Increasing efficiency in the Police Service

The role of collaboration

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Contents

Executive summary ..................................................................................................................... 4

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 10
   This report .............................................................................................................................. 10
   A note on data ....................................................................................................................... 11

2. Scope and Integration: The current collaboration landscape ........................................... 12
   Number of collaboration projects ......................................................................................... 12
   Spread of collaboration projects ........................................................................................... 12
   Maturity of collaboration projects ........................................................................................ 14
   Proportion of business delivered through collaboration projects ......................................... 15
   Anticipated savings from collaboration projects .................................................................... 16
   Wider benefits ....................................................................................................................... 17
   Assessing the effectiveness of collaboration ........................................................................ 18
   Nature of collaboration projects ........................................................................................... 23
   Collaboration involving the frontline versus projects focused on support functions ............ 23

3. Models of collaboration.......................................................................................................... 27
   Number of forces collaborating by model .............................................................................. 27
   Number of collaboration projects by model .......................................................................... 28
   Anticipated savings by model .............................................................................................. 28
   Force to force collaboration .................................................................................................. 29
   Force to public sector collaboration model .......................................................................... 31
   Force to private sector and force to public and private sector collaboration models ............ 32
   Delivery and location of collaborated resources .................................................................. 35

4. The financial perspective: Value and Yield ......................................................................... 39
   Data used in this chapter ....................................................................................................... 39
   Expected savings ................................................................................................................... 39
   Level of ambition .................................................................................................................. 40
   Potential level of savings from collaboration ...................................................................... 41
   Budget reductions for different policing functions ............................................................... 43
   Reducing unit costs .............................................................................................................. 45
   Areas for future focus .......................................................................................................... 48

5. Barriers and enablers ............................................................................................................. 49
   Leadership and culture ......................................................................................................... 49
   Vision and scope .................................................................................................................... 50
   Benefits and evaluation ........................................................................................................ 52
   Finance, resources and processes ......................................................................................... 52
   Governance and accountability .............................................................................................. 53
People and policies ........................................................................................................... 54
6. Conclusion and recommendations ............................................................................. 56

Annex 1: Programme methodology ............................................................................. 58
Annex 2: Glossary ........................................................................................................... 60
Annex 3: Explanation of annual data return (ADR) functions ..................................... 63
Annex 4: Demanding Times definitions – frontline and non-frontline roles .............. 73
Annex 5: Collaboration typology ..................................................................................... 74
Annex 6: Principles applied to data reconciliation and cleansing ............................... 75
Executive summary

More police forces are planning to make savings from collaboration: but further work is needed to ensure that they are fully exploiting the benefits it can offer.

Introduction

Police collaboration is not a new phenomenon. Forces in England and Wales have always looked to share resources and to outsource some parts of their business in order to increase their operational resilience.

Sharing resources can also result in significant savings. This makes collaboration – whether with another force, the public or private sector – one option available to the police as they work to close the 20% savings requirement outlined in the October 2010 Spending Review (SR).

However, when Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) last asked about this, only 29 of the 43 forces across England and Wales had identified how savings could be made through collaboration. HMIC therefore took a further snapshot of collaborative activity in winter 2011 to see if progress had been made.

This report describes what we found, and includes the projected financial savings from collaborative activity over the spending review period – the first time these comparative data have been collected or published. It also includes case studies of how different forces are collaborating (and with whom); and provides data and analysis to enable forces and their governing bodies to make informed choices when considering the value of future collaborations. We end with some key questions that might be useful to forces in making these decisions.

Definition of collaboration

We defined collaboration as:

“all activity where two or more parties work together to achieve a common goal, which includes inter force activity and collaboration with the public and private sectors, including outsourcing and business partnering.”

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2 This means that projects initiated or developed since November 2011 are not included. In particular, the West Midlands/Surrey Police procurement activity to collaborate with the private sector is not included in our analysis, although reference is made through a case study. The contract value for this activity is estimated to be £1.5bn over seven years for the two forces, with the option to expand for other forces. Should this be successful it could have a major impact on the national collaboration picture
**Scope**

Although the financial challenge for forces is to reduce capital and revenue expenditure, this review focused on the revenue element of force budgets, as this is where the bulk of their expenditure lies.\(^3\) This means that where possible capital-based procurement activity (and procurement often contains a large capital element) has been excluded from our analysis.

We also excluded collaboration activities taking place within a force (e.g. local policing units sharing resources).\(^4\)

While the focus of this review was on the financial benefits, the main report also includes some details of collaborations aimed at increasing resilience in protective services, in recognition of the fact that saving money is not the only reason for working with others. See p.17.

**Key findings**

**Every force has either already committed to realising savings from collaboration, or is planning to do so**

Progress has been made: the use of collaboration is both widespread and increasing. Based on the data provided in November 2011, almost all forces had identified collaborative savings, and every force had either committed to realise these, or was planning to do so (although savings were not always the main reason for collaborating).

Forces identified 543 collaboration projects as either planned (62%), or already up and running (38%). These ranged from small collaborations to large-scale programmes which will transform the way police services are delivered.

The projects can be divided into four models of collaboration:

- More than two-thirds (381) of projects are **collaborations between forces** – for example, Kent Police and Essex Police have joint directorates for serious crime and for information and communication technology (ICT);
- One-fifth (116) of projects are **collaborations with the public sector** – for instance, Hampshire Constabulary is working with the county council and fire and rescue service to collaborate on a range of non-frontline functions;
- Thirty-four are **collaborations with the private sector** – for instance, Lincolnshire Police is working jointly with the private sector for its back and middle office functions;\(^5\)

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\(^3\) ‘Revenue expenditure’ is spending on those day-to-day items such as staffing, supplies and services. ‘Capital expenditure’ on the other hand is spending on items such as vehicles and buildings, that will have a life of several years.

\(^4\) Collaborations in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) are largely internal (for instance, involving cross-borough working) and therefore outside this scope. Given the large size of the force, their internal collaborations are more on the scale of regional collaborations elsewhere, and therefore have been included in the total number of projects given below; but they have been excluded from the savings and yield totals, as the data do not allow the internal and external activity to be separated.
• Twelve projects comprise collaborations with both the private and public sector – for example, Avon and Somerset Constabulary work jointly with a consortium of county and borough councils and private sector organisations to deliver a range of support services.

**Forces estimate that they will save £169m through collaboration by March 2015 (but there is wide variation across England and Wales)**

Forces plan to make £169m\(^6\) of savings from collaboration over the SR period (2011/12–2014/15), which equates to 11% of the SR savings requirement.\(^7\) At a time of reduced funding, this could be a significant help, and puts forces in a good position for future spending reviews.

However, the anticipated savings varied significantly:

• Collaboration offers greater savings in some areas of policing than in others (with a range from 1% to 63% of savings in different functions planned for by March 2015);

• Some forces do not intend to use collaboration to save much money, while one plans to save over 60% of their SR savings requirement in this way, as Graph A on the next page shows.

This variation may be attributable to different operating contexts, the choices forces have made in the past, and how much money each force needs to save. However, there is value in those forces that are making the least savings through collaboration looking to see if there are models working elsewhere that might help them to close their savings requirement and protect frontline services.

They could also look at how the amount they are spending on particular units or functions compares with other forces, as a useful starting point in identifying where the greatest yield might be found. HMIC recognises that collaboration may not provide an immediate solution to finding savings, or be the only way of doing so; and a comparison of unit costs makes no judgement on quality of service. However, we estimate that if all forces reduced their unit costs to those achieved by forces in the lowest quartile, an extra £13m could be saved in Finance across England and Wales, and another £17m in Human Resources (HR).

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\(^5\) 10 additional forces have signed up to the OJEU (Official Journal of the European Union) notice for this project.

\(^6\) £169m is based on data from 41 forces (and so excluded the MPS – see n.3 above – and West Mercia Police, as they could not provide data at this level of detail in November 2011).

\(^7\) This is based on the savings requirement for all forces other than MPS and West Mercia, as calculated by HMIC (using data provided by forces) as part of the 2012 valuing the police programme. See *Policing in Austerity: One year on*. Available from [www.hmic.gov.uk](http://www.hmic.gov.uk).
Graph A: Proportion of the spending review financial gap that will be covered by savings from collaboration by 2014/15 (projected)

By 2014/15, around a sixth of policing will be delivered through collaboration

Savings are planned from across a broad range of policing functions, with all forces collaborating in specialist functions (including scenes of crime work, investigations and public protection), and most doing so in ICT, fleet and vehicle maintenance, and training. A few smaller forces have gone much further, and committed to collaborating in all policing functions apart from neighbourhood policing and response, often ‘sharing’ assistant chief constables in collaborated functions – something that other forces have also put in place.

As a result, by 2014/15 a sixth of the total policing budget will be spent on collaborated police functions – varying little between 2011/12 and 2014/15 – and masking a range of 1%-51%, as the following figure shows.⁸

⁸ The range applies only to those forces that provided spend data.
Graph B: Percentage of 2011/12 NRE projected to be spent in collaborated functions in 2014/15

HMIC found that almost half of all 543 collaborations involve the back office (which includes HR, ICT and Finance). These are set to generate a higher level of savings than other functions; and more importantly, they put forces in the best position to protect their front line, and so maintain the quality of service they provide to the public.

The quality of the financial cases made by forces needs to improve

The current financial climate makes it crucial for forces to focus resource on making sure the decisions they make are financially viable and can be justified.

Good financial planning needs good resourcing – both in terms of people and time – and forces are having to make tough choices to meet their savings requirement. However, many forces were unable to provide clear financial data to establish the financial benefits of the decisions they have made. It is therefore impossible to assess if these were based on sound analysis of projected costs and benefits, or if instead forces have simply gone for the convenient option in terms of the collaborations they have entered into.
Key questions for gauging the cost and service benefits of a proposed collaboration

The primary test for deciding whether or not to embark on a collaboration project has to be the public interest test. This might mean delivering cost savings (efficiency) or, alternatively, better protection for the public (effectiveness).

HMIC did not find that any one model of collaboration was so successful that it could be recommended as a template for all forces to follow. Local priorities and context are always key: there is no one-size-fits-all route to making savings from collaboration. However, our findings did suggest that forces have the best chance of exploiting opportunities for savings if they consider each proposal against the following practical framework of questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the benefits - is there a sound financial case?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What are the risks - to quality of service and the flexible use of resources?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would a different collaboration model be a better fit?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can more be done – how do collaboration savings compare with those in other forces?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do all parties show strong leadership, a willingness to compromise and a shared vision?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What does success look like and how will it be measured?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At the end of this process: is it likely to be worth it or are there other ways of achieving the same (or a better) result?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

HMIC found that forces are developing a clearer picture of how they intend to collaborate, and with whom: but the anticipated savings, level of ambition and approach vary considerably across England and Wales. While there may be good reasons for this inconsistency (such as different operational contexts and local priorities), those forces that are currently saving the least money through collaboration should look to those that are saving the most, to see if there are ways of working that might be a good fit for them.

Our inspection found that the greatest savings are likely to be reaped from sharing support functions; and it would appear that this also offers opportunities to help minimise the reductions to frontline services.

It is important to note that there is a limit to the amount of change that the Service can sustain while still delivering core business. The key aim must therefore be for forces and the Service to understand the benefits and risks attached to the range of options for increasing efficiency, and to make an informed and manageable set of choices in the best interests of the public.

HMIC will continue to assess and report on the progress made by forces as they work to meet the savings requirement.
1. Introduction

The Police Service is facing its biggest financial challenge in a generation. The 2010 Spending Review (SR) cut the central Government police funding grant by 20% for all 43 forces in England and Wales by 2014/15 (in real terms). This represents a savings requirement of approximately £2.4 billion over the four-year period.9

With staff costs accounting for over 80% of police budgets,10 the Service is set to significantly cut its workforce. In Adapting to Austerity (2011), Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) highlighted the need for police efficiency to be ‘transformed’ in order to sustain these reductions while also maintaining or improving the level of services to the public. Collaboration in its broadest sense (see ‘Definitions and scope’, below) is one way of achieving this transformation.

This report

Our main focus is the opportunities collaboration offers to save money, rather than assessing additional resilience and capacity. However, to give a more rounded picture of the possible benefits of joint working, we consider four examples of specialist function collaborations which aim to reduce the risk to the public from serious criminality rather than delivering savings (see p.17 below).

We begin by examining the scope of collaboration and models used by forces and authorities. The report then focuses on the collaboration yield and reviews barriers and enablers to collaboration. The financial implications, based largely on anticipated savings, are considered throughout, with savings and potential gross yield from different types of partnership and from collaborations across different policing functions calculated for the first time.11

Methodology

HMIC first gathered data on collaboration between forces in February 2011. This identified limited levels of ambition and found that force plans were not going far enough to achieve the ‘step change’ in scope and pace needed to drive out savings over the SR period.

In June 2011, we therefore asked forces and authorities to consider the scope for further collaboration. Their revised plans were reviewed by HMIC later in 2011 through ‘Support and

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9 This is equivalent to £2.2billion in 2010/11 prices (which have been used throughout the report, as all collaboration financial data were provided by forces in this way).

10 Based on Police Objective Analysis 2010/11.

11 HMIC’s report Policing in Austerity: One year on, available from www.hmic.gov.uk provides a comprehensive assessment of the entirety of forces’ financial plans for the CSR period and includes an assessment of the effect on quality of service.
Challenge’ visits with chief constables and chairs of police authorities. Forces and authorities submitted their final collaboration plans to HMIC at the end of September, and provided data in November 2011 on the costs and savings for each collaboration project over the SR period.

**Definitions and scope**

We have adopted the following definition of collaboration:

> “all activity where two or more parties work together to achieve a common goal which includes inter force activity and collaboration with the public and private sectors including outsourcing and business partnering.”

This includes collaboration with other forces, with the public sector and with the private sector. It does not however include collaboration activity within a force (for instance, merging units).

In this report, a *project* is:

> “a collaborative arrangement between one or more organisations in one specified business function.”

Although the financial challenge for forces is to reduce capital and revenue expenditure, this review focused on the revenue element of force budgets, as this is where the bulk of their expenditure lies. This means that where possible capital-based procurement activity (and procurement often contains a large capital element) has been excluded from our analysis.

**A note on data**

The size and scope of the individual projects identified by forces inevitably varied, and not all forces were able to provide both costs and savings data. The data do however provide a comprehensive picture of collaboration activity at November 2011.

In addition, we did not look at the nature or estimated savings from collaboration activities taking place within a force (such as between local policing areas).

See Annex 1 (‘Programme methodology’) and Annex 6 (Principles applied to data reconciliation and cleansing) for further detail on the approach taken.

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12 See Annex 2 for a glossary of terms used throughout this report.

