

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Norfolk Constabulary Major Crime

July 2008



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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical description of force area

Norfolk Constabulary is responsible for policing the county of Norfolk, an area of some 2,068 square miles. It has a coastline of 90 miles with ports at Great Yarmouth, King's Lynn and Wells, 249 miles of waterways (of which 124 miles are navigable) and 6,331 miles of roads.

Exceptional policing demands arise from Norwich International Airport, the royal residence at Sandringham and Norwich City Football Club. The force is also responsible for offshore emergency plans, which include the key economic site of Bacton gas terminal; terrestrial policing extends out 12 miles into territorial waters.

Demographic profile of force area

Norfolk is a sparsely populated, largely rural county with a resident population of some 829,000 and 371,700 households. Around 38% of the population live in the three major urban areas of Norwich, Great Yarmouth and King's Lynn, 18% in various market towns, 40% in parishes of more than 300 persons and the remaining 4% in parishes of less than 300 persons. There are an estimated 4.7 million visitors to the county annually.

Strategic priorities and direction

The core aim of the of Norfolk Constabulary's policing model is to strengthen the local delivery of front-line policing, which will deliver excellent local services where 'people are our priority'.

In working towards this, the force has four force control strategy priorities, which drive all activities, as outlined in the 2008–11 policing plan, as follows:

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- prioritising the six most vulnerable neighbourhoods;
- reducing anti-social behaviour;
- protecting vulnerable people; and
- tackling serious and organised crime.

The strategic direction of the force was reviewed at the start of 2007/08 and as part of this review, the force set out its approach as follows:

“Vision: Our vision is a new model for policing that will deliver excellent local services where our people are our priority.

Pledge: We will make Norfolk an even safer place to live, work and visit by:

- Improving confidence and satisfaction
- Reducing crime, anti-social behaviour and fear of crime
- Increasing detections.

Principles:

- Working in partnership with the community to identify and resolve problems
- Developing a professional, skilled and flexible team
- Delivering high quality services
- Being proactive and intelligence-led
- Improving performance yet driving down costs.”

There is one newly created county delivery unit (CDU), headed by a chief superintendent with a high degree of delegated authority. This is broken down into seven districts, headed by superintendents. Under these superintendents sit 32 local delivery unit inspectors, to provide more leadership and support to the 52 safer neighbourhood teams (SNTs) that are coterminous with ward and parish boundaries.

In addition to the CDU, the force also has a protective services command led by a chief superintendent, which includes major investigations, intelligence, vulnerable people and forensic sciences.

Staffing levels across the force are as follows (full-time equivalent):

- CDU – 1,062 officers, 258 police community support officers, 208 staff;
- Control and despatch centre (CDC) and partnerships – 75 officers, 228 staff;
- protective services – 399 officers, 246 staff; and
- headquarters (HQ) and support – 90 officers, 563 staff.

The CDU and protective services are supported by HQs and support services departments, the CDC and partnerships.

Force developments since 2007

The force has continued to improve performance during 2007/08, achieving a 10.7% reduction in all crime. It has also achieved its best detection rate of 32.4% for 2007/08 and is currently at 38%. Satisfaction rates have increased; the overall experience figure is up from 65.2% to 67.5% and keeping people informed is up from 46.9% to 49.4%.

To continue to improve performance, the force will progress a number of initiatives including:

- The implementation of the new CDU structure and protective services command.
- Additional superintendents and inspectors at local level, followed by additional sergeants.

- A review of front-line operational processes through Operation Quest (jointly funded by the Home Office).
- A support services review designed to streamline the departments reviewed and provide the most effective support possible to front-line policing.
- The establishment of a new corporate communications department to professionalise the media relations and marketing of the force, externally and internally
- A substantial investment in protective services, resulting in the creation of new posts to meet identified requirements.
- A review of force forms continues – since May 2007, the force has discontinued 277 forms and is trying to reduce the remaining 650 as far as possible, putting all forms onto an electronic database accessible from the front page of the force intranet.

Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard.
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Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Norfolk Constabulary’s capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.227	0.221	-2.64%	0.271
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.012	0.000	-100.00%	0.000
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	100.00%	Not Available	Not Available	Not Available
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.049	0.012	-75.51%	0.055
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	100.00%	0.00%	-100pp*	87.81%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.218	0.073	-66.51%	0.103
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	11.11%	66.67%	+55.56pp*	62.82%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.133	0.279	+109.77%	0.173
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	54.55%	69.57%	+15.02pp*	67.17%
Number of manslaughters per 10,000 population	0.000	0.036	Not Applicable	0.016

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% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	100.00%	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.061	0.061	0.00%	0.082
% of murders detected/convicted	100.00%	80.00%	-20pp*	81.63%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	2.244	1.517	-32.40%	2.108
% of rapes detected/convicted	21.62%	20.80%	-0.82pp*	23.49%

*pp' is percentage points.

***Most similar force (MSF) group for Norfolk is Derbyshire, Devon and Cornwall, Gloucestershire, Lincolnshire, North Yorkshire, Suffolk and West Mercia.*

From the statutory performance indicator (SPI) data in the table above, it can be seen that the crime type of manslaughter poses a threat to Norfolk Constabulary. The rate of offences (per 10,000 population) is well above the MSF average and is one of the highest rates across England and Wales. It should also be noted that the rate of offences for kidnapping is well above the MSF average, but is not high when considered against the rest of the country.

The SPI data also indicates that major crime investigation in Norfolk Constabulary is comparable with that of the rest of the MSF group. Norfolk is performing above the MSF group in some areas (blackmail and kidnapping) and below the group in some other areas (attempted murder and rape). When considering England and Wales as a whole, Norfolk is comparable with other forces.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT), published in September 2007, indicated that Norfolk was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to homicide, rape and kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Norfolk has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types is initially mapped. It is currently estimated that 32 OCGs impact the force area, across a number of major crime types.

The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a reasonable understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified protecting vulnerable people as its major crime priority within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on the

protection of the vulnerable, particularly in respect of online child exploitation and human trafficking.

Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and addressed.

The force has invested suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, minimise risks to the public and inhibit major crime.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates maturing processes in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with Suffolk, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire are recognised.

Intelligence

Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.

Strengths

- Dedicated analysts in the form of a principal analyst, deputy principal analyst and three crime and intelligence analysts work in the intelligence directorate. Their responsibilities include the compilation of key National Intelligence Model (NIM) products, including the FSA and problem and subject profiles across a range of level 2 issues. The force homicide reduction strategy was compiled using data from a problem profile constructed by level 2 crime and intelligence analysts.
- Access to knowledge assets is provided by the force operational information system through an internet facility covering current legislation and case law, codes of practice, manuals of standards, ACPO guidance and force policy relevant to intelligence. The operational information system also provides access to the force briefing system and various live databases such as the crime intelligence system (CIS), computer-aided despatch and the Police National Computer (PNC).
- The analytical function uses Xanalyst software to facilitate data mining and the production of the ten analytical products adopted by the NIM.
- There is consistency in the format of both force and basic command unit (BCU) strategic assessment documents. All include six-year curve profiles detailing crime levels, actions and deeper analysis.
- The force management board (FMB) formally discussed the FSA. This process included discussion of the proposed priorities and provided an audit trail of decision making. Furthermore, this meeting ratified the intelligence requirements around the proposed priorities, as well as identifying emerging trends where intelligence gaps exist.
- The October 2007 FSA has been produced largely by the deputy principal analyst, in conjunction with the corporate development department. Identified control strategies are the reduction of anti-social behaviour, the protection of vulnerable people, tackling serious and organised crime and ensuring community confidence. Running parallel to this is the development of the force three-year strategic plan. The FSA was presented to the force joint planning working group not only to inform it of the most significant threats, but to drive the business planning process and the setting of force targets by the police authority (PA).
- Profiles prepared for the force tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TTCG) have included knife crime, homicide reduction and rave events.

- All force analysts now work in the protective services command and are centrally managed by the principal analyst.
- All BCU intelligence resources became part of the intelligence directorate in February 2008.

Work in progress

- The force has recruited a principal analyst, recognising the importance of the role. This individual will act in a strategic role, based in the corporate development department, to ensure that all aspects of force business are considered analytically, and represents a significant opportunity to drive analytical work in the force.
- As part of the force restructure in November 2007, a business case was accepted to increase the number of analysts working in the intelligence directorate within the protective services command. This will provide greater proactive capacity to prioritise serious and organised crime operations and map OCGs and their activity.
- There are plans to create a 'real-time crime centre' by centralising the whole intelligence function. This will service not only HQ functions, but all BCUs and SNTs. When this transition fully takes place, the force will need to examine how the tasking process should sit within such a structure.
- Although a limited number have been produced, intelligence products do not yet robustly inform and drive the intelligence requirements of the force. There remains a blurring between level 1 and level 2 activity, with the emphasis at level 1 very much on volume crime performance. However, with the development of a new control strategy, areas of threat and risk are being examined and, as a consequence, intelligence products will be commissioned in line with the intelligence requirement. The centralisation of analytical management structures is bringing a new focus to remove the blurring between level 1 and level 2 activity.
- An element of analytical work has been carried out in respect of multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) and violent crime strategies, alongside some development work with the vulnerable persons strategic unit, which has requested more analytical products on, for example, domestic abuse and sex offenders.

Area(s) for improvement

- Currently, three analysts, including the deputy principal analyst, are based at force HQ. These analysts support level 2 operations, OCG activity, the force intelligence bureau (FIB) and major crime investigations. There is a fourth position but the postholder has been seconded away from the force for a considerable period. There is barely sufficient capacity to cope with current demand.
- The force acknowledges that BCU-based analysts are occasionally abstracted to support major investigations but that no backfill process takes place to support the BCU, which creates an adverse impact. However, the force is undergoing a major review of its structure and one component has been to bring the force analytical capacity together to provide a better service.
- Whenever an analyst is required for a major investigation, support is invariably provided by the HQ-based analysts. However, this causes resilience issues in the HQ analytical establishment. When deployed to a major investigation, analysts have been restricted to providing telephone analysis and time lines. Furthermore, they are not physically based in the major incident room (MIR); rather, they work remotely from their usual place of work, as the software they use is not routinely accessible from all workstations across the county.
- There is currently no dedicated capacity for level 2 analysts to support major investigations. Any analytical support required by a senior investigating officer (SIO) is provided at the expense of BCUs. However, awareness of the service and expertise analysts can bring to a major investigation is improving among SIOs.

Summary – The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force’s community impact assessments to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.

