

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Metropolitan Police Major Crime

July 2008



Metropolitan Police – HMIC Inspection Report

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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

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In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical Description of Force Area

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) is the largest and most complex police organisation in England and Wales. It is made up of 32 borough-based operational command units (OCUs), sharing coterminous boundaries with the London boroughs. It is responsible for policing 620 square miles, with an estimated resident population of over 7.5 million (3.2 million households). On an average weekday 1.06 million people enter central London during the morning peak hours (0700 to 1000) with 88% doing so by means of public transport. London is also one of the world's most popular city destinations, attracting some 27 million overnight visitors every year.

The MPS is one of the largest public sector organisations in the country and is configured to deliver a range of international, national and pan-London services, as well as local service delivery across the 32 territorial boroughs. In terms of staff numbers, the MPS is around three times larger than the next largest force. Its annual budget accounts for about 24% of the total cost of police services in England and Wales. In addition, the MPS is routinely required to respond to a range of major and critical incidents and events characterised by an ongoing commitment to provide reassurance to the people of London against a backdrop of a heightened terrorist threat while operating in an intense 24/7 national media environment.

Demographic Description of Force Area

London is the largest city within the European Union and the resident population is currently growing at a rate of 40,000 people per year. The capital contains 13 of the 20 most deprived boroughs in the UK and one in four of all the poorest districts in England (as measured on the Government's indices of multiple deprivation) is in London. It is home to almost 47% of the UK's black and minority ethnic (BME) citizens and significant numbers of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers. It is estimated that 300 languages are spoken within London schools. 26% of London households with dependent children are headed by a lone parent. About 21% of the UK's economic activity takes place in London.

Structural Description of Force including Staff Changes at Chief Officer Level

The force headquarters is based at New Scotland Yard (NSY), with many of its support functions transferred to new and modern offices at Empress State Building near Earl's Court. The last major restructure of the MPS took place in April 2000. This involved the dissolution of the area structure and the move to borough-based policing. This move was designed to reinforce locally accountable service delivery.

The MPS Modernisation Programme has entered its second year aimed at creating a more efficient and accessible police service. The MPS has a well-established management team with a wealth of command experience. Operational Services is the newest business group in the MPS. Their aim is to improve service delivery, putting Londoners at the heart of everything the MPS does. A further recent addition to the top team is the appointment of a new Director of Strategic Finance, whose previous role at the Greater London Authority (GLA) will bring a wealth of experience and understanding of the Mayor's budget setting process.

There have been no major changes to the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) and there remains a good relationship with members. In terms of resources, the MPS net revenue expenditure on services for 2007/08 is estimated to be £3,043.1million. The arrangements

for setting the annual budget are more complex than for other forces due to the involvement of the London Assembly, the Mayor of London and Capital City funding.

Strategic Priorities

The MPA has agreed the MPS corporate priorities as part of the Policing London Strategy for 2006–09. The Policing London Strategy sets the direction and priorities for the MPS for the next three years and is to be refreshed on a yearly basis. The corporate priorities, together with a brief description, are:

Safer Neighbourhoods – providing a dedicated local policing team for each electoral ward in London;

Counter Terrorism, Security and Protection – successfully combating terrorism and improving safety and security;

Criminal Networks – developing the understanding of criminal networks and reducing the harm they cause to London;

Capital City Policing – securing the transport network and the Olympic Games, while ensuring the resilience to deal with major incidents;

Information Quality – ensuring that staff, partners and the community have the information available they need when they need it;

Citizen Focus – putting what the public want from the police service at the heart of what the MPS does; and

Together – improving the quality of leadership training that the workforce receives.

The 2007/08 annual policing plan forms the one-year delivery mechanism of the three-year Policing London Strategy. The annual policing plan contains measures and targets for the operational strategic priorities shown above.

Force Performance Overview

Force development since 2007 inspections

The MPS has demonstrated strong performance against many of the priorities and targets set by the MPA during 2006/7. There has been a notable achievement in crime reduction with recorded offences falling to the lowest annual crime figure since 1998/99 and offences brought to justice being at the highest ever level, with the HO target achieved a year ahead of schedule. Gun enabled crime also reduced in 2007/8 by 11.3% and the number of violent crimes reduced by 6.1%. Notwithstanding the overall good performance on violent crime the MPS acknowledge public concern regarding recent attacks involving young people and are tackling such crimes with a particular focus on 'gangs'.

There has also been significant progress in the delivery of Safer Neighbourhood Teams across London with the MPS now having coverage in each of the 624 wards and having introduced an enhanced level of coverage in 87 wards with a population in excess of 14,000 people. In addition the MPS has staffed 21 Safer Transport Teams and has established six SN teams to focus on particular community based problems. Two pilot schemes are also underway to trial 24/7 SN teams. This focus on delivery reflects the importance placed on the Safer Neighbourhoods (SN) programme to the policing of London by the Commissioner with the explicit support of the Mayor of London and Government.

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The MPS has appointed 4562 PCSOs to staff SN teams and has achieved their proportionate share of the 16,000 PCSOs required to be in place by the end of April 2007 and these officers are utilised on a range of duties that also include aviation security, government security zone, royal parks, and as station PCSOs. This has been a challenging task for the MPS.

The commitment to SN has assisted the clear focus upon gathering community intelligence and since the introduction of SN there has been over 235,000 intelligence reports recorded and over 36,000 visits to victims of crime and engagement in nearly 1500 community payback schemes. During May 2007 there were 150 community payback schemes per week.

However some key performance targets have not been achieved such as victim satisfaction with the overall service where the MPS achieved 78% satisfaction against a target of 81% and victim of racist incidents satisfaction where the MPS achieved 64% satisfaction against a target of 72%. This continues to be viewed by both the MPS and the MPA as a key area for improvement.

Throughout this period the MPS has maintained and resourced a strong focus upon countering terrorism. To facilitate this in October 2006 the MPS Special Branch and Anti-Terrorist Branch joined to become the Counter Terrorism Command (CTC). The CTC fulfils a national function by supporting the National Coordinator of Terrorist Investigations and other Forces during complex cross border intelligence and criminal investigations. A significant number of proactive counter terrorism investigations have been undertaken during the period with there currently being about 100 people either at or awaiting trial in connection with terrorism investigations. The attempted car bombings in London on 29 June 2007 and in Glasgow the next day have highlighted the importance of maintaining this effort but also emphasised the importance of working with communities to defeat terrorism. The links that the SN teams are beginning to develop with their communities are essential as has ensuring that focus is maintained at Borough level by the appointment of a CT lead at Senior Management Level and a CT intelligence officer now in the majority of Boroughs.

Both the MPS and MPA recognise the financial challenges that lay ahead over the next few years and to enable them to be equal to that challenge are increasing their focus on improving levels of productivity and striving to forge innovative partnerships. The establishment of the MPS Productivity Board chaired by the DC is driving activity on productivity in addition to focusing upon efficiency and value for money to assist meeting that challenge.

In relation to the previous HMIC baseline assessment for 2005/6 areas for improvement have been closely monitored and actioned through the Performance Management Group where the DC receives update reports on overall progress.

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Major Crime

GRADE	Exceeds the standard – and delivering at the appropriate level for the higher risks being faced.
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Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details the MPS's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as its response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

Ref:	Indicator	2006	2007	Change	MSF** ave.
SPI5e	Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.723	0.688	-4.84%	0.787
	Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.004
	% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
	Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.218	0.123	-43.90%	0.206
	% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	53.66%	82.61%	+28.95pp*	57.75%
	Number of blackmails per 10,000 population	0.822	0.557	-32.25%	0.334
	% of blackmail crimes detected/convicted	8.27%	13.16%	+4.89pp*	21.60%
	Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.971	0.758	-21.95%	0.560
	% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	29.22%	27.77%	-1.45pp*	35.59%
	Number of manslaughters per 10,000 population	0.009	0.007	-28.57%	0.019
	% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	71.43%	40.00%	-31.43pp*	67.67%
	Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.222	0.200	-10.18%	0.181
	% of murder crimes detected/convicted	79.64%	92.00%	+12.36pp*	92.77%
	Number of rapes per 10,000 population	3.152	2.693	-14.58%	2.724
	% of rape crimes detected/convicted	31.09%	33.23%	+2.14pp*	27.54%


*'pp' is percentage points.

**Most similar force (MSF) group for the MPS is Greater Manchester, Merseyside, West Midlands and West Yorkshire.


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The number of offences (per 10,000 population) in the MPS for blackmail, kidnap and murder is above the MSF average and, despite a reduction in the number of offences in 2007 compared to the previous year, overall continues to remain high in comparison to other forces in England and Wales. The sanction detection rates for blackmail, kidnapping and manslaughter are below the MSF averages, with the sanction detections for manslaughter falling significantly in 2007.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT), released on 25 September 2007, revealed that the MPS faces an **exceptional** level of demand in respect of the policing response to homicide offences.




Homicides (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total




Three forces that border the MPS indicate raised demand for this crime type.

In the long term, the force is above the national average and, despite a decrease in 2007, is also above the MSF average.

The NPSAT revealed that the MPS faces an **exceptional** level of demand in respect of the policing response to rape offences.




Rape (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total



Three forces that border the MPS indicate raised demand for this crime type.


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The NPSAT revealed that the MPS faces an **exceptional** level of demand in respect of the policing response to kidnapping offences.



In the long term, the force is above the national average and, despite a decrease in 2007, is above the MSF average.

Kidnap (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total



Two forces that border the MPS indicate raised demand for this crime type.

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, the MPS has sought to make progress in relation to the problem by ensuring that the analysis of major crime types is thoroughly mapped. It is currently estimated that 171 OCGs impact the force area, across a large range of crime types as follows:¹

- 56% ASB
- 59% Supply of drugs
- 59% Robbery and/or street crime
- 25% Burglary and theft
- 22% Murder and kidnap
- 51% Serious assault

The force strategic assessment (FSA) reveals a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified eight strategic serious and organised crime priorities in the force control strategy as follows: terrorism, serious violence, immigration crime, gun-enabled

¹ Source – MPS Pan-London Gang Profile, June 2007

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crime, sexual offences, economic crime/e-crime, drug crime and robbery, with criminal networks and youth identified as a cross-cutting theme across all eight, requiring an integrated corporate response. The force strategic intelligence assessment (SIA) has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on youth crime and criminal networks, this focus progressing further with the development of the new SIA that takes into account key issues such as the Olympics, management of intelligence and immigration.

The force has invested substantial resources for interventions to maximise the return on harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and to inhibit major crime. In particular, the MPS role in the provision of major investigative resource support to both regional/national partners is noteworthy.

The force has a high major crime demand and presents a high risk but this inspection assessment reveals that the MPS demonstrates an equally high level of sophistication in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with a number of forces and agencies are recognised, albeit some are at a very early stage.

Intelligence

MC01 Summary

The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, supplying dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. It has fully committed to its major crime investigations with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.

