

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



## HMIC Inspection Report

### Hampshire Constabulary Major Crime

July 2008



*Hampshire Constabulary – HMIC Inspection Report*

*July 2008*

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## **Contents**

### **Introduction to HMIC Inspections**

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09  
Programmed Frameworks  
Major Crime  
Future Programmed Inspections  
The Grading Process  
Developing Practice  
Force Overview and Context

### **Findings**

#### **Major Crime**

#### **Recommendations**

#### **Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations**

## Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

## HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

## **Programmed Frameworks**

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

## **Major Crime**

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.

July 2008

- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.
- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

## Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

## The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

### Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

### Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of ‘additional’ resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to

discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

### **Failing to meet the standard**

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

### **Developing Practice**

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

## **Force Overview and Context**

### **Geographical description of force area**

Hampshire Constabulary covers the two counties of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight. There are two principal cities, Portsmouth and Southampton, together with many towns and villages. Both Portsmouth and Southampton have their own universities and premiership and championship football teams. Portsmouth is the home of the Royal Navy and is also a continental ferry port. Southampton is a major commercial port and situated nearby is one of the largest petrochemical refineries in Europe.

July 2008

As well as the cities, the force area contains thriving modern towns and a tourist industry that has developed among the historic market towns and rural countryside. It hosts a number of annual events and festivals including the Farnborough Air Show, Homelands music and dance festival, Power in the Park (in Southampton) and the Isle of Wight Festival.

The two counties have a significant motorway network and have some of the busiest roads in the country, particularly along the coast.

It has a significant military presence with a number of Army, Navy and Air Force establishments located within the two counties. Hampshire and the Isle of Wight have a vibrant tourist industry with many local areas of interest including the ancient Saxon city of Winchester.

### **Demographic profile of force area**

Hampshire Constabulary is the second largest non-metropolitan police service in England and Wales and polices an area of 418,000 hectares and serving a population of 1.8 million in 730,000 households. Approximately 411,000 people live in the two main cities; about 135,000 people live on the Isle of Wight.

There is a lower than national average black and ethnic minority (BME) population and average earnings are higher than the national average, although there are areas of deprivation. Hampshire reflects the national picture regarding traffic congestion, green belt urbanisation, an ageing population and social pressures in areas that lack housing.

### **Structural description of force area**

The headquarters is in Winchester and houses the chief officer team, comprising the Chief Constable, deputy chief constable, three assistant chief constables (ACCs) and the director of finance and resources.

The portfolio of the deputy chief constable comprises of the professional standards department, IT and communications, corporate services, media and corporate communications and strategic projects.

The ACC (specialist operations) (ACC (SO)) is responsible for the two specialist operational command units (OCUs), crime and operations. The crime OCU consists of the force intelligence bureau (FIB), major crime department (MCD), performance and review (P&R) unit, scientific services department, serious and organised crime unit (S&OCU), special branch (SB), and specialist investigations. The operations OCU consists of the air support unit, critical incident cadre, dog support unit and search, force support unit, marine support unit, operational planning and policy unit, roads policing unit (RPU) and tactical firearms support unit.

The ACC (territorial operations) (ACC (TO)) is responsible for the six territorial OCUs, which consist of the Central OCU, Isle of Wight OCU, North and East OCU, Portsmouth OCU, Southampton OCU and the Western OCU.

The ACC (personnel and operational services) is responsible for call management, the criminal justice department, personnel and training and development.

The director of finance and resources is responsible for financial accounting and services, business and property services and transport.

As at 31 May 2008, Hampshire Constabulary employs 3,823 police officers, 2,837 police staff, 331 police community support officers (PCSOs), 450 special constables, and 19 volunteers.

## Strategic priorities

Hampshire Constabulary and Hampshire Police Authority (HPA) believe that policing is best delivered when it takes account of and responds to local needs. These views are obtained through HPA's process of consultation with the public and through local intelligence gathering and consultation by the constabulary, and regard is given to both the Home Secretary's key strategic priorities for the police service for 2008/09 and to HPA's three-year strategic plan for 2008–2011. The priorities are:

- making neighbourhoods safer – working with communities to build and maintain neighbourhoods where people are safe and feel safe;
- safeguarding people – protecting the vulnerable;
- protecting communities – preventing and planning; and
- preventing, reducing and detecting crime – targeting criminals, protecting victims,

## Key initiatives to improve performance during 2007/08

Hampshire Constabulary has a stated commitment to ensuring Hampshire and the Isle of Wight remain among the safest places in the country.

In the 2007/08 policing plan the constabulary set out its strategic priorities as;

- enhancing safer neighbourhoods;
- strengthening public protection; and
- reducing and detecting crime.

In setting the force control strategy (FCS) which focused resources to achieving improved performance against these priority areas, specific stretching measures and targets were set.

The figures show overall crime is down 8.8 per cent, which equates to more than 15,000 offences, while detection rates are up across the board.

The British Crime Survey (September 2007), which measures public satisfaction, also rated the force as third nationally and top among its group of most similar forces (MSF) for the number of people who think their local police are doing a good job.

When comparing the force's annual performance figures for 2007/08 with 2006/07:

- overall crime is down by 15,954 offences to 164,94;
- violent crime is down by 2,007 offences to 42,422;
- house burglaries are down by 151 offences to 5,300;
- vehicle crime is down by 4,034 offences to 17,781;
- overall detection rates are up from 21.6 per cent to 26.5 per cent;
- violent crime detection rates are up from 42.3 per cent to 44.9 per cent;
- house burglary detection rates are up from 18.1 per cent to 18.9 per cent; and
- vehicle crime detection rates are up from 8.0 per cent to 8.1 per cent.

*July 2008*

Compared with its MSF, Hampshire Constabulary has:

- the lowest number of house burglaries for a second year running;
- the second highest level of detecting house burglaries; and
- the lowest number of vehicle crimes.

This year the constabulary's specialist units that tackle the most serious crime, including serious and organised crime, child abuse investigation and special branch, dealt with a total of 1,246 incidents and achieved a detection rate of 57.2 per cent.

Operations were executed across the two counties to disrupt and dismantle more than 30 of the most serious organised crime groups (OCGs) involved in offences such as drug supply, kidnap, money laundering and identity theft.

July 2008

## Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard
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### Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Hampshire Constabulary's effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room (MIR).

There is only one statutory performance indicator (SPI) at present, although other indicators shown below facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested below give some context around the volume of such crimes and success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care.

The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer (SIO) and specialist assets.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.236	0.221	-6.36%	0.352
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.028	-0.011	-139.29%	0.001
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	0.00%	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.105	0.077	-26.67%	0.090
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	68.42%	100.00%	+31.58pp*	93.33%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.502	0.138	-72.51%	0.194
% of blackmail crimes detected/convicted	20.88%	36.00%	+15.12pp*	25.97%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.563	0.403	-28.42%	0.368
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	40.20%	36.99%	-3.21pp*	40.55%
Number of manslaughters per 10,000 population	0.022	0.028	+27.27%	0.014
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	25.00%	100.00%	+75pp*	Not applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.055	0.083	+50.91%	0.110
% of murder crimes detected/convicted	50.00%	120.00%	+70pp*	101.23%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	3.650	3.324	-8.93%	2.448
% of rape crimes detected/convicted	14.67%	22.92%	+8.25pp*	20.95%

\*pp' is percentage points.


\*\*Most similar forces (MSF) for Hampshire are: Avon and Somerset, Bedfordshire, Essex, Kent, Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and Thames Valley.

July 2008

From the SPI data contained in the table above it can be seen that rape and to some extent kidnapping offences pose a threat to Hampshire Constabulary. The rate of offences (per 10,000 residents) for rape is high and in excess of the MSF average by some margin – this is the case despite a recent decrease in offences. The rate of offences for kidnapping is also high and above the MSF average, though it should be noted that there was a significant decrease in 2007. On a positive note, there was a substantial reduction in the level of blackmail offences in 2007 that has brought Hampshire Constabulary to a position comfortably below that of the MSF average.


The SPI data also indicates that major crime investigation in Hampshire is strong when compared to the peer group. Hampshire Constabulary has sanction detection rates in excess of the MSF average for all major crime categories, with the exception of those for kidnapping. In addition to the fact that sanction detections are above the MSF average, it should be noted that this current position is largely due to substantial improvements seen in 2007.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT) released on 25 September 2007 revealed that Hampshire Constabulary faces an exceptional level of demand in respect of the policing response to rape offences.