Strengths

- A number of examples were provided of relevant multi-agency agreements, including a derivation of the national protocol for deaths in military establishments and links with the Health Care Commission and the Commission for Social Care Inspection to investigate deaths in a care home setting. An example was given of the establishment of a joint agency gold group to oversee one such enquiry. Good working relationships also exist with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Her Majesty’s Prison Service (HMPS), the fire service and the ambulance service (although it is acknowledged that more proactive training with ambulance staff in respect of scene management is required).
- Community impact assessments (CIAs) are used extensively on BCUs after major crime and critical incidents. A CIA is generally started in advance of any request from an SIO, initiated by the BCU. They are the subject of regular review by the BCU senior management team (SMT) – this can be on a daily basis, if appropriate. A CIA was undertaken in respect of Norwich Airport following terrorist attacks in Central London and Glasgow Airport. A CIA was also completed in respect of sex workers in the county, following the murders of five women in Ipswich in December 2006.
- Data-sharing protocols with partners are well established and are developed through an extensive network of partnership TTCGs across the force. Crime and disorder reduction partnership (CDRP) analysts attend the partnership TTCG meetings and their tactical assessments are linked to BCU and force documents.
- A network of prison liaison officers (PLOs) is deployed in prisons across the force area to strengthen working relationships and exchange intelligence between the police and prison service. A policy document sets out the force response to a death in prison custody, and PLOs play a key role in such enquiries.
- There is evidence of a close working relationship with the HSE and adherence to the ACPO/HSE work-related death protocol. An element of joint training with HSE staff has also taken place, although no formal multi-agency, work-related death forum exists, as it does elsewhere in the country.
- A homicide reduction strategy was formulated in June 2007, having been commissioned through the FSA process. The end product centred on two areas of potential risk, namely street violence and domestic abuse. This links with current force activity to reduce night-time violence and domestic abuse – specifically improvements to the CIS to ensure SPECSS (separation/pregnancy/escalation/cultural/sexual assault/stalking) risk assessments are carried out and referral to a multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) of those domestic abuse cases where the victim is at significant risk.

- Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) liaison officers and minority ethnic liaison officers (MELOs) employed by the force are heavily involved in the CIA process.
- A number of examples were provided of effective relationships with partners and other agencies, particularly those developed by the FIB service desk, including:
 - HMPS;
 - the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA);
 - Interpol;
 - Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC); and
 - the regional asset recovery team protocols.

Work in progress

- While joint tasking with partners exists across the force at BCU level, obtaining all relevant data from partners is not yet considered a mature process. As part of the inspection process, the question was asked whether hospital accident and emergency units, through the primary care trust, would inform the police if a significant number of individuals from a particular community or ethnic background were being treated for knife wounds or assault injuries. Responses were mixed and appeared dependent on local arrangements, as opposed to any formalised agreement.

Area(s) for improvement

- There remains an issue with a lack of awareness among SIOs and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) with regard to how to handle and subsequently use prison intelligence material. There is a tendency to seek to use the product as evidence on a regular basis and a lack of corresponding knowledge of the processes involved.
- On occasion, there has been confusion as to ownership of CIAs, as both the BCU and HQ community safety department have been running them separately. There is a need for a more coherent approach between BCUs and HQ departments.

Summary – The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be adequate. Problem profiles are satisfactory, with links to force and BCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- Examples were given of robust analysis of life-threatening crime and the identification of hotspots, notably the centres of Norwich and Great Yarmouth. If issues are identified through such work, then they are fed into the control strategy and/or intelligence requirement.
- Problem profiles, using nationally agreed templates, are compiled and maintained by level 2 analysts in the intelligence directorate. These cover homicide, knife crime, Vietnamese crime groups, organised immigration crime, cash-in-transit robberies, human trafficking, distraction burglaries and gun crime. Any emerging issues from these profiles are reflected in the FSA and tactical assessment.
- Control strategy priorities were identified utilising the problem analysis triangle. This approach involved the key analytical findings from each of the partnership districts and all of the elements of protective services being mapped against victim, offender and location headings. Those issues that were identified as consistently impacting on all three were those selected and subsequently recommended in the control strategy. The information gaps identified during this process are now included in the intelligence requirement recommendations.
- The force conducted a detailed microanalysis of its protective services gap and the newly produced FSA reflects a lot of that work, identifying a number of issues and a recommendation that serious and organised crime and protecting vulnerable people are adopted as two of the control strategy priorities.
- The force three-year strategic plan (2005–08) contains an objective to tackle criminality, with sub-objectives of investigating crime. These sub-objectives include:
 - optimising the use of automatic number plate recognition (ANPR);
 - improving level 2 and specialist capability;
 - co-operating with neighbouring forces and other law enforcement agencies to tackle cross-border crime;
 - ensuring that the skills of investigators are appropriate to the investigations they are carrying out and that they are accredited in accordance with professionalising the investigative process (PIP); and
 - putting in place mechanisms for more effective management and supervision of investigations.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- There are few, if any linkages between level 1 activity at BCU level, which is focused on volume crime and neighbourhood policing, and level 2 force activity to deal with major and organised crime. While some criminality is specific to level 1 or level 2, more typically there are significant crossovers and this fact should be reflected in both strategic and tactical responses.
- Analysis of potential threats such as criminal kidnaps, paedophile rings or gun crime is rarely carried out, although a programme of work for strategic products which features these key areas is being developed to feed into the next strategic assessment process.
- Gun crime has been assessed as a low threat to Norfolk and this is reflected in the FSA. Deployments of authorised firearms officers are monitored, as is all firearms-related intelligence. However, the force acknowledges that because firearms intelligence is relatively uncommon, it cannot provide details of how many general or specific covert human intelligence source (CHIS) taskings have related to firearms. What is also uncertain is whether CHISs were tasked to ascertain firearms intelligence to inform the OCG mapping process, giving rise to a concern that, if no such intelligence is received, an assumption follows that no such problem exists.

Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are shared with partners and BCUs when appropriate. There is an emerging trigger plan for ‘hot briefing’ whenever a significant change in either the major crime threat or where the nature of the analysis demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners exist. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- Several examples were provided of intelligence sharing with the regional intelligence group and the eastern regional intelligence unit (ERIU), notably in relation to Operation Arctic (armed robberies) and most recently in relation to attacks on automatic teller machines (ATMs).
- Examples were given of the force using the national injuries database. In one case where an elderly woman had been murdered, the database identified that the injuries had been caused by a hammer, thereby offering a line of enquiry that led to the murder weapon being recovered.
- The force contributes to, and makes use of, the following national support services and intelligence systems:
 - the national compromise database;
 - the serious crime analysis system;
 - the IMPACT nominal index (INI);
 - TruckPol;
 - SwiftFind;
 - the Police Gazette;
 - Operation Liberal;
 - the antique and art loss register;
 - the violent and sex offenders register;
 - the Metropolitan Police Service firearms acquisition;
 - the SOCA knowledge section; and
 - the child exploitation and online protection centre.
- The force policy document (FPD) on information management sets out the principles applying to information management across Norfolk Constabulary. It provides an overarching framework to ensure that information is managed effectively and lawfully, as both a force asset and shared resource. This document also provides a mandate for the performance of information management functions to ensure that all staff (including agencies, contractors and partners involved with police information) carry out their duties competently and efficiently.
- Examples were provided of both awareness and use of the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) helpdesk to identify and employ experts to support major crime enquiries. Feedback was also provided by the force on the quality of the work of these experts. A member of the FIB is responsible for serious crime analysis system returns/liaison and feedback from the NPIA on the quality of force returns has been positive.
- Child and public protection issues regularly require the force to interact and share

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intelligence with partners, for example through the MAPPA process. Discussion meetings are held to decide whether and how to share intelligence with social services.

- In the 12 months to January 2008, the force made 129 requests for advice and assistance to the NPIA specialist operations centre. This is of a similar volume to the other forces in the eastern region.

Work in progress

- Protocols with partners vary in terms of how they are devised and overseen. Some supersede the management of police information (MoPI) and a number require review. A collection of standard operating procedures (SOPs) exists but the force is looking to formalise these by way of a move to information-sharing agreements.
- A service desk in the FIB is tasked with ensuring that the protective services command remains MoPI compliant. FIB staff have an awareness of MoPI, which has recently been rolled out across the force. The force is seeking to put systems in place to ensure full compliance, with the work overseen by a MoPI steering group.
- The force is addressing potential vulnerabilities, in terms of MoPI compliance, in the weeding of intelligence where a large number of records exist already with the prospect of an ever-increasing volume over coming years.

Area(s) for improvement

- Relations with multi-agency partners are generally good; there is effective engagement and the force shares information with partners at BCU level. However, staff consider that the situation does not necessarily work as effectively in reverse, as the police are not always viewed as a priority for partners who have competing demands on their resources. Accepting that most partners' problems can often be traced to a small number of individuals and/or locations, further analytical input should identify these issues and lead to more dynamic problem-solving activity at both levels 1 and 2.
- The force achieved only a 35% compliance rate with the code of practice in respect of submissions to the serious crime analysis system in 2007. The national average is 72%. During this period, the force made 20 such submissions, only seven of which were made within the allotted timescale of 14 days.

Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is incomplete, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is not fully understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are not identified sufficiently early.

Strengths

- Communities are not specifically profiled in the FSA but the force uses MOSAIC data to identify vulnerable groups in terms of, for example, crime type, age and location. This in turn informs preventative strategies.
- A vulnerable localities index is being developed in tandem with CDRP analysts.
- OCG mapping has identified previously unknown OCGs operating in the force area, and the dismantling of a number of these OCGs has revealed aspects of how organised criminality works. Future risks and threats are identified and assessed through established NIM processes. If such threats and risks exist at level 2, they are raised at the force TTCG. The risk that any OCG represents is quantified by way of an OCG risk matrix.
- The protective services command report on Operation Mitchell (investigation into a serious assault) evidenced work by the dedicated major investigation team (MIT) with the Portuguese community in Great Yarmouth, including the production of posters in Portuguese. These prompted an eyewitness to the assault to come forward.
- The force recognises the need for intelligence about emerging communities and has encouraged staff to make referrals to source handlers whenever possible. As a result, there has been an increase in CHISs providing information on Eastern European and other communities.

Work in progress

- Vulnerable localities index data is becoming more prominent and the FSA signals that it will be used more widely from November 2007. This work assisted in forming the control strategy and is being used in support of the force's resource allocation model.
- Communities are not currently mapped or profiled. This is now being addressed through the force intelligence steering group. Community mapping represents a significant ongoing piece of work because the force has only a partial picture of all communities resident in the county. Particular gaps in intelligence exist about Romanian and Bulgarian nationals.
- Emerging and new communities are identified through neighbourhood profiles and the work of the MELOs. While profiles are developing in terms of complexity and understanding of criminality (both victim and suspect-wise) there is still considerable work to be done.

