

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

South Wales Police Major Crime

July 2008



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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;

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- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.

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- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.
- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

| Inspection area | Dates |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Neighbourhood policing | April 2008 – September 2008 |
| Developing citizen focus | April 2008 – September 2008 |
| Civil contingencies | September 2008 – May 2009 |
| Public order | September 2008 – May 2009 |
| Critical incidents | September 2008 – May 2009 |
| Professional standards | June 2009 – December 2009 |
| Information management | June 2009 – December 2009 |
| Leadership | June 2009 – December 2009 |

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

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Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

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Force Overview and Context

Geographical description of force area

South Wales Police covers an area of 812 square miles, made up of a mixture of densely populated urban areas, valley communities, coastal areas and rural communities. Though it comprises just 10% of the landmass of Wales, the force area contains 42% of the country's population (1.25 million), and South Wales Police is the largest Welsh force in terms of officer and police staff numbers. As at 31 March 2008, South Wales Police employed 3,252 police officers, supported by 1,769 members of police staff, 328 police community support officers and 334 special constables.

The police authority has agreed a net revenue budget of £240,301,000 for 2008/09, compared with £232,099,000 in 2007/08, an increase of 3.5%.

Demographic profile of force area

The force headquarters (HQ) is in the town of Bridgend, which forms one of six divisions: Bridgend (population 129,878); Cardiff (population 315,116); Merthyr Rhondda Cynon Taff (population 286,985); Neath and Port Talbot (population 135,332); Swansea (population 224,642); and Vale of Glamorgan (population 121,235). Each division is coterminous with its unitary authority and community safety partnership, except Merthyr Rhondda Cynon Taff, which covers the authorities of Merthyr and Rhondda Cynon Taff.

Structural description of force, including staff changes at chief officer level

The police authority has invested heavily in its force chief officer team. As well as maintaining its full chief police officer complement of Chief Constable, deputy chief constable (DCC) and three assistant chief constables (ACCs), the police authority has appointed three civilian directors – a director of finance, director of human resources (HR), and director of legal services – as part of the force chief officer team.

Chief Constable Barbara Wilding has been in post since January 2004. The changes in her top team for the period under review are as follows:

- Deputy Chief Constable Peter Vaughan – appointed April 2007
- Assistant Chief Constable David Morris, Communities and Operations – appointed February 2007
- Director of Legal Services, Mr Gareth Madge, appointed September 2006
- Director of HR, Mr Dougie Woods – appointed June 2007
- Director of Finance, Mr Umar Hussain – appointed August 2007
- Assistant Chief Constable Nick Croft, Corporate Intelligence – appointed April 2008
- Assistant Chief Constable Colette Paul, Protective Services – appointed May 2008.

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Strategic priorities

The vision for South Wales Police and South Wales Police Authority is 'Keeping South Wales Safe', and both have committed themselves to maintaining communities that have full confidence in the police service. This joint vision indicates the strength of feeling and commitment in both bodies in ensuring that they meet their commitments to the people of South Wales.

During 2008/09, the specific priorities for the force are:

- making every contact count;
- reducing crime and detecting crime;
- providing an emergency service;
- protecting our communities; and
- ensuring it is efficient and effective.

The new vision and strategic priorities have been developed following the introduction of a performance-driven planning process that is based around the assessment of policing and community safety (APACS) performance measurement framework.

Every division and department has an 'at a glance' plan, with specific performance targets in place, that is based on and contributes to delivery of the force's annual plan. This ensures that there is a clear line of sight from vision to service delivery.

Performance against the departmental/divisional plans and the annual plan is monitored through the governance structure.

Strategic force development

The first stage of Seren, the force's change and development programme, is now drawing to a close and has enhanced the force's infrastructure and strategic systems through a number of projects, including:

- implementation of the Niche crime recording and management information system;
- the force-wide roll-out of neighbourhood policing;
- the introduction of tasking and demand management units;
- development of the force's information and communication technology;
- a review of the HQ and divisional organisation and function;
- the forthcoming introduction of a duty management system; and
- an ongoing review of shift management.

The next phase of Seren will focus on developing staff and officers, ensuring that they are in the right place and have the right skills to meet the force's current and future demands. This will be supported by the monitoring and analysis of performance at an individual level.

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Developments since the 2007 inspection

Since the inspection in 2007, the force has progressed in a number of areas, including the development of a performance-driven annual plan, discussed above, that is aligned to APACS and underpinned by divisional and departmental plans.

Other key developments include the following:

- **Call management**

Improving call handling is the top priority for the force and a proposal has been submitted to establish a 'one-stop shop' in terms of a customer service contact centre for the force that encompasses both first contact and incident resolution. The initial phase of the proposed programme will comprise:

 - reviewing existing working practices to ensure that the most effective use is being made of technology, shift patterns and existing resources;
 - reviewing the function of the switchboard to enhance the existing functionality and resolve more calls at the first point of contact;
 - investing in the 101 single non-emergency number to sustain its current position and roll it out across the force area so that it can take all non-emergency calls for the force; and
 - process re-engineering the tasking and demand management units and occurrence bureau, creating a virtual link between these units.
- **The development of a corporate identity**

Clarity of vision and of the force's five key priorities has been established, reinforcing the message 'One Force, One Vision' with all staff working towards the same goal of Keeping South Wales Safe.
- **The introduction of a performance management board**

The performance management board (PMB) is a monthly forum chaired by the DCC and attended by divisional commanders and departmental heads. Its purpose is to examine compliance with force policies within divisions and departments in order to improve performance. The compliance reviews highlight good practice and areas for improvement, both at strategic and individual levels, through a formal written report and monthly presentation.
- **Strengthening the internal inspection and audit processes**

In line with the development of the PMB as stated above, the force is committed to strengthening its internal control and audit functions. To this end, areas identified in recent inspections by HMIC and specific issues identified as weaknesses have been targeted as part of an ongoing process.
- **The Welsh Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Unit (WECTU)**

This unit went live on 1 April 2008. Its operational centre is in Bridgend but satellite offices are sited throughout the four Welsh forces. Phase 1 of the development of the WECTU will take place over the financial year 2008/09. During this period a full governance document and operational manual, including service level agreements, will be developed.
- **Workforce transformation project**

Stemming from a recommendation from the division/HQ review, South Wales Police is currently undertaking workforce transformation to match skills with tasks; to provide more capacity and productivity; and to make the workforce more cost efficient. Workforce transformation will also look at which posts require a warranted officer to undertake that role. To date, 85 posts have been remodelled, which equates to a £1.3 million saving. Of these posts:

 - 53 have been disestablished and replacements assigned;

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- 32 are in the process of being disestablished; and
- 28 officers have been assigned to front-line roles.

The wider programme has looked at improving the way in which sickness absence is managed and has also carried out a review of the 30+ scheme and its current participants, resulting in significant changes to processes. In addition, the programme has rationalised many issues in relation to resource planning.

- **Implementation of Socrates**

The force has recently implemented a forensic tracking and performance management system to replace the silo systems that were in place.

- **All-Wales collaboration**

The National Policing Plan for Wales has been formally agreed and adopted by all four police authorities. Collaborative ventures include:

- serious organised and cross-border crime;
- major crime, including the scientific support unit;
- local policing, including links with the joint emergency services group;
- public protection; and
- business support.

In addition to these developments, a number of initiatives are currently in progress, including the following:

- **A review of the force governance structure**

The current structure has been in place for approximately six months and it is timely to review its effectiveness. The revised structure will also take into consideration a number of developments, including the introduction of PMBs and the police authority's review of its processes and governance structure.

- **Resource usage**

This includes the implementation of a duty management system and a review of shift patterns in use for response and neighbourhood officers across the force.

Major Crime

| | |
|-------|---------------------|
| GRADE | Meets the standard. |
|-------|---------------------|

Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details South Wales Police’s capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those that pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

| | 2006 | 2007 | Change | MSF** group mean |
|---|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------------|
| Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population | 0.774 | 0.748 | -3.36% | 0.537 |
| Number of abductions per 10,000 population | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.00% | 0.000 |
| % of abduction crimes detected/convicted | Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population | 0.082 | 0.016 | -80.49% | 0.068 |
| % of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted | 90.00% | 100.00% | +10pp* | 97.09% |
| Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population | 0.196 | 0.057 | -70.92% | 0.126 |
| % of blackmail offences detected/convicted | 8.33% | 14.26% | +5.96pp* | 40.42% |
| Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population | 0.311 | 0.393 | +26.37% | 0.308 |
| % of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted | 34.21% | 50.00% | +15.79pp* | 54.59% |
| Number of manslaughters per 10,000 population | 0.041 | 0.016 | -60.98% | 0.027 |
| % of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted | 60.00% | 50.00% | -10pp* | 50.83% |
| Number of murders per 10,000 population | 0.098 | 0.123 | +25.51% | 0.116 |

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| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--------|---------|-----------|---------|
| % of murders detected/convicted | 66.67% | 113.33% | +46.66pp* | 101.89% |
| Number of rapes per 10,000 population | 2.234 | 2.079 | -6.94% | 2.316 |
| % of rapes detected/convicted | 26.37% | 38.19% | +11.82pp* | 30.81% |

*'pp' is percentage points.

** Most similar forces (MSFs) for South Wales are: Avon and Somerset, Durham, Gwent, Humberside, Lancashire, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire.

From the statutory performance indicator (SPI) data in the table above, it can be seen that life-threatening and gun crime, kidnapping and murder pose a threat to South Wales Police. The rates of offences (per 10,000 population) for kidnapping and murder are above the respective MSF averages after increasing in 2007; however, they are not quite among the highest in England and Wales. The rate of offences (per 1,000 population) for life-threatening and gun crime fell slightly in 2007 but is still higher than the MSF average.

The SPI data also indicates that major crime investigation in South Wales Police is comparable with the rest of the peer group. The force is performing at a level above the MSF average in some areas (attempted murder, murder and rape) but below the MSF average in other areas (blackmail and kidnapping).

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT), published in September 2007, indicated that South Wales Police was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to homicide, rape and kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, South Wales Police has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types is mapped.