The rate of offences is well above both the national and MSF averages despite the fact that there was a decrease in offences in 2007.

Rape (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total, Excl. MPS



Hampshire Constabulary is bordered by 2 other forces that also indicate raised demand for policing response to this type of crime.



*July 2008*

The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified its major crime priorities within the force control strategy (FCS). The force strategic intelligence requirement (FSIR) has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on the identified crime types.

Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and/or addressed.

The force has invested suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and inhibit major crime. Other significant areas have been identified and shared with the force but have been redacted from this report for operational security reasons. This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a maturing process in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with police forces in the south east region and also Dorset are recognised, although these are at a very early stage.

## Intelligence

**Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, supplying intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to its major crime investigations with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.**

### Strengths

- Within the major crime department (MCD) there are three dedicated crime analysts who respond to the operational demands of the MCD, which is primarily for homicide and stranger rapes. They also complete strategic assessments (SAs) in order to identify major crime trends, and have recently completed a profile on knife-related homicide.
- Within the force intelligence bureau (FIB) there are focus desk teams, each with intelligence analysts (these are overseen by the senior analyst). These provide a service seven days a week, but not 24 hours a day (see Areas for improvement below).
- The desks undertake problem profiles for specific crime themes such as violent crime (including homicide and rape), and community issues as far as they impact on major crime, eg immigration offences. The focus desks mirror, in part, the areas of risk identified in the force control strategy (FCS).
- Open source intelligence is used by the focus desks in their scanning processes, which include specific word searches of force systems, eg command and control (Altaris) and the record management system (RMS). This informs actions for the homicide prevention strategy as well as ensuring crimes and incidents do not develop into critical incidents or more serious crimes. Snapshot problem profiles are completed monthly.

### Work in progress

- Details of other specialist analytical capability have been examined by the inspection team and owing to operational security reasons the detail has redacted from the report.
- The force has identified that there is a need for better training of its analysts for specific crime types.
- The murder prevention project has identified various intelligence requirements which include the necessity to identify precursor incidents.

### Area(s) for improvement

- Analysts at territorial OCU level are not focused towards major crime issues. With a few exceptions, analysts within the MCD tend to react to ongoing enquiries and therefore rely upon analysts and other members of staff from the focus desk to identify emerging themes and trends, eg precursor work for crimes of rape.
- The scanning process undertaken by FIB analysts is duplicating work being carried out by others. This daily activity is reducing analytical capacity at level 2.

- There is a need to fully resource the violent crime desk within the FIB and include an intelligence development officer.

## **RECOMMENDATION 1**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should review both capacity and efficient use of analytical support dedicated to the Level 2 intelligence function.**

**Summary – The force seeks intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force's community impact assessments (CIAs) to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.**

### **Strengths**

- For every major crime enquiry there is analytical support allocated to the team.
- There is some evidence of understanding of the drivers of homicide through the knife crime problem profile and of the geographical distribution of homicides (see Areas for improvement below).
- Intelligence concerning major crime types flows upwards through the NIM process to the level 2 FIB. The desks within the FIB have some effective arrangements for information sharing with organisations and partners such as the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA), the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and Interpol. The desks rely upon contact with partners at territorial OCU level, eg relationships with drug and alcohol action teams (DAATs).
- Intelligence cells on major crime enquiries obtain local operational command units' (OCUs) intelligence requirements. Focused intelligence gathering then takes place to meet this gap alongside the investigation and this is disseminated to local intelligence management units (IMUs).
- CIAs are required in all major crime cases and these are completed in a timely fashion by the district chief inspector or the Safer Neighbourhood inspector in conjunction with the SIO.
- Major crime cases are not concluded until the force has undertaken a consolidation phase, and as far as possible included OCU resources to regain a sense of normality in areas that have been impacted by the crime investigation; this includes leafleting, high visibility patrols and public meetings.
- The FIB has a dedicated community desk that monitors cross-force community intelligence and has awareness of level 2 and 3 action and investigations.
- Multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPAs) partnership working and prevention is being driven by the police and probation. Information sharing works well between the police, probation and adult services with involvement and contributions at MAPPAs meetings by housing and mental health services. Some other partners are not so active in their contributions.

### Work in progress

- None identified.

### Area(s) for improvement

- There is a need to undertake multi-agency activity up to force level in order to focus upon and prevent major crime. In order to achieve this there is a need for the FIB to exploit existing protocols with crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) in order to gather and exchange information at level 2.
- Analysts produce target and victim profiles; however, operational understanding of this analysis needs to be improved, in particular with regard to the development of preventative activity. The homicide prevention strategy is, however, a significant step towards bridging this gap, but this needs to become more widely understood and developed within mainstream business across the force. Major crime analytical resources need to be committed towards problem profiles that are of a satisfactory standard.
- The lack of a community safety department (CSD) analyst is impacting the force ability to develop prevention initiatives, and as a result the FIB analysts are completing this work, which detracts from their contribution to the major crime analytical function.
- There is a need to exploit level 1 resources, particularly Safer Neighbourhood teams, for major crime intelligence gathering. Recent improvements within the structure and systems of the MCD intelligence function should adequately cater for improvement in level 1 intelligence gathering as they are implemented.
- While there is an independent advisory group (IAG) in place, these are not routinely used as a point of contact into communities to assist in CIAs or empowered to inform links into minority communities. It is recognised that this is a force issue and that the MCD has an ambition to utilise independent advice, but is restricted by availability. A recent example of engagement is a presentation to the newly formed race and faith IAG on homicide investigation and CIAs.

**Summary – The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to its major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the FCS is found to be similarly adequate. Problem profiles for knife crime and homicide are satisfactory, with links to force plans and limited links to OCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.**

### Strengths

- The FSA identifies some emerging threats and crime types which are then distilled into the FCS. The FCS is very brief but includes major crime under the heading of preventing, reducing and detecting crime.
- Preventative, enforcement and intelligence measures are identified but in a limited capacity. As a result the FCS has limited focus on level 1 activity towards major crime.
- There is an understanding of the threats posed by other life-threatening issues

July 2008

such as dangerous offenders and paedophile rings through the FCS. MAPPA, rape, serious violence, child abuse and domestic abuse are translated into the FSIR.

- The FSIR provided some evidence of identified intelligence gaps and the tactical assessment (TA) provided evidence of prioritisation of resources to target specific operations.
- Each of the six territorial OCUs has a public protection unit (PPU) and these are serviced by a central team within the CSD. This ensures that the management of violent offenders and registered sex offenders (RSOs) is linked to other closely related disciplines.
- There are detective inspectors (DIs) who have been identified as force leads for each of the vulnerable areas, eg domestic abuse, MAPPA, homicide prevention, child abuse, homophobic crime.

### **Work in progress**

- A developing area is to identify OCGs or individuals responsible for specific crime types. Until recently National Intelligence Model (NIM) profiles developed by FIB analysts identified crimes committed by OCGs rather than individuals responsible.
- The crime OCU business plan for 2007/08 addresses organisational priorities that match the FCS, but the force has recognised that the response to major crime should be more comprehensively reflected in it. The business delivery plan for 2008/09 published in January 2008 now fully reflects a range of measures for the MCD to deliver these priorities.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- CDRP and OCU priorities should be more clearly linked to the FCS objectives in order to provide a more holistic and geographic approach to these major crime themes.
- Within the FSA there is no clear prioritisation and subsequently there are no priorities set within the FCS and no assessment tools are used.
- Data used for the FSA should be expanded to include sources from external agencies.
- While precursor events are outlined in the crime OCU business plan, there is little analytical scoping of these crime types and their impact.
- While headquarters (HQ) department business plans generally reflect the FCS to a limited degree, they do not specifically address their actions towards major crime.
- While neighbourhood profiles are completed as part of the roll-out of Safer Neighbourhoods, they are not analysed or assessed with regard to the identification of vulnerability, harm or increasing demand above district/OCU level.