Area(s) for improvement

- Full identification and profiling of vulnerable communities is some way off, although the force is looking across the board at vulnerable groups and the FSA offers an opportunity to drive this work.
- The information exchange between level 1 and level 2, in respect of tactical activity, remains problematic. Recommendations in the force tactical assessment for level 1 activity are not always reported on through the BCU tactical assessment. This hampers the force's ability to conduct predictive analysis.
- Although clearly very knowledgeable about the customs of and issues affecting minority communities, MELOs do not share this information in a consistent manner. The inspection found evidence of both good and poor practice, with many MELOs readily passing on anything they considered relevant and helpful, while others only responded to specific requests. The wealth of cultural and community information the MELOs hold should be more accessible to front-line staff.

Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence, the FMB reviews the force strategic risk register every quarter. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan.

Strengths

- Business continuity plans cover 26 areas of activity, including various aspects of protective services, which sit under an overarching gold crisis management plan.
- The force has had a corporate risk register for 18 months. This has been reviewed recently and the updated version is soon to go once more before the FMB. The risk manager has been tasked with drawing the protective services microanalysis together into a departmental risk register.
- Individual departments are tasked with identifying and assessing their own risks. The head of risk management has provided a basic user guide to assist with this process. These are then incorporated onto risk registers, for which the force uses an electronic system, held on the intranet, where individual risks are identified and summarised. Control measures are detailed along with the individual responsible for them. Impact and likelihood are also scored. The highest scoring risks are identified by the force and, if deemed significant, will appear on the corporate risk register, which is considered by the FMB on a quarterly basis. The PA reviews this register every six months.
- The force has in post a dedicated risk manager, currently based in the finance department and responsible for all elements of financial and organisational risk. Risk management is considered at both organisational (corporate) and departmental level.
- Each risk register has an action plan attached. Any items of good practice in identifying and reducing risk can be captured and distributed for the wider benefit.
- A risk analysis of the protective services command has been conducted. A formal agreement is in place with Cambridgeshire and Suffolk Constabularies on resource collaboration to meet exceptional demand. Mutual aid is also agreed between the three forces in respect of the Home Office large major enquiry system (HOLMES) equipment and accommodation.
- If the force is required to offer disaster victim identification, it is well equipped to establish a casualty bureau. Responsibility for the casualty bureau rests with the superintendent (operations) in the protective services command. A casualty bureau is staffed by HOLMES trained personnel, and therefore if the force was required to operate a HOLMES MIR and casualty bureau simultaneously, assistance would be sought from neighbouring forces, in line with current collaboration agreements.
- HOLMES is on the force 'critical applications' list. A new server was purchased to support the upgrade to version 11, and version 12 was implemented in December 2007. A back-up system for HOLMES exists and, when server upgrades take place, there is a regional agreement to support any HOLMES enquiries that are required during that period.

- The PIP project maintains a risk log, identifying areas of vulnerability to the project and measures to mitigate that risk. The force has also recently undergone a PIP peer review conducted by the NPIA. There were no areas of significant concern identified and the review was overwhelmingly positive.
- The force undertook a business continuity exercise for all departments and areas. Plans have been completed, collated and held by the operational planning department, which is tasked to review, test and audit plans on an annual basis.
- A business continuity plan exists in respect of HOLMES. This plan is held by the operational planning department and is reviewed annually by the plan owner. The plan ensures that the HOLMES support unit delivers its critical functions under severe or adverse conditions through the definition and prioritisation of the critical functions of the HOLMES unit and the detailing of agreed responses in the event of an emergency

Work in progress

- While the protective services command does not yet have a risk register, it has carried out a microanalysis to identify any gaps in the provision of protective services. The analysis highlighted major crime as a moderate risk, highlighting the multi-tasking of officers and excessive demand as problematic. Kidnap was identified as low risk but there are concerns that this may have been based purely on historical data, and did not take into consideration demographic changes or emerging communities. Running parallel but separate to this analysis was a PESTELO (political, environmental, social, technological, economic, legal and organisational) assessment, conducted by the corporate support department, in respect of major crime. This latter document identified the main risks as excess demand, finances and loss of key staff. The risks identified in these two documents will be merged to create a protective services command risk register.
- A draft FPD on risk management sets out the background and methodology for managing and embedding risk management processes across the force. The FPD details the process behind risk registers and offers useful advice on their construction, using an eight-stage system ranging from the identification of objectives, tasks and risks through to the likelihood, impact and controls to prevent or mitigate risk.
- Acknowledging that the identification of risk can be subjective, an assurance group will be established to examine risk register entries and endeavour to identify those of most significance to the force. This ‘filtering system’ will help to ensure that the highest risks are identified to the FMB and appear on the corporate risk register.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force is creating ways of collaborating with some other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Some of the operational databases are searchable from the ERIU. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been implemented.

Strengths

- There is no automatic or documented means of downloading intelligence from HOLMES to other force systems but HOLMES account sharing with other forces (for potential linked enquiries) is established. An example is Operation Sumac in Suffolk in December 2006, when access to the HOLMES accounts in relation to unsolved prostitute murders in Norfolk was provided to the Suffolk MIR.
- The majority of relevant intelligence gathered during the course of a major enquiry is disseminated, wherever appropriate, across the force by the intelligence cell deployed in support of a major investigation.
- Analysts in BCU intelligence units regularly undertake trawls of data contained within the back office facility of the ANPR system.
- Numerous examples were provided of cross-border intelligence flow, such as Operation Aline, targeting a series of robberies committed in Norfolk by Cambridgeshire-based criminals. A BCU commander chairs a gold group, which meets weekly to assess the community impact of these offences and resourcing issues. Operation Artic is another joint operation between Norfolk and Suffolk to tackle post office armed robberies and ATM snatches.
- Responsibility for the force ANPR systems sits with the director of intelligence, who is ultimately responsible for tasking. There is good awareness among senior investigators of the potential of ANPR as an intelligence tool in major and serious crime investigations.
- ANPR is tasked on a daily basis via the level 2 daily management meeting (DMM) and, as part of this meeting process, intelligence summaries regarding issues of cross-border significance are shared each day with Cambridgeshire and Suffolk.
- The ERIU has full access to the Norfolk CIS.
- Partners contribute to the intelligence collection process through a variety of means – for example, CDRP data is shared and helps to inform the FSA. Partners also supply information and intelligence to localised TTCG meetings and working relationships with SOCA and HMRC are strong.

Work in progress

- A protocol is being drawn up between the protective services command, the director of intelligence and the head of the MIT to formalise the provision of

intelligence and analytical resources to major crime investigations (an informal arrangement exists at present).

- Purchasing of the i2 workstation facility is under consideration as the force seeks ways to search across a number of databases.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force has static and fixed ANPR sites with both force policy and SOPs governing ANPR use. The intelligence directorate owns ANPR policy but there remains a gap in the knowledge and understanding of some SIOs as to how ANPR can assist investigations. Furthermore, there is uncertainty as to what happens to ANPR hits that are not followed up.
- Analysts or other intelligence staff do not routinely access HOLMES at the cessation of a major enquiry, and there appears to be little if any interrogation of HOLMES accounts as a research tool for other enquiries or to enhance the general intelligence picture. As part of the newly centralised line management of analysts, all have undergone HOLMES refresher training and have access to HOLMES for analytical purposes.
- When working in support of a dedicated operation, intelligence development officers (IDOs) have to manually check the CIS on a daily basis for any new intelligence entries of potential relevance to the operation.

Summary – The force has a case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is efficient.

Strengths

- A review policy, compliant with ACPO guidelines, is in place which stipulates 72-hour, seven-day or 28-day reviews of current major crime investigations. The head of protective services is responsible for commissioning reviews. In the event of a 28-day review, it is likely that either Cambridgeshire or Suffolk would be invited to conduct this. The force has not experienced a high number of murders and, accordingly, only a small number of external reviews have been conducted. Suffolk Constabulary reviewed Operation Merchant in 2006 and while a collaborative arrangement exists, Norfolk officers have not carried out a review in another force for over five years.
- The force ran a review officers course in early 2007, with six Norfolk officers trained alongside colleagues from Cambridgeshire and Suffolk Constabularies. Staff regard reviews as a positive opportunity to improve the quality of their investigations. Review findings are presented to the force by way of a report and the head of protective services is responsible for ensuring any lessons learnt are disseminated appropriately.
- On receipt of ACPO/NPIA doctrine guidance relevant to major investigations, MIT staff examine the documents to ensure the force is compliant. While these checks are largely informal, an action plan is created if deemed appropriate. The family liaison co-ordinator provided an example of using the guidance to identify and address gaps in the force provision of family liaison officer (FLO) services.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- No regional review group exists, although collaborative review arrangements are in place. There is a regional senior investigators forum but it is not clear whether this incorporates review activity.
- Outstanding missing persons enquiries are tracked and logged on PNC; there is, however, no policy or mechanism whereby long-term missing persons cases are periodically examined.
- Line managers undertake reviews of rape investigations informally. There is no formal review or system to monitor the quality of review, as advocated in Recommendation 5 of the HMIC thematic inspection of rape investigation and prosecution *Without Consent*, January 2007.

Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- There is a robust tasking process at all levels within the force. At level 1, partners lead partnership tasking and co-ordination group meetings, with only a limited degree of police involvement. These meetings can feed appropriate issues into the BCU tasking meetings. These in turn link to the force (also known as level 2) TTCG, which takes place fortnightly. Potential level 2 and major operations are discussed with the deputy chief constable (DCC) in advance of the force TTCG and priorities agreed. Level 2 operations are monitored at the weekly OCG meeting, which in turn reports back to the force TTCG.
- Specialist resources are deployed by, and are accountable to, the force TTCG chaired by the DCC. This includes the drugs and serious crime squad (DASCS), the technical support unit, the economic crime unit, IDOs and the covert support unit (CSU).
- The CDC managers are part of the level 2 DMM, which is conducted by conference call arrangements. Any incidents of interest can be flagged by the CDC for wider dissemination across the force.
- Problem profiles, using nationally agreed templates, are compiled and maintained by level 2 analysts in the intelligence directorate. Examples include:
 - homicide;
 - knife crime;
 - Vietnamese crime groups;
 - organised immigration crime;
 - cash-in-transit robberies;
 - human trafficking;
 - distraction burglaries; and
 - gun crime.

Any emerging issues from these profiles are reflected in the FSA.

- All MIT investigations are reflected in the fortnightly force tactical assessment and resources are bid for through this process. For more urgent cases, resources are bid for through the level 2 DMM; in one case, intelligence cell and analytical resources were sought and allocated for a series of robberies on Western Area.
- A homicide reduction strategy was drawn up in June 2007, having been commissioned through the FSA. The end product centred on two areas of potential risk, namely street violence and domestic abuse. This links with current force activity to reduce night-time violence and domestic abuse, in the latter case through improvements to the CIS to ensure that SPECSS risk assessments are carried out and the referral of those domestic abuse cases, where the victim is at significant risk, to a MARAC.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – Due to appropriate training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.

