of the data collection with forces and with other interested parties such as the Home Office. We gave forces several opportunities to quality assure and validate the data they gave us, to make sure it was accurate. For instance:

- We shared the submitted data with forces, so they could review their own and other forces' data. This allowed them to analyse where data was notably different from other forces or internally inconsistent.
- We asked all forces to check the final data used in the report and correct any errors.

We set out the source of this report's data below.

## Methodology

### Data in the report

British Transport Police was outside the scope of inspection. Any aggregated totals for England and Wales exclude British Transport Police data, so will differ from those published by the Home Office.

When other forces were unable to supply data, we mention this under the relevant sections below.

### Most similar groups

We compare each force's crime rate with the average rate for forces in its most similar group (MSG). MSGs are groups of similar police forces, based on analysis of demographic, social and economic factors which relate to crime. We could not identify any forces similar to City of London Police. Every other force has its own group of up to seven other forces which it is most similar to.

An MSG's crime rate is the sum of the recorded crimes in all the group's forces divided by its total population. All of the most similar forces (including the force being compared) are included in calculating the MSG average.

[More information about MSGs can be found on our website.](#)

## **Population**

For all uses of population as a denominator in our calculations, unless otherwise noted, we use ONS mid-2018 population estimates.

## **Survey of police workforce**

We surveyed the police workforce across England and Wales, to understand their views on workloads, redeployment and how suitable their assigned tasks were. This survey was a non-statistical, voluntary sample so the results may not be representative of the workforce population. The number of responses per force varied between 0 and 920. So we treated results with caution and didn't use them to assess individual force performance. Instead, we identified themes that we could explore further during fieldwork.

## **BMG survey of public attitudes towards policing (2018)**

We commissioned BMG to survey public attitudes towards policing in 2018. Ipsos MORI conducted a similar version of the survey in 2015–2017.

The survey consisted of about 400 respondents for each of the 43 forces. Most surveys were completed online, by members of online research panels. However, a minority of the surveys (around 750) were conducted face-to-face. These face-to-face surveys were specifically targeted to groups that are traditionally under-represented on online panels. This aimed to make sure the survey respondents were as representative as possible of the total adult population of England and Wales. A small number of respondents were also surveyed online via postal invites to the survey.

Results were weighted by age, gender, ethnicity and indices of multiple deprivation to match population profiles. The sampling method used is not a statistical random sample and the sample size was small, which may be more problematic for larger force areas compared to small ones. So any results provided are only an indication of satisfaction rather than an absolute.

[The findings of this survey, and previous surveys, are available on our website.](#)

## **Review of crime files**

We reviewed police case files for these crime types:

- theft from person;
- rape (including attempts);
- stalking;
- harassment;
- common assault;
- grievous bodily harm (wounding); and
- actual bodily harm.

Our file review was designed to provide a broad overview of how well the police:

- identify vulnerability;
- conduct investigations; and
- treat victims.

We randomly selected files from crimes recorded between 1 May and 31 July 2018 and assessed them against several criteria. We reviewed 60 case files in each force, except for the Metropolitan Police Service where we reviewed 90.

For our file review, we only selected a small sample size of cases per force. So we didn't use results from as the only basis for assessing individual force performance, but alongside other evidence.

## Force in context

### 999 calls

We collected this data directly from all 43 police forces in England and Wales.

### Recorded crime and crime outcomes

We took this data from the July 2019 release of the Home Office [police recorded crime and outcomes data tables](#).

Total police-recorded crime includes all crime (except fraud) recorded by all forces in England and Wales (except BTP). Home Office publications on the overall volumes and rates of recorded crime and outcomes include British Transport Police, which is outside the scope of this HMICFRS inspection. Therefore, England and Wales rates in this report will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Police-recorded crime data should be treated with care. Recent increases may be due to forces' renewed focus on accurate crime recording since our 2014 national crime data inspection.

Other notable points to consider when interpreting outcomes data are listed below.

- Crime outcome proportions show the percentage of crimes recorded in the 12 months ending 30 September 2018 that have been assigned each outcome. This means that each crime is tracked or linked to its outcome. So this data is subject to change, as more crimes are assigned outcomes over time.
- Under the new framework, 37 police forces in England and Wales provide outcomes data through the HODH every month. All other forces provide this data via a monthly manual return.
- Leicestershire, Staffordshire and West Yorkshire forces participated in the Ministry of Justice's out of court disposals pilot. As part of the pilot, they stopped issuing simple cautions or cannabis/khat warnings and restricted their use of penalty notices for disorder for adult offenders. These three forces continued to follow these procedures since the pilot ended in November 2015. Later, other forces also limited their use of some out of court disposals. So the outcomes data should be viewed with this in mind.

For a full commentary and explanation of outcome types please see the Home Office statistics, [Crime outcomes in England and Wales: year ending March 2019](#).

### **Domestic abuse outcomes**

In England and Wales, 29 police forces provide domestic abuse outcomes data through the Home Office data hub (HODH) every month. We collected this data directly from the remaining 14 forces.

Domestic abuse outcome proportions show the percentage of crimes recorded in the 12 months ending 31 March 2018 that have been assigned each outcome. This means that each crime is tracked or linked to its outcome. So this data is subject to change, as more crimes are assigned outcomes over time.

### **Workforce figures (including ethnicity and gender)**

This data was obtained from the Home Office annual data return 502. The data is available from the Home Office's published [police workforce England and Wales statistics](#) or the [police workforce open data tables](#). The Home Office may have updated these figures since we obtained them for this report.

The data gives the full-time equivalent workforce figures as at 31 March. The figures include section 38-designated investigation, detention or escort officers, but not section 39-designated detention or escort staff. They include officers on career breaks and other types of long-term absence but exclude those seconded to other forces.

### **Spend per head of population**

We took this data from the [HMICFRS value for money profiles](#).

These profiles are based on data collected by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, through the Police Objective Analysis. The spend over time figures are adjusted for inflation. The population figures are ONS mid-year estimates, with the 2018/19 value calculated by assessing the trend for the last five years. [More details on this data can be found on our website](#).

### **Stop and search**

We took this data from the Home Office publication, [Police powers and procedures, England and Wales, year ending 31 March 2018](#). Stop and search totals exclude vehicle only searches and searches where the subject's ethnicity was not stated.

### **Vetting data (workforce without up-to-date security clearance)**

We collected this data directly from all 43 police forces in England and Wales.

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