## RECOMMENDATION 2

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that OCU intelligence products should contain greater focus and emphasis on the Level 1 contribution towards tackling major crime and serious and organised crime.**

**Summary – The force trend analysis and problem profiles at level 2 are rarely shared with partners and OCUs. There is limited evidence of trigger plans for hot briefing when there is a significant change in either the threat or nature of the analysis. Information-sharing protocols with key partners at level 1 such as CDRPs exist; however, there is limited evidence of information sharing-protocols at a higher level. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information (MoPI) compliance by 2010.**

### Strengths

- Information is being shared in a timely manner, in particular through the FIB focus desks, which have developed good personal relationships, and staff attend meetings across agencies (see Areas for improvement below). There is a specific agencies desk which is outward-focused and liaises with law enforcement agencies nationally and internationally in respect of major crime and serious and organised crime.
- There is a general information-sharing protocol for the force that is mainly used at OCU/CDRP level.
- Comment is made elsewhere in this report about territorial OCU public PPU's having good relationships with partners. The PPU's have developed protocols to gather intelligence from partners' systems and share this in a timely manner.
- There are dedicated prison liaison officer posts sited within the prisons who work very closely with the prison service. The force intelligence management unit (FIMU) provides a 24-hour contact point for all outside agencies and police officers. The violent crime desk has sound working relationship with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and there is frequent ad hoc information sharing.
- The violent crime desk produces monthly data for the serious crime analysis section (SCAS) at the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA). Furthermore there is evidence of regular supply and use of data to and from the centralised analytical team collating homicide expertise and management (CATCHEM), NPIA good practice (GENESIS) and National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) databases to assist in intelligence gathering and use of best practice.

### Work in progress

- There is a general information-sharing protocol in place which is mainly used at CDRP level, and work is under way in the FIB to construct bespoke information-sharing protocols.
- Work in Hampshire Constabulary has continued towards implementation of MoPI in six business areas, building on the threshold standards, which were met in March 2007.

July 2008

- Following a peer review, the current force action plan will be adjusted to cover other business areas which have responsibility for managing policing information. The emphasis continues on maintaining the momentum for MoPI with a risk-based implementation from the initial six business areas to compliance across all business areas by 2010. This project status is on target to achieve compliance and is assessed as green status.
- The 2008 control strategy has a strand to work with partners to tackle serious sexual and violent offenders.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Notwithstanding the positive comments above, the exchange of information tends to concern single crimes rather than the overarching of crime types on the various organisations.
- There is little evidence of proactive sharing of intelligence within the MCD and other agencies relating to homicide.
- While the violent crime desk has good links and contact with the health service, this significant area of business should not rely on a single point of contact and there is a need for the force to improve intelligence sharing with the health service for violent crimes, although this is better at some unitary local authority sites.

**Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, some future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.**

### **Strengths**

- There is evidence of some understanding of vulnerable communities being identified in neighbourhood profiles which are then used as a source for territorial OCU SAs at level 1. Furthermore, there is evidence of sound use of lesbian and gay liaison officers (LAGLO) within the community during the investigation of homophobic attacks and in providing reassurance to specific community groups.
- The force has good public protection arrangements which identify the risk posed by MAPPAs offenders and potentially dangerous people. There are weekly meetings held between police and the probation service and strong management by police supervisors and managers. All referrals are recorded on MAPPAs meeting minutes and entered onto the Violent and Sex Offenders Register (ViSOR) IT system. There is a central ViSOR unit and PPU offender management teams which have responsibility for updating records and quality assurance. The force has provided evidence demonstrating that access to ViSOR is available to a significant number of intelligence teams across the force, and the FIMU provides 24-hour access if required.
- Details of other strengths been examined by the inspection team and shared with the force but owing to operational security reasons the detail has been redacted from this report.

### **Work in progress**

- There is work in progress to scope prevention activity and the understanding behind honour killings. The force is scoping a multi-faith women's IAG at force level which focuses on honour-based violence, domestic violence etc.
- The force is setting up a disability IAG and a lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGTB) IAG.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Vulnerable communities are not identified above level 1 and are not explicit within the FSA. Some crime types that involve specific communities, eg cannabis factories, describe the targets but have little emphasis on the effect of these crimes on vulnerable communities.
- There is no evidence available to show how the force can scope the impact of major crime on itself and on the communities in Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, or review the ability of the force to deliver the control strategy.
- While some demographic profiling at neighbourhood level describes communities, these need to be enhanced to identify areas of risk, vulnerability and difference in major crime issues.
- The FSA is silent on the vulnerability of communities.
- The FSA does not mention the risk posed by RSO or MAPPA offenders to vulnerable communities.

### **RECOMMENDATION 3**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop its analytical processes to fully understand the impact of major crime on its communities (and in particular vulnerable groups). In order to do this detailed community profiles should be developed which will inform future risk and threat assessments.**

**Summary – The force strategic risk register (FSRR) is reviewed every three months by the resource management board (RMB). Each identified risk has a current action plan, which is monitored on a quarterly basis prior to the resource management board.**

### **Strengths**

- The FSRR is owned by the director of finance and resources. It is reviewed on a quarterly basis by the RMB. There is a definition for each identified risk and each risk is scored against probability, impact and exposure, which then determines the risk level. There is then a scoring process for the effectiveness of control measures to mitigate the risk. Each identified risk has a risk owner and an accountable individual who is a member of the chief officer team.
- The FSRR records risks to the organisation at a strategic level, eg threat of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) or other terrorist attack, non-implementation of operational legislation, threat of pandemic etc.
- There is an organisational risk register following similar processes to that of the

July 2008

strategic risk register, with the definition, scoring and effectiveness of controls and risk owners. There are ten risks recorded which range from the flooding of a police station to failure to monitor working time regulations.

- There is a force resilience forum chaired by the assistant chief constable (strategic operations) (ACC (SO)) which has its own risk register. This includes the availability of the Home Office Major Large Enquiry System (HOLMES) as an investigative tool, and is detailed and linked to the community risk register as required by the Civil Contingencies Act.
- The risk management co-ordinator monitors the actions identified at the RMB and each action is intended to treat, transfer, tolerate or terminate the identified risk (see Areas for improvement below).

### **Work in progress**

- While there is no Crime OCU risk register, the work which is in progress to improve capability and capacity of protective services (in the light of *Closing the Gap* and the ACPO minimum standards) has a new protective services risk register linked to its identified actions within its improvement plan. The risks across the 14 protective service areas are shared with other OCUs and will be routinely monitored by the ACC (SO) and through the protective service governance project. The risk register follows the 'bowtie' method and the recognised scoring method detailed in strengths above.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force needs to ensure that operational imperatives, an example of which would be the risk associated with the significant shortage of detectives across the force, are included within the protective service risk register.
- It is recognised that the organisational risk register does look at generic and themed risks, but few of these relate to serious and organised crime issues, eg drug factories and human trafficking, and more relate to business risks such as the risk to the organisation's information security from non-compliance with the force policy of clear desks due to the lack of provision of storage for paperwork. This limits the amount of information available to resource and prioritise the risk.
- There needs to be a formal process which identifies and escalates risks onto the FSRR, including those already identified and included on other risk registers. Furthermore, it is evident that there is difficulty in following up actions in order to make sure that activity takes place.

July 2008

**Summary – The force is not fully collaborating with all the others within its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation. With the exception of automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) and ViSOR, none of the force operational databases are searchable or accessible from outside of the force area. However, the South East regional intelligence unit (SERIU) does have access to Hampshire Constabulary IT systems and a user access requirement is being agreed. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been implemented.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has an integrated record management system (RMS) that allows it to link all its records on one IT platform, including command and control, intelligence and crime management systems. This system is potentially capable of linking with 11 other police forces who also have the same system.
- The force has invested heavily in the HOLMES system and is currently using HOLMES version 11A, which is interoperable with other forces, and has major incident room web (MIRWEB) and CASWEB functionality.
- The force has checked and cross-referred critical data links from archived HOLMES to the RMS system; where the names of TIE (trace, interview and eliminate) suspects exist within HOLMES, these have been cross-indexed and can be searched on RMS.
- Each HOLMES enquiry has a dedicated intelligence cell which identifies intelligence within HOLMES and disseminates this both generically onto RMS and specifically to interested parties, eg local OCU IMUs, as a result of identified gap analysis.
- The FIMU has access to all force IT systems including Altaris, RMS, the Police National Computer (PNC), ViSOR and legacy systems but does not have access to HOLMES.
- Intelligence collection includes access to information from uniformed officers, detectives and specialist units such as the dedicated source-handling unit (DSHU), MIRs etc, which is submitted to the FIMU. This acts as both a quality control and sanitiser of all intelligence submitted using the 5x5x5 system, and ensures intelligence sources are fully protected.
- Within the FIB there is a focus desk which is dedicated to liaising with other law enforcement agencies. This desk physically exchanges information and intelligence between agencies both regionally, nationally and internationally. Out of hours the FIMU undertakes intelligence checks with other forces and acts as the portal for IMPACT nominal index (INI) checks.
- Details of the force ANPR have been examined by the inspection team and owing to operational security reasons the detail has redacted from the report.
- The Altaris command and control system is searchable by officers for listening to automatic voice recordings. This has proved useful in such cases as rapes (first reports). This IT benefit has been marketed through policy and training.