Strengths

- While there is no specific training to raise awareness of community needs during major inquiries, diversity issues nonetheless run as a golden theme through all courses and additional elements can be incorporated as and when required.
- An MIT supervisor prepared a report following a case involving members of the Iraqi Kurd community, detailing lessons learnt and issues that officers faced in dealing with differing cultures.
- LGBT liaison officers and MELOs employed by the force are heavily involved in the CIA process and their expertise and knowledge are sought during the course of major enquiries, such as the Iraqi Kurd incident above.

Work in progress

- All officers receive diversity training but it is of a generic nature. As part of the initial crime investigators development programme (ICIDP), one MIT officer is writing a guide to assist officers with the cultural issues presented by particular communities. This is acknowledged as an important piece of work, since the cultural profile of the county is changing rapidly.

Area(s) for improvement

- Officers rely on MELOs as the sole means of assistance when dealing with unfamiliar communities. The cultural profile of the county has changed over recent years and officers are now dealing with individuals from a number of differing backgrounds and cultures. While the MELOs are the initial point of contact and are very effective, there is no specific training in respect of the various customs and beliefs of communities resident in Norfolk. During the inspection, staff indicated that they would welcome an aide-memoire containing guidance on dealing with different communities. The force is urged to consider preparing such a guide, which could extend to include guidance around honour-based violence and forced marriage.

Prevention

Summary – The force has an independent advisory group and key individual network but these are rarely used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- Examples were provided of a close working relationship with the HSE and adherence to the ACPO/HSE work-related death protocol. An element of joint training with HSE staff has also taken place, although no formal multi-agency, work-related death forum exists, as it does elsewhere in the country.
- Access to community advice in respect of major and serious crime is facilitated through the network of contacts established by the MELOs.
- Some 18–20 staff from Norfolk County Council are trained as MIRWEB/CASWEB call-takers and an arrangement exists to use these staff to support the force in times of high demand.

Work in progress

- The force does not make best use of its independent advisory group (IAG). A group was formed to examine how the force and IAG can work together more closely, resulting in 24 recommendations. The IAG provides independent advice in respect of some force policies (though few, if any, relate to major and serious crime) and addresses community issues and impact. The potential for its involvement in critical incidents and major crime has been recognised but has yet to be fully explored. Access to IAG members is currently on an ad hoc basis through gold group arrangements.
- The force has had a standing IAG for three years, and the group meets every two months. The force has, however, struggled to recruit IAG members; those who have left recently are currently being replaced through an advertising campaign, but the response so far has been poor.

Area(s) for improvement

- The current IAG members bring experience from the gay, disabled, Jewish, Chinese and Indian communities. Given the changing demographics in the county, there is a need to identify members of the Eastern European emerging communities to join the IAG. Furthermore, there is little or no youth involvement in any IAG activity, a group frequently under-represented in advisory roles.

Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were sufficiently understood by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- In the event of a major or critical incident happening out of hours, staff in the CDC have access to an on-call rota for senior detectives. An area-based detective inspector (DI) makes an initial assessment of the event to determine whether the on-call force SIO should be contacted. A call-out rota also exists for crime scene investigators (CSIs), force negotiators and red centre commanders for kidnap incidents.
- The information held in the CDC to guide the response to kidnap incidents indicates which negotiator is on call and who is red centre command trained; a negotiator is always on call (there are four trained in the force). This is considered sufficient, given the volume of incidents experienced by the force. There were only two kidnap incidents with a ransom demand in 2007 and one product contamination incident. A kidnap and blackmail protocol document is available to CDC staff to assist in the response to initial calls concerning such incidents, although the force is reliant on CDC staff accurately to define/interpret a kidnap situation and ensure that the command and control incident log is restricted to those who require access.
- Staff in the CDC benefit from a series of SOPs in drop-down menu form, which are immediately accessible on their screens. These cover suspicious deaths, sexual offences, terrorism and kidnap. Question sets have been considered but the force has decided that they can detract from the flow of a conversation and affect any rapport developed between the caller and call-taker.
- On receipt of a report of a major or critical incident, call-takers will alert their supervisor immediately, who then remotely monitors the call and offers assistance if required. A patrol is despatched to the scene and a supervisor informed.
- In the absence of formal criteria on the establishment of an MIR, the decision is taken by the SIO after discussion and scoping with the HOLMES team. This allows for a degree of flexibility in the decision-making process, which can also consider the option of setting up either a limited indexing HOLMES system or paper-based enquiry, as has been the case in a number of category C murders in the county in recent years.
- Force policy states that an officer will always attend the scene of a death and there is evidence of full compliance. If there are any suspicious circumstances, a supervisor and detective will also attend. In addition, force policy states that a scene log will be kept for all major incidents. There was evident awareness among all front-line staff as to the purpose of such logs and supplies of the document are kept in response vehicles, together with protective clothing and scene cordon tape. The scene log is structured so that it can be entered as an exhibited document. It contains initial scene advice, entries for each person

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attending the scene (to record time in and out, with signature) as well as prepared statements for each officer having ownership of the log to submit statements of continuity.

- Senior CSIs are the gatekeepers for call-out procedures for CSIs. CDC staff will speak with the on-call senior CSI, who decides whether a CSI should be called to a scene. Exchange secondments have taken place between CSIs and CDC staff to help understanding, although such opportunities have diminished recently due to staffing levels. All call-takers receive a forensic input on induction and training days. The force makes regular use of specialist advisers from the Forensic Science Service (FSS) at Huntingdon. SIOs and CSIs also attend events and seminars arranged by the FSS.
- The major investigation policy sets out clear criteria for setting up major investigations – a flowchart form shows minimum staffing levels for various incident categories, where investigation teams will be drawn from for each major incident category, how investigations will be financed and the review process for undetected enquiries.
- The force has in place sufficient dedicated resources to respond to major crimes by way of its MIT.
- A number of force documents are available to SIOs and practitioners when dealing with kidnap and extortion incidents. These include an aide-memoire to SIOs dealing with kidnap, blackmail and product contamination, a document on how to administer and release pre-evidenced cash and a support document entitled *Kidnap and Extortion – Initial Consideration*.

Work in progress

- Members of the CDC initial crime investigation unit are trained to PIP level 1, but only a very basic input on questioning and investigation is given to the initial call-takers induction course. Call-takers are yet to be trained to PIP level 1, although this is under consideration as part of the development of an ongoing training programme for CDC staff. This is an important area of training, given that call-takers provide the critical first response to the initial call regarding a potential homicide, kidnap or rape.

Area(s) for improvement

- ‘Golden hour’ training has been provided to all supervisors in the CDC. This is based on the Centrex training course and has been delivered in-house. However, it then becomes the responsibility of individual supervisors to cascade this (and refresher training) to their own members of staff, there being no structured programme of refresher or update training for call-takers.
- There is no formal training in operating major enquiries on a manual index system. As the force makes use of such a system, training in its use is necessary.

Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed incompletely.

Strengths

- The CIS enables analysis to be conducted on domestic abuse incidents and crimes as well as crimes against children. An example is the identification of ‘hot houses’, which considers domestic abuse data and overlays information from the child-at-risk register. This informs work on vulnerable victims and venues, and enables intervention plans to be formed.
- The force is now able to access the children’s services database to establish the ‘live picture’ regarding children at risk. This in turn allows positive multi-agency intervention to be carried out.
- SNTs are kept informed of domestic abuse victims. Processes have been put in place to link SNTs more directly to medium and low risk domestic abuse victims, with SNTs being briefed by staff from the force domestic violence units. SNTs also receive briefings on domestic abuse arrests and are specifically tasked for domestic abuse information.
- A domestic abuse developmental briefing officer trains and briefs officers and CDC staff to identify domestic abuse incidents, assaults and harassment in the street and how to react to them appropriately.
- Domestic abuse advocacy workers and front-line officers enter risk assessments for victims directly onto the CIS, so that all staff can access this information when in contact with a particular domestic abuse victim (if the assessment has been identified as high risk, then a detective sergeant (DS) must be briefed personally by the officer or advocacy worker). The sergeant will then review each risk assessment and formulate a safety intervention plan.
- The force has a very concise and clear risk identification – assessment – management chart which can be viewed on the new vulnerable persons unit website. It has also been forwarded to all domestic abuse champion officers in the force, as well as being used as a training tool.
- Case conferences are held to deal with potentially dangerous offenders. Each case is managed by whichever agency initially identifies the potentially dangerous offender. The police lead is the detective superintendent for the family protection unit. It is acknowledged that the agencies do not work under the MAPPA structure but do draw on the expertise of MAPPA members in respect of risk management. Any lessons learnt are fed through the MAPPA policy and procedure sub-group.
- A homicide reduction strategy was formulated in June 2007, having been commissioned through the FSA process. The end product centred on two areas of potential risk, namely street violence and domestic abuse. This links with current force activity to reduce night-time violence and domestic abuse – specifically, improvements to the CIS to ensure that SPECSS risk assessments are carried out and referral to a MARAC of those domestic abuse cases where the victim is at significant risk.

Work in progress

- The force is seeking to establish standardised procedures and develop solutions, such as multi-agency intervention plans, for frequently missing young persons. Meetings have been planned with social services to address this issue.

Area(s) for improvement

- There has been little or no strategic analysis of current or future demand profiles of major crime types and precursors to these offences (other than through the protective services microanalysis), although a significant amount of work has been conducted around vulnerable locations pertaining to drug markets and town centre violence. Near-miss offences such as attacks on vulnerable victims are not routinely considered. With scarce analytical resources at level 2 and with level 1 analysts devoted to volume crime issues, this is an area of weakness for the force.
- While the domestic violence units are aware of the profiles of domestic violence offenders and recurring problems, area criminal investigation department (CID) staff are more focused on volume crime and are less well sighted on domestic violence.

Summary – The policy covering threats to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of joint/regional/cross-border/multi-agency operations are present.