13 ‘Revenue expenditure’ is spending on those day-to-day items such as staffing, supplies and services. ‘Capital expenditure’ on the other hand is spending on items such as vehicles and buildings, that will have a life of several years.

14 Collaborations in the Metropolitan Police (MPS) are largely internal (for instance, involving cross-borough working) and are therefore not covered by our definition of collaboration. Given the large size of the force, their internal collaborations are more on the scale of a regional collaboration, and have therefore been included in the total number of collaboration projects (543). However, it has not been possible to separate the internal and external activity within their projects. All financial data from the MPS have therefore been excluded from charts and national totals, but figures have been provided as footnotes where possible.
2. Scope and Integration: The current collaboration landscape

Number of collaboration projects

Overall, the 43 forces across England and Wales provided details of 543 collaboration projects.\(^{15}\) These revealed a complex and patchy national pattern of collaboration, with wide variation in both the number and maturity of projects.

The number of projects per force ranged from seven in South Wales, to 51 in Durham. Twelve forces had 30 or more initiatives at various stages of development. We found no evidence to link large force size with higher numbers of projects. This may be because there are fewer forces of a similar scale for large forces to collaborate with; or that at this size the complexity of projects (particularly between forces) increases. As such, ‘internal’ collaboration may have a stronger focus within these larger forces and may be similar in scope to external collaboration between smaller forces.

This is particularly the case for the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) whose internal change programme is on a scale comparable to regional activity across multiple forces and often involves a mixture of internal and external collaboration. Due to this difference in approach, savings from MPS projects have been excluded from this report as they do not meet our definition.\(^{16}\)

Spread of collaboration projects

As Figures 3 and 4 on the next page show, while there is no clear regional pattern, particular areas of concentrated activity include forces in the Eastern, East Midlands and North East regions along with some more isolated pockets. The number of collaboration projects has also become more evenly spread across the county. In February 2011, about a quarter of forces were responsible for a little over 70% of established collaborations. By November this disparity was less marked, with a quarter of forces accounting for half of established projects.

\(^{15}\) This may overestimate the total number of projects through double counting, since in some cases forces collaborating on the same project provided different data. All analysis is based on 543 projects unless otherwise stated. See Annex 6 for the data principles applied in our analysis.

\(^{16}\) In 2014/15 the MPS anticipates spending almost £538m on collaborated functions with a predicted savings level of £213m over the CSR period. This includes both internal and external collaborations based on 25 projects across a range of functions.
Figure 3: Police Force Collaboration Relationships (February 2011)

February 2011

Figure 4: Police Force Collaboration Relationships (November 2011)

November 2011
Maturity of collaboration projects

The 543 projects identified by forces include some at the earliest stage of being scoped, and others which were already up and running.

Figure 5: National collaboration projects by stage (November 2011)

A comparison of data from November 2011 with what forces provided in February 2011 shows that use of collaboration has developed and progressed over the year. Nearly two thirds (63%) of projects were at the scoping stage in February 2011; by November 2011, the majority (61%) either had agreed business cases, or had been established.17

In particular, collaborative arrangements in the South West, Wales, the East Midlands and the North West have developed and broadened between February and November. However, for about a third of forces the overwhelming majority of projects are in their earlier stages and yet to be established, while for West Mercia, Cumbria, Lancashire and Cleveland the majority are already up and running. Few forces have an even balance of both pre and post implementation projects (see Figure 6).

17 February 2011 data were collected in a different format and are therefore not directly comparable. Out Programme Methodology at Annex 1 includes further details.
**Proportion of business delivered through collaboration projects**

Forces were asked to supply data on the amount of money they would be spending on collaborated functions over the next four years (2011/12 - 2014/15).

Overall, between 16% and 17% of the total policing net revenue expenditure (NRE)\(^\text{18}\) will be spent on collaborated functions in England and Wales in 2014/15, which does not vary significantly from the 2011/12 figures. Put another way, about **a sixth of policing business** is expected to be delivered collaboratively over the next four years.\(^\text{19}\)

This figure conceals wide variation between forces (see Figure 7 below), with data showing that they plan to deliver between 1% and 51% of their business through collaboration by 2014/15.\(^\text{20}\) Hertfordshire and Cambridgeshire Constabularies and Norfolk and Suffolk Constabularies will be delivering over a third of their business collaboratively, while Bedfordshire Police plans to deliver just over half of their policing services through collaboration by 2014/15.

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\(^{18}\) NRE is used to avoid the double counting caused by cross charging agreements between forces inherent in collaborative arrangements. These figures do not include MPS.

\(^{19}\) A sixth of policing delivered collaboratively is based on the amount spent on collaborated functions which is equivalent to approximately £1.3bn (excluding MPS) by 2014/15. The amount spent on regional specialist crime units that have been established for at least a year is approximately £44m. See also p.17 below.

\(^{20}\) The range applies only to those forces that provided spend data.
Despite this variation, we identified that the forces which have embedded collaboration most extensively have a number of factors in common:

- they are usually small to medium sized, with a lower than average net revenue expenditure per 1,000 population compared with their peers; and
- they are likely to have well-established relationships with forces in close geographic proximity which often share similar demand profiles.\footnote{I.e. share similar crime profiles and demands on their service.}

Forces that share these characteristics but have not so far embedded collaboration across their functions should therefore look to see whether they are well placed to do the same.

**Anticipated savings from collaboration projects**

Overall, forces anticipate achieving savings of **£169 million** from collaboration over the four years of the SR period. Only £6m (4% of total savings) of this is from projects based purely on shared locations.\footnote{See further p.31 below.} About three quarters is from projects that either have agreed business
cases or are already established. We found no clear pattern between level of savings as a percentage of net revenue expenditure (NRE) and size of force.

The reliance individual forces are placing on collaboration to reduce their SR savings requirement also varies significantly (see Figure 8). While some are not using collaboration at all for this purpose, others are relying heavily on it. Four forces are expecting collaboration to deliver at least a quarter of the total savings needed to fill their SR gap, with one relying on collaboration to deliver around half.

Figure 8: Proportion of the SR financial gap that will be covered by savings from collaboration

In February 2011, many forces were unable to clearly articulate the level of savings they anticipated from collaboration. Follow-up work for this report in November 2011 showed that more forces were including financial considerations as part of their assessment. However, while progress has been made, there remains room for improvement.

Wider benefits
Not all collaborations are aimed at making cashable savings; in 2008, HMIC highlighted their value in meeting regional demand from serious and organised criminality.\(^{23}\)

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HMIC has identified that around 30 of the projects covered in this review are based on largely regional specialist crime units that have been established for at least a year, and have as a primary objective of increasing resilience and capacity, with cashable savings a secondary consideration.

The savings from these, amount to £2.6m by 2014/15 or 1.6% of the total savings identified by this review. However, the focus on public protection allows forces to respond more effectively to serious criminality and other specialist demands and reduce the risk to the public. The four case studies that follow highlight these wider benefits and particularly how the public are being better protected.24

Assessing the effectiveness of collaboration

Protective Services Collaboration: Benefits

Delivering protective services collaboratively was initially developed by forces as a means of increasing resilience through improved capacity and capability – highlighted by HMIC in Closing the Gap (2005) as risks to effectively protecting the public.

In 2009, HMIC’s follow-up report Get Smart: Planning to Protect found that some forces in England and Wales still had serious weaknesses in how they planned to protect the public from serious and organised crime. We therefore recommended greater collaboration and consistency across the police service.

How the police service protects the public from serious harm is not always visible while the impact of not doing so can be significant. HMIC has therefore looked at four collaborations and how these aim to keep the public safe through:

- provided greater capacity to meet and resource demand – both over time and space;
- reducing risk through increased capability and shared intelligence and routine access to experts in handling specialist crimes; and
- preventing and detecting more crimes through ‘pooled’ expertise and resources resulting in fewer victims of crime and more offenders brought to justice.

The case studies identify the benefits being realised from established collaborations aiming to reduce the risk to the public from certain types of criminal activity and both increasing and changing demand.

organised crime. Available from www.hmic.gov.uk

24 ‘Protective services’ is the term used to describe the following specialist functions: counter terrorism and extremism; serious organised and cross border crime; civil contingencies and emergency planning; critical incident management; major crime (homicide); public order and strategic roads policing.
Case Study 1

Cleveland & Durham Specialist Operations Unit

In April 2011 the two forces expanded their established collaborative arrangements through a joint Specialist Operations Unit. The key drivers included wanting to reduce abstractions from frontline duties, a reduction in firearms officers and process improvements.

The original police firearms operations remit widened and now includes firearms training, collision investigation, motorcycles, traffic management and safety cameras. Some other functions were considered but offered insufficient operational benefit and resilience gains.

The forces now benefit from joint firearms and roads policing resources with the capability and capacity to meet the operational demands of both forces. In addition to providing the two-force armed response vehicle (ARV) function, the firearms unit also provides specialist firearms support across both forces.

Benefits include increased cooperation and sharing of assets, joint training, joint pre-planned operations and combined firearms Command and Control.

Case Study 2

Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire & Hertfordshire – Joint Firearms Unit

Building on a well-established two-force model, Cambridgeshire joined this collaboration in April 2012. The new unit combines firearms resources for all three forces to deliver operational and training services across the counties, including at Luton Airport.

The forces benefit from increased capacity and greater flexibility in deployment, facilitated by a common shift pattern. Greater access to the skills and expertise of specialist officers is supported by coordinated tasking through a single, dedicated function. The collaboration provides greater resilience for the training function and improved business continuity arrangements through access to more facilities (armouries and training centres).

While the benefits of increased capacity and capability from established collaborations are more easily evidenced, performance improvements particularly in terms of preventing crime are more challenging – even more so when collaborations are in the relatively early stages.

The following two case studies highlight some of the early performance benefits from collaborations in these specialist areas – achieved through more effective recovery of criminal assets and dismantling and reducing the harm that can be caused by organised crime groups.
Case Study 3
The East Midlands Special Operations Unit

This regional collaboration provides a special operations unit across five forces in the East Midlands. The multi-disciplined unit incorporates Major and Serious Organised Crime, Intelligence, Counter Terrorism and Forensic Services, allowing the five forces access to a multi million pound shared asset.

The forces benefit from an increased and expert resource pool (combining staff and skills from across the region), frequent working across regional boundaries (providing a better match for the activities of cross border criminals) and access to a shared intelligence base through a single command. These provide greater capacity and increased resilience to manage demand and improve capability through sharing of skills and expertise as well as assets and equipment.

These improvements have translated into various operational benefits. For example, since April 2010 the East Midlands Regional Asset Recovery Team (RART) has achieved a substantial increase in performance, with confiscation orders totalling £1.5m.

In September 2011 the unit was expanded to include the East Midlands Special Operations Unit - Major Crime (EMSOU-MC) Unit. In the four months following, the Major Crime Unit dealt with 31 new enquiries, including more than 20 murders. These were spread across the East Midlands area and required a number of cross border deployments between the five forces – enabled by their collaboration.

Case Study 4
Kent & Essex Serious Crime Directorate

The joint serious crime directorate combines more than 1,100 officers and staff who are dedicated to tackling serious and organised crime. Operational benefits include increased capability and capacity to manage high risk offending and thereby improve the protection of the public. This is supported by improved intelligence flows both between the two boundaries and with the Metropolitan Police and other agencies (including SOCA). This proved especially useful in the period of public disorder in Summer 2011.

The joint directorate has the ability to deploy a greater number of staff and respond more effectively to peaks of demand. It also benefits from an intelligence capability seven days a week, 24 hours a day (which had not previously been in place across both forces).

Performance highlights of the joint directorate (for 2011/12) - all of which exceed target, include a total of 53 organised crime groups disrupted or dismantled against a target of 40, criminal confiscation orders of £6.89m (against a target of £4.04m), forfeiture of proceeds of crime totalling £860k (against a target of £800k) and a total of 319 offenders charged with Class A drug supply offences.
In November 2011 the Home Office issued the shadow *Strategic Policing Requirement* (SSPR) with the intention that this would inform the planning arrangements for police forces and police authorities for 2012/13. Later this year, HMIC will complete an assessment of the national capability of the police service to protect the public and to prevent serious crime. This will deal with aspects of policing that cannot be delivered at a local level and will assess how forces and other partners are working together to tackle serious crime and national threats.

**Making savings**

Whilst acknowledging that savings are not necessarily the only driver of collaboration, the current period of austerity and reduced police budgets make the relationship between the number of collaborations and the savings they generate an important consideration. By comparing the extent of collaborative activity with anticipated savings levels, it is possible to assess the effectiveness of force collaborations.

Overall, no clear relationship exists between the number of collaborations and the level of savings expected from them. About two thirds of forces fall within a broadly similar group where low to moderate activity generates a relatively low level of savings as a proportion of 2011/12 NRE. However, the remaining forces display different patterns:

- Some outlined a low number of collaborations and were either not anticipating these delivering any savings (or very low savings), or were unable to identify what the savings might be;

- Others anticipated delivering a comparatively high level of savings from a low to medium number of collaborations; and

- Some described a lot of projects which result in a much higher savings level than most other forces – Norfolk and Suffolk being prime examples.

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25 NRE rather than GRE is used. See footnote 19, p.15 for further details.

26 As at November 2011, Staffordshire did not identify savings and West Mercia did not identify savings at project level while GMP, West Midlands and Cumbria have only reported very low savings from their collaborations. In some cases this may be due to the size of force or a cautionary approach to quantifying financial returns or that collaboration was established for a different purpose than savings delivery (i.e. risk and resilience within protective services). Equally, this does not account for progress made since November 2011 when the data were captured.
Collaboration Case Study 5

Norfolk and Suffolk
Established collaboration in a two-force partnership

Norfolk and Suffolk started collaborative working nine years ago with Police Investigation Centres. In 2009 they instigated a Business Support Review (BSR) to remove cost to maximise frontline policing. Within months of this review the Spending Review was announced, presenting an opportunity to work on a joint BSR and wider collaboration. In May 2010 a Preferred Partnership Strategy was agreed.

The forces and authorities established a Programme Management Office (PMO) to coordinate delivery of savings and two internal change programmes. The collaboration includes all functions except local policing and control rooms.

The programme is divided into portfolios; Business Support Review (16 collaboration projects), Operational Collaboration (4 collaboration projects), Protective Services collaboration (14 collaboration projects). In addition there are enabling projects including converging HR policies and key ICT systems.

The programme is designed to deliver a significant proportion of Norfolk’s and Suffolk’s SR savings requirement. The activity has predominantly focused on middle and back office and this is largely where savings are being made. Sequencing of projects has been determined by where the largest cash savings could be made and the complexity of change, helping the authorities’ weight the savings required in years 1 and 2. If significant ICT changes were required this led to projects being sequenced towards the end of the programme.

