

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Lincolnshire Police Major Crime

July 2008



Lincolnshire Police – HMIC Inspection Report

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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

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In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical description of force area

Lincolnshire is a mainly rural county bordering the North Sea and the Wash. The force encompasses small villages, market towns and one city. The county has a population of 665,270 and there are 282,183 households. There are population clusters in the south of the county, and the largest urban centre is the city of Lincoln. The rural and sometimes isolated eastern coastal areas have a high influx of tourists in the summer. Geographically, Lincolnshire is twice the size of any other county in the East Midlands region.

The county as a whole has a poor road network, with no motorway and only 65 kilometres of dual carriageway out of a total road length of 8,553 kilometres. The vast majority (88%) of roads are 'C' or unclassified. The A1 passes through part of the county, as does the East Coast main line rail network. But the overall transport infrastructure within the county is poor and public transport is minimal outside the major population areas.

Demographic profile of force area

Community cohesion is a headline challenge for the police and all public services in Lincolnshire, as is reflected in the local area agreement. This is not limited to issues created by the increasingly diverse ethnic mix (which has the potential for further growth through the EU accession states); it also includes the challenges of a year-on-year influx of middle-aged families with teenage children, as well as pre- and post-retirement adults.

Lincolnshire has an ageing population. For example, nearly 30% of the population of East Lindsey is aged 60 or over. Despite this, Lincolnshire has been identified as one of the fastest growing communities within the East Midlands region. The East Midlands Development Agency is seeking to encourage investment and improved infrastructure within the county. This will help to raise skills levels, attract higher-skilled industries to the county and keep younger people in the area, while improving employment prospects generally.

Average wages across the East Midlands are 6.7% lower than the national average, and employment rates in some areas of the county are more than 5% below the national average. In the 2000 index of multiple deprivation, 25 Lincolnshire wards were in the top 20% most deprived areas nationally. The East Midlands, as a region, lags behind the rest of the UK in workforce skills, and Lincolnshire has the lowest level of skills within the region.

Structural description of the force area

The force headquarters is located at Nettleham. As at 31 May 2008, it manages and supports a workforce of 1,204 police officers, 931 police staff, 158 special constables and 160 police community support officers (PCSOs). The police authority authorised a 2008/09 net budget requirement for the force of £116.6 million. The budget requirement exceeds the 'capping' rules for the increase in council tax precept, and is currently under review by the Home Office.

The Chief Constable is supported by the deputy chief constable (DCC), the assistant chief constable (ACC), the director of human resources (DoHR) and the director of finance and administration (DoFA). Richard Crompton was appointed Chief Constable in June 2008, after serving four years as deputy chief constable in Lincolnshire. Also from June 2008, Peter Davies is acting deputy chief constable and Elaine Hill is acting assistant chief constable until permanent appointments are made. The DoHR, Sue Scott has been in post for over 3 years and the DoFA, Peter Steed, was appointed in December 2007.

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The police authority has been chaired for three years by Mrs Angela Crowe. She maintains a strong and supportive working relationship with the chief officer team.

The force is organised into three territorial basic command units (BCUs), each led by a chief superintendent, supported by a superintendent, a detective chief inspector and a chief inspector. The senior management team of each BCU includes an administration manager, a communications officer and an area human resources (HR) manager, who provide business support. Force headquarters houses all operational and non-operational support departments, each led by a suitably qualified departmental head, reporting to one of the chief officers.

Of the three BCUs, the West BCU (Lincoln, Gainsborough and Sleaford) experiences the greatest demand and has six sectors. The East BCU has four sectors covering the Skegness and Boston area, while the South BCU has three sectors covering the Grantham and Spalding area. The sectors are inspector led and are responsible for providing the immediate response service, as well as for dealing with community-based policing issues. There are a total of 59 neighbourhood policing teams delivering local policing.

Strategic direction

The force vision is 'Policing with PRIDE':

Professionalism;

Respect;

Integrity;

Dedication;

Empathy.

The strategic aims are to build trust and confidence through safer neighbourhoods, protecting the public and improving services.

The force's strategic priorities contained in the strategic plan for 2006–09 are unchanged:

- To adopt a citizen-focused approach to service delivery. By implementing a citizen-focused plan for delivering their services, established community policing teams (CPTs) across the county have the Quality of Service Commitment in place and have contributed to the county-wide community cohesion agenda.
- To reduce crime and improve the standards of investigation by having a fully integrated approach to cross-border, serious crime and organised criminality in collaboration with other forces in the East Midlands region. The force aims to continue the reduction of volume crime by focusing on those categories that are a priority for the public, and to build confidence in its ability to bring offenders to justice by working with the local criminal justice board to achieve stretching targets for sanction detections. In collaboration with its partners, the force aims to reduce the harm caused by offenders who have drug-dependency problems by combining enforcement activity with treatment.
- To promote safety and reduce the fear of crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour (ASB). Further enhancement of working arrangements with partners and the community are planned to reduce incidents of crime, disorder and ASB. The force aims to encourage the involvement of local people in the local police service and to

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provide transparency in the way it deals with local problems, including the continued delivery of the government strategy on road safety.

- To introduce national call-handling standards and training in respect of customer care and the new arrangements for keeping victims informed. This will deliver a high-quality, responsive and accessible service to the public.
- To have a supported and valued workforce that not only is skilled, highly motivated and well led, but also reflects the community it serves. An excellent HR infrastructure and framework will enable the force to recruit and retain excellent people and effectively maintain attendance levels that are among the best of all forces in the country.
- To have an appropriately funded, effective and efficient policing service and to achieve the ambition of being the top performing force in the most similar force (MSF) group. This will entail bringing the level of expenditure per head of population into line with the MSF average, and will ensure that resources are managed in an efficient and effective manner to support the policing strategy for the people of Lincolnshire. The force aims to establish comprehensive financial services and management information and to implement an effective system of checks and balances to secure sound corporate governance arrangements.
- To develop leaders for the future by implementing the leadership charter that will underpin the HR strategy to select the best leaders for roles at all levels in the organisation.
- To improve the HMIC baseline assessment performance and be fully compliant with the Bichard recommendations.

Specific priorities for 2008/09 are in place, with interim performance targets for the first six months of the year. The interim targets are to allow for decisions to be made on the sustainability of the force through funding and the development of the assessment of policing and community safety (APACS) performance framework. The 2008/09 priorities are as follows:

- To improve road safety, with interim targets to reduce the number of people killed or seriously injured on the roads, with particular focus on young drivers and two-wheeled vehicles.
- To improve the safety of children and young people. The approach to this is by working in partnership to reduce youth offending and violence towards children and their abuse.
- To improve community confidence. By reducing the number of signal incidents and crimes and keeping customers informed, the interim targets are to achieve at least 85% satisfaction with overall service, and at least 70% satisfaction with follow-up.
- To improve community safety and to focus on what causes the most harm. Measures include reducing the number of offences of violence against the person and serious acquisitive crimes, as well as achieving a detection rate of 50% for more serious violence against the person a sanction detection rate of 18%.
- To improve efficiency and productivity through the best use of resources.

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Key initiatives to improve performance during 2007/08 (in the areas of major crime and serious and organised crime)

A dedicated business manager has been employed to provide efficient and effective financial and administrative services to the crime support department and major incidents. Each major crime investigation is allocated a dedicated resource manager. The force holds a central major incident budget as a contingency.

Neighbourhood analysts and researchers are now in post and fully engaged in neighbourhood policing and with the neighbourhood teams. These individuals will ensure that community issues are analysed in full and issues surrounding citizen focus are highlighted within the strategic assessment.