Strengths

- A threat-to-life policy exists and there is good awareness of the role of Osman warnings. Examples were provided of their use at both area and MIT level to intervene in threat-to-life scenarios. This included Operation Mitchell where, following a serious assault on a suspected Class A drug supplier from London, an MIT investigation began. Actions included the issue of Osman warnings to individuals identified as being at risk from reprisals.
- The threat-to-life policy was formally approved in September 2007 after a year of informal operation until legal services agreed the wording of standard letters sent to recipients of Osman warnings. The policy deals with initial and subsequent actions along with individual roles and responsibilities. Tactical options are incorporated in respect of disruptive/preventative measures.
- The policy document is available on the force intranet, and there is evidence of a fair level of understanding among operational staff.
- Details of those persons in receipt of Osman warnings are held on the CIS. For incidents happening out of hours, access to Osman information will depend on the subject concerned, as not all staff have access to all records. CDC staff are aware that Osman warnings are flagged on the CIS and where possible will inform patrols attending incidents of any threats to life to the subjects with whom they are dealing.
- The force has an Osman database, together with an SOP, which enables analytical work to be carried out around the number of, and reasons for, issue. It is intended that the database will contain records of all warnings issued.
- A force firearms threat assessment has been published and is subject to regular review. Examples were provided of joint regional operations against gun crime, including Operation Arctic – a successful reactive investigation into a series of armed robberies and ATM offences – and Operation Aloft, which was a proactive, intelligence-led regional operation concerning a series of armed robberies on post offices. The intelligence build involved all regional forces and some partner agencies, and led to a joint operation with Hertfordshire Police.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by dedicated covert resources. It operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by, all staff. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- The force led on proposing a number of options for the creation of a regional procedure to manage intimidated witnesses. Each force position was examined in a joint policy document outlining the procedures used by Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire Constabularies to protect witnesses from the criminal activity of third parties. The document covers the national tiers of witness intimidation, police relations with the CPS and the courts and the range of services offered by the three forces. Particular regard is given to guidance for, and the responsibilities of, a number of roles within the constabularies. Each of the forces now work to similar policies in respect of witness protection, with the exception of Cambridgeshire, which has no capacity and is reliant on Norfolk and Suffolk for assistance.
- The CSU manages witness protection issues and is funded from the protective services budget, supplemented by a £50,000 contribution from Cambridgeshire to manage its witness protection issues. The protective services command accountant checks/audits CSU accounts on a monthly basis.
- Norfolk's dedicated CSU is staffed by officers working to national protocols, with overall management provided by a detective chief inspector (DCI).
- The CSU is located in a secure building with access restricted to CSU staff. All computerised records are backed up and the CSU office contains a fireproof safe for paper-based information.
- The force has a comprehensive policy relating to witness intimidation and support which adheres to national guidelines. The criteria for adoption onto the witness protection scheme are clearly laid out, as are individual roles and responsibilities.
- CSU officers give presentations to area staff to raise awareness of force policy and how the unit operates. This has resulted in a good understanding at all levels of the force as to how witnesses can be protected.

Work in progress

- Collaborative arrangements exist with Suffolk and Cambridgeshire but the geography of the region entails large travelling distances. To counter this, and provide an element of centralised control, consideration is being given to merging the Norfolk CSU and the Suffolk witness protection unit and relocating to a dedicated site.

Area(s) for improvement

- The witness protection workload of the force has increased by some 74% since 2004. This reflects in part the fact that all of Cambridgeshire's witness protection work is being taken on by the force, with little support from Suffolk, which struggles with capacity issues. Norfolk is currently running 13 live cases, five of which require an active level of support. The present level of resourcing is not commensurate with this growth in workload, although an additional member of staff is being recruited. Because of current and predicted demand, both from within the force and from Cambridgeshire, the force should seriously consider improving resilience in the CSU.
- The collaborative arrangement with Cambridgeshire is not formalised or documented, appearing instead to be reliant on correspondence between key individuals.

Summary – The force has an emerging system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The responsibility for conducting CIAs rests with area commanders and these have been completed as a matter of course for all recent major enquiries. The progress or impact of each CIA is discussed at weekly SMT meetings. Advisory groups (the equivalent of the IAG) are involved in the consideration of relevant issues at the conclusion of investigations. The CIA will not be signed off until the area commander is happy that all issues have been addressed. One of the component parts of the CIA is to consider the impact of policing activity as well as that of the incident itself.
- It is uncertain whether agencies such as health would proactively share information about, for example, an increase in the number of serious injuries to members of a particular community that have not been reported to the police. The force is confident, however, that its response to such information would be positive and a variety of routes are available to access particular communities. These include the use of MELOs, SNTs and the race equality council.
- The MIT has recently introduced a questionnaire, which it sends to witnesses interviewed by members of the team to measure performance against the MIT target of an 80% satisfaction level. A representative sample from each major enquiry is tested; information from the surveys is helping to identify training needs and share these with the individual officers concerned.
- The force drugs strategy sets out measures to target drug suppliers alongside activities to support drug users and assist them in becoming drug free.
- The force homicide reduction strategy details the work in Operations Enterprise and Nightsafe to reduce homicides arising from street violence. The strategy also identifies measures to improve the risk assessment of domestic violence incidents, in order to protect victims and develop risk assessment; a multi-agency approach, using a MARAC, actively manages high-risk cases.
- Before the introduction of SNTs, there was relatively little reassurance or assessment of public confidence following a major crime or critical incident. Some SNT performance is now measured by customer satisfaction and consequently a number of SNTs focus on this activity to reassure their communities.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- The impact of police activity following a major or critical incident, or changes in levels of public confidence, are not specifically measured other than through existing satisfaction surveys. Other forces have developed harm indicators and Norfolk may wish to explore this area further.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- A vetting policy (published in November 2007) sets out the national vetting policy along with force vetting procedures for police officers, police staff and non-police personnel such as CDRP staff, PA members, contractors or volunteers. Some individuals, for instance interpreters, are subject to counter-terrorist check (CTC) clearance in addition to the non-police personnel process. The policy sets out an appeals procedure against vetting decisions and caters for instances when vetting is refused or failed.
- The force vetting unit now achieves 100% compliance with ACPO policy; all human resources (HR) forms now incorporate candidate declarations. In addition, financial checks have been introduced and use of the INI has increased productivity of the unit, saving a considerable amount of time.
- A list of 'designated posts' exists alongside the vetting policy (although not published with it). Examples of posts on this list include special branch and the DASCS, determined to be at a higher risk and thereby requiring an enhanced level of vetting. All new applicants to transfer to, or be attached to, a role on the designated list are subject to these vetting (including financial) requirements.
- The force is proactive in its use of anti-corruption measures, which are overseen by the anti-corruption and integrity unit (ACIU). From an information security perspective, there is regular sampling of email usage and content, an instant message system and internet access. Robust measures exist to identify inappropriate usage, which is acted on by supervisors and managers.
- The ACIU is headed by an experienced ex-DCI. The professional standards department (PSD) also incorporates a reactive investigations team, a vetting and information security unit, data protection, a freedom of information unit, an analytical/statistical unit and a quality assurance unit. The ACIU has been in place since early 2007 and was formed in response to the increased threat identified in the SOCA national corruption threat assessment.
- Lists of posts have been produced that are subject to differing vetting levels – CTC, security clearance, management vetting, developed vetting (DV) and Criminal Records Bureau – in line with national vetting policy and guidance issued by the security services. The requirements centre on access to material at different levels, which dictate which level of vetting is necessary.
- The PSD has access to all intelligence files via a dedicated single point of contact (SPOC) at DI level. Confidentiality agreements are signed by all staff involved in covert operations, with warnings of disciplinary consequences for unauthorised disclosure of information. Pyramid of knowledge records of dissemination of intelligence are maintained.

- The force has a comprehensive information management policy, which makes reference to the ACPO information systems community security policy 2002, insofar as it relates to the role of the force vetting manager.

Work in progress

- All members of the PA are vetted to CTC standard with the lead member in respect of protective services about to undergo DV. The lead member will be made aware of their responsibilities with regard to passing on information to the wider PA as part of the DV process.
- The PSD is keen to drive forward a collaborative arrangement with Cambridgeshire and Suffolk Constabularies in respect of anti-corruption work. A project plan has been developed to examine the potential for a regional anti-corruption tasking process and a control strategy. Intended as a 'no cost' option, the project has three distinct phases and, by April 2008, aims to develop tackling corruption in a more efficient, effective and cohesive manner. The end game is the strategic deployment of resources, through effective and accountable tasking, to meet current and future corruption threats and vulnerabilities, as follows:
 - Phase 1 will standardise PSD policy and procedures and is now almost in place, with the three forces operating in a similar manner.
 - Phase 2 aims to prepare a regional control strategy to address the main areas of vulnerability, using national, regional and force strategic assessments.
 - Phase 3 will introduce a new regional tasking and co-ordination structure, chaired by a nominated ACPO lead.

Area(s) for improvement

- The CIS was developed as a bespoke force system and the information security section advised on access control. All roles were examined and a level of access agreed. Auditing is, however, problematic, as the system does not facilitate audit processes or dip sampling. For example, if an officer accessed details of registered sex offenders, this would not be identified, nor would an officer accessing a level 2 nominal's intelligence screen at 3am. The latter may be identified in a routine sweep but not proactively. The PSD has highlighted this as a problem, hoping that the next phases of the CIS will incorporate the necessary changes.
- The MIT has been required to assist with an increasing number of PSD enquiries, as there is little SIO experience in the PSD. While the PSD does have DIs, not all have an investigative background. MIT staff have also been investigating a death in custody in Suffolk on behalf of the Independent Police Complaints Commission, indicating a lack of resilience and expertise in the PSD to deal with such incidents rather than abstracting MIT staff from major crime work.
- In spite of the ongoing work, there are concerns that vetting is a weakness, with

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examples of some departments endeavouring to bypass the force vetting system. Further, the force is seeking to recruit a significant number of volunteers, which will place a tremendous demand on vetting staff (if volunteers are indeed to be vetted). The recruitment process will invariably be different to that for police officers and police staff and volunteers will not be subject to employment law or Police Regulations. The risk of infiltration needs to be clearly identified and assessed.

- Some 18 months ago, the ACIU provided a list of designated posts but this has not been formally reviewed since that time (although some posts have been added). Those applying for a role within a department on the designated list are subject to vetting at the required level; however, the force is unable to say when those already in post were last vetted.
- The force has no 'aftercare' system whereby any changes to personal circumstances can be captured and trigger re-vetting if appropriate.

Enforcement

Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are partially effective, with some use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.

Strengths

- In the event of a critical or major incident, with examples being the 7/7 bombings and any homicide in the force area, the PA is made aware not only of the circumstances but also of the financial implications for the force. The lead PA member for finance works with the director of resources and holds discussions with the chair of the PA and the Chief Constable as appropriate.
- The PA also has a lead member in respect of major and serious and organised crime. This individual is due to undergo DV, so that he can be briefed in greater detail on serious or sensitive operations. The head of protective services meets with the PA lead regularly on an informal basis to give an update on current operations. The PA lead then passes on sanitised and non-specific details of serious or sensitive operations to authority members during informal meetings (at which the public is not present).
- Access to community advice in respect of major and serious crime is facilitated through the network of contacts established by the MELOs.
- A gold support group process deals with critical incidents and members are vetted appropriately. An example is Operation Moon, which was a product contamination investigation involving a threat to a major supermarket chain and food manufacturer. A gold group was convened during the opening hours of the investigation and met regularly throughout a 72-hour period at the height of the investigation. Representation on the group included commercial stakeholders, SOCA, the national domestic extremism team and the Food Standards Agency.