The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified alcohol-related street violence, domestic abuse and terrorism and extremism as its major crime priorities in the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on public protection, alcohol-related violent crime, drugs, terrorism and extremism, immigration crime and economic migrants. In this overall documentation, the issues have broadly been identified and addressed.

The force has invested suitable resources in interventions to maximise the returns from harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and to inhibit major crime.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates maturing processes in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement,

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collaborative arrangements with Gwent and Dyfed-Powys Police and Operation Tarian (regional resources) are recognised.

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Intelligence

Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime and to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.

Strengths

- In January 2008, the Home Office published the statistical bulletin *Homicides, Firearm Offences and Intimate Violence 2006/07*; this reports that, during 2006/07, South Wales had 13 murders per million population compared with a UK average of 13.7.
- Crime analysis in South Wales is undertaken at two levels – basic command unit (division) (level 1) and force (level 2). At level 1, analysis concentrates on volume crime, anti-social behaviour and other crime and criminals impacting at local level. At level 2, the force intelligence bureau (FIB) analyses crime and criminals who cross divisional and force boundaries.
- The force has an establishment of 24 crime and intelligence analysts, three of whom are fixed term and the rest permanent. There are three researcher posts based in three of the six divisions.
- Level 2 analytical capacity comprises one principal analyst, one senior intelligence analyst (deputy principal analyst), one senior products analyst, five level 2 intelligence analysts, one operations support division analyst, one volume crime team analyst and one dedicated major crime analyst.
- In June 2007, a new post of senior intelligence analyst was created to quality assure intelligence products and to ensure that the force meets the ACPO guidance on the National Intelligence Model (NIM) 2005.
- At level 1, the force has 13 analysts based in its six divisions and researchers in three of the divisions who are funded by the community safety partnership.
- Until 1 April 2008, the force employed a level 2 special branch analyst to focus on the strategic priority element of terrorism and to provide continued strategic and tactical oversight. This function has become part of the WECTU and is no longer part of the force analytical establishment.
- The level 2 major crime analyst has completed a problem profile for homicide; this reviewed the 107 homicides committed in South Wales since 2001 and its findings will inform the homicide reduction strategy.
- The main responsibility of the five level 2 crime analysts is to provide analytical support to serious and organised crime investigations at the development, investigative and evidential phases. A recent example that illustrates their work concerned the intelligence cell, comprising level 2 analytical resources. This was tasked with identifying OCGs operating in South Wales that were linked to both firearms offences and the supply of drugs. The tasking enabled intelligence to be developed as a basis for targeting level 1 and level 2 resources to disrupt activity against the threat posed by these OCGs (Operation Tornado).

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- Additional responsibilities for the five level 2 crime analysts include:
 - undertaking analysis for the monthly tactical assessment in relation to a defined control strategy priority, eg gun crime, Class A drugs, immigration crime or distraction burglary;
 - providing additional resilience to the major crime investigation team (MCIT) when the dedicated analyst is fully employed; and
 - co-ordinating the identification of level 2 OCGs in relation to a defined control strategy priority.
- Operation Hurricane is the response by the force to the potential and emerging threat posed by OCGs that are known to possess and use firearms. The operation was set up in 2007 to focus on intelligence development and enforcement opportunities following the gang-related, non-fatal shooting of an individual in a nightclub in Cardiff, which demonstrated links between OCGs in Cardiff, Newport and Bristol. Gun crime remains a level 2 control strategy priority and the FIB is responsible for collecting and reviewing intelligence at level 1 and level 2 to support the continued identification, assessment and management of the potential and emerging threat posed by OCGs. Enforcement activity is tasked through NIM tasking processes, which focus on disruption and dismantling tactics, and operational command rests with a dedicated superintendent.
- The regional intelligence unit (RIU) is housed in Operation Tarian (Welsh for shield). The RIU strategic and tactical analyst is complemented by three intelligence analysts, dedicated to developing specific serious and organised crime groups and supporting 'live' operations conducted by the regional task force (RTF). Additionally, there is a dedicated distraction burglary analyst.
- The RIU produces the annual Wales strategic assessment and quarterly tactical assessments, as well as market and problem profiles as and when tasked by either the regional intelligence group (RIG) (monthly meetings), the regional tactical tasking and co-ordination group (RTTCG) (quarterly) or the regional strategic tasking and co-ordination group (annual).
- The RIU has completed the following profiles in the last 12 months:
 - a problem profile on the facilitation and exploitation of migrants;
 - a problem profile on criminal networks and firearms;
 - a problem profile on intellectual property crime; and
 - a criminal business profile on cannabis cultivation in Wales.
- The RIU is driving the OCG mapping process for Wales, which forms part of the regional strategic assessment (RSA) and tactical assessment.
- Despite some challenging resource issues, the analytical team has been able to provide tactical analytical support to all homicides, which have included a number of long-term, high-profile re-investigations. Furthermore, the force has progressed strategic NIM analytical products in relation to homicide and guns and gangs problem profiles, which are ongoing. With the long-term re-investigations winding down and the additional level 2 researcher posts, capacity will be more conducive to meeting the normal demand profile.
- The RIU provides additional resilience at times of overwhelming demand for the three southern Welsh forces. South Wales Police has never had to draw on this resource to date.

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Work In progress

- Between March and October 2007, South Wales Police invited the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) NIM support team to undertake a review of its NIM assets, processes and products. The force has an action plan to take forward the review findings.
- An action plan is in place to address the level 2 researcher shortfall and the issue features in the force risk register. In April 2008, funding was agreed for two level 2 researchers and the posts will be advertised.

Areas for improvement

- There is limited research and development support at level 2, which means that analysts are diverted from their primary role to undertake this function. This capacity is further eroded by an abstraction rate to level 2 operational intelligence support.
- The force may benefit from limiting operational abstraction of the major crime analyst to afford the opportunity to develop strategic NIM products in relation to major crime, precursor offences and the threat posed by dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals or groups.
- No analyst has oversight of public protection in terms of multi-agency public protection arrangement (MAPPA) nominals, domestic violence offenders and potentially dangerous people.
- The abstraction rate from the FIB to support major crime investigation has been high and could have a detrimental effect on FIB capacity to produce strategic NIM products.

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Summary – The force seeks (and shares) intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be embryonic. The force’s community impact assessments to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.

Strengths

- Community impact assessments are routinely undertaken after each incidence of major crime. The force procedure for community impact assessment holds the divisional commander responsible for their completion and update, in conjunction with the senior investigating officer (SIO). The assessment includes consideration of a long-term community strategy following an investigation or trial.
- The relationship between the FIB and the RIU is well established and works effectively in practice.
- The force has completed an assessment of protective services that has informed both the second All-Wales (Protective Services) Strategic Assessment and the National Strategic Assessment.
- Force and divisional analysts have access to data provided to the force by the Welsh Assembly Government, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the Welsh Ambulance Service to identify emerging and potential threats.
- There was good evidence of developing partnerships at divisional level that facilitate an in-depth understanding of the threat posed, particularly in relation to the production, supply and misuse of controlled drugs.
- The inspection found pockets of relevant good practice at divisional level; one example is the joint working arrangements between partners and other agencies in Swansea to understand the extent of harm associated with the misuse of controlled drugs.
- The force has recently submitted the third round of OCG mapping data and has identified 190 OCGs impacting on the force in eight crime areas, namely:
 - drugs (117);
 - burglary (35);
 - vehicle crime (3);
 - fraud (5);
 - firearms (2);
 - robbery (1);
 - immigration (1); and
 - other (26).

This is an increase of 145 OCGs from the first round of mapping. All six divisions have contributed to the process: 52 OCGs were identified by force-level departments; 18 by Merthyr and Rhondda Cynon Taff (A division); 17 by Cardiff (C division); 18 by Vale of Glamorgan (E division); 27 by Bridgend (F division); 30 by Neath and Port Talbot (G division); and 28 by Swansea (H division).

- Between 1 April and 30 September 2007, there were 31 firearms-related offences in the force. Of these, 15 involved air weapons, three related to handguns (one to cause criminal damage, one used as a blunt instrument and one used as a threat)

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and 14 related to a weapon being fired and causing injury (three caused serious injury).

- OCG mapping data submitted by the southern Welsh forces includes intelligence from other agencies such as the Border Agency and the Federation against Copyright Theft. This data has contributed to the ACPO Wales RSA, completed in September 2007 by the RIU, to further inform forces about the threats posed by criminal networks operating in Wales.
- At regional level, partners and other agencies are fully engaged and information sharing works well in practice.
- The free flow of information and intelligence between forces and Operation Tarian, coupled with the high levels of operational co-operation and co-ordination, means that there is a joined-up approach which is reflected in shared crime priorities, common standards for intelligence products and the ability of law enforcement agencies to engage and disrupt serious and organised crime.
- The RIU is taking the lead in mapping the threat from OCGs across Wales. At the last round (December 2007) of submissions to the national co-ordinator's office, the region was able to include OCGs identified by local authorities, the United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO), Trading Standards and British Transport Police (BTP), in addition to the force returns. OCG mapping is now informing the NIM tasking processes and providing a basis for the RSA.
- Operation Tarian has sought to encourage staff from other agencies to base themselves in Tarian and work alongside the regional units on a daily basis; there is then little need to arrange formal meetings or to telephone to discuss ongoing issues. Issues can be addressed across the table in real time, resulting in operational enquiries being resolved very quickly. Staff from the following agencies are currently based in Tarian:
 - courts enforcement;
 - HMRC; and
 - Trading Standards.

Work in progress

- The force has started to consider the drivers of homicide and has undertaken some basic research in the form of the homicide baseline assessment. The force accepts that this is embryonic, but it is a step in the right direction towards understanding homicide precursors and patterns. This work is based on all homicide incidents since January 2001; the force average over that time is 15 homicides a year, with seven in one year and a peak of 23 in another.
- Last year's review of NIM processes – undertaken by the NPIA NIM support team – recommended that the force develop a policy to provide clear guidance on covert human information source management and cell intervention so that intelligence collection is focused on force and divisional priorities. The force has an action plan to take forward the review findings.
- A number of agencies that actively engage at regional level are reluctant to engage further at force level and expect the information exchanged to be disseminated to forces. The RIU and three forces are establishing a process that facilitates the free flow of intelligence.

