

# PEEL

## Police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy 2018/19

An inspection of the Metropolitan Police Service



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# What this report contains

This report is structured in four parts:

1. Our overall assessment of the force's 2018/19 performance.
2. Our judgments and summaries of how effectively, efficiently and legitimately the force keeps people safe and reduces crime.
3. Our judgments and any areas for improvement and causes of concern for each component of our inspection.
4. Our detailed findings for each component.

## Our inspection approach

In 2018/19, we adopted an [integrated PEEL assessment](#) (IPA) approach to our existing PEEL (police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy) inspections. IPA combines into a single inspection the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy areas of PEEL. These areas had previously been inspected separately each year.

As well as our inspection findings, our assessment is informed by our analysis of:

- force data and management statements;
- risks to the public;
- progress since previous inspections;
- findings from our non-PEEL inspections;
- how forces tackle serious and organised crime locally and regionally; and
- our regular monitoring work.

We inspected all forces in four areas:

- protecting vulnerable people;
- firearms capability;
- planning for the future; and
- ethical and lawful workforce behaviour.

We consider the risk to the public in these areas important enough to inspect all forces every year.

We extended the risk-based approach that we used in our 2017 effectiveness inspection to the efficiency and legitimacy parts of our IPA inspections. This means that in 2018/19 we didn't inspect all forces against all areas. The table below shows the areas we inspected the Metropolitan Police Service against.

<b>IPA area</b>	<b>Inspected in 2018/19?</b>
Preventing crime and anti-social behaviour	Yes
Investigating crime	Yes
Protecting vulnerable people	Yes
Tackling serious and organised crime	Yes
Firearms capability	Yes
Meeting current demands	Yes
Planning for the future	Yes
Treating the public fairly	Yes
Ethical and lawful workforce behaviour	Yes
Treating the workforce fairly	Yes

# Force in context

	Metropolitan Police rate	England and Wales rate
<b>999 calls per 1,000 population</b> 12 months ending 31 March 2019	255	175

	Metropolitan Police rate	Most Similar Forces rate
<b>Recorded crime per 1,000 population</b> 12 months ending 30 September 2018	93	100

## Metropolitan Police workforce

	FTE in post on 31 March 2019	FTE in post on 31 March 2014	Percentage change
Police Officer	30,435	30,932	-2%
Police Community Support Officer	1,255	2,087	-40%
Police Staff	8,390	11,303	-26%

	Metropolitan Police spend	England and Wales spend
<b>Spend per head of population</b> 2018/19 projection	£297	£192

# Overall summary

	<b>Effectiveness</b>		<b>Last inspected</b>
		<b>Requires improvement</b>	
	Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour	 Good	2018/19
	Investigating crime	 Requires improvement	2018/19
	Protecting vulnerable people	 Requires improvement	2018/19
	Tackling serious and organised crime	 Outstanding	2018/19
	Armed response capability	Ungraded	2018/19
	<b>Efficiency</b>		<b>Last inspected</b>
		<b>Good</b>	
	Meeting current demands and using resources	 Good	2018/19
	Planning for the future	 Good	2018/19


	<b>Legitimacy</b>		<b>Last inspected</b>
Fair treatment of the public	 <b>Good</b>	2018/19	
Ethical and lawful workforce behaviour	 <b>Requires improvement</b>	2018/19	
Fair treatment of the workforce	 <b>Good</b>	2018/19	

## How does the force compare with similar forces?

We compare the Metropolitan Police Service's performance with the forces in its most similar group (MSG). MSGs are groups of similar police forces, based on analysis of demographic, social and economic factors. [For more information about MSGs, see our website.](#)

The Metropolitan Police Service's MSG forces are West Midlands Police, Greater Manchester Police and West Yorkshire Police. We haven't yet inspected West Yorkshire Police as part of IPA 2018/19, so use its graded judgments from our previous PEEL assessment for comparison.

**Figure 1: Pillar judgments for the Metropolitan Police Service, compared with forces in its MSG**



## HM Inspector's observations

I am satisfied with most aspects of the Metropolitan Police Service's performance in keeping people safe and reducing crime. The force's national and international functions bring with them huge pressures and intense scrutiny. It will never get everything right; but we believe the force's performance is moving in the right direction. During this inspection I found some areas of exceptional service to the public, aspects that were clearly underfunded, and some poor areas. The force needs to make some improvements, particularly in its effectiveness, to provide a consistently good service. But Londoners should acknowledge the challenges their police service faces and the progress being made.

The force is good at preventing crime and tackling [anti-social behaviour](#). It is very good at dealing with [serious and organised crime](#). But it needs to improve how it investigates less serious crime and how swiftly it brings offenders to justice. Investigations aren't always conducted by appropriately trained staff and need to be better supervised. The force has improved how it records crime since our last inspection.

The force needs to improve how it protects [vulnerable people](#). It needs to accurately assess the level of risk to all vulnerable people. I am concerned that it doesn't have enough resources in place to effectively manage all dangerous offenders.

The Metropolitan Police Service has a good understanding of current demand. It is developing sustainable financial and workforce plans. Leaders are ambitious and want to be innovative in making the organisation more efficient in the future.

The force upholds an ethical culture and promotes standards of professional behaviour well. However, it needs to improve its healthcare provision to detainees and how its use of force in detention facilities is governed. I am also concerned about the backlog in staff vetting.

Overall, I commend the Metropolitan Police Service for the progress it has made over the past year. The force is generally improving and changes it is making are working. I will continue to monitor the force's progress in areas where it still needs to improve.



**Matt Parr**

HM Inspector of Constabulary

# Effectiveness



# Force in context

	Metropolitan Police proportion	England and Wales proportion
<b>Proportion of officers in a neighbourhood or response function</b> in post on 31 March 2019	33%	40%

## Victim-based crime per 1,000 population

12 months ending 30 September 2018

	Metropolitan Police rate	Most Similar Forces rate
<b>Violence against the person</b>	23	28
<b>Sexual offences</b>	2	3
<b>Theft Offences / Robbery</b>	49	47
<b>Criminal damage and arson</b>	7	9

## Crime Outcomes

12 months ending 30 September 2018

	Metropolitan Police proportion	England and Wales proportion
Proportion of crimes where action was taken	12%	13%
Proportion of crimes where suspect was identified	36%	46%
Proportion of crimes where victim did not support police action	19%	23%

## Outcomes for crimes flagged as domestic abuse

12 months ending 31 March 2018

	Metropolitan Police proportion	England and Wales proportion
Charge/summonsed	16%	16%
Evidential difficulties: suspect identified; victim does not support	38%	49%

# How effectively does the force reduce crime and keep people safe?



## Requires improvement

### Summary

Overall, the Metropolitan Police Service could be more effective at reducing crime and keeping people safe. Performance across the areas we assessed is mixed. While the force is outstanding at tackling [serious and organised crime](#) (despite the worrying high levels of some crime types) and is good at preventing crime and tackling [anti-social behaviour](#), we remain concerned about how the force protects [vulnerable people](#), in particular how it protects children from registered sex offenders (RSOs) and generally how well the force investigates crime.

The force is good at preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour. Once its new model is fully staffed, it should provide a higher standard of crime prevention and problem solving force-wide. It works well with other organisations to tackle local problems. It uses a good range of tactics. But it needs to get better at understanding how it uses anti-social behaviour powers.

The force needs to get better at investigating crime. It should train its staff to investigate to a consistently good standard and use risk assessments reliably. It should review how it allocates investigations. This will help make sure that it gives vulnerable people the right level of response. It also needs to improve how it gathers early evidence.

The force doesn't protect vulnerable people well enough. It needs to have more sex offender managers. And it should brief local officers about medium- and low-risk sex offenders. It should use its powers more effectively to protect victims of domestic abuse. It should also collect feedback from vulnerable domestic abuse victims to improve its response.

The force's approach to tackling serious and organised crime is outstanding. It has an excellent understanding of these threats. It has enhanced this by bringing in an intelligence expert and local organised crime advisers. The force has many diversionary activities. It disrupts and investigates serious and organised crime to a high standard.

The force works well with its partners to understand and tackle serious violence. It uses good tactics and recognises that stop and search isn't the only option. Serious violence remains a significant problem, but the force is working hard to address it.

## Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour



### Good

The force is good at preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour. It has just done one of the largest structural changes ever seen in British policing. The new approach focuses on crime prevention and community engagement. It planned its changes to neighbourhood policing well, merging 32 policing boroughs into 12 [basic command units](#) (BCUs). But the changes aren't yet properly resourced. This means the high standards of crime prevention and problem solving are not in place everywhere.

The force understands the threats its communities face and understands local problems. It works with organisations in each community to tackle these. Officers understand hidden harm such as [county lines](#) much better than before. They know what warning signs to look for. The force's approach to problem solving is effective. It shares information and tactics with other organisations very well. It uses a good range of tactics to prevent crime. This includes initiatives like 'autumn nights' (which sees officers start and finish work later than usual and carry out preventative patrols, speaking to young people and businesses) and the test purchases of phones, knives and fireworks. It also does a lot of work with young people.

The force needs to get better at understanding how it uses anti-social behaviour powers. The team that deals with [gangs](#) has a good understanding of these powers, but other local teams are not as good at this. The force doesn't monitor these powers centrally. Work is ongoing, but this needs to continue.

The force has a good approach to preventing online crime, particularly hate crime. Its work with victims is excellent, especially those who speak a foreign language. The force has done some great work, with charities and with third-party reporting sites, to support victims. It is now better at evaluating and sharing good practice within the force, and with other organisations.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

## Prioritising crime prevention

The Metropolitan Police Service has an effective approach to neighbourhood policing. In January 2017, the force changed its approach to neighbourhood policing and crime prevention. It changed its structure from 32 policing boroughs, which aligned to the 32 local authorities in London, to 12 BCUs. This was one of the largest structural changes ever undertaken in British policing. The new approach puts a greater focus on crime prevention and community engagement. Each BCU now has departments for neighbourhood policing, response, [safeguarding](#) and criminal investigation (CID), and some support and leadership roles.

The model works well in areas where the BCUs are fully staffed and have good relationships with local organisations and the local authority. Full staffing is two dedicated police officers and one police community support officer (PCSO) for each ward. This provides sufficient capacity for officers to carry out effective crime prevention activities. However, the planned increase in officer numbers isn't yet complete. This means these high standards of crime prevention and problem solving are not in place everywhere. The force should make sure it completes its planned increases of officers and PCSOs.

The force has provided training to neighbourhood officers in problem solving and tackling anti-social behaviour through a two-year force-wide programme. Officers in the well-resourced BCUs are proactive in preventing crime. This includes working with hard-to-reach groups, youth projects and faith groups. Officers take individual responsibility for engagement with their communities and problem-solving activity. We noted some positive examples of high-quality problem solving and work that is bringing communities together.

## Protecting the public from crime

The force has a good understanding of the threats its communities face. It leads activity across a range of organisations – including local authorities, [independent advisory groups](#) (IAGs), faith groups and charities – to understand local threats and problems. These include anti-social behaviour, youth violence and shoplifting. There are lots of positive examples of the force working with these organisations to understand complex or hidden threats such as modern-day slavery and county lines.

Frontline officers are increasing their understanding of the signs of modern slavery and county lines activity, and schools' officers provide advice about warning signs in young people. The force has more work to do to build the confidence of officers to look for hidden harm such as female genital mutilation and forced marriage. Intelligence and performance analysts and researchers are moving back to BCUs, having been a central function for many years. The force has tested this move and seen positive results. We will assess the success of this change in a future inspection.

The force has an effective approach to problem solving. It uses the [SARA \(scanning, analysis, response, assessment\)](#) problem-solving model and an information and communications technology (ICT) system (Airspace) to manage and investigate anti-social behaviour and to store local problem-solving plans. The force works well with local authorities and shares information effectively. It is part way through the introduction of a partnership and prevention hub in each of the BCUs. Staff at the hubs

work closely with a wide range of organisations to prevent crime. They also update and manage information-sharing agreements. An example of good practice is the joint crime prevention approach with the London Fire Brigade. The force has trained firefighters in crime prevention and the fire service now provides crime prevention and health advice during 'fire safe and well visits'. This means that a wider group of people are reached than if the force were solely responsible for this.

The force uses a variety of tactics with local authorities and organisations to prevent crime. It uses 'MetTrace', giving out kits to people in neighbourhoods affected by burglaries. The kits include SmartWater property-marking equipment, crime prevention advice and signs to put up. The force uses initiatives such as 'autumn nights'. We spoke with dedicated ward officers who demonstrated their focus on dealing with the underlying causes of crime and anti-social behaviour. This includes working with youth clubs and schools to speak with young people, leafleting the communities with advice specific to the problems in that area, and carrying out test purchases of fireworks, knives and second-hand mobile phones (to see if they have previously been stolen). This is positive.

The force needs to improve its understanding of its use of anti-social behaviour powers. The [Trident](#) team has a good understanding of how effectively it uses these powers against gang members, but this isn't the case at a neighbourhood level. The force doesn't collect data centrally that would allow it to scrutinise its use of anti-social behaviour powers (such as the number and circumstances of each power used) to make sure that they are being used effectively. In November 2018, it started work to understand its use of these powers. Until the force has completed this work, it can't be sure that it uses anti-social behaviour powers effectively.

The force has an effective approach to preventing online crime, including hate crime. Its [FALCON](#) cyber protect team sends out protective messages to the public about staying safe online. The force's economic victims of crime unit – provided jointly with City of London Police – works to prevent victims of fraud and online crime being targeted by criminals again. The force also has an online hate crime hub. This reviews every hate crime report (many of which are online), builds prosecution cases, supports victims when there are language barriers and works with charities that support victims. The hub provides training to local officers and third-party reporting sites. It has strong links with the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), civil groups, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and local officers throughout the force. The force works hard to make sure it doesn't miss victims of online hate crime and that the right organisations support them.

Last year we said the force needed to routinely evaluate and share effective practice, both internally and with partner organisations. This year we found positive evidence of this happening at several levels. There are regular meetings of BCU commanders as well as regular meetings and conferences involving neighbourhood inspectors, which focus on sharing best practice of preventative tactics. In January 2017, the force and MOPAC carried out a 'pathfinder' review of its two pilot BCUs. This was to test the effectiveness of its approach to crime prevention, neighbourhood policing and response. It used this evaluation to make changes that improved neighbourhood policing and crime prevention performance in these BCUs.

## Investigating crime



### Requires improvement

The force needs to improve how it investigates crime. The recent structural changes it has made should help improve how it responds to crime. But it needs to make sure that it supports its staff and gives them suitable training so that they can investigate crime to a consistently good standard. This includes response officers, specialist investigators and [senior investigators](#). It should also continue to increase the number of its trained investigators. The force needs to make sure that all staff who are involved in investigations understand the [THRIVE+](#) risk assessment tool and use it reliably.