Work in progress

- All major crime and larger serious and organised crime enquiries are funded from a contingency fund which, for the financial year 2007/08, stands at £400,000; it is held and managed by the DCC. For major crime enquiries, the SIO submits a budget bid based on likely expenditure over the forthcoming weeks. The DCC either approves or rejects the bid and requires further work; once approved, the finance department then manages the budget for that particular operation. The DCC receives a weekly update and, if there is a need for further funding, will liaise with the head of finance before authorising the release of new funds. While this system enables the force at ACPO level to retain some financial control of operations, it does not hold SIOs accountable for resources and allows them to develop their budgetary skills. The force is in the midst of reviewing this whole process and devolving a budget for the management of major/serious crime directly to the head of the protective services command.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – Two ACPO officers and the head of crime are fully trained in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, CIAs and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- Two chief officers and four force SIOs are trained in the management of linked and series crime in accordance with NPJA guidelines. The head of protective services is a trained SIO, has completed a SCIMITAR (serious crime, intelligence management, information technology and resources) course, as well as previously having performed the roles of director of intelligence and head of the serious and organised crime department.
- The Chief Constable and the assistant chief constable are both trained to act in the role of officer in overall command for critical or major incidents.
- A number of staff at inspector rank and above have received formal training in respect of the management of critical incidents.
- The completion of CIAs is commonplace in the event of critical and major incidents and is carried out to a high standard.
- A programme of critical incident training exercises is run by the specialist operations department. A mock incident is phoned through to the CDC to test the initial response of various key roles, with each exercise being debriefed for all staff involved. However, it is not known how often these exercises take place or how lessons learnt are cascaded to the remainder of the force.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- The ACPO lead for protective services, the DCC, is not a trained officer in overall command; this officer has no crime investigation background and has not received SCIMITAR training, pushing reliance down to the protective services command.

Summary – The force’s performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes, cost, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- All major enquiries are debriefed at their conclusion and any lessons learnt are incorporated into training days. The force holds two SIO forums each year, to which officers from both Cambridgeshire and Suffolk Constabularies are invited. Guest speakers are invited, recently including a Home Office pathologist and representatives from the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act compliance unit. All senior detectives (DIs and above) are invited and the event assists with the continuous professional development element of PIP.
- A review policy compliant with ACPO guidelines is in place which stipulates 72-hour, seven-day or 28-day reviews for current major crime investigations. The head of protective services is responsible for commissioning reviews. For 28-day reviews, it is likely that either Cambridgeshire or Suffolk Constabularies will be invited to conduct the process.
- There are a small number of performance indicators in place for the MIT, including a witness satisfaction target of 80%. This is measured by questionnaires, sent to a representative sample of interviewees in major crime enquiries. Information from the surveys is used to identify training needs for the department and individuals.
- On receipt of ACPO/NPIA doctrine documents relevant to the MIT, staff examine the documents to ensure that the force is compliant in the relevant areas. While these checks are conducted informally, an action plan can be created if appropriate. One benefit of this process has been identified by the FLO co-ordinator, who used the guidance as a means of highlighting and addressing gaps in the provision of FLO services.
- Once initial budgets have been allocated by the DCC from the force contingency fund, monitoring of spending is the responsibility of finance officers. The finance officer posted to the protective services command monitors spending on level 2 operations, while homicide investigations are monitored by area-based finance officers. The financial management of major enquiries is also set out in the MIT terms of reference document.

Work in progress

- CDC supervisors can use a proactive listening system to monitor all live calls taken by call-handlers. Debriefing of calls is routine and if development needs are identified, dedicated tutors are tasked with driving improvement. Refresher training for staff, whereby wider lessons can be introduced, is being developed.

Area(s) for improvement

- While major enquiries are debriefed and the force holds SIO forums, CDC staff are not routinely involved in debriefs of major incidents and staff could not recall any lessons learnt being fed through to them.
- The force does not make use of the resource management facility on HOLMES. Major enquiries are controlled and overseen by finance officers who will seek paperwork from the MIR as and when required. This is problematic, as it is not clear how the force manages the ongoing (and potentially very costly) process of major investigations and what systems for financial control and scrutiny are in place. This includes the role of ACPO and the PA.
- A review policy exists and managers are aware of the review process, but the ACPO lead for protective services was unaware of the policy or to whom a review team would report.

Performance Management and Resilience

Summary – The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force and thorough written regional agreements to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with SOCA exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide limited protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- Examples were provided of a close working relationship with the HSE and adherence to the ACPO/HSE work-related death protocol. An element of joint training with HSE staff has also taken place, although no formal multi-agency, work-related death forum exists (as it does elsewhere in the country).
- The force adheres to a protocol for sudden unidentified deaths in infants (SUDI) and either an area DI or family protection unit DI will attend all such incidents and liaise with a dedicated SUDI paediatrician.
- PIP implementation has been accorded formal project status within the force, headed by a dedicated project manager who reports to a programme board, chaired by the assistant chief officer (HR). All investigators undergo the PIP and ICIDP process, with the force following NPIA guidance in respect of those officers in specialist roles (for example, the family protection unit or surveillance) who can be assessed specifically against those national occupational standards relevant to their roles. A template exists which demonstrates what an effective investigation should look like. This can be used to assist with the supervision of staff against the national occupational standards. There is also an excellent PIP website to support the process.
- All area DCIs are, or will be, PIP level 3 accredited and can deal confidently with major investigations on areas – they are the SIOs for most category C murders. If lack of exposure became problematic, then they are able to increase exposure by way of a short period of shadowing or attachment to the MIT.
- Processes for the management of rape investigations are sound. An area DCI or DI is appointed as SIO to all allegations of rape, which are treated as major enquiries. A policy file to record investigative decisions is maintained and a number of serious sexual offence trained ((SSOT) officers are available on a call-out rota to deal with victims. SSOTs ensure victim care is maintained and there are a number of victim care centres spread across the force which act as ‘one-stop venues’ for medical examination and interview. SIOs hold regular meetings with the CPS and counsel to talk through evidential and quality issues on rape cases, with feedback provided to the force to enhance future investigations.
- The force has a dedicated FLO co-ordinator together with three FLO advisers (two on area and one on the MIT). It has 41 crime-trained FLOs and 20 FLOs trained to deal with fatal or serious road accidents. These staff are distributed across the areas and MIT and, given the number of major incidents requiring FLO skills, the force is resilient in this area. A spreadsheet is maintained of all

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trained FLOs; it records deployments, any sensitivity around, and length of, deployment, along with any personal issues of relevance to the role. The FLO training course includes a detailed input on 'suspect in the family' cases, supported by FLOs who have worked in such scenarios.

- A risk assessment is always completed before any FLO deployment and is reviewed regularly. FLOs are always deployed in pairs and a deployment strategy is drawn up by the co-ordinator and SIO, with particular emphasis on welfare. All FLOs are on a mandatory basis referred to the occupational health unit (OHU) three times a year, regardless of deployments. In addition, they are referred before and after each deployment. This is strictly monitored by the FLO co-ordinator and advisers and if an FLO does not attend the OHU when required, they cannot work as an FLO until the situation is rectified.
- House-to-house enquiries are generally conducted by outside enquiry teams. There are, however, three police support teams based on areas that can be drafted in to support this area of work, depending on the circumstances and volume of work in each case.
- In the event of a major or critical incident happening out of normal working hours, staff in the CDC have access to an on-call rota for senior detectives. An area DI will be contacted to make an initial assessment of the event, before deciding whether the on-call force SIO is required. A call-out rota also exists for CSIs, force negotiators and red centre commanders for kidnap incidents.
- Force policy states that an officer will always attend the scene of a death and there is evidence of full compliance. If there are any suspicious circumstances, a supervisor and detective will also attend. In addition, force policy states that a scene log will be kept for all major incidents. There was evident awareness among all front-line staff of the purpose of such logs and supplies of the document are kept in response vehicles, together with protective clothing and scene cordon tape. The scene log is structured so that it can be entered as an exhibited document. It contains initial scene advice, entries for each person attending the scene (to record time in and out, with signature) as well as prepared statements for each officer having ownership of the log to submit statements of continuity.
- Senior CSIs are the gatekeepers for call-out procedures for CSIs. CDC staff will speak with the on-call senior CSI who decides whether a CSI should be called to a scene. Exchange secondments have taken place between CSIs and CDC staff to help understanding, although such opportunities have diminished recently due to staffing levels. All call-takers receive forensic input on induction and training days. The force makes regular use of specialist advisers from the FSS at Huntingdon. SIOs and CSIs also attend events and seminars arranged by the FSS.
- Four senior CSIs service the demand of three areas; this provides inbuilt flexibility and opportunities to backfill absences as required. If a protracted investigation requires the long-term absence of a CSI from area, then the head of scenes of crime will be sited at the relevant area to support the remaining CSI staff.
- The role of crime scene co-ordinator is performed by the head of forensic investigation or one of his two deputies. This leaves the senior CSI to perform the role of crime scene manager. In the event of a gold group being formed, the

crime scene co-ordinator would be a member of that group.

- All members of the MIT are trained to use HOLMES and can therefore carry out their own research, obviating additional work for indexers. There are sufficient terminals to allow staff ready access to HOLMES, both dedicated machines and 'mixed use' machines.
- A programme of critical incident training exercises is run by the specialist operations department. A mock incident is phoned through to the CDC to test the initial response of various key roles, with each exercise being debriefed for all staff involved. However, it is not known how often these exercises take place or how lessons learnt are cascaded to the remainder of the force.
- Other than for specialist roles, such as FLO or HOLMES, area staff spoke of considerably fewer abstractions to major enquiries since the establishment of the MIT. Category C murders are managed and investigated efficiently by area staff, with no significant impact on volume crime performance. Area officers tend to run major enquiries on paper systems, as this method is considered less demanding than using HOLMES.
- A dedicated MIT was established in 2004, comprising an SIO team, four investigative teams and a HOLMES team. The skills base within the MIT includes trained exhibits and disclosure officers, tier 5 interview advisers, tier 3 suspect and witness trained officers and vulnerable persons interview trained staff, as well as 15 trained FLOs. There are four PIP level 3 trained SIOs and all have received awareness training in HOLMES.
- A collaborative agreement is in place to provide mutual aid between Cambridgeshire, Norfolk and Suffolk in respect of major crime investigations. Similar arrangements are also in place for HOLMES trained staff. The mutual aid protocol was drawn up in 2005 but remains current and identifies a number of posts and roles which can be delivered in support of the agreement. The roles are listed individually along with a description of the training and experience necessary to carry it out. Each force has a nominated SPOC responsible for dealing with requests under the terms of the protocol.
- The MIT maintains a detailed and readily accessible register of the skills set of its staff, including their vetting status. While a number of training courses are delivered internally (eg, interview training and HOLMES), there are also examples of regional training, such as the initial ICIDP courses.
- The force has made groundbreaking use of 'M3' technology, which is an add-on facility to HOLMES and enables the merging of multi-media items onto the HOLMES system. This includes scene photographs, CCTV images, 999 calls and both witness and suspect interviews.
- The force has access to 79 call-takers trained for CASWEB and MIRWEB roles (19 from the local authority and 60 police staff). The maximum commitment from the force would be ten telephone lines and the number of call-takers available would influence the number of lines declared by the force. In view of the volume of major incidents dealt with by the force over a 12-month period, the number of call-takers available is considered sufficient.