Elements such as a joint HR management team are in place. The Protective Services portfolio is not heavily reliant on IT and the majority of savings are due to be delivered in years 1 and 2. Procurement issues are driven by existing contracts and dates for renegotiation. Resources have been retained to resource the PMO and deliver the savings. Thereafter these resources will be reduced.

Both forces and authorities are clear that they do not employ a lead or host force model. Two joint ACCs have been appointed, one to lead the Collaboration Programme and the other the Protective Services portfolio. Joint management teams have been appointed to lead collaborated functions. Pay and conditions have not been harmonised. A job evaluation project is almost complete and will inform pay remodelling work in June 2012.

The establishment of the PMO early in the programme has identified significant savings, 68% of which will be delivered within the first two years of the SR. The cost of the joint PMO was also agreed at an early stage. Key decisions and Section 23 agreements were put in place early and the focus has been on the delivery of savings during the SR. In addition both forces made reserves available to meet costs associated with change.

The formula applied to apportion costs is as follows; Norfolk Constabulary 56%, Suffolk Constabulary 44%. This was calculated by comparing force net revenue budgets, supplemented by comparative demand profiling. Force savings are calculated by comparing the contribution to the future cost of a collaborated function with their individual costs of the function in its non collaborated form.
Nature of collaboration projects
Forces outlined projects across a broad range of functions, with all or the majority of forces collaborating in four areas:

- 43 forces described collaboration projects involving specialist functions, including scenes of crime activity, crime investigations and public protection;
- 41 forces listed information and communication technology projects;
- 36 forces outlined fleet and vehicle maintenance projects; and
- 35 forces described training projects.27

In terms of number of projects, ICT and specialist crime were the most common: but no one business area has a monopoly, with collaboration occurring across varied and multiple functions.

Collaboration involving the frontline versus projects focused on support functions
In Demanding Times (May 2011), HMIC identified the importance of protecting the front line and of reorganising support function resources in order to optimise the accessibility and visibility of these police officers to the public.

Using the November 2011 data, we therefore compared the number of collaboration projects involving the frontline with the number concentrated on support functions. We then broke this down by the maturity of each project (see Figure 9 on the next page). The results suggest a continuing trend (at a national level) of forces scoping collaboration projects that involve support functions rather than the front line.

27 Functions are defined by annual data return (ADR) categories. Annex 3 has the full definition for each ADR category.
This finding is supported by further analysing the stage of project development and using the *Demanding Times* categories\(^{28}\) to assess if there was any change in where forces were focusing their collaborative activity between February and November 2011 (see Figures 10 and 11\(^{29}\)), which shows again that there were more collaboration projects focusing on the middle office, with only just over a third of projects focusing on front line policing.\(^{30}\)

The back office is now the preferred area for collaboration accounting for nearly half of all projects, with only just over one in ten collaborations in visible policing which include traffic, firearms and dogs.

This is likely to be partly a result of specialist function collaborations now being fully exploited (all forces are collaborating in this way) with attention now turning to back office collaborations which have increased in volume and are evenly balanced between already established and new early stage projects for the future.

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\(^{28}\) HMIC (2011) *Demanding Times* proposed a definition of the police frontline. This includes the categorisation of police business functions into visible, specialist, process management, process support and back office. The frontline is a mix of some of those categories. See Annex 4.

\(^{29}\) In these figures, where projects feature in more than one *Demanding Times* category the project is shown in the category in which the highest proportion falls.

\(^{30}\) The front line comprises “those who are in every day contact with the public and who directly intervene to keep people safe and enforce the law”. For a full definition see the Glossary at Annex 2.
Figure 10: Collaboration projects by stage and *Demanding Times* categories (February 2011)

**Figure 11:** Collaboration projects by stage and *Demanding Times* categories (November 2011)
While the back office will account for almost half the total savings being delivered through collaborations by the end of the SR, collaborations in visible policing and middle office process management tend to focus less heavily on savings as they include those established at an earlier stage based on increasing resilience and capacity.

The evidence suggests that forces are increasingly looking at opportunities to protect the front line, through not only now preferring to collaborate in other business areas, but by making savings away from the frontline. 32

This emphasis on back office savings gives forces a better opportunity to protect, or even enhance, frontline numbers if they so choose.

31 Savings in this chart total £161m as they exclude projects where data were not broken down by function.

32 Total support functions are generating 63% of savings (£100.8m). See Annex 4 for full details of definitions.
3. Models of collaboration

Forces and authorities use a number of different terms for their collaboration projects, often used interchangeably and inconsistently. For the purposes of this report, a collaboration typology has been compiled to provide greater clarity and ensure a consistent framework for analysis (see Annex 5).

The 543 projects reported by forces fit into four main models:

- Force to force collaboration (between two or more forces, or at a regional or national level);
- Force and public sector collaboration;
- Force and private sector collaboration; and
- Force and both private and public sector collaboration.

Each of these models is described in more detail below.

Number of forces collaborating by model

While all forces were engaged in force to force collaboration (see Figure 13), about two-thirds (28) were also using at least one other model. Of these, only Lincolnshire Police was collaborating solely with the private sector.

Figure 13: Profile of force activity by model
Number of collaboration projects by model
Over two-thirds of the total 543 collaboration projects were just between forces. Projects involving the public sector account for about a fifth of all collaboration initiatives, while those with the private sector were the least common.

Figure 14: Collaboration projects by force and model (November 2011)

Anticipated savings by model
Force to force collaborations are anticipated to make by far the highest savings, comprising about three-quarters of the total savings expected from joint working (see Figure 15, overleaf). Collaboration with the private sector has the next highest savings, with about a tenth of the total.

Figure 15: Collaboration savings anticipated by 2014/15
**Force to force collaboration**

As we have seen, force to force collaboration not only has the highest volume of projects but also has the highest total savings of £132m, which accounts for three-quarters of the total savings forces have identified.

While there is a clear rationale for force to force collaboration to predominate for the already established projects (the majority of which are regional), the evidence suggests that this preference for force to force collaboration is continuing – even with the most recent projects still under development.³³

This is not altogether surprising:

- Force to force collaboration is the most accessible option, as forces share the same core purpose and greater interoperability.
- All forces are faced with a SR challenge which is heavily frontloaded. Forces are therefore more likely to look to each other as they face the same imperative and challenging timescales.
- Shared experiences through regional structures and previous collaborative partnerships for protective services make other forces a natural first port of call.³⁴
- Some frontline policing services can only be delivered by police forces and so some collaborative activity will always involve force to force collaboration.
- Sections 22A to 23I of the Police Act (1996)³⁵ refer to collaboration agreements, while Section 24 creates a statutory footing for working collaboratively through shared operational deployment (commonly referred to as mutual aid). This provides a tried-and-tested framework for accessing resources and support.

In February 2011, 35 out of 42³⁶ forces had established collaborations in protective services while only 12 were collaborating in other business areas. While force to force collaboration remains dominant regardless of stage, by November 2011 this focus was shifting, with about a third of projects concentrating on visible and specialist functions, and back office collaboration becoming increasingly important.

**Number of forces involved in force to force collaborations**

Four in ten force to force collaboration projects involve just two forces, with the second most common set up seeing forces collaborating across an entire region (this model comprises about three in ten force to force collaboration projects). Apart from in these regional

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³³ About seven in 10 projects being scoped are force to force.
³⁴ Following HMIC’s *Closing the Gap* (2005) report and the 2007 Protective Services Programme Inspection, collaboration with other forces was seen as an essential tool in addressing the continuing gaps in the capability and capacity of key operational policing services.
³⁵ As amended by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2012.
³⁶ MPS were excluded from this assessment.
collaborations, the number of projects decreases as the number of forces involved increases, highlighting a preference for a smaller number of partners.

This may be because:

- two parties are more likely to share common goals, borders, aspects of geography and criminal activity than a wider range of forces; or
- trust and relationships built on a strong foundation are key enablers and the fewer forces involved or the more established relationships are, the easier these are to sustain.  

Collaboration with one other force and across a region can occur together. For example, Cheshire Constabulary collaborates with other forces in the North West region and also with Northamptonshire Police, while North Wales Police is collaborating both within the North West region and with Wales as a whole. In addition, what begins as a two-force collaboration can expand over time in order to increase efficiency and widen the benefits (see case study 6 below). Indeed, some of the more recent projects have been set up to deliberately accommodate this kind of expansion. One example is the police multi-force shared service developed by Cheshire Constabulary and Northamptonshire Police collaborating on their back office function which is open to other forces. Another is Athena, a collaborative approach to buying an IT system and agreeing to share it and use it in the same way. The forces within the Eastern region and Kent Police have signed up, and at least another 15 are considering joining.

**Collaboration Case Study No. 6**

**Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire and Cambridgeshire**

**Force to Force Collaboration**

**Introduction of a third partner to an existing partnership**

Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire began collaborating in 2007, and by 2009 the two forces had collaborated on six areas of Protective Services, delivering annual cashable savings of £2.3m. By the beginning of the Spending Review period Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire had either implemented or were in the process of implementing 13 collaborated units, (including procurement with Cambridgeshire), delivering overall annual savings of £4.4m.

The potential impact of Cambridgeshire joining the partnership was a risk to the stability of the two-force collaboration but this was managed by effective negotiation between the three Chief Constables. The benefits of Cambridgeshire joining the alliance were clear and lessons learned by Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire assisted Cambridgeshire personnel to begin working alongside their colleagues.

In May 2011, the three chief constables and chairs of the police authorities signed a Strategic Alliance agreement with clear aims. These identified cashable savings of £15–20m annually by the end of 2015/16, improved effectiveness, resilience, non-cashable efficiencies and customer service across all three counties as well as processes which are fit for purpose across all three forces, for the next 3-10 years. The Strategic Alliance includes all policing services, with the exception of local policing and elements of protecting vulnerable people which lend themselves to locally based delivery with partner

37 Chapter 5 ‘Barriers and Enablers’ has further details.
agencies. The aim is that all elements of protective services, operational support and organisational support will be collaborated by the end of 2015/16. The three chief constables have agreed ‘ways of working’ for the Alliance, which enables forces to retain their own identities.

As this collaboration is based upon neither a host nor a lead force model, an appropriate governance framework has been created to ensure all forces and authorities have strategic input and decision making ability. In April 2011, an Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) was appointed to head protective services across all three forces and from 1 December, a Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) took responsibility across all three forces for Professional Standards. All other functions are currently headed by the respective ACPO officers in each force; this will continue to be the case as new proposals are developed across the Alliance.

Other enablers include, a dedicated collaboration team with agreed terms of reference, a shared vision and outcomes (with appreciation of the differing financial and organisational positions of each force) and construction of sound and robust business cases which have given Chief Officers and Police Authorities confidence that agreed Section 23 working arrangements are sound.

### Force to public sector collaboration model

About a fifth of collaboration projects (21%) are with public sector organisations, including local authorities (by far the most frequent), the Fire and Rescue Service, criminal justice agencies, the National Health Service (for example Primary Care Trusts and health boards) and universities.

No force is collaborating solely with the public sector. Those who are entering into collaborations beyond inter-force are more likely to opt for the public sector than the private sector if they only choose one or the other (14 forces versus one). There are a number of factors which influence public sector popularity including locality; existing relationships; the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) for a partnership approach to tackling crime and disorder; and similar SR saving targets.

The pace of public sector collaboration is similar to that of force to force collaboration, with projects at a similar stage of maturity. Just under half of all public sector collaboration projects are already in progress, with about a fifth established for more than a year.

Overall, collaborations with the public sector account for only £10.5m of the total collaboration savings, far less than the proportion of projects they represent. This highlights that projects either have no or a low level of revenue savings.

This is explained by the strong emphasis on shared locations, in order to reduce costs and increase public accessibility. A number of forces collaborate with the public sector through shared locations, including the MPS and the City of London Police, and Surrey Police. Additionally some forces such as Warwickshire are sharing front counter services with their county council and Greater Manchester Police (GMP) is locating its neighbourhood teams with the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA).

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38 These 116 projects with the public sector do not include the private sector in any form.

39 The focus of this report has been on revenue savings, as detailed further on p.11.
However, sharing locations does not appear to deliver a high level of revenue savings as they are likely to disproportionately impact on capital costs. On the other hand, they do present the opportunity for a ‘quick win’, and the basis for a strong partnership approach.

Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of collaborative ventures with the public sector are non-frontline: use of buildings and ICT account for more than a quarter (29%) of this type. In fact, far more collaboration projects with public sector organisations focus on use of buildings and estate than those between forces. This model makes up the majority of all buildings and estate collaboration projects with this function accounting for just over 5% of the total collaborations reported by forces in this study.

**Force to private sector and force to public and private sector collaboration models**

Nearly one in 10 collaboration projects (46) involve the private sector, with 14 forces engaged in one form or another. Based on the data provided by forces, only one of these 14 does not also collaborate with the public sector.

Thirty-four projects only involve the private sector. They include collaboration in back office functions (such as ICT and finance), and in the middle office (such as custody, call handling, intelligence and fraud). A few force to private sector projects are of a substantial size, with baseline budgets between £600k and £8.6m and significant outsourcing or shared services. Only three forces provided full savings data for their planned or established collaborations involving the private sector.

Collaborations combining the private and public sector in one project appear to be at a later stage of development although with only 12 projects of this type conclusions are difficult to draw. One example is ‘Southwest One’, which was launched in 2008 and involves Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Somerset County Council, Taunton Dean Borough Council and IBM. These organisations established a ten-year joint venture company which aims to provide shared services for human resources (HR), finance, ICT, procurement and other corporate services. Just over 500 staff have been seconded from the Constabulary to the joint venture company. The shared service model aims to make savings and improve capacity and capability through service improvement, shared accommodation and a contact management strategy.

**Business partnering and outsourcing**

Forces reported private sector collaborations with a number of organisations which included examples of both outsourcing and business partnering. There is a range of terms to

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40 This range is based on private sector projects which were used in the calculation of yield (i.e. that had both costs and savings data provided).

41 Organisations included Capita, Microsoft, Steria, G4S, IBM, Heathrow and City of London Airports, the Association of British Insurers and the Trafford Shopping Centre
describe both, often used interchangeably, although some characteristics differ (see Figure 16).