Despite having limited resources and being primarily reactive, the level 2 analysts have been able to complete a good range of National Intelligence Model (NIM) products; these include problem profiles on homicide, which have been used to influence the homicide prevention strategy, cannabis, immigration crime and knife crime. They have also completed crime-pattern analysis of particular communities, as well as a number of target profiles connected to current and former operations.

Lincolnshire Police has recently introduced an electronic 5x5x5 intelligence-reporting system, which has increased the timeliness of the submission and dissemination of intelligence both within Lincolnshire and to other forces/agencies; this is also linked to an electronic public information register.

Automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) is linked to the closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems in Skegness, Boston and Grantham. A number of other fixed cameras are in the process of being fed into these servers. There is also a programme of strategic ANPR deployment around the force boundaries.

Valuable and effective training is being delivered to operational staff on the West BCU in scene protection and initial enquiries at major and critical incidents. During the inspection, this training received favourable comment.

The separation/pregnancy/escalation/cultural/sexual assault/stalking (SPECSS) risk-assessment model is now fully integrated into the operational response to domestic abuse.

The introduction of neighbourhood teams is a great benefit; each BCU has a dedicated neighbourhood analyst and researcher, and they have developed and completed community profiles, thus providing a useful assessment of all the force's communities and key individual networks (KINs) within them.

Collaboration (strategic partnerships)

The head of the criminal investigation department (CID) holds regular meetings with other heads of CID from the region and is also a member of the East Midlands special operations unit (EMSOU) project board.

The East Midlands collaboration project is reviewing a range of options for the region, including the formal provision of mutual aid and the introduction of common standards and processes.

Each BCU professional development unit has a community engagement co-ordinator, who could be utilised as a resource in a major crime investigation. This has been used to good effect to advise major crime staff investigating homicide.

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Representative workforce (including diversity)

All supervisors have undergone race and diversity training (the Police Race and Diversity Learning and Development Programme (PRDLDP)) and monitor staff in this area. Crime support has scheduled a number of in-house professional development days, and diversity is a subject area to be delivered at the next event, in spring 2008. The force will also benefit from regional senior investigating officer (SIO) development days, when subjects such as honour-based violence and homicides will be covered. A major crime unit training day has been arranged for June 2008, when input from an independent advisory group (IAG) is planned.

The force has strong IAG links and the force actively seeks IAG views and guidance on a range of issues, including homophobic issues connected to a homicide investigation. This interaction has been evident in a number of recent major investigations.

Managing diversity is important to Lincolnshire and is incorporated in the HR plan: "We want our workforce to be representative of our local communities." The percentage of the economically active ethnic minority population in Lincolnshire is 1.3%.

In 2007/08, the percentage of black and minority ethnic (BME) police officers met the target of 1.4%, exceeding the figure for the population generally. The target of having over 1% of BME police staff (equating to 9 full-time equivalent (FTE) posts), was within 10% of being achieved: as of 31 March 2008, it stood at 0.9% (8 FTE). The percentage of female police officers was 21.8%, exceeding the target of 21%.

The number of disabled staff (police officers and police staff) totals 3.5%, which is below the annual target of 4.5% of total force strength. During 2008, HR will carry out an audit to help identify where reasonable adjustments can be made to support the aims of the disability equality scheme.

A positive action working group was set up in March 2008 to consider how HR can contribute to making the workforce more representative at all levels. A three-year action plan will be developed by the group, and will include such ideas as a firearms positive-action open day to encourage more female applicants to operations support, where women are under-represented.

Work is taking place to consider the establishment of a women's network group, and a formal mentoring scheme for female staff is being developed. BME staff have been offered career development interviews, and the outcomes of these will be analysed and reported on during 2008/09.

Adjustments to training delivery approaches have been made to support those with a flexible working pattern and those members of staff with a disability. This includes offering weekend and evening training. Dyslexic students have been offered dictaphones, additional learning support and additional time for exams. The protected learning time policy has been reviewed and Initial Police Learning and Development Programme (IPLDP) student officers now have secured protected learning time, which has resulted in greater flexibility for them both with their study and in terms of working around shift patterns.

Workforce modernisation

The force went through a workforce modernisation review and, during the review period, began to implement recommendations made by the review. An example includes the recruitment of five civilian financial investigators to the economic crime unit.

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The sustainable funding project initiated by the force has sought to increase the number of civilian investigators in such areas as public protection, crime investigation and major crime reviews.

Following the relaxation of the rules of the crime fighting fund, a civilianisation project was set up and led by a chief superintendent. The objectives of the project were delivered by civilianising 62 posts, with a projected saving of £1.4 million. Police officers occupying civilianised posts were redeployed to operational roles.

Protective services

The force is committed to achieving the national protective services standards, has carried out an assessment of the force's current position and has developed action plans to work towards compliance.

The main corporate initiative is the sustainable funding project, which has aimed to secure additional funding to deliver excellent performance in areas across the force, including those of serious and organised crime and major crime. The agreed option includes the restructuring of the intelligence investigation unit (IIU) to become a serious and organised crime department, headed by a detective chief inspector.

The crime support department pioneered the use of electronic capture of fingerprints from victims of crime. A trial was set up to test the use of this equipment, funded by a bursary from the National Conference of Scientific Support together with Sagem Sécurité, the French defence company. Sagem reprogrammed an immigration fingerprint device to capture elimination prints. The trial was very successful, the equipment proved simple to use, the victims of crime were both impressed and supportive of their prints being captured in this way, and the speed of the process significantly increased. Most significantly, victims' elimination prints eliminated 36% of the lifts sent in. These lifts would otherwise have been stored on Ident 1, on the open crime scene mark database. This suggests that there are significant improvements in search accuracy to be gained by using this system and removing fingerprint lifts from innocent people that are on the fingerprint database. The force is now looking to roll out this technology with the help of the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and the National Fingerprint Board.

The force is rolling out mobile data to scenes of crime officers (SOCOs). This system uses dedicated high-gain antennae on SOCO vans and encrypted access to force information technology (IT) systems. This will allow force systems, including command and control, to be accessed from anywhere in the county. It will also enable SOCOs to be allocated jobs (and given all the relevant information) while out on the road, and will allow fingerprints and other digital evidence to be sent in very quickly.

A new E-fit V system for the description of offenders is being implemented. E-fit V allows E-fits to be taken when the victim says they could identify the offender if they 'saw them again', rather than when they can give a description of the offender; this is not possible with current systems.

The technical support unit (TSU) has established a force-wide local area network, which will handle covert and overt police CCTV images and audio product, to be routed to a central point where it can be recorded, monitored or redistributed. The system has been used successfully on a number of level 1 and level 2 operations, and has a number of benefits, including:

- CCTV and audio product can be recorded at one fixed point, ie headquarters.

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- There is no reliance upon the occupier or a police officer having to operate the recording equipment.
- Time is saved in the TSU and there is no need for officers to attend premises to check views/equipment, as this can be done from headquarters.
- There is a prolonged life expectancy of the recording equipment, as it is at a fixed location, rather than being transported from one location to another.
- There is a reduced risk of compromise.
- Live viewing can be carried out from police premises.

The force has created two posts dedicated to the examination of mobile telephones and SIM cards. This type of work has previously been outsourced. The creation of these roles and investment in the latest technology will enable the force to undertake the examination of mobile telephones and SIM in house, thus providing a more efficient and effective service.

In June 2008, a programme manager will be appointed, with responsibility for planning the sustainable funding project programme, taking into account changing demands from national, regional and local initiatives and linking them into the project. Project managers will be appointed to each of the six strands of the programme to oversee and manage the implementation and delivery of the projects:

- neighbourhood policing;
- response and patrol, contact management;
- volume crime;
- serious and organised crime, major crime, intelligence;
- public protection; and
- operations support.

It is anticipated that the programme of implementation will take two years, subject to available funding.