July 2008

- The territorial OCU PPU's have good relationships with partners and have developed protocols to gather intelligence from partners' systems. The MAPPA co-ordinator has access to the probation OASYS system. Prison liaison officers work in the prisons and are able to liaise with prison intelligence officers.
- Evidence was provided to show that action is being taken to address the Richard recommendations. The force is working towards implementation of MoPI in six business areas, building on threshold standards which were met in March 2007. Project status is green and on target to meet compliance by 2012.
- The force seeks to be fully compliant with directorate of public affairs (DPA) requirements under the lead of the deputy chief constable who is the national lead for IT security.

### **Work in progress**

- The force has completed a gap analysis concerning intelligence and data sharing across systems, which has led to a force improvement plan.
- It is recognised by the force and across the region that there are difficulties in compatibility with IT systems operated by forces. The current regional collaborative aims have been developed where there is only limited impact by IT systems.
- Details of the force ANPR have been examined by the inspection team and owing to operational security reasons the detail has redacted from the report.
- Details of the force proposed links to outside agencies have been examined by the inspection team which has benefited specialist and collaborative activities/operators and owing to operational security reasons the detail has redacted from the report.
- The force has joined with the BIA and HMRC to establish co-located offices at an international ferry port.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Four areas of improvement have been shared with the force and owing to operational security reasons these have been redacted from this report.
- There is a need for a scoping exercise to be completed within the FIMU to identify training needs of officers/staff, based upon the analysis of poor intelligence submissions.
- The RMS is not able to interface with Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) IT systems to allow the secure transfer of sensitive data and case files.
- Hampshire Constabulary and its statutory partners should have shared intelligence requirements and associated collection plans to improve efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence gathering and sharing. There is a need to exploit existing protocols between Hampshire Constabulary, CDRPs and other law enforcement agencies in order to gather and exchange information at level 2.

**Summary – The force has a case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is effective.**

**Strengths**

- There is a review policy in place for major crime cases which is reviewed on an annual basis and is applied to all major crime cases. There is a dedicated performance and review (P&R) team who are line managed by the head of crime OCU.
- The ACC (SO) has good overview of all major crime cases and the dedicated P&R team carry out 28-day reviews on each homicide case. Depending on the nature of the enquiry, a gold group will be set up which provides an additional degree of rigour and oversight, eg Operation Heathcote.
- A case tracking system was introduced from 1 April 2007 and the detective inspector (DI) on the P&R team looks at performance dynamically against the tracking system. The P&R team also carry out thematic reviews for other major crime investigations, eg investigation of rape.
- The force does submit returns to NCPE for rape. Furthermore, the force has improved its performance in its data submissions to the NCPE serious crime analysis section (SCAS). The force has link officers within the intelligence directorate who manage the process.
- Good practice is sought from other forces, eg the Essex Briefing Book, which picks up immediate issues ahead of minutes being typed. The use of the NPJA Crime Faculty is exploited to good effect and Strathclyde Police shared good practice in the investigation and prevention of knife crime.
- Debriefs take place dependent on the need to identify good practice and lessons to be learnt for future operations. These can be facilitated by the head of the P&R team. For example, Operation Otter resulted in a change in policy for scene guarding.
- Major crime investigations carried out on territorial OCUs are subject to the same review timescales, and these are reviewed by the OCU detective chief inspector (DCI).
- MAPPA processes are well established and the strategic management board (SMB) decides upon appropriate courses of action and review, eg single or multi-agency review. The SMB undertakes a bi-annual audit where it dip samples a number of cases. A variety of cases are selected from across the force area and each case is reviewed with information being provided by relevant partners.

**Work in progress**

- The P&R team is developing an intranet site which will publish good practice identified from reviews and other enquiries in a matrix form.
- The organisational learning and good practice matrix and library are currently under development by the crime OCU P&R unit and will be included on the intranet. A system for chasing through all recommendations and best practice

July 2008

(including those obtained through review and debriefing) is proposed. HOLMES is intended to be used as a management tool.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

**Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process functions satisfactorily to manage suitable responses to major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.**

### **Strengths**

- Assessments of historical and current criminality in order to identify predictable demand are undertaken by the violent crime desk within the FIB. Examples provided are the problem profiles for homicide and knife crime.
- The structure of tasking and co-ordinating within Hampshire Constabulary is incrementally based and within the crime OCU there are separate tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) processes for the seven departments. FIB desks attend all of these meetings as appropriate. Each department TCG reports to the crime OCU TCG meeting, where decisions are made on engaging resources and managing major crime demands. Once reviewed and agreed by this meeting, chaired by the head of crime, this feeds in to the monthly force TCG.
- There are regular tasking and co-ordinating processes throughout the Hampshire Constabulary, which provide information and intelligence to enable an assessment of threats posed. There is then a bidding process within the TCG to determine the level of resource applied at level 1 and level 2. This assessment is based upon NIM intelligence rather than harm, vulnerability, impact or risk.
- The force has identified appropriate operational priorities to manage the risk of identified threats or harm being realised. There are links between the SA, FCS and FSIR. For each threat recommended as a control strategy priority, the SA identifies current situations and emerging trends or predictions.

### **Work in progress**

- Previously the threats posed by an increase in kidnapping have not featured highly within the SA; however, this has been identified by the force and it has indicated that kidnap will be included within the new FSA and FCS.
- While NIM compliance has been part of the force review process since 2005/06, a compliance check has not been completed since the reorganisation of the intelligence directorate in May 2007. However, the NPIA will be carrying out a compliance check in 2008/09.
- The focus desk functions are currently being reviewed in order to determine whether existing structures, roles and portfolios match the FCS and emerging crime issues.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Current activity is not reviewed in detail within the FSA; furthermore the

July 2008

assessment and its review document does not identify emerging threats that sit outside the current FCS. However, current activity was discussed (but not recorded in any detail) at the crime TCG and, based on the minutes of the force strategic TCG, there was limited evidence supplied demonstrating the outcome of specialist policing activity.

- There is a need for a more formalised and documented decision-making process, which details the rationale for not supporting or resourcing operations, particularly those submitted by territorial OCUs. While activity within the crime OCU was widely understood, this was not disseminated to territorial OCUs and there was an element of frustration at that level as to why bids were not receiving support.
- The crime OCU has its own separate finance and personnel functions (specialist) within it. These specialists do not attend any of the TCG meetings and are not involved in the discussions for operations. It is, however, recognised that key police managers attending TCG meetings also sit on finance and personnel panels. Budget-holders from specialist service providers do attend and will consider both financial and physical resourcing.

**Summary – Due to inadequate bespoke training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is limited.**

**Strengths**

- There is some evidence of bespoke training being provided to some specialist staff, eg FLO co-ordinators attended an Islamic awareness seminar, some major crime officers have attended multi-agency training days run by the Southampton Mosque and officers going through the initial crime investigator’s development programme (ICIDP) receive some training.
- Recognising the need for Polish speaking staff, the Isle of Wight OCU is supporting two officers in learning Polish.
- All MCD training days over recent years have had a dedicated diversity input.

**Work in progress**

- The MCD is developing a series of bespoke training packages for MCD training days which have distilled the learning from recent crime investigation.

**Area(s) for improvement**

- The force has been unable to supply a human resources (HR) training plan specifically for major crime or diversity.
- While diversity is included within some training courses, there is not a structured approach to providing awareness training of diverse community needs during major crime investigations. Few staff have received specific training and, with the exception of the examples listed in strengths above, no benefits have been realised.