The force needs to review how it allocates crimes for investigation. It should make sure that crimes involving vulnerable people get the right level of response. It also needs to get better at evidence gathering during the early stages of investigations. For example, it could train more of its frontline staff to be able to extract digital forensic evidence. This would help it complete more of its investigations promptly. As the force moves away from its traditional 'handover' culture, the quality of investigations should improve.

The force is good at managing its higher-risk offenders. But it needs to get better at catching criminals and completing its investigations. It has a lot of suspects shown as wanted on the [police national computer](#) (PNC). It should make its processes more efficient so that it can locate and arrest these suspects more promptly. It has created a dashboard to help with this. It works well with other organisations to track offenders who have fled the country and in managing foreign offenders. It also manages its [bail](#) responsibilities well. The new Connect ICT system should help the force manage suspects better.

#### Areas for improvement

- The force needs to ensure staff are provided with suitable training and support to be able to risk assess incidents correctly, and to improve the quality and consistency of crime investigations.
- The force needs to review its current allocation policy to ensure that those involving vulnerability receive the appropriate response.
- The force should improve its ability to retrieve digital evidence from mobile phones, computers and other electronic devices quickly enough to ensure investigations are not delayed.
- The force should continue to seek to increase the capacity and capability of qualified detectives and senior investigating officers to improve the quality of its investigations.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

## Investigation quality

For the past three years, the force has needed to improve the quality of its crime investigations. The previous way of working relied on separate teams performing individual functions as part of the investigation process. Not enough time was available at each stage and a handover culture had developed. As a result, many different people handled each investigation. This was inefficient, could negatively affect evidential opportunities, failed to recognise the needs of the victim and could ultimately lead to a loss in public confidence.

The force recognised that it needed to change its response to crime and considered how best to manage increasing demand and complexity with fewer available staff and resources. It has recently completed implementation of the new transformation portfolio, which has brought with it a new way of working. This includes digital reporting, remote investigations that no longer require the physical deployment of an officer, as well as the structural boundary changes with 12 new BCUs. We believe these changes can improve how the force responds to crime.

The force is encouraging victims to report more crimes online. Eleven percent of all reported crime now comes via the new digital 101 online portal. However, the force hasn't trained the 101 online crime staff in how to create crime reports, and information recorded on reports often lacks detail. Many crimes still come via the traditional route into one of the three force control rooms. Staff assess incidents for complexity, threat, harm and risk. High-volume, low-risk crimes are allocated to the telephone and digital investigation unit (TDIU) to be managed remotely. This has positively assisted in managing demand for the force, because the TDIU now deals with 45 percent of all crime. But staff within both units have limited investigative training and experience. The effect of this is that victims may not be receiving an appropriate response. The force needs to train its staff to be able to assess incidents correctly and improve the quality and consistency of crime reports.

The TDIU has been able to close 80 percent of the crime reported to it without further investigation. However, we are concerned that the unit appears to be closing crimes, rather than conducting effective investigations, and is not always identifying vulnerabilities. The force needs to review its current allocation policy to ensure that those involving vulnerability receive the right response. We found that there is a poor understanding, use and recording of the THRIVE+ risk management tool across many of the units that manage investigations. We also found that those who do consider it use it more as a deployment than a risk assessment tool. The force should make sure that all staff understand and consistently apply the THRIVE+ tool because this would improve their investigative response.

The force's transformation portfolio has had a significant effect on frontline policing within the BCUs. Response officers now carry an investigative workload and retain ownership for volume and priority ([PIP 1](#)) crimes, which is something they haven't been responsible for in years. The force created investigative training packages in support of the transition. This included 'Mi-Investigation', which aimed to provide the necessary development for uniformed officers to undertake volume and priority investigations effectively with less supervision. However, the provision of Mi-Investigation training for frontline officers has so far been inconsistent. This means

that there are differences in standards of investigation between BCUs, which means the public doesn't always receive the same standard of service.

The force also temporarily allocated 60 detective sergeants to the response teams to provide suitable investigative supervision and guidance. This was a necessary step, because we found evidence of some crimes being missed by response officers (crimes that had not been recorded at the time of the initial report). The force needs to be confident that the appropriate mentoring and coaching has been conducted before it releases the detective sergeants back to their teams.

Qualified detectives manage the more complex and high-risk investigations (PIP 2). These detectives are now working from safeguarding hubs and investigation units within the BCUs, rather than in central teams. This is positive because it should assist in identifying and managing risk at a local level. However, crimes are still swapping back and forth between response and CID. Some areas are using the duty inspector as the final decision maker and we see this as good practice.

Caseloads within CID have reduced. This should mean that detectives can spend more time on investigations and provide a better service to victims. But caseloads within safeguarding units have increased – often to 20–30 investigations per officer. These are crimes involving greater risk and requiring more victim liaison. Some of these more specialist officers haven't received the required training for their role. We also discovered that this has caused significant staff welfare problems resulting in resignations in some areas. The force needs to review its crime allocation processes, because response officers are dealing with more complex crime than expected and CID appears to have a low caseload, while safeguarding has a disproportionately greater share.

Standards of investigation are inconsistent. We noted that investigations by detectives and specialist units tend to be of a higher standard than those by officers in the TDIU or in response teams. The force needs to ensure that it is not missing investigative opportunities or risk in high-volume and low-priority crime. Some BCUs have also created their own local resolution units or investigation pods. The force should reassure itself that it isn't duplicating the role performed by the TDIU. Data from our crime file review showed that 80 percent of crimes had an effective investigation. Eighty-three percent of the cases reviewed had all lines of enquiry identified and pursued. However, supervision of investigations is inconsistent. Data from our crime file review showed that 32 percent of crimes had ineffective supervision.

Demand for qualified detectives has been increasing. A detective resilience group was set up to address the identified shortage. This focused on the high turnover of staff within CID and the lack of a defined detective career pathway that could attract more officers. The force has made good progress in reducing the detective shortfall and has filled 90 percent of established posts. It allows for [direct entry](#) into CID. This has seen diversity increase with 50 percent of direct entry CID candidates being female and 38 percent from black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) backgrounds. This is positive.

However, the force still doesn't have enough qualified senior investigating officers. This leaves it with a significant gap in its capacity to manage serious and complex crimes (PIP 3) and to provide independent advice, support and review for high-profile,

complex, serious and organised or major crime investigations (PIP 4). The force needs to ensure that it reaches its required numbers within the next three to five years.

The force only completed the BCU restructuring in February 2019. This means that in some areas there has been little time for new working practices to become established. We welcome the introduction of 12 new detective superintendents with responsibility for improving performance. They should bring the culture change needed to improve the standard of investigations.

The way staff gather forensic evidence from scenes of crimes varies. There are examples of the force closing crimes early, with evidential opportunities being missed. There are 180 fewer frontline examiners than three years ago, and crime scene examiners now only attend 50 percent of the burglaries investigated. Forensic opportunities are also being limited because there are insufficient local officers trained in the use of the forensic download kiosks. This equipment extracts data from digital devices such as mobile phones. This means that evidence may be lost because victims or offenders could delete data before specialists are able to extract it. It also delays investigations, because officers must wait for the central team to complete the work. The force is also experiencing delay with exhibits submitted to the forensic laboratory for analysis, with standard submissions taking an average of 170 days to complete. Such a delay could potentially compromise prosecutions.

Although we only assessed a small sample of case files, the quality of the investigations we reviewed were generally of good quality. The file review highlighted that in most cases the investigation was effective (72 out of 90 files reviewed), with investigative lines of enquiry identified and pursued (75 out of 90 files reviewed). Victim care was good (78 out of 90 files reviewed). The service victims receive also varies. The force generally achieves a better level of service for victims of more serious crime and those assessed as vulnerable. Most crime reports we examined were compliant with the [Code of Practice for Victims of Crime](#). We found evidence of detailed police contact, but references to victims' needs and victim personal statements were often absent. There is, however, good evidence that appropriately trained staff interview victims and witnesses.

Unfortunately, the force doesn't gather data about cases where the victim doesn't support a prosecution. So, although it is concerned that the CPS doesn't seem to pursue such allegations, it doesn't have accurate information to fully assess this. Work has commenced to correct this lack of information. Local criminal justice champions seek to improve case quality in investigations where the victim doesn't want to proceed, so as to improve the likelihood of a prosecution being pursued by the CPS. There is positive evidence of the force pursuing crimes, using evidence from [body-worn video](#) and call centre transcripts, despite victims being unwilling to support a prosecution.

## Catching criminals

The Metropolitan Police Service is generally good at actively pursuing and managing its higher-risk offenders. However, it still needs to improve how it catches criminals and resolves investigations. Since our last inspection, the number of outstanding warrants has increased. The force has the highest numbers of persons wanted on the PNC, compared with all forces within England and Wales, and is above average per 1,000 population (2.1 compared with the 1.1 national average). This is poor management and fails to deal with the risk posed by named outstanding offenders.

The force is seeking to improve its performance and has created a new online dashboard to provide details of those who remain outstanding. It aims to arrest the most prolific offenders first, because these are causing the most harm. Neighbourhood teams know the outstanding subjects in their area, which is positive. The force has a small team to trace the most difficult to find offenders. But it needs to do more to actively reduce the numbers and mitigate any risk.

The force makes positive use of the available processes to refer foreign nationals to [ACRO](#). There is also a semi-automated process in the force custody suites for checking overseas criminal records. Fifty percent of the force's wanted offenders are foreign nationals. The force works well with other organisations to track offenders who have fled the country and in managing foreign offenders.

Our [2018 custody inspection](#) identified that the force manages its bail responsibilities well. However, it found that detainees [released under investigation](#) (RUI) aren't always given sufficient explanation of what this means or the implications. One problem is that the force's crime-recording and custody systems don't interface with each other. This will be remedied once the force implements its Connect ICT programme – which will unite seven databases. The force can then consider differences between bail data and RUIs. It will also help the force to focus on the timeliness of investigations, risk and vulnerability. The force has made improvements in the use of both pre-charge and post-charge bail, which suggests that it is managing the risk posed by offenders better.

During the fieldwork, we identified that some specialist units don't necessarily deal with their own cases. This is at odds with the handover culture the transformation portfolio is trying to eliminate. The violent crime task force arrests are dealt with by BCU staff, for example. But BCU officers are releasing some known violent and knife criminals under investigation or with no further action. This means that opportunities are being lost to take dangerous offenders off the streets or to monitor their activities through the correct use of the Bail Act 1976. When the task force subsequently processed their own prisoners, there was a noticeable improvement in the investigative outcome. The force must recognise these findings and ensure that it responds appropriately to deal with its high-harm offenders.

The force's investigation and performance portfolios conduct regular reviews of its performance data. Its investigative outcome data for the 12 months to September 2018 show that:

- 56 percent of investigations get completed with no suspect identified;
- 27 percent have the investigation completed and prosecution prevented;

- 12 percent result in action being taken; and
- 5 percent haven't yet been assigned an outcome.

These figures are broadly in line with the national average. The force must continue to analyse its data to help bring more offenders to justice and achieve the best possible outcomes for its victims.

The force is aware of its responsibilities towards [disclosure](#) and in the past few years it has been under intense scrutiny regarding disclosure compliance. This follows the courts dismissing two high-profile rape cases because the prosecution hadn't disclosed evidence retrieved from mobile devices to the defence. The force subsequently reviewed all active rape and sexual assault cases to ensure full disclosure. All staff have been provided with some level of disclosure training. But some response officers don't yet appear to fully understand their disclosure responsibilities. They view the requests from CPS as unrealistic in terms of volume of material to be reviewed and the deadlines set for submission. However, understanding and confidence levels should get better as response officers become used to managing their own investigations under the new model. The force plans to increase the number of disclosure champions from 170 to 500. It also has 47 Super [Disclosure officers](#) who deal with file quality issues and provide the link with CPS. The force continues to struggle with some aspects of disclosure such as high volumes and issues of complexity. It isn't alone in this and a national working group has been set up to consider disclosure issues in a digital age.

## Protecting vulnerable people



### Requires improvement

The force still has some way to go to protect vulnerable people effectively. It has a clear definition of what vulnerability means. It also has a more effective strategy than it did before. But we are very concerned about how it manages RSOs. We recognise the challenges the force faces in rising demand and a lack of resources, and we welcome the increase in the number of officers who manage sex offenders. But the force must increase this number further. It must also brief neighbourhood officers about medium- and low-risk sex offenders.

The force has worked hard to get a better understanding of vulnerability in London. It works with other organisations to do this. It is much better at overseeing how it protects vulnerable people than it was before. Officers now have a better understanding of vulnerability and hidden harm. But staff in the control room don't always spot the signs of vulnerability. Although the force has made some progress in how its staff use the risk assessment tool, this needs to be more consistent. This will help it respond better to incidents involving vulnerable people.

The force mostly responds to incidents quickly enough to keep vulnerable people safe. It plans to introduce a [mental health triage service](#) in 2019. This should help its staff respond to this area of vulnerability more effectively. The force needs to use its powers more effectively to protect victims of domestic abuse. It should also collect

feedback from vulnerable victims of domestic abuse to improve the service it offers. It needs to address both these issues if it is to protect victims of domestic abuse more effectively.

### **Causes of concern**

The Metropolitan Police Service is failing to effectively manage the risk posed by medium and low-risk registered sex offenders in line with approved practice.

### **Recommendations**

- The force takes immediate steps to increase the number of officers and staff within offender management so that they can manage medium and low-risk offenders in line with authorised professional practice.
- The force should ensure that frontline staff are aware of the registered sex offenders in their area, so that they can play a part in monitoring and managing them.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force should improve its initial assessment and response to incidents involving vulnerable people by ensuring that staff working in call handling understand and apply consistently the THRIVE+ risk assessment tool.
- The force should review its use of DVPOs, DVPNs and Clare's Law to ensure that it is making best use of these powers to safeguard victims of domestic abuse.
- The force should implement a process to get feedback from vulnerable victims of domestic abuse.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### **Understanding and identifying vulnerability**

The force has a clear definition of vulnerability. Its strategy for protecting vulnerable people is much more effective than the one it had previously. It now has a good governance structure and a head of profession, with individual leads for each strand of vulnerability. The force provides officers with detailed guidance on how to recognise vulnerability. Each BCU commander sets five vulnerability priorities based on the risks in each area. Although few of the officers and [staff](#) we spoke with could quote a definition or describe the force strategy, most had a clear understanding of vulnerability and the steps they would take to protect vulnerable people. The force should communicate its strategy and definition of vulnerability more effectively.

