A report into the effectiveness of vetting and counter-corruption arrangements in Dorset Police

About us

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces and fire and rescue services, in the public interest. In preparing our reports, we ask the questions the public would ask, and publish the answers in an accessible form. We use our expertise to interpret the evidence and make recommendations for improvement.

Introduction

Vetting, IT monitoring and counter-corruption: requires improvement

In September 2021, HMICFRS changed the way it reports on how effectively forces managed vetting and counter-corruption.

Previously, we inspected these areas as part of our police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL) programme and provided our findings in the inspection report.

The new arrangements mean we will inspect each force separately to PEEL, although we will continue to use the same methods and produce a report containing our findings, graded judgments and any areas for improvement or causes of concern. The report will be accessible via a web link from the most recent force PEEL report.

Between 21 February and 4 March 2022, we inspected Dorset Police to examine the effectiveness of the force’s vetting, IT monitoring and counter-corruption. We briefed senior personnel in the force at the end of the inspection.

This report sets out our findings. It includes areas for improvement identified at the time of the inspection, which we recognise the force may have already addressed.

How effectively does the force vet its officers and staff?

The force vetting unit (FVU) uses an IT system to effectively manage vetting, ensuring all vetting clearances for the workforce are renewed periodically, in line with the Authorised Professional Practice on vetting. The system flags renewals in advance, giving the FVU time to forward plan and send relevant documentation and reminders to officers and staff.

The FVU has set up filters that help monitor the number of enhanced management vetting and recruit vetting cases due for renewal or review. Our random sampling of data confirmed that the force only had three people in post without the correct level of vetting for their role. The force showed awareness of these cases and had already sent reminders in the weeks before our inspection.

The force is effective at predicting future vetting demand through engagement with the human resources (HR) team. At the time of our inspection, the force vetting officer maintained a comprehensive spreadsheet with predicted dates and expected numbers for the national officer recruitment programme as far ahead as March 2023. The FVU updates the spreadsheet with HR and overlayed data about future renewals. This helps advance planning.

The force maintains a list of designated posts that need enhanced vetting. The list contains a brief rationale of why each role is designated. This is subject to ongoing review. At the time of our inspection, there were 93 roles listed, occupied by 815 postholders. The force couldn’t immediately reconcile the designated post list against the postholders. This means it couldn’t confirm if all personnel in designated posts held the correct level of vetting. The vetting management system doesn’t link directly to HR systems, so the force relies on good links between the two departments. We found a very small number of examples of HR not notifying the FVU of internal moves requiring enhanced vetting in time for vetting to take place.

The FVU has the capacity and capability to match current demand. A service level agreement is in place, which sets timescales for vetting applications from submission to decision. Our dip-sampling of data held by the FVU showed the unit’s current workload was manageable.

Before it deployed the vetting IT system in 2021, the force couldn’t analyse vetting decisions. Although the force intended to make more use of the protected characteristics data available, it doesn’t currently analyse this to look for any disproportionality in its vetting decisions. For example, it doesn’t analyse the proportion of rejections for applicants with a particular protected characteristic compared to the proportion of rejections for a control group without that protected characteristic. As a result, the force has no way of understanding if there is any disproportionality, so it isn’t taking any action to address it. We have identified this as an area for improvement.

In our 2019 PEEL spotlight report Shining a light on betrayal: Abuse of position for a sexual purpose we made a national recommendation, stating:

“All forces that are not yet doing so should immediately comply with all elements of the national guidance on vetting. By July 2020, all forces that haven’t yet done so should vet all personnel to the appropriate standard. Forces should also have a clear understanding of the level of vetting required for all posts, and the level of vetting held by all their officers and staff. Forces should make sure all personnel have been vetted to a high enough level for the posts they hold.”

While the force had previously shown some progress, we found it still needs to improve the management of its vetting. As a result, we have identified this as an area for improvement.

How effectively does the force protect the information and data it holds?

The force has been slow to monitor all its IT systems (including handheld and remote devices) to identify improper use. At the time of our inspection, the force had procured an established IT monitoring system and had begun introducing it. But this had been problematic. The force wasn’t yet using this capability to its full potential.