## Prevention

**Summary – The force has an IAG but this is rarely used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.**

### Strengths

- A force-level IAG has been established consisting of five members, who have terms of reference to inform and advise the constabulary on diversity matters. It is consulted and advice is recorded in the minutes of formal meetings chaired by an ACC. The ACC (SO) and the ACC (Territorial Operations) (ACC (TO)) both sit on the force IAG, thereby ensuring that the IAG has insight into specialist operations, territorial policing issues and perspectives, and policy and direction.
- A Hampshire Constabulary consultative group (HCCG) is in place. Its members are drawn from diverse communities and have responsibility within their terms of reference for the review of existing policies and those that are being developed, but it is not within their terms of reference to take an active part in gold groups or inform the direction of activity in the investigation of major crime.
- The Hampshire IAG has scrutinised one CIA of Operation Oak Tree while the operation was still running. Furthermore, evidence has been submitted concerning the use of CIAs following major crime incidents, eg Operation Otter, and how community leaders assisted during Operation Roebuck (all minuted).
- As part of the neighbourhood policing project, the force has established key individual networks (KINs) at neighbourhood level and there is evidence that the MCD tap in to the local knowledge of safer neighbourhood officers and police community support officers (PCSOs) to make contact with the community.
- The force makes good use of established internal representative groups such as LGTB groups and the Black Police Association. Evidence has been provided where these groups have been used as link officers into diverse communities; a specific example is the homophobic attacks in the Southampton area.
- There were examples provided from across the force area of other groups who assist the police in the direction of investigations, eg a youth IAG, Portsmouth OCU IAG and the silver sexual offences investigation group, run by the head of CID attended by other partners.

### Work in progress

- The force is in the process of setting up a disability IAG and an LGBT IAG.

### Area(s) for improvement

- While the force IAG has been consulted about CIAs, this does not happen routinely, and furthermore they have yet to be involved in a major crime investigation gold group. However, the race and faith IAG have received a presentation from the MCD on homicide investigation.
- The IAG is not drawn from all representative groups from within the Hampshire Constabulary area, and while it can provide advice and guidance, it does not always represent its communities or groups; therefore, the composition of the IAG should be reviewed.

- While there are terms of reference for the HCCG and IAGs, the force has not supplied any evidence that formal partnership agreements exist or that there is a review process.

#### **RECOMMENDATION 4**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should review how it can more effectively use its IAGs. This review should ensure vulnerable groups are represented, that IAGs are routinely consulted during major crime investigations and where appropriate consideration be given to members participating in gold groups.**

**Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that 'golden hour' principles were sufficiently understood and tested by call management staff and first responders.**

#### **Strengths**

- There are clear and easily accessible procedures contained within the RMS and police national legal database (PNLD) for seeking specialist advice and guidance, which was clearly understood by officers and staff. There is a comprehensive series of on-call rotas for major crime which is facilitated through the force control room. There is an organised and structured approach to the call-out of specialist resources which is accessible through the RMS to all officers and staff, which is routed through the control room out of hours. This is regularly tested in real-life events and has proven to be effective.
- The force has in place systems and processes to promptly identify and action both critical and potentially critical incidents and major crimes. The force has a critical incident cadre of superintendents and other specialist who take responsibility for critical incidents. The cadre was recently the subject of an external evaluation by London Metropolitan University who gave them high praise and issued a series of practical recommendations.
- The crime OCU provides an SIO rota of DCIs and detective superintendents to provide strategic direction. This is supplemented by a territorial operations (TO) DCI on-call rota. If more than one major incident comes in simultaneously, then the TO DCI will take responsibility for the less serious incident in the initial stages.
- The force has introduced a new shift pattern within the crime OCU which provides weekend coverage of specialist resources including the MCD.
- It is evident from group interviews that there is a good level of understanding of 'golden hour' issues and the actions required to respond to them. Call-handling staff benefit from drop-down menus on the command and control system to ensure that correct questions are asked and prompt action taken.
- The potential for a missing person to lead to a critical incident was clearly understood by staff at all levels.
- To minimise organisational risk around critical incidents and major crime, violent

July 2008

crime and community focus desks within the FIB undertake daily searches of crimes and incidents to ensure appropriate action has been taken.

- Within the scientific support department there is a comprehensive list of on-call specialists available to provide support to major crime teams.
- The force follows the guidelines on major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) and has recently undertaken a capability assessment for compliance.

### **Work in progress**

- Following the MIRSAP capability assessment there were a series of recommendations which the force is in the process of addressing, eg the major crime quality assurance group is soon to be replaced by the strategic operations crime quality assurance group which will be chaired by the head of crime.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

## **Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.**

### **Strengths**

- There is a good understanding of the threats arising from risks such as drug markets, alcohol abuse, domestic abuse, child abuse, dangerous offenders and town-centre violence.
- At OCU level the PPU's bring together the risk of vulnerability and dangerousness linking domestic abuse, public protection (RSOs and MAPPAs offenders), child abuse, vulnerable adults and hate crime.
- Analysis of the threat posed by dangerous offenders is managed through the MAPPAs process and prevention strategies are drawn up and agreed by all partner agencies.
- There are well-established and active CDRPs across the force which undertake preventative activity and link in with the Safer initiatives. In relation to major crime the key 'Safer' are tackling knife crime through Safer streets and domestic abuse within Safer homes. There is some evidence of unitary CDRPs owning homicide and knife crime reduction work.
- There is a rape prevention group within Hampshire, which is focusing on preventative work for vulnerable communities.
- The violent crime desk within the FIB searches intelligence and crime databases in order to identify precursor offences. This desk is currently leading the force Sharp initiative using analysis of the use of knives, and in particular the part that knives play in gang-related violence.
- The OCU PPU's also carry out searches on incidents to identify high-risk incidents which can quickly become critical and where a poor police response is both life-threatening and poses severe reputational risks for the force. This allows

July 2008

immediate action to be taken with the involvement of the critical incident cadre or at the appropriate level.

- A preventative approach to domestic violence has been adopted and the PPU analysts are using the domestic violence separation/pregnancy/escalation/cultural/sexual assault/stalking (SPECSS) risk model.
- There are a number of discrete pieces of work by force leads within the MCD to scope their designated portfolios with the homicide prevention strategy.
- The prison liaison officers identify prisoners due for release and notify FIB focus desks in order to identify risks of re-offending.
- Hampshire Constabulary has a good working relationship with the HSE and Trading Standards in preventative and investigative capacities. Examples are the joint media releases from the HSE and the major crime team for the Gosport War Memorial investigation and the knife test purchase operation by Trading Standards jointly with the police. This activity forms part of a work strand from the homicide prevention strategy for knife crime.

### **Work in progress**

- The force has recently completed a homicide problem profile in order to drive prevention activity and compliment the work currently being done by inspector leads for the six strands of homicide.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- An area for improvement has been shared with the force but has been redacted from this report for operational security reasons.
- The existing drugs strategy group is police-centric with no CDRP representation. There is recognition that the drugs strategy needs to be improved to include more preventative work, which is currently limited.
- Some unitary CDRPs have their own homicide reduction work but this is not uniform across all CDRPs in Hampshire and the Isle of Wight.

**Summary – The policy covering threat to life is fully accessible to staff and partially understood and implemented. Examples of joint, regional, cross-border and multi-agency operations exist.**

### **Strengths**

- There is a documented threat to life policy which is accessible via PNLD or the intranet. The force has a murder prevention champion and Osman warnings form part of the murder prevention strategy.
- The policy is well understood and applied in a dynamic fashion across the organisation irrespective of rank. There are procedures in place where officers can get advice from the CID, duty inspector, critical incident cadre and the DCI on call (both SO and TO). The witness protection unit (WPU) can also be contacted for advice.

July 2008

- Prevention tactics are considered and used, eg arrest of the subject or potential victim and overt disruption through uniformed patrols – these are generally considered before the use of Osman warnings. The rationale behind the decision made and options discounted will be recorded as a policy decision.
- Reports of threats to kill have declined during 2007 when compared with 2006.
- Operation Sharp has preventative activities based upon intelligence and seeks to prevent knife-related homicides, in particular those crimes involving gangs and young persons. This operation has also involved test purchases (knives) in partnership with trading standards.
- Operation Phoenix is an example where the force together with other forces tackled the illegal use of Class A drugs, firearms and stolen property.
- Other areas of strength concerning to ‘threat to life’ have been examined by the inspection team and for operational security reasons have been redacted from this report but have been shared with the force.