Governance of management of police information (MoPI) has been established through the strategic programme board, which is chaired by the DCC. The MoPI project board, also chaired by the DCC, reports to the strategic programme board. A MoPI working group, chaired by a superintendent, has subgroups for general information enquiry system (GENIE) development; training; intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking (IMPACT); MoPI and crime and intelligence; and review, retention and disposal (RRD).

A new information management unit (IMU) has been set up within the professional standards department (PSD). The unit is responsible for data protection, freedom of information, vetting, force security, information-sharing agreements, data-quality issues, audit of police systems, RRD and disclosure. The force has appointed an IMU manager and is in the process of recruiting to roles within the unit, which should be fully staffed by September 2008.

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Force developments since 2007

The force has a number of areas, identified in the sustainable funding project. It is looking to develop in the areas of public protection, serious and organised crime and major crime, with initiatives aimed at delivering an excellent service.

The introduction of a force microwave link, enabling live images to be viewed from any location in the force, increases the opportunities for covert surveillance, as well as the efficiency of level 2 operations. This network has been used in several operations involving the distribution of Class A drugs.

The force has recently built on the work of Operation Pentameter, with the formation of an immigration team. This team not only works with other regional partners, but also organisations such as the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA) and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority.

In 2007/08, the force set targets to achieve at least 14,181 sanction detections and a rate of at least 25%. The targets were met, with 14,260 sanction detections and a rate of 28%.

An overall satisfaction rate of 79.7% was achieved in 2007/08. The introduction of crime helpdesks has improved the satisfaction rate to a rolling three-month average of 82.4% in 2008/09.

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GRADE	Fails to meet the standard
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This element of the inspection report also details Lincolnshire Police's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

As with serious and organised crime, skilful mapping and analysis has made it possible to determine more accurately the degree of risk posed and appropriate interventions to curtail the impact of such criminality.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening & gun crime per 1,000 pop.	0.275	0.315	+14.55%	0.265
No. of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.000
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
No. of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.103	0.059	-42.72%	0.070
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	57.14%	125.00%	+67.86pp*	84.56%
No. of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.457	0.074	-83.81%	0.103
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	19.35%	160.00%	+140.65pp*	55.72%

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No. of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.265	0.044	-83.40%	0.185
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	38.89%	100.00%	+61.11pp*	68.51%
No. of manslaughter per 10,000 population	0.000	0.029	Not Calculable	0.017
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	0.00%	Not Calculable	Not Applicable
No. of murders per 10,000 population	0.015	0.133	+786.67%	0.085
% of murders detected/convicted	400.00%	88.89%	-311.11pp*	88.19%
No. of rapes per 10,000 population	2.667	2.284	-14.36%	2.131
% of rapes detected/convicted	12.71%	21.94%	+9.23pp*	22.84%

**pp" is Percentage Points.

***Most Similar Family (MSF) for Lincolnshire is: Cambridgeshire; Gloucestershire; Norfolk; North Yorkshire; Suffolk; West Mercia and; Wiltshire.*

From the SPI data in the table above it can be seen that the crime types of life threatening and gun crime and murders pose a potential threat to Lincolnshire. The rates of offences are worse than the MSF averages but are not necessarily high when compared to England and Wales as a whole.

The SPI data also indicates that Major Crime investigation in Lincolnshire is comparable with the rest of the peer group. However it should be noted that the sanction detection rates for attempted murder, blackmail and kidnapping are well in excess of the MSF average after large increases in 2007.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT) published in September 2007 indicated that Lincolnshire was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to Homicide, Rape and Kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

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While OCG mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Lincolnshire has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types are thoroughly mapped. It is currently estimated that nine OCGs impact the force area, across two major crime types

The Force Strategic Assessment demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The Force has identified controlled drugs, firearms, organised immigration crime and terrorism as its major crime priorities within the Force Control Strategy. The Force Strategic Intelligence Requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on these crime types.

Within the documentation overall, the issues broadly been identified and/or addressed.

The Force has invested suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and inhibit major crime. In particular, Lincolnshire's role in the provision of co-ordination for Operation Pentameter to regional/national partners is noteworthy.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a maturing process in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with the East Midlands regional forces and East Midlands Special Operations Unit (EMSOU) and SOCA are recognised.

Intelligence

Summary

The force has insufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime and to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully contributed to major crime investigation, supplying the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.

Strengths

- The force has a total of 13 analysts. Three analysts are dedicated to level 2 criminality issues, and they work from the force intelligence bureau (FIB) based at headquarters. The staff primarily service the two level 2 crime units and the major crime unit (MCU) and intelligence investigation unit (IIU). The staff are not dedicated specifically to serious and organised crime (SOC) and are allocated to support a major or serious crime investigation as it arises.
- Despite having limited resources and being primarily reactive, the level 2 analysts have been able to complete a good range of National Intelligence Model (NIM) products, including problem profiles on homicide, cannabis, immigration crime and knife crime. They have also completed crime-pattern analysis of communities, as well as a number of target profiles connected to current and former operations.
- The force makes good use of open source intelligence; for example, it regularly uses the Gangmasters Licensing Authority website and other easily accessible social networking sources to gather intelligence.

Work in progress

- Analysts have produced a problem profile of all homicides occurring between 2002 and 2007; this has been shared with a professor at Lincoln University who is assisting the force in producing its homicide prevention strategy, due for completion by April 2008.

Areas for improvement

- There is no dedicated level 2 analyst post specifically to concentrate on major crime (MC). Considerable benefits would flow from having a dedicated member of staff working on MC, who would provide an overview of all the intelligence and operations connected to MC, ensuring continuity and gradually building a complete and working knowledge to develop and support operations. **(Recommendation one)**
- With only three analysts dedicated to level 2 criminality, there is little opportunity for staff to complete proactive research and analysis. For a period of four months in 2007, two analysts were abstracted to major operations, leaving only one in the FIB to manage the structured NIM documents; this left no opportunity for proactive work or for developing intelligence and identifying patterns and trends around MC.
- The force needs to develop processes to test the effectiveness of the NIM products it produces; currently it cannot be certain that reports are timely and meet user needs. The force has only just begun to conduct results analysis, which leaves it unable accurately to understand which tactics work most effectively and which may need refining, adapting or rejecting.

- Out-of-hours intelligence searching was not widely understood in the force; this may indicate its under-use and is an opportunity the force should explore with partners.

Summary

The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be embryonic. The force's community impact assessments to evaluate risk following major crime are extensive.

Strengths

- Partners – including local councils, probation and the drug and alcohol action team (DAAT) – are all invited to the force level 2 tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TTCG) meetings and the six-monthly strategic meetings. There are good links with the DAAT, as evidenced by an Operation Pentameter 2 nominal who is of interest to seven forces nationally.
- There is in place a memorandum of understanding with Trading Standards to share information on specific operations.
- The force is engaged with the UK Human Trafficking Centre, which is a victim-focused organisation that was used successfully during Operation Pentameter, when it provided digital audio players to victims, giving vital information and assistance in their own language. The centre also provided accommodation for victims.
- Frequent use is made of community impact assessments on all major and critical incidents as a matter of routine. Such an assessment was provided during inspection in the case of a recent homicide, Operation Jester, which demonstrated review, assessment and actions taken to manage the community.
- The Government Agencies' Intelligence Network (GAIN) has just been introduced to the force around levels 1 and 2, with up to 20 partners attending, including Trading Standards.

Work in progress

- The force needs to ensure that senior managers are involved in the GAIN meetings in order to demonstrate commitment to (and to encourage) the sharing of information with partners.
- The force aims to establish an information-sharing agreement with Trading Standards; the management of police information (MoPI) board is leading this.
- The force is currently undertaking joint work on homicide prevention with Lincoln University; this should provide a wealth of detail and information to direct the force's homicide prevention strategy. The work will be completed by April 2008.