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- The ACPO Wales RSA dated September 2007 was drafted before the FSA was completed, due to competing priorities around OCG mapping. The RIU is fully aware of this and is working with forces to ensure that the timing of force strategic products allows them to inform future regional assessments.

Areas for improvement

- Outside the statutory MAPPA structure, there is insufficient evidence of effective relationships with partners and agencies that would enrich the intelligence picture in respect of major crime, near misses and precursor incidents, both at divisional and force level.
- The force has not engaged minority groups specifically to improve its understanding of particular groups' vulnerabilities to, or potential contribution to, major crime.
- The work in Swansea to understand the drug world better involves innovative partnerships with the ambulance service and local health services. If such protocols were adopted at force level and expanded into violent crime, the force would benefit from a rich source of data on violent crime and near-miss homicides that it currently lacks.
- There still appear to be technical problems with the force intelligence system, with Niche hampering the analysts' ability to deliver meaningful NIM products.
- Although effective information-sharing protocols are evident and working at divisional and regional level, there was limited evidence of information regularly and routinely being sought or shared with partners at force level. One outcome of this is that few OCGs have been identified by the force as a result of intelligence from partner organisations and agencies.
- Health service provision in Wales is somewhat fragmented and complex, and health areas are not coterminous with police boundaries. This makes developing partnerships challenging and there is little liaison to develop homicide prevention work. Overcoming these barriers would benefit the force's violent crime prevention strategies, through the addition of intelligence concerning near-miss homicides and other incidents that may be precursors but are not reported to the police. The benefit to the health services would be a long-term reduction in patients presenting with serious injury.
- There are no documented terms of reference for the RIU, with a consequent lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities. Examples of this are: the inadequate sharing of information about OCGs from outside southern Wales that operate in the area; the question of whether the single point of contact (SPOC) for dissemination is the main force concerned or the RIU; and the role (if any) that the RIU has in relation to major crime.

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Summary – The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is similarly adequate. Problem profiles for homicide, gun crime and knife crime are limited but developing, with links to force and division-level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- The force intelligence products are compliant with the ACPO guidance on NIM 2005.
- The FSA of November 2007 indicates that 39% of homicides in the past seven years have been domestic related. Domestic violence specifically features in the control strategy and has a prevention, intelligence and enforcement (PIE) action plan.
- The FSA takes account of the UK threat assessment control strategy priorities, national policing priorities and regional control strategy priorities, as well as the community safety strategies of partner agencies.
- Problem profiles have recently been completed in relation to gangs, gun crime and homicide; the gun crime strategy – Operation Hurricane – has been developed as a consequence of the gun crime profile.
- A range of intelligence products has informed the FSA and considers future impacts. These products include:
 - homicide baseline assessment;
 - baseline assessment of the sex industry, including immigration crime issues;
 - force tactical assessments;
 - the six divisional strategic assessments;
 - level 2 drugs network analysis; and
 - Class A drugs market profile, incorporating gun crime issues.
- In June 2007, a new post of senior intelligence analyst was created to quality assure intelligence products and to ensure that the force meets the ACPO guidance on NIM 2005.
- Each control strategy priority and associated PIE delivery plan is allocated a lead officer at superintendent level.
- The second All-Wales (Protective Services) Strategic Assessment – covering major crime (homicide) and serious, organised and cross-border crime – was completed in September 2007. For South Wales Police, the threat/risk assessments for major crime and serious, organised and cross-border crime were high and medium respectively.
- The RSA reviews the principal threats to Wales from serious, organised and cross-border criminality. It takes account of the UK threat assessment, relevant sections of the All-Wales (Protective Services) Strategic Assessment, and intelligence sourced directly from the four Welsh forces, open sources, national OCG mapping process and external agencies such as the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and the Border Agency.

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- Each crime area in the RSA has been scored against a pre-set threat/risk matrix, used as part of the OCG mapping process – the high, medium or low-priority gradings will determine future actions to be taken in the region.
- Those crime areas in the RSA emerging as high priority, namely terrorism and domestic extremism and Class A drugs, are nominated as regional control strategy priorities. The medium-priority areas of facilitation, trafficking and exploitation of migrants, cannabis cultivation, firearms and distraction burglary generate regional intelligence requirements, each having a documented intelligence requirement and delivery plan. The low-priority areas of kidnap and extortion, intellectual property crime and fraud are areas where the region should maintain awareness.

Work in progress

- The force has recognised the future threat posed by gun crime and is in the process of developing a gun crime strategy under the aegis of Operation Hurricane. Enforcement is progressing; the intelligence, prevention and partnership aspects are embryonic.

Areas for improvement

- No intelligence requirements have been set to close the intelligence gaps in relation to homicide, including those offences that may be precursors to homicide, and near-miss incidents.
- The force has no systems or processes in place to analyse precursor events and offences, near misses or other life-threatening offences and issues, which would enable it to fully assess the threat posed by these offences at levels 1 and 2.
- SIOs are required to complete form CRIMSEC 7A for submission to the Home Office in respect of every homicide investigation; the form contains information that informs the analysis of homicide. However, some analysts were unaware of this form and the force should consider introducing a process whereby completed forms are routed through the strategic major crime analyst.
- The homicide problem profile would benefit from more in-depth analysis of a range of relevant factors, including consumption of alcohol, use of prescription and controlled drugs by victims and suspects, and issues concerning the mental health of victims and suspects.
- The homicide problem profile does not indicate how many suspects were previously known to the police or have Police National Computer warning flags, which would inform a future prevention strategy and help identify those who may have the potential to kill or cause serious harm as potentially dangerous offenders at an early stage in their offending career.
- The force has set some intelligence requirements to reduce knowledge gaps but does not prioritise requirements or relate them to the level of existing knowledge in order to focus the activity of officers and staff collecting intelligence.
- No processes or systems are in place to review or monitor collection against force or regional intelligence requirements that are not prioritised, and there was little

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knowledge at level 1 of the force intelligence requirement. The force demonstrated little knowledge of the regional intelligence requirements.

- Threat-to-life issues resulting in the issue of an Osman warning are not routinely analysed; such analysis would serve as a building block to complete the picture of threat in relation to major crime.
- The RSA comprehensively considers the threat posed to the region by serious and organised crime; however, there is no analysis or assessment of the threat posed regionally by major crime.

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Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are only recently being shared with partners and divisions. There is an emerging trigger plan for hot briefing whenever either a significant change in the major crime threat or the nature of the analysis demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners such as MAPPA are effective. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- The force routinely shares products with the other agencies that attend the force tactical tasking and co-ordination group (FTTCG) meetings.
- It makes use of national databases in order to assist investigations and inform practitioners of current good practice.
- The force has a database of officer and staff language skills; however, it has not yet considered extending this to include life skills that may assist SIOs or others when confronted with unusual scenarios.
- Information sharing concerning threat-to-life issues out of hours is facilitated by the force control room, which has access to all force intelligence systems, including the violent and sex offenders register (ViSOR) and the IMPACT nominal index.
- There is a clear governance structure in place through an IMPACT programme board, which is chaired by the chief information officer (chief superintendent). The IMPACT programme board reports by exception to the corporate intelligence programme board, chaired by an ACC, who in turn reports by exception to the chief officer information group. The continued employment of a dedicated project team supports the force management of police information (MoPI) implementation action plan.
- Divisional commanders attend the FTTCG, which affords them the opportunity to make direct bids for level 2 resources and raises awareness of level 2 problem profiles, other NIM products and tasking of force resources.
- There was strong evidence that general intelligence is sought and shared at level 1 with partners such as local authorities, local health boards and drug referral workers.
- The system for hot briefing partners on major crime issues operates primarily through the established MAPPA. Briefing partners other than those in MAPPA operates through the RIU. All partners who attend regional tactical tasking have appointed a SPOC and examples were provided of dynamic information sharing concerning crimes in action. Out of office hours, the regional senior detective on call is the police conduit.
- In order to overcome long-standing problems of access to other agency and partner databases, Operation Tarian actively encourages agencies and partners to base a member of staff, with access to the relevant IT systems, in the Tarian RIU.

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- The RIU has developed a document (*Appendix A*) with partners and agencies to share information at RTTCG on active and developing target nominals and operations, both to inform all agencies and to ensure a joined-up approach where appropriate. The following are contributors to *Appendix A*:
 - the four Welsh police forces;
 - BTP;
 - Border Agency;
 - all regional teams (RTF, RIU, regional asset recovery team (RART) and regional intelligence cell (RIC));
 - Trading Standards;
 - UKIPO;
 - SOCA; and
 - HMRC.

Work in progress

- The force is working through areas for development identified by the NPIA IMPACT programme MoPI peer review conducted in November 2007, namely:
 - terms of reference for project board meetings;
 - planning for implementation of review, retention and disposal;
 - further engagement with the force HR department;
 - expediting planning for the integration of information from other than the six initial business areas of the IMPACT nominal index.
- A central registry for all the information-sharing agreements held by the force is being developed as part of the MoPI guidance implementation requirements and will be in place by spring 2008.

Areas for improvement

- Information-sharing protocols with partners and other agencies should be developed at force level to provide a two-way flow of information to prevent and disrupt criminal activity.
- Although evidence of dynamic information sharing with MAPPA partners is noted, the force needs to extend information-sharing agreements to other partners and agencies, such as community safety partnerships, regarding threats posed by major crime.
- The force does not have a database of the life skills of its officers and staff. Such a database could be invaluable to an SIO and could also prove cost effective if it obviates the need to employ people with the particular skills necessary for an investigation.

Developing practice

- The RIU has developed a document (*Appendix A*) with partners and agencies to share information at RTTCG on active and developing target nominals and operations, both to inform all agencies and to ensure a joined-up approach where appropriate. The following are contributors to *Appendix A*:
 - the four Welsh police forces;
 - BTP;
 - Border Agency;

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- all regional teams (RTF, RIU, RART and RIC);
- Trading Standards;
- UKIPO;
- SOCA; and
- HMRC.