### **Work in progress**

- The force identified that there is no system in place to identify how many Osman warnings have been given, and how many were repeat warnings or repeat threat to life occurrences during a particular time period. The P&R unit within the crime OCU are undertaking a full review of the threat to life policy, management and protocols and will submit both findings and a new policy to the ACC (SO) for consultation and approval.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force should conduct a training needs analysis for supervisors and managers who may need to give advice on Osman warnings and other preventative measures.
- There are no authority levels set for the issue of Osman warnings.
- There is no system in place for the delivery or monitoring of cross-border Osman warnings.
- The force should develop a firearms suppression strategy to compliment the existing threat to life policy. There is limited evidence (excepting Operation Trojan 1 and 2 and Operation Radon) of individual or joint disruptive operations against gun crime.

**Summary – The force has a witness protection capability supported by dedicated covert resources. The force operates to a policy that is promulgated to and understood by most staff. The force is collaborating with other forces and partners.**

### **Strengths**

- There is a clear policy that is accessible to officers via the intranet. During group interviews officers showed understanding of the need to protect witnesses and where they would go to for advice and guidance.

July 2008

- The witness protection team has been involved in raising its profile and increasing understanding of serious and organised crime teams by providing a one-day input on witness protection, and the MCD have had an input on this.
- Currently there are approximately four times as many witnesses, subjected to protection, located within Hampshire from other forces than the force has within its own programme.
- Other areas of strength have been identified by the inspection team and shared with the force but for operational security reasons these have not been included within this report.

### **Work in progress**

- The South East collaboration consortium is developing minimum standards for witness protection, including processes and a standard template and the use of a standard IT system; the use of PIMS or ViSOR have yet to be agreed.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- While there was good understanding of witness protection at level 2, further work should be undertaken with officers and staff at territorial OCU level to improve their level of understanding and subsequent referral or tactical options where needed.

**Summary – The force has a limited system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.**

### **Strengths**

- The FIB focus desks receive and review copies of threat assessments and TCG minutes from all OCU level 1 TCGs to look at common threats.
- Within the territorial OCUs there is a good understanding of local communities within neighbourhoods; this is in part resulting from the profiles completed under the safer neighbourhoods project.
- The FIB community desk sits above OCU IMUs and monitors community intelligence, specific crimes such as immigration offences and community tensions. There is some limited community infiltration through Safer Neighbourhood officers, CHISs and local community safety officers where intelligence is obtained.
- The first phase of Operation Phoenix has been independently evaluated by Portsmouth University to consider the impact on the community, following a police operation involving 600 officers.
- Major crime enquiries utilise their intelligence cells in order to scope local intelligence requirements, which are then fed back to OCUs.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The force needs to develop its understanding and intelligence regarding vulnerable communities and the harm upon them as a result of major crime. A tool needs to be developed in order to quantify this harm using identified harm indicators. Some limited work is being carried out by the serious and organised crime desk, which completes a monthly profile regarding some communities who are considered to be vulnerable. But as yet the force has not identified specific vulnerable communities.
- The communities desk needs to develop information-sharing protocols with CDRPs and other enforcement agencies in order to access their data, which has been analysed at a higher level in order to identify harm within communities across the force. These policing family members should be tasked as part of the Hampshire Constabulary intelligence requirement as there is a lack of understanding of both the nature of harm to communities and the impact and exploitation of these due to major crime. The force reports that counter terrorism (CT) issues and threats could be more fully recognised at CDRP level.

**Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force sometimes considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a comprehensive security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.**

### **Strengths**

- The professional standards department (PSD) has responsibility for operational security and there are security policies and protocols in place. There is a dedicated internal investigation team and a dedicated force information assurance and security officer, who looks at force policies and operational procedures at a high level.
- Vulnerable posts are risk assessed and identified for enhanced vetting. (See Work in progress below). The PSD operations team have been management vetted and the PSD IT system is stand-alone as it contains high levels of data protection and IT security.
- There is a protocol and arrangements are in place for corruption allegations to be investigated by either Kent or Surrey forces, and for the serious and organised crime casework to be dealt with by the central CPS special casework section.
- The PSD has undertaken anti-corruption initiatives and has become more proactive; for example, it has identified the possibility of breaches through inappropriate rights to IT systems and protection of sensitive data, resulting in amended authorisation, changing policy and physically moving the IT hardware to a secure site. Routine drug and alcohol tests for officers and staff are undertaken.
- Discreet flags are placed upon the RMS system where high-profile or sensitive cases are concerned. This flagging process allows the PSD to monitor those members of staff who access this sensitive information.

### **Work in progress**

- The force is in the process of implementing the minimum standards for personnel

July 2008

security as defined in the National Vetting Policy and the Police Community and the Manual of Protective Security.

- Incumbents of 'designated posts have been identified and are subject to vetting in accordance with national and local policy expectations.
- Other areas that are considered to be work in progress have been examined by the inspection team. Comments have been shared with the force but have been redacted from this report for operational security reasons.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- At the early stages of any major crime investigation the SIO should liaise with the PSD in order to develop a formal security requirement. At this time PSD advice can be obtained, risk identified and actions allocated in order to minimise this risk and improve security.
- While policies and procedures are scrutinised by the information assurance and security officer, there is only limited scrutiny of ongoing police enquiries within the crime OCU. This takes place where risk has been identified rather than as a security process targeted towards risky activities on a more routine basis.
- There is a need to enforce the clear desk policy and, while it is acknowledged that officers and staff were aware of the policy, the lack of secure storage facilities prevents this from being fully implemented.

## **Enforcement**

**Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with inadequate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.**

### **Strengths**

- There is a dedicated ACPO lead for major crime occurrences. The ACC (SO) is an experienced SIO who takes a very active approach to the oversight of the investigation of major crime. The ACC (SO) is also vice chair of the ACPO homicide working group (HWG), demonstrating the force's link nationally with heads of CID/crime and other partners and stakeholders within HWG.
- The monthly force performance group examines a number of crime OCU performance indicators including violent crime detections (which will include homicides and rapes) and compliance with victim codes.
- The Hampshire Police Authority (HPA) has a link member for major crime. There are regular meetings between the ACC (SO) (bi-monthly), head of crime (monthly) and the chair of the HPA. The HPA also attends the Crime OCU performance meetings which are held quarterly. The HPA stated that through the link members, they are informed and updated about major crime investigations.
- HPA Link members are vetted to an appropriate level depending upon their area of responsibility, eg link members for major crime and serious and organised crime are vetted to SC level.

July 2008

- Gold support groups take place once an incident has been declared as critical. The HPA members and officers have attended gold groups.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- While gold groups are attended by wide-ranging representatives from within the force, there are few examples where the wider community and other interested parties or groups, eg IAGs, are involved. While HPA members attend gold support groups, there is an emphasis on information sharing rather than critical advice and challenge.

**Summary – The ACPO lead and the head of the crime department are fully trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, CIAs and policing in partnership.**

### **Strengths**

- The ACC (SO) is a career detective who is experienced and trained in a wide range of crime investigations. He, together with the ACC (TO) and the head of crime have attended the management of linked series and serious crime course.
- The force is well prepared for the management of serial offenders and series crimes. Each focus desk within the FIB scans modus operandi (MOs) of similar crimes. The scientific support department looks at forensic retrievals (identifications) and patterning across the county; it also concentrates on significant aspects of individual crime types, eg words used by sex offenders to identify series crime.
- There is adequate support for the ACC (SO) and head of crime through the availability of trained staff and critical incident arrangements, eg the critical incident cadre. The force has tested their capabilities in this area through three live scenarios (Exercise Remount) and lower level operations (both real and simulated exercises).
- Where necessary and circumstances dictate, an officer in overall command (OIOC) is appointed, eg Operation Anagram, which is a national scoping exercise being undertaken by every police force in order to identify and review female missing person cases during specified periods. The operation is being co-ordinated nationally through the HWG and is chaired by Hampshire's ACC (SO).

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Where CIAs are required, the analysts at either local IMUs or the level 2 community focus desk should be involved in their completion; the HQ community safety team should also be consulted.
- The force needs to provide training for officers required to complete CIAs.