Areas for improvement

- The force has a number of good working relationships with partners and key agencies; however, none of these are subject to formal protocols or information-sharing agreements. The force needs to develop these to improve and increase the cross-flow of information.
- The force needs to develop access to, and increased use of, closed intelligence sources.

Summary

The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime in a sufficient way. Consequently, the FCS is found to be similarly adequate. Problem profiles for homicide, cannabis, immigration and knife crime are extensive, and there are links to force and basic command unit (BCU)-level plans. There is a wealth of evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- The 2006 FSA, FCS and intelligence requirement made little reference to major crime, as none of the major crimes are considered to impact significantly on the force area. The FCS and intelligence requirement for the three BCUs all include SOC to a greater or lesser degree – eg the East BCU has reference to Class A drugs and an intelligence requirement to use level 2 covert human intelligence sources (CHISs) to fill gaps. The FCS also refers to organised immigration crime, firearms and terrorism.
- Controlled drugs, firearms, organised crime and terrorism feature in the 2007 FSA; all four areas are also included in the FCS and the force intelligence requirement for 2007. There is reference to money laundering; it was initially identified in the region that money from cannabis dealing was being laundered through a range of legitimate establishments.
- There is good knowledge in the FIB of precursor offences, with daily monitoring of crimes and incidents. For example, the force is aware that the theft of plasma cutters is a precursor to an automatic teller machine (ATM) theft, as is theft of JCB heavy plant. These types of offences are part of BCU TTCG processes, with preventive tasks set by the chair in an effort to prevent ATM thefts.
- The force has completed problem profiles for homicide (entitled *Strategic Overview of Homicide in Lincolnshire 2002–2007*), domestic abuse (which accounts for 45% of the recorded offences over the five-year overview) and organised immigration crime. They include analysis of current and future demand profiles. The results of the homicide problem profile are being incorporated into the homicide prevention strategy.
- The separation/pregnancy/escalation/cultural/sexual assault/stalking (SPECSS) risk-assessment model is now fully integrated into the operational response to domestic abuse.
- A baseline threat assessment of the use of firearms over the last year (until September 2007) was provided to the inspection team. The document identifies times, dates and locations of incidents, and follows the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) threat assessment.

Area for improvement

- There is no reference to MC in the South and West BCUs' control strategies, although there is reference in the intelligence requirements. The force needs to be assured that MC is accurately reflected in the control strategy for each BCU, where appropriate.

Summary

Trend analysis and problem profiles have recently come to be shared with partners and BCUs. There is an emerging trigger plan for 'hot' briefing, either when there is a significant change in the major crime threat, or when the nature of the analysis demands a fast response. There are information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as Trading Standards. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full MoPI compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- The force has a comprehensive MoPI action plan, which, in line with NPIA guidance, includes an assessment of risk. A superintendent leads the MoPI project. The force has actively engaged with the NPIA, which has reviewed and assessed the force's progress; it is on track to be compliant by 2010. The multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) in force are already fully MoPI compliant.
- Partners are invited to attend the force level 2 TTCCG; these include the county council, probation and the DAAT.
- Good productive partnership arrangements are evident in the independent advisory groups (IAGs), key individual networks (KINs) and community safety partnerships.
- Good use is made of national databases, and all appropriate staff were able to show evidence of use; for example, all senior investigating officers (SIOs) and deputy SIOs were aware of and used the Genesis best-practice database, and all recognised the value, and promoted the use, of the serious crime analysis section (SCAS) database. For 2007, the force was one of only three forces nationally to achieve a 100% compliance rate for the submission of sexual offences and murder to the SCAS database.
- There is a memorandum of understanding with Trading Standards to share information on specific operations. Intelligence is also shared with the BIA for example during Operation Pentameter 2.
- A 'hot' briefing process is in place, managed primarily by the superintendent (crime operations), who directs and manages force resources in response to significant change in the threat level and to initiate a fast time response. In the absence of the superintendent, this role is performed by the detective chief inspector.

Area for improvement

- Although there are good multi-agency connections in force, none are focused specifically on MC, apart from MAPPA and GAIN, which focus primarily on individuals. Opportunities can be developed and exploited here to increase intelligence sharing. To maximise potential, the force needs to review its intelligence requirement and focus on engaging with those partners who can improve it, and then, in support, develop MoPI-compliant, information-sharing agreements. It should also review existing arrangements to reassure itself that potential is not being missed to improve and maximise opportunities that agencies may be willing to share.

Summary

In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are not identified sufficiently early.

Strengths

- Each BCU, as part of the force neighbourhood policing (NP) structure, has a dedicated analyst and researcher, and every neighbourhood has a constantly refreshed profile that contains a wealth of information and intelligence. This information is used to inform both the setting of local priorities and the strategic assessment process.
- Organised crime does feature in the 2007 FSA; for example, it deals with the residual factors from Operation Karoo and the activities of an OCG resident in a neighbouring force area.

Work in progress

- In autumn 2007, the dedicated NP analysts completed a separate strategic assessment on neighbourhood issues. This is considered by the force to be a pilot and will be discussed at the force project board to see whether it should be included in the FSA. HMIC commends this work, which brings considerable value to both MC and SOC, and significantly enhances the profiling of communities in the FSA for the future.

Area for improvement

- Communities are profiled in the FSA, but only in the form of an overview, which lacks depth and clarity. HMIC acknowledges the work on neighbourhood profiles, which presents an ideal opportunity for the force to develop its understanding of vulnerable communities and of how organised criminality operates, leading to better identification of future risks and threats.

Summary

Regarding elements of intelligence, the force strategic risk register is reviewed every two months by the deputy chief constable (DCC), who oversees the strategic development group. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan.

Strengths

- The force strategic risk register is managed by the corporate development department and is overseen by the strategic development group, which meets every two months and is chaired by the DCC. All risks identified by the sustainable funding project board (SFPB) are also contained in the register.
- The force has a strategic risk log, which provides the history and action to date in managing and monitoring progress against risks identified in the register. The force provided the inspection team with documentation on two risks in the register: staff being voluntarily on call, and cold case review capacity. In the case of the latter, the force now has a review unit in place.
- Crime support has its own risk register, which includes both medium and high risks; a high risk, for example, was the potential retirement of staff in the high-tech crime unit (HTCU).

Work in progress

- There are a number of risks in the register that can be classed as work in progress. These include the homicide prevention strategy, high-tech crime resources and level 2 analysis capability, all of which feature in more detail in this report. The working party for on-call arrangements will report in early 2008, with implementation of its recommendations by April 2008.

Area for improvement

- The need for five additional analysts was not included in the strategic risk register; given the impact these additional resources would have on the effectiveness of the force's NIM processes, they clearly should be in the register.

Summary

The force is fully collaborating with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Some of the operational databases are searchable from the general information enquiry system (GENIE). The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been fully implemented.

Strengths

- The force is heavily reliant on its old crime information system (CIS), supported by the electronic 5x5x5 intelligence-submission system, which allows staff to complete a 5x5x5 intelligence report and submit it to the divisional intelligence unit (DIU) for input onto the CIS and dissemination. The inspection found that, despite the age of the system, it worked well in the main, allowing users to locate data and intelligence effectively.
- The force has the back office facility 2 (BOF2) for its automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) at a range of sites strategically spread across the force. All staff can access ANPR 24/7 via the force control room. There are 26 fixed-site ANPR cameras, with a further nine programmed to go live during 2008. National and regional reads are routinely added to the force ANPR data, as are 'hot lists' as and when they are received.