Work in progress

- The force is developing a process to seek feedback from rape victims on the quality of service they received from the police. This will be used to make improvements to the way the force deals with rape victims.
- To address some concerns that still exist around the quality of initial scene preservation and management, two DSs from the MIT have been informally identified as crime scene controllers. They are called to ensure effective scene management and support those area staff involved in this process.
- The force is reviewing the issue of succession planning, with a policy being drafted to identify career pathways for detectives. It is anticipated that any new structure will be in place during 2008. In addition, the force is undertaking a detailed 'skills review'. Each individual skill is listed and, through a process of consultation, the review will determine how many individuals with each skill are required to cope with anticipated demand. The performance development review (PDR) process will play a key role in the allocation of courses as and when vacancies arise and there is an expectation that individuals will commit to a role for a minimum of two years.
- Force SIOs are either already PIP level 3 accredited or working towards accreditation. Two SIOs have been accredited and six are on the interim register (the latter including the principal SIO for the force). There are also three tier 5 trained interview advisers but an ongoing skills review has recommended that one further officer should be trained to this standard. An in-force assessor is overseeing the completion of all performance development profiles.

Area(s) for improvement

- There is only a small team of dedicated, HOLMES-trained staff in the MIT, comprising two supervisors and three indexers. This leaves the force vulnerable to over-reliance on the ability and expertise of these individuals. In addition, only a limited number of officers are trained as office managers, but this role is not routinely performed unless an enquiry is expected to be complex or lengthy. MIT supervisors acting as reader and/or receiver file 'for approval' actions in order for them to be finalised and assessed by the disclosure officer. This, however, involves the reader or receiver acting as office manager and in effect checking their own work. This is contrary to the major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) guidance, which identifies one of the roles of the office manager as being to read and assess all documentation before recommending for filing. The office manager also has the responsibility for the efficient running of an incident room and this role is not being performed in the MIT. The force should review its operating procedures in respect of the HOLMES functions in the MIR.
- There are a number of HOLMES trained sergeants on areas who can be called on to assist in MIRs; of the 18 MIRs established in 2007, the two MIT HOLMES supervisors acted as document reader and receiver on all of them. This is clearly an intense workload and is acknowledged not to be sustainable. In reality, in the event of a new homicide enquiry, ongoing work will be put on hold or afforded

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less priority, to concentrate on the new investigation.

- All BCU detectives should be trained to PIP level 2. Some areas have had little or no input from the centralised PIP implementation team and have resorted to proactively seeking out information. Confusion also exists surrounding the interaction between the ICIDP and PIP, with an anomaly arising whereby no PIP-accredited detectives are required to act as tutors to those undertaking the ICIDP and PIP. Other officers saw the requirement to complete a force PDR while undergoing PIP accreditation through a separate PDR process as cumbersome. Some area officers are not taking the exam or completing the PDR properly, and many view the ICIDP as a stepping stone to promotion as opposed to the gateway to a detective career. The force must ensure that it provides greater clarity and direction around the implementation of PIP, particularly on areas.
- HOLMES training staff are currently seeking to establish a planned programme of refresher training, particularly for exhibits officers. Any changes to the HOLMES system – for example, the upgrade to Version 11 – are not accounted for in the training programme (other than for dedicated MIT staff) but staff will be trained when they are next called upon to assist in an MIR.
- While the standard of initial crime scene management and preservation is acceptable, there are variations across the force which suggest scope for improvement. Of concern is that police community support officers are routinely used to guard crime scenes and maintain the completion of crime scene logs, but there is no evidence that they have been trained in this area. Similarly, the CDC call-taker induction course shows no reference to, or input from, the CID or MIT regarding 'golden hour' principles, although there was broad familiarity with what they are. There have been bespoke training sessions for area staff on how to complete crime scene logs and the management of cordons, delivered by supervisors or BCU training departments, but there is a need for a standardisation in the delivery of this training across the force, as the potential for evidence loss is vast. Examples were given of poor exhibit continuity and ineffective management of cross-contamination issues.
- The MIT HOLMES team consists of two supervisors and three indexers. Although the MIT tries to avoid calling on additional staff from areas, this level of staffing is insufficient for large or complex major investigations and there have been occasional negotiations with areas to release HOLMES-trained staff. There are no protocols in place for this, each case being considered on merit. However, with the MIT managing most major investigations across the force, there is a danger of area-based HOLMES trained staff becoming de-skilled due to their lack of regular exposure to the HOLMES system. Conversely, there have been occasions when a homicide investigation has been managed by area and the MIT has been called on to support by supplying trained HOLMES staff, either to set up an incident room or remain for a longer period to perform key MIR roles. Given the small number of dedicated MIT HOLMES staff, this prompts concern over resilience.
- If necessary, the force can manage a major investigation using a manual index system rather than the computerised HOLMES system. Evidence was found of investigations beginning on a manual system but later being converted to HOLMES, causing duplication of work. There was no evidence of staff being trained in the manual system but whenever it was used, HOLMES trainers would provide a basic training input to enable the user to manage the system. There

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appear to be variations of a manual system in use, but no process by which the HOLMES trainers audit the use of these systems, to identify areas of weakness or good practice.

- The force is reviewing how category C homicide investigations are managed. While the terms of reference for the MIT state that it will deal with all homicide investigations, many category C investigations are managed by areas. The role of the MIT has evolved and it has recently assumed responsibility for dealing with aggravated burglaries, armed robberies and the investigation of a large-scale disorder following an unlicensed music event. It has also assisted BCUs with volume crime work. This has dispelled myths that the MIT only investigates homicides, but an anomaly has arisen whereby the MIT is investigating an unlicensed music event while an area is dealing with a category C homicide. The force's best-trained homicide staff are not always available to meet the demands of the force.
- Sudden deaths are not routinely attended by supervisors, although a supervisor will always be informed and will use their professional judgement as to whether or not they should attend the scene. The Chief Constable has identified this as a priority area in the training of new sergeants.
- The investigation of drug deaths receives a minimum level of commitment in that supply chains are not always pursued. This means that the real cause of death may not always be identified and potential acts of homicide are possibly being missed.
- House-to-house enquiries for major investigations are routinely carried out by MIT staff, whereas previously this was dealt with by a mobile support team. In a complex enquiry, this could present a resilience issue, as trained staff who normally perform the roles of outside enquiry teams would be unavailable, creating potential delays to major lines of enquiry. In some other forces, the house-to-house role falls to dedicated trained staff on BCUs with front-line sergeants performing the role of co-ordinators.
- The director of intelligence is one of the nominated SIOs, primarily to give further resilience to the on-call rota. However, the potential for conflict between the two roles makes it unlikely that the postholder will be used as an SIO beyond initial call-out. Consequently, it is unlikely that sufficient evidence will be gathered to maintain PIP accreditation and as such the value of having this post as an accredited SIO is questioned.

Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is effective. Elements of equipment and resources are delivered through written collaborative agreements, which are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.

Strengths

- There are 41 trained crime FLOs in the force, spread across areas, HQ and the MIT. An individual FLO only ever works on one enquiry at a time and FLOs are always deployed in pairs. Assigning an FLO to a major investigation is decided through contact between the SIO and the FLO co-ordinator or one of three FLO advisers based on areas. A dedicated standalone FLO database is consulted to identify the most appropriate FLO. A risk assessment is always completed before any FLO deployment and is reviewed regularly. FLO strategies are written by the FLO co-ordinator or advisers on behalf of the SIO. The co-ordinator or advisers will then look after any needs the FLO may have on any given deployment. All FLOs have three mandatory referrals to the OHU a year, regardless of deployments. In addition, they are referred to the OHU before and after each deployment. This is strictly monitored by the FLO co-ordinator and advisers and if an FLO has not attended the OHU, they cannot work as an FLO until the situation is rectified.
- The force adheres to a SUDI protocol in respect of infant deaths and either an area or family protection unit DI will attend all such incidents to liaise with dedicated SUDI paediatricians.
- Six SIOs are trained to respond to kidnap and extortion offences. Having attended the SIO course, officers receive additional training in the form of a table-top exercise with SOCA. Training recently took place and included CDC staff (including call-takers), the FIB and the technical support unit. There has also been joint training between Norfolk and Suffolk in the last 12 months and the six regional forces have agreed to assist each other with threat-to-life scenarios. The force has also identified suitably trained and vetted interpreters through the head of special branch.
- While the MIT deals with some allegations of stranger rapes, area DIs are generally appointed SIO for rape investigations, using policy files to record decisions. Victims are dealt with by SSOT officers and the availability of these officers is appropriate. The on-call DCI and DI have access to a list of all available SSOT officers when they begin their on-call period. SSOT officers ensure that victim care is addressed and the force has dedicated victim care centres in each area, which cater for medical examination and interview in the same building. Regular meetings are held with the CPS and counsel to talk through evidential and quality issues, and feedback is sought from relevant counsel at the conclusion of rape cases to enhance future investigations. Any allegation of rape that is classed as no further action is signed off by the area DCI.
- In October 2007, the force began working with Essex Medical and Forensic Services Ltd, which supplies forensic medical examiners and healthcare

professionals for examinations of persons in custody and victims of sexual assaults. The particular expertise required is assessed by the company when called, in line with the *Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in Police Custody* document (ACPO). The company acknowledged the positive work and relations it had with Norfolk in a formal communication, which noted:

- that senior management were extremely efficient and courteous;
 - the rapid and effective response to issues raised by Essex Medical and Forensic Services;
 - the work undertaken was superior to some other forces with which the company works;
 - that the sexual offence service is very organised and of a high standard, with knowledgeable, confident and professional officers; and
 - custody staff were courteous, professional and work to a high standard.
- A documented mutual aid agreement exists between Cambridgeshire, Norfolk and Suffolk in respect of major crime investigation. This agreement was drawn up in 2005 but remains current and identifies a number of posts and roles to be delivered in support of the agreement. The roles are listed individually, along with a description of the training and experience necessary to carry them out. Each force has nominated a SPOC responsible for requesting and responding under the terms of the agreement. In cases of extraordinary demand, the following areas can be supported:
 - surveillance (mobile/armed/technical/covert rural observation posts);
 - CHIS and undercover operatives;
 - financial investigation (asset recovery/money laundering);
 - economic crime investigation, including identity theft;
 - deployment of mobile and static ANPR equipment and databases;
 - hi-tech crime, including network investigation and data recovery;
 - kidnap investigation; and
 - technical support capability, including intrusive deployments.
 - A forensic deployment protocol complements the major crime investigation mutual aid agreement, designed to provide clarity over the preferred deployment of forensic resources in cases where scenes arise in one or more of the two neighbouring forces. The objective is not to replace the forensic strategies required but to optimise the outcome of any forensic examination.
 - Norfolk is part of a ten-force consortium across the eastern ACPO region for forensic submissions to the FSS. The force also negotiated with Selmark to handle speculative DNA submissions, with effect from September 2007, which is expected to result in an increase of 60 DNA hits per year. Some drug submissions and all major crime submissions go to the FSS (Huntingdon) while other drug submissions go to the local government chemist, as well as some volume crime work from Central Area.
 - A protocol also exists with the six regional forces on access to specialist scenes of crime equipment. For example, Bedfordshire has a 360 degree camera, Norfolk a crime scope, Suffolk a UV flash (for photographing bruises), while Essex can provide access to a major crime scene vehicle.