Evidence

- The MPS analytical focus on major crime is principally through the Metropolitan intelligence bureau (MIB) and the serious crime directorate (SCD). The force has made significant investment in analytical resources, with 165 band D analysts and 34 higher analysts deployed in the SCD, while the recently formed MIB currently has 28 band D analysts and eight higher analysts. At the time of the assessment, the MIB was recruiting additional staff to meet its affordable workforce target of 40 band D analysts and the SCD was striving to achieve its target of 201 band D analysts.
- Each major investigation team (MIT) has a designated analytical capability within an intelligence cell that includes designated detective officers and a researcher. These dedicated analytical resources are available to meet the identified demands for this area of activity, including proactively developing intelligence and identifying patterns and trends around major crime. This is informing preventative and enforcement activity.
- The MPS crime academy fulfils the full range of training courses for analysts and this extends further than current national training. Included in the academy programme are courses for intelligence managers and researchers, with briefing officers courses embedded into the range of other training courses.
- The standing capability of its intelligence assets is such that the MPS is regularly asked by other organisations, both within and outside the policing community, to assist with intelligence in high-profile cases of extreme difficulty (such as the recent investigation into the serial murders in Suffolk). This includes much of the work carried out abroad at the behest of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Work in progress

- The MPS principal analysts post was vacant at the time of the assessment but the force is recruiting two posts by way of replacement, one to focus on the delivery of assessments and the other to focus on research, development and analysis.

Area(s) for improvement

- The career structure for analysts is currently unclear and limited, leading to high levels of attrition as staff pursue other options externally, having received significant levels of MPS investment and training. The MPS has yet to develop a bespoke career structure for analysts, offering improved access to specialisation.
- A further developmental opportunity could be created by increasing the predictive analysis capability, since at present there is insufficient understanding of what predictive analysis can deliver in relation to proactivity. Intelligence reviews are rarely commissioned and then only on a day-to-day basis as a by-product of other pieces of work.

MC02 Summary

The force seeks (and shares) intelligence about level 2 and level 3² major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force assessments of community impact to evaluate risk following major crime are extensive. Intelligence about these crime types is sought and shared through effective relationships with partners and other agencies, including engagement with minority groups. Extensive and integrated community impact assessments follow significant events to evaluate risk.

Strengths

- The MPS seeks intelligence with partners at both strategic and operational (borough operational command unit (BOCU)) level. At strategic level, partnership intelligence is cited as part of the intelligence requirement across all eight force crime priorities and partnership contribution is explicitly referred to as a priority within specific commands, such as Trident, the violent crime directorate (VCD) and the economic crime unit (SCD6).
- At local level, BOCUs implement information-sharing arrangements on an ad hoc basis, for example in relation to multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) subjects or as part of the MPS five boroughs project, focused on disrupting organised criminal networks and encouraging partnership contributions from, for example, housing, local authorities, education etc.
- Current intelligence-sharing arrangements exist with the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) (current statement of intent that was ratified in October 2007), Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and some other forces within bespoke operations such as Grafton and Middlemarket. There is a memorandum of understanding with the City of London Police in relation to high-level economic crime. One team of UK Border Agency (UKBA) enforcement officers is assigned to work with the MPS's Trident taskforce and another team has an operational relationship with the MPS clubs and vice unit, CO14.
- There are strong links between the MPS and other parts of the UK, for example through the Trident OCU (SCD8), where experience of gun crime or the impact of travelling offenders is evident, such as in Bristol, Birmingham and Nottingham. MPS officers in these teams have the capability to access all of the available intelligence systems through approved channels, the open-source intelligence systems and those placed with other agencies. This is particularly relevant for 'lives at risk' investigations such as kidnaps, where intelligence requirements are crucial and a fast-time response is essential.

Level 1 – local crime and disorder, including ASB, capable of being managed by local resources, eg, crimes affecting a BCU or small force area.

Level 2 – cross-border issues, affecting more than one BCU within a force or affecting another force or regional crime activity, usually requiring additional resources.

Level 3 – serious and organised crime usually operating on a national and international scale, requiring identification by proactive means and a response primarily through targeted operations by dedicated units and a preventative response on a national basis.

ACPO Guidance – National Intelligence Model (NIM) 2005.

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- Community intelligence is collected, developed and disseminated locally and there is evidence that this intelligence is often used to inform activity, particularly at BOCU level, where it underpins the production of target and problem profiles involving the safer neighbourhoods teams and partners in the development of products to counter serious crime. With the full introduction of safer neighbourhoods teams, there is now a recognised need to encourage and maximise the benefit of this intelligence.
- Community impact assessments (CIAs) are routinely conducted as part of the investigative process, whether at TP level or within the SCD. For more specialist requirements (linked, series or high profile crime), advice and support are sought from the MPS independent advisory group (IAG) family and the diversity and citizen focus directorate (DCFD).
- The MPS develops problem profiles in relation to identified thematic issues (eg, so-called honour killings) as well as victim profiles by crime type, particularly regarding vulnerability (eg, sex workers, stranger attacks on lone females, gay murder) and situational profiles, identifying where violent crime and murders are happening, down to streets and ward level. The MPS has mapped murder, near misses and lower-level violence to identify patterns, trends and risk factors to inform intervention and prevention strategies.

Work in progress

- The London regional intelligence unit (RIU) has recently been established and has made contact with other force intelligence bureaux. The MPS is also liaising with both the eastern and south-eastern RIUs; however, no specific joint operations have currently commenced emanating from the RIU.

Area(s) for improvement

- None.

MC03 Summary

The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to its major crime comprehensively and the force control strategy is equally thorough. Problem profiles for all eight priorities contained in the control strategy are available and are extensive, with links to force and BOCU level plans. There is a wealth of evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues. MPS intelligence products meet ACPO guidance in the NIM 2005.

Strengths

- The MPS has considered all major crime issues and serious organised criminality in its corporate strategic assessment (CSA), including the range of precursor offences with clear linkage to both force and BOCU plans. This includes the current and future demand profile for all types of critical incidents and an assessment of potential risks and threats. In addition, the risk/threat of firearms and community profiles, particularly vulnerable communities and locations, are detailed. The strategic assessment meets local, regional and national requirements.
- The CSA is informed by the force strategic intelligence assessment and provides a clear picture of long-term threats to the MPS, with eight identified strategic priorities (violence against the person, sexual offences, terrorism, immigration crime, gun-enabled crime, drugs, economic crime and criminal networks). The SIA is based on performance, organisational knowledge, PESTELO (political, environmental, social, technological, economic, legal and organisational) analysis, community impact and public concern.
- The MIB has generated an extensive range of NIM products that inform each business group delivery strategy and detail action that supports the strategic priorities. Products such as the MPS pan-London gang profile, which are used to inform business group tasking, are of high quality and comprehensive. Through these NIM products, the force does have a clear understanding of the threat posed by other life-threatening issues such as kidnaps, paedophile rings and dangerous offenders and is continually improving the level of understanding about organised criminality in its communities. Examples include the MIB development of a problem profile for kidnap in a new community.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- The MIB and the strategic corporate tasking process have recently been introduced and have yet to become embedded. The new overarching structure provided by the MIB and the strategic tasking and co-ordination group (STCG) should diminish compartmentalisation across central business group directorates, delivering improved tasking and intelligence management processes which are focused on force strategic priorities, and will drive activity across business groups.

Developing practice

- The requirement for a five boroughs project was identified in the FSA and is focusing on reducing harm within communities caused by gun-enabled crime. The operation seeks to bring to bear combined SCD and BOCU resources on offenders, utilising a joint intelligence cell located in the MIB, staffed by SCD and relevant BOCU staff. The BOCUs represent a key strategic risk to MPS performance in relation to gun-enabled crime reduction. Results will be evaluated by the MPS leadership academy for the purpose of establishing good practice to be rolled out to other BOCUs.

MC04 Summary

Trend analysis and problem profiles are routinely shared with partners and BOCUs. There is a full trigger plan for 'hot briefing' when there is a significant change in either the major crime threat or where the nature of the analysis demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners are highly effective. The force aims to be substantially compliant with the management of police information by 2010.

Evidence

- The MPS has an extensive network of partnerships, with a vast range of agencies involved in the fight against crime. There is a generic information-sharing framework and toolkit available and the sharing of information within such networks is regarded as daily business at both BOCU and SCD level. The generic template is compliant with ACPO guidance on the management of police information (MoPI). It is, however, not mandatory and there is a vast range of variation as BOCUs and SCD departments tailor the template to fit individual requirements. This in part reflects the partnership dynamic of MPS information sharing, where the MPS is not always the lead agency.
- There is evidence that, within the SCD, there is consistent compliance and use of databases such as Genesis and Catchem. Operational orders contain references to such databases, where information has been sought, and there is good awareness among staff as to their existence. The cultural and communities resource unit is also an increasingly important resource and use is made of the unit as a matter of course whenever a critical investigation warrants it. References to such databases and the cultural and communities resource unit are also included in policy logs as part of the investigative process.
- The MPS directorate of information (DoI) has disseminated an information-sharing user guide (v4 28 June 2007) that provides a series of steps that identify the purpose and address legal and security requirements necessary to share police information. The guide defines 'police information'. The MPS has a corporate security manual (METSEC), which includes policies and guidance on security and sections on vetting and physical and system security.
- The DoI is the owner of the information management policy, of which security of systems and information is a part.
- MPS corporate induction training has been amended by course owners and includes key MoPI cultural and behavioural messages. Amended courses include the initial police learning and development programme (IPLDP), Crimint Plus and violent and sex offenders' register (ViSOR) modules and EPFS (extended police family school) courses. As a critical reader, new MPS training is also reviewed by the MoPI workstream of the improving policing information (IPI) programme. Amended courses so far include 'Every Child Matters' training, Impact nominal index training, station officers course for police community support officers and the criminal justice initial investigators course.

Work in progress

- The MPS aims to ensure that the corporate data warehouse (CDW) is available to all forces by the end of summer 2008 on request.
- The MPS is currently developing a memorandum of understanding with the UKBA.

- A project initiation document has been agreed to conduct information-sharing audits on all BOCUs. This represents a substantial undertaking and is intended to identify all external information-sharing activity with non-police organisations.
- The MPS has initiated a force-wide change programme for delivering MoPI compliance and operational benefits. Awareness of MoPI among MPS staff is low and some BOCU management teams do not readily understand the detailed issues. The MPS management board has recently approved a business case for a strategic, force-wide solution that will deliver the necessary business, technological and cultural changes that MoPI compliance requires. As part of the wider IPI programme, MoPI aims to deliver strategic and tactical improvements in information management across the MPS. Although focused on delivering compliance, MPS MoPI is operationally led and benefits-driven and seeks to support compliance where identifiable policing benefits are identified.
- There is a general lack of understanding of the detailed MoPI issues at BOCU level. MoPI features in a range of training interventions. The MPS training management board has agreed to a mandatory MoPI e-learning training package to increase cultural and behavioural awareness of information collection and recording principles.
- MoPI compliance is being delivered as part of a wider change programme aligned to corporate strategy and with existing programmes of work. This approach is endorsed by the management board, and is supported by the recent restructuring of the DoI. The MPS aims to be substantially compliant with MoPI by the 2010 deadline. The DoI is leading delivery of MoPI compliance. A DoI commander has been appointed to lead the business engagement and support the MoPI senior responsible officer, the deputy director of information.
- The MoPI DoI commander chairs a regional forum attended by the five metropolitan forces in England and Wales, to identify issues relating to MoPI compliance and co-ordinate a national-level response to the MoPI requirements.