Work in progress

- A user requirement has been established for the new CIS, which includes integration with other systems; this is currently out to tender. It is envisaged that the new CIS will be fully in operation by July 2009.
- The GENIE system – a collaborative project to integrate systems not only within the force but also regionally – is under way. Together with selected users, the force is currently piloting and testing the interoperability of the following systems: CIS, the National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS) command and control, NSPIS custody, Mirage (the old command and control and custody system), case preparation, domestic abuse database and the firearms system. Evidence shows that GENIE is working well, identifying and flagging links on a nominal across all systems.
- Strong reliance is placed on the DIU to deliver the intelligence processes; at present the DIU only provides a limited service. HMIC acknowledges that the force is looking (via the SFPB) to deliver a minimum of 16 hours per day availability of the DIU. This will provide a more effective service.
- All the Bichard recommendations are written into the MoPI project board plan, which includes a full audit framework. The force is on track to be fully MoPI compliant by the target date of 2010.

Areas for improvement

- Interoperability of systems at the operational level is currently non-existent; even with the work in progress on GENIE, the force should not lose sight of the fact that GENIE will not integrate ANPR and the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES), two key systems to enhance the intelligence picture in force. Subject to

technical solutions, these two systems must be high on the priority list to secure interoperability.

- Although a policy does exist to transfer intelligence from HOLMES to the CIS, the process is for intelligence cell staff to work alongside a major incident room (MIR) and complete the transfer of intelligence. However, this process was not well used or understood.

Summary

The force has a case review policy that is generally applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidance; the policy is efficient.

Strengths

- A review unit was established in September 2007, consisting of a temporary head of the unit (funded until the end of March 2009), two permanent staff (MCU detectives) and two temporary staff (MCU detectives).
- A member of NPIA staff is currently assisting the force in its review of an undetected 1994 homicide.
- A new review policy is in place that complies with the *Murder Investigation Manual* (MIM); the force consulted with the national homicide working group to identify the latest good practice and developments. The policy includes some additional elements – eg the inclusion of a ‘hot’ debrief of all detected homicides after seven days.
- The head of unit attends the regional review group, which invites guest speakers and is attended by a member of staff from the NPIA.

Work in progress

- An officer in the public protection unit (PPU) is currently reviewing the force response to rape and its investigation, with a remit to identify good practice.

Areas for improvement

- To date, no reviews have been conducted of undetected rapes. Consideration should also be given to reviewing undetected non-stop fatal road traffic collisions (RTCs) when they occur, although HMIC acknowledges that, in the last two years, the force has not experienced an undetected RTC incident requiring review. **(Recommendation two)**
- None of the review staff have received, or are nominated to attend, any nationally accredited training; if funding beyond March 2008 allows, this should be a priority for the force. **(Recommendation two)**
- HMIC acknowledges the resourcing difficulties faced by the force; however, the abstraction of four staff from the MCU – two permanent and two temporary – is not ideal. This removes trained and skilled staff and impacts on the capability of the MCU. The force should consider workforce modernisation opportunities as part of the SFPB, in order to release the staff back to the MCU. **(Recommendation two)**

Summary

The force tasking and co-ordination process functions cohesively to deliver suitable responses to managing major crime threats. The documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The assistant chief constable (ACC) chairs the force level 2 TTCG, which commissions and receives problem and target profiles as required. Representatives from key partners attend the meeting; they could include, for example, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), DAAT and EMSOU. The TTCG document identifies appropriate intelligence, enforcement and prevention opportunities and outlines current developments in each investigation.
- Level 2 TTCG meetings have a clear focus on historical, current and predictive demand. For example, the European football tournament (Euro 2008) has qualifiers from Portugal and Poland, and there are significant communities in Lincolnshire from both those countries. In response, the force has initiated a gold group to review intelligence and has tasked the production of an intelligence requirement.
- MAPPA level 3 offenders are a standing item in the level 2 documentation; this allows effective review and assessment, where appropriate.

Work in progress

- None identified

Areas for improvement

- The inspection noted that the covert level 2 meeting is held immediately after the overt level 2 meeting. The force may wish to consider holding the covert meeting first, as this area of business may have greater priority and resource implications, and may therefore influence decisions to be made at the overt meeting.
- Although the rationale for overall decisions is generally recorded at TTCG meetings, it could be beneficial to make a formal record at these meetings, outlining what threats and risks were considered during the decision-making process. This may add value as the investigation progresses, facilitate review and be used to assess other investigations, thus securing greater consistency.

Summary

Due to appropriate and comprehensive training, the force's awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.

Strengths

- The inspection found evidence that all staff had received in-force generic diversity training.
- Each BCU professional development unit has a community engagement co-ordinator who could be utilised as a resource in an MC investigation. This has been used to good effect to advise MC staff investigating a homicide in Boston (Operation Jester), when the SIO and the team received diversity guidance through both community representatives and the IAG at a very early stage. An excellent relationship was formed, and both strategic (policy) and tactical (eg press releases) investigative work benefited. In September 2007, a joint event with Kaleidoscope a local group, was hosted by a number of forces, including Lincolnshire Police – 'Gay murder investigations what if it happened to me?'
- Human resource (HR) managers co-ordinate all staff performance development reviews to identify training needs identified by individuals in conjunction with their supervisor. This could include diversity requirements, which would then go forward to the force training strategy group, chaired by the ACC, which prioritises the training needs of the force.
- The IAG has diverse representation, and the force actively seeks IAG views and guidance on a range of matters, including homophobic issues connected to a homicide investigation.

Work in progress

- Crime support has scheduled a number of in-house professional development days for MC staff, and diversity as a subject area will be delivered at the next event – in spring 2008. The force will also benefit from regional SIO development days, when subjects such as honour-based violence and homicides will be covered. An MCU training day has been arranged for June 2008, when input from an IAG is planned with the aim of securing specialist knowledge – eg in relation to minority communities.

Areas for improvement

- The force should review its knowledge of key minority communities and consider whether there is a need for (or benefits to be gained from) bespoke training to educate its staff in preparation for an incident, so that they have good information about minority communities, as well as contacts in them.
- The force needs to introduce and develop records of exactly which staff have received diversity training, when and what type, so that it can target those staff with the greatest need and thus enhance their effectiveness.

Prevention

Summary

The force has an IAG, and this is frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners to the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- Each BCU has its own IAG, and in 2006 the force formulated a proposal for a force IAG, which consists of the BCU-level chairs and vice-chairs. IAG members, representing a diverse cross-section, were spoken to during the inspection, and they stated that they were fully consulted in all relevant cases in force. There was good evidence that IAGs contributed openly and that they had frequent opportunity to work with the police to assist and influence police investigations. All IAG chairs and vice-chairs receive the daily force media briefing by email and, if an incident occurs in force, they are routinely consulted or briefed at an early stage.
- An IAG has been used in force for a multiple fatal RTC, in which foreign nationals were the victims. The force also moves IAG members from one IAG to another if they have specialist knowledge or skills to assist.
- The police authority funds the attendance of at least three IAG members at the annual national IAG conference.
- The force uses gold groups routinely for critical and major incidents, and members of an IAG were able to give evidence of their participation in the gold group for Operation Jester; this included receiving copies of the 7- and 28-day reviews.

Work in progress

- The IAG chair and vice-chair group intends to follow ACPO guidance and develop a strategic IAG, with a member of the chief officer group (COG) invited to attend.