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Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.

Strengths

- Based on the November 2007 FSA, PIE priorities have been established as the basis for tackling the threats posed to vulnerable communities by serious and organised crime groups.
- Level 1 strategic assessments use community data gathered from neighbourhood meetings, public surveys and the activities of partners; together with the Welsh Office vulnerable localities index, this allows the force to identify those communities most at risk.
- The inspection found pockets of good practice at divisional level, particularly in relation to drug misuse, where divisions are working with the community, partners and other agencies and are endeavouring to fully understand the issues.
- South Wales Police has recently developed its neighbourhood policing community profiles to include the following localised information:
 - statistical information (relating to matters such as population, deprivation factors, family make-up and other demographic information);
 - a comprehensive geographical survey of the neighbourhood, detailing places of interest (including geographic information systems location information), the nature of the establishment or building, services offered or activity undertaken, and details of key contacts at the address; and
 - information relating to key individuals in the neighbourhood, such as elected representatives, community leaders and influential individuals.
- Community and race relations groups meet every six weeks with local communities, including independent advisory group (IAG) members, in each of the six divisions to identify emerging risks, threats and tensions impacting on that particular community.
- The minorities support unit has a strategic and tactical role encompassing the race, faith, gender, age, sexuality, disability and Welsh-language strands of diversity. The unit, now in its 25th year, reviews emerging issues such as migrant workers and forced marriages. A field officer covers each divisional area and is supported by officers who lead on strand topics. The unit works closely with neighbourhood officers.

Work in progress

- The November 2007 FSA includes a documented intelligence requirement to close the intelligence gap on immigration crime.
- The force is continuing to develop local neighbourhood profiles; these profiles, if regularly updated and linked to NIM processes, could help to close a number of the current intelligence gaps.

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Areas for improvement

- The November 2007 FSA does not include community profiles and the force has yet to develop the principle of utilising local information contained in the neighbourhood profiles to inform NIM processes.
- There is no strategic profile of the new and emerging communities resident in or transient across South Wales; this would promote a better understanding of the impact on and threat from organised crime in relation to those communities.
- It is evident that various meetings and initiatives are under way at divisional level that could improve understanding of the range of communities policed in South Wales. However, the initiatives are not joined up and do not link with NIM processes; this impedes the ability to piece together the full picture when compiling the FSA.

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Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence, the force strategic risk register is reviewed every six weeks by the Chief Constable, who oversees the force risk committee. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan.

Strengths

- The force has not recorded any current strategic risks concerning major crime intelligence, although the risk of an ‘under-resourced and ineffectively structured analysis function’ will impact indirectly on this area of business.
- A gold, silver and bronze command structure is in place to manage strategic risk at three levels:
 - bronze – where the risk identified can be managed at divisional commander or head of department level;
 - silver – managed by the chief officer with portfolio responsibility for that specific area of the business; and
 - gold – where the risk identified is managed by the Chief Constable and the ACPO team.
- Risks identified at any of the three levels can subsequently be escalated or rescinded to a more appropriate level as necessary.
- A risk register is in place at gold level to manage each risk. Each risk is categorised as an organisational, resource, operational, knowledge and information or financial risk. The register uses a traffic light system, giving oversight of the stage of management and control, and each risk has a nominated risk owner.
- Each risk has a nominated risk owner and associated control measures to manage and reduce the level of risk.
- The force risk register has a front page ‘traffic light dashboard’ that corresponds to the current assessment of each individual risk as high (red), medium (amber) or low (green).
- Risk management is a standing agenda item at weekly divisional command and departmental meetings.

Work in progress

- Local risk management will be included in the compliance CompStat process, scheduled to be undertaken by the force’s review and inspection programme in early 2008. Once in place, this may address the area for improvement noted below in respect of local risk management.

Areas for improvement

- Strategic risk registers are not maintained at bronze or silver level and, in the absence of such records, effective management of risk at these levels cannot be guaranteed.

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- Despite Operation Tarian, there is no bespoke system for managing regional risks; instead, they are managed on an ad hoc basis through what appears to be the most suitable forum. The forces should consider commencing a regional risk management process, which would fit into the regular all-Wales Chief Constable and police authority meeting process.

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Summary – The force is fully collaborating with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Some of the operational databases are searchable from the region and other Welsh forces. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been partially implemented.

Strengths

- The MCIT has no dedicated intelligence capacity, a deliberate decision in order to retain local control of intelligence in an investigation. The relevant divisional intelligence cell is responsible for ensuring that intelligence on the Home Office large major enquiry system (HOLMES) is copied into the force intelligence system.
- The force has invested in an ANPR capability conducive to the level of threat faced. The future development of systems is to be on an all-Wales basis to enhance interoperability and to maximise the effectiveness of their use across Wales.
- Criminal intelligence analysts have access to all crime and electronic records in relation to domestic violence and child abuse. They will also have access to ViSOR in the near future.
- All four Welsh forces are working in collaboration to share information more effectively. Each force has access to each other's intelligence systems through the FIB; the RIU has access to all four intelligence systems.
- In order to overcome long-standing problems of access to other agency and partner databases, Operation Tarian actively encourages agencies and partners to base a member of staff, with access to their relevant IT systems, in the RIU.

Work in progress

- Intelligence sharing remains work in progress; the ACPO regional lead intends to develop live information sharing both at force level and on a cross-regional basis.
- In March 2007, the force went live with the Niche records management system. The system ensures that every person coming to police notice for any reason has a unique file created at that point. The system automatically links future information on that person and has the capacity for other systems to be added, for example ANPR, which can automatically link readings to nominals on the system. The force is still working through a number of substantial 'teething issues', but the system will undoubtedly be an asset to the force once these issues are resolved.
- Since March 2008, HOLMES version 12 has been in use. There was a collaborative venture with Gwent and Dyfed-Powys forces to purchase joint servers for the upgrade.

Areas for improvement

- The MCIT has no dedicated tactical intelligence capacity. When an investigation requires intelligence support, resources are taken from the FIB or a division. With

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an average of 15 homicides per year, the force should consider the benefits of dedicated intelligence support for the operational MCIT teams.

- The major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) manual states that: “From the outset of the investigation, and in line with the National Intelligence Model (NIM), there should be an ongoing process to review the accrued covert material; this should be in consultation with the covert policing cell manager, with a view to further dissemination and sanitisation. This information can then be placed in force intelligence systems in a timely manner. Recommendation 8, The Bichard Inquiry 2004.” South Wales Police has not established systematic processes to ensure that this happens on all occasions.
- ANPR data is not routinely analysed; when further developing ANPR, the force should consider how it will analyse the increasing intelligence product obtained.
- There is no process in place to ensure that intelligence product contained in standalone systems such as HOLMES is fed into the force intelligence system.

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Summary – The force has a case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance. The policy is highly effective. (This refers to organisational learning.)

Strengths

- South Wales Police has a dedicated review team comprising a detective superintendent, a detective chief inspector (DCI), a detective inspector (DI), a detective sergeant (DS), two detective constables (DCs) and an administrative assistant.
- The force review team provides the 28-day unsolved homicide review capability for Dyfed-Powys and Gwent forces through a documented memorandum of understanding.
- Last year, the force major crime review unit (MCRU) undertook reviews of two homicides that remained unsolved at 28 days.
- Reviews undertaken by the MCRU make recommendations that are incident specific, procedural or organisational. These are disseminated as follows:
 - incident specific – to the SIO;
 - procedural – dissemination options include via the investigative training unit, management training unit, probationary training unit, divisional crime managers, divisional commanders meetings, force intranet, crime strategy, weekly orders, simulated operations (Hydra – SIO course), HOLMES training or professional standards department (PSD);
 - organisational – to the force major crime review board for tasking and monitoring.
- The force has in place a comprehensive major crime review policy, which, in addition to homicide, includes fail-to-stop fatal road traffic collisions, missing persons and unsolved stranger rape investigations.
- Since January 2005, South Wales Police has gathered good practice from all reviews, pathology forums and hot debriefs of detected murders. The resulting good practice matrix is widely disseminated throughout the force and nationally.
- Through Operation Moscow, the force has been undertaking cold-case reviews of undetected rapes and serious sexual assaults going back to October 2000. To date, the team has reviewed 290 cases, utilising a specially adapted version of HOLMES II.
- A by-product of the force's investment in cold-case reviews is the professionalisation of the investigation of road deaths – all road death investigators have attended a professionalising the investigative process (PIP) level 3 SIO course, despite the fact that they cannot be accredited as such.
- Operation Moscow was a determining factor behind the force drive to establish sexual assault referral centres (SARCs), to improve aftercare for victims and to enhance the quality of investigation.
- During the spring of 2007, the force led a major crime review seminar that was attended by representatives from 35 forces.

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- The head of the MCRU is chair of the south-west regional major crime review group, attended by eight forces. As chair of this group, he represents the region on the national forum.

Areas for improvement

- Division-based DIs act as SIOs in all cases of rape other than stranger rape, when an HQ-based DCI takes the SIO role. Line managers undertake reviews of rape investigations informally. There is no formal review or system to monitor the quality of reviews as advocated in recommendation 5 of the HMIC thematic inspection of rape investigation and prosecution *Without Consent* (published January 2007).
- The dedicated MCRU is line managed by the PSD. This may inhibit officers and staff from engaging fully with review staff and therefore prevent lessons being learnt. Line management by the crime training department would promote learning more effectively.

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Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The ACC (protective services) chairs the monthly FTTCG, which is attended by divisional representatives and senior managers responsible for specialist resources. SOCA and the RIU are represented at the meeting, which effectively tasks and holds level 2 resources to account.
- Effective systems are in place for hot tasking outside the FTTCG. The on-call detective superintendent authorises all decisions to deploy or otherwise and briefs the ACPO officer/head of the criminal investigation department (CID) at the earliest relevant time.
- The FTTCG provides an effective safeguard by tasking a financial strategy on those occasions when one has not already been built into proposed investigations or operations.
- The director of intelligence chairs a recently established monthly intelligence development group, attended by divisional intelligence managers and DIs working at level 2. The purpose of this group is to develop level 2 operations using problem-solving techniques in order to better inform recommendations to the FTTCG.
- Each control strategy priority and associated PIE delivery plan is allocated a lead officer at superintendent level.
- OCG mapping forms part of the tactical assessment to drive FTTCG business and focus resource deployment in accordance with force priorities and other emerging issues or trends.
- Target and problem profiles are tasked and considered by the TTTCG; examples include the homicide problem profile and the gun crime profile.