Area(s) for improvement

- The contribution to and from other forces to the MPS intelligence picture is inconsistent and often ad hoc. Information-sharing arrangements are often bespoke to specific operations and arranged between individuals rather than facilitated by corporate, overarching and sustainable protocols. Other forces report difficulties in accessing MPS intelligence systems on a regular basis as a means of informing their strategic assessments or intelligence requirements or, conversely, in relation to feeding intelligence into MPS systems.
- The advent of the MIB may go some way to resolving the issue by providing a single point of contact (SPOC) but at present, the routine scanning of and feeding into external intelligence sources requires development. Intelligence linkage and joint working with SOCA notwithstanding, the new statement of intent is limited and feedback from every directorate reflects dissatisfaction with the interface and support received from the agency.

MC05 Summary

In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. Future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.

Strengths

- Communities are not specifically featured in the CSA or SIA but such documents are informed by bespoke community profiles, where identified as either posing a threat or conversely becoming at risk.

The organised criminal networks matrix operated by the MPS also identifies vulnerable communities and feeds into the CSA and STCG. Identified vulnerable communities are also considered in the SCD tasking and co-ordination processes.

- The 'Communities Together' team, under the DCFD, part of the deputy commissioner's command, which also includes the TP joint co-ordination and intelligence cell and the racial and violent crime task force, collates a weekly community tension return from all 32 TP OCUs. This data feeds a number of MPS intelligence and tasking processes and provides independent advice and community reassurance.
- There is an emerging threats analysis function in the MIB that assesses the impact of gang and OCG activity; capability exists in the SCD, tasked via the STCG, to work with relevant BOCUs in targeting and disrupting OCG activity.

Work in progress

- The DCFD's 'Communities Together' team is constructing a pan-London picture of vulnerable communities, in order to better inform the MPS as to the range and extent of all its communities. This is integral to the ongoing process of threat assessment in relation to the impact of serious and organised crime activity prompted by the Olympic Games in 2012. However, BOCU and partner input appears minimal, which, in view of the transient nature of many London communities, may be an oversight, given the intelligence-gathering potential of safer neighbourhood teams.
- The five boroughs project is focusing on reducing harm in communities caused by gun-enabled crime and seeks to bring to bear combined SCD and BOCU resources on offenders, utilising a joint intelligence cell located in the MIB, staffed by SCD and relevant BOCU staff. Results will be evaluated by the MPS leadership academy for the purpose of establishing good practice to be rolled out to other BOCUs.

Area(s) for improvement

- BOCUs create community profiles in accordance with their own strategic priorities and analytical capability. Accessing such local profiles in order to inform the pan-London picture is as yet inconsistent. Moreover, the project is centrally co-ordinated and the BOCUs have a SPOC in the MIB, who co-ordinates and disseminates such intelligence. Otherwise, the linkage between BOCUs and the MIB needs to be clarified in terms of intelligence submission and dissemination. The MIB does not have an explicit community intelligence function, which would provide a collection and dissemination conduit for community profiles emerging at local level as preventing or being at risk.

MC06 Summary

The force corporate risk register is reviewed every month by the corporate risk review group. Membership of this group comprises MPS deputy assistant commissioners and the MPA chief executive. The review group acts as the conduit between business groups and the MPS management board. Strategic risk management is a newly introduced concept and requires mainstreaming into the strategic and operational planning process at corporate, business group and BOCU levels.

Evidence

- The force strategic risk register, known as the corporate risk register in the MPS, is a significant part of the CSA process. The business risk team is one of the initial contributors to the CSA. The CSA process takes a comprehensive range of sources of information to produce an initial draft to include the business risk (corporate risk register), intelligence (the SIA from the MIB), performance (analysis of corporate performance) and environmental scanning (this includes Government initiatives and performance frameworks).
- The corporate risk register is one of the contributing products that are considered in a workshop format, where the CSA team decides on initial content. Guided by the risk management team, risk workshops identify the various risks and opportunities to the service for management board consideration. The final report is compared to the corporate risk register to enable each business group to address and account for differences or gaps between the risk register and the CSA, as well as assist in prioritisation. The MPS therefore has a process that ensures decisions are informed cognisant of the risk.
- The business risk team has also identified generic areas of organisational risk – crime and disorder, operational policing, risk assessment and strategic risk management. To correspond to these areas, risk registers have been established at three levels – corporate, business group and BOCU.
- The risk registers and individual risks are ‘owned’ by nominated leads, so that, for example, the 11 strategic risks identified in the corporate risk register are owned by management board members, with the 40 risks relevant to policing operations distributed among the relevant lead officers of the business groups. BOCU risk registers are the responsibility of local senior management teams, overseen by cluster commanders and supported by SC6.

Work in progress

- The MPS has published a draft business risk management standard operating procedure (SOP) (September 2007), setting out the structure of risk management in the force, describing the approach to risk management and providing guidance on how to compile a risk register. The SOP is being circulated for the purpose of consultation with a view to being eventually adopted as force practice.

Area(s) for improvement

- Business risk management in the MPS is at a very early stage of implementation and requires embedding into relevant planning processes at all levels, so that it becomes an integral part of day-to-day business. The SOP provides a model which will enable business groups and BOCUs to work towards effective management of key risks, using appropriate resources.

MC07 Summary

The force is creating ways of collaborating with some other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region.

Strengths

- The MPS relies on the accessibility and capability of corporate databases and shares the frustrations of other users that there is limited interoperability between significant databases such as the Home Office large major enquiry system (HOLMES), the MPS crime reporting information system (CRIS) and the police national computer (PNC). Nevertheless, an intelligence-sharing regime is in place to ensure that maximum interrogation of these systems takes place in order to establish links such as persons of interest or trends. The process is managed via daily and bi-weekly NIM processes and, strategically, the MIB is now in place to co-ordinate and disseminate intelligence across business groups and via information exchange protocols with external partners. There is as yet no consistent corporate process for cross-border intelligence sharing, although a number of bespoke and ad hoc arrangements exist, for example with RIU partners or neighbouring forces (Kent, Essex and Hertfordshire) suffering the impact of MPS criminality.
- The force has invested in technology to enable automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) information derived from static and mobile sources to be used locally and pan-MPS. Expanding the network across borders has yet to be developed, although the MPS is developing partnerships with surrounding county forces to progress this. There is significant evidence to suggest that at both SCD and BOCU level ANPR is increasingly regarded as both an enforcement and investigative tool.
- The MPS head of information compliance is responsible for achieving Data Protection Act compliance and there is a yearly process of notification to the Information Commissioner, which is auditable and documented.
- The MPS has played a significant role in the development of the UKBA (London enforcement offices) joint intelligence units. There are four such units, which have direct access to MPS intelligence databases.
- The MPS CDW has been created to integrate the data from disparate MPS systems and takes regular (from daily to weekly) updates from key operational systems. Approximately 7,000 licensed users have access to the CDW, using an integrated intelligence platform. The CDW and integrated intelligence platform allow access to six key operational databases: CRIS, Anite custody, national strategy for police information systems (NSPIS) custody, Crimint (intelligence), stop/search and CAD (computer-aided dispatch).

Work in progress

- The following systems are proposed additions to the CDW: Merlin (child protection database), planned for the third quarter this year and HOLMES, for the first half of 2009. The MPS aims to introduce custody imaging during the second half of 2009.
- The IPI programme includes initiatives aimed at improving interoperability across MPS systems and reducing the need to re-key information or login to multiple policing systems. These include the IQ: reduced re-keying project, which allows the 'copy paste' transfer of information across multiple systems, and the IPI single point of access

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stream, which will deliver a single portal for accessing information held on disparate MPS systems.

Area(s) for improvement

- The use of the ViSOR database is not routinely exploited as an intelligence source. The system is standalone and is not linked into other MPS intelligence systems. Part of the reason for this is attributable to a lack of awareness among staff outside the specialist MAPPA environment as to the potential of the information contained on the database and also to the limited ability to access the system in the absence of such staff. However, IPLDP recruits now receive some input in order to create an awareness of ViSOR.
- Analysts report some frustration with the lack of improved interoperability and bureaucracy in relation to accessing and using various key MPS data systems. For example, one Trident operation involved single data entry 25 times for supporting documents.

MC08 Summary

The force has a comprehensive case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is highly effective.

Strengths

- In April 1999, the MPS established a specialist crime review group (SCRG) and implemented a structured review process for murder investigations. This now has a wider remit and is known as the specialist crime review group, performing a review and quality assurance role in relation to homicide, serious crime, part 8 reviews and any other investigation fitting the MPS critical incident criteria. Workloads are controlled and reviewed via a departmental tasking process chaired by the commander MIB and informed by the STCG.
- The specialist crime review group enters any undetected cases into a 'traffic light' database for either closure or review in two years. Major cases and the ongoing investigation of historic cases are scrutinised, and outside of the current financial year, there are high clear-up rates for murders.
- Reinvestigation and review of current and ongoing investigations are now regarded by MPS staff as a de facto and constructive part of the investigation process, which has had a discernible impact on the quality and sustainability of results, as well as providing the MPS and the public with confidence in the effectiveness and capability of its investigators and procedures. There is a published and accessible murder, specialist crime and cold case review policy, located on the SCRG intranet site, where results, learning and good practice are also published.
- The MPS crime academy is directly linked into the specialist crime review group and is represented at the tasking and review processes. There is substantial evidence of learning being transformed into both MPS training products (senior investigating officer (SIO) courses specifically) and policy updates, as well as being included on the national Genesis site.
- Elsewhere within the SCD, post-operational debriefing and results evaluation are conducted as business as usual, with results being collated and, where appropriate, passed to the crime academy for incorporation into wider training and good practice dissemination.
- SCD and SCD8 seek reviews of unsolved cases where shots have been fired, by the murder review group or the cold case review team. Other units have access to this facility when required. Each major investigation has a debrief to include lessons learnt and good practice. This information is then promulgated to the rest of the command, as well as the crime academy and, where relevant, to other MPS units.
- All SCD units have intranet websites and publish details of strategies, policies, operations and results, together with learning and good practice for the information of MPS staff across other business groups.
- The murder review group is distinctly separate from the cases that it is reviewing, reporting to a commander not engaged in the investigation. The group has gained significant expertise in its field, with the services of the MPS being called on both nationally and internationally. The MPS has not utilised independent reviews from

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external forces because of the independence of the existing structures and the depth of expertise that can be provided.