The force has worked hard to develop its understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability in London. It recognises that certain crimes are under-reported, such as female genital mutilation and forced marriage. It is working with MOPAC, charities and local authorities to understand this better. The force knows it has more work to do to

understand the scale of online child sexual exploitation and the viewing of indecent images of children online.

Last year we said frontline officers didn't have a good enough understanding of newer threats such as modern slavery. This year we found a much more positive picture. Frontline officers in most of the places we visited are proactive in looking for hidden harm. They had received recent training about recognising vulnerability and we could see an improvement in their understanding of hidden harm such as modern slavery and county lines.

Call handlers in the control centres (the force has three control rooms throughout London and takes calls for British Transport Police and City of London Police) don't always identify vulnerable people at first point of contact. We found instances where they missed obvious signs of vulnerability and didn't pass on the call appropriately. This is despite the force being much better equipped to identify vulnerable people than in previous years. Some 20,000 officers and staff (including call handlers) have received safeguarding awareness training since April 2017. But there is still more to do to make sure that call handlers don't miss the signs of vulnerability.

The force still has work to do to change attitudes and behaviours in how staff handle calls. Call handlers still focus on the amount of time it takes to deal with each call instead of properly assessing vulnerability and risk. Despite this, there are examples of good practice, particularly call handlers contacting the crisis assessment team for help in identifying risk relating to callers with mental health problems. Without effective use of a risk assessment model, it is more difficult for staff to prioritise risk and justify their decisions, which means they may not be giving incidents the appropriate priority and response.

The force now has safeguarding teams in each BCU that cover all aspects of safeguarding, including child sexual exploitation, mental health, safeguarding investigations and missing persons. Safeguarding teams support frontline officers and staff well when they deal with vulnerable people. The organisations the force works with (such as local authorities and charities that support vulnerable people) told us the safeguarding teams were a positive development. The force has not yet fully resourced all these teams, which means there is an inconsistent approach to safeguarding across the BCUs. The force should ensure that it resources the safeguarding teams to the agreed levels with appropriately trained staff.

## **Responding to incidents**

The force generally responds to incidents quickly enough to keep vulnerable people safe. Frontline officers understand vulnerability much better than previously, and this is leading to better outcomes for victims and vulnerable people, but there is more work to do. In some BCUs, officers complete [domestic abuse, stalking and harassment forms](#) on their handheld devices. These are quality checked by supervisors and then sent to the safeguarding team. This process and scrutiny appear to work well, but some areas are still using paper forms that create duplication (officers must input details electronically from the paper copy, with the paper copies collected the next day). This is inefficient and means that risk to victims could be missed if not all the original detail is accurately copied.

Response teams that include a mental health professional are better able to triage and respond to incidents involving mental health. In Central South BCU, there is a crisis assessment team that carries out assessments and takes people home if needed, freeing up response officers to carry out other duties. Where this is in place, the system works well. In 2019, the force introduced a mental health advice line, staffed by mental health professionals with access to bed management services. This provides mental health advice and access to medical records of patients known to the local trust. The force carried out an assessment of some of its mental health triage. It found that in 79 percent of cases that were triaged, officers didn't have to use [section 136](#) powers or have a person informally admitted to mental health facilities. When the crisis assessment team attended an incident, they avoided having to use a section 136 or convey a person to a hospital in 48 percent of cases.

The force's domestic abuse arrest rate is 34.6 percent, which is higher than the England and Wales average of 31.8 percent. However, its use of [voluntary attendance](#) – when a suspect is interviewed at a police station but is not under arrest – is almost double that of the England and Wales average. The force should make sure it understands why it uses voluntary attendance in a higher proportion of domestic abuse cases so that it doesn't put victims at risk. Officers in the safeguarding teams usually use pre-charge bail in cases of domestic abuse, to protect victims, and this is positive.

Deployment to domestic abuse incidents is mandatory. However, response officers don't have to attend all vulnerable victims, which means they could miss risk and fail to safeguard. The force understands that this is a gap and is working to understand the effect of this and how it can make improvements.

The force works with health professionals and local mental health trusts to respond to incidents involving people with mental health conditions. But the support of other organisations isn't always available. Officers can spend a long time waiting with people who have mental health conditions for assessments, or for secure facilities to be available. The Serenity integrated mentoring team, which consists of police officers and mental health professionals, has carried out detailed work to understand why some people with mental health conditions are repeat callers and 'high-intensity users'. These individuals require several organisations to work together to support them, and police spend a lot of time dealing with them. The team has also carried out work to understand how they can reduce demand in this area and this is having a positive effect on the number of high-intensity users.

### **Supporting vulnerable victims**

Neighbourhood teams are involved in the ongoing safeguarding of vulnerable victims and make referrals to other services by attending [multi-agency risk assessment conferences](#) (MARACs) where the police, local council and other organisations discuss how to support vulnerable people. When BCUs are appropriately resourced, the safeguarding of vulnerable victims is of a better standard than in those BCUs that aren't yet fully resourced.

The force should make better use of legal powers to protect victims of domestic abuse. This is still an area for improvement. The force uses a small number of [domestic violence protection orders](#) (DVPOs) compared with the number of

domestic abuse incidents it attends. Some officers don't seem to understand how to use DVPOs. The force is addressing this. In one BCU we visited, the safeguarding unit has a team that deals with all DVPOs, which has resulted in a marked increase in their use. This isn't in place across all safeguarding units.

The force contributes effectively to the [multi-agency safeguarding hubs](#) (MASHs) in each local authority area. These teams are in local authority offices where dedicated officers work alongside local authority partners. Relationships are supportive, and the work of the police MASH teams is highly regarded by the local authorities.

Officers refer all high-risk domestic abuse cases to MARACs, as well as cases that meet other criteria.<sup>1</sup> The force doesn't have quotas for referrals. SafeLives, a domestic abuse charity that provides statistics to help organisations improve their approach to domestic abuse, recommends that the number of cases the force should refer to MARAC should be 13,370. The actual number of cases discussed was 11,508. This is an increase of 389 since the previous year. The force is working with SafeLives to improve the number of referrals made.

The force doesn't routinely collect feedback from vulnerable victims of domestic abuse on their experience of the police. It has started work on a victim survey, but this isn't yet in place. The force uses satisfaction surveys from MOPAC to obtain feedback about their services. Without asking vulnerable victims of domestic abuse about the service they receive from the force, it can't reassure itself that it is offering the most appropriate services and it may miss opportunities to improve. The force should accelerate its work to produce a vulnerable victim of domestic abuse survey.

In March 2018, we published a national child protection post-inspection review. This inspection found that specific teams in the force closely manage high- and very high-risk RSOs. The force also has a new system, 'Operation Beat,' for briefing officers and staff about high- and very high-risk RSOs in their local areas to address a concern raised in a previous report about the oversight of RSOs. Briefings about each high-harm RSO are produced by teams for local officers and PCSOs to use. This is positive and local officers we spoke with were aware of high- and very high-risk RSOs in their areas. But the force doesn't yet have an effective approach to managing medium- and low-risk RSOs. It doesn't usually contact them unless an incident takes place. And it doesn't brief local officers about their presence. Failure to brief local officers regarding low- and medium-risk offenders is a missed opportunity to use frontline staff in the wider collection of intelligence on those who might pose a risk to children.

We remain particularly concerned about how the force manages RSOs. In some cases, sex offender managers are managing more than 100 offenders each (a reasonable number is around 50 RSOs per manager). This is significantly more than we found in 2016 (when the figure was between 50 and 60 offenders each). Across London, the average consistently remains at 60 offenders per offender manager. We welcome the increase in the number of officers who manage sex offenders, but the force needs to do further work to make sure that it can

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<sup>1</sup> The other criteria are that the victim has been involved in five domestic-related crimes in the last 12 months, the perpetrator has been involved in a case heard at MARAC in the last 12 months, or the officer assesses the case as needing to be referred.

effectively protect children from those who pose a risk to them. This should include increasing the number of officers and staff within offender management so that they are able to manage RSOs in line with [authorised professional practice](#) (APP). Our other recommendations are contained within the [national child protection post-inspection review report](#).

## Tackling serious and organised crime



### Outstanding

The force has an outstanding approach to tackling serious and organised crime.

It has an excellent understanding of the threats from serious and organised crime, including newer threats. The force has made this even better by bringing in an intelligence expert. This expert is helping the force link together its intelligence systems and provide good intelligence to frontline and specialist teams. The force has also introduced local organised crime advisers. These advisers provide a link between frontline officers and serious and organised crime teams.

The force shares data effectively. It works with many other organisations to tackle serious and organised crime within London and across the country. It uses partner data to produce [local profiles](#) that cover the whole of London. It understands the gaps in its intelligence and works well to address these. It uses its resources to tackle county lines gangs who are committing crime in other parts of the country.

The force has many activities that it uses to divert people away from serious and organised crime and gangs. It works with a wide range of organisations and charities to protect victims of organised crime. It disrupts and investigates serious and organised crime to a high standard. It uses frontline officers in operations and this works well. It develops highly successful tactics to disrupt organised criminals, such as by using account-freezing orders. It also works well with offenders to prevent organised criminals re-offending. The force communicates well with the public about serious and organised crime.

It has an effective method for assessing how successful it is at tackling serious and organised crime using various measures.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### Understanding threats

The force has a comprehensive understanding of serious and organised crime threats in London. Tackling serious and organised crime, county lines and modern slavery are priorities for the force, as set out in its control strategy. This strategy determines how the force will use its resources to tackle crime. It uses [MoRiLE](#) to assess intelligence from a wide range of law enforcement and public and private organisations, to inform the force strategic assessment.

The force has a detailed understanding of newer threats. Over the past year, it has focused on modern slavery and county lines. It has established a virtual-currency working group, which brings together several organisations to better understand the threat posed by organised criminals' use of virtual currencies. The force works with the National Cyber Crime Unit and other forces to understand the links between cybercrime and organised criminality. The force also has a dedicated firearms threat desk (Viper), which links all firearms intelligence and incidents together using data from other organisations, the dark web, and overt and covert operations. It uses the databases of other organisations to identify new and emerging threats, and shares this information across the force and with other interested agencies. This is good practice.

The force shares data well about serious and organised crime with many other organisations. These include [regional organised crime units](#), the National Crime Agency (NCA), other police forces, local authorities and international organisations. It uses partner data to produce local profiles of serious and organised crime that cover the whole of London. It prioritises the production and reassessment of these profiles according to threat and risk in the local areas. Serious and organised crime local profiles are produced for each BCU. The area commanders own these profiles and work closely with partners to develop and implement action plans to tackle local serious and organised crime issues.

The force gathers and uses intelligence effectively to increase its understanding of the threat posed by serious and organised crime. The current head of intelligence and covert policing is on secondment from another government agency. She has significantly enhanced the force's approach to gathering intelligence. The force has recruited an extra 60 analysts and increased their training, moving analysts back to local areas so they can focus on issues there. This has been welcomed by officers and local partners. The force can now link together data such as automatic number plate recognition, communications data and online intelligence about organised criminals much better than before. The force is using this enhanced approach to share intelligence and identify organised crime threats with other organisations.

The force understands the gaps in its intelligence and uses regular force meetings and its organised crime advisers to make sure all teams that need to be aware of the gaps are informed. It works with the NCA, forces from other countries, charities, IAGs and a range of other organisations to fill these gaps. The force sets out where it has gaps in its intelligence. Its force intelligence teams co-ordinate the work to fill these gaps, oversee the work being done, and inform [senior officers](#) of the current gaps.

The force is good at identifying new organised crime groups (OCGs). It has established organised crime advisers in each of its 12 BCUs over the past two years to provide the link between local organisations, local officers and the force teams that tackle serious and organised crime. These officers are all experienced detectives from the specialist crime command. They gather local intelligence about organised crime, produce local profiles with the force's intelligence teams and make sure that they assess identified OCGs quickly. The force told us that it had identified and [mapped](#) 41 OCGs in this way in 2018. We think this is good practice. Neighbourhood teams know what the OCGs are in their areas and how to report their activity. Officers told us they had received recent training to help them spot signs of county lines.

The force has a dedicated team that is responsible for mapping, re-scoring and archiving OCGs. The team works closely with the sensitive intelligence unit and the organised crime advisers to make sure that OCG mapping and assessment are prompt and current so that disruption activity against OCGs is taken at the first opportunity. The force also uses the gang violence matrix and the gang-related incident tracker system to make a full assessment of the threat and risk that gangs pose in London.

### **Serious and organised crime prevention**

The force has many innovative prevention programmes that aim to divert those at risk of being drawn into serious and organised crime. It identifies those who are at risk of being drawn into gangs using the gang violence matrix, which scores gang members based on offending and victimisation. Those rated 'green' are deemed suitable for diversion activity. These schemes are tailored to the lifestyle of those involved. Some receive mentoring and coaching, some help with training and others benefit from sports programmes.

The force uses the 'London gang exit' service to divert 16 to 24-year-olds away from gangs. This is funded by MOPAC and run by the Safer London foundation. It also uses 'Divert', a custody programme designed to divert 18 to 25-year olds away from criminality and organised crime using guidance and support tailored to each person and offering education, training and employment opportunities. This project started with staff and volunteers from the force. It has been so successful (with a re-offending rate of just 8 percent) that it is now Home Office funded.

The Trident team works with many youth groups including 'Premier League kicks', a group of 13 football clubs that work with children. The force also works with several organisations that focus on supporting and safeguarding exploited young people, families and victims of organised crime. These projects demonstrate very positive practice by the force, allowing people to give evidence, move away from criminal exploitation and learn new life skills.

The force uses a range of tactics to tackle organised crime. The violent crime task force is a team of officers funded by MOPAC whose job it is to tackle violence and knife crime. The force also has the long-established Trident team that tackles gun crime and gangs. These teams work closely with the violence reduction unit run by MOPAC, which tackles underlying causes of violence and gang-related crime. They use a range of tactics, such as intelligence-led operations to arrest organised criminals and people who regularly carry weapons. The teams also work well with communities and frontline officers to increase understanding about using warrants and orders to tackle gangs and organised criminals. These teams have had noticeable successes in tackling gang violence and seizing weapons.

The force has developed an effective protect and prevent response to cybercrime and fraud. The Falcon unit (the force's response to fraud and cybercrime) works with several other organisations to divert talented children away from cybercrime. The force is the pilot for an intervention panel that MASHs, local authorities, schools and the force itself can refer children to. The force also founded the economic victims of crime unit with City of London Police. This unit helps vulnerable victims of fraud and cybercrime to protect themselves against further attacks. The success of this unit has

meant that two other forces have requested that it support vulnerable victims of fraud and cybercrime in their areas, with more forces joining during 2019. This is very positive.