**Figure 16: Key Characteristics – Business Partnering & Outsourcing in Policing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business Partnering</th>
<th>Outsourcing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Working with a “partner” in the delivery of a service</td>
<td>• Contracting out of a business function to a supplier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supports a transformational approach</td>
<td>• Sole responsibility is transferred to the supplier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Can be as a customer / supplier relationship</td>
<td>• Risk borne by supplier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Responsibilities likely to be shared with partner</td>
<td>• Often for technology / customer contact functions (IT / telephony)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Risks retained or shared</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A large proportion of the private sector collaborations being scoped are in Lincolnshire, which is facing a large SR reduction compared to the national picture. Their anticipated return from force to private collaboration projects of just over 12% over a ten-year period will only go some way to closing their SR savings requirement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaboration Case Study No. 7</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lincolnshire</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collaboration with the private sector</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In response to the SR, the force established the Policing Change Programme in June 2010. The first project was commissioned with the objective to achieve a balanced budget in 2011/12, which would enable a planning period of 4 year to build a strategy to deliver the level of savings required by 2014/15. This project delivered over £3.9m through process and structure review, mainly within back and mid-office functions. This was achieved having minimal impact on the front line. In autumn 2010 four further projects were commissioned, one of which was to explore the feasibility of a private sector strategic partnership.

Following market testing Lincolnshire Police Authority approved the business case to deliver a strategic partnership approach in March 2011, using an accelerated procurement process which was led by the DCC (now chief constable). As well as delivering the required savings the Authority also wanted to transform the service, with particular focus on the back and middle office, limit the impact on the public during the transition period and maintain or improve performance for the ten year period. Ensuring that the bidders were clear on their objectives enabled them to shape their solution to meet the Authority needs.

A fundamental requirement of each bidder was to meet the affordability target range set by the Authority. An inability to reach the range could result in a failed bid (as price contributed 30% to the overall marks awarded at evaluation). There was also a requirement to start delivering savings from 2012/13. Owing to this requirement, the force adopted an eight month escalated and extensive procurement process with the service planned to transfer to the partner in April 2012.
The Authority was keen to avoid a conflict with regional collaboration. Bidders had to ensure that any solution did not conflict with known regional collaboration plans.

Planning was enhanced by engaging with external advisors who had experience in other public sector procurement contracts and public sector organisations.

Staff had already experienced significant recent change and there was a resistance to the private sector to be addressed. Frequent communication and offering staff the opportunity to gain an understanding of the reasons behind this approach and to ask questions removed some of the mystery of the process.

The contract is worth £229m and over a ten year period will yield more than £28m of guaranteed savings, together with significant ICT and buildings infrastructure investment that would not otherwise have been possible. It has wide scope, including custody, criminal justice and control room services.

In addition to the guaranteed cashable yield of just over 12% the force is making significant savings in budgets they retain and which the partner manages and monitors on their behalf.

Following a period of transition, the contract went live on 1 April 2012. After almost two months of operation, at the time of writing, a planned ‘soft landing’ of transferred services has been achieved with several key milestones already delivered. The contract is accessible to others, by two different routes and Lincolnshire Police is currently discussing this with a number of forces.

*Business partnering “goes beyond traditional outsourcing, by drawing on the skills, expertise, technology and innovation of the private sector to support end-to-end transformation and service delivery within the organisation”*.42

Supported by the Home Office, Surrey and West Midlands Police are two very different forces exploring the opportunities through a procurement exercise to form a partnership with a private sector service supplier. This represents an early example of business partnering; with few projects of this type reported to HMIC in November 2011.

**Collaboration Case Study No. 8**

**Surrey and West Midlands**

**Business Partnering for Police Programme supported by the Home Office**

Surrey and West Midlands Police and Police Authorities, supported by the Home Office are exploring the potential benefits of forming a partnership with the private sector in order to improve services to the public and reduce costs. Both forces have already undertaken significant structural and process change and have explored many options within the limits of present resources.

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42 This definition is used by the Surrey / West Midlands business partnering programme.
Collaboration between two forces which are different in geography, demographics, policing requirements and size indicates that those factors are not necessarily barriers to effective collaboration and transformation. For Surrey the notion of wide scale transformation and innovation in delivering some services with the private sector would be more difficult to achieve alone. Entering into the programme with West Midlands has provided significant benefits to enhance the options for the future.

The procurement process, launched in January and expected to conclude in 2013, sits within a broader policing agenda that aims to: reduce crime and disorder; improve satisfaction with service delivery; bring offenders to justice and prevent future offending; and increase trust and confidence in policing.

The three broad outcomes for the programme are:

Customer and citizen-driven service

To keep pace with the demands and preferences of customers, utilising skills and capabilities currently beyond reach. Improved intelligence of customer needs – alongside better use of information leading to more targeted, high quality and effective service. The relationship between information and action will be radically improved.

Enhanced performance

In future, any activities undertaken which are not core police activities must be delivered as efficiently as possible. Relentless focus on efficiency and productivity will release resources to focus on front-line activities.

Within our means

Both forces need to guarantee reduced delivery costs in the medium term to prepare for the current and next CSR. The procurement process will test market capacity and if the case for private sector involvement is compelling.

Any partner will need to share the policing ethos. In adding capability they must strengthen the core policing role ensuring alignment with public service values, especially the sanctity of the office of constable and policing with consent.

The PCC will take the final decision whether to proceed.

Business Partnering is part of a wider programme which includes collaborating with other forces such as Sussex and Staffordshire, and exploring opportunities to develop partnerships with other public bodies. The forces may need a combination of options to meet the financial challenges and continue to improve service delivery. The forces will be engaging with public and staff to better understand their views on these options.

Delivery and location of collaborated resources

It is for forces and authorities to decide both the most appropriate collaboration model and their preferred method of organising and locating collaborated resources. This is particularly the case for force to force collaboration where such decisions are likely to be based on individual circumstances and preferences, with evidence of a variety of different approaches in play.

This section describes some of the set ups currently being used. While this report does not evaluate the outcomes from different models and approaches, and so is unable to conclude with a recommendation that one particular set up is the route to success, our intention is to
give forces information on the range of options available to them and to help them decide the best way to maximise savings from collaboration.

**Lead and host forces**

A common approach for inter force collaboration is to appoint a *lead force*. Resources predominantly remain within forces on their original terms and conditions, while the delivery or development of the collaborated function is led by one force. The South West region (Avon and Somerset, Dorset, Devon and Cornwall, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire) employs a lead force model for certain collaborated functions, with Wiltshire Police leading on ICT convergence for the region, and Avon and Somerset Constabulary on harmonised firearms, firearms training and learning and development.

Other approaches which retain resources within each individual force include assigning an established post in one force to lead on a collaborated function, establishing joint command and control posts, or both.

In Norfolk and Suffolk a single head of department leads the collaborated function, supported by a joint management team. Collaborated functions across Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire assign one ACPO officer to oversee a function across all three forces.

Kent and Essex's Serious Crime Directorate has a joint Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) lead with their single procurement unit employing a joint head of department across both forces, as well as a joint head of ICT. Norfolk and Suffolk have joint ACCs for protective services and for their collaboration programme.

In some regions, a particular role has been created with sole responsibility for collaboration. The East Midlands has recruited a Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) specifically to co-ordinate and lead collaboration across the region, while Bedfordshire Police and Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire Constabularies have appointed a single Collaboration Programme Director.

Within the Yorkshire and Humberside collaboration, an overarching DCC is responsible for operational teams as well as the collaboration programme team, with regional governance procedures in place across the force chief officer teams and their police authorities. This means that delivery is not a single force responsibility, but is shared regionally.

In contrast to resources remaining in their original force, a host force approach brigades the total collaborated resources within a single force, under the same terms and conditions. The host force then provides the function for each of the collaborative partners. This involves the transfer of staff to the host force through Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment regulations (TUPE). Thames Valley Police and Hampshire Constabulary have already put this approach in place for ICT and information management functions, with Cheshire Constabulary and Northamptonshire Police planning to replicate the model for their back office collaboration (currently at implementation stage).

The Cheshire/Northamptonshire example illustrates that sharing a geographic border need not be a prerequisite for host force delivery. While some operational functions can only be
shared by neighbouring forces, the Service should still consider all options with an open mind.

The key differences between lead and host force models are outlined below.

**Figure 17: Key characteristics – Lead force model versus host force model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead force</th>
<th>Host force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Staff remain employed by their home force</td>
<td>• Staff are transferred to “host” force employment (TUPE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Terms and conditions for staff can vary</td>
<td>• Common terms and conditions for staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Lead” force responsible for delivery of the given function</td>
<td>• “Host” force responsible for delivery of the given function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Quicker to implement</td>
<td>• Harmonisation requires greater investment (time and cost)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lead force model has the benefits of being quicker to implement than the host force model, and the collaborating forces retain their individual resources. However, the host force model has the advantage of increased flexibility, with staff employed on identical terms and conditions. The cost of harmonising pay is therefore met at an early stage in the collaboration process.

**Collaboration Case Study No. 9**

**Hampshire Constabulary and Thames Valley Police**

**Host Force Collaboration with staff transferred under TUPE arrangements**

Collaboration between Hampshire (HC) and Thames Valley Police (TVP) commenced in 2007 and initially focused on ICT, as it was considered an enabler to collaboration. A joint head of ICT was appointed in 2008 and in 2009 projects to create a ‘Joint Operations Unit’ and a single ‘Information Management’ (IM) department were commissioned. The sequencing of work has been dictated by financial, operational and deliverability considerations.

TVP is the host force for the delivery model for ICT and IM units. As such staff contracts have transferred to TVP under TUPE arrangements. HR, procurement, finance and legal support will be provided by the host force. Direction and priorities are set by a Joint Operations Board with representation from both forces. It is jointly chaired and decisions are made by both the TVP Director of Information and the HC DCC.

TUPE transfer arrangements have not led to significant delays in implementing collaboration arrangements, despite significant project management planning and discipline. A considerable amount of work is involved in completing the transfers, including early engagement with support services. Generally, staff have welcomed the protection provided by a TUPE transfer.

Of greatest concern are the changes to the service post transfer, with particular emphasis on opportunities to be redeployed if posts are affected by reorganisation. Engagement with Staff Association representatives early in the planning stage and throughout the implementation has been essential to ensure that staff, affected by the transfer understand how their interests are being safeguarded.
Staff contractual arrangements have been a significant challenge. There are differences in pay arrangements and levels between some HC staff and TVP staff and for new roles post any restructure. Pay arrangements have been reviewed and staff are being consulted about changes to support the new structure to ensure that it will be sustainable. The aim is for all staff to move to the TVP terms and conditions of service, with appropriate transitional arrangements. This proposal is included in current staff consultations. The benefits of collaboration include financial savings from a significant reduction in headcount (60+ posts for ICT).
4. The financial perspective: Value and Yield

This chapter looks at forces’ anticipated savings from the planned and established collaboration projects they provided details of in November 2011. In order to give forces practical help in deciding which projects to progress, and to gauge the value of future proposals, we then analyse the savings from different models of collaboration, and from different areas of police business. The chapter continues with a discussion of considerations that might help forces to focus on projects which stand the best chance of driving out the highest savings. Drawing these sections together, we conclude with suggested areas for future focus.

Data used in this chapter

Forces were asked to submit standard cost and savings data to HMIC for each of their collaboration projects as of November 2011. These included:

- 2010/11 baseline budgets;
- anticipated revenue savings over the four-year SR period; and
- total partnership implementation costs.

In addition to this project information, forces were asked to provide their total spend on collaborated functions for 2011/12 to 2014/15, and the amount of their SR savings gap being met by collaboration over the same four-year period.

While this is all information which forces should have already held, it is not routinely collected through a standard data return. This is therefore the first time that nationally consistent data on collaboration spend and savings have been collected, and these analyses carried out. The result is the most comprehensive assessment of collaboration to date.

Expected savings

Overall, the total identified savings from collaborations by 2014/15 is estimated to be £169m, representing around 11% of the SR savings requirement. A third of these savings (£54m) are from projects already established. But the bulk (£114m) is planned from projects that are work in progress. The as-yet unproven status of some projects and the level of savings they are planning to achieve should be borne in mind in the analysis that follows.

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43 This report is based on a snapshot of data provided to HMIC by forces on their anticipated savings from collaboration activity over the CSR period. The information reflects the position as of November 2011 and does not take account of developments since that time.

44 We have highlighted where a force was unable to submit data in a common format.

45 £169m is based on data from 41 forces and so excluded the MPS (see note 3 above) and West Mercia who could not provide data at this level of detail in November 2011.
More than three-quarters of the savings expected from collaboration are due to be delivered in the first two years of the SR period. While this is in line with the frontloading of the SR savings requirement, it requires a fast pace – the majority of savings are planned to come from projects that have not yet been implemented. A key risk is the deliverability of savings in accordance with forces’ SR savings profiles.

**Level of ambition**

Several factors affect the level of ambition to make savings from collaboration:

- Some forces started sooner than others and may have already made savings from collaboration before the start of the SR period. As a result this group may have less scope to drive out more.

- The purpose of collaboration differs. As noted above, the main purpose of frontline collaborations is often risk reduction rather than savings; and they are driven by the local context in which geographical factors and shared operational demands will play a part. This may mean those forces whose focus is more on frontline than non frontline projects are less likely to be able to realise high levels of savings.

- Some forces started the SR period with higher unit costs, and consequently have scope to make greater savings. However, HMIC has compared collaborations involving support functions (such as Finance, IT, HR and Training) against unit costs among collaborating forces: and no distinctive pattern emerges. Forces with low unit costs are just as likely to be involved in collaborations as those with higher unit costs.

Even taking these factors into account, the ambition of forces to make savings can be described as modest. What is clear is that collaborations in support functions predominate and are set to increase.

Figure 18 shows force savings from support functions expressed as a percentage of their net revenue expenditure.\(^{46}\) The median average\(^{47}\) and upper quartiles act as a diagnostic tool for reviewing the relative ambition of force savings plans. Figure 18 highlights three key points:

- Some forces are planning to deliver savings considerably above the ‘median’, and stand out as those who are maximising their savings opportunities through support function projects. Examples include Norfolk and Suffolk Constabularies who are integrating significant elements of their business.

\(^{46}\) Net revenue expenditure (NRE) is used as collaboration projects attract payments between forces which would result in double counting if based on gross revenue expenditure (GRE).

\(^{47}\) The median is the appropriate “average” to use as the mean is affected by extreme values and therefore those forces whose savings are minimal compared to their NRE.
While accepting that forces often have differing starting points, taking the median average as a fairly modest level of ambition, national savings could be increased by £35m for support function collaboration if all forces were to achieve this level.

Taking the upper quartile as a more demanding ambition would result in national savings from support functions being increased by £75m.

Figure 18: Support functions (SF) savings as % of NRE at 2014/15

The savings for the highest achieving forces suggests there may be scope for improvement. If forces were to achieve a more even spread of savings nationally, there would be a financial advantage and the potential for greater protection for officer numbers. HMIC suggests that all forces achieving below the median average for savings should review their approach, as opportunities may be being missed.