- The crime academy was established in 2003 following amalgamation of the detective training school and the forensic scientific support college and sits within the SCD. The crime academy also embraces training in such areas as intelligence and crime analysis not previously available in the MPS. In total, the academy currently offers a prospectus of 70 different courses, covering every aspect of criminal investigation and delivered not just to MPS staff but also to students from other forces within the UK and overseas. The academy is rapidly becoming a repository for good practice and learning and is habitually linked into organisational learning processes, exemplified by its integration into the murder and cold case review process and linkage with the July review group (the post-Stockwell organisational learning group).

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- At SCD level, there is an effective and systematic grip on the review process. This is not the case at BOCU level in relation to level 1 investigations, where low levels of investigative experience are impacting adversely on performance in terms of quality investigation, leading to junior officers 'reporting' rather than investigating crime. Effective supervision capability is also at a premium.
- Performance management of BOCU supervision, such as dip sampling, inspection and review cycles of 'mission critical' processes, is also variable. Some BOCUs are more proactive than others, dependent on the level of senior management team experience and commitment. This has implications for the effective management of some serious and major crime locally.

MC09 Summary

The force tasking and co-ordination processes operate satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The deputy assistant commissioner SCD chairs the fortnightly SCD TCG, where level 2 issues are monitored and tasked, supported by the co-ordinating and tasking office. There are clear linkages through the co-ordinating and tasking office to consider taskings that are received from other forces, with action taken to direct these to the appropriate ACPO rank, should a fast-time response be required. Decisions not to resource are documented with the rationale and any follow-up action for deployment requests, resources or work remitted to other units or business groups are also followed up, minimising opportunities for work to fall through gaps.
- The SCD tasking process includes a review of resources, and ensures that all options have been considered, from disruption to progression. In complex and/or protracted cases, the facility has been used to task reviews from the cold case review team to ensure that a clear focus has been maintained.
- While the SIA is relatively new and requires embedding as a key corporate intelligence management process across the organisation, it is comprehensive, reviewed and refreshed in support of the STCG and is increasingly being utilised by business groups to inform in-house tactical assessments and the tasking processes.

Work in progress

- The MIB is developing a cross-MPS consultation process, focused on identifying emerging threats and highlighting trends in offending patterns that could be precursor crimes. For example, the MIB examines paedophile sexual offences being investigated by different SCD units in order to identify common themes. The SIA also includes precursor crime generators in order to assess potential impact and harm. The use of such information assists the MPS to identify strategic priorities and emerging threats, effectively informing the deployment of appropriate resources either to research further or be deployed into preventative or enforcement activity.

Area(s) for improvement

- The intelligence requirement for precursor crime is not yet effectively promulgated to BOCUs. BOCU strategic assessments are based on level 1 crime and do not always identify the link to major crime types. However, work is ongoing to develop the intelligence requirement and design a system for BOCUs to flag up such matters.
- Cross-BOCU tasking occurs, but not systematically, and is dependent on local cluster commanders as strategic negotiators/co-ordinators of tasking and activity. Major crime that surpasses BOCU capability is managed locally, unless of sufficient gravity either to attract additional resources from TP or warrant being tasked to the SCD. Practice in relation to managing this crime type is variable across the MPS, with some clusters operating more effective cross-border tasking processes than others. There is evidence of cross-border intelligence exchange as well as operations achieving success, but this is reliant on personalities rather than embedded or established processes. The cluster commander structure requires clarity in terms of defining the remit for cross-border tasking and deployment of resources, both at TP and BOCU level.

MC10 Summary

Due to appropriate and comprehensive training, the force's awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is acute. Training is provided to staff to create an awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations.

Strengths

- The MPS crime academy at Hendon combines all areas of training relating to investigative work, from foundation detective training to specialist roles, crime scene examiners, crime analysts and staff involved in intelligence roles. The academy also employs detectives to deliver training where appropriate, ensuring experienced and informed input. Responsibility for the professionalising the investigative process (PIP) programme is also located within the remit of the crime academy. A detective chief superintendent is head of the crime academy and sits on regional and national detective training bodies, such as the national PIP programme board, and is therefore linked into national work.
- The crime academy has a total budget of £5.49 million for crime training. A prospectus is sent to every chief constable and every force training manager. The MPS attends key national training conferences to market the services that can be offered and is focused on income generation – for example, the foyer environment at the crime academy is funded by other forces that send students on courses, and there are also contracts with overseas police forces (eg, Trinidad and Tobago, the An Garda Siochana) to provide specialist training in areas such as family liaison.
- The crime academy has recently completed a course review process against the cultural and behavioural requirements of the MoPI guidance and has amended all of the affected courses appropriately, across the prospectus.
- The MPS delivers a comprehensive range of training products focused on raising awareness among staff of community diversity issues. These range from diversity training incorporated into basic probationer training to SIO training relating to family liaison responsibilities, media management and CIAs. Diversity issues are also integrated into basic critical incident training, as well as promotion development courses. Extensive use is made of external expertise and input into course syllabuses and all MPS staff receive corporate diversity training, which is orientated towards rank and related responsibilities.
- The corporate IAGs also undertake ad hoc reviews, such as the recent lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) advisory group review into the selected murder investigations conducted by the MPS over the last ten years, in order to identify lessons and good practice specifically relevant to the needs of the LGBT community. The result is published on the LGBT website, as well as made available to the crime academy for learning to be identified and incorporated as appropriate into the SIO/PIP syllabus.
- The MPS is collaborating with the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) on training products for the level 3 SIO development programme and detective inspectors programme.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- None.

Prevention

MC11 Summary

The force has an array of IAGs and these are always used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- The MPS is advised by five corporate IAGs: race; LGBT; gypsy and traveller; youth; and disability. Alongside the MPS corporate IAGs, other pan-London advisory groups have been introduced, supporting and advising the work of the prevention and investigation of shootings, safeguarding children, knife crime, criminal justice and improving rape investigation and victim care. Additionally, commands such as traffic and firearms are developing small, dynamic community reference groups to provide specific advice around critical areas of MPS performance and the practitioners' forum of the guns, gangs and weapons reduction board (eg, the Kratos reference group, focused on reviewing MPS suicide bombing tactics).
- The MPS's IAGs have become a major strength within London and the MPS has previously won the national category in the fifth Independent Advisory Group Awards. This award was presented at the national advisory group conference, "for highly effective consultation and reassurance on a huge scale within short timescales, building on an established and effective IAG network".
- The MPS relationship with independent or community advice has now defined its policing style. It is now systematically 'advised' by over 11,000 Londoners through 635 safer neighbourhood panels, BOCU advisory groups, local community police consultative groups and CDRPs, as well as via many more regular and ad hoc forums, all providing the MPS with a local and pan-London perspective on a wide range of community and performance-related issues. Evidence is recorded and considered as part of community assessments.

Work in progress

- The MPS has been conducting a review of IAGs, led by the DCFD, the first since their inception in 1998. The review has consulted widely and examined every aspect of the role of the IAGs, encompassing issues such as recruitment, role, governance and vetting. It has produced 39 recommendations, which aim to improve current local and corporate IAG procedures and governance, as well as introduce a new corporate pan-community IAG that will provide access to, and improve dialogue with, all London communities. The intention, following management board approval, will be to enshrine the agreed recommendations in new SOPs for advisory groups that will thereafter govern and inform the MPS approach and relationship with independent advice.
- The MPS is working to reintroduce clarity into the primary role of its community advisors on the IAGs, as in some cases they are beginning to perform a quasi-scrutiny role, requiring servicing through the provision of significant amounts of performance data and access to senior leaders and managers in forums which amount to performance management exercises.

Area(s) for improvement

- None.

MC12 Summary

Leading-edge contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were fully understood and tested by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- There are very effective contingency plans and business continuity plans in place to deal with and minimise the impact of the escalation of an incident to a major crime. SOPs for major incidents and crimes are in place for operators and supervisors. Process maps and diagrams are readily available and from initial receipt of a call, these prompt operators to take specific courses of action. They set in motion a series of activities to call out and direct resources, ensure supervision and instigate risk assessments, drawing on higher levels of management as required, providing process maps and audit trails of decision making. Call management staff and first responders were familiar with the 2005 *Practice Advice on Core Investigative Doctrine*. Forces visit the Central Communications Command (CCC) to scrutinise and learn from the MPS processes.
- A recent major incident proved an effective live test of the system, whereby an incident managed locally was escalated into a pan-London and national response. This was the first major test of the system and it operated seamlessly throughout the day, with the CCC migrating entirely in-house from local to pan-London, linking to national capability, an achievement of some significance given the scale of the operation. The learning from this incident has been promulgated nationally.
- Awareness among staff is high, primarily because the process is 'flexed' on a daily basis. While incidents may not reach the same scale, as they escalate, the CCC is always considering the possibility of opening a special operations room. In effect, the thinking is tested daily and the link between command support and the special operations room is well known. The number of incidents occurring across the MPS daily also ensures that SOPs (for example, relating to command and control rotas, access to specialist resources, process aides-memoire etc) are reviewed and assessed on a constant basis, since the CCC proactively analyses calls throughout the day in order to identify as early as possible potential critical incidents and thereby initiate resourcing trigger plans.
- The force has clear criteria for establishing major incident rooms (MIRs) with minimum standards set out for different types of incident, with a good level of understanding among staff about the criteria and sources of guidance.
- Staff training is comprehensive and includes critical incident response, eg, training new recruits in how to identify critical incidents. The CCC is focused on developing multi-skilled staff, since this provides flexibility of resource management.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- The CCC training focus requires 4,500 training days with only 2,300 training days available, so the training programme will take time to develop all staff to the necessary

level of competence.

MC13 Summary

The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed extensively.

Strengths

- The SIA provides a comprehensive picture of current and long-term crime and disorder issues affecting the MPS, identifying new and emerging threats. The SIA facilitates the setting of intelligence priorities for the MIB and STCG as well as defining the corporate intelligence requirement. The MPS also operates a strategic prioritisation matrix, which assesses vulnerability, risk and potential harm caused by crime and disorder and utilises the product to identify priorities to be recommended to the CSA for inclusion in the control strategy. Each control strategy strand contains a range of intelligence, enforcement and prevention activities and each business group is supported by a tactical assessment which provides updates on trends, progress and performance, as well as a menu of tactical options to be considered at tasking.
- The MIB has created priority teams focused on 5 key crime types – gun-enabled crime, drugs, robbery, serious violence and sexual offences; these are key features of the MPS corporate tactical assessment. Terrorism remains within the remit of SO15 and economic crime within SCD6. Signal and precursor crime analysis is conducted in each priority team and near-miss trends are also analysed by the serious violence team. Criminal networks and gangs are analysed by the MIB assessment team and while immigration crime is primarily dealt with by SCD6 and SCD11, the intelligence requirement is addressed by the MIB.
- There is a strategic prevention co-ordination infrastructure (co-ordinated by SCD3) that collects and develops intelligence in relation to prevention activity that delivers reduction. The unit has already taken on significant amounts of work in relation to prevention activity carried out within the SCD. The unit is represented on the MPS youth crime board and mental health board and works closely with the VCD in TP. Examples of activity include developing preventative work with partners through a guns, gangs, weapons and reduction board and the development of an MPS ‘gangs’ manual, offering practice guidance. Each business group control strategy contains a prevention strand, with nominated leads and underpinned by delivery plans.
- The VCD is responsible for implementing and delivering the MPS strategy in relation to reducing domestic violence. There is a strong preventative strand underpinned by risk assessment, which has now been introduced as mandatory for all operational officers called to investigate such allegations or deal with domestic incidents. There is also a robust supervision regime in place, monitoring positive arrest policy compliance, risk assessment compliance and quality and providing support and assistance to BOCUs as appropriate.

