West Mercia PEEL 2018

West Mercia Police is good at preventing crime and tackling ASB.

The force prioritises crime prevention, and its safer neighbourhood teams (SNTs) give good coverage across communities. In April 2018, the force launched its new approach to neighbourhood policing. This focuses on problem solving and early intervention. The force is now developing a new neighbourhood policing strategy too.

The force’s SNT officers are committed to solving problems and preventing crime. Sometimes, the force deploys them to non-emergency incidents that do not directly relate to their role. However, it does appropriately involve them in force-wide risks.

SNTs and officers vary in terms of consulting the public. We noted one team’s innovative use of Facebook Live, which more than tripled the number of participants in its community forum.

If the force had a strategic view of problem-solving performance, it could be more confident that these teams are supporting force priorities as effectively as possible.

The force is good at protecting the public from harm. Officers understand the threats that their communities face. And they have a good understanding of community needs from area beat profiles.

The force’s recruitment of partnership analysts should improve information sharing with partner organisations. The harm reduction units (HRUs) are an effective community safety resource.

Given the views of some officers, the force would benefit from clarifying its approach to problem solving and RMPs.

West Mercia Police requires improvement in the way in which it investigates crime.

At times, the force does not have enough capacity and capability to cope with investigative demand. This adversely affects the service that it gives to the public. The force keeps victims waiting too long to see an officer, and it takes too long to investigate some crimes. Sometimes, it tasks response officers with investigating more complex crimes. It needs to improve the quality of its investigations.

We found many supportive supervisors within the force. Some admitted that they cannot adequately supervise the high number of crimes that officers are responsible for in their teams. This view was borne out by our review of a sample of crime files: approximately half had ineffective or no supervision. The sample included more serious offences that detectives investigate.

The force needs to improve its approach to catching criminals and resolving investigations. The force has good processes relating to wanted suspects who are listed on the Police National Computer (PNC). It also manages foreign national offenders (FNOs) to minimise the risk of them re-offending. Among other measures, it needs to put processes in place so that it understands and prioritises effectively those suspects who represent the most harm to the public. It also needs a better understanding of its performance in relation to suspects who are released under investigation (RUI), and to comply better with its disclosure obligations.

The force needs to improve the way in which it protects vulnerable people.

The workforce has a good understanding of vulnerability, including the importance of identifying and safeguarding vulnerable people. Officers told us that they regularly look for hidden vulnerability. During our inspection, there was evidence of this.

However, during our inspection, we were told of a ‘drift’ in the culture of positive action at domestic abuse incidents within the force.

The force creates a greater proportion of domestic abuse reports as emergency or priority responses than the England and Wales rate. This demonstrates that these cases are being appropriately flagged, which is positive. However, according to our review of incidents, the force does not always give these incidents an appropriate or timely response. This potentially puts victims at risk.

The force needs to continue its efforts to improve the workforce’s understanding of the importance of thoroughly risk-assessing reports of domestic abuse. We note the lack of a force-wide analysis of DASH quality and completion rates.

The force does not always use pre-charge bail for high-risk domestic abuse cases.

Also, as a result of different approaches within the force to multi-agency risk assessment conferences (MARACs), the force may not be addressing risks most effectively.

We note that the force is planning to review the effectiveness of MARAC arrangements within its 2019 vulnerability review.

The force is good at tackling SOC, which represents a significant improvement in its performance since we last inspected this area of policing. It is a force priority, and the force understands the threat it poses. According to its own analysis, the threat posed by MSHT represents the force’s biggest intelligence gap.

The force considers threats, harms and risks daily. It consults relevant forces and intelligence units so that it can co-ordinate appropriate responses. The force also ensures an exchange of relevant information about county lines criminality.

The force’s local profiles for each area have created opportunities for it to commission analysis. For example, it is evaluating first-time entrants into the justice system and whether there is any connection with adverse childhood experiences they may have suffered.

The force has effective processes for managing OCGs. It is proactive in identifying new OCGs, gangs and networks. SNTs collect intelligence that helps the force to identify and tackle OCG activity.

The force does good work to prevent SOC, and to identify those who are at risk of being drawn into organised crime. For example, it works with partner organisations to protect those who are at risk of cuckooing. It has also used legislation to protect a child victim of county lines criminality.

The force does not yet measure or analyse the community impact or effect of its activities to tackle OCGs, urban street gangs (USGs) and county lines. But it does plan to do so.

It should be noted that West Mercia Police has invested substantially in this area since our last inspection. It has also sought advice and support from colleagues in other areas of public safety and outside forces. Some of the initiatives implemented by the force to tackle SOC, while very new, are becoming worthy of notice.

We have previously inspected how well forces provide armed policing. This formed part of our 2016 and 2017 effectiveness inspections. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the UK and Europe have meant that the police service maintains a focus on armed capability in England and Wales.

It is not just terrorist attacks that place operational demands on armed officers. The threat can include the activity of OCGs or armed street gangs and all other crime involving guns. The Code of Practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons (PDF document) makes forces responsible for implementing national standards of armed policing. The code stipulates that a chief officer be designated to oversee these standards. This requires the chief officer to set out the firearms threat in an armed policing strategic threat and risk assessment (APSTRA). The chief officer must also set out clear rationales for the number of armed officers (armed capacity) and the level to which they are trained (armed capability).