Potential level of savings from collaboration

There is currently little published data identifying the level of savings that might be achievable from police collaboration. In 2010, Deloitte was commissioned by the four Yorkshire and Humber forces and authorities to consider where savings could be made through four-force collaboration. Deloitte (2010) calculated that collaboration across both

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Deloitte MCS Ltd (May, 2010) Delivering Value for Money through Collaboration. This was based on four forces: North Yorkshire; Humberside; West Yorkshire; and South Yorkshire.
operational and support services could lead to the total cost base across the four forces reducing by around 9% over a five-year period\textsuperscript{49} - or 7.2% pro rata over four years.

Deloitte (2010) calculated the gross yield over the five-year period for particular areas of policing business and suggested a gross yield of 13% for operational services and 15% for support services (10.4% and 12% respectively pro-rata over four years).\textsuperscript{50}

While the emphasis differs with frontline gross yields slightly higher than those for support functions, the gross yields are not that dissimilar to those found in the course of the current review - 13% for front line and 14% for support service collaborations. Overall, this represents a 14% gross yield on the cost of all collaborated functions by 2014/15.

For the purposes of this report gross yield is calculated by comparing the savings each collaboration anticipates making by 2014/15 with the 2010/11 baseline for the same collaborated function.\textsuperscript{51} It therefore expresses the percentage by which the budget can be reduced in 2014/15 after collaboration savings. This follows a similar approach to that adopted by Deloitte who focussed on gross yield when reviewing savings opportunities.

The calculation of gross yield allows a comparison of savings between forces and functions. A limitation of this approach is that the costs have not been deducted as forces only provided very limited information on what these might be. For any collaboration there will be a cost of collaborating which may include staff, IT systems and equipment. HMIC recognises that there will be difficulties in accurately allocating some costs (such as redundancy which are often managed across a whole organisation rather than within specific functions) to specific collaborations in a way that can be compared reliably. However, as these costs may vary between forces and functions they may affect comparisons and gross yield figures therefore only provide a basic benchmark.

High value savings are dependant on the relationship between gross yield and the size of overall budget. While much relies on local circumstance and the maturity of projects, in order to make the biggest possible savings (both within the SR period and beyond), forces should therefore be looking to achieve a high yield in high spend areas – what we call ‘big ticket’ collaborations. By identifying the gross yield that can be achieved in different functions and through different models of collaboration, an assessment of any potential ‘big ticket’ items within the police service can be made.

\textsuperscript{49} Deloitte (2010) excluded General Operations which covers neighbourhood, response and investigative policing arguing that collaboration was not an appropriate model to achieve greater efficiency in these areas. The 9% saving reduction in cost base over a 5 year period was calculated before volume and inflation effects and is a gross figure which does not include implementation costs. This represents the same methodology applied by HMIC in this report to calculate gross yield.

\textsuperscript{50} These may not be directly comparable as categories may vary.

\textsuperscript{51} All savings reported to HMIC by forces are attributed to collaboration and reflect the position as of November 2011. Any changes that may have occurred since November 2011 have not been included. 2010/11 is drawn as the CSR baseline and therefore the most appropriate year for assessing change, although inevitably some collaboration will have begun before this point.

42
Budget reductions for different policing functions

HMIC gathered data of sufficient quantity and quality for the detailed examination and national extrapolation of six functions, which include both support and front line functions. The average gross yields for each of the functions masks a significant range.

The widest ranges are for ICT and HR projects, which also have the highest maximum gross yields (63% and 47% respectively).

Figure 19: Savings and Gross Yield for six functions over the savings review period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>No of Forces</th>
<th>Total Savings</th>
<th>Extrapolated to 42 Forces</th>
<th>Gross Yield</th>
<th>Maximum Gross Yield</th>
<th>Minimum Gross Yield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialist Crime Teams</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>£10m</td>
<td>£21m</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>£3m</td>
<td>£10m</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Support</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>£11m</td>
<td>£32m</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>£8m</td>
<td>£20m</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>£17m</td>
<td>£41m</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources (HR)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>£7m</td>
<td>£32m</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>£57m</td>
<td>£156m</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further analysis however reveals that in almost all cases projects with high gross yields are based on small collaborations which will only deliver a low level of savings. This is particularly the case for ICT, where the gross yield from larger initiatives can be extremely low with only one example of a larger initiative which has a 40% gross yield and is therefore likely to deliver high value savings. This collaboration combines an IT system for Gwent Police and two councils, housed in joint accommodation which delivers reduced overheads and support costs. For HR, the pattern is similar with the higher yields tending to be generated by the smaller projects, although there are examples of larger projects which also have higher gross yields.

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52 HMIC has excluded data for procurement in this analysis on the basis that capital savings cannot definitively be excluded from some force returns although HMIC made every effort to do so.

53 The individual figures in the table may not correspond to the total as rounded numbers have been used. MPS data are excluded, as explained above. Derbyshire data have also been excluded from this calculation as these contained some duplication and it was not possible to disaggregate these to provide reliable figures for the yield calculation. Derbyshire data however have been used in all other financial analyses.

54 The 'size' of the initiative is based on baseline budget as a percentage of NRE and therefore assesses its relative importance within that force’s overall budget.
The data also broadly support earlier savings extrapolations identifying that £75m\(^{55}\) of additional savings from support functions could be achieved if forces matched those in the upper quartile. Based on the evidence that we were able to capture, it appears that high gross yield and high value are easier to achieve through support functions.

This study has provided a typology of collaboration models which establishes a common framework for describing and assessing the potential benefits of different types (available at Annex 5).

The best financial data exist for two models: force to force and force to public sector, with the small number of projects involving the private sector for which savings data have also been provided by forces ruling out any firm conclusions at this stage. The following information is therefore provided for illustrative purposes only given the limited examples of savings from private sector collaborations available at the current time.

Each model delivers savings at a different percentage gross yield over the spending review period and HMIC found that this was not due to the different policing functions being collaborated. Analysis comparing the gross yield for the same functions within each model showed very similar gross yields suggesting that the differences are a consequence of the model adopted rather than the business area being collaborated.

There is a broad range of gross yields for each of the models – some of which may be due to the different starting points for forces and the degree to which they have already made internal savings. On average, collaboration between forces achieves a gross yield of 13\% and while the lowest of any other type, ranges from 2\% to 57\% highlighting that levels differ significantly between forces and projects.

Total savings from force to force collaboration at around £132m are far higher than for any other type of collaboration. This is not unexpected as all forces are collaborating in this way and it is difficult for forces to collaborate with anyone other than another force for some operational functions.

Force to public sector has an average gross yield of 21\% but a smaller range (4\% to 43\%) and a far lower level of anticipated savings - around £11m. The high gross yield suggests that these projects may offer opportunities for ‘quick wins’, especially as barriers to collaborating with the public sector may be less likely. However, it appears that public sector collaboration does not on the basis of current projects, offer high volume revenue savings.

The average gross yields for joint working with the private sector alone or with the private and public sector in a single venture are based on data from only three forces (17 projects) and two forces (three projects) respectively, with firm conclusions impossible to draw from such a limited sample.\(^{56}\)

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\(^{55}\) See above (page 43) on the potential for an additional £75m in savings from support function collaborations if all forces achieved the level of savings of those in the upper quartile. This compares with £65.3m achievable from Scientific Support, ICT and HR if savings from those forces collaborating in these functions are extrapolated to all 42 forces according to the average gross yield.

\(^{56}\) The average gross yield for projects involving the private sector alone is 41\% with total anticipated savings of £14.4m and private and public sector combined is 13\% with total anticipated savings of £11.4m by 2014/15.
Projects involving the private sector account for 5.7% of the combined NREs for the three forces. Two of the three are adopting bulk support function collaborations and aim to achieve large savings through high gross yield and high budget value. Savings in this area may help forces avoid cuts to the front line.

While from the limited data available it appears that working with the private sector is worthy of further investigation, some force to force collaborations that have been reported to HMIC as part of this study are predicting gross yields not that dissimilar to those involving the private sector. In addition, just over a third of force to force projects are already up and running and therefore in a stronger position to identify savings levels than embryonic or 'unproven' projects involving joint working with the private sector.

**Reducing unit costs**

Economies of scale are often cited as a way of reducing unit costs, especially in business support functions. Analysis for this review shows that economies of scale do not appear to feature strongly as there is a preference for forces to collaborate with only one other force and the highest gross yields:

- are anticipated from smaller sized collaborations which tend to deliver lower value savings.

A good way to test for economies of scale is to compare unit costs and size of force. In simple terms, evidence of significant economies of scale would exist if larger forces had lower unit costs and smaller forces higher unit costs.

Using 2011/12 budget data drawn from HMICs Value for Money profiles, analysis of six business support functions suggests that for three (Finance, ICT and professional standards) there is some evidence of economies of scale, but the relationship is weak. Figure 20 on the next page shows an example for the Finance function.

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57 36% of force to force projects are already established (137 of a total of 381 projects).
58 Economies of scale only account for 18% for Finance, 17% for ICT and 14% for professional standards of the variation between forces.
Smaller forces with budgets of only £100m - £150m are in fact able to achieve unit costs comparable with forces five to six times larger. In the absence of significant economies of scale, forces with higher costs could consider collaboration as one option to move towards forces with lower costs. As ever, caution needs to be taken in drawing specific conclusions about individual forces as low unit cost may not represent the best value for money as it takes no account of the quality or effectiveness of the service provided.

One approach to reducing high unit costs is to identify another force which is delivering an acceptable service at lower cost, and adopt their management structures and processes if possible - which may not always be through collaboration. We estimate that if all forces reduced their unit costs to those achieved by forces in the lowest quartile, an extra £30m could be saved in HR and Finance alone (£17m for HR and £13m for Finance). See figures 21 and 22 on the next page.

Another approach is to look to collaborate if this will achieve lower unit costs and is the most appropriate given the barriers and enablers that exist and the local context. What is clear is that a range of options exist for making savings which may account for the mixed pattern of collaboration as forces have made different choices and have had different starting points. By keeping a clear eye on the comparative information, forces are in the best position to make sensible long-term decisions.
Figure 21: Variance in unit cost of HR function (based on 2011/12 CIPFA Police Objective Analysis (POA) estimates

Spend in HR as a percentage of total NRE

If all forces (excl MPS) achieved a lower quartile of 1.2%, potential savings of ~£17m

MPS have been excluded

Figure 22: Variance in unit cost of finance function (based on 2011/12 CIPFA Police Objective Analysis (POA) estimates

Spend in finance as a percentage of total NRE

If all forces (excl MPS and Cleveland) achieved a lower quartile of 0.5%, potential savings of ~£13m

Cleveland have been excluded due to unreliable Police Objective Analysis data

MPS have been excluded
Whether forces are taking the business partnering/outsourcing route to achieving savings in support services costs, or are entering into an arrangement with other forces, there are lessons to be learned from the experience of central government. The National Audit Office (NAO) recently reported on the efficiency of government corporate functions delivered through shared service centres. The report found that the planned savings had not been realised for several reasons, but two stand out. First, new software systems were overly tailored to meet a diverse range of needs, rather than increasing the focus on standardisation and simplification from which efficiencies from automation are best achieved.59 Second, there was a lack of detailed cost information and benchmarks against which to assess whether savings were being delivered.

HMIC also found that some forces had difficulties providing comprehensive financial data for this study which may be due to the financial grounding for projects not being strong enough.

**Areas for future focus**

The evidence suggests that if collaboration is the right option to pursue, in order to achieve savings in line with the highest identified levels, forces should concentrate on functions which combine high percentage gross yield and a high budget value.

Whilst some forces are anticipating achieving significant savings through collaborating large volumes of their business (Norfolk and Suffolk Constabularies are good examples), collaborations with the public and private sector are less common but should not be ruled out as both may offer opportunities for delivering savings, depending on local context. It may be that the widespread force to force collaboration identified in this study acts as a stepping stone to later joint working with other sectors once savings have been realised between forces although forces should carefully consider the risks in respect of their current and future ability to respond to the needs of the public whilst maintaining high quality services.

Forces need to consider a range of options and match their needs to the most appropriate method of making savings. This may include focussing on lower unit costs achieved by other forces – whether through collaboration or not. They must use a business head and have the quality of the service they deliver to the public at their heart.

59 National Audit Office (March 2012) *Efficiency and reform in government corporate functions through shared service centres.*
5. Barriers and enablers

There is significant national variation in the scope, integration and maturity of collaboration. A range of factors can affect development of collaborations - either by preventing initiatives starting in the first place or once they are in place inhibiting progress or changing the direction they take. These can have a significant impact on the ability to deliver collaborative change and realise the benefits it offers.

We considered barriers and enablers under six main categories:

- Leadership and Culture;
- Vision and Scope;
- Benefits and Performance;
- Finance, Resources and Processes;
- Governance and Accountability (including Section 23 Agreements); and
- People and Policies.\(^{60}\)

**Leadership and culture**

Effective leadership, support from senior stakeholders and a willingness and commitment to make collaboration work are essential requirements. Collaboration can involve a real or perceived loss of independence and relationships built on trust and the ability to compromise are vital to success.

The needs of individual forces may have to come second to the collaborative initiative, and it can be a challenge for forces and authorities to balance this against internal demands and priorities. This is clearly less challenging if the number of collaborating forces is limited or projects are based on pre-existing structures - hence the tendency for inter force collaboration between two forces or regional projects to be the most common.

Each force provided HMIC with information about those projects they were undertaking that involved collaboration. HMIC compared the information that different forces provided about the same projects and found that the information did not reconcile for a quarter of the 543 projects. This might be understandable for projects that were in the early stages of development but over 40% of those that did not reconcile were established projects, with some in place for more than a year. These differences of opinion could not be resolved despite an extensive and prolonged period of support that was offered as part of this study.

Collaboration necessarily involves give and take – not only within individual projects, but there needs to be an eye on the benefits it can bring across the Service as a whole, and in

\(^{60}\) The six main categories are taken from NPIA’s barriers and enablers.
the long term. Individual projects may not reap rich rewards for one of the forces involved; but if it does for the other, then the picture for the Service across England and Wales – and therefore for the public they serve – is improved. There needs to be compromise; and while this was evident in some places, collaborations faltered in others, with the overall gains to the Service lost.

**Vision and scope**

“Last year I pointed out that the proposed national police air service was a good example of collaboration, saving £15 million a year and resulting in a better co-ordinated and more consistently available service….

Chief officers of all forces in England and Wales have given their support to the proposal, as have the overwhelming majority of police authorities in principle.