Work in progress

- The DCFD’s ‘Communities Together’ team is constructing a pan-London picture of vulnerable communities, in order to better inform the MPS as to the range and extent of all its communities. This is integral to the ongoing process of threat assessment in relation to the impact of serious and organised crime activity prompted by the Olympic Games in 2012. However, BOCU and partner input appears limited at present, which, in view of the transient nature of many London communities, may be an oversight, given the intelligence-gathering potential of safer neighbourhood teams.

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Area(s) for improvement

- Notwithstanding that there are priority (control strategy) leads at ACPO level and that central resources contained in the SCD homicide command and the VCD are focused on major crime matters, the level of understanding and commitment to such issues at BOCU level is varied. The SIA is promulgated to relevant directorates and business groups via chief officer leads and the MIB. However, further routine dissemination of the SIA and related intelligence requirements or associated problem profiles to partners and to BOCUs is limited to key information via the MetBaTs (MPS briefing and tasking system), ad hoc Information exchange protocols (IEPs) or via appropriate IAGs or gold groups. Thus, the local picture is not always comprehensive, consistent or borough specific. BOCUs do have in-house intelligence capabilities (borough intelligence units) but these are not always sighted on the corporate intelligence picture relating to major crime.

MC14 Summary

The policy covering threat to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of joint/regional/cross-border/multi-agency operations abound.

Strengths

- The SCD has a dedicated unit focused on prevention, which is engaged in prevention activity across London with multi-agency groups such as the guns, gangs and weapons harm reduction group. Significant work is carried out with external partners/customers to prevent and reduce crime and each business group control strategy contains a prevention strand, with nominated leads and underpinned by delivery plans.
- The MPS has a robust preventative campaign in relation to firearms prevention and education strategies, forging direct links within communities for targeted preventative activity. The 'Stop the Guns' campaign features posters, press advertisements, radio endorsements, nightclub flyers and a website.
- Problem profiles on thematic problems are conducted (eg, so-called honour killings) as well as victim profiles by crime type, particularly regarding vulnerability (eg, sex workers, stranger attacks on lone females, gay murder) and situational profiles, identifying where violent crime and murders are happening, drilling down into streets and wards. The MPS has mapped murder, near misses and lower-level violence to identify patterns, trends and risk factors to inform intervention and prevention strategies. The MPS contributed fully to a European homicide working group, where the SCD(1) commander was asked for advice regarding homicide prevention.
- The MPS has reviewed and analysed all public enquiries in the last six years to identify and distil organisational learning and create a corporate memory. It has also examined a dataset of ten years of different types of murders, for example, those committed by mentally disordered offenders, near misses and lower-level offences, to ensure that learning takes place and is rolled out to the front line in the form of tool kits and risk models. The domestic violence separation pregnancy escalation community isolation stalking sexual assault model (DVSPECSS) is an example of a risk assessment model derived by this means).
- The MPS's generic contingency plans for dealing with kidnap, are disseminated to all staff through the CAD and Aware systems and the SCD intranet site. There is a good level of understanding among investigating staff regarding the options and contingency plans. Across the MPS, daily NIM processes include a review of 'threat-to-kill' offences as well as other identified trigger crimes that could generate risk. Tasking (reactive or proactive) and actions are systematically documented, creating an audit trail of accountability and decision making.
- SCD6, is engaged with a number of partners in prevention plans to combat economic crime, including Companies House, HM Land Registry, the London fraud forum and the London public sector counter-fraud partnership.

Work in progress

- None.

Areas for improvement

- None.

MC15 Summary

The force has a witness protection capability, supported by dedicated covert resources, that is fit for purpose. It operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by, all staff. The force is collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- The MPS has a witness protection capability supported by dedicated covert resources. The witness protection unit is also accessible to staff requiring advice via published contact numbers. The MPS operates a witness protection policy that is promulgated across the organisation via the intranet (MPS Aware system) and CAD (MPS command and control system) and is generally understood by staff. It is collaborating with other forces and partners on an ad hoc basis when witness protection issues necessitate cross-border co-ordination.
- The witness protection scheme SOPs have also been promulgated to staff via the intranet and CAD systems and access to guidance can be located on the SCD11 website for reference purposes. The SOPs are detailed and comprehensive and provide a clear series of indicators as to when action should be taken, as well as the relevant level of responsibility for taking action.
- If there is threat to life or serious crime, witnesses are protected as a matter of urgency. In respect of less willing witnesses, there are now systems in place for the 'top end' cases, ie, corporate objectives, threat to life and an indication that, with the right support, they will give evidence. SIOs are aware of this system and witness protection is included as a key element of SIO training courses.

Work in progress

- None.

Areas for improvement

- ACPO guidelines relating to tier 1 witnesses are not always effective, particularly during out of hours after midnight, when access to resources is limited. While there is an awareness and understanding of the scheme by MPS staff, there are vulnerabilities relating to level 1 crime, since there is an unrealistic expectation of the scheme among borough staff that cannot always be realised.
- There is a need to consistently market to BOCUs the remit of the scheme and who it is intended to protect within the relevant criteria, as well as the evidence threshold required for admittance to the scheme.

MC16 Summary

The force has a system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are fully used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The MPS uses a range of community tension indicators that are collated from BOCUs on a weekly basis by the MIB. The indicators include data derived from BOCU daily incident briefings, public satisfaction surveys, disproportionality data (from the corporate stops database), the critical incident advisory team (which highlights potential signal crimes), local media and press articles and MAPPA feedback. However, there is no overarching structure that collects and analyses all data available from the range of indicators that exist. The MIB is not yet configured to undertake this task and, although each business group has developed in-house systems for collecting and collating such data, there is as yet no single process for corporately assessing harm in individual communities or which could amount to corporate threat.
- The MPS, via the Performance Information Bureau (PIB) conducts regular public satisfaction surveys across a range of subject areas. Data and intelligence from these sources are fed into the MIB, as are the results of citizen focus analysis (produced by the DCFD). Together these are used to inform the SIA.
- The MPS includes CIAs within the serious and major crime investigation review process. Where appropriate, should issues arise in relation to either local management of investigations on BOCUs or impact assessments, then liaison with BOCUs and TP is facilitated via SIOs and relevant members of local command teams. This ensures that issues are addressed and audit trails created for accountability purposes.

Work in progress

- The DCFD's 'Communities Together' team is constructing a pan-London picture of vulnerable communities, in order to better inform the MPS as to the range and extent of all its communities. This is integral to the ongoing process of threat assessment in relation to the impact of serious and organised crime activity prompted by the Olympic Games in 2012. However, BOCU and partner input appears limited at present, which, in view of the transient nature of many London communities, may be an oversight, given the intelligence-gathering potential of safer neighbourhood teams. The PIB is also developing an 'intelligence tree' approach, which aims to collect and analyse information relating to risks created by people and places in order to better identify commonality of risk and the effectiveness of prevention tactics.
- Developing harm reduction in communities as a corporate performance measure is at an early stage within the MPS. A strategic prevention co-ordination infrastructure (co-ordinated by SCD3) collects and develops intelligence in relation to prevention activity that delivers reduction. The unit has already taken on significant amounts of work on prevention activity. There is a plethora of work that is ongoing across all MPS business groups on harm reduction but, though the range is wide, the approach is piecemeal and not driven by a co-ordinated and corporate framework, supported by a structured monitoring and management information process that feeds the SIA.

Area(s) for improvement

- None.

MC17 Summary

The inspection found evidence that the force sometimes considered relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a developing security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- MPS security and integrity of management systems fall under the remit of the METSEC programme board, chaired by the director of information. There are two sub-groups of the METSEC programme board, one dealing with the technical aspects of security and the other developing policy.
- The DoI has disseminated an information-sharing user guide (v4 28 June 2007) that provides a series of steps that identify the purpose and address legal and security requirements necessary to share police information. The guide defines 'police information'. The MPS has a corporate security manual (METSEC), which includes policies and guidance on security. The DoI also owns and publishes an information management strategy, which includes guidance on the security of systems and policing of information.
- The information security policy also includes sections on vetting and physical and system security. However, the MPS current identity and access management is not based on any up-to-date corporate risk assessment and there is no correspondingly robust and appropriate corporate governance structure enabling a joined-up approach to security management across the organisation. Consequently, the MPS lacks an integrated system for managing access to and use of its assets and information.
- The head of information compliance tests adherence to policy via an inspection regime, but this activity is limited, not least because the inspection team is only four strong. The team conducts small quality audits (eg on PNC) and will also check the physical security of buildings in which information systems are used. Information compliance inspections also include audits of email traffic in and out of the organisation. The head of information compliance also has a remit to look across the organisation for policies that are not working or require updating.
- The directorate of professional standards (DPS) does not proactively police corporate IT systems such as Crimint, as this is the responsibility of BOCUs. The DPS is largely reactive and dependent on the identification of suspicious activity by others. It has a small proactive capability, the intelligence development group, and has recruited an IT professional so that advice can be provided to various project boards implementing new MPS systems.
- The head of information compliance liaises with the DPS via the METSEC programme board (chaired by the director of information), where the DPS has a seat and also a liaison officer acting as the SPOC.
- The single sign-on project was completed in the beginning of 2008; this provided a single password access system to policing applications on the Aware network. Furthermore, the identity access management programme will provide a single token access solution for MPS buildings and IT systems.

Work in progress

- The MPS has recognised that current identity and access management is based on outdated risk assessments and is not joined up across business groups, lacking in appropriate governance and enforcement processes, potentially exposing it to the risk of security breaches. The DPS has created a business case for the identity and access management programme, which will develop a single token access for MPS buildings and IT systems to replace the existing identity and password security system. The proposal is to enhance and simplify security processes by delivering identification for use in access control to protect MPS assets and areas. The commander DPS is the project business sponsor.
- The head of information compliance is working in collaboration with MoPI, under the IPI programme, to determine an appropriate compliance regime for the MPS. Additionally, the DPS has an emerging requirement for an IT solution for audit trail monitoring of all policing systems.
- The MPS is unable to be specific as to the number of information-sharing protocols currently in existence. The corporate guidance provided in relation to implementing and designing such protocols is mandatory through the publication of SOPs. Also provided is a template, the design of which may be tailored to partnership requirements. The MPS has recognised that it has no corporate overview of the number of or control of information exchange protocols and has accordingly commissioned an auditing exercise in order to assess the level of compliance with force policy and MoPI guidance.