Areas for improvement

- None identified

July 2008

Summary

Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were fully understood by call-management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- The force has a network of plans designed to ensure business continuity; in exceptional circumstances, it also has a business continuity policy, which directs each departmental head to be responsible for developing their own business continuity plans. It also has emergency and contingency plans to deal with any eventuality, eg an influenza pandemic.
- In March 2007, as part of a test, the force completely closed its force control and communications centre (FCCC) and relocated provision for three days to a different site at the headquarters.
- FCCC call takers, dispatchers and supervisors were familiar with the ‘golden hour’ principles; some drop-down menus are available to them, including bomb, bomb hoax and missing persons. There was consistent evidence that FCCC staff provided first responders with accurate and timely intelligence before their arrival at an incident. Consistent evidence was also found that first responders were equally well aware of the ‘golden hour’ principles, with examples given of good scene protection at homicides and other potential major or critical incidents.
- Valuable and effective training is being delivered to operational staff on the West BCU in scene protection and initial enquiries at major and critical incidents. This training drew favourable comment during inspection.
- The MCU has the following complement of fully trained and dedicated staff: one detective inspector, two detective sergeants and 14 detective constables, line managed by a detective chief inspector who also line manages the IIU. It is able to operate a maximum of nine MIRs, spread geographically across the force. HMIC considers that the force has sufficient dedicated resources to meet its predicted demand profile.
- All FCCC inspectors are accredited firearms silver commanders.

Work in progress

- None identified

Areas for improvement

- The inspection was unable to identify any business continuity plans concerning MC or any of the specialist assets. A business continuity plan for crime support was finalised in August 2003, but it did not make any reference to MC or specialist assets, apart from fraud; this document is no longer fit for purpose. The force needs to review its business continuity plans urgently, so that, in the event of an unforeseen critical situation, departmental heads have plans to follow and implement.

July 2008

- Although staff trained in critical incidents are available in force, none of the supervisors and managers in the FCCC are trained in critical incident awareness/management. While HMIC acknowledges that FCCC inspectors receive awareness training as part of their initial development course, the force should ensure that at least all its FCCC inspectors and above receive critical incident training, to enable a professional and effective immediate response once an incident is reported to the FCCC.
- HMIC acknowledges that real-time intelligence is consistently delivered to first responders; however, there is no formal intelligence capability in the FCCC. The introduction of an intelligence capability into the FCCC would enhance research and capability for major and critical incidents.
- The valuable and effective 'golden hour' training being delivered on the West BCU should be transferred to the force's other two BCUs.

Summary

The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed extensively.

Strengths

- Controlled drugs, firearms, organised crime and terrorism feature in the 2007 FSA; all four areas are also included in the FCS and the force intelligence requirement for 2007.
- The force has completed problem profiles for homicide (entitled *Strategic Overview of Homicide in Lincolnshire 2002-2007*), domestic abuse (which accounts for 45% of the recorded offences over the five-year overview) and organised immigration crime. They include analysis of current and future demand profiles. The results of the homicide problem profile are being incorporated into the homicide prevention strategy.
- The SPECSS risk-assessment model is now fully integrated into the operational response to domestic abuse.
- A baseline threat assessment on the use of firearms over the last year (until September 2007) was provided to the inspection team. The document identifies times, dates and locations of incidents and follows the NPIA threat assessment.
- There is a good level of knowledge in the FIB of precursor offences, and officers undertake daily monitoring of crimes and incidents. For example, the force is aware that the theft of plasma cutters is a precursor to an ATM theft, as is the theft of JCB heavy plant. These types of offences are part of BCU TTCG processes, with preventive tasks set by the chair in an effort to avert ATM thefts.

Work in progress

- None identified

Area for improvement

- The good work on production of problem profiles and precursor offences could usefully be extended to identify vulnerable communities and locations. There needs to be a greater understanding of threat-to-life issues, which should supplement existing work streams to better inform the force about its vulnerable people, communities and locations.

Summary

The policy covering threats to life is fully accessible to staff and is reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of joint/regional/cross-border/multi-agency operations are abundant.

Strengths

- The policy *Management of Threats to Human Life* deals with all threat-to-life issues and is accessible to all staff via the force intranet; it provides simple advice and a flowchart for staff to follow. The detective inspector who heads the witness protection unit (WPU) is the force's single point of contact for threat-to-life issues. The inspection found that, at all levels, there was a sound working knowledge and appreciation of the policy. The WPU was considered as the first port of call to seek guidance and advice, with staff available 24/7; the on-call SIO is also a key resource, who must be contacted to authorise the issue of an Osman warning. Trained staff in the DIU usually conduct risk assessments.
- The force is engaged in the East Midlands regional firearms suppression strategy – Operation Devine – led by Leicestershire Constabulary. This is focused on the criminal possession of firearms, including work with firearms licensing and high-profile policing at public events that may attract firearms. Most of Lincolnshire's work has been concentrated on firearms licensing.
- Nine of the 13 homicides that occurred in 2007 were domestic murders; in response to this, the three BCUs now conduct a daily review of all domestic abuse incidents, to risk assess them and identify preventive and reduction strategies.
- The force uses Osman warnings; it was not able to provide an example connected to a homicide, but it did give an example of an offender who wished to give evidence against a co-accused in a case. Warnings are more commonly used in cases of domestic violence. The on-call SIO must be contacted for approval to issue an Osman warning.
- Two detective superintendents and a detective chief inspector are trained to manage kidnap and extortion incidents, while all immediate threat-to-life issues are referred to SOCA.

Work in progress

- The homicide prevention strategy is due for completion by April 2008. It aims to be an all-embracing document with a list of tactical options for operational staff to use to prevent homicide. This work has been supported by the homicide problem profile and expert assistance from Lincoln University.

Area for improvement

- Firearms offences are low in number, and consequently the force has no formal firearms prevention or investigative strategies or policies. These should be introduced, so that when an incident occurs there are clear policies and procedures to inform and direct the force's operational response.

Summary

The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by dedicated covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by, all dedicated staff. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- The force has a dedicated witness protection capability, led by a detective inspector. The capability includes intelligence development to service witness protection demands. Witness protection staff are on call 24/7. The detective inspector is the force's single point of contact for all witness protection issues, including Osman warnings.
- The DCC is the national ACPO lead for witness protection. The force engages the services of a specialist lawyer, who delivers training and best practice to detective inspectors and above.
- The detective inspector attends the East Midlands regional witness protection meeting.
- The witness protection policy is available to all staff on the force intranet; this includes a simple-to-follow flowchart that takes staff through the process.
- A good process exists for establishing whether or not an individual case should be accepted for witness protection; this includes the setting-up of a gold group, chaired by the ACC.

Work in progress

- Specific acceptance criteria for the scheme are being developed to provide greater clarity for witness protection; this will be completed by April 2008.
- An Osman database was purchased from Lancashire Constabulary in January 2008. The force is now developing a new policy to replace the existing published guidance; this will cover the management structure and the process of ongoing review. The force needs to ensure that the new Osman database can accurately detail how many Osman warnings have been issued and, more importantly, to whom and when.

Areas for improvement

- None identified

Summary

The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventive and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are fully used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- All critical incidents are subject to a community impact assessment, and IAGs are engaged whenever appropriate; both actions bring a wealth of community intelligence, which assists the force in measuring harm to communities.
- The East BCU has a tensions monitoring group that meets every two months and is attended by key partners. There is a plan to roll these groups out across the force to ensure a corporate approach to tension monitoring. At these meetings, community tensions and issues are discussed and plans put in place for monitoring where further action is required. The group meets every two months and is chaired by the superintendent (operations). The partners report ongoing tensions back to the police using an agreed reporting mechanism. This same mechanism was used by the BCU during a recent murder trial involving a Polish national to report tensions direct to Operation Element. The success of the group is attributable to the buy-in of all partners and to the agreed structures – namely an annual plan, reporting mechanism, media strategy and governance structure.
- The introduction of safer neighbourhood teams, with each BCU having a dedicated neighbourhood analyst and researcher, is a great benefit. They have developed and completed community profiles, thus providing a useful assessment of all the force's communities and the KINs within them.
- Counter-terrorism (CT) activity is linked to neighbourhood policing through the FSA and control strategies. The FCS gives direction to community policing teams (CPTs) around intelligence gathering, including the tasking of CPTs to obtain specific CT-related intelligence for the 'rich picture'. This intelligence features in the latest FSA.

