Derbyshire PEEL 2018

This question was not subject to detailed inspection in 2018/19, and our judgment from the 2016 effectiveness inspection has been carried over.

Derbyshire Constabulary needs to improve the way it investigates crimes. This finding is a decline from the judgment of ‘good’ that we gave the force after our last inspection of this area in 2016.

The force is dealing with significantly more investigations following our crime data integrity (CDI) inspection earlier this year, and is yet to understand the full effect of that.

It was apparent that the proportion of investigations that the force doesn’t handle effectively has grown, and supervisors needed to play a more active role to keep cases on track. Now, the force places more emphasis on resolving investigations quickly – specifically, by telephone resolution. But, in some cases, this has meant that it hasn’t followed all possible lines of enquiry. The force’s record keeping about cases should be more accurate (for example, it should be recording victim contact). Also, it has a significant backlog in completed cases that are waiting to be allocated a final outcome.

The force should review how it manages suspects during investigations. It uses voluntary attendance, as an alternative to arrest, more often than other forces typically do. This approach has implications for the use of bail to safeguard victims and witnesses. The force isn’t analysing suspects’ compliance with terms of bail and more coherent efforts made to arrest fugitives.

Overall, Derbyshire Constabulary’s outcomes for investigations are similar to those of other forces. But the number of investigations that it deals with has begun to increase quickly since it rectified faults in the way it recorded crime.

The force has enough detectives, and they have manageable workloads. It is good at identifying hidden types of crime (such as modern slavery). And it is effective in dealing with foreign national offenders.

Derbyshire Constabulary needs to improve the way it protects vulnerable people. This is a decline from the judgment of ‘good’ that we gave the force after our last inspection of this area in 2017.

The force should do more to develop its understanding of all types of vulnerability across the local community. It should do this by working more closely with partner organisations (such as local authorities). Currently, it tends to rely on its own data about crime and incidents. But the volume of crimes being recorded that affect vulnerable people is rapidly increasing, driven by changes the force needed to make to record crime more accurately. And the force isn’t analysing all calls for service that it receives, to determine whether vulnerable people are at risk of harm.

Frontline teams attend incidents involving vulnerable people promptly. They can recognise when a person should be considered as vulnerable, including less obvious forms of vulnerability. The force has formed new teams to help these people with long-term support. Such support includes continued safeguarding measures and paying reassurance visits. The force continues to improve how it offers services to people who have mental health conditions.

The proportion of domestic abuse cases that lead to an arrest has declined. The force is dealing with more suspects by voluntary attendance.

The force should review how it manages risk assessments and referrals to specialist organisations. During our inspection fieldwork, some risk assessments didn’t include important details. This means that the most appropriate support isn’t always forthcoming. The headquarters unit, which handles both assessments and referrals, has an increasingly large workload. In addition, the agencies at the two multi-agency safeguarding hub (MASH) sites are contributing less. This is making it more difficult for meaningful information sharing and early intervention to take place.

The force is well organised to manage the risks presented by violent and sexual offenders who live in the community, and others who operate online.

This question was not subject to detailed inspection in 2018/19, and our judgment from the 2016 effectiveness inspection has been carried over.

We have previously inspected how well forces provide armed policing. This formed part of our 2016 and 2017 effectiveness inspections. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the UK and Europe have meant that the police service maintains a focus on armed capability in England and Wales.

It is not just terrorist attacks that place operational demands on armed officers. The threat can include the activity of organised crime groups or armed street gangs and all other crime involving guns. The Code of Practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons (PDF document) makes forces responsible for implementing national standards of armed policing. The code stipulates that a chief officer be designated to oversee these standards. This requires the chief officer to set out the firearms threat in an armed policing strategic threat and risk assessment (APSTRA). The chief officer must also set out clear rationales for the number of armed officers (armed capacity) and the level to which they are trained (armed capability).