Area(s) for improvement

- The MPS lacks an overarching strategy for the proactive testing of the security of access to police buildings or IT systems across all business groups. This is linked to the lack of a consistent strategy in relation to staff vetting; SCD directorates and units all operate different systems of monitoring staff security vetting levels, with some units being unaware of the vetting status of all staff, or lacking any process in place to determine that staff are appropriately vetted. Further, the lack of a systematic approach to the vetting of members of the extended police family, including IAG and MPA members, creates an organisational risk, because there is no consistent standard required or system to implement vetting. The MPS requires a high-level corporate governance structure that provides clear direction and guidelines, thereby guarding against compromise through consistent, proactively tested procedures and standards that all staff are aware of and which are regularly tested for compliance.
- The SCD risk register does not define a risk pertaining to information security. Specific operations have bespoke security control measures; however, there is no strategy for anti-corruption in place that incorporates linkage with the DPS.
- Proactivity in terms of monitoring the security of intelligence and testing the probity of staff usage is not generally practised and reflects the need for a robust governance structure.
- The force does not routinely consider professional standards issues in relation to the operational planning for major crime work and only in high-profile investigations (those determined to be critical incidents) are the DPS integrated into the gold group or investigative governance structures.
- MPS security guidelines require all non-vetted people to be escorted when in police buildings and, further, the provision of police information is also governed by vetting

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requirements for recipients. IAG vetting has recently been reviewed by the DCFD, with proposals that existing members who have established credible reputations will not be vetted but that any new members recruited will have to submit themselves to an initial vetting process. However, the review in its entirety has not been accepted and is still under consultation.

MC18 (This is also covered by MC06) Summary

The Force Corporate Risk Register is reviewed every month by the Corporate Risk Review Group (CRRG). Membership of this group comprises MPS Deputy Assistant Commissioners and the MPA Chief Executive. The CRRG acts as the conduit between business groups and MPS management board. Strategic Risk Management is a newly introduced concept and requires mainstreaming into the strategic and operational planning process at corporate, business group and BOCU levels. The 2007 CSA incorporated 9/11 corporate risks with two being subject of discrete pieces of work undertaken before the delivery of the CSA

Evidence

- The MPS has adopted business risk management as a key component of MPS governance processes, with strong links to the CSA, business continuity planning and organisational resilience during times of crisis. The Force Strategic Risk Register is referred to as the Corporate Risk Register (CRR) within the MPS and forms a significant part of the Corporate Strategic Assessment (CSA).
- The Business Risk Team (BRT – SC6) is one of the initial contributors to the CSA, which incorporates inputs from the SIA, Corporate Performance Data, Citizen Focus, Force Modernisation, Human Resources, Directorate of Information, Counter Terrorism Command and Environmental Scanning (which includes government initiatives and performance frameworks). These are considered initially using a business risk methodology in order to identify the various risks and opportunities for the MPS if the Management Board adopts (or otherwise) each of the strategic issues identified during the process. The workshops are guided by the BRT, and the final product is compared to the CRR before submission to management board in order to ensure that any gaps are identified.
- The MPS BRT has also identified generic areas of organisational risk; Crime and Disorder, Operational Policing, Risk Assessment and Strategic Risk Management. To correspond to these areas risk registers have been established at three levels; Corporate, Business Group and BOCU.
- The risk registers and individual risks are 'owned' by nominated leads, so that for example the eleven strategic risks identified within the Corporate Risk Register are owned by Management Board members, with the 40 risks relevant to policing operations distributed among the relevant lead officers of MPS Business Groups. BOCU risk registers are the responsibility of local Senior Management Teams, overseen by cluster commander's and supported by SC6

Work in progress

- The MPS published a draft Business Risk Management SOP in September 2007 setting out the structure of risk management within the MPS, describing the approach to risk management and providing guidance on how to compile a risk register. The SOP is being circulated for the purpose of consultation with a view to being eventually adopted as force practice

Area(s) for improvement

- Business Risk Management within the MPS is at a very early stage of implementation and requires integration into relevant planning processes at all levels of the MPS so that it becomes an integral part of day- to-day business. The SOP provides a model which will enable MPS business groups and BOCUs to work towards effective management of key risks using appropriate resources

Enforcement

MC19 Summary

Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with appropriate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command groups.

Evidence

- The MPS governance arrangements clearly reflect the organisational structure, comprising ten business areas, led by members of the MPS management board and with performance and delivery overseen by the MPS performance board, chaired by the deputy commissioner.
- Major crime management falls under the remit of the assistant commissioner SCD and comprises nine individual commands, each led by chief officers of commander rank, or police staff equivalent, supported by departmental and unit management teams. Other business group departments also engaged in such work but falling within different business groups include the VCD, under the remit of a commander, and the DPS, also under the remit of a commander.
- All chief officers are vetted to security cleared level and some, depending on role and seniority, are also developed vetted.
- MPS performance is reviewed by the MPA, with some major crime issues being reviewed by the full authority, and others by individual members, depending on sensitivity. The performance committee receives monthly high-level reports and every second meeting reviews specific and detailed reports from each directorate. This provides a narrative and keeps members informed regarding developments and progress.
- MPA members are also linked with BOCUs and are routinely informed of homicides, as well as participating in gold groups. Within this structure, the MPA has received reports about criminal networks and disruption activities and results. The MPA reports a positive drive from the SCD to keep members informed and aware of the work that is being undertaken by the MPS.
- There are also lead MPA members on key SCD themes, who are appropriately placed through individual experience and expertise to carry out a scrutiny role. The MPA also has a link to the intelligence, covert policing and tasking project board and its meeting structure and considers its local (local strategic partnership) role as pivotal to bring a strategic pan-London (serious and organised crime/major crime) balance to locally driven, more volume-based crime issues, since it considers that a greater focus on serious and organised crime issues at BOCU level and in TP needs to be encouraged.
- Three members of the MPA have developed vetted status and all others are counter-terrorist check cleared. Vetting within the authority has thus far been implemented on a voluntary and perceived needs basis.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- The vetting status of the MPA members is not necessarily a bar to receiving information in relation to major crime; nonetheless, in view of the scrutiny role and in the interests of enhancing the exercise of accountability over the MPS through greater dissemination of sensitive information to individuals cleared to receive it, the MPS and MPA may wish to consider leading on the introduction of a balanced and systemic vetting process for all MPA members.
- Most existing IAG members have not been vetted. Following a review by the DCFD, it has been suggested that existing members who have established credible reputations will not be vetted but that any new members recruited will have to submit themselves to an initial vetting process. However, the review in its entirety has not been accepted and is still under consultation, leaving the matter of MPS scrutiny and the vetting of members of the public who, under the remit of being an IAG member, have access to police buildings and potentially sensitive information unresolved.

Developing practice

- The MPS, both at SCD and BOCU level, implements gold groups for new and ongoing investigations or operations. The gold group concept is thoroughly embedded across the organisation and there are many examples of its effective use at both strategic and local level. The best example of the effectiveness of the system lies in the post-Stockwell gold group network that was created to manage community concern in the aftermath of the events of 7 July 2005. The MPS guidance for the implementation and management of gold groups represents good practice, is closely followed by senior staff members responsible for managing gold groups and advocates extensive representation from communities.

MC20 Summary

MPS ACPO SCD leads, and unit heads within the SCD, are fully competent in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone comprehensive training and testing in critical incident command, CIAs and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- Within the SCD, resilience and depth in terms of experience are significant, with ACPO/OCU commander leads accredited to PIP 2/3. The heads of homicide and the MIB are also trained in series and linked crime management.
- SCD ACPO and superintending ranks also follow a programme of training and development within the SCD for SIOs, that requires accreditation in roles and responsibilities explicitly pertinent or generic to the management of serious, organised and major crime, all provided or delivered under the remit of the crime academy. The level of experience and expertise in the SCD is comprehensive, encompassing a wide range (from all aspects of homicide and criminal networks to financial fraud) of skills and crime priorities. Consequently, the SCD is resilient, flexible and innovative (for example, the PIP process is also incorporated into the performance development review (PDR) process as explicit objectives) in its approach to managing major crime, with some excellent results generated as a consequence.
- All MPS commanders have received, or are scheduled to receive, gold firearms training as well as training specific to the role of Dedicated Senior Officer (DSO), the latter using well-established Hydra and Minerva immersion techniques and real-time training exercises. CO19 has worked with the NPIA to develop MPS training provision for firearms commanders that is compliant with national standards, including amendments that are specific to MPS practice (eg Kratos/kidnap SOPs). The new courses focus on developing operational and occupational competency, formal accreditation with ongoing refresher training and re-accreditation of officers performing firearms command roles. The MPS has assembled a pool of experienced gold and silver firearms commanders who are participating in course delivery and assisting with course assessment. Each course has been piloted to ensure comprehensive feedback and informed content adjustment as appropriate. The NPIA has been invited to attend the pilot courses to validate MPS command training and assist in the establishment of a national standard.
- The MPS has a national and international 'NSY' brand and the level of expertise is such that it is frequently asked to conduct investigations and to provide support to investigations where particular specialisms are required, or there are national and international considerations.

Work in progress

- The PIP process is underpinned by linkage to the MPS performance development review (PDR) system by creating objectives that are explicit to 'professionalising' investigation and introducing them into the PDRs of those officers aspiring to become detectives and SIOs. Objectives are relevant to the stage of development, role and responsibility of individual officers, who are expected to gain accreditation as well as maintain skills by regularly attending training provision or exercising skills in Hydra immersion techniques.
- The MPS is also beginning to track officers showing particular skill and there is an active policy of recruitment into the SCD of 'the brightest and the best', ensuring that the SCD

and the VCD, in terms of dealing with major crime, are always staffed by the most able and promising.

Area(s) for improvement

- None.

MC21 Summary

The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation.

Strengths

- The MPS rigorously manages the performance and progress of its major crime teams and departments. Each directorate has a bespoke performance management framework, within which there are clear accountabilities, performance and delivery targets. Each directorate head (assistant commissioner) attends the MPS performance board, chaired by the deputy commissioner, and gives an overview of performance, reporting achievement against control strategy priorities. There are also monthly SCD performance meetings where each individual directorate gives an account of performance and achievement against targets, as well as an ongoing review of operating costs. This meeting also scrutinises progress in terms of conviction rates and attrition rates. The SCD also has a performance management capability responsible for providing supporting management information (specifically, for example, in relation to ongoing costs) as well as conducting in-house inspection and review processes, commissioned on a needs basis.
- All SIOs in the SCD and the VCD are subject to a review process that follows ACPO guidelines. Reviews are documented in policy logs and investigation plans are scrutinised and assessed, both as a quality control measure and performance management/development tool. All SIOs interviewed displayed support and acceptance of the review system, regarding it as a necessary management oversight and support mechanism.
- At a team level, there is also scrutiny of Crimint outputs, support to BOCUs for non-homicide investigations, the number of debriefs, OCG disruption levels, the number of high-priority actions and asset confiscation seizures.
- The MITs in SCD1, Trident and SCD5 are also performance managed, and have regular meetings with their senior managers to discuss the progress of cases with documented actions.
- Learning from judicial hearings, inquests and cold case review is disseminated by the force crime academy, which acts as a learning repository for the results of all such proceedings, as well as reviewing investigation debriefs and promulgating findings through training or directly to the relevant command via briefings circulated on the force intranet to each relevant business group website.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- None.