The force manages offenders effectively to prevent organised criminals re-offending. It uses a good range of tactics to manage organised criminals while in prison. The offender management teams work effectively with the prison intelligence units. They work together to identify activity to disrupt criminal activity and make sure that criminal networks cannot establish themselves in prison. The team also assess high-harm individuals to identify opportunities to reduce their criminal activity while in prison.

The Trident gang command offender management unit oversees a central repository of all the orders it has against organised criminals. The unit is responsible for drafting orders and monitors compliance, working with officers to arrest anyone found breaching them. The force uses [serious crime prevention orders](#) (SCPOs), violent offender orders and stand-alone anti-social behaviour orders to disrupt serious and organised criminals while in custody or on release. The force currently has 134 people with active SCPOs, of which 40 to 50 are in the community with the remainder being in custody. The force also uses enhanced prison release licences to disrupt gang violence and organised criminals. Using one team to manage all orders to disrupt serious and organised criminals is good practice.

The force communicates well with the public about serious and organised crime. It publicises successes and provides advice to communities. For example, the force has strong links with the Romanian police force and charities to provide protective advice to vulnerable communities in Romania. It uses social media effectively and MOPAC publicises successes from the violent crime task force on its social media accounts. The force uses independent advisory groups (IAGs) that scrutinise its work and pass on messages to the public. Local officers have set up email accounts with businesses to provide advice and to inform them of the tactics of OCGs in their area, such as their use of forged banknotes. Officers attend council meetings to pass on advice and information about OCGs, and visit schools to warn children of the dangers of carrying knives and getting involved in gangs.

### **Disruption and investigation**

The Metropolitan Police Service is good at managing and prioritising activity to tackle organised crime. The specialist crime command decides monthly which serious and organised crime threats to focus activity on, and holds to account the teams that carry out this activity. This group decides on fast- and slow-time tasking requests, so can start activity against organised criminals very quickly if needed. It has 18 teams of officers who focus on serious and organised crime in its specialist crime command, and four teams within its Trident unit that focus on gang crime including county lines. Other meetings about OCGs take place at a local level, with oversight monitored centrally by the force's intelligence team.

The force co-leads the London serious and organised crime partnership board with MOPAC, which includes a range of organisations such as City of London Police, housing, health and the London Fire Brigade. The board uses the serious and organised crime profile produced by the force to guide its activities along with the joint

action plan that sets out how the partnership will share intelligence and work together. Its focus is tackling county lines activity, cybercrime and protecting vulnerable victims of organised crime. This is a supportive group and we found evidence of co-ordinated work between local authorities and the force to tackle county lines and modern slavery to link the response of each organisation to organised crime.

The force has capable [lead responsible officers](#) assigned to every mapped OCG, all of whom are of at least detective inspector rank with experience in specialist crime. Senior leaders regularly hold these officers to account. They use a broad range of overt and covert tactics against OCGs and the force uses its resources to support other forces to tackle county lines gang member who live in London but commit crimes in other parts of the country. This is positive. The force has used the Modern Slavery Act legislation effectively in tackling county lines to discourage gang members' involvement. The plans we reviewed during our insight and inspection were of a high standard and covered protect, prevent and prepare activities as well as pursuing criminals.

Neighbourhood officers are involved in good activity to disrupt OCGs. Operation Eskimo, for example, involved several organisations disrupting a county lines gang: seizing weapons, drugs and property, and making several arrests. Almost all the officers we spoke with have a good understanding of the gangs that operate in their areas and can demonstrate activity to collect intelligence, carry out reassurance patrols and take an active part in planned operations. Some neighbourhood officers have a good understanding of OCGs too, but this isn't evident in all areas. Organised crime officers have increased local officers' understanding significantly, but local officers told us that, without full resources in place in the new structure, they have little time for proactive work against organised criminals.

The force uses financial investigations and asset recovery effectively to disrupt and dismantle OCGs. Each OCG that the force has assessed has an accredited financial investigator assigned to it. The force uses account-freezing orders to disrupt organised criminals. This tactic has been highly successful. The force's cybercrime team, prison intelligence and offender management units also use financial investigations. Lead responsible officers are trained to look for proceeds of crime opportunities where the force can seize financial assets from criminals. This is positive.

The force uses its mapping process to record disruptions to organised criminal groups. It assesses how effective its resources have been in disrupting organised crime so that it can learn from each operation and make improvements. The force regularly uses this information to review how it tackles organised crime through its serious crime investigation review group. The force has an academic bursary scheme that supports academic research into serious and organised crime, child sexual exploitation and cybercrime. This is good practice.

The force has devised an effective method for assessing the impact it has on serious and organised crime. This is good practice. It uses various measures such as referrals, judicial restrictions, seizure of assets and disruptions. The force also measures its prevent activities such as how much money it seizes from criminals.

This means it has a good understanding of the effect it has on serious and organised crime.

### **Tackling serious violence**

Tackling serious violence from knife and gun use in London is a priority for the force. It recognises this is a problem that cannot be solved by the police alone and has carried out detailed analysis of the causes of serious violence with other organisations. It works closely with MOPAC, community safety partnership boards and local authorities to produce plans to tackle knife and gun crime together, which are specific to the problems in each area. The force uses information-sharing agreements effectively. It is part of the 'information sharing to tackle violence' initiative with all the local health authorities in London and the London Ambulance Service, all of which share anonymous data about injuries, weapons used and locations to understand knife and gun crime better.

The force uses many tactics to prevent knife and gun crime, such as working with retailers to reduce the availability of knives and carrying out operations to recover firearms that have been stolen outside London. It also uses stop and search and weapon sweeps (searches of areas where weapons may have been dropped or hidden) to target those who habitually carry weapons. It uses intelligence to target areas most afflicted by gun and knife crime. The force recognises that stop and search is just one of many measures to help tackle knife and gun crime.

The force is working with other organisations to develop an effective response to knife and gun crime. It set up the violent crime task force (VCTF) in April 2018, with extra funding from MOPAC to target knife crime. This team works effectively with the long-established Trident team that targets gun crime and gangs. The force has a wide range of investigations taking place into knife and gun crime within its serious crime investigation teams. These teams work well together with Trident teams, Viper teams (who deal with criminal use of firearms) and the VCTF.

The force uses many tactics to divert young people away from gangs and knife and gun crime. It has several teams that work with secondary schools, community groups and many other organisations to provide training material to help teachers and those who work with children to understand the causes of serious violence. The force has committed to safeguarding those at risk of serious violence. It has invested significantly in more schools' officers. The force has also trailed a youth diversion programme in police custody, which identifies and supports children who are at risk of serious youth violence. Often the same children are victims of criminal exploitation. These are positive initiatives to keep young Londoners safe.

There has been a reduction in the number of murders in London where knives and guns were used during the previous 12 months compared with 2017/18. Although knife and gun crime remain a significant problem in London, the force and its partners are working together to tackle this. They use many diversion schemes for young people, effective information sharing and a well-resourced team that tackles knife crime. We think this joined-up approach is very positive.

## Armed policing

We have previously inspected how well forces provide armed policing. This formed part of our 2016 and 2017 effectiveness inspections. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the UK and Europe have meant that the police service maintains a focus on armed capability in England and Wales.

It is not just terrorist attacks that place operational demands on armed officers. The threat can include the activity of OCGs or armed street gangs and all other crime involving guns. The [Code of Practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons](#) makes forces responsible for implementing national standards of armed policing. The code stipulates that a [chief officer](#) be designated to oversee these standards. This requires the chief officer to set out the firearms threat in an [armed policing strategic threat and risk assessment](#) (APSTRA). The chief officer must also set out clear rationales for the number of armed officers (armed capacity) and the level to which they are trained (armed capability).

### Understanding the threat and responding to it

The Metropolitan Police Service has a good understanding of the potential harm facing the public. Its APSTRA conforms to the requirements of the code and the [College of Policing guidance](#). The APSTRA is published annually and is accompanied by a register of risks and other observations. The [designated chief officer](#) reviews the register frequently to maintain the right levels of armed capability and capacity.

Last year we identified an area where the force's APSTRA could be improved. This focused on the joint working relationship between the Metropolitan Police Service, City of London Police and British Transport Police, all of which have an important role protecting London residents, the business community and the travelling public in the capital. Although the three forces work well together, they do not share an APSTRA that would focus on the entire threat in London and potentially leave the three forces in a stronger position to address it. Although this joint assessment does not currently exist, we were told that it is in development.

All armed officers in England and Wales are trained to national standards. There are different standards for each role that armed officers perform. Most armed incidents in London are attended by officers trained to an [armed response vehicle](#) (ARV) standard. However, incidents sometimes occur that require the skills and specialist capabilities of more highly trained officers.

Because of the terrorist threat, the force has received Home Office funding as part of a programme to boost armed policing in certain parts of England and Wales. We established that the force has fulfilled its commitment to the programme by increasing the availability of ARVs.

## **Working with others**

It is important that effective joint working arrangements are in place between neighbouring forces. Armed criminals and terrorists have no respect for county boundaries. Therefore, armed officers must be prepared to deploy flexibly in the knowledge that they can work seamlessly with officers in other forces. It is also important that any one force can call on support from surrounding forces in times of heightened threat.

The force has sufficient ARV officers and specialist capabilities in line with the threats set out in the APSTRA. It also has tried and tested procedures in place to work in support of neighbouring forces on joint armed operations.

We also examined how well prepared forces are to respond to threats and risks. Armed officers in the force are trained in tactics that take account of the types of recent terrorist attacks. Also, the Metropolitan Police Service has an important role in designing training exercises with other organisations that simulate these types of attack. The force reviews these training exercises carefully so that learning points are identified and improvements made for the future.

The force regularly debriefs incidents attended by armed officers. However, it does not identify best practice and areas for improvement on every occasion. We recommend that the force reviews operational debriefing procedures. This will help ensure that opportunities to improve are not overlooked.

Most importantly, we recognise how the Metropolitan Police Service has responded to recent terrorist attacks. Armed officers have acted professionally and selflessly to protect individuals from those intent on committing atrocities.

# Efficiency



# Force in context

	Metropolitan Police spend	England and Wales spend
<b>Spend per head of population</b> 2018/19 projection	£297	£192

## Spend per head of population by category

2018/19 projection

	Metropolitan Police spend	England and Wales spend
<b>Visible frontline</b>	£95	£65
<b>Non-visible frontline</b>	£87	£62
<b>Frontline Support</b>	£30	£17
<b>Business support</b>	£73	£41
<b>Other</b>	£13	£8

# How efficiently does the force operate and how sustainable are its services?



**Good**

## Summary

The Metropolitan Police Service is good at meeting current demand and using resources. It works closely with other organisations to understand demand. Its restructure will help it manage increasing demand with reducing resources. It needs to oversee the skills and capabilities of its workforce centrally. It is focusing on new digital ways of working to assist in managing its demand. There are some excellent examples of innovation and working with others.

The force has an effective approach to planning for the future. It has done a lot of work to understand current and future demand. It has linked its planning with other functions such as human resources (HR) and finance. Its plans are ambitious but achievable. The force works well with its partners. It understands what the public wants and uses this feedback to change the services it provides. It sets and manages its budgets well. But it faces a funding gap for the financial year 2022/23.

## Meeting current demands and using resources



**Good**

The force is good at meeting current demands and using resources. It has just done one of the largest structural changes ever seen in British policing. The restructure was necessary for it to provide a good policing service to the public despite increasing demand and reducing resources. But this needs time to take effect. The force also needs to make some cultural changes to the way its workforce does things. It has invested in programmes and technology to support these changes.

The force based its changes on an assessment of current and expected demand for its services. It has tried to match its resources to that demand to provide a balanced policing service across the force. It works closely with other organisations to understand demand, including hidden demand. It also looks at the factors that affect demand and ways to reduce any that are unnecessary.

The force is focusing on new digital ways of working to assist in managing its demand. A new interactive response system (IVR) within the control rooms has reduced demand by 30–35 percent. Online reporting tools and the new TDIU have also significantly reduced demand on frontline officers.

There are some excellent examples of innovation and working with others. This helps the force and its partners manage demand together. The force also works with business consultants, other forces, industry and academia. Operation Venice is the response to moped-enabled crime. It shows how the force works well with others to develop new concepts.

The force has assessed the skills and capabilities of its workforce, including its leaders. But it doesn't hold this information centrally on a single database. It should review the information it holds using a centralised database, to make sure it fully understands it. This will give the force more confidence in its ability to meet current and future demand.

### Areas for improvement

- The force should review the workforce skills and capabilities information that it already has, including for its leaders, to assure itself that its understanding is as comprehensive as it can be. It should ensure that it has central governance with a central database. This will enable the force to be confident in its ability to be efficient in meeting current and likely future demand.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### Assessing current demand

The Metropolitan Police Service has assessed demand, and expected future demand, across all police operations. It describes its [force management statement](#) as being a catalyst for considering how it responds to demand. The integrated design delivery team looks at how the organisation can work better to ensure quality of service to the public. The new strategic insight unit reviews the changing patterns of demand. In doing its analysis, the force has reviewed all internal processes, consulted with partners and external organisations, and looked at good practice from other forces both within the UK and abroad.

The force has used an external company to assess how to match its available resources to current and expected demand. This includes how it will manage the increase in the amount and complexity of demand with a reducing workforce. The force does an annual strategic assessment using the [MoRiLE](#) risk assessment system. This assesses demand in terms of risk, harm and threat. All this analysis provides the basis for the force's strategy designs. This includes the force control strategy and crime assessment policy, which prioritise according to harm, threat and risk, and available resource. The force performance board reviews and approves the control strategy every six months.

The force works closely with the public, partners and other interested parties to understand hidden demand. Community safety leaders are very involved in this work. The force is taking the lead in some areas of [vulnerability](#) and [safeguarding](#). This includes female genital mutilation, human trafficking, child sexual exploitation, and [serious and organised crime](#) involving [county lines](#). Analysis of hidden demand and data at [BCU](#) level is provided to the safeguarding board aided by a newly developed 'Met performance dashboard'.

### **Understanding factors that influence demand**

The force works with MOPAC to consider external factors that affect demand. The force has invested in a new strategic insight unit to help it understand external demand and the implications across the organisation. It is looking at the wider external factors that affect both volume and complexity. These include a growing population, demographic changes, changing crime patterns and the effect of Brexit. From this, the force can map the data to ward level.

The transformation portfolio has reviewed local policing to identify areas that can be more efficient. This has reduced demand in several ways. Its suggestions include:

- encouraging the public to report crimes online via the digital 101 facilities;
- deploying an officer only when necessary; and
- creating a TDIU to manage more investigations remotely.

Eleven percent of crimes are now reported online and the TDIU deals with 45 percent of all reported crime. This has reduced demand for response officers. The force reports having significantly fewer deployments as the result of these initiatives.