We examined 60 corruption intelligence files. The force uses a variety of investigative techniques to develop corruption intelligence. We found the counter-corruption unit (CCU) was carrying out some proactive IT monitoring, including access to payday loan websites, and excessive use of the internet or force telephones by members of the workforce. The unit also monitors force phone use and cross references it against data associated with members of organised crime groups for links to corruption.

But the force doesn’t cross reference the telephone numbers of its phones with those of vulnerable victims. We found that the CCU doesn’t have enough resources to properly exploit its IT monitoring capability to proactively collect intelligence.

We found that the force hasn’t been active enough in its messaging and direction about using encrypted apps on force devices. In particular, it hasn’t given clear direction about using them operationally, or guidance on expected behavioural standards for personal use. We encourage the force to ensure that the workforce is aware of what is acceptable use of these apps.

In our 2016 report PEEL: Police legitimacy – An inspection of Dorset Police we identified IT monitoring as an area for improvement and we made recommendations, stating:

“The force should ensure that it has the capability and capacity to monitor all its computer systems to identify risks to the force’s integrity.”

Similarly, in our 2018/19 report PEEL: Police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy – An inspection of Dorset Police we identified IT monitoring as an area for improvement and we made recommendations, stating:

“The force should ensure that its counter-corruption unit:

• has enough capability and capacity to counter corruption effectively and proactively; [and]
• can fully monitor all of its computer systems, including mobile data, to proactively identify data breaches, protect the force’s data and identify computer misuse […].”

Then in our 2019 PEEL spotlight report Shining a light on betrayal: Abuse of position for a sexual purpose we made recommendations, stating:

“Where forces are yet to implement an effective ICT monitoring system that allows them to monitor desktop and handheld devices, they should do so as soon as reasonably practicable.”

Despite these previous findings, and despite acquiring an IT monitoring system, the force hasn’t made sufficient progress to improve its ability to monitor desktop and handheld devices. We strongly urge the force to do so.

How well does the force tackle potential corruption?

The force has a current counter-corruption strategic threat assessment. This is based on national priorities: STUDIOS (sexual misconduct, theft, unauthorised disclosure of data, drugs, inappropriate/notifiable associations, organised crime infiltration/corruption and social media).

The force is part of an alliance with Devon and Cornwall Police. Together they have a counter-corruption control strategy with an action plan identifying the people with responsibilities.

During our review of 50 corruption files, we found that the force correctly categorises corruption intelligence in line with the Authorised Professional Practice on counter-corruption (intelligence). We found that the force receives corruption intelligence from a range of sources. In most cases, the CCU responds effectively. But we found a very small number of cases in which the CCU didn’t fully exploit opportunities to develop the intelligence. In most cases, CCU officers and staff worked effectively, and the case files we examined were very well organised. All enquiries and decisions were clearly visible, including supervisory direction and oversight. But we found no evidence of the CCU proactively collecting intelligence.

The force CCU recognises abuse of position for a sexual purpose as serious corruption. It has raised awareness across the force with a mandatory computer-based training video. But we found inconsistent levels of understanding in the workforce. As such, the force should take steps to improve the level of awareness of all its officers and staff.

The force doesn’t have effective working relationships with external organisations that support vulnerable people. This would encourage intelligence reporting on abuse of position for a sexual purpose.

In our 2016 report PEEL: Police legitimacy – An inspection of Dorset Police we identified resourcing of the CCU as an area for improvement. We made recommendations, stating:

“The force should review the capacity and capability of its anti-corruption unit (ACU) to ensure the ACU can manage its work effectively.”

Similarly, in our 2018/19 report PEEL: Police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy – An inspection of Dorset Police we identified areas for improvement, stating:

“The force should ensure that its counter-corruption unit:

• has enough capability and capacity to counter corruption effectively and proactively;
• can fully monitor all of its computer systems, including mobile data, to proactively identify data breaches, protect the force’s data and identify computer misuse; and
• builds effective relationships with individuals and organisations that support and work with vulnerable people.”

Then in our 2019 PEEL spotlight report Shining a light on betrayal: Abuse of position for a sexual purpose we made a national recommendation, stating:

“By April 2020, all forces that haven’t yet done so should […] establish regular links between their counter-corruption units and those agencies and organisations who support vulnerable people.”

The force has previously shown some progress in meeting the above, but we found it still needs to improve. Accordingly, we have identified this as an area for improvement.

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A report into the effectiveness of vetting and counter-corruption arrangements in Dorset Police