But to get the full benefits, the commitment of the whole of the police service in England and Wales is needed… the time for talking about collaboration, and the era of police fiefdoms, is over. I am, in exceptional cases of last resort, prepared to mandate where a small minority of authorities or forces create a barrier to significant savings. I am therefore announcing today that I intend to make an order requiring the police service to collaborate in the provision of air support. This order will be made using the new powers brought in by the police reform and social responsibility act. It will require all authorities and forces to collaborate in the provision of air support through a single collaboration agreement for England and Wales.”

Speech by The Rt Hon Nick Herbert MP to the CityForum event, 26 January 2012. 61

A shared vision of what each collaboration project is intended to achieve and common objectives amongst all parties are prerequisites for a successful collaboration. The fact that nationally a complex pattern of collaboration exists suggests that forces’ visions for collaboration differ and there is the potential for these differences to impact on the extent and effectiveness of individual collaborations.

For example, one proposed merger of Professional Standards departments failed to progress due to difficulties in agreeing standards of scale, resource and investment. These issues were also identified as initial barriers to collaboration in the South West although these were overcome through the Regional Strategy and South West Region Collaboration Board which provided strategic direction and clarity of purpose.

A common issue raised by forces is the varying starting points including the different stages they have reached within their individual internal change programmes. Some forces have already streamlined their internal processes, while others have yet to do so. This lack of parity, with one force benefitting more or less than another, can be a barrier to collaboration particularly where individual forces have varying levels of investment and significant SR savings to find. Whilst cited by forces, this study has not found evidence of a relationship

61 Available from www.homeoffice.gov.uk
between the starting point for forces and the gross yield that can be achieved. This casts some doubt on the importance ascribed to this issue as a barrier to a high level of return from collaboration.

Moreover, where forces and authorities adopt a pragmatic approach and view the benefits of collaborating as a whole (rather than at individual force level) the opportunities are clearly increased. This approach can work as an effective enabler.

The issue of parity is not therefore always insurmountable. The greater good, the benefit of combined savings (both over the SR period and beyond), interoperability and enhanced service provision for the public can therefore be viewed as outweighing any imbalance of investment. Different ambitions and views on the speed at which collaboration should progress can lead to a change of direction or even a change of collaborating partners – both within and outside regional structures. Original plans based on regional collaborations may be adjusted and result in smaller groups being set up as in the Eastern and West Midlands regions.

**Collaboration Case Study No. 10**

Cheshire and Northamptonshire

**Hosting of Force to Force collaboration with the private sector (outsourced technology)**

The aim of this collaboration is for Cheshire and Northamptonshire to jointly deliver a shared service (back office) to both forces. The technology and application management is contracted out to Cap Gemini and their private sector partners. The vision is to achieve 40% cost savings to meet current SR targets as well as improving information to drive better resource management decision making in front line services.

The resulting framework covers provision of services including; change management support, implementation of Oracle software combined with Crown Duty Management to deliver maximum financial savings and better decision making across a number of service functions through a fully integrated service management system. This will be done through an established industry model for shared services that adopts best practice processes already supported by technology. The shared service centre will initially cover transactional services for HR, finance, procurement and a payroll service. Both forces are committed to evaluating the possibility of extending it to other areas as the shared service is stabilised.

The shared service will be located in Cheshire. This decision is based on a business case evaluation of estate, skill and cost. While Cheshire / Northamptonshire will jointly deliver a shared service, the technology and application management is contracted out to Cap Gemini and their private sector partners.

The two forces are not in the same or an adjoining region, therefore this project demonstrates that it is not necessary to be geographically proximate for effective collaboration. Both ACPO teams and Police Authorities have an excellent working relationship, with costs being shared in proportion to size. This works out as a 60:40 split with Cheshire and Northants respectively. Discussions for the shared service began in December 2010, demonstrating that progress can be achieved despite a fast pace. Savings will be delivered in 2012 /13, with both forces already having commenced staffing reductions.

This collaboration is open for other forces to join.
While there are many examples of forces collaborating across shared boundaries, this example illustrates that geography does not necessarily have to be a barrier.

Benefits and evaluation
Any business case supporting collaboration should be underpinned by robust analysis and a clear benefits statement to assist in maximising outcomes and evaluating the success of the project at the beginning, middle and end. This requires consistent data to be held across forces, a problem that some of the forces in the North East region faced which was resolved through an independent assessment of achievable benefits for the region by external consultants. The provision of data to HMIC in November 2011 also acted as a catalyst to Yorkshire and the Humber in resolving this issue.

Some forces found it extremely challenging to quantify the level of savings anticipated from collaborations and how these savings would be apportioned between those forces involved.

While some forces had apportioned costs and savings at an early stage, according to a number of criteria and an agreed formula (examples include Norfolk and Suffolk, Cheshire and Northamptonshire and the North West region) others were not as far advanced and had not resolved different starting points, which subsequently delayed business cases and the realisation of benefits.

Finance, resources and processes
Savings have not been the sole driver for collaboration. Where low levels of savings (or none at all) are anticipated, this does not appear to act as a barrier. Similarly, the level of savings was not consistently cited as the main driver for collaboration irrespective of savings requirements or financial vulnerability over the SR period (and beyond).

The lack of ability to resource the level of change that collaboration requires can be a barrier particularly given the current period of austerity and the front-loading of the SR savings. However, forces have not referred to this as a ‘show stopper’ and where it did present a problem initially, innovative ways around it have been found. For example in the South West region ‘up front’ investment from all the necessary partners delayed the progress of initiatives but this has now been resolved through enhancing the governance of the South West Region Collaboration Board.

Forces that have heavy commitments to policing the Olympics have reported resilience as a barrier to collaboration. This is particularly the case for specialist teams such as firearms, dogs and search trained officers. Essex, Hampshire, TVP, Kent, Surrey and Sussex have identified this as a reason for delaying savings from collaborative ventures within the SR period.

Where ICT, finance and HR processes are not harmonised across forces, the benefits of force to force collaborations can be limited. In the case of ICT, the Government’s announcement to create a new IT company might provide an opportunity to assist with harmonisation. Harmonisation of processes associated with people and HR policies are discussed in more detail at the end of this chapter.

**Governance and accountability**

The importance of a formalised governance structure involving all partners together with robust centralised programme management is recognised by many forces. However, about a quarter of final collaboration plans reviewed by HMIC did not detail clear governance structures for collaboration. A range of structures have already been put in place by some forces to facilitate these.

Many forces have established collaboration ‘joint committees’, which – while recognising that each chief constable is accountable to their police authority – can streamline collaboration processes and aid decision making. In some cases joint committees devolve elements of decision-making to joint working groups or boards and use these to inform their decision making.

Wales has gone further by establishing an ‘All Wales’ Police Authority which coordinates and oversees the collaboration programme. The All Wales model encompasses a single combined police authority structure including the criminal justice board and ACPO Cymru with connections to the Welsh Government, demonstrating a clear and united commitment to collaboration.

**Collaboration agreements**

The Police Act (1996), formalises joint working arrangements between two or more forces or police authorities where there is the opportunity to deliver greater efficiency and effectiveness. This is achieved through collaboration agreements (previously known as “section 23 agreements”). Until recently, two separate agreements were required for each collaborative venture – one for the forces involved and another for the police authorities. This changed under the provisions of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, which introduced a single type of collaboration agreement which may be made by chief officers and policing bodies (either separately or together).

Collaboration agreements are flexible and it is recommended that they contain specific milestones to allow all parties to review their ongoing participation. Provision is often made for one or more parties to withdraw from a collaboration agreement so long as there is agreement by parties. If this occurs then the old agreement is terminated and a new agreement enacted.
A collaboration agreement is applicable where, in the opinion of the chief officer or police authority, the collaboration delivers greater efficiency or effectiveness to at least one of the participating forces or authorities.\(^\text{63}\)

There is no clear evidence that collaboration agreements are slowing the pace of collaboration although some forces have identified this as an issue while others have put processes in place to reduce bureaucracy. The police authorities in Norfolk and Suffolk have delegated authority for signing off collaboration agreements and implementation plans to the Chief Executives. Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire police authorities delegate authority to their Chief Executives on a bespoke individual basis according to need and project composition.

Some forces involved in regional collaboration have devised a template for collaboration agreements to make the process simpler, speedier and less bureaucratic. The North West region uses an ‘umbrella agreement’ which only requires the precise detail of each individual agreement to be completed. Others have agreed a clear format to avoid delays.

The changes implemented by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 allow partners other than police forces and policing bodies to join a collaboration agreement. This will help the police service to take advantage of the opportunities available for collaborating with others in the public and private sector and take advantage of outsourcing and business partnering opportunities. The changes also include new duties for chief officers and policing bodies to keep collaboration opportunities under review and to collaborate where it is in the interests of the efficiency or effectiveness of one or more police forces or policing bodies. These new duties are set out with the needs of all potential participants in mind and where collaboration would provide the best outcome for another police force or group of forces, then a chief officer or policing body should pursue it, even if it does not expect to benefit directly itself.

The transition to Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) by November 2012 and the impact on already established programmes and collaborated assets is of particular concern to about a fifth of forces, while many more mentioned the impact PCCs might have on their collaborative arrangements. The 2011 Act provides for existing collaboration agreements to be automatically transferred from police authorities to PCCs. Where a collaboration agreement is in place PCCs would have the opportunity to review and revise these in the future as police authorities do currently.

**People and policies**

Without the support of staff any collaborative venture will struggle to succeed. Bringing together staff from different forces and organisations can require the integration of very different cultures and the harmonisation of terms and conditions. The involvement of staff, staff associations and unions and frequent communication through a variety of channels is something that all forces subscribe to.

\(^{63}\) The Home Secretary has published statutory guidance on collaboration which police authorities and forces must consider when entering into a collaboration agreement. If it is not followed there should be reasonable grounds for not doing so.
Where staff work jointly but are employed by different forces under different terms and conditions there can be a lack of parity. Staff can be working alongside each other, often in identical or similar roles, but on differing terms and conditions. These issues currently have to be addressed by the individual forces involved.

Where significant differences in pay and conditions exist between forces there can be a marked impact on efficiency, costs and savings following standardisation. The full extent of these is not always evident until after the transfer is complete. Few forces are using the Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment (TUPE) arrangements to equalise terms and conditions. This is where the responsibility for police staff transfers to one force ensuring parity.\textsuperscript{64}

For police officers, police regulations can impose deployment conditions at locations outside force boundaries or those which involve considerable travel from the normal place of work. In some circumstances, these restrictions can also increase the cost of collaboration.

The impact of different pay and conditions is acknowledged as a potential barrier to collaboration by stakeholders including Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Police Federation and staff associations. The recommendations from the Winsor review\textsuperscript{65} attempt to provide a more consistent approach to allowances and other payments which will be supported by the work of the new police pay review body.

\textsuperscript{64} Page 37 provides a case study of Thames Valley and Hampshire and their TUPE arrangement, whilst Cheshire and Northamptonshire are considering these arrangements.

\textsuperscript{65} Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions Final Report, Volume 2, March 2012.
6. Conclusion and recommendations

The scale of the financial challenge over the next four years\(^{66}\) coupled with public expectations for high quality policing services create a very challenging environment for the Service. The need to improve efficiency and effectiveness is therefore more critical than perhaps ever before.

Collaboration offers the potential to improve both efficiency and effectiveness. Forces are improving the service in some areas (such as protective services) and save money in others (£169m of savings planned by 2014/15). Savings, particularly those in non-front line functions, assist forces in protecting their front line service.

A ‘step change’ requires knowledge and understanding of what works best in delivering high value savings whilst protecting visible policing. Experimentation with different approaches rather than making evidence based and informed decisions about where and how to make savings is time consuming and costly - both of which are in short supply.

This report has sought to increase knowledge and provide an evidence base by capturing consistent costs and savings data for collaboration projects for the first time in the absence of a standard data return. While there remain some gaps in the data, the report provides the most detailed assessment yet of collaboration nationally. It illustrates a stark variation in the extent of collaboration both in terms of the amount of policing business being delivered collaboratively at force level as well as the level of savings predicted.

A sixth of policing is planned to be delivered collaboratively in England and Wales by 2014/15. The current pace of collaboration will need to quicken in order to implement these changes and reap the financial rewards over the span of the SR.

Despite the financial challenge and vulnerability of forces, savings are not always a key driver of collaboration. Some forces found it challenging to provide basic details of costs and savings and few forces are looking to transform the way they deliver their services through collaborating with either the public or private sector.

The current collaboration landscape is mixed and patchy but it is encouraging that collaboration across support functions predominates and increasingly so in the future, with a strong focus on back office collaboration both in terms of the number of projects and the value of savings. Collaborating in support functions offers a good opportunity to deliver high value savings due to potential high gross yields which can be maximised by collaborating across significant areas of the support infrastructure.

While some policing functions are more likely to be delivered with other forces due to their operational nature, this report has found that forces have the opportunity to be more radical and innovative in the type of collaboration they choose, particularly with some information now available on the gross yield that might be expected from different types of collaboration.

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\(^{66}\) 20% cut in central government funding by 2014/15.
The current ‘mixed economy’ approach may limit the opportunities for larger scale collaboration. However with four in ten projects currently in the scoping stage the potential still exists for a change in approach. A key consideration for collaborative activity is what it can deliver by improving efficiency and at what cost – both financially and in terms of service delivery. This report has looked at the current collaboration landscape and the level of anticipated savings from collaboration as well as some of the gains from established Protective Services collaborations. These include capability and resilience gains which enable forces to better manage high risk areas of business. The impact of collaboration on the quality of service across the business is the next step in assisting the police service.

Collaboration will not be the best or most viable solution for all forces – one size does not fit all. It should therefore be considered alongside other options to reduce costs and improve efficiency. These include assessing the potential to reduce unit costs to “best in class” and replicating proven successes of high performing peers. The crucial consideration for forces and authorities and PCCs, is therefore one of informed choice and pursuing the solution which best meets local needs in reducing costs whilst enhancing frontline delivery to the public.

Recommendations

- HMIC recommends that forces and police authorities consider these findings as part of their decision making process, supporting ‘informed choice’. Collaboration should be assessed as part of a wider range of opportunities to make savings (for example reducing unit costs of key functions in line with the “best in class” in policing and other sectors).

- HMIC suggests that all forces achieving below the median average for savings should review their approach as it is likely that opportunities may be being missed. There is a clear obligation on forces to explore the merits of this but it is one option and may not be achievable in the local context.

- HMIC suggests that forces review deliverability of savings from collaboration according to their SR profile and where collaboration is the best option; take immediate steps to move with greater focus and pace.

- With the imminent introduction of PCCs and the ability for them to make changes to current collaborative activity, assessments of efficiency and effectiveness of initiatives should be clearly evidenced and based on sound commercial principles.
Annex 1: Programme methodology

HMIC’s interest in collaboration began in 2005 with Closing the Gap, a report which focused on how protective services collaborate, particularly those dealing with organised crime and terrorism.