Work in progress

- The FTTCG commissioned a homicide problem profile to ascertain the drivers of homicide and has undertaken some initial basic research in the form of the homicide baseline assessment. The force accepts that this is embryonic but it is a step in the right direction towards a better understanding of homicide precursors and patterns. This work is based on all homicides since January 2001; the force average over that time is 15 homicides a year, with just seven in one year and a peak of 23 in another.
- The force is beginning to understand the reach of its OCGs at level 1 and level 2 and the impact of resident and non-resident OCGs. A scoring matrix is being developed that will rank OCGs in terms of the threat they pose. High-scoring OCGs are considered by the FTTCG; this enables the ACPO chair to deploy the range of tasking opportunities available at that time, taking the full intelligence picture into account.

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- Last year's review of NIM processes undertaken by the NPIA NIM support team recommends the attendance of appropriate divisional representatives at the FTTCG (ie level 1 TTCG chairs). The force has an action plan to take forward the review findings.
- The same review recommended that the intelligence development group should be developed into an effective forum to finalise the level 2 tactical assessment. This would enable the chair of the level 2 FTTCG to prioritise the issues in the document and task resources effectively. The force has an action plan to take forward the review findings.

Areas for improvement

- Domestic violence-related incidents account for approximately two out of every five homicides in South Wales. Although there are victim-centred, multi-agency groups to support victims of domestic violence, the force does not have an offender-based strategy. Level 1 tasking does not review the most prolific offenders to consider them for appropriate tasking; this is a cornerstone of homicide prevention.
- Home Office statistics (January 2008) show that South Wales has the highest number of serious wounding offences per 1,000 population in the UK. Despite this, repeat and prolific violent offenders are not routinely assessed at NIM tasking meetings to consider proactive tasking.
- The FTTCG does not review force intelligence requirements or oversee specific actions to reduce the intelligence gap, nor does it review the force control strategy PIE action plan to ensure delivery.
- The FTTCG does not review OCG mapping, in terms of tasking and reviewing threat assessment, to determine the priority in which OCGs should be subject to tasking.
- The force control strategy priority leads are not held to account for delivery of the PIE action plan at the FTTCG (or at any other meeting).
- There is some doubt as to whether the FTTCG ever tasks divisional resources to target or disrupt level 2 nominals resident in the relevant division. The two-way process between the divisional TTCG and the FTTCG appears to be fragmented.
- The FTTCG should set documented objectives or success criteria for every sanctioned level 2 operation, to ensure that all officers, staff and line managers involved in level 2 operations have clearly defined and tightly focused parameters in which to work.
- The FTTCG does not commission results analysis or community impact assessments to evaluate outcomes compared with the costs and impacts of sanctioned operations.
- The force has no process to prioritise the collection of information against the regional intelligence requirements. The regional intelligence requirements were unknown when tested at all levels in the force.

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- OCGs submitted to the RIU are not reassessed to assess the level of threat posed to the region. Such a process would help the chair of regional tasking to prioritise OCGs impacting on the whole region.

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Summary – Due to appropriate and adequate training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.

Strengths

- The minority support unit delivers specialist training to major investigation teams when it is necessary because of a particular aspect of an individual investigation; an example was provided of a homophobic murder. The unit also provided awareness inputs to SIOs for so-called honour-based violence and forced marriages.
- The force has provided generic diversity training, but for many officers this was some years ago and has not been updated.
- A diversity trainer has been recruited by the training unit to ensure that diversity is a golden thread throughout all training courses.
- The Hydra-based immersive training for SIOs includes a diversity theme running through any scenario devised for the course.
- Partners are increasingly involved in training; examples include joint interview training with social service partners for vulnerable adults and children.

Work in progress

- The force is rolling out a five-day diversity course for supervisors, which will be delivered during 2008.

Area for improvement

- The force does not have a database of the languages spoken by, or other skills of, its officers and staff. Such a database could be invaluable to SIOs and could also prove cost effective if it obviates the need to employ people with a particular skill needed for an investigation.

Prevention

Summary – The force has an IAG and key individual networks, which are always used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- The role of an IAG in a major crime investigation is to review the investigative strategy and advise the SIO on relevant diversity issues, which may impact on or be affected by both the crime itself and subsequent police action. In some instances, an IAG may act as a conduit to the community to prevent rumour and misinformation. South Wales Police has a documented protocol and terms of reference for community involvement for its IAG in critical incidents and major crime investigation.
- There is a force-level IAG, members of which are security vetted, as are the members of similar groups at divisional level.
- Lay advisers are not members of gold groups in South Wales – instead, a lay advisory group, comprising representative community members, is formed and meets regularly with the SIO.
- Consideration of the use of IAG members and/or key individuals representing the community as advisers to the SIO is a routine part of business.
- The neighbourhood teams have established key individual networks (KINs). A KIN involves local community members who together represent a broad cross-section of the community, and is used to glean public opinion and identify tensions and problems in the community that may impact on policing. The KIN is also a conduit for the local police to feed back information to the community, where appropriate.
- All meetings between the SIO and IAG are minuted. In the event that an SIO acts against the advice of one or more members of the IAG, this is documented in the policy file and formally fed back to the IAG, together with the rationale for the decision.
- Following the occurrence of major crime, divisional commanders consult KIN individuals where necessary as part of the community impact assessment and ongoing community strategy.

Area for improvement

- In order to demonstrate transparency and accountability, and to maintain the trust and confidence of the community, the force should consider reviewing its policy to have IAG or other lay representation on major crime gold groups where this is considered appropriate by the ACPO chair, rather than meeting the SIO in isolation.

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Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were fully understood and tested by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- Golden hour training has been introduced for recruits, officers undergoing the initial crime investigators’ development programme and those undergoing sergeant and inspector promotion training.
- The force has recently delivered a series of development seminars to front-line sergeants; these included golden hour principles and good practice emanating from reviews and national seminars.
- Each of the five SIOs has assigned responsibility for providing local support and training input to the division in the dedicated MCIT.
- Control room staff have received specific training in how to distinguish a kidnap from a child abduction case.
- Control room actions are informed by drop-down menus to steer staff towards the correct options. Menus are in place for missing persons, firearms incidents, kidnap and domestic violence incidents.
- The force has disaster recovery plans in respect of HOLMES; a secondary server in an alternative secure location supports the main server.
- There are clear call-out procedures for SIOs. The SIO determines the level of investigative support required at the time and the control room has access to call-out lists and the skills database.
- The force has the capability to set up a major incident room (MIR) out of hours if deemed necessary by the SIO.
- All inspectors and above have undergone a one-day critical incident command course, an immersive-style training run on Hydra.
- The force has a sudden and unexplained death policy to provide guidance to staff.

Areas for improvement

- Apart from new student officers and sergeants, front-line officers and control room staff have not received specific guidance concerning golden hour principles or good practice when attending suspected major crime scenes.
- The force should consider widening control room training to include golden hour expectations.
- The force has no systematic means of updating front-line officers and staff on good practice or lessons learnt from force reviews or national forums on golden hour issues in order to maximise evidential potential and to minimise the incidence of omissions or errors.

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Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.

CONTEXT: Although the NPSAT showed the force as facing a high level of life-threatening and gun crime, the level of firearms offences was medium. Between 1 April and 30 September 2007, there were 31 firearms-related offences in the force. Of these, 15 involved air weapons, three related to handguns (one to cause criminal damage, one used as a blunt instrument and one used as a threat) and 14 related to a weapon being fired and causing injury (three caused serious injury).

Strengths

- The force has started to consider the drivers of homicide and has undertaken some basic research in the form of the homicide baseline assessment. The force accepts that this is embryonic, but it is a step in the right direction towards understanding homicide precursors and patterns. This work is based on all homicide incidents since January 2001; the force average over that time is 15 homicides a year, with just seven in one year and a peak of 23 in another.
- In recognition of the problems caused by alcohol-related violence, the force has a rigorous enforcement strategy in Cardiff city centre, which includes the proactive use of licensing laws wherever particular premises prove troublesome. This is supported by a long-term, intelligence-led, alcohol-related violence reduction plan targeted at licensed premises where suspects and victims of assault had been drinking at or before the assault. The force considers best practice to design out violent crime related to licensed premises and is working in partnership with health services to publicise the issues concerning excessive drinking.
- Intelligence products comply with the ACPO guidance on NIM 2005.
- Identification and management of risk should be an integral part of every stage of an effective investigation of domestic abuse. This principle is embedded in the force – as guidance, in the domestic abuse risk assessment and management process, and in operational practices. The system for initially assessing the risk management level of the victim is fully automated, using information from the incident report and the initial risk assessment form.
- The multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) approach to risk reduction relating to domestic violence commenced in South Wales in 2003. This recognises the multiple and unique needs of victims and their children, and has been independently evaluated by Cardiff University. All very high-risk victims are referred by the relevant domestic violence co-ordinators to a MARAC meeting to develop a multi-agency risk management plan.
- The force has a comprehensive policy in place to manage sex and dangerous offenders. The Cardiff multi-agency public protection unit is a good example of co-location and information sharing on an everyday basis. The unit houses police, probation, social services, mental health and housing staff. While the practitioners work together, their respective IT systems are also linked and accessible to all staff in the unit.
- Alcohol-related violence and gun crime specifically feature in the FSA, with a PIE plan combined with intelligence requirements.

July 2008

- The force is developing a gun crime strategy, named Operation Hurricane; this is an attempt by the force to position itself so that it is ahead of a problem that it perceives will grow rapidly unless tackled. It has developed a strong enforcement arm and is now developing the associated intelligence and prevention aspects. The force is developing the strategy in liaison with forces that have experienced high levels of gun crime, such as West Midlands.