The force is focusing on streamlining internal processes because these cause unnecessary bureaucracy and waste. It has reviewed all policies and removed areas of duplication, as well as documents and practices that are no longer relevant. The force has recently moved from 32 boroughs to a new 12-BCU structure. This has given BCU commanders larger areas of responsibility. Some councils have had concerns about this. But the force continues to work with its partners to improve efficiency and understand each other's demand.

The continuous improvement team has run several 'day in the life' exercises to understand workloads. The force has implemented the BCU transformation in three waves. The first wave included feedback meetings with BCU staff. These allowed the force to understand what worked well, what didn't and what needed to be changed in the next wave. These pilot areas experienced some significant challenges, especially in relation to response times. The force reacted quickly by introducing a solution and ensured that it made improvements in the remaining phases of change. The force is also taking some action to reduce demand with changes to its crime screening policy. It no longer investigates low-value crime when there is no suspect identified.

## **Working with others to meet demand**

The force recognises that it cannot manage demand on its own. It has committed to joint working and has effective arrangements to manage demand efficiently across organisations. Mental health is a considerable demand to all emergency services. The new force model emphasises partnership, interventions and prevention work. Each command unit has a mental health team. The Serenity integrated mentoring project works with mental health teams across London to support people in crisis. Initiatives with dedicated hospital liaison officers are seen as positive. BCU officers also work with mental health nurses, the marine support unit and SO15 (counter terrorism command) on suicide prevention with vulnerable individuals.

The force has secured transformation funding to explore the benefits of sharing control rooms with the ambulance service and fire service, to triage calls and provide a joint response. Pilot projects with the fire service in dealing with people who have collapsed behind closed doors, and providing joint crime prevention advice, are examples of good joint working.

## **Innovation and new opportunities**

One of the force's priorities over the next seven years is to 'learn from experience, from others and constantly strive to improve'. It has engaged a range of business consultants to provide expertise to support the Met Direction strategy. A recent exercise, co-ordinated by the force and supported by KPMG, University College London and Deloitte, looked at '5 days to change the Met'. This engaged public, private and academic partners over five days of planning for the future, design work, prototyping and engagement.

The Metropolitan Police Service has worked with West Midlands Police on artificial intelligence, Hampshire Constabulary on non-crime domestic reporting, and Police Scotland and the Police Service of Northern Ireland on the change portfolio. It is also talking to the New York Police Department to establish a formal mentoring, problem-solving and exchange programme. The force also has funding to create an academic partnership with the Toronto Police Service to look at how they use data and visually present it for frontline delivery.

The force has worked with several business schools and academia in areas such as recruitment techniques and HR policy. The street doctor scheme with the University of Kingston is an example of innovative working. Here, medical students talk with other undergraduates and the public about knife crime.

The MetTrace scheme in response to residential burglaries (discussed earlier) has been a success for the force. The force has calculated that the scheme has saved £3.2m in police costs and £36m in costs to society. It has secured funding for a new MetTrace contract and the project will be extended.

We were pleased to see that the force looks externally for new talent. It has brought people in through the [Police Now](#) and [direct entry](#) schemes, including detectives and [senior officers](#) from other forces. Another example of innovation is the secondment of the current head of intelligence and covert policing from another government agency. This person comes from a background in counter-terrorism, intelligence and

security-related issues. The secondment is an opportunity for the force to enhance its approach to intelligence gathering.

Operation Venice is a good example of innovation. This initiative is the force's approach to moped-enabled crime. In 2017, there was a substantial increase in the use of stolen two-wheel vehicles to commit crime. The force considered options such as pursuit tactics, intelligence opportunities, crime flagging, the investigative response and continuity of evidence. Operation Venice provides pragmatic and realistic crime prevention advice and various tactical response options.

The force worked with industry to design motorcycles to assist in the pursuit of scooters in a city environment. It was the first force to use the prototype that had been developed. Remote-controlled stingers increase the safety of officers and are more effective for stopping scooters committing further offences. [Body-worn video](#) footage is also used in active pursuits. The force trained specialist teams in their legal powers and available tactical options. These include the development of 'forensic tagging' using a unique spray that helps to identify the suspects and scooters involved. A further 15 forces now use this tactic nationally and it is considered good practice.

### **Investment and benefits**

The first phase of the transformation portfolio aimed to save £700m without reducing operational effectiveness. It met these savings mainly through budget scrutiny. The focus is now on changing the way the force operates along with targeted reductions in back office functions. To support the programme, the force is planning to invest £1.58 billion from 2018/19 to 2022/23. It will fund £380m of this from selling parts of its estate. It will invest:

- £800m in bringing the remaining buildings up to date;
- £130m in its fleet to reduce emissions; and
- £520m in ICT infrastructure, including body-worn video and mobile technology for all officers and [staff](#).

The force is aware of the savings that are still required and understands that it must plan for 2022/23, when it will face a budget gap of £167m.

The transformation portfolio aims to reduce the demand to the front line and ensure that officers have a fair workload. The digital policing strategy has helped demand management. The force has also invested in a 'public access and first contact' portfolio. On 15 August 2018, it introduced its automated IVR system to filter calls. It anticipated that the system would divert 10–15 percent of all calls to the control room. It has reduced demand by 30–35 percent.

Before introducing IVR, a high number of calls weren't answered within target times and too many were abandoned. Comparing July 2018 with September 2018:

- the number of 999 calls answered within the target time increased from 56 percent to 78 percent;
- the number of 101 calls answered within the target time increased from 7 percent to 61 percent; and
- the number of abandoned 101 calls reduced from 57 percent to 23 percent.

We believe that this is only part of the benefit that the force could realise. If the force can encourage staff within the call centres to manage risk and close incidents at the earliest opportunity, this would further reduce demand to frontline staff and improve public satisfaction.

### **Prioritising different types of demand**

The transformation portfolio is the force's largest ever structural change. As part of this, the force analysed BCU demand in detail. It reports that the new model hasn't cut costs but is sustainable. The focus is on strengthening local policing and providing a more visible neighbourhood presence. The command of response, neighbourhood, investigation and safeguarding has all returned to a local level. There is an increase of about 1,700 officer posts dedicated to tackling local priorities and [anti-social behaviour](#). The force has reduced management costs, including staffing, estate and fleet, to maximise the availability of frontline staff. Smarter working also supports the aim for greater public visibility, with the roll-out of over 30,000 tablets and mobile digital devices.

The force completed the BCU restructuring in February 2019. This means that in some areas there has been little time for the new working practices to become established.

Prioritising demand and deploying resources daily is done centrally by a team referred to as 'MetGrip'. There are three daily 'pacesetter' meetings on each BCU to deal with any identified risk, threat, intelligence or demand that can't be managed locally. The MetGrip chief inspector scans the force for real-time incidents, or any risk or threat, and decides whether to deploy additional resources. This gives the force the ability to move its assets about where needed.

### **Assigning resources to demand and understanding their costs**

The force has a corporate tasking process to ensure that it assigns resources according to threat and risk. This is a monthly cycle, working to the control strategy and corporate priorities. A direct example of how this works is the creation of the violent crime task force. The force established this (with MOPAC support) in response to the increase in demand around homicides and knife crime.

The force has actively monitored and evaluated benefits from each stage of the transformation implementation. Savings made from centralising and outsourcing HR services has resulted in increased levels of responsibility for line managers. We recognise that this has also increased the training needs of supervisors and required changes to be made to HR systems, all of which incur costs.

## Workforce capabilities

The force doesn't have a single skills and capability database at present: it holds this data in a variety of places. However, it has conducted a skills audit to understand any skills gaps and is using this to inform its recruitment and training. Each BCU has its own comprehensive skills profiles, which are used to assist planning at local resource planning meetings. So, while each BCU commander knows their workforce's skills, gaps and future requirements, there is no force-wide oversight. The force relies on the fact that its complete workforce has the necessary skills.

The new model has caused some initial problems because response teams don't have the skills and experience to meet current demand. Response officers haven't managed investigations for many years and need training. Student officers, who start on response teams, can't drive police vehicles because they aren't ready for independent patrol. Such issues affect the provision of policing services. The shortage of staff has made this situation worse.

The force has recognised an urgent need to improve the skills of supervisors to oversee investigations and has created training for all staff. It has identified six skill areas for which it is developing learning packages under its new 'Learning training' programme.

The force also has a shortage of qualified detectives and other investigators to meet the increasing demand. It has made good progress in reducing the shortfall and has filled 90 percent of established posts. It is taking an innovative approach to recruiting new detectives via a direct entry scheme. We will watch with interest as this develops. There is a significant investigative capacity gap with qualified [PIP 3 senior investigative officers](#) and PIP 4 strategic investigators. The force recognises the need to improve PIP accreditation and maintain [continuing professional development](#). It is hoping to achieve the required numbers over the next three years.

## More efficient ways of working

The final stage of the force's implementation of its new model occurred a month before our inspection. The changes had not yet fully embedded and it was too early for the force to have seen the benefits. But it is moving in the right direction and making progress. Its strategies are good and should be effective.

Progress would be faster if the force could make the required cultural changes. Within call handling, for example, the objective historically has been to deal with as many calls as possible within the designated timescales. This has now changed. The new objective is to provide a quality service and to resolve an incident at the earliest opportunity. However, this has yet to become standard operational practice. Staff still appear to focus on dealing with the call as quickly as possible. We identified the need for further development in many calls we reviewed. Staff were missing vulnerability and risk at first contact, were neglecting intelligence opportunities and were focusing on passing the call on with limited development. The managers we met recognised that contact centre staff are still not confident in managing risk and continue to err on the side of caution. They often consider worst case scenario, rather than likelihood of outcome. Supervisors aren't challenging the use, or lack of use,

of [THRIVE+](#). Nor are they challenging the lack of questioning by call handlers. However, there are plans to address the problems identified.

This is an example of the need to change the culture of the organisation, alongside the structural changes the force has implemented. The force knows that this is much harder to achieve but that the results could be significant, and it will take time to achieve.

### **Working with others**

The force works with several other organisations to learn and share best practice both nationally and internationally. The London collaboration blue light programme is a joint initiative between the Metropolitan Police Service, London Ambulance Service and London Fire Brigade. It is exploring opportunities to work together. This includes sharing buildings, control rooms and creating joint response units. There are pilot projects with the fire service, such as dealing with people who have collapsed behind closed doors and providing joint crime prevention advice. Such initiatives will assist the force in managing its demand.

The force has also worked with industry to tackle certain crime types. The car industry's new keyless access systems have led to an increase in vehicle crime. The force has recognised the need to work with manufacturers more closely to influence this development and improve security. We recognise the benefits the force is seeking to achieve in preventing vehicle crime.

The force's successful Operation Venice took a wide-ranging approach when designing its response to moped-enabled crime working closely with MOPAC, community safety partnerships, fleet management, forensic services and industry. It considered various options in its tactical response and its solution also provided realistic crime prevention advice. 'Be Safe', 'Lock, Chain, Cover' and 'Look Up Look Out' involve mobile phone providers, delivery companies, the motorcycle industry and local authorities. A well-developed marketing campaign supported the operation, with advertisements on buses and screens at petrol stations. The operation has been successful in reducing moped-enabled crime and changing manufacturing standards in the moped industry. The force has shared learning with other forces within the UK and internationally, including Europol.

### **Using technology**

ICT within policing tends to fall short of that in the private sector. The Metropolitan Police Service is trying to improve the service it provides by investing in technology. Its 'public access and first contact' programme – with the IVR system, digital 101 reporting and TDIU – shows how the force is using technological advances to successfully manage and reduce its demand. The force is addressing the fact that it has numerous systems that don't talk to each other. The new 'Connect' programme will integrate seven ICT systems. This is the force's most ambitious ICT project to date and has been several years in design. There is a two-year implementation plan, but the force recognises that it will take longer for it to be fully functioning.

The force's investment in technology to fight crime and increase productivity has had varied success. The provision of forensic download kiosks to assist in the extraction of information from media devices should help investigations. Data from mobile phones,

in particular, is something that is becoming more relevant. However, the force hasn't been able to train enough officers to operate the equipment, so has not yet achieved the benefits of this new technology. Body-worn video technology is highly valued by officers and has shown real successes in fighting crime and increasing productivity. The devices are easy to use and have directly increased confidence to undertake stop and search.

The force's spending on mobile technology has also had mixed results. The force has provided its frontline officers with tablet devices to support them in mobile working. When officers encountered problems with their use, they reverted to less-efficient paper forms for some activities, such as stop and search and obtaining witness testimony. Laptops have been instrumental in making the workforce progressively more agile. Staff also report increased levels of satisfaction in the ability to do their job. The use of laptops for witness statements is variable, as is the completion of crime reports. There has been increased use of [PNC](#) checks, which can provide better outcomes to cases. This is because officers can themselves complete relevant checks on victims, witnesses and suspects, and print the required documents for case files. However, the force has not yet trained enough officers within specialist departments to use the PNC and the National Strategy for Police Information Systems, which is affecting productivity.

## Planning for the future



### Good

The force has an effective approach to planning for the future. It has done a lot of work to understand current and future demand. It has linked its planning with other functions such as HR, learning and development, finance and the transformation portfolio. It is trying to reduce unnecessary demand. But it needs to review how the structural changes and changes in demand are affecting its frontline officers.

The force works well with its partners. It engages with the public in a variety of ways so that it understands what the public wants. It uses this feedback to change the services it provides, such as how people can contact the police. It uses technology such as body-worn video and mobile devices to enhance its services. It also considers the potential effect of changing technology when making its plans. The force looks externally for new talent, which is good.

The force sets and manages its budgets well. It has achieved substantial savings since 2012. But it can't keep its current number of officers beyond 2022/23 without additional funding, at which point it will face a further budget gap. It has a good capital spending programme to support its changes and plans.

The force would benefit from having a single database for skills and capability. It doesn't have any formal succession planning in place, but it has invested in a comprehensive leadership development programme for all its 10,000 leaders and managers, known as 'Leading for London' to improve its organisational culture and support its supervisors to lead better. The force's plans are ambitious but achievable.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### **Assessing future demand for services**

The Metropolitan Police Service tries hard to understand and predict demand. It mainly does this through the transformation portfolio. The programme covers 12 major pieces of work, each of which includes an assessment of future demand. This is based on current demand projected forward, with an element of judgment for emerging issues when these are harder to quantify or predict. It used external consultants and feedback from the public to model its future demand. This work shaped the new local policing model of 12 BCUs, and how the public contacts the police.

The force needs to understand better the demand on its response officers. Recent changes mean that these officers now investigate crime. This new demand can be significant, especially because many response officers and supervisors don't have experience of carrying out or supervising investigations. The force recognises there is more to do to make these changes effective.