In February 2011 and following the Policing Minister’s speech to City Forum calling for a ‘step change’ in collaboration, HMIC completed an initial, high level assessment of what forces were doing collaboratively and with whom. The findings from this work have been used to provide comparisons with the more comprehensive data available from this study and collected in November 2011.

At the National Collaboration Conference on 22 March 2011, the Minister set out his vision for collaboration, indicating that forces would need to demonstrate to HMIC that they were being sufficiently ambitious. In mid April 2011, HMIC wrote to all forces to start a further round of the ‘support and challenge’ process. Throughout 2011, all forces were involved in ‘support and challenge’ meetings with regional HMIs. Those meetings were held either with individual forces or in groups of forces that were identified as collaboration partners in February’s assessment. Forces received a feedback letter following those meetings.

In order to inform the ‘support and challenge’ process, HMIC requested that forces supply emerging collaboration plans in June 2011, and formalised plans by 30 September 2011. HMIC also gathered more detailed data from force collaboration leads; the initial data were assessed during mid-summer.

Due to the complexity of the subject matter and differences in the way forces categorised information, HMIC decided to refine the process before forces submitted their formalised collaboration plans in September. HMIC visited nine forces that had provided data of varying quality to ensure HMIC’s standard data collection template matched existing working practices in forces and would provide data in a consistent format nationally.

Before 30 September 2011, having reviewed the standard template, HMIC sent it to all forces with a technical guidance note. HMIC worked extensively with forces to help them complete these templates in a consistent manner, and made them aware that there would be a last opportunity to update data in November 2011.

On 28 October 2011, HMIC wrote to forces and offered them the opportunity to update and amend their data. At the same time, HMIC highlighted parts of the data where ‘partner forces’ had entered information inconsistently or where other technical queries were raised. This letter was accompanied by a technical guidance note and specific commentary on identified issues, and HMIC, again, provided extensive support.

Forces submitted their final data to HMIC on or shortly after 9 November 2011. Since then, HMIC has contacted a small number of forces to reconcile critical issues. HMIC has analysed both these data submissions, and contextual information from the ‘support and challenge’ process and forces’ formal collaboration plans.
Data collection and analysis

Key aims of most collaborations are to reduce unit costs or risks beyond that which could be achieved by forces working alone. To fully assess whether the level of ambition is sufficient for each force would require the collection of unit costs at the start of individual projects, started at different times and grouped into comparable categories, either financial categories (e.g. those used by Police Objective Analysis) or Home Office categories of staffing functions.

HMIC took the view that this purist approach would have created a disproportionate data burden on forces. Instead, we adopted a pragmatic approach to the collection of data. As a result, our findings provide broad indicators to trigger the question of whether forces are doing enough in this area, while recognising the need for local discretion in deciding which areas offer the best opportunities locally.

All forces were asked to provide a common financial baseline (2010/11), against which savings could be compared over the SR period. Since the vast majority of collaborations involving significant savings have not yet been established, the estimated savings, while understating the savings already achieved by a limited number of forces who started earlier than the baseline, give the best indication available.

We asked forces to provide data which should have been available in constructing a basic business case and tracking performance for the collaboration. No two collaborations are exactly the same, but to get a broad view of the scale of the savings being achieved for similar types of services, HMIC grouped collaborations into Home Office categories by function.

Lastly, HMIC has based comparison of reported force savings from their collaborations against the net revenue expenditure of the force, to reduce the scope for inaccuracies caused by adopting locally defined baseline collaboration expenditure.
Annex 2: Glossary

Business partnering

“Business partnering goes beyond traditional outsourcing; it draws on the skills, expertise, technology, and innovation of the private sector to support end-to-end transformation of service delivery within the organisation and to improve services to the public” as defined by the Surrey and West Midlands programme.

Collaboration

Collaboration is defined in its broadest sense as: “all activity where two or more parties work together to achieve a common goal, which includes inter-force activity and collaboration with the public and private sectors including outsourcing and business partnering.”

Collaboration agreements (previously Section 23 Agreements)

Section 23 of the Police Act 1996 is the legislative vehicle by which forces and authorities are able to collaborate. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 introduced changes to the arrangements for collaboration agreements.

Front line

The police front line comprises those who are in everyday contact with the public and who directly intervene to keep people safe and enforce the law.

Gross Revenue Expenditure (GRE)

This is the level of expenditure before costs or expenses have been deducted.

Gross Yield

“Yield” describes the level of return on investment, usually quoted in percentage terms. This is the % by which the baseline budget can be reduced. Gross yield is the level of yield before costs or expenses are deducted.
Host force

Staff are transferred to “host” force employment (TUPE); Common terms and conditions for staff; “Host” force responsible for delivery of the given function; Harmonisation requires greater investment (time and cost).

Lead force

Staff remain employed by their home force; Terms and conditions for staff can vary; “Lead” force responsible for delivery of the given function; Quicker to implement than host force.

Net Revenue Expenditure (NRE)

This is the level of expenditure, after costs or expenses have been deducted. This has been used to avoid the double counting caused by cross charging agreements between forces inherent in collaborative arrangements.

Non front line

Those who do not work in frontline functions (estimated to be approximately one-third of the national police workforce).

Outsourcing

The contracting of a business function to an external supplier with the typical aim of reducing the overall spend for that function.

Programme

A collaborative arrangement between one or more organisations in more than one connected business function which is represented as a single entity.

Project

A collaborative arrangement between one or more organisations in one specified business function.
Support Functions

This description is based on the "Demanding Times" definitions for front and non frontline functions. Support functions are equivalent to non-frontline.
### Annex 3: Explanation of annual data return (ADR) functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACPO and Directors</strong></td>
<td>Police officers of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) rank and police staff at equivalent level. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air</strong></td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed as pilots, ground crew or air observers, or in administrative functions connected with air support. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Buildings</strong></td>
<td>Staff who are predominately employed on duties relating to the cleaning, maintenance, security and administration of police buildings, but not staff employed as part of a contract. Includes handymen, grounds maintenance and cleaners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burglary</strong></td>
<td>Staff who predominantly investigate offences of burglary. Includes staff assigned to ‘Operation Bumblebee’, analysts or administrative assistants and those officers/staff in supporting roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Catering</strong></td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed in the provision of catering facilities but not catering staff employed as part of a contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Child/Sex/Domestic</strong></td>
<td>Staff who predominantly investigate and resolve offences against children and/or cases of domestic violence involving any member of a family. Includes those staff employed in Missing Persons. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CID

Staff mainly employed in plain clothes (or supporting those employed in plain clothes), for the investigation of crime.

Staff who predominantly investigate crime or support the investigation of crime and who are not shown under other specific squad headings.

Does not include members of a squad set up on an ad-hoc basis to deal with a temporary or local problem. These would be included under their normal category.

Also includes officers formerly recorded as ‘CID aides’ or 'trainee investigators', i.e. officers temporarily seconded to CID but not those on short term attachments for familiarisation or assessment purposes.

Includes staff who are predominantly employed on administrative, clerical or other support duties on behalf of general CID, asset confiscation, burglary, drugs, fraud, stolen vehicles, vice or other permanent CID squads. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.

CID Specialist Units

Any specialist units or squads, analysts or administrative assistants employed, not specifically mentioned elsewhere, eg Robbery, Major Crime Units

Communications/IT/Audio

Staff who are predominantly employed in the provision, maintenance, research, development and administration of radio, telephone and communications networks or computer systems. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.

Community Safety/Relations

Staff or support staff who predominantly undertake community safety work, including community relations, schools liaison, crime reduction, youth offender teams, closed circuit television, crime prevention/crime reduction and architectural liaison officers, dealing with repeat victimisation or the visual aids unit. Includes analysts and administrative assistants and those officers/staff in supporting roles.

NB: Neighbourhood policing teams are included in the Neighbourhoods category.
**Complaints & Discipline**  
Staff who are predominantly employed in the investigation and administration of complaints and discipline matters. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.

**Control Room (Call Handlers)**  
Staff who are predominantly employed as control room operatives in either force or area control rooms including officers employed as telephonists.

Does not include staff who are predominantly employed in dealing with front office enquiries from the public (see Enquiry/Station). Includes computer-aided dispatch controllers and those officers/staff in supporting roles.

**Coroner’s Officer**  
Staff who are predominantly assigned to duties in connection with sudden deaths and inquests. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.

**Corporate Development**  
Staff who are predominantly employed within force or area inspection units, including quality assurance and similar functions.

Staff who are predominantly employed in collation of statistics within the force.

Staff who are predominantly employed in research and development, legal and data protection issues, operation and strategic planning and information and policy analysis units.

Includes staff responsible for Freedom of Information.

Does not include officers employed on research and development in connection with computers or communications (see Communications/IT/Audio).

**Crime/Incident Management**  
Staff who are predominantly employed on crime desks, crime management units or in identification parade suites. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.

**Criminal Justice Units**  
Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration, checking and processing of prosecution files including liaison with the Crown Prosecution Service and staff who are
predominantly employed in the making of additional enquiries required to supplement the quality of files.

Staff who are predominantly employed in the processing and administration of applications in connection with licensed premises, registered clubs and matters concerning betting, gaming and lotteries, including those who are predominantly employed in the execution of warrants, service of summonses and dealing with general/routine enquiries.

Includes those who are predominantly employed in dealing with the processing of fixed penalty tickets and the recovery of penalties, including those who are predominantly assigned to liaison duties with magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court.

Also includes those otherwise employed in supporting roles.

Criminal Records Office

Staff who are predominantly employed in maintaining the force Criminal Records Office including officers working in police national computer units. Includes vetting and disclosure.

Custody

Staff who are predominantly employed as custody officers, performing duties in accordance with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Includes gaolers, ie staff who are predominantly employed in looking after prisoners in police custody. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.

Departmental Heads

Staff who are head of more than one operational unit or department specified on this form, eg Superintendent – Operations. Includes officers with supervisory responsibility for more than one support department or unit. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.

Dogs

Dog handlers including those employed for general policing, drugs and explosive detection duties. Includes staff who are predominantly employed with dogs sections other than dog handlers. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.
| **Drivers** | Staff who are predominantly employed on driving duties relating to the transportation of personnel and/or property but not including officers shown in the Traffic function. |
| **Drugs** | Staff who predominantly investigate drugs offences, including staff who are predominantly assigned to the inspection of chemists’ registers in connection with dangerous drugs, but not including officers specifically assigned to asset confiscation duties (see Asset Confiscation). |
| **Enquiry/Station** | Staff who are predominantly employed in dealing with front office enquiries from members of the public at any police station but excluding any officer who deals exclusively with property (see Property) or whose primary function is that of telephonist of radio controller (see Control Room). |
| **Finance** | Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration of finance. |
| **Fingerprint/Photographic** | Staff who are predominantly employed as Fingerprint Officers or employed in a Fingerprint Bureau; and staff who are predominantly employed as photographers or in photographic laboratories. Does not include scenes of crime officers (see Scenes of Crime). Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles. |
| **Firearms – Tactical** | Staff who are predominantly employed in the use of firearms either as tactical advisors, trainers or in the provision of firearm support to operational incidents. Officers employed in armed response vehicles should only be included if they are mainly employed within the force firearms unit as described above. Officers employed in armed response vehicles but not employed within the force firearms unit should be shown within their regular deployment category. |
| **Firearms/Explosives** | Staff who are predominantly employed in the processing of applications and in making enquiries for firearm and shotgun certificates, renewals, rejections, appeals and firearms |
surrendered to police custody, or in connection with the licensing and security of explosives and explosives stores.

**Fraud**
Staff who predominantly investigate fraud cases. Does not include staff who are predominantly employed in asset confiscation (see Asset Confiscation). Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.

**Hate Crime**
Staff mainly employed in the investigation of hate crime, including race and homophobic incidents. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.

**HOLMES Unit**
Staff who are predominantly employed in duties connected with the operational use of the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES). Officers employed as full time HOLMES training instructors would not be included in this section (see Training).

**Intelligence**
Staff who are predominantly employed in criminal intelligence units including field intelligence officers and local intelligence officers and staff who are predominantly employed in the co-ordination of the policing of football matches (football liaison) and collating associated intelligence. Other staff who maintain indices and records for criminal intelligence purposes should also be included. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.

**Local Commanders**
Operational local commanders and their deputies in a Basic Command Unit or equivalent.

**Marine**
Staff who predominantly conduct marine or boat patrol including supervisors. See Underwater for members of underwater search units. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.

**Mounted**
Staff who predominantly conduct mounted patrol duties, including supervisors. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.

**Neighbourhoods**
Staff predominantly employed in neighbourhood policing teams. Includes PCSOs and those officers/staff in supporting roles.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational Planning</td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed in planning operational events. Includes those planning special events and involved in contingency planning. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Admin/Clerical</td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed on administrative or clerical duties anywhere in the force not covered in other categories. Includes staff who are predominantly employed in the production of plans for court or other purposes. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel/Human Resources</td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed in personnel/career development and management, equal opportunities and diversity, including associated administrative support. Includes staff who are predominantly employed in the administration and management of recruiting personnel in the force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ports</td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed at sea or airports on general policing and security duties, excluding protection staff (see Special Branch/Protection/etc). Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press and Public Relations</td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed in media relations and publicity about the force. Includes press officers and those officers/staff in supporting roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration, retention and disposal of property coming into police possession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation Officers Year 1</td>
<td>Student officers within their first year of training only. Does not include student officers in their subsequent years; such officers would be recorded under their usual function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Includes staff who are predominantly assigned to 24/7 response policing. Also includes task force/support group/territorial patrol. Does not include traffic and motorway patrol (see Traffic) and members of dogs sections (see Dogs). Officers of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
supervisory rank who perform patrol duties, eg shift supervisors, would be included as would special constables.

Does not include neighbourhood policing teams or first year student officers (see Probation Officers Year 1).

**Scenes of Crime**

Staff who are predominantly employed in providing scientific support including scenes of crime officers, their supervisors and those engaged in related administrative duties. Does not include staff who are predominantly employed in connection with fingerprints or photographs (see Fingerprint/Photographs). Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.

**Special Branch/ Protection/ Immigration/ Nationality**

Staff who are predominantly employed on Special Branch duties including officers posted to units situated at ports.

Staff who are predominantly employed in the protection of persons or property, excluding staff at ports eg armed patrol/counter terrorist (see Ports).

Includes staff who are permanently employed in the registration of foreign nationals and the conduct of naturalisation enquiries other than special branch officers.

Includes administration staff who are predominantly employed in providing administrative support for staff employed in the protection of persons or property but excluding staff at ports (see Ports) and those officers/staff in supporting roles.