Work in progress

- Following production of the homicide baseline assessment, the force intends to develop a homicide prevention strategy.

Areas for improvement

- The force has produced a basic analytical homicide product but has yet to develop a homicide reduction strategy.
- Such a strategy ought to include the development of relationships with mental health practitioners to identify people with mental illness, whether known to the police or not, who have the potential to kill or cause serious harm.
- The force would benefit from developing a partnership intelligence strategy to improve the identification of near-miss and precursor offences.
- Home Office statistics (January 2008) show that South Wales has the highest number of serious wounding offences per 1,000 population in the UK. The introduction of an overarching violent crime strategy would promote a long-term, joined-up approach to reducing such crime.
- Domestic violence-related homicide, and the escalation of violence that in many cases precedes domestic homicide, continues to feature heavily in South Wales. The force estimates that around 40% of all homicides are domestic violence-related, and domestic violence features heavily in the violence against the person crime figures. Although domestic violence features as a standalone control strategy priority, the force should consider appointing a force lead to co-ordinate domestic violence strategy, pulling together all the elements and driving them forward in a co-ordinated way.
- The force should raise awareness of situations that may be precursors to homicide, notably:
 - people with mental health issues coming to police notice because they are involved in threats, violence or refusal to take medication;
 - certain categories of harassment; and
 - people coming to police notice who believe they may have dishonoured their family.

July 2008

Summary – The policy covering threat to life is in draft format. Staff demonstrated reasonable understanding of the necessary steps to take. Examples of joint, regional, cross-border and multi-agency operations are patchy.

Strengths

- Although the draft threat-to-life policy has taken a number of months to progress, officers and staff at all levels are aware of the importance of immediately referring such issues to the duty bronze inspector or critical incident manager for initial assessment and subsequent escalation of command responsibility to the on-call SIO, in accordance with the critical incident policy. All incidents falling within this remit require policy logs to be kept.
- The force is developing a gun crime strategy, named Operation Hurricane; this is an attempt by the force to position itself so that it is ahead of a problem that it perceives will grow rapidly unless tackled. It has developed a strong enforcement arm and is now developing the associated intelligence and prevention aspects. The force is developing the strategy in liaison with forces that have experienced high levels of gun crime, such as West Midlands.
- Swansea is piloting the employment of a mental health nurse in the custody suite to divert people with mental illness away from the criminal justice system. This might present the force with an ideal opportunity to build links with mental health practitioners in order to identify potentially dangerous people known to health services but not currently on the police radar.

Work in progress

- The threat-to-life policy is in draft format and currently subject to consultation. The force ought to consider the inclusion of developing practice from other forces, including:
 - clarification of what constitutes a ‘threat to life’ to provide guidance on a range of scenarios – eg, where anonymous information is received stating that a shooting or similar incident will occur at a named venue on a known date;
 - a threat assessment guide, combined with referral thresholds to a suitable SIO based on the level of threat, to ensure greater consistency of application. For example, a threat to life assessed as low might be managed by a division-based DI, whereas a threat scoring high or very high might require management by the on-call detective superintendent overseen by ACPO;
 - a menu of tactical options to provide guidance to officers dealing with threat-to-life issues – eg, situations when serving an Osman warning might act as a catalyst and lead to serious injury or loss of life;
 - the use of reverse Osman warnings – eg, where an escalation of domestic violence indicates a serious risk of homicide; and
 - suitable means of storage, sanitisation (if appropriate) and then transfer to the force intelligence system.

Areas for improvement

- Osman warnings are retained in hard copy with the relevant case papers. The force should, as and when resources permit, consider recording these warnings

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on a searchable intelligence system to facilitate analysis and to inform future decision-makers should the same person be threatened at a later date.

- Operation Tarian officers dealing with threat-to-life issues currently have to work with different policies in relation to threats to life across the three southern Welsh forces. South Wales and Dyfed-Powys policies are still in draft format, and the forces might like to consider the adoption of a common threat-to-life policy.

July 2008

Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by dedicated covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by, all staff. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- Officers and staff interviewed demonstrated an awareness of the means to protect tactics and covert resources. The force has established a covert operations management unit as the SPOC and centre of excellence for all such matters.
- A witness protection capability exists, which is able to undertake the full range of witness protection measures.
- The force is represented at national forums to keep abreast of lessons learnt and developing practice.
- The witness protection SPOC raises awareness of witness protection issues through personal briefing at all levels and use of the force intranet system to disseminate learning points and national good practice.

Work in progress

- An all-Wales group is led by an ACC to consider the provision of witness protection; a paper has been completed and is with the Welsh chiefs and chairs group for consideration. If approved, this is likely to provide a cost-effective and efficient service for Wales.
- Although the force currently has no witness protection policy, it has produced a draft all-Wales policy that is currently at the consultation stage.
- In the short term, the head of department is seeking authority to train a back-up witness protection SPOC in order to provide greater resilience.

Summary – The force has a limited system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The minority support unit provides a weekly community impact assessment to the ACPO team, utilising a range of sources.
- Robust systems and processes are in place for reviewing community tension on a weekly basis; this in turn informs an update to the fortnightly security review group, which is chaired by the ACPO lead.
- The force undertakes postal, telephone and face-to-face surveys to help gauge public opinion on local issues, the impacts of crime in general terms and the public perception of policing.
- There were pockets of good practice at divisional level – for example, the joint working arrangements between partners and other agencies in Swansea to understand the extent of harm associated with the misuse of controlled drugs.
- Community and race relations groups meet every six weeks with local communities, including IAG members, in each of the six divisions to identify emerging risks, threats and tensions impacting on that particular community. This feeds into NIM processes.
- Level 1 volume and signal crimes are monitored closely to identify local fluctuations that might be an indicator of underlying serious and organised crime – these are then reported via existing NIM processes.
- The force neighbourhood teams have established KINs. A KIN involves local community members who together represent a broad cross-section of the community and are used to glean public opinion and to identify tensions and problems in the community that may impact on policing. The KIN is also a conduit for local police to feed back information to the community, where appropriate.
- It is evident that intelligence is sought and shared with partners and voluntary organisations – such as a charity providing shelter and provisions for homeless and vulnerable people – to support ongoing prevention and enforcement activity, mainly in relation to OCGs active in supplying Class A drugs.

Work in progress

- Swansea Division is leading the force in developing a range of indicators that provide a fairly sophisticated radar, monitoring the effects of enforcement and prevention activity, particularly in relation to the supply and misuse of controlled drugs. It is noteworthy that a number of these indicators are pioneering in terms of intelligence sharing with partners. The division has endeavoured to develop this further in respect of unreported assault and near-miss homicide, but this has been unsuccessful to date.

Areas for improvement

- Results analysis at level 1 and level 2 is not undertaken. Continual results analysis would help the force build a picture of tactics that work best from a police perspective, those that have the greatest impact on community confidence and satisfaction and those that reduce crime levels over the short to longer term.
- The force does not have in place indicators or evaluative approaches to monitor the impact of preventative or enforcement activity.
- Community engagement is a crucial aspect in enabling the police service to understand the harm caused by crime in specific communities. Specifically tasked neighbourhood policing teams are one method the force could employ to assess and measure a baseline – and then changes from that baseline – over time and on specific occasions. Such tasking must be linked to NIM processes in order to apply it dynamically and to ensure that it informs further tactical and strategic tasking.
- Formal community impact assessments before and after operations would inform the results analysis.
- The development of partnership working, particularly around sanitised information sharing with partners (eg health), would add major crime data (such as unreported assaults) to the overall intelligence picture. This would help gauge the effectiveness of activities such as violent crime initiatives.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a developing security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted, commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- The service confidence policy allows the force to take positive action to protect its staff assets or members from risk. The policy comes into effect when there is insufficient evidence to discipline or prosecute an officer (or member of police staff) but sufficient intelligence exists to erode confidence in the integrity of a postholder, who may then be moved to a post where the level of risk presented is minimised. The policy also covers situations where a spouse or partner has a pending criminal trial.
- An ‘inappropriate association’ policy has been adopted to monitor associations that have the potential to compromise either an individual or the organisation.
- The force has a lawful business monitoring policy to monitor and/or record communications as a means of ensuring that staff and officers comply with force policy and expected standards of behaviour.
- A widely published confidential reporting line enables staff to report anonymously any wrongdoing or misconduct.
- Vetting of staff in the police service is undertaken to provide a safe working environment for staff and to protect members of the public and police information; it is a cornerstone of achieving an ethical, honest and corruption-free police service. South Wales Police established a vetting unit in late 2007.

Work in progress

- The security vetting manager is new in post and the force aims to agree a vetting policy, in line with ACPO guidance, by early 2008. The vetting policy ought to identify which designated posts require security vetting and specify the appropriate level.

Areas for improvement

- In its drug-testing programme, the force should prioritise sensitive and key posts.
- Incomplete vetting records mean that the force is unable to identify comprehensively who is vetted and to what level. A fundamental review of vetting arrangements would be valuable, to include re-vetting in any case of doubt or uncertainty.
- Once vetted to an appropriate level, officers are not subject to further scrutiny or asked to volunteer any change in circumstances that might affect their vetted status.
- Management vetting is intended to enhance basic security vetting, as it can examine aspects such as financial vulnerability, inappropriate behaviour, personal integrity, vulnerability to improper pressure or influence and vulnerability through health or welfare conditions. The force is currently not undertaking any management vetting.

- Some key support roles associated with an investigation, for example family liaison officers outside the major investigation team, are not currently vetted. Security vetting of all key role-holders and enhanced management vetting of a small number of individuals would minimise the risk of embarrassment to the force during a high-profile investigation.

Enforcement

Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with appropriate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.