Performance management and resilience

MC22 Summary

The inspection team found a strong investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands. Collaborative agreements with SOCA exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide extensive protection for the investigative capability. The MPS considers that it has sufficient resources to meet all but the most exceptional demand, such as that generated by the events of July 2005.

Evidence

- Critical and serious incident investigation in the MPS is supported by specialist teams, units and departments that can be contacted 24/7 through the SCD reserve for advice and to co-ordinate the call-out of the SIO. The call-out procedures are clearly set out in the London homicide manual.
- There are well-rehearsed processes and training in place for the management and investigation of major crime, from guidance for first officer on scene, through to the arrival of dedicated investigation teams (all SCD staff are PIP accredited), who can call on support from a number of specialist units such as the cultural and communities resource unit. This unit is available 24/7 and can support the incident commander with such skills as knowledge of a particular language, culture, hobby or lifestyle.
- SCD investigation teams also have their own IAG liaison that links into communities to help manage the impact of incidents and investigative activities.
- There is a 24/7 on-call SCD commander/ACPO rank. All on-call superintending ranks ensure that any new investigations or significant developments are brought to the attention of the on-call SCD ACPO officer. In apparent high-profile cases, for example child murder, racist murder, the murder of a law enforcement officer, cases attracting high media attention (such as deaths in hospital or involving the mentally ill) or other similar critical incident, MPS SOPs require the on-call SCD ACPO officer to be contacted at the earliest opportunity, either by the on-call SCD superintending officer or local senior management team member.
- The homicide command has teams placed geographically across London that provide homicide advisory teams, crewed by suitably experienced officers. These teams are required to attend, within one hour of the call, all incidents of suspicious, unexplained death in their geographical command area. They are tasked through the 24-hour SCD reserve. On-call SIOs are available to deal with requests from BOCUs regarding homicide and unexplained death operating procedures and other serious crime issues. The SIO will be available to assume initial investigation on behalf of the SCD in instances of suspicious, unexplained death.
- Each MIT has a dedicated major incident room (MIR), and officers in the team are trained as interviewer co-ordinators, advanced exhibits officers and family liaison officers.
- Trident investigates all homicides where death results from shooting and where both the victim and the suspect are from black communities. SCD5 has experienced MITs focused on serious cases involving children and has significant experience in this

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important area. The MPS fully engages in both national and international investigations where Trident cases are involved, maximising the skills and experience gained.

- The MPS has a national and international 'NSY' brand and the level of expertise is such that it is frequently asked to conduct investigations and to provide support to investigations where particular specialisms are required, or there are national and international considerations. The MPS has also fully contributed, for example, to a European homicide working group, where the SCD(1) commander was asked for advice regarding homicide investigation.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- Notwithstanding the new statement of intent, intelligence linkage and joint working with SOCA are limited and feedback from every directorate reflects dissatisfaction with the interface and support received from the agency. Dissatisfaction stems from SOCA activity which results in operations that impinge on BOCUs, where there has been no liaison or intelligence exchange either with the MIB or relevant BOCU. The MPS is striving to enhance linkage and develop collaborative arrangements. However, the MPS now has SOCA staff co-located within the MIB confidential unit and in the new RIU. A performance framework is being developed with SOCA, supported by a proposed routine meeting structure to be introduced between SOCA and the MPS MIB command.

Developing practice

- The provision of a 24-hour, seven-day a week response to major crime through the development and implementation of homicide assessment teams has led to improved provision of 'golden hour' principles and the ability to deliver a strong investigative capability, providing the right people to the right place at the right time. Other metropolitan forces, which identify a strong demand to respond quickly to a high volume of critical incidents that may develop into major crime investigations, may wish to consider the implementation of such a system.

MC23 Summary

Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through an infrastructure that is proven to be highly effective. Elements of the proactive use of these specialist assets are delivered through largely written and verbal collaborative agreements that are thoroughly tested. The inspection found evidence of both proactive and reactive use of these assets across a wide range of offences.

Strengths

- The MPS focuses on homicide and serious crime through investigation teams in SCD8 Trident and SCD5 child abuse, and a dedicated homicide command (SCD1). This command investigates homicide, linked series rapes, all suspicious deaths, corporate manslaughter and any other serious crime that requires the support of the command. The service is delivered with 1,300 staff and the command has a 24/7 response capability through homicide advisory teams, which are the first responders to scenes, ensuring effective scene management from the outset. Each has an average team workload of five homicide investigations and two/three related crimes per team. SCD1 provides support to boroughs (9,650 hours during the period 1 April 2007 – 31 March 2008) and in each case SCD1 supplies a documented strategy for the incident.
- SCD1 has a proactive homicide task force capacity (one north and one south) that follows up proactive enquiries on existing work and all covert work. The task force has a tasking and prioritisation matrix for slow and fast-time issues. There is no spare capacity and the teams can only be deployed on fast-time proactive manhunts and the top end of unsolved cases.
- In SCD8 Trident, there are four MIT teams staffed to the corporate model. The OCU carries out proactive enquiries and covert work in support of the MIT teams. The OCU provides a 24/7 response to shootings, both fatal and non-fatal.

Work in progress

- The SCD command team commissioned a review into intelligence and proactivity in the directorate six months ago. The drivers for this were the increased use of firearms and gun-enabled crime, an increasing number of harmful criminal networks across London and the increased level of sophistication and violence shown by those networks, highlighting a need to invest in more technically advanced law enforcement tools and techniques. The SCD foresaw the need to 'work smarter' within finite resources and the need to start to move to a different 'platform' of capability in anticipation of the demands of the Olympics in 2012.

Area(s) for improvement

- The review identified that there was insufficient proactive capability to combat the increasing demands of organised criminal networks, increasing complexity of murders and the rise of shooting offences and gun-enabled crime. Further, SCD proactive assets were not uniform in structure, skills and equipment and not configured to effectively manage demand, since none had a demand management strategy in place that attempted to project demand and orient resources accordingly. In short, SCD proactive support services, ie, the technical collection department, technical support unit, surveillance and telephone investigation unit, have difficulty in meeting the escalating levels of demand.

MC24 Summary

The force has a full-time and dedicated case review team that is always deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is highly effective.

Strengths

- The MPS has a specialist crime review group that performs a review and quality assurance role in relation to homicide, serious crime, part 8 reviews and any other investigation fitting the MPS critical incident criteria. Workloads are controlled and reviewed via a departmental tasking process, chaired by the commander MIB and informed by the STCG.
- Reinvestigation and review of current and ongoing investigations are now regarded by MPS staff (evidenced both from feedback to HMIC and via the intranet site) as a routine and constructive part of the investigation process, which has had a discernible impact on the quality and sustainability of results, as well as providing the MPS and the public with confidence in the effectiveness and capability of its investigators and procedures. The MPS has also made good use of staff expertise by employing experienced and competent retired detectives as cold case review officers. Such officers represent a repository of expertise, which enables them to command significant respect from those whose work they review.
- The MPS has not utilised independent reviews from external forces because of the independence of the existing structures and the depth of expertise that can be provided.
- There is a published and accessible murder and cold case review policy, located on the SCRG intranet site, where results, learning and good practice are also published.
- The MPS crime academy is directly linked into the review process, being represented at the tasking and review process, and there is substantial evidence of learning being transformed into both MPS training products (SIO courses specifically) and policy updates, as well as being included on the national Genesis site. Elsewhere in the SCD, post-operational debriefing and results evaluation are conducted as business as usual, with results being collated and, where appropriate, passed to the crime academy for incorporation into wider training and good practice dissemination.
- All SCD units have intranet websites and publish details of strategies, policies, operations and results, together with learning and good practice for the information of MPS staff across other business groups.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- None.

MC25 Summary

The inspection found that the force was fully compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the Murder Investigation Manual and MIRSAP. The MPS actively contributes to national developments.

Strengths

- The MPS complies with the ACPO Murder Investigation Manual and MIRSAP and has further developed a London homicide manual that builds on this guidance by including an MPS context. The guidance is clearly understood by ACPO and SIOs and is actively used in reference documents and regularly reviewed.
- The MPS commander who leads SCD(1) homicide is also the vice-chair of the ACPO homicide group, ensuring that the MPS fully contributes to, and takes cognisance of, national developments. The MPS ACPO engaged in this business area clearly understand their roles and responsibilities. Similarly, each MIT has dedicated SIOs, who are also clear about their roles and responsibilities, most with significant investigative experience.
- The MPS contributed fully to a European homicide working group, where the SCD(1) commander was asked for advice regarding homicide investigation.
- Policy files are completed for every major crime and do include decisions not to pursue a line of enquiry. Sensitive policy decisions are recorded in separate policy files where appropriate. As previously documented, there are consistent and auditable review processes, providing both a performance management framework and a quality assurance regime.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- None.

Appendix 1: Developing practice

<p>INSPECTION AREA: Serious and Organised Crime</p>
<p>TITLE: Five Boroughs Project</p>
<p>PROBLEM:</p> <p>The five boroughs project was instigated to provide a police-led enforcement capability operating across five boroughs in south-east London, namely Croydon, Greenwich, Lewisham, Southwark and Lambeth. The operation was developed to reduce the harm associated with street gangs and linked organised criminal networks operating in and across the existing BOCU and CDRP boundaries.</p> <p>Strategic intention</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainable reductions in gang-related violence. • The removal of criminal gangs or a significant reduction in their impact on serious violence. • A voluntary and statutory partnership of organisations and individuals operating to prevent further youth involvement in gang-related violence.
<p>SOLUTION:</p> <p>The operation established an intelligence cell co-located with the MIB and worked with local intelligence units in BOCUs and specialist crime OCUs to identify and research members of specified gangs.</p> <p>The operational approach delivered:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. structured research and intelligence focused on individuals operating in eight key gangs and their derivatives; and 2. generic operations targeting venues and locations, becoming progressively more focused on the nominated targets. <p>The tasking and co-ordination of MPS and partner assets are key elements of the operational approach, as is cross-borough working. For example, joint working between the SCD and TP units is co-ordinated through the Alliance gold group and bi-weekly TTCCG meetings. Co-ordination of all SCD activity operates through a SPOC system; weekly returns of work are collated by SCD and passed to the MIB, with proactive tasking through the MIB (Alliance desk) to SCD units.</p>
<p>OUTCOME(S):</p> <p>Approach</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cross-business unit co-ordination of policing activity across BOCU boundaries. • Structured research and assessment of those at greatest risk. • Focus on areas and venues of risk with armed stop/search.