July 2008

**Summary – The force’s performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of cost and some outcomes, but is not sufficiently developed to measure inputs and outputs relative to cost.**

### **Strengths**

- Comment has been made earlier in this report in section MC08 concerning the review policy for major crimes, which takes place in accordance with national guidelines.
- Within 24 hours, every live major crime enquiry is reviewed by the SIO. This can be with the assistance of other peer SIOs. There is formal policy and a rigorous process to review each live enquiry after 28 days. The findings of each review are fully documented within the policy file. This process is complimented by regular TCG meetings where staffing and resource considerations are addressed. Periodic bids for additional resources and finance can be made to the head of crime either during or outside the TCG process.
- In addition, formal debriefs are held as appropriate at or towards the end of major crime investigations, eg Operation Otter. Where practicable, the organisational learning from such events is reviewed against existing force policy. In practice, organisational learning is often identified by team meetings and less informal reviews during the enquiry.
- There is clear evidence of learning from previous events, eg Operation Heathcote and the management of RSOs and dangerous offenders. The investigation into unexplained deaths at Gosport War Memorial Hospital has led to changes in the way that deaths are investigated in hospitals or other institutions.
- There is a finance panel that oversees expenditure within the crime OCU, looking at spends, staffing and vacancies. Major crime managers do not manage individual operation costs; however an overview of expenditure is provided at the crime OCU senior management team (SMT) meeting – this is a reactive approach and cost is not measured against output or goals. However, there is constant monitoring through this process for efficiency gains, eg the recent review of scene guarding to reduce cost which has subsequently changed the guiding policy.

### **Work in progress**

- The police authority is kept informed about investigations through a link member and they have just started to attend the quarterly crime OCU performance meetings where major crime investigations are discussed.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- There is some evidence that the desired outcomes are measured against cost, inputs or outputs. Subsequently, once the force understands the efficiency of its tactics, it will be more able to make decisions about the use of these tactics against its identified operational goals in the future.
- The force needs to develop financial systems to monitor and understand the amount of resource committed to each theme within prevention, intelligence,

July 2008

enforcement and sustainability (PIES), allowing them to balance the resourcing for each operation.

- The PSD owns an organisational learning matrix (OLM) which is populated with learning issues identified, and the policy-holder is then tasked with actions to be undertaken. While discussions are under way for a more formalised structure to be introduced, it does not appear that policies are being changed and there are no governance processes in place.

## Performance management and resilience

**Summary – The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with SOCA and other forces exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide sufficient protection for the investigative capability.**

### Strengths

- Hampshire Constabulary has a dedicated MCD that has strong leadership and appropriate managerial structures in place. The MCD is split across the force area working from dedicated MIRs. Accommodation appears fit for purpose.
- There is an establishment of 79 police officers and 31 police staff. At the time of inspection there were 11 police officer vacancies. The MCD is supported by the major crime and policy review unit, the HOLMES team and finance, administration and business staff.
- Based upon previous demand for major crime resources, the teams as outlined above are sufficient. In recent months there has been a significant increase in the number of homicides; this demand has been catered for within existing resources enhanced by strong management and processes, eg weekly TCGs where resourcing of crimes is discussed. The MCD has moved to a five-team structure which provides resilience and improved working practices and procedures. This also provides a more consistent service to major crime victims.
- Comment has already been made in this report about the 24-hour call-out procedures and use of contingency plans, which are sound and robust.
- There is a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the territorial OCUs that they will provide support for the first 48 hours of any major crime reported. Thereafter, it is owned by MCD and has little impact on OCUs apart from their requirement to complete CIAs.
- The force has in place systems, policies and processes to respond effectively to unexplained deaths in communities and institutions. It has been a lead force nationally in the change of approach to the investigation of unexplained deaths in hospitals, care homes and military establishments. It has a close working relationship with the HSE and was able to provide joint investigation evidence. During the inspection it was evident from group interviews of constables, sergeants and inspectors that there is a clear understanding of what is required

July 2008

at the scene of an unexplained death at such an institution or within the workplace. The 'golden hour' principles are understood at call-handler and first responder level. Lessons learnt from the investigation of unexplained deaths at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital have been promulgated across the force and shared nationally.

- The MCD has managers who lead nationally on the production of NPIA doctrine in respect of investigating deaths in healthcare settings and DNA mass screening, familial DNA investigations etc.
- All unexplained deaths are recorded on the force crime system and a quarterly digest of incidents investigated or where advice is given is circulated to OCU commanders.
- There is a dedicated investigative training capability within the training and development department. The crime OCU has a training needs group which establishes what training is required within its business areas, and this feeds in to the training prioritisation steering group. Furthermore, succession planning is determined through the crime skills group and it is evident that projected SIO vacancies have been considered and that individuals have been identified to fill vacancies at superintendent and DCI levels.
- The force is undertaking significant professionalising the investigation process (PIP) training for all major crime detectives. Ten SIOs are PIP level 3 accredited.
- Within the major crime department there are 25 officers who are tier interview trained to level 2, six at level 3, seven at level 5 and at the time of inspection a further two officers were being trained to level 5. There are 150 level 2 trained officers as a requirement of ICIDP.
- The force delivers a generic PIP three-day course to all officers. Officers who undertake the ICIDP training can go on to Portsmouth University to study for a foundation degree and funding is provided.
- The crime OCU has a programme to train 14 detective officers each year for the next two years in line with territorial OCUs. The transfer of officers into the crime OCU will be incremental, with approximately three officers each month from different territorial OCUs joining the programme.
- There is a structured training programme provided to the critical incident cadre specifically for critical incident and scene management.
- Each territorial OCU has a dedicated PPU under the line management of the DCI but professionally managed by the DCI within the CSD.
- The force has a forensic resource management unit (FRMU) which co-ordinates activity and call-out of crime scene investigators (CSIs) and other forensic specialists upon notification of an incident requiring attendance. The FRMU has access and good relationships with forensic scientists, pathologists and other experts who can be called upon 24 hours a day.
- The force is well resourced for CSIs, crime scene co-ordinators and crime scene managers (CSMs). The CSMs provide complete and thorough management of

July 2008

serious crime scenes and expert advice on evidence retrieval and efficient submission for analysis. This was evidenced at the debrief of Operation Otter, which was attended by a member of the inspection team. The CSIs are all trained in particular specialisms which have been shared with the inspection team.

- There is in place a clear approach supported by policy into the investigation and oversight of sudden and unexplained deaths. There is a grading system applied to such deaths and while child deaths (under 18 years) are investigated by the child abuse investigation unit (CAIU), other unexplained deaths are investigated locally on territorial OCUs at DS level and supervised by a DI.
- The force can evidence cross-border and collaborative arrangements for the training of its officers and staff, eg the specialist child abuse investigators development programme (SCAIDP), sexual offences investigation trained (SOIT) officers and FLOs. Within the public protection arena the force undertakes training with other agencies for the management of RSOs and dangerous offenders, and child abuse investigations at all levels.
- The force has a regional formal MOU in place to call in mutual aid if required or could go to the NPIA who organise it. The force has provided mutual aid to Kent, Suffolk and the Metropolitan Police. Arrangements are in place to request additional staff from the private sector, eg agency typists and investigators.
- There is a regional agreement to use HOLMES, but there has not been the opportunity recently to test this in live circumstances.
- The MCD has assisted the RPU with MIRSAP and policy file training. The RPU has its own trained FLOs who are included in joint training with major crime FLOs.

### **Work in progress**

- The force has rolled out the PIP level 2 accreditation programme to its DSs and DCs. There is a target in the major crime business plan that all SIOs should be accredited to PIP levels 2 or 3 within 18 months of joining the department.
- A training needs analysis (TNA) has been undertaken for all sergeants and inspectors. Gaps have been identified and new training will be in place from April 2008. Included within this new training will be complex leadership, major disaster and crime functions. Existing training has been amended for delivery to sergeants and inspectors.
- The force has identified a gap in the number of trained detectives at level 1 and 2. In addition to the strand above concerning the training of detectives, it has embarked upon a small scale workforce modernisation project within the crime OCU. This has led to the selection and appointment of 12 police staff investigators (PSIs) who are fulfilling roles within the MCD. The force has identified an induction and training gap for these PSIs which it is presently addressing.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- There is need to augment the analytical and researcher roles within the MCD as currently detectives are undertaking this role, which is taking them away from

July 2008

their core functions.