Strengths

- The ACC (protective services) is the force lead for major crime investigation.
- The establishment of gold support groups is always considered, and when appropriate they are formed in accordance with the ACPO Murder Investigation Manual (MIM).
- Independent community members are always involved in gold support groups or act as advisers to the SIO when a gold group is not in place.
- Community or lay advisory groups are established by the minority support unit to support the SIO when it is considered that this will benefit the investigation and/or community.
- The police authority has no specific governance role in respect of major crime but considers itself able to fulfil its role through existing arrangements.
- The detective superintendent, head of the MCIT, holds regular peer review meetings with SIOs, where lines of enquiry are reviewed and agreed. The peer review meeting is documented in the policy file, but SIO policy decisions are not countersigned by the line manager.
- The Police Authority for Wales (PAW) is now established as a legal entity and early in 2008 will have employer status. PAW members will be security vetted to security check status. The PAW has a specific lead and oversight of major crime in Wales.

Area for improvement

- In order to demonstrate transparency and accountability, and to maintain the trust and confidence of the community, the force should consider reviewing its policy to have IAG or other lay representation on major crime gold groups where this is considered appropriate by the ACPO chair, rather than meeting the SIO in isolation.

Summary – The head of crime is fully trained in the management of linked and series crime, and is supported by staff who have undergone adequate training in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The Chief Constable and the acting ACC are trained in the management of linked and series crime. Six middle and senior managers in CID have also completed this course.
- The Chief Constable and three chief or senior officers have attended serious crime, intelligence management, information technology and resources (SCIMITAR) training.
- The minority support unit works closely with the IAG and other key individuals in the community to develop a network of independent support for major crime investigations.
- The responsibility for homicide cases clearly rests with the relevant divisional commander, who is required to provide resources to support the dedicated investigation team; this ensures local ownership and long-term community planning beyond the investigation phase.
- The force has invested in Hydra computer-based immersive training. All officers of inspector rank and above undergo a one-day, Hydra-based critical incident training package.
- All DSs and inspectors in the force undergo training on basic community impact assessment.
- Sergeant and inspector promotion courses and neighbourhood policing training include a 'policing in partnership' input.

Area for improvement

- No performance management information is produced that would demonstrate to the ACPO lead whether an MIR or outside enquiry team is working at maximum efficiency.

Summary – The force’s performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes, costs, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- For each detected homicide, the SIO completes a ‘detected murder – hot debrief’ form, to update the corporate memory on lessons learnt, good practice, particular challenges and improvement suggestions. These are incorporated into a good practice matrix that the MCRU circulates widely, in the force and nationally.
- The cost of providing intelligence and evidential standard telecommunications packages can spiral out of control in an investigation. SIOs in South Wales routinely chair telecommunications strategy meetings to gain a full understanding of the potential value of a particular piece of evidence or intelligence balanced against the cost. This enables the staged submission of telecommunications requests, spreading the workload of the force telecommunications SPOC and ensuring that costs are monitored and evaluated against their intelligence or evidential potential.
- Homicide investigations run by the major investigation team are ‘owned’ by the SIO; the divisional commander is responsible for community impact assessments, in conjunction with the SIO, and for managing any community impact issues in both the short and long term.
- Figures for the year ending June 2007 show that the sanction detection rate for South Wales Police was fairly high at 32%.

Areas for improvement

- There are no performance management systems in place designed to reassure chief officers that each MIR and outside enquiry team is working at maximum efficiency and effectiveness.
- Similarly, there is limited use of performance indicators measuring costs, outcomes and quality issues in relation to major crime.
- For each homicide that occurs, the MCIT is supported by the relevant division and HQ staff in relation to:
 - the outside enquiry team;
 - exhibits officers;
 - family liaison officers;
 - the disclosure officer;
 - the telephone officer;
 - CCTV collection and viewing; and
 - the intelligence cell.

In 2007, the force investigated 15 homicides, only two of which were still unsolved at the 28-day point. On average throughout the year, 60 divisional and HQ staff were seconded to the MCIT; this peaked at one point at 90 seconded staff. This area might benefit from comparative assessment or benchmarking.

- SIOs were unaware that it is good practice and their responsibility, according to the MIRSAP manual, “to read and mark as filed all documentation generated via the MIR”.

In appropriate circumstances, due to high volumes of work, the SIO delegates part of this function to an appointed deputy. The inspection found that in South Wales Police it is accepted practice for this to be delegated.

- The MCIT is divided into five distinct teams, based in different locations across the force area. The members of each team are deployed in response to force rather than local major crime incidents, which means that each team rarely works together. This makes meaningful performance management and day-to-day supervision of the five MCITs unusually difficult.
- No performance management information is produced for:
 - rape investigation;
 - the source-handling unit;
 - the telecommunications SPOC (throughput and delays); or
 - the hi-tech unit (throughput and delays).

Such information would provide ACPO with oversight of each stage of the investigative process and would offer an early warning of over or under-performance in a particular area.

Performance Management and Resilience

Summary – The inspection teams found sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with SOCA and Operation Tarian exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide sufficient protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- In the period January 2001 to July 2007, the force averaged 16 homicides per year, the majority of which were solved within 28 days. There has not been an unsolved murder since a murder that occurred in 1979 in the Vale of Glamorgan.
- The force has a dedicated MCIT housed on five sites, each with the capacity to run two MIRs. The MCIT is staffed sufficiently to meet the predictable demand pattern for major crime.
- In order to formalise arrangements for police officers on call, the force has taken the step of paying an allowance of £25 per night for officers who are on call.
- All road traffic SIOs have undergone the crime SIO course, as it was felt that the national road death course was inadequate.
- The MCIT has sufficient specialist trained staff to meet the predicted demand pattern.
- Specialist advice and support to major crime investigation is available on a 24-hour basis.
- The force training manager oversees training for major investigation roles and ensures succession planning.
- In the event of extraordinary demand, the force is able to rely on mutual assistance from its two southern Welsh neighbouring forces. This has worked well in practice over a number of years and has recently been cemented with a signed agreement by all three forces.
- All force SIOs are either trained to PIP level 3 or are undergoing the evidence-gathering process for this accreditation.
- Family liaison officer support, welfare and co-ordination are systemised and well managed by the force. The family liaison officers are managed by a co-ordinator, using a traffic light management system that identifies those who are available to take on work and those who are not, based on historical demand.
- The force has a service level agreement to set up MIRWeb and CasWeb within one hour during the normal working day, and within two hours outside this time. It has a dedicated room in HQ with eight terminals and tests the system on a regular basis.
- The scientific support unit has sufficient equipment, or a plan of where to gain access to specialist equipment out of hours, which allows it to progress the range of possible scene types in all weather conditions.

- Ahead of formal collaborative arrangements, the scientific support units of the three southern Welsh forces regularly exchange staff on a short-term basis, to improve knowledge of particular aspects of unusual crime scenes and to provide a contingency capacity in the event that one force has an extraordinary short-term demand. There is currently no written agreement covering such arrangements, although one is in the process of being drawn up to cover the interim period before the units merge.

Work in progress

- A sexual offences working group has been set up to review a number of issues surrounding the sexual offence liaison officers (SOLOs); this includes the provision of a SOLO on a 24-hour basis, something that is not currently available.
- Swansea Division is piloting the provision of on-duty SOLO cover for 12 hours per day and formal on-call SOLO cover for the remaining 12 hours.
- Scientific support in the three southern Welsh forces will be regionalised over the next two years. The scientific support manager from Gwent is leading a project that will provide an enhanced service compared with what is currently provided in each force, but at a lower cost. The regional scientific support manager will be in post by late April 2008.
- The force is training additional staff to ensure greater resilience around MIRWeb and CasWeb, with an aim to train 100 staff in total.
- The long-term secure storage of major crime exhibits is problematic; the force has acquired a secure bunker but this is full, so it is researching other options.
- The force has in place a sudden and unexplained death policy in order to guide and assist officers called to such incidents.

Areas for improvement

- Although the force has a sudden and unexplained death policy, several deficiencies need clarification. For example, the policy:
 - does not define for first responders what is meant by the terms ‘sudden death’ and ‘unexplained death’; during interviews, different interpretations were provided for these terms;
 - states that “a supervisor must be informed immediately of the circumstances of the death” but does not set out expectations as to whether the supervisor should attend and take control; and
 - when the cause of death is not obvious, calls for a full, thorough and professional investigation. It allows a uniformed officer to decide whether the cause of death is obvious, but officers have had no training to equip them to make this crucial decision.
- Intelligence support to major crime investigation has been shown to make significant demands on FIB staff, hindering level 2 proactive work on NIM analytical products. The force should consider ways of providing operational analytical support to major crime in a way that does not detract from usual business.
- Golden hour principles and forensic awareness are taught to all new recruits and officers on promotion courses but there is no training input for first responders not caught by the above training.

- MCIT teams currently investigate crimes in action such as kidnap and extortion; the rationale for this is that the on-call SIO is the line manager for the MCIT. The force should consider whether crimes in action would be better investigated by the level 2 proactive team.
- The force needs to consider increasing the capacity of the HQ MIR in terms of terminals for staff for MIRWeb and CasWeb; they currently have only eight. This is based on experiences during Operation Knott, a recent national exercise to test capacity and response.

Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that has proved effective. Some elements are delivered through developing collaborative agreements with neighbouring forces and Operation Tarian; these are thoroughly tested. The inspection found evidence of the proactive and reactive use of these assets across a wide range of offences.

Strengths

- HMIC examined the provision of surveillance, source-handling units, financial and economic crime investigation, forensic and other support to the investigation of major crime and found it to be appropriate.
- The level 2 accredited investigation team (part of the task force) and major crime teams undertake their own case preparation and management.
- The serious and organised crime task force is tasked by the FTTCG and undertakes the proactive development and investigation of level 2 crime operations. It does not ordinarily undertake the reactive investigation of recorded crime allegations.
- Each division in the force has a basic surveillance capability, enabling it to meet the normal level 1 demand.
- The technical support unit is available on a 24/7 basis, providing technical and covert deployment support for South Wales Police and regional (Operation Tarian) operations in South Wales.
- The hi-tech crime unit has recently moved to new premises and is funded to purchase new equipment. A risk assessment process is in place to ensure that delayed examinations are balanced against the urgency of evidential requirements and the risk of individuals re-offending during the delay period.
- While the hi-tech crime unit has the capability to include network investigation, it does not currently have the capacity due to the level of demand for its other services.
- The force has an operational security capability to undertake independent assessment of covert work.
- The force has a dedicated source unit capability both at force level and in each of the divisions. The force dedicated source unit is line managed by a dedicated DI (controller), while the division-based units are line managed by the DI (controller) with responsibility for the divisional intelligence unit.
- The force has recently invested in a covert microwave network; this covers the force area and will significantly enhance both overt and covert real-time video and still image transmission, to and from any point in the force area.