Work in progress

- None identified

Area for improvement

- The force needs to identify some indicators to measure harm in communities reliably and to gauge the impact of preventive and enforcement activity.

Summary

The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a developing policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted, commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- The force security board is attended by the head of the professional standards department (PSD) and the head of the internal investigation unit and vetting officer, as well as by other key staff, such as the estates security officer; the board's remit is to monitor and review security arrangements. During the inspection, consistent evidence was found of controlled access and good security procedures in place around specialist assets.
- An effective meeting structure is in place, with the heads of the PSD and crime meeting before the force TTCG, which both attend; this enables them to review all level 2 operations. The head of the PSD also attends the force's closed and open level 2 TTCG meetings.
- The force uses the Police National Computer (PNC) to audit disproportionate use of the PNC. It also has an auditable email archive system, and risk monitoring takes place. The force actively monitors internet usage, and it provided examples of staff being issued with management warnings for misuse of the facility.
- In February 2008, a PSD and an MC SIO attended a nationally accredited counter-corruption course to improve capability and ensure good links with MC investigation.

Work in progress

- The force vetting officer has drafted a new vetting policy that is compliant with ACPO guidance. It has identified new posts and the levels to which staff should be vetted. The policy states that the majority of staff will be security cleared; at present, some 25 staff are undergoing vetting, most of them staff in the IIU and MCU. The inspection also noted that unvetted staff were conducting PSD investigations, a weakness that the force must remedy.
- At the time of inspection, no anti-corruption initiatives had been conducted by the PSD. There is a capacity problem, in that some staff have been abstracted to MCU investigations, although recently PSD staff have been 'red circled' and can no longer be abstracted. In January 2008, the PSD commenced an anti-corruption operation, in line with the recommendations of the Taylor Report. A draft business case has been submitted to increase the number of SIOs by two in the internal investigation unit, in order to increase capacity for anti-corruption operations.

Area for improvement

- There is no formal established post of security manager, and in the past the force has bought in independent review of the security of force premises and computer systems. There are limited formal security policies in place and, if resources permit, the force should consider creating a post to review the integrity and security of all its premises, assets and staff.

Enforcement

Summary

Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with appropriate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.

Strengths

- The police authority has a scrutiny and audit committee, which consists of eight or nine members. The authority receives a copy of the force's monthly performance pack, which includes major and serious crime. It also receives regular briefings from the COG. Members concur with the chief officers' view that major and serious crime are low risks, and that there are sufficient resources in place to meet predictable demand. The authority also has a research and policy officer, who could focus on major or serious crime issues, if this were considered appropriate.
- The ACC established gold support groups for major crimes and critical incidents at the earliest opportunity. Examples were provided of Operation Zest (February 2007), established within 24 hours, and Operation Jester, established within 48 hours. These groups routinely involve attendance by IAG members. The gold group for Operation Zest also consulted the local community in an effort to return the community most affected by this gay homicide to harmony. In addition, Positive Health, a disease prevention group for gay men, was consulted. On Operation Jean (a special branch (SB) criminal investigation), a Muslim officer was an integral part of the gold group and forged links with the Muslim community, seeking its advice as to the local impact of police activity.

Work in progress

- At present, three members who sit on the East Midlands region collaboration board are in the process of being vetted; this should be completed by April 2008.

Area for improvement

- Subject to satisfactory vetting arrangements, it may assist the governance arrangements if a member of an IAG was invited to sit on a gold group for a critical incident or major investigation.

Summary

The ACPO lead and the head of crime are not trained in the management of linked and series crime and have not received officer in overall command (OIOC) training. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone comprehensive training and testing in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The ACC was trained in serious crime, intelligence management, information technology and resources (SCIMITAR) in February 2003.
- The critical incident policy sits as an ‘overarching mechanism’ in regard to contingency plans to deal with high-risk or vulnerable groups. The force has introduced a policy for the management and prevention of critical incidents, which contains guidance on how to declare a critical incident and identifies individual roles and responsibilities from initial procedure, investigation and intelligence. The policy also gives guidance on the completion of community impact assessments. A wide range of staff have been trained in critical incident command, and they are available in force to support operations and incidents as appropriate.

Work in progress

- None identified

Areas for improvement

- The new head of crime (who took up post in December 2007) is not trained in the management of linked and series crime, and neither is the ACC. The force recognises these gaps and will seek to train one of the two post holders as soon as a course can be arranged in 2008.
- None of the chief officers is trained or experienced in the OIOC role; the force should ensure that the ACC receives training in this discipline. If faced with the necessity for an OIOC, the force would approach other forces in the region; however, this issue is not covered by any formal agreement or protocol.

Summary

The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes, cost, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- Major crime activity is monitored by the ACC during the level 2 TTCG process; information includes the number of MCU and BCU staff deployed to an operation. In the case of a homicide investigation, the ACC sets an initial budget appropriate to the level of investigation required; thereafter, the SIO is required to submit a written application to the ACC for additional funding. There are sound processes in place to monitor expenditure. For example, forensic specialist services are managed by the force resource manager, who deals with all financial bids for homicide investigations and has the ability to cost all MC investigations.
- The head of crime operations reviews all active major crime investigations on a weekly basis directly with SIOs. There is a monthly prosecution performance team meeting chaired by the CPS, which reviews major crimes, including all undetected rape offences.
- The force regularly conducts structured, independently led debriefs following investigations.

Work in progress

- The review unit has yet to make a full impact on the review process, but it is now engaged in structured debriefs and will play a key role in identifying and disseminating good practice across the force.

Area for improvement

- Although the force does review investigations, the process is not yet mature enough to identify which tactics work best and what actions or lines of enquiry are the most cost-effective.

Performance management and resilience

Summary

The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; furthermore, collaborative agreements with SOCA and EMSOU exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage HR provide partial protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- The MCU has an appropriate complement of fully trained and dedicated staff, line managed by a detective chief inspector who also line manages the IIU. All these resources report to the detective superintendent (crime operations). During 2007, the force investigated 11 homicides without significant impact on BCU resources. It is able to operate a maximum of nine MIRs, spread geographically across the force. The operations conference, held monthly and attended by BCU commanders, reviews major crime investigations and the number of abstractions from BCUs. The force ensures that BCU staff are not engaged in long-term roles such as disclosure officer, and there is evidence that current call-out procedures work well. HMIC considers that the force has sufficient dedicated resources to meet its predicted demand profile.
- There are eight professionalising the investigative process (PIP) level 5 interview coordinators in force, two of whom are MCU staff.
- The force has sufficient dedicated and trained staff to deliver forensic support for major crime. It has three senior scene of crime officers (SSOCOs), 18 full-time scene of crime officers (SOCOs) and five assistant SOCOs based at Skegness, Louth, Boston (East BCU), Sleaford, Gainsborough and Lincoln (West BCU), Grantham, Bourne and Spalding (South BCU). Staff are available from 8am to 10pm Monday to Friday, and 8am to 4pm at weekends. An SSOCO and a full-time SOCO are always available on call.

Work in progress

- Eight officers are capable of fulfilling the SIO role, with all post holders working towards PIP level 3 accreditation; the SIO cadre includes the MCU and IIU managers and BCU-based detective chief inspectors. Accreditation is targeted for completion by April 2008. There is a full PIP programme for the force, including delivery of PIP level 2 staff training, beginning with detective investigators, during 2008.
- A review has recently been conducted of on-call arrangements in force for all staff. The aim is to identify key functions and ensure that staff are compensated appropriately for the restrictions that being on call places on them.