**Staff Associations**

Staff who are predominantly employed with Staff Association work.

**Staff Officers**

Staff who are predominantly employed as staff officers to Senior Command within the force.

**Stores/Supplies**

Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration, handling of stores/supplies and procurement.

**Surveillance Unit**

Staff who are predominantly employed on surveillance duties. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Technical Support Unit</strong></th>
<th>Staff who are predominantly employed in the provision, maintenance and installation of technical support equipment. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traffic</strong></td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed on motorcycles or on patrol vehicles for the policing of traffic and motorway related duties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>This includes officers employed in accident investigation, vehicle examination and radar duties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Includes staff who are predominantly employed to support the traffic function of the force including radar, accident investigation vehicle examination and traffic examination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Includes those officers working with hazardous chemicals, and those administrative staff predominantly serving the internal needs of the traffic function of the force and those officers/staff in supporting roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traffic Wardens</strong></td>
<td>Traffic wardens engaged in patrol and other duties. Includes senior traffic wardens who are predominantly employed in the supervision of traffic wardens, otherwise than on patrol. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed in the training and instruction of other officers including training management, force training school instructors, divisional training officers, public order trainers, driving school instructors, detective training instructors, HOLMES training instructors, physical training instructors and officers employed in training administration. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles but does not include officers employed in firearms training (see Firearms Tactical).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Underwater</strong></td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed in an underwater search unit but not including officers employed in marine units (see Marine).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Crime</td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly assigned to the investigation of theft of or from motor vehicles. Includes staff working in the car crime unit/stolen vehicle squad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Workshop/Fleet</td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration and maintenance of the force vehicle fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice</td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed in the investigation of offences relating to obscene publications and prostitution. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Staff who are predominantly employed as welfare officers, occupational health officers, health and safety advisors, nurses and force medical officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Staff absent from duty due to maternity/paternity leave, career break, full time education or suspension and those on long term leave (sickness, compassionate, special and unpaid leave).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 4: *Demanding Times* definitions – frontline and non-frontline roles

In *Demanding Times*, we stated that ‘the police front line comprises those who are in everyday contact with the public and who directly intervene to keep people safe and enforce the law’. Applying this definition, we produced the map shown below, in which roles for which there is some agreement that they are frontline are shaded in green.

Please note: In some cases roles cut across more than one category, and where this is the case the percentage split is shown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLIC FACING</th>
<th>SUPPORTING PROCESSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visible</strong></td>
<td><strong>Specialist</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Response**
- Neighbourhood
  - Community
  - Safety/relations
  - Probationers (“Student Officers”)
- Traffic
  - Dogs
  - Firearms (tactical)
  - Mounted

**Visible**
- Air
- Firearms (specialist)
- Marine / Underwater
- Surveillance Unit
- Ports / Special Branch / Protection / Immigration / Nationality
- Child / Sex / Domestic / Missing Persons
  - Fingerprints
  - Photographic
  - Scenes of Crime
  - Technical Support Unit (80%)
- Asset Confiscation (80%)
- Burglary (80%)
- CID (70%)
  - CID – Specialist Crime Unit (70%)
  - Drugs (80%)
  - Fraud (80%)
  - Hate Crime (80%)
  - Vehicle Crime (60%)
  - Intelligence (40%)
  - Vice (70%)

**Specialist**
- Coroners Officers
- Operational Planning
- Chief Police Officers
- HOLMES (murder) Unit (30%)
- Crime & Inc Mgt (60%)
- Criminal Justice (30%)

**Middle Office**
- Intelligence (60%)
- Control Room / Call Handling (40%)
- Criminal Justice (70%)
- Criminal Records Office
- CID (30%)
- CID Specialist Crime Unit (30%)
- Vehicle Crime (40%)
- HOLMES (murder) Unit (70%)
- Hate Crime (20%)
- Fraud (20%)
- Burglary (20%)
- Asset Confiscation (20%)
- Tech Support Unit (20%)
- Professional Standards Unit (50%)
- Crime & Incident Management (40%)
- Drugs (20%)
- Vice (30%)

**Back Office**
- IT/Audio/Comms
- Corp Development
- Finance
- Personnel / Human Resources
- Press and Public Relations
- Property
- Staff Associations
- Buildings
- Drivers
- Staff Officers
- Catering
- Stores Supplies
- Training
- Other Admin/Clerical
- Vehicle
- Workshop/Fleet
- Occupational Health / Welfare
### Annex 5: Collaboration typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaboration model</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Common terms</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Force to force collaboration</strong></td>
<td>One on one (two forces)</td>
<td>Preferred partnership; partnership; strategic alliance; cluster</td>
<td>Sub categories are determined by the number of forces involved. Analysis will determine the appropriate numerical groupings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(including non Home Office forces)</td>
<td>Three to four forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Five or more forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPO region</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>An ACPO region must include all forces in the region involved.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 forces</td>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Force(s) and public sector(s)</strong></td>
<td>Council</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public sector partner is the defining factor rather than scale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F&amp;RS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NHS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HMRC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Force(s) and private sector(s)</strong></td>
<td>Outsourcing</td>
<td>These terms are defined in the glossary.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business partnering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Force(s) with public and private sector(s)</strong></td>
<td>Outsourcing</td>
<td>These terms are defined in the glossary.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business partnering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 6: Principles applied to data reconciliation and cleansing

This report is based on information gathered from all 43 police forces in England and Wales, covering many collaborations, and is the first time these data have been collected centrally. The data set is large and complex, particularly because it covers relationships between forces, other public sector agencies and the private sector. We have taken reasonable steps to collect and verify data, being mindful of the burden that detailed checking would impose on each force. We have only used data in the report which are robust enough to support our recommendations.

What data have been used?

- The collaboration data which have been used in this report have been provided to HMIC by police forces.
- The data have been checked by HMIC to ensure that the savings provided were cumulative, in the right format, and that the estimated savings were larger than the collaboration expenditure and the baseline spend. Anything which didn’t add up or looked unlikely was verified with forces, including any high ‘yields’ compared with other forces. Forces’ own data were returned to them at various stages for checking.
- HMIC restricted its request for data to those which should already have been collected locally by forces. In doing so, we aimed to keep the bureaucratic burden to a minimum.
- Data were collected as snapshots in February 2011 and November 2011. The February data contained details of collaborations (stage, collaborating partners, etc), but no financial information.
- The November data were requested in two parts:

  1. An overall summary table giving total collaboration expenditure and savings for each year of the SR from each force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2011/12</th>
<th>2012/13</th>
<th>2013/14</th>
<th>2014/15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSR savings met by collaboration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on collaborated functions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

  2. A detailed table by collaboration project, providing details on stage, function and collaborating partners, as well as baseline expenditure and savings data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaborating Partners</th>
<th>ADR function</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>2010/11 Baseline budget</th>
<th>Cumulative Force Savings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Air Support</td>
<td>Established &gt; 12 months</td>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>2012/13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Almost a quarter of forces provided returns in which the collaboration savings from the summary table did not match those from the detailed table. Some forces were unable to split savings data by function / project.

All financial figures have been provided in 2010/11 prices.

**What has been excluded from the data?**

- Projects which do not meet the collaboration definition have been removed.
- One-off savings have not been included as the report only focuses on recurring savings over the SR period.
- Where capital costs and savings were identified, they have been removed from both the detailed table and the summary table. This affects procurement functions (eg Stores and Supplies) where the baseline spend can include capital items being procured. We have endeavoured to remove capital expenditure however because we have relied on locally collected data, it may be the case that some unidentified capital costs and savings remain.
- Some forces have not provided complete data, ie they have provided savings data but no baseline data, and vice versa. Details of how these projects/forces have been treated for specific analyses can be found below.
- Projects which do not have a collaboration stage or function have been removed from the relevant analysis and charts (ie projects without a stage are not included in any analysis regarding stage).
- Collaborations in the Metropolitan Police (MPS) are largely internal and are therefore not covered by our definition of collaboration. Given the large size of the force, their internal collaborations are more on the scale of a regional collaboration, and have therefore been included in the total number of collaborations. However, within their collaboration projects it has not been possible to separate the internal and external activity. As such all financial data from the MPS have been excluded from financial charts and national totals, but MPS figures have been provided as footnotes where possible.
- South Wales Police (SWP) provided an amalgamated return containing financial data for the whole of the Welsh Region collaboration (so including other Welsh forces) rather than just for their force; therefore their financial data have only been included at a national level. At a force level, SWP’s financial data have been excluded and the financial figures for other Welsh forces will be under represented as the data in the amalgamated return cannot be apportioned to individual forces.

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67 Forces provided different levels of data, e.g. some forces were able to provide summary detailed expenditure and savings, whereas others were only able to provide summary data. Some forces were not able to provide both expenditure and savings. As such, it has not been possible to include all forces in all of the analysis; we have included forces wherever they have provided sufficient data.

68 Lincolnshire Police were unable to split the savings from their private sector projects by separate functions (only total savings were available). Therefore savings data from Lincolnshire’s private sector collaborations have not been included in the analysis at function level. Data on their private sector collaborations have been included in analysis by stage as all of these collaborations are at the same stage.
• Some forces also provided information on collaborations which had been considered and disregarded. These collaborations have been excluded from the analyses.

**What has been amended?**

• All Air collaborations where identified by forces have been categorised as a national collaboration.
• We have used cumulative savings to reflect total savings over the SR period.
• We have used national Home Office definitions (ADR functions) to group locally defined projects. Where the descriptions of projects provided by forces do not match the ADR definitions or do not match those of the force’s partners, they have been amended (e.g. Property projects have been classified as a Buildings project if the collaboration related to estate).
• Figures in the report may not always add up to quoted totals up due to rounding.
• Non-established collaborations involving private sector companies have been anonymised and all private sector collaboration financial data relating to these projects have been removed, as this is commercially sensitive data.

**How have the number of collaborations been identified?**

• As all forces provided their own details of collaborations, we needed to identify duplicates, i.e. force A identified a collaboration with force B in function X, and force B identified a collaboration with force A in function X. In these cases, and where the collaboration descriptions indicate they are the same collaboration, collaborations have only been counted once for a national perspective.
• As the financial data are force specific, all spend and savings data have been included in the financial analysis.

**Principles applied to financial analysis data:**

**Yield:**

• The national yield figure of 14% is derived from total savings by the end of the SR period divided by total 2010/11 baseline spend figures. This uses data from the *detailed table*. Collaboration projects where there is no spend or savings data have been excluded. This also applies to the national yield split by collaboration type.
• Where it could be identified that baseline figures were for the whole function and not just the collaborated element of the function, these baseline figures have been excluded from the analysis.
• The yield by function and force figures are provided at force level and use data from the *detailed table*. Forces have been excluded where they have no baseline or savings data.
• Yield by function has been calculated for six functions\(^{69}\) where sufficient data were supplied by forces to allow detailed analysis. Data have been deemed sufficient where the combined Net Revenue Expenditure (NRE) of those forces collaborating in that function is greater than 20% of the national NRE. The only exceptions to this are Air (a national collaboration), Stores and Supplies (which includes procurement and therefore possibly some capital costs), and Other Admin / Clerical (due to the varied nature of the collaboration projects within this function).

**Savings:**

• The total collaboration savings of £169 million are total savings by the end of the SR period from the *detailed table*, and exclude those forces that did not provide any savings data (therefore West Mercia has been excluded as – whilst they provided savings data in the *summary table* – they were unable to provide savings broken down by project in the *detailed table*).

• Gross Yield has been calculated for the six functions detailed above. Not all forces have collaborations in these functions, so total national savings have been estimated making the assumption that all forces (excluding the MPS) could have collaborations in these functions. These extrapolated savings are based on average savings as a percentage of total force expenditure (NRE) for those forces which have collaborations in that function. This is then multiplied by the total national NRE to give estimated national savings.

• NRE has been used instead of the baseline spend as we are unable to estimate the baseline spend figures for all those forces that are not currently collaborating in that function.

• The median and upper quartile savings as a percentage of NRE have been used to estimate potential additional savings which could be made from collaboration. This assumes that forces which currently have savings as a percentage of NRE that are lower than the median or upper quartile (including those with no savings data but that have provided baseline spend data), are able to improve their returns on collaborations and achieve the median or upper quartile.

• The median and upper quartile have been derived from all forces except those with no savings data in the *detailed table*.

• Staffordshire were not able to provide savings data and West Mercia could not provide savings data at an individual project level.

**Expenditure as percentage of NRE:**

• Total expenditure in collaborated functions by the end of the SR period as a percentage of total force expenditure (2011/12 NRE estimates from CIPFA Police Objective Analysis (POA) data) has been provided at a national and a force level. This uses data from the *summary table*, and excludes forces that did not provide any expenditure data.

\(^{69}\) Specialist Crime Teams, Firearms, Scientific Support, Traffic, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and Human Resources (HR).
As mentioned previously, financial data for South Wales Police have been excluded from force level analysis and charts as they provided an amalgamated return containing financial data for the whole collaboration (including other Welsh forces) rather than just for their force. However, SWP was able to provide HMIC with their force specific expenditure data in the *summary table*. SWP have therefore been included in Figure 1 in this report.

Please note that, as the rest of the data in the amalgamated return cannot be apportioned to the other individual Welsh forces, expenditure for Dyfed-Powys, Gwent and North Wales are not reported in full.

Six forces (Devon and Cornwall, GMP, North Yorkshire, Staffordshire, Warwickshire and West Midlands) only provided spend data at project level i.e. in the detailed table. Spend data from these forces were not provided in the summary table and have therefore not been included in the analysis of collaborated spend as a percentage of NRE.

**Savings as percentage of Financial Gap:**

- The national and force level savings over the SR period as a percentage of the financial gap uses savings data from the *detailed table*. The financial gap figures are those calculated by HMIC (using data provided by forces) as part of the 2012 Valuing the Police inspection. See *Policing in Austerity: One year on*.

- At a national level, savings and financial gap figures have been excluded for the MPS (due to the internal nature of its collaborations, as mentioned before) and West Mercia (because whilst they were able to provide savings in the *summary table*, they did not provide savings in the *detailed table* and have therefore been treated as ‘missing data’ for this analysis).

**Other:**

- Savings which could be made by forces reducing their ‘unit costs’ in a function are estimated using the expenditure in the function as a percentage of total force expenditure (NRE). This is derived for finance and HR using 2011/12 Police Objective Analysis (POA) data. This assumes that forces which currently have ‘unit costs’ that are higher than the lower quartile, are able to improve their efficiency and achieve the lower quartile. The MPS has been excluded from this analysis, and Cleveland have been removed from the finance savings as their POA finance data are unreliable.