The force has positive relationships with its main partners (other emergency and public services in London). It is working with the fire and ambulance services on a joint bid to the police reform and transformation board to improve the co-ordination of emergency services across the capital. It also works closely with mental health services, local authorities, schools, marine services, probation and various charities to support victims and better co-ordinate criminal justice services. This is positive.

The force is trying to reduce unnecessary demand caused by complicated processes and bureaucracy. It does this through the consultation processes within the transformation portfolio as well as through events such as '5 days to change the Met' and the development of digital capability. The force has invested in body-worn video technology (which has reduced complaints), digital photography for evidential purposes and mobile technology (which creates efficiencies through more flexible working and reduced reliance on being in police buildings).

### **Understanding public expectations**

The force engages well with the public in a variety of ways. Formal consultation is through regular MOPAC satisfaction surveys. The force developed its Met Direction strategy using the banner of 'What matters to Londoners?' and this strapline is well understood in the force. Falling satisfaction levels for burglary victims, for instance, recently led to the force assigning more detectives to that area of work. Senior leaders engage with the Greater London Authority, MPs and community groups. The force uses central and local IAGs to understand what people want, such as more neighbourhood teams and schools' officers.

The force considers the potential effect of changing technology when planning. For example, it asked the public how it wanted to contact the police and built its plans around this feedback. Its plans include voice response, online forms, telephone, digital investigation and physical response when appropriate. The force has provided body-worn video cameras to 20,000 officers. Officers now use this technology in over 90 percent of stop and search encounters.

We were pleased to see that the force looks externally for new ideas and new talent. It uses Police Now and direct entry candidates effectively, with three of the latest seven appointments of chief superintendents coming from external organisations.

### **Making best use of resources to meet likely future demand**

Planning for the future is well co-ordinated across finance, HR, learning and development, and the transformation portfolio. All the force's plans are aligned and work towards meeting the broad corporate objectives. Capital plans have clear links to the corporate strategies and the force plans investment in areas such as digital policing and the estate that will help it achieve its priorities. This is positive.

The force has identified future demand through its transformation portfolio, which covers almost all areas of activity. This is good. Each programme of work identifies demand, forecasts future demand and, through consultation, develops options for addressing that demand in an affordable way. Business partners staff and support the programmes of work, and there is a thorough governance process in place to scrutinise activity.

The force used external expertise to review its response and investigative demand. The new way of working reflects these results, though the change to response officers carrying an investigative workload isn't yet fully effective. Before the force decided how its new policing model should look, it also asked the public what eight crime types mattered the most. It used this feedback to develop its new way of working.

### **Prioritising**

The force has aligned its plans effectively, including the transformation portfolio, the financial forecast and the workforce plan. These plans meet the priorities set out in Met Direction and the 'What matters to Londoners?' work. The force is realigning resources to achieve savings. It is also moving resources into areas that matter to the public, including neighbourhood policing and schools' officers, investigation and vulnerability. The force has achieved substantial savings through support services and reducing the cost of its estate. It continues to scrutinise these areas for further opportunities.

### **Future workforce**

The Metropolitan Police Service has a comprehensive workforce plan, developed in conjunction with finance and transformation, to reflect the changing numbers and skills required of the future workforce. However, there is no single skills database that allows the force to comprehensively understand the skills and capabilities of its officers and staff. It holds data in a variety of places and, for major change projects such as the creation of BCUs, the force had to undertake a separate exercise to identify the skills of the workforce. This is a gap for the force.

The force has brought in external talent through the Police Now and direct entry schemes (including direct entry detectives), and through senior recruitment from other forces. This is good practice. It is also working with industry leaders to develop its cadet scheme and volunteer schemes.

Positive action programmes are in place to support women and people from minority groups, both at application stage and for further development once appointed. The force has also lifted the London residency requirement to attract more candidates. It has recently reviewed the recruitment process to identify any barriers in the process. A review of women in policing identified several areas where the force is seeking to improve, including keeping in touch with women on maternity leave, women-only fitness tests, flexible working and women's health.

## **Finance plans**

Financial planning by the Metropolitan Police Service is sound and prudent. The budget for 2019/20 is £3,381m including MOPAC. The force is keeping officer numbers at around 31,000. It is doing this by using its financial [reserves](#), which it has built up in previous years from underspends in pay budgets. The force knows it can't sustain this position beyond 2022/23. If there is no additional funding for policing, the force will need to reduce officer numbers at that point to approximately 26,800.

The force sets and manages budgets appropriately. It has made reasonable assumptions for council tax, inflation and pay awards, and has subjected these to internal and external scrutiny. The budget process has identified savings amounting to £95m from 2019/20 to 2022/23 across a range of headings. But the force describes a 'cliff edge' position by 2022/23 when it will face a further budget gap of £167m. This is partly due to the requirement to meet additional employer pension costs amounting to £104m from 2020/21 onwards. The mayor has responded by increasing council tax by 5.1 percent in 2018/19 and the same in 2019/20.

The force has a capital spending programme of £250m to £475m per year over the next four years. The main elements of this are transforming the estate, and investigation and prosecution, as well as ICT and fleet. The force is good at managing the scrutiny of business cases and funding. Its total reserves are proportionately less than in many other forces. The force expects these reserves to reduce from £154m to £43m over the next four years through spending that it has already earmarked. It holds specific reserves for designated purposes. These include supporting officer numbers and a general reserve of £46m, which is less than 2 percent of net expenditure.

## **Leadership and workforce development**

The force would benefit from having a single database for skills and capability. This would provide a force-wide overview that would include any training needs. There is inconsistency in training provision across the force. In the absence of meaningful information, the force has identified six skill areas and is developing learning packages as follows:

- mental health awareness;
- investigation;
- analysis of data;
- coaching and influencing;
- wellbeing and resilience; and
- digital skills.

The force has also recognised an urgent need to improve supervisors' skills in overseeing investigations and has developed training for all staff.

The force doesn't have a formal succession planning process. Line managers identify talent and put plans in place to develop and nurture these officers and staff. The force uses direct entry for detective roles as well as some senior posts. It participates in the national [fast track](#) scheme and has recruited externally for some senior roles. It is also seeking to make it easier for people leaving the force to return with new skills. The force has adopted the [College of Policing's Competency and Values Framework](#) for the first time, having previously developed their own role competencies for professional development.

With the support of MOPAC, the force has introduced its leadership development programme 'Leading for London'. Developed following extensive research into the force's leadership and cultural needs, the programme has used a blended learning approach to build leadership capability and support the wider transformation portfolio, covering all layers of leadership from the commissioner and management board to sergeants and police staff managers.

### **Ambition to improve**

The force's plans are ambitious in both their scale and pace of change. However, they are realistic and achievable. The assumptions made within these plans are subject to appropriate challenge. The force has consulted widely to discover what matters to Londoners. It is good at working with its partner organisations, especially the other emergency services. It is developing ambitious plans for these organisations to work together more effectively. The force is learning from other police and commercial organisations, and is working with academia and the College of Policing.

The force is achieving savings through joint procurement, more effective ICT systems (that link up) and substantial investment in modern technology such as body-worn video and mobile devices. The force has also recently introduced a new Oracle finance and HR platform. These ambitious changes will need careful management but will potentially provide more efficient ways of working. The force has achieved £700m of savings since the Olympics in 2012. It has identified a £95m in savings for the next four years, with a further £167m required by the end of 2022/23.

# Legitimacy



# Force in context


## Comparison of Metropolitan Police workforce ethnicity with local population

as of 31 March 2019




	Metropolitan Police proportion	Local population proportion
<b>Black, Asian and minority ethnic</b> as % of those with stated ethnicity	18.4%	40.2%
<b>White</b> as % of those with stated ethnicity	81.6%	59.8%
<b>Not Stated</b> as % of total	3.0%	

	Metropolitan Police proportion	England and Wales proportion
<b>Proportion of female officers in post</b> as of 31st March 2019	27%	30%



**Stop and search by ethnicity**  
12 months ending 31 March 2018



# How legitimately does the force treat the public and its workforce?



## Good

### Summary

The Metropolitan Police Service is good at treating the public and its workforce legitimately.

The force has a culture of treating people with fairness and respect. It is good at removing barriers to engagement. Understanding of [unconscious bias](#) varies. This is despite the training provided. The force's 'walk in an officer's shoes' educational exercise is commendable. It should make sure that it trains all officers in safety techniques. And it should properly supervise and analyse stop and search records.

The force needs to improve the way it maintains an ethical culture and ensures lawful behaviour among its workforce. It has still to vet a significant number of staff. It has moved from a blame culture to a more open, learning environment. But staff don't always know where to refer ethical issues. The way the force responds to high-level corruption is impressive. But it needs to do more to manage internal risk and intervene early with those at risk of corruption.

The force is good at treating its workforce fairly. Staff have increasing levels of trust and confidence in their leaders. The force has a positive and strong approach to diversity. It has improved its procedures for managing complaints of internal discrimination. The force has experienced a huge demand for its services in recent years. It is making improvements to its wellbeing provision. The force should support its supervisors with wellbeing concerns.

## Treating the public fairly



### Good

The force has a culture of treating people with fairness and respect. It is clear that fair treatment and decision making are important. It makes sure that its workforce understands this. It is good at helping people engage with the force and removing barriers. It finds new ways to involve those from harder-to-reach communities. This includes engagement hubs, use of digital platforms and various innovative activities. There has been a significant reduction in public complaints.

Understanding of unconscious bias varies throughout the organisation. This is despite the training the force provides to help the workforce interact well with the public. The force should reinforce this training. It should also make sure that it trains all officers in safety techniques. The force monitors use of force correctly. This is central to officer safety training and additional inputs.

The force's arrangements for the use and scrutiny of stop and search are positive. But it should make sure that it properly supervises and analyses stop and search records. The introduction of [body-worn video](#) devices has given officers more confidence to do stop and search. The force's innovative 'walk in an officer's shoes' educational exercise is commendable.

### Areas for improvement

- The force should ensure that it reinforces awareness of unconscious bias among staff and gives them regular access to guidance to help them to make fair decisions with confidence.
- The force should make sure it appropriately trains all officers in officer safety techniques.
- The force should ensure that all its stop and search records are correctly supervised.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

## Treating people fairly and respectfully

At all levels, the force has a culture of treating people with fairness and respect. The commissioner regularly emphasises the importance of treating people with respect and writes monthly blogs with these messages. There are [chief officer](#) strategic leads for inclusion, engagement, use of force, and stop and search.

There has been a significant reduction in public complaints, which could suggest that the force is engaging with the public more appropriately. The force has several strategies to address how it responds internally and externally to minority and under-represented groups. We found many examples of positive engagement with

different community groups. These collectively help increase the force's legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

The redesign of the local policing model has included the implementation of new engagement hubs with the force's partner organisations, especially in high-violence areas. Initiatives such as 'cuppa with a copper' and '#Together team' demonstrate how the force is working with local authorities, blue light partners, businesses, residents and the youth sector to prevent crime. The force has the largest cadet programme in the UK and its success lies in its diversity: 57 percent BAME, 50 percent female and 30 percent vulnerable youths. The force currently only has 619 volunteers and may benefit from increasing this number, especially as the number of dedicated staff in each neighbourhood has reduced because of the restructuring.

The effectiveness of community engagement varies. There are positive examples of proactive initiatives, such as volunteer and schools' officer patrols, volunteer weapon sweeps and volunteer test purchasing activities. In contrast, residents appear less interested in attending the police liaison groups, though local councils regularly take part. The force doesn't appear discouraged by such variability and continues to seek new and innovative ways to connect with local communities.

The force is good at using the many digital platforms to engage with the public. It has Twitter, Instagram and Facebook accounts at all levels of the force. It supports the new neighbourhood watch website, OWL (online watch link), as well as the 'Nextdoor' app. It also has 'your area' pages on its own website. However, aside from the public confidence survey and Twitter, the force does not centrally monitor what engagement activity takes place. It needs to get a better understanding of how different activities affect levels of public confidence.

The force has trained the workforce on unconscious bias and communication skills. However, we still found a varied understanding of unconscious bias. The force should consider how effective its training is and what guidance it provides to its staff.

## Using force

The force is fully compliant with the [National Police Chiefs' Council's](#) use of force recording requirement. Use of force is a central element in the officer safety training provided to recruits, regular officers, special constables and PCSOs. [BCUs](#) also conduct local inputs and the force intranet has pages dedicated to legislation, effective deployment and access to relevant forms. Officers are aware of the relevant legislation and confident in recording its use and submitting the required forms.

In some BCUs, supervision is ad hoc where use of force doesn't lead to an arrest. The force needs to ensure consistency of supervision in such circumstances. It has a robust process that provides oversight and scrutiny of the use of force and submission of the appropriate forms when linked to arrest. Supervisors now review all forms in custody and make checks before closing a custody record. The force uses body-worn video footage to hold officers to account and as an investigation tool. However, the use of body-worn video cameras isn't mandatory for officers when force is used. There is an online interactive use of force dashboard available to all staff, but the force doesn't audit the use of the dashboard by frontline staff. It is, therefore, unable to assess its value.

Local [IAGs](#) externally review and discuss the use of force and body-worn video, which also feature quarterly on BCU performance information. The performance dashboard is also available to the public and is scrutinised at IAGs and the MOPAC challenge panels. The force assesses the data it collects on the use of force and uses it to make organisational improvements including the provision of new personal safety equipment.

Not all officers are up to date with their officer safety training. It is important that officers are current with their first aid training, as well as with the legislation and practice in the use of force and stop and search. We note that the force's risk and assurance board is addressing this.

### **Using stop and search powers**

The force has strict processes in place regarding the recording of stop and search. It focuses on dealing with crimes that cause Londoners the most concern. The commissioner provides clear direction on the use of stop and search, with the full support of the MOPAC. The force expects that at least 20 percent of all stop and searches should target weapons and 40 percent should target neighbourhood concerns. Following a stop and search, the force requires the relevant forms to be inputted into the system within 24 hours. Officers can do this via mobile devices. However, poor connectivity means the force has not yet achieved the full benefits of this. Officers regularly must use paper records and then re-input the data electronically when they return to the station. This is inefficient and causes unnecessary duplication. In response to the increase in knife crime and the increasing use of stop and search, the force has invested significantly in instruction and refresher training on the use of [these powers](#). However, the force needs clearer messaging on its increasing use of stop and search to ensure that officers understand the reasoning. Frontline staff in some BCUs are concerned that the force is beginning to set performance targets. This could ultimately affect the quality and legality of the searches they do.

There are inconsistencies in supervision of the stop and search record. As an example, force-wide supervisors dip-sampled 18,540 records in March 2019, amounting to 69 percent of records. However, we identified one BCU having 370 records unsupervised since November 2018. The force needs to maintain consistency in supervision to ensure that officers are using their powers legitimately.