Work in progress

- The recent investment in the hi-tech crime unit should enable it to clear the backlog of hard-drive examination to a level where any delay is within reasonable parameters. The force expects this to be achieved by August 2008.

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- The force has collaborative arrangements regarding computer examination with its two southern Welsh neighbours to provide additional specialist support when the need arises. This arrangement is not documented but has always served South Wales Police well. The Welsh forces are working at Chief Constable level to formalise these and other arrangements.
- Scientific support in the three southern Welsh forces will be regionalised over the next two years. The scientific support manager from Gwent is leading a project that will provide an enhanced service at a lower overall cost. The regional scientific support manager will be in post by late April 2008.
- A new regional covert forensic manager post will be filled in spring 2008 to provide a regional lead and expertise in covert operations, crimes in action and complex forensic issues such as the large-scale, unlawful production of Class A drugs such as methamphetamine.
- Although each of the three southern Welsh forces currently has an adequate response to the threat of kidnap and extortion, they are exploring whether Operation Tarian should be asked to provide a single response, ensuring a streamlined response with enhanced expertise and equipment and with cost savings for each force.

Areas for improvement

- The force does not have the capability or capacity to undertake any proactive internet-based work, including, for example, covert monitoring.
- The force routinely redeploys specialist assets such as the FIB, financial investigators and the surveillance team to homicide investigation, impacting on its level 2 capabilities and heightening the risk of compromise in the case of surveillance officers.
- The force employs three telecommunications SPOCs who are often stretched beyond capacity; there is a danger that time limits for the retention of information by telecommunications companies may overrun, and there is no process to risk assess and prioritise outstanding applications.
- Numerous officers in specialist departments are on the 30+ scheme or approaching 30 years' service; the force needs to consider succession planning in respect of these roles.
- There appears to be a backlog in copying CCTV into evidential format by the CCTV unit; at the time of inspection, this backlog was around four months.

Summary – The force has a full-time and dedicated case review team that is always deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is highly effective. (This refers to impact on cases.)

Strengths

- South Wales Police has a dedicated review team comprising a detective superintendent, a DCI, a DI, a DS, two DCs and an administrative assistant. Over the last seven years, the success of cold-case homicide review has led to seven undetected murders being solved.
- The force review team provides the 28-day unsolved homicide review capability for Dyfed-Powys and Gwent forces through a documented memorandum of understanding.
- Last year, the MCRU undertook reviews of two homicides that remained unsolved at 28 days.
- Reviews undertaken by the MCRU make recommendations that are incident- specific, procedural or organisational. These are disseminated as follows:
 - incident specific – to the SIO;
 - procedural – dissemination options include via the investigative training unit, management training unit, probationary training unit, divisional crime managers, divisional commanders meetings, force intranet, crime strategy, weekly orders, simulated operations (Hydra – SIO course), HOLMES training or PSD;
 - organisational – to the force major crime review board for tasking and monitoring.
- The force has in place a comprehensive major crime review policy, which, in addition to homicide, includes fail-to-stop fatal road traffic collisions, missing persons and unsolved stranger rape investigations.
- Since January 2005, South Wales Police has gathered good practice from all reviews, pathology forums and hot debriefs of detected murders. The resulting good practice matrix is widely disseminated throughout the force and nationally.
- Through Operation Moscow, the force has been undertaking cold-case reviews of undetected rapes and serious sexual assaults going back to October 2000. To date, the team has reviewed 290 cases, utilising a specially adapted version of HOLMES II.
- A by-product of the force's investment in cold-case reviews is the professionalisation of the investigation of road deaths – all road death investigators have attended a PIP level 3 SIO course, despite the fact that they cannot be accredited as such.
- Operation Moscow was a determining factor behind the force drive to establish SARCs, to improve aftercare for victims and to enhance the quality of investigation.
- During the spring of 2007, the force led a major crime review seminar that was attended by representatives from 35 forces.
- The head of the MCRU is chair of the south-west regional major crime review group, attended by eight forces. As chair of this group, he represents the region on the national forum.

Areas for improvement

- Divison-based DIs act as SIOs in all cases of rape other than stranger rape, when an HQ-based DCI takes the SIO role. Line managers undertake reviews of rape investigations informally. There is no formal review or system to monitor the quality of reviews as advocated in recommendation 5 of the HMIC thematic inspection of rape investigation and prosecution, *Without Consent* (published January 2007).
- The dedicated MCRU is line managed by the PSD. This may inhibit officers and staff from engaging fully with review staff and therefore prevent lessons being learnt. Line management by the crime training department would promote learning more effectively.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force is predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards in MIM and MIRSAP.

Strengths

- The HOLMES manager completes a documented seven-day review of every investigation managed on HOLMES, to ensure compliance with MIRSAP. The review is submitted to the SIO.
- A dedicated review team, independent of the investigative chain of command, has now undertaken a number of comprehensive reviews. These are presented to ACPO, thus allowing the force to learn lessons and ensure compliance with the ACPO MIM.
- The force follows national guidance in terms of staffing numbers and the setting up and running of an MIR, as contained in the MIM and MIRSAP.
- HOLMES policy is required to be documented by the SIO, in accordance with MIRSAP.
- SIO line managers meet regularly to discuss progress with the relevant SIO and to review policy files.

Areas for improvement

- The force should ensure that the seven-day HOLMES review is made available to the SIO line manager to facilitate appropriate supervision.
- SIOs were unaware that it is not only good practice but their responsibility, according to the MIRSAP manual, “to read and mark as filed all documentation generated via the MIR”. In appropriate circumstances, due to high volumes of work, the SIO may delegate part of this function to an appointed deputy. The inspection found that in South Wales Police it is normal and accepted practice for this to be delegated on all occasions.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

That the force progress implementation of a threat-to-life policy and standard operating procedures at the earliest opportunity.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

| | |
|-------|---|
| ACC | assistant chief constable |
| ACPO | Association of Chief Police Officers |
| ANPR | automatic number plate recognition |
| APACS | assessment of policing and community safety |

B

| | |
|-----|--------------------------|
| BTP | British Transport Police |
|-----|--------------------------|

C

| | |
|----------|---|
| CasWeb | A web based user interface of the HOLMES 2 Casualty Bureau application enabling forces to help each other if one force is dealing with the aftermath of a major disaster. |
| CID | criminal investigation department |
| CompStat | computational statistics |
| CPS | Crown Prosecution Service |
| CROP | covert rural observation post |

D

| | |
|-----|---------------------------|
| DC | detective constable |
| DCC | deputy chief constable |
| DCI | detective chief inspector |
| DI | detective inspector |
| DS | detective sergeant |

F

| | |
|-------|--|
| FIB | force intelligence bureau |
| FSA | force strategic assessment |
| FTTCG | force tactical tasking and co-ordination group |

H

| | |
|--------|--|
| HMI | Her Majesty's Inspector |
| HMIC | Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary |
| HMRC | Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs |
| HOLMES | Home Office large major enquiry system |
| HQ | headquarters |
| HR | human resources |

I

| | |
|--------|--|
| IAG | independent advisory group |
| IMPACT | intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking |

K

| | |
|-----|------------------------|
| KIN | key individual network |
|-----|------------------------|

M

| | |
|--------|---|
| MAPPA | multi-agency public protection arrangements |
| MARAC | multi-agency risk assessment conference |
| MCIT | major crime investigation team |
| MCRU | major crime review unit |
| MIM | <i>Murder Investigation Manual</i> |
| MIR | major incident room |
| MIRSAP | major incident room standardised administrative procedures |
| MIRWeb | A web based user interface of the HOLMES 2 MIR application enabling forces anywhere in the UK to provide call handling and data entry facilities to assist another force. |
| MoPI | management of police information |
| MSF | most similar force(s) |

N

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|-------|--|
| NIM | National Intelligence Model |
| NPIA | National Policing Improvement Agency |
| NPSAT | National Protective Services Analysis Tool |

O

| | |
|-------|---|
| OCG | organised crime group |
| OPSY | operational security |
| Osman | Osman v UK (1999) 1 FLR 193, where the court established that in certain circumstances the state has a positive obligation to take preventive measures to protect an individual who is at risk from the criminal activities of others |

P

| | |
|------|---|
| PAW | Police Authority for Wales |
| PIE | prevention, intelligence and enforcement |
| PIP | professionalising the investigative process |
| PMB | performance management board |
| POCA | Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 |
| PSD | professional standards department |

R

| | |
|-------|---|
| RART | regional asset recovery team |
| RIC | regional intelligence cell |
| RIG | regional intelligence group |
| RIU | regional intelligence unit |
| RSA | regional strategic assessment |
| RTF | regional task force |
| RTTCG | regional tactical tasking and co-ordination group |

S

| | |
|------|--------------------------------|
| SARC | sexual assault referral centre |
|------|--------------------------------|

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|----------|--|
| SCIMITAR | serious crime, intelligence management, information technology and resources |
| SGC | specific grading criteria |
| SIO | senior investigating officer |
| SOCA | Serious Organised Crime Agency |
| SOCTF | serious and organised crime task force |
| SOLO | sexual offence liaison officer |
| SPI | statutory performance indicator |
| SPOC | single point of contact |

T

| | |
|------|--|
| TTCG | tactical tasking and co-ordination group |
|------|--|

U

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| UC | undercover |
| UKIPO | United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office |

V

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|-------|-----------------------------------|
| ViSOR | Violent and Sex Offender Register |
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W

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|-------|--|
| WAG | Welsh Assembly Government |
| WECTU | Welsh Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Unit |