Work in progress

- The force is vulnerable in terms of the limited exposure its CSIs receive to major crime. It is addressing this by introducing training programmes held at the county showground, where a competency-based assessment takes place to identify issues and build confidence. These are held two to three times a year, depending on the number of new staff appointed to the department and the number of CSIs requiring refresher training. No regional training is held but the force is trying to encourage the FSS to take on a role in the competency training programme.

Area(s) for improvement

- The MIT terms of reference state that it will investigate all work-related deaths. However, numerous examples were given by staff of instances where these cases have remained on area; these cases can be complex and are a drain on area resources.
- DCs on two areas provide a limited amount of night-duty cover. For the early part of the week, Central Area has a single detective to provide this cover while at the weekend there are two officers. This arrangement helps the area to deal with major crime at times when demand is high in respect of the night-time economy, but there is an issue over the experience of the detectives selected for this role. Officers still completing their ICIDP are being deployed as night duty detectives, often working alone. Situations have arisen where inexperienced uniformed supervisors have expected these equally inexperienced constables to assume control of major crime scenes until the area DI has been called or arrives. This presents a significant area of vulnerability.
- The MIT DCI post was vacant at the time of inspection, as the postholder had been posted to Central Area. Furthermore, the MIT HOLMES manager has been abstracted to work on an HQ-based project team. Consequently, one of the MIT DIs is SIO/DSIO on six current cases. Not only does this create a resilience problem for the MIT at this level, but the force is also abstracting from the MIT for long-term postings, at the expense of major crime work.
- An emerging problem for the force is recruitment to the CID; officers view the role as demanding and the shift patterns not conducive to a good work/life balance.
- Officers posted to the DASCS often conduct their own interviews following arrests from their operations, and spend time file building. This is a concern, as it could lead to officers who work in a covert arena being recognised and therefore compromise operations. The force has considered using MIT staff to interview and file-build from DASCS operations, but senior managers have not taken this up. Furthermore, the department has had to spend time re-training some DASCS officers who have become de-skilled in file building, having been removed from front-line policing.

Summary – The force has an on-demand case review team that is generally deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is efficient.

Strengths

- Force policy in respect of major crime reviews was written in early 2007 and reflects national ACPO guidance. The force also ran a review officers course in 2007 in which six Norfolk officers were trained along with officers from Suffolk and Cambridgeshire. Reviews for current investigations are commissioned after 28 days, following discussions between the head of protective services and the SIO. However, this arrangement can be flexible – for a high-profile murder, this would be brought forward to seven or 14 days. In the event of a 28-day review, it is likely that either Suffolk or Cambridgeshire would be asked to carry out the review. Norfolk does not experience a high number of homicide investigations and, accordingly, only a small number of such reviews have been conducted. Suffolk reviewed Operation Merchant in 2006 and while a collaborative arrangement exists, Norfolk officers have not carried out a review in another force for over five years. Review findings are presented to the force in a report and the head of protective services is responsible for ensuring that any lessons learnt are disseminated.
- The force has developed a scoring matrix against which it determines whether a cold case is suitable for review; this measures the evidential opportunities available. The matrix has identified a number of cold cases suitable for review, including a murder from 1970 where DNA was exploited but without success, and the murder of a prostitute in the 1990s, which is ongoing. In addition, all unsolved homicide cases are routinely examined (although not necessarily subject to formal review) every two years.
- The terms of reference for the review of a current investigation usually require a forensic element and one of the senior managers within the forensic investigation department will form part of the review team. The forensic investigation department also carries out its own informal review, usually within 24 hours of a major investigation commencing. This is held between the senior CSI and the crime scene co-ordinator, who acts as a critical friend to ensure that no immediate forensic opportunities have been overlooked.
- The force is working proactively in respect of Operation Advance (the national project to exploit forensic opportunities in rapes and sexual assaults from the 1990s) by not only including stranger rape and serious sexual assaults but also non-sexual assaults. The support manager in the forensic investigation department acts as the SPOC and determines whether a case should be pursued under the remit of Operation Advance.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- There is no review forum in the eastern region formally to identify and share good practice, although the six forces do consult on an ad hoc basis.
- There is no dedicated cold-case review unit, and all such work is resourced from the MIT; the force has identified the need for dedicated resources to be deployed to such reviews. Currently, a cold case being worked on will be shelved if a new live case requires investigation, until time and resources allow for it to be revisited. Cold-case work is not routinely subject to NIM tasking processes and the decision to carry out such work rests with the head of the MIT, who will take into account existing workloads. If there is a positive line of enquiry, such as DNA, then the ACPO lead will be informed and permission sought to progress the enquiry, but again this will still be balanced against competing priorities.
- The ACPO lead was not aware of the force review policy or the fact that a review team should be reporting its findings.
- The DCI who leads on cold-case work on behalf of the MIT has been seconded to Central BCU for the last four months to assist with volume crime performance. His continued abstraction will have a clear impact on the force's ability to carry out cold-case review work.
- Road death investigations are debriefed (with partners if appropriate) but there is no mechanism routinely or periodically to review unsolved traffic crimes, such as 'fail-to-stop' collisions.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force is predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the *Murder Investigation Manual* and MIRSAP.

Strengths

- The force has defined structures, resources and policies in place to enable it satisfactorily to discharge its duties in response to investigations of homicide and other major investigations. The dedicated MIT promotes the development of specialised, experienced staff.
- Policy files are completed as a matter of course in all major crime investigations, as well as in a number of less serious crimes. There is always some supervision of files by more senior or experienced officers. Staff attending management of serious crime, DI and SIO courses have received training in the completion of policy files.
- Category C murders are not automatically investigated by the MIT, as the force recognises the need to maintain the skills of area-based detectives, who normally oversee such investigations. There is, however, flexibility in the process and, depending on the circumstances of an individual category C case, it could be investigated by the MIT.
- Two chief officers and four SIOs are trained in the management of linked and series crime in accordance with NPIA guidelines. The head of protective services is a trained SIO, has completed a SCIMITAR course and formerly performed the roles of director of intelligence and head of the serious and organised crime department.

Work in progress

- A departmental objective for the MIT is to undertake a review of MIRSAP compliance across the force.

Area(s) for improvement

- If necessary, the force can manage a major investigation using a manual index system rather than the computerised HOLMES system, but some staff stated that they had not received any formal training to use the manual system. Evidence was also found of investigations beginning on a manual system but later being converted to HOLMES, causing duplication of work. There was no evidence of staff being trained in the manual system but, whenever it was used, HOLMES trainers would provide a basic training input to enable the user to manage the system. There appear to be a number of variations of manual system in use, but no process by which the HOLMES trainers audit the use of these systems to identify areas of weakness or good practice.
- The MIT HOLMES manager has been abstracted to an HQ-based project team, diminishing the role of office manager that he regularly performed and removing

the important quality assurance that this role offers, albeit on a short-term basis. While there are three inspectors trained as HOLMES office managers, they are based on areas and, in reality, the MIT is unlikely to secure their services for a protracted major investigation.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACIU	anti-corruption and integrity unit
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition
ATM	automatic teller machine

B

BCU	basic command unit
BOF	back office facility

C

CASWEB	call taking element for HOLMES2 application
CDC	control and despatch centre
CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CDU	county delivery unit
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CIA	community impact assessment
CID	criminal investigation department
CIS	crime intelligence system
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CSI	crime scene investigator
CSU	covert support unit
CTC	counter-terrorist check

D

DAAT	drug and alcohol action team
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DASCS	drugs and serious crime squad
DC	detective constable
DCC	deputy chief constable
DCI	detective chief inspector
DI	detective inspector
DMM	daily management meeting
DS	detective sergeant
DSHU	dedicated source-handling unit
DV	developed vetting

E

ERIU	eastern regional intelligence unit
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F

FIB	force intelligence bureau
FIU	financial investigation unit
FLO	family liaison officer
FMB	force management board
FPD	force policy document
FSA	force strategic assessment
FSS	Forensic Science Service

H

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HMPS	Her Majesty's Prison Service
HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HQ	headquarters
HR	human resources

HSE Health and Safety Executive

I

IAG independent advisory group

ICIDP initial crime investigators development programme

IDO intelligence development officer

INI IMPACT nominal index

L

LGBT lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender

M

MAPPA multi-agency public protection arrangements

MARAC multi-agency risk assessment conference

MAST mobile armed surveillance team

MELO minority ethnic liaison officer

MIRSAP major incident room standardised administrative procedures

MIRWEB a web-based message input facility directly linked to the HOLMES2 incident room database

MIT major investigation team

MSF most similar force(s)

N

NIM National Intelligence Model

NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency

NPSAT National Protective Services Analysis Tool

O

OCG organised crime group

OHU occupational health unit

P

PA	police authority
PDR	performance development review
PIP	professionalising the investigative process
PLO	prison liaison officer
PNC	Police National Computer
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act
PSD	professional standards department

R

RIG	regional intelligence group
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act

S

SAR	suspicious activity report
SC	security cleared
SCIMITAR	serious crime, intelligence management, information technology and resources
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SMT	senior management team
SNT	safer neighbourhood team
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SOP	standard operating procedure
SPECSS	separation/pregnancy/escalation/cultural/sexual assault/stalking
SPI	statutory performance indicator
SPOC	single point of contact
SSOT	serious sexual offence trained
SUDI	sudden unidentified death in infants

T

TP test purchase
TTCG tactical tasking and co-ordination group

U

UC undercover

V

VOSA Vehicle and Operator Services Agency