The introduction of 22,000 body-worn video devices has given officers more confidence in conducting stop and search. Some 88 percent of the force's stop and searches have corresponding body-worn video footage.

We reviewed a representative sample of 100 stop and search records to assess the reasonableness of the recorded grounds. We found that 88 percent of those records contained reasonable grounds. Our assessment is based on the grounds recorded by the searching officer and not the grounds that existed at the time of the search.

In our [2017 legitimacy report](#), we recommended that all forces should:

- monitor and analyse comprehensive stop and search data to understand reasons for disparities;
- act on those; and

- publish the analysis and the action by July 2018.

The force has complied with some of this recommendation. It has an online interactive dashboard containing a comprehensive set of data, which can be broken down in a variety of ways. It does identify the extent to which [find rates](#) differ between people from different ethnicities but it doesn't do that across different types of searches (and it doesn't separately identify find rates for drug possession and supply-type offences). It also isn't clear that the force monitors enough data to identify the frequency of possession-only drug searches, or the extent to which these align with local or force-level priorities. The force's website doesn't mention what analysis it has carried out to understand and explain reasons for disparities or any subsequent action taken.

MOPAC's stop and search community monitoring meeting provides effective external scrutiny and challenge on the use of stop and search. This is a large meeting with members of the public and representatives from each of the local policing areas. Panel members are willing to challenge the force during the meeting. MOPAC is seeking to make the panel more diverse to ensure that it is more representative of the communities the force serves. Similar external scrutiny groups exist at a local level, specifically within IAGs.

'Walk in an officer's shoes' is an innovative educational exercise based on various scenarios. It asks its audience whether it would ignore the subject, stop and talk, or stop and search. The force has rolled this out in trials across the pan-London monitoring group, with a limited version to schools and the wider community. Not only does the exercise educate the public on their rights when being stopped, it shows the decision making undertaken by officers in considering the deployment of the tactic. Feedback has been so positive that the force's stop and search lead is considering taking it to City Hall for further implementation. We consider this an example of good practice by the force.

## Ethical and lawful workforce behaviour



### Requires improvement

The way the force maintains an ethical culture and ensures lawful behaviour among its workforce requires improvement, particularly in respect of reducing the significant number of staff who require appropriate vetting. We make three recommendations about vetting.

The force has moved from a blame culture to a more open, learning environment. Its leaders act as role models for ethical behaviour. This is good. The force takes ethics seriously when discussing operational decisions. But it should make sure that the workforce is aware of the processes for referring ethical issues for discussion. The force is good at building confidence with communities by publishing the outcomes of misconduct hearings.

The way the force responds to high-level corruption is impressive. But it needs to do more to manage internal risk via its integrity registers. It also needs to intervene more often at an early stage with officers and [staff](#) at risk of corruption. It should invest in suitable software to proactively monitor its ICT systems.

### **Causes of concern**

The size of the vetting backlog within the Metropolitan Police Service is a cause of concern.

### **Recommendations**

- Within 12 months the force should ensure all staff have received at least the lowest level of vetting clearance for their roles, working to clear any backlogs and new vetting renewals when they become due, to ensure it is fully compliant with the national vetting guidelines.
- The force should undertake work to ensure it fully understands the vetting status of staff where their current vetting status is currently unknown and vet staff who do not have current vetting. It should ensure that it has appropriate central governance over the number of staff who require enhanced vetting and re-vetting.
- The force should monitor its vetting decisions to identify disparities and disproportionality (e.g. BAME groups), and act to reduce them where appropriate.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force should ensure that awareness of its process for the workforce to refer and discuss ethical concerns where the workforce can review any feedback and changes made as a result is reinforced among all staff.
- The force should ensure it has a current counter-corruption strategic threat assessment that uses the national corruption categories and control strategy which enables it to understand and manage the risk corruption poses to the organisation.
- The force should use early interventions routinely as part of their people intelligence work to support those at risk of falling into corrupt practices.
- The force should ensure it:
  - has sufficient capability and capacity in its counter-corruption unit to be effective in its proactive approach to counter corruption;
  - has full ICT monitoring to effectively protect the information contained within its systems; and
  - builds effective relationships with the individuals and organisations that support and work with vulnerable people.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

## Maintaining an ethical culture

Leaders act as role models for ethical behaviour in the Metropolitan Police Service. The force continues to promote the [Code of Ethics](#). However, there is some confusion among its [senior leaders](#) as to what takes priority. They told us that the force focuses on its values and Met Direction, rather than the Code of Ethics. If senior leaders are uncertain, then it is unsurprising that the workforce is struggling to understand the force's focus. The force's policies and procedures comply with the Equality Duty and reflect the Code of Ethics.

The Metropolitan Police Service is part of a strategic partnership group with British Transport Police and City of London Police. The forces discuss ethical issues at their tri-force 'London Police Challenge Forum' meeting. Now in its third year, the panel meets quarterly to consider 'ethical dilemmas', which anyone from the three forces can submit. However, the force hasn't been effective in telling frontline officers and staff about the ethics panel. Many staff don't know how to raise ethical dilemmas, where to review the findings of previous ones raised, or what changes have been made as a direct result of [ethics committee](#) consultation. Some senior leaders also don't know about the ethics panel. This is a problem, because the force may be missing opportunities to promote its ethical approach to decision making as a result.

The force considers ethics seriously in discussions involving significant operational decision making. Recently, this discussion has been about the decision to increase its use of stop and search. It has focused on ensuring that the tactic is used ethically and lawfully so that it doesn't lose the confidence of the community. It has increased its internal and external scrutiny of stop and search encounters to improve [safeguarding](#). The force reports that public complaints involving the use of stop and search powers have significantly reduced. It publishes complaints data monthly and this is available to the public as part of the force's publication scheme through its [directorate of professional standards](#) (DPS). The force reports that stop and search generated just 4 percent of the total number of public complaints received in 2018/19 (320 of 8,919). This is a reduction of 35 percent on the previous year. This has helped leaders be confident that the public accept the use of stop and search to tackle violence and other neighbourhood concerns.

## Vetting

The force doesn't comply with all aspects of the vetting [APP](#) and [Code of Practice](#). It has adopted several minor deviations from the national policy, which the force vetting board has approved. The board meets quarterly. It considers vetting refusals and monitors clearances. Figures from December 2018 show that the force had a significant backlog of approximately 16,000 staff who did not hold appropriate vetting. Vetting issues have directly affected the potential workforce pool for the force. The December 2018 intake of new recruits was 40 officers short, because the force couldn't complete the vetting checks in time. It has since decided to prioritise police officer recruit vetting. This means other cases – including re-vetting of existing staff – have been delayed. As of April 2019, 37 percent of the overall workforce – 33 percent of officers, 72 percent of PCSOs and 45 percent of staff – don't hold up-to-date security vetting. We understand the force response given the context, and recognise that it has taken steps to increase the size of the vetting team to cope with this increased demand. This will take some time to become fully effective.

The vetting unit cannot say how many people require enhanced vetting. It relies on each department to manage its own staff re-vetting. There is, therefore, no corporate governance and no one can provide details of the total number of staff who need re-vetting. In response to our previous recommendations to renew vetting status for all police officers and staff, the force has initiated a two-year completion plan and recruited more staff to deal with the backlogs. However, there remains a significant risk to the integrity of the force due to the number of people who still require vetting. During our inspection, the force was unable to provide any information regarding the vetting refusal rate for all candidates with [protected characteristics](#). We have since found that the force is now able to run reports in respect of failures broken down by ethnicity and gender at all pre-employment checks including vetting. It is, therefore, able to actively report on and identify disproportionality through recruitment.

The force complies with its obligations to provide details to the [College of Policing](#) for any people who should be on the barred and advisory lists. These lists prevent people who have left the force while under investigation for gross misconduct, or who the force has dismissed, from re-joining or working in law enforcement. Similarly, the DPS checks the barred list when considering new joiners.

### **Standards of behaviour**

The DPS sets the required standards of behaviour for the force. It has reorganised its command structure and designed an enhanced 'professionalism portfolio'.

Its prevention and reduction team is responsible for:

- organisational learning in relation to professional standards;
- creating bespoke training packages for new recruits;
- promotion courses;
- high-volume specialist operational command units; and
- those performing the role of appropriate authority.

While there are some performance challenges among the workforce, the focus is on individual and organisational learning rather than blame. The force encourages and supports staff to use the national decision model and make ethical decisions through its Leading for London training to all supervisors. It has created green and red card behaviours to help people understand the Code of Ethics, ethical behaviours and expected values. The aim is to develop a learning culture, with individuals promoting the five acceptable (green) behaviours that the force wants from its leaders. The force reinforces certain standards of behaviour through random substance misuse testing and with-cause alcohol testing.

The force shares lessons learned and reinforces the standards expected of all staff through various methods of communication. The DPS provides training inputs and has a dedicated intranet page. It also publishes notices on the intranet and external website showing outcomes of misconduct hearings and dismissals. It shares these with the wider organisation to promote learning and act as a preventative measure for others. The DPS is currently developing a process to make sure that the force consistently records learning from complaints and misconduct cases, because it recognises that information may be lost before it reaches them.

The workforce uses the force's integrity policies involving gifts and hospitality, declarable associations and business interests. However, levels of knowledge vary. The policies aren't easy to access because the force intranet requires searches to be word-specific. BCUs and departments play an important role in recording and approving these procedures. The DPS now oversees gifts and hospitality for staff at management board level. BCUs maintain their own registers of gifts and hospitalities, but there is no central register.

The DPS manages business interests and any associated risks, and returns rejected applications to local supervisors for information. However, the directorate doesn't have enough staff to monitor compliance proactively. It records all declarable associations on its intelligence platform. The integrity assessment unit within the DPS manages all high-risk declarable associations. Business interests and declarable associations are included in the annual [performance and development review](#) (PDR) process.

### **Tackling corruption**

In our [2016 legitimacy report](#), we said the force should produce a local counter-corruption strategic assessment and control strategy every year to identify the risks to its integrity. It has done this, and its professionalism board has approved both documents. The force now has an overall DPS strategic intelligence assessment (SIA), which looks at all professional standards issues rather than just corruption. It completed this in February 2017 and it has a review date of January 2018 (which is therefore outstanding). While the SIA includes corruption threats such as unauthorised disclosure of information, sexual misconduct and inappropriate associations, it doesn't use the nationally recognised corruption categories. This makes it more difficult to compare findings with other forces.

It is unclear whether the force has completed any of the actions identified in its 2017 DPS strategic threat assessment. The lack of a meaningful strategic control strategy means that it is far more likely to be reactive than proactive in its approach to corruption.

The force doesn't routinely use early interventions as part of its intelligence work to support those at risk of falling into corrupt practices. Some BCUs are starting to do this, but their focus has been on managing existing complaints. The force does conduct integrity interviews if it deems it necessary. It could improve on how it manages employee information. It currently considers indicators such as working hours, injuries at work and sickness rates to monitor wellbeing. The force could combine these with performance and conduct data such as complaints, grievances, business interests and any other intelligence known to the [anti-corruption command](#). This would help it identify opportunities to intervene early with those at risk of corruption.

Within its anti-corruption command, the Metropolitan Police Service has the necessary staff (and access to appropriate tactical options) to address known corruption threats. It is entirely self-sufficient in assessing, developing and dealing with corruption-related intelligence. Its approach to identified high-level corruption is outstanding. However, the way the force identifies potential 'internal insider threats' is only reactive. When it revised its borough intelligence units in 2014, it lost its local proactive capability to manage officers' activity. Dip-sampling individual use of ICT is

no longer feasible and ICT monitoring systems are inadequate. Together with the high number of unvetted staff within the organisation, this leaves the force in a vulnerable position and is a significant organisational risk, because it cannot fully protect the information within its ICT systems.

The force only responds reactively to the [abuse of position for a sexual purpose](#). Its approach to ICT monitoring may be hindering this. It hasn't yet completed the necessary actions regarding our 2016 recommendation. However, it now treats this type of abuse as serious corruption and the cases we examined had been appropriately referred to the [Independent Office for Police Conduct](#). The force must work better with external organisations to encourage reporting, seek intelligence and safeguard potential victims. The force provides full briefings to new recruits and employees to ensure that they are aware of this type of corruption. It has given its supervisors guidance on the warning signs to look for that might suggest an individual is abusing their position for a sexual purpose.

The force is good at building confidence with communities by publishing the outcomes of misconduct hearings.

## Treating the workforce fairly



### Good

The force is good at treating its workforce fairly. Staff have increasing levels of trust and confidence in their leaders. They view the commissioner as being instrumental in this cultural change. Force leaders are good at getting feedback from staff and sharing this information. The force has reviewed its grievance procedure and the workforce values the new process. But trust and confidence would improve further with better communication from the force about how it addresses problems.

The force has a positive and strong approach to diversity. It is focusing on making its workforce more representative of the community it serves. It is more representative than ever before, and the force aims to improve that further. It has improved its procedures for managing complaints of internal discrimination.

The force has experienced a huge demand for its services in recent years. It needs to assess how its staff are affected by long working hours. It recently developed a strategic response to the wellbeing of its workforce. But this has yet to be fully implemented. The workforce does not value current [occupational health](#) provision.

We are concerned that the force is expecting supervisors to take most of the responsibility for supporting wellbeing. Supervisors report feeling overwhelmed with their performance management responsibilities, increasing workloads and new duties with the force restructure. The force should support its supervisors with wellbeing concerns.

The force has a people strategy with clear career pathways. But staff don't feel they have much opportunity for career progression. The force should address this. It works hard to remove potential barriers to promotion.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force should improve the way it communicates with its workforce to increase trust and confidence in its leaders and should communicate how it has responded to problems identified by its workforce.
- The force should improve how it manages and monitors individual performance, supporting its supervisors in making fair and effective assessments so that staff value the process. The force should also make sure performance development reviews happen consistently and fairly across the organisation and manage poor performance effectively.
- The force should support its supervisors to manage staff wellbeing, including giving them the time and skills to recognise the signs of problems and intervene early.
- The force should assess how its workforce is affected by relying on working overtime and breaching the working time directive to manage demand.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

### **Improving fairness at work**

The workforce is generally positive about how force leaders seek feedback and invite challenge from across the organisation. Leaders and staff can share feedback in different ways. These include the traditional annual staff surveys, a vibrant online force forum, senior leader blogs, as well as local BCU initiatives. Staff told us they don't feel restricted in what they can say, they are confident about raising concerns and there is no climate of fear. The 2018 'Building better Met staff' survey showed that 57 percent of staff feel it is safe to speak up and question the way things are done.

The commissioner holds monthly question-and-answer sessions where matters can be raised by anyone in the force, and staff value these sessions. The commissioner's visibility at all levels of the organisation and her personal style mean that the workforce believes its commissioner is a leader who is true to her promises.