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- Offender focus, using all available enforcement opportunities.
- Tactical learning applied pan-London.
- Search arch deployments for detecting weapon carriage and creating public reassurance. Positive feedback is being received generally, including from young people. Detection levels without spotters are not substantial, but increase where spotters are deployed, including one recovery of a handgun. Short-term (30–60 minutes) deployments (pulsing) and a focus on transport routes are proving most effective.
- Greater operational co-ordination with the UKBA, successfully removing key gang members from the country. Indications, for example, are that some 21% of Alliance nominals in Southwark are current UKBA cases.
- Home address visits to young people on the fringes of street gangs focusing on parental involvement and the safeguarding and direct referral of youths at risk to local projects/programmes.
- Neighbourhood weapon sweeps – preventative, intelligence-led, utilising partners and linking to safer neighbourhood teams’ environmental audits.
- Deployment of officers to public places, CCTV monitoring and enhanced briefing/training for contracted staff. There are several examples of direct detections of firearms activity and deployments in advance of potential violence where CCTV covers late licensed premises.
- New initiatives set up and furthered by the Alliance intelligence cell, including: the development of a harm matrix to determine subjects at most ‘risk’; a structured prison debrief program; an information-sharing agreement with educational establishments; and a specifically designed forensic strategy involving the use of a separate operational response database to enhance forensic hits.
- Development of tactics to disrupt violent gang members who are engaged in drug-dealing across BOCU and force boundaries. The sharing of intelligence and operational co-ordination between MPS BOCUs and home county forces has resulted in further offender disruption.
- Focus on events, including places of potential conflict, and linked transport routes, using staff from several BOCUs.

Impact

Ongoing reductions in gun-enabled crime and shootings, notably those linked to licensed premises, the disruption of gangs through imprisonment and increases in statutory control (bail and licence conditions).

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INSPECTION AREA: Serious and Organised Crime

TITLE: Disruptions to Criminal Networks

PROBLEM:

In 2004, the MPS launched a strategy to tackle criminal networks that caused the most harm. This required it to develop a new understanding of the socio-economic and political impact of criminal networks, and how they engaged with communities, to reduce the negative impact they have on neighbourhoods and communities, by way of prevention, intelligence and enforcement.

In developing the criminal networks approach, recognition was given that many criminals are involved in criminality as a business or to fund a lifestyle, and that the majority of criminal networks will be involved in multiple criminal activities.

The MPS criminal network approach reflects that there is a wide range of difference in the criminality/harm caused by criminal networks.

SOLUTION:

A criminal networks control strategy was created to focus action on disrupting criminal networks. This control strategy sets out strategic outcomes designed to reduce the criminality of the criminal networks operating within London. A measure of the success of this control strategy is the number of criminal networks in London that have been disrupted.

The MPS has a criminal networks prioritisation and performance meeting, chaired by ACPO, that aims to identify and inform the intelligence picture, allowing for the appropriate prioritisation of resources with action taken on the most harmful criminal networks. The work undertaken against criminal networks is monitored through this meeting, tactics are challenged and resource allocation approved. This ensures MPS activity against criminal networks is focused and achieves the desired outcomes. The meeting will also overview the MPS performance against the criminal network disruption target. Supporting this meeting is a cross-business group disruption panel that assesses the validity of the disruption activity to ensure consistency in approach.

OUTCOME(S):

The criminal network prioritisation and performance meeting links learning and intelligence from tackling criminal networks into the MPS corporate tasking process. This ensures that corporate assets are allocated to those criminal networks causing the most harm and criminality within London's communities.

The MPS criminal networks control strategy requires a target to be set on the number of criminal networks disrupted each year. The MPA drives this target. In the financial year 2007/08, the target was 225; by the end year, the MPS had disrupted 326 criminal networks.

The disruption of criminal networks target is a corporate target to which all business groups contribute. The roll-out of the criminal networks matrix across all business groups will ensure corporate compliance in meeting disruption targets. To identify criminal networks that had been disrupted, improved intelligence on the methodology and planning capabilities

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of networks in London have begun to be captured. This information is updated on the MPS criminal networks matrix. The matrix is used to ensure appropriate police activity is undertaken against those criminal networks identified. In the financial year 2008/09, the MPS seeks to move the disruption process towards capturing qualitative disruption information, improving the intelligence known on those criminal networks in London as well as identifying appropriate organisational learning.

Assessment of the disruption claim is conducted by a disruption panel, which sits on a monthly basis and comprises members of the SCD, TP, central operations and specialist operations. Disruptions to date are published on the criminal networks intranet site. Consequently, disruption activity is being initiated by all business groups and is not just dependent on the SCD.

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INSPECTION AREA: Serious and Organised and Major Crime

TITLE: Gold Groups

PROBLEM:

The gold group system was introduced to the MPS primarily at SCD and BOCU level as set out in the MPS critical incident manual published in 2000. Since then, the system has become embedded across the organisation, both at MPS wide and local levels. There are a number of examples that reflect the effective strategic advice that is provided in this process.

In 2007, while operating a risk register for high-risk gold groups in the MPS, it was recognised that the standard, record keeping and capturing of organisational learning varied across BOCUs. A review of the critical incident manual indicated minimal changes in content around the structure of gold groups since 2000. Requests were also starting to be received by the media under the Freedom of Information Act for minutes and actions from prominent gold groups. Further enquires also indicated that there was a limited overview of how many gold groups were actually held within each business group for any set period.

SOLUTION:

It was identified that further guidance for gold groups was necessary to provide advice around:

- when a gold group should be called;
- the agenda;
- minutes, including subsequent disclosure guidelines;
- membership;
- closure;
- capturing response issues;
- organisational learning; and
- an audit trail for gold groups.

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OUTCOME(S):

New guidance has been introduced and is now being utilised within TP at local gold group level prior to wider use in the MPS. A clear change in standard and content has been achieved with the capturing and dissemination of gold group lessons developing as a result. Subsequently, the gold group process has continued to evolve and remains central to the policing approach for critical incidents and major crime.

The best example of the effectiveness of the system lies in the post-Stockwell gold group network that was created to manage community concern in the aftermath of the events of 7 July 2005. The MPS guidance for the implementation and management of gold groups represents good practice, is closely followed by senior staff members responsible for managing gold groups and advocates extensive representation from communities.

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INSPECTION AREA : Serious and Organised and Major Crime

TITLE: Homicide Assessment Teams (HATs)

PROBLEM:

To improve the initial scene management and ensure that experienced detectives are quickly at the scene of any murder or unexplained death.

SOLUTION:

There is now one Homicide and Serious Crime Command to cover the whole of the Metropolitan Police area. It provides homicide assessment teams (HAT's) each crewed by suitably experienced officers, all of whom are PIP accredited. There are three shifts to cover the 24hr period. HAT's are required to attend, within one hour of the call, all incidents of suspicious unexplained death and shootings involving the discharge of a lethal barrelled firearm. The MIT teams are on an 8 week on call rota and it is officers from these teams that staff the HAT cars.

Detective Inspector IO's will perform night duty to ensure the immediate attendance of a senior detective to crime scenes. They are aligned to the three night duty HAT cars. SIO's are on-call to deal with requests from BOCUs regarding homicide and unexplained death operating procedures and other serious crime issues. These SIO's will be available to assume initial investigation on behalf of the SCD in instances of suspicious unexplained death. There is an additional MIT and SIO to provide extra support at times of high activity.

The HAT's are initially tasked through the 24-hour SCD reserve. After initial deployment the activities of the HAT cars will be coordinated by an on call Detective Superintendent. The Detective Superintendent will also be available for the granting of urgent authorities required by an investigation, dealing with Media issues if necessary, obtaining additional resources and liaising with ACPO officers. This is intended to unburden the SIO's of these functions to enable them to concentrate on the investigation.

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OUTCOME(S) :

The deployment of HAT cars has significantly improved the initial scene management and ensured that experienced detectives are quickly at the scene of any murder or unexplained death. They are able to quickly review the measures taken for scene preservation by Borough officers and amend if necessary. The SIO and IO can give documented advice for investigations that remain with Boroughs. If needed, the Borough can be supported with additional staff. In cases where a victim of assault is still alive but is in a life threatening condition the homicide command can stay alongside and advise the Borough so that in the event of the victim dying there is a smoother and more effective handover of the investigation.

FORCE CONTACT:

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Appendix 2: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	Automatic Number Plate Recognition
ASB	Anti-Social Behaviour

B

BOCU	Borough Operational Command Unit
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C

CAD	Computer-Aided Dispatch
CaTO	Co-ordination and Tasking Office
CCC	Central Communications Command
CDRP	Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
CDW	Corporate Data Warehouse
CIA	Community Impact Assessment
CRIS	Crime Reporting Information System
CSA	Corporate Strategic Assessment
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Command

D

DCFD	Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate
DoI	Directorate of Information
DPS	Directorate of Professional Standards
DSO	Dedicated Senior Officer
DVSPECSS	Domestic Violence Separation Pregnancy Escalation Community-Isolation Stalking Sexual Assault

E

EPFS Extended Police Family School

F

FCS Force Control Strategy

FSA Force Strategic Assessment

H

HMI Her Majesty's Inspector

HMIC Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HMRC Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

HOLMES Home Office Large Major Enquiry System

I

IAG Independent Advisory Group

IEP Information Exchange Protocols

IPI Improving Policing Information

IPLDP Initial Police Learning and Development Programme

L

LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender

M

MAPPA Multi-agency Public Protection Arrangements

MIB Metropolitan Intelligence Bureau

MIR Major Incident Room

MIRSAP Major Incident Room Standard Administrative Procedures

MIT Major Investigation Team

MoPI Management of Police Information

MPA Metropolitan Police Authority

MPS Metropolitan Police Service

MSF Most Similar Force(s)

N

NIM National Intelligence Model

NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency

NPSAT National Protective Services Analysis Tool

NSPIS National Strategy for Police Information Systems

NSY New Scotland Yard

O

OCG Organised Crime Group

OCU Operational Command Unit

P

PESTELO Political, environmental, social, technological, economic, legal and organisational

PDR Performance Development Review

PIB Performance Information Bureau

PIP Professionalising the Investigative Process

PNC Police National Computer

R

RIU Regional Intelligence Unit

S

SCD Specialist Crime Directorate

SGC Specific Grading Criteria

SIA Strategic Intelligence Assessment

SIO Senior Investigating Officer

SMB	Strategic Management Board
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPI	Statutory Performance Indicator
SPOC	Single Point of Contact
STCG	Strategic Tasking and Co-ordination Group

T

TP	Territorial Policing
TSU	Technical Support Unit
TTCG	Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Group

U

UKBA	UK Border Agency
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V

VCD	Violent Crime Directorate
ViSOR	Violent and Sex Offenders' Register