- The force as part of the south east region is yet to undertake regional intelligence- based threat assessments. These should inform resourcing levels and the need for collaborative arrangements and MOUs.
- The force has recognised that it needs to increase the number of Tier 5 tactical interview managers to reduce the impact on OCU trained staff.
- There is currently no criminal justice unit (CJU) facility within the crime portfolio. As a result officers tend to retain case folders and only submit skeleton dockets to local OCUs. There is a proposal to develop a crime CJU but in the mean time a review should take place in order to identify any gaps regarding specialist services and advice to witnesses in serious cases.

**Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be effective. There are written and verbal collaborative agreements for the provision of specialist covert resources which have proved effective when implemented. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a wide range of offences.**

### Strengths

- Following the publication of the HMIC *Closing the Gap* report, the force conducted its own gap analysis concerning its capabilities and capacity. The Strategic Forward Together project, which included the restructuring of a number of business areas including elements of the crime OCU, detailed what the force needed to do to become a stand-alone strategic police force. This included a number of enhancements to its investigative capability. This was supported by HPA, which significantly increased funding to provided additional resources and staffing levels for protective services, eg the creation of a second full-time surveillance team which allows the existing team to be dedicated to level 2 crimes; the additional team can assist in this area but in the main assists OCUs with their targets.
- There is sufficient in-force investigative and forensic technical capability for the investigation of major crime and serious and organised crime. The details of this has been shared with the inspection team but it is considered inappropriate to describe it in any detail. Furthermore, evidence has been supplied of how the force manages provision of service through service level agreements (SLAs) with external forensic technical suppliers.
- The force has a capability for the provision of pre-evidenced resources.
- The force has good working relationships with surrounding forces for use of surveillance resources. They are members of the South East surveillance users group, with which there is a set protocol for sharing resources, and the group meets on a quarterly basis.
- The force has a regional formal MOU in place to call in mutual aid if required or could go to the NPIA who organise it. The force has provided mutual aid to Kent, Suffolk and the Metropolitan Police. Arrangements are in place in order to

July 2008

request additional staff from the private sector in times of need, eg agency typists and investigators.

- The South East collaboration consortium was formed with other forces in the region – Surrey, Sussex and Thames Valley. This consortium looked at standardisation of processes, uniform purchasing of equipment and sharing of services. There were 31 recommendations of which the top eight were prioritised and include:
  1. High-tech crime unit – Hampshire leads
  2. Technical support – Thames Valley leads
  3. Witness support – Hampshire leads
  4. Air support – Sussex leads
  5. Internet crime – Surrey leads
  6. Scientific support, fingerprints and screening – Thames Valley leads
  7. Confidential unit – Sussex leads
  8. Advanced and specialist search – Thames Valley leads

### **Work in progress**

- The South East collaboration consortium as described above is currently undertaking individual review of policies and procedures within the eight identified areas in order to harmonise the processes of service delivery. This will inform joint training which commenced in December 2007.
- Other areas deemed to be work in progress have been shared with the inspection team but have been redacted from this report for operational security reasons.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- Two areas for improvement have been identified by the inspection team and shared with the force but for operational security reasons these have been redacted from this report.

**Summary – The force has a full-time and dedicated case review team that is generally deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is effective.**

### **Strengths**

- Within the crime OCU there is a dedicated P&R unit which undertakes formalised scheduled reviews and debriefs of selected major crime investigations. The majority of work undertaken by this team is with current rather than historic unsolved cases.
- There are two dedicated members of staff who undertake cold case review and other staff within the major crime team will assist them or complete independent reviews as capacity allows. At present, due to increased crime resources demand the capacity for such reviews is limited; however, the list of cold cases has been scoped for risk and potential quick wins. The force follows the ACPO murder investigation manual (MIM) guidelines for timescales of cold case

July 2008

reviews.

- Cold case reviews are commissioned by the ACC (SO) and head of crime through the TCG process.
- Road deaths are reviewed by staff within the RPU. The MCD has assisted the RPU with criminal investigations and contributed towards the road death investigation manual.
- While Hampshire Constabulary has not required other forces for category A+ murder reviews, which would be commissioned by the ACC (SO), there is an established process in place. Other forces have assisted within the review process where there has been risk to the organisation; examples include the Kent Police review of a potentially racist murder, Surrey Police conducting a 28-day review of a homicide in Portsmouth and Operation Columbian. Examples were provided of reviews for other forces being carried out by Hampshire officers.
- The force demonstrated its compliance with MIRSAP.

#### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

#### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

**Summary – The inspection found that the force was predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the MIM and MIRSAP.**

#### **Strengths**

- The MIM is widely available and understood at chief officer and SIO level. Two senior members of the force were contributors when the manual was compiled and officers from the force have been actively involved in its revision.
- MIRSAP is widely understood and implemented across the MIRs.
- The force has demonstrated its flexible application of MIRSAP through the staffing of critical MIR posts, eg the combination of receiver and action allocator, and office manager and statement reader where the demand within enquiries has allowed.
- Policy files are completed for every major crime and where HOLMES is used, policy files are recorded within it. If HOLMES is not used, a paper policy file or RMU records are completed.
- Decisions not to pursue lines of enquiry and the rationale are fully documented within the policy files. Where the TCG process directs lines of enquiry, policy logs are updated and limited rationale is included within the TCG minutes.
- Sensitive decision making will be recorded on paper files and will be added to HOLMES at the close of an enquiry.

**Work in progress**

- The force has undertaken a capability assessment against MIM and MIRSAP guidance. It has identified a small number of gaps which it is in the process of addressing.

**Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

## Recommendations

### Recommendation 1

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should review both capacity and efficient use of analytical support dedicated to the Level 2 intelligence function.

### Recommendation 2

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that OCU intelligence products should contain greater focus and emphasis on the Level 1 contribution towards tackling major crime and serious and organised crime.

### Recommendation 3

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop its analytical processes to fully understand the impact of major crime on its communities (and in particular vulnerable groups). In order to do this detailed community profiles should be developed which will inform future risk and threat assessments.

### Recommendation 4

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should review how it can more effectively use its IAGs. This review should ensure vulnerable groups are represented, that IAGs are routinely consulted during major crime investigations and where appropriate consideration be given to members participating in gold groups.

## Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

### A

ABC	Activity-based Costing
ABE	Achieving Best Evidence
ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
APA	Association of Police Authorities
ASB	Anti-social Behaviour

### B

BANES	Bath and North East Somerset
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic Command Unit
BME	Black and Minority Ethnic

### C

CAIT	Child Abuse Investigation Team
CDRP	Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
COG	Chief Officer Group
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service

### D

DC	Detective Constable
DCC	Deputy Chief Constable
DCI	Detective Chief Inspector
DI	Detective Inspector
DS	Detective Sergeant
DDA	Disability Discrimination Act

DV Domestic Violence

DV Domestic Violence

**E**

ECM Every Child Matters

**F**

FIG Force Intelligence Group

FTE Full-time Equivalent

**G**

HMI Her Majesty's Inspector

HMIC Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HQ Headquarters

HR Human Resources

**I**

ICIDP Initial Crime Investigators Development Programme

ICT Information and Communications Technology

**K**

KPI Key Performance Indicator

**L**

LSCB Local Safeguarding Children Board

**M**

MAPPA Multi-agency Public Protection Arrangements

MARAC Multi-agency Risk Assessment Conference

MSF Most Similar Force(s)

**N**

NBM	Neighbourhood Beat Manager
NCPE	National Centre for Policing Excellence
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency

**P**

PACT	Police and Communities Together
PCSO	Police Community Support Officer
PIM	Performance Improvement Meeting
PIP	Professionalising the Investigative Process
PPAF	Police Performance Assessment Framework
PPU	Public Protection Unit

**Q**

QoSC	Quality of Service Commitment
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**R**

RSO	Registered Sex Offender
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**S**

SARA	Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment
SDVC	Specialist Domestic Violence Court
SGC	Specific Grading Criteria
SMB	Strategic Management Board
SMT	Senior Management Team
SPI	Statutory Performance Indicator
SPP	Special Priority Payment
SSN	Safer Stronger Neighbourhood

**T**

TTCG      Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Group

**V**

ViSOR      Violent and Sex Offenders' Register