

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



**HMIC Inspection Report**  
**Greater Manchester Police**  
**Major Crime**  
**July 2008**



*Greater Manchester Police – HMIC Inspection Report*

*July 2008*

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## **Contents**

### **Introduction to HMIC Inspections**

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09  
Programmed Frameworks  
Major Crime  
Future Programmed Inspections  
The Grading Process  
Developing Practice  
Force Overview and Context

### **Findings**

#### **Major Crime**

### **Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations**

## Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

## HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

July 2008

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

## Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

## Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

## Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

## The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

### Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

### Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

## **Failing to meet the standard**

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

## **Developing Practice**

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

July 2008

## Force Overview and Context

The Force Command Team is led by the Chief Constable and includes the Deputy Chief Constable; five operationally focused Assistant Chief Constables and two Assistant Chief Officers leading support functions. Chief Constable Michael Todd died in March 2008. The new Chief Constable takes up his post on 1 November 2008.

## Geographical Description of Force Area

The area covered by Greater Manchester Police includes the cities of Manchester and Salford and the towns of Bolton, Bury, Oldham, Rochdale, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford and Wigan.

There are 12 Territorial Divisions (Basic Command Units) that comprise Greater Manchester Police. These mirror the 10 local authority areas, with Manchester divided into three due to its size.

A Chief Superintendent leads each division. Geographically, Divisions are made up of neighbourhoods. These are policed by Neighbourhood Teams, which include police officers, police community support officers, police staff, special constabulary and some volunteers. Neighbourhood Teams are supported by Response Teams answering emergency calls from the public and other specialist units such as the CID and Public Protection Units.

There are a number of specialist Branches and Divisions that support operational policing including the Specialist Operations Branch, Local Policing Improvement Branch, and Diversity Command.

## Demographic Description of Force Area

GMP is one of the largest forces in the country and has a population of almost 2.6 million.

## Strategic Priorities

'Fighting crime, protecting people' is the vision of Greater Manchester Police. This is supported by five strategic aims, published in the Greater Manchester Police Authority annual policing plan. These are:

- The people of Greater Manchester are safer because of the effective citizen focused services we deliver to protect them; ranging from tackling anti-social behaviour through to serious and organised crime, and terrorism;
- The people of Greater Manchester feel safer as a result of our approach to partnerships and policing based on local neighbourhoods;
- Because they feel safe and are safer, people have great aspiration for their local community and Greater Manchester. They will participate with us in policing and partnership work to further improve their communities;
- Officers, staff and volunteers in GMP feel well led, valued and are skilled and motivated to provide high quality services; and
- Greater Manchester Police deliver effective, efficient and economical services.

The aims are the foundation to the continuing development of the police service in Greater Manchester. This development centres on putting people first, whether they are members of the public or police officers and staff.



July 2008

## **Force Performance Overview**

### **Force developments**

#### Local Policing

Neighbourhood policing is central to GMP and delivered by neighbourhood policing teams in each division. They work with the public and local agencies to identify problems, issues and concerns and put plans in place to achieve solutions that will last. High profile activity is underway to tackle anti-social behaviour, drug dealing, violent crime, burglary, robbery and vehicle crime.

#### Performance

GMP continues to improve performance with 32,744 fewer victims of crime in the 12 months April 2007 to March 2008, compared with 333,776 victims of crime during 2006-7. At the same time there has been an increase in the number of offenders brought to justice. Challenging targets are in place to continue the trend of crime reduction that has been seen in the past five years.

#### Specialist support

GMP is at the forefront in tackling the terrorist threat and targeting the most serious criminals. The work of the GMP Counter Terrorism Unit is central to the national effort to protect the public. The Force's Serious Crime Division has an enviable record in addressing the most serious crime and criminals. The work of the Major Incident Teams, Cold Case Review Unit and management of sexual and violent offenders has all been recognised. The Force has also moved additional resources into targeting gun and gang issues in Greater Manchester through the Xcalibre team.

#### Contacting police

Resolving calls for help from the public is a critical priority for GMP. Improvements have already been made in how calls for help are dealt with. People report they are increasingly satisfied with the way GMP handle calls and current performance shows emergency calls on the 999 service are answered within four seconds. The Force is also introducing a new way of dealing with less urgent incidents that gives more flexibility to the way arrangements are made to deal with them.

July 2008

## Major Crime

GRADE	<b>EXCEEDS the STANDARD</b>
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### Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details GMP's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those that pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	1.144	1.084	-5.24%	0.768
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.004
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.369	0.357	-3.25%	0.169
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	67.02%	41.76%	-25.26pp*	70.19%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.447	0.228	-48.99%	0.214
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	26.32%	25.86%	-0.46pp*	38.50%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.769	0.628	-18.34%	0.399
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	47.96%	28.75%	-19.21pp*	47.30%
Number of manslaughters per	0.039	0.016	-58.97%	0.025

Greater Manchester Police – HMIC Inspection Report

July 2008

10,000 population

% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	50.00%	25.00%	-25pp*	74.72%
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.181	0.177	-2.21%	0.171
% of murders detected/convicted	82.61%	91.11%	+8.5pp*	89.91%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	3.285	3.203	-2.50%	2.462
% of rapes detected/convicted	29.03%	33.58%	+4.55pp*	27.52%

\*pp' is percentage points.


\*\*