Areas for improvement

- The force provided data on homicides and the number of occasions when a Home Office pathologist had conducted a postmortem into unexplained deaths; it could not, however, provide data on the total number of unexplained deaths. The force needs to collate this information to confirm the numbers and review whether all deaths are receiving an appropriate level of investigation. The current process is not robust and presents risks to the force. It also misses the opportunity for learning and potential good practice.
- With its current level of staffing, the MCU is operating at capacity and there is little resilience for exceptional demand. The force should review its establishment levels, and, as a minimum, identify its contingency plans for exceptional demand.
- During the period of inspection, a Category C homicide investigation was staffed by both MCU and BCU staff, by negotiation between senior managers. However, not all MCU staff were deployed to the investigation. HMIC accepts that this was a straightforward investigation, but the force needs a clear policy on the staffing of homicide investigations, which should be the role of trained and dedicated MCU staff and should thereby minimise the impact on BCUs.

Summary

Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Elements of covert installation are delivered through verbal collaborative agreements, which are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.

Strengths

- The force has sufficient dedicated and trained resources to cover the majority of specialist investigations. During inspection, the force was able to provide evidence of a number of operations, including the covert installation of audio equipment in a dwelling and the use of technical equipment to covertly obtain telephone numbers dialled by a mobile telephone.
- The force reported to the national compromise database – Operation Nectarine – in 2007.
- A detective sergeant heads the ECU which undertakes the Proceeds of Crime Act responsibilities on behalf of the force. ECU deal with confiscation; to ensure that they identify all opportunities, they actively interrogate the CIS for both crimes and intelligence and NSPIS custody. Each detective constable is dedicated to one of the three BCUs in force. Some staff specialise in money laundering and are currently actively engaged in seven cases.
- A written protocol is in place between the five East Midlands regional forces, namely the East Midlands Regional Information and Co-ordination Centre (EMRICC). This collaboration was developed to maintain communication and co-ordination across the region, thereby providing effective identification and deployment of the necessary resources to a mobilisation event, which will include either a spontaneous incident or a pre-planned event, either in or outside the region. EMRICC has been activated on four occasions, including for the disappearance of Madeleine McCann from Portugal in May 2007 and, more recently, during Operation Orca, which concerned the widening of the M1 motorway through the region. An ACPO lead is appointed on each occasion to direct EMRICC.

Areas for improvement

- The force needs to develop a network investigation capability. During inspection, no staff were able to articulate a process or procedure for this type of investigation – apart from HTCUC staff, who said they would support enquiries if asked.
- The HTCUC is purely reactive at the moment and needs to develop a proactive capability.
- The successful plan introduced to eliminate the backlog in the HTCUC is only short term and the force needs to develop a long-term plan to avoid further backlogs.
- Benefits may be realised from co-locating all data-recovery disciplines in one unit, rather than basing mobile telephone recovery in the TSU.

- Consideration should be given to the introduction of dedicated BCU-based FIs, as this may improve the force performance on securing confiscation and forfeiture orders.

Summary

The force has a full-time and dedicated case review team that is generally deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is efficient.

Strengths

- The review unit was formed in September 2007 and is led by a former senior detective, who is employed on a temporary basis until March 2009, when, subject to funding, the post will be made permanent. The head is supported by two permanent detective constables abstracted from the MCU. A new policy has been drafted that complies with the MIM and major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP).
- In the last two years, there have been no cases of undetected fatal non-stop RTCs, and there are no historical cases to be reviewed in the area.
- In 2004, the force's investigation of a double homicide was reviewed by the Metropolitan Police Service.

Work in progress

- None identified

Areas for improvement

- There is currently insufficient capacity in the unit to conduct two-year-old case reviews; the force should address this to minimise risk and maximise detection opportunities.
- To date, no reviews have been conducted of undetected rapes; this needs to change if the force is to develop learning and good practice and increase detection opportunities in this area of crime.
- None of the review staff have received any nationally accredited training; this, along with funding beyond March 2008, should be a priority for the force.

Summary

The inspection found evidence that the force is predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the MIM and major incident room standardised operating procedures.

Strengths

- The force provided the inspection team with a copy of a policy file for homicide, together with internal review documents. Both documents show evidence of knowledge and good use of both MIM and MIRSAP. Policy files are used in all cases of homicide or suspicious death.
- The force uses flexible MIRs, applying minimal indexing, where appropriate and as decided by the SIO in conjunction with the HOLMES manager. A common approach is to use HOLMES to manage exhibits and disclosure for both major and serious crimes.
- The Metropolitan Police Service review of a double homicide investigation in 2004 provided independent external review and concluded that compliance with MIM and MIRSAP was consistent and effective.

Work in progress

- None identified

Area for improvement

- At present, the force does not mandate the use of policy files other than in the case of suspicious deaths and homicides. Informally, it recommends their use in the case of rape and serious sexual assault and threat-to-life cases. The force should review its policy and specify when policy files will be used in cases of major and serious crime.

Recommendations

Recommendation one

HMIC recommends that a dedicated analytical resource is allocated to major crime investigation this would provide an overview of all the intelligence and operations connected to major crime, ensuring continuity building a working knowledge to develop and support operations.

Recommendation two

HMIC recommends that the force recruits sufficient and trained staff to ensure effective review of undetected serious sexual offences takes place without impacting on resources of the MCU.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition
ATM	automatic teller machine

B

BCU	basic command unit
BIA	Border and Immigration Agency
BOF2	back office facility 2

C

CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CIS	crime intelligence system
COG	chief officer group
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CPT	community policing team
CT	counter-terrorism

D

DAAT	drug and alcohol action team
DCC	deputy chief constable
DIU	divisional intelligence unit

E

ECU	economic crime unit
EMRICC	East Midlands Regional Information and Co-ordination Centre
EMSOU	East Midlands special operations unit

F

FCCC	force control and communications centre
FCS	force control strategy
FI	financial investigator
FIB	force intelligence bureau
FSA	force strategic assessment

G

GAIN	Government Agencies' Intelligence Network
GENIE	general information enquiry system

H

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HR	human resources
HTCU	high-tech crime unit

I

IAG	independent advisory group
IIU	intelligence investigation unit

K

KIN	key individual network
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M

MAPPA	multi-agency public protection arrangements
MC	major crime
MCU	major crime unit
MIM	<i>Murder Investigation Manual</i>
MIR	major incident room

MIRSAP major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MoPI management of police information
MSF most similar force(s)

N

NP neighbourhood policing
NIM National Intelligence Model
NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency
NPSAT National Protective Services Analysis Tool
NSPIS National Strategy for Police Information Systems

O

OCG organised crime group
OIOC officer in overall command
Osman Osman v UK (1999) 1 FLR 193, where the court established that in certain circumstances the state has a positive obligation to take preventive measures to protect an individual who is at risk from the criminal activities of others
PIP professionalising the investigative process
PNC Police National Computer
POCA Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
PPU public protection unit
PSD professional standards department

R

RIG regional intelligence group
RTCG regional tasking and co-ordination group

S

SAR suspicious activity report
SB special branch
SCAS serious crime analysis section

SCIMITAR	serious crime, intelligence management, information technology and resources
SFPB	sustainable funding project board
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SOC	serious and organised crime
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SOCO	scene of crime officer
SPECSS	separation/pregnancy/escalation/cultural/sexual assault/stalking
SPI	statutory performance indicator
SSOCO	senior scene of crime officer

T

TSU	technical support unit
TTCG	tactical tasking and co-ordination group

W

WPU	witness protection unit
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