Frontline officers and staff representatives are involved in change networks. The force regularly briefs these networks on the transformation portfolio. It uses these networks to test concepts, support implementation and provide review and feedback. But while staff were told about significant organisational change because of the BCU mergers, many felt they were given wrong messages about new postings and shift patterns. This left them feeling that change was being imposed on them, with little consideration of their wellbeing.

The force makes improvements based on feedback from the workforce such as introducing spit guards and making changes to mobile devices. Staff told us they recognise change is slow in such a large organisation and that its size and complexity make influencing decisions difficult. They welcome the responses to their feedback. There has been a positive response to the commissioner's one-off payment for recognition of the difficult times faced by officers over a two-year period. The officers appreciate the gesture and it has assisted in raising staff morale.

The force has invested significantly in improving its grievance processes. It has reviewed and recently revised its grievance procedure. It has also created a grievance management team, a helpline for staff to ask for advice and a new database to record grievances. Newly appointed grievance facilitators who are trained in mediation help local staff and officers. The latest grievance policy focuses on early resolution. It is perceived to be fair by the workforce and staff have confidence in using it. There is also a strategic board to examine lessons learned from complex matters, such as disproportionality and grievance procedures involving mental health, to identify future improvements. This is supported by a strong network of staff associations. This is positive.

One of the force's strategic priorities is to make sure that its workforce is representative of its community. It is addressing under-representation with a programme of work supported by its people strategy and its diversity and inclusion-enabling strategy. In September 2016, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) published the findings of their investigation into how the Metropolitan Police Service managed internal complaints of discrimination. While the EHRC found no evidence that the Metropolitan Police Service had committed unlawful acts, they made several recommendations. Since the EHRC investigation, the force has made many improvements. It has introduced new policies, created a discrimination investigation unit within the DPS and dedicated teams of specialists to respond to internal complaints of discrimination. It has launched a telephone helpline for staff and managers, trained locally based mediators and grievance resolution champions, and implemented a new performance scorecard to measure success. The force is investing in improvements to the way it records internal discrimination complaints so that it is better able to identify victimisation. It has also increased sanctions for those who are found to have victimised a colleague.

The force has a positive and strong approach to diversity, led by the commissioner who chairs a quarterly STRIDE (strategic and inclusion) board. This is a well-attended group with senior representation from MOPAC, community leaders and staff associations. They scrutinise workforce information and focus on areas such as recruitment, promotion and retention. A delivery board holds chief officers to account and there have been many initiatives to address disparity in the workforce and encourage people from under-represented and minority groups to consider a career in the organisation.

The force is more diverse and representative than ever before. Fourteen percent of officers are from BAME backgrounds. This is half of all BAME police officers nationwide. Twenty-three percent of [police staff](#) and 38 percent of PCSOs are BAME and 56 percent of volunteer police cadets come from BAME communities. Women account for 39.5 percent of officer numbers, 59 percent of police staff and 37.5 percent of PCSOs. This is positive, and the force has plans in place to increase this diversity further.

## Supporting workforce wellbeing

Health and wellbeing provision for officers is improving. A consistent theme in force communications and strategy since 2011 has been to improve wellbeing for operational officers. Since the launch of its first health needs assessment in 2018, the force developed a new wellbeing strategy, which has been audited and measured against the [Oscar Kilo Blue Light Wellbeing Framework](#). The force is implementing this strategy force-wide and has a dedicated wellbeing strategic lead. MOPAC and the force's risk and assurance board audit the outcomes from the wellbeing strategy. These improvements are positive. We will assess the success of the wellbeing strategy over the next 12 months.

The force has significantly invested in the Leading for London programme to improve supervisors' skills in managing staff welfare and accessing support services. Its 2018 health needs assessment identified that a lack of local HR provision left supervisors as the only wellbeing link for its officers. This meant early intervention opportunities were being missed and few preventative services for mental health issues were offered. However, the force has since invested in several other services to improve wellbeing and staff told us they can see some improvements already. In 2018, the following were implemented:

- increasing the network of blue light champions;
- recruit training about managing stress and mental health;
- a MIND contract for managing mental health and resilience for sergeant to chief superintendent; and
- a fatigue study commissioner with Surrey University.

At the end of 2018, the Metropolitan Police Service allocated further funding for new health and wellbeing services. These are being implemented during 2019 and will include:

- a dedicated support line for supervisors to access advice from healthcare professionals; and
- a new employee assistance programme that includes a 24/7 helpline.

The force has experienced unprecedented demand for its services in recent years. Significant challenges were the two terrorist attacks at Westminster and London Bridge, the Grenfell fire, responding to serious violence in the capital and numerous public protests. This means that senior managers have had to choose between workforce wellbeing and public safety, using overtime and cancelled rest days to meet this demand. We recognise that public safety must come first in these circumstances. However, the effect of this demand on workforce wellbeing is significant and the force doesn't fully comply with the working time directive or police regulations. The force scrutinises how it manages demand through its health, safety and wellbeing board, and holds frontline policing managers to account for their use of cancelled rest days and overtime. The force is aware of the risks of their approach to meeting unplanned demand, and senior officers and managers review the risks regularly.

Current occupational health service provision isn't valued by the workforce generally. The requirement to complete questionnaires before speaking to someone is seen as impersonal and there were seen to be limitations on the number of counselling sessions available to staff. The force is reviewing its response and has committed extra funding so that staff have better access to counselling services.

The force monitors management information to understand wellbeing issues. It considers traditional proxy indicators such as working hours, injuries at work and sickness rates. These indicators could be better used to identify early intervention opportunities for those at risk of work-related stress or even corruption.

The force recognises that improving the wellbeing of its workforce isn't a quick fix and the transformation portfolio is a long-term strategy. The force has only just completed its initial structural changes and must continue work to achieve the cultural changes it needs for success. Once the immediate effects of the change start to stabilise and the new wellbeing strategy is fully functional and embedded, the benefits the force anticipates should be realised.

### **Managing performance and development of officers and staff**

The force manages staff performance and requires supervisors to complete PDRs every year for officers and staff members. These reviews need more structure to properly track someone's performance and support their future development. The force has made changes to its PDR process and is enhancing the skills of its supervisors through its Leading for London programme and the leadership performance portfolio for its managers. The force needs to make sure that its workforce clearly understands, values and uses its approach to the appraisal process.

Poor performance isn't consistently identified and addressed. Because of the significant challenges involved in dealing effectively with poor performance, it is often ignored by staff. Managing unsatisfactory performance has also been adversely affected by the centralisation of HR resources and support. Staff are confident about using management action, but the force needs to make sure that there is a place to store the results to prevent them being lost.

The force restructure has reduced the number and availability of supervisors. This results in line managers having less time with their staff, little time to consider managing talent, and missing early warning signs and opportunities to intervene early to improve staff performance or consider wellbeing properly. Supervisors are deferring performance reviews because they must prioritise according to risk and manage their staffing responsibilities against increasingly competing operational demands.

The force uses the national [Competency and Values Framework](#) and role profiles to recruit and develop officers. The people strategy has set out plans to build specialist and lateral career pathways for officers including creating advanced practitioner roles. There will be three pathways: response, community and investigation. Recruits will be allocated to career paths at the point of entry by matching applicants' skills, potential and aspirations to availability and capability requirements. There is [direct entry](#) into two entry points: inspector (manager) and superintendent (senior manager) ranks, enabling more diverse and specialised leaders. This is positive, and we will check progress of these plans over the next year. The force's graduate offer, in partnership

with [Police Now](#), is the talent pathway from constable to chief officer and is well established.

However, police staff told us there is little opportunity for career progression or lateral movement into other roles and they feel undervalued. The force needs to address this disparity.

The force has considered potential barriers that prevent the workforce from applying for promotion. The senior leadership team reports that it is confident that selection is based on competence and welcomes the involvement in the processes of members of staff associations who frequently act as observers. Uniformed officers feel that the promotion process is generally fair and open with no explicit barriers.

The force recognises that people from under-represented groups often experience more barriers. In response, it has developed an online career development service to support BAME and female officers. This and other schemes are monitored and reviewed at strategic meetings to consider applications to join the schemes and identify any practice that could be considered unfair. This is very positive.

# Annex A – About the data

Data in this report is from a range of sources, including:

- Home Office;
- Office for National Statistics (ONS);
- our inspection fieldwork; and
- data we collected directly from all 43 police forces in England and Wales.

When we collected data directly from police forces, we took reasonable steps to agree the design of the data collection with forces and with other interested parties such as the Home Office. We gave forces several opportunities to quality assure and validate the data they gave us, to make sure it was accurate. For instance:

- We shared the submitted data with forces, so they could review their own and other forces' data. This allowed them to analyse where data was notably different from other forces or internally inconsistent.
- We asked all forces to check the final data used in the report and correct any errors.

We set out the source of this report's data below.

## Methodology

### Data in the report

British Transport Police was outside the scope of inspection. Any aggregated totals for England and Wales exclude British Transport Police data, so will differ from those published by the Home Office.

When other forces were unable to supply data, we mention this under the relevant sections below.

### Most similar groups

We compare each force's crime rate with the average rate for forces in its most similar group (MSG). MSGs are groups of similar police forces, based on analysis of demographic, social and economic factors which relate to crime. We could not identify any forces similar to City of London Police. Every other force has its own group of up to seven other forces which it is most similar to.

An MSG's crime rate is the sum of the recorded crimes in all the group's forces divided by its total population. All of the most similar forces (including the force being compared) are included in calculating the MSG average.

[More information about MSGs can be found on our website.](#)

## **Population**

For all uses of population as a denominator in our calculations, unless otherwise noted, we use ONS mid-2018 population estimates.

## **Survey of police workforce**

We surveyed the police workforce across England and Wales, to understand their views on workloads, redeployment and how suitable their assigned tasks were. This survey was a non-statistical, voluntary sample so the results may not be representative of the workforce population. The number of responses per force varied between 0 and 920. So we treated results with caution and didn't use them to assess individual force performance. Instead, we identified themes that we could explore further during fieldwork.

## **BMG survey of public attitudes towards policing (2018)**

We commissioned BMG to survey public attitudes towards policing in 2018. Ipsos MORI conducted a similar version of the survey in 2015–2017.

The survey consisted of about 400 respondents for each of the 43 forces. Most surveys were completed online, by members of online research panels. However, a minority of the surveys (around 750) were conducted face-to-face. These face-to-face surveys were specifically targeted to groups that are traditionally under-represented on online panels. This aimed to make sure the survey respondents were as representative as possible of the total adult population of England and Wales. A small number of respondents were also surveyed online via postal invites to the survey.

Results were weighted by age, gender, ethnicity and indices of multiple deprivation to match population profiles. The sampling method used is not a statistical random sample and the sample size was small, which may be more problematic for larger force areas compared to small ones. So any results provided are only an indication of satisfaction rather than an absolute.

[The findings of this survey, and previous surveys, are available on our website.](#)

## **Review of crime files**

We reviewed police case files for these crime types:

- theft from person;
- rape (including attempts);
- stalking;
- harassment;
- common assault;
- grievous bodily harm (wounding); and
- actual bodily harm.

Our file review was designed to provide a broad overview of how well the police:

- identify vulnerability;
- conduct investigations; and
- treat victims.

We randomly selected files from crimes recorded between 1 May and 31 July 2018 and assessed them against several criteria. We reviewed 60 case files in each force, except for the Metropolitan Police Service where we reviewed 90.

For our file review, we only selected a small sample size of cases per force. So we didn't use results from as the only basis for assessing individual force performance, but alongside other evidence.

## Force in context

### 999 calls

We collected this data directly from all 43 police forces in England and Wales.

### Recorded crime and crime outcomes

We took this data from the July 2019 release of the Home Office [police recorded crime and outcomes data tables](#).

Total police-recorded crime includes all crime (except fraud) recorded by all forces in England and Wales (except BTP). Home Office publications on the overall volumes and rates of recorded crime and outcomes include British Transport Police, which is outside the scope of this HMICFRS inspection. Therefore, England and Wales rates in this report will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Police-recorded crime data should be treated with care. Recent increases may be due to forces' renewed focus on accurate crime recording since our 2014 national crime data inspection.

Other notable points to consider when interpreting outcomes data are listed below.

- Crime outcome proportions show the percentage of crimes recorded in the 12 months ending 30 September 2018 that have been assigned each outcome. This means that each crime is tracked or linked to its outcome. So this data is subject to change, as more crimes are assigned outcomes over time.
- Under the new framework, 37 police forces in England and Wales provide outcomes data through the HODH every month. All other forces provide this data via a monthly manual return.
- Leicestershire, Staffordshire and West Yorkshire forces participated in the Ministry of Justice's out of court disposals pilot. As part of the pilot, they stopped issuing simple cautions or cannabis/khat warnings and restricted their use of penalty notices for disorder for adult offenders. These three forces continued to follow these procedures since the pilot ended in November 2015. Later, other forces also limited their use of some out of court disposals. So the outcomes data should be viewed with this in mind.

For a full commentary and explanation of outcome types please see the Home Office statistics, [Crime outcomes in England and Wales: year ending March 2019](#).

### **Domestic abuse outcomes**

In England and Wales, 29 police forces provide domestic abuse outcomes data through the Home Office data hub (HODH) every month. We collected this data directly from the remaining 14 forces.

Domestic abuse outcome proportions show the percentage of crimes recorded in the 12 months ending 31 March 2018 that have been assigned each outcome. This means that each crime is tracked or linked to its outcome. So this data is subject to change, as more crimes are assigned outcomes over time.

### **Workforce figures (including ethnicity and gender)**

This data was obtained from the Home Office annual data return 502. The data is available from the Home Office's published [police workforce England and Wales statistics](#) or the [police workforce open data tables](#). The Home Office may have updated these figures since we obtained them for this report.

The data gives the full-time equivalent workforce figures as at 31 March. The figures include section 38-designated investigation, detention or escort officers, but not section 39-designated detention or escort staff. They include officers on career breaks and other types of long-term absence but exclude those seconded to other forces.

### **Spend per head of population**

We took this data from the [HMICFRS value for money profiles](#).

These profiles are based on data collected by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, through the Police Objective Analysis. The spend over time figures are adjusted for inflation. The population figures are ONS mid-year estimates, with the 2018/19 value calculated by assessing the trend for the last five years. [More details on this data can be found on our website](#).

### **Stop and search**

We took this data from the Home Office publication, [Police powers and procedures, England and Wales, year ending 31 March 2018](#). Stop and search totals exclude vehicle only searches and searches where the subject's ethnicity was not stated.

### **Vetting data (workforce without up-to-date security clearance)**

We collected this data directly from all 43 police forces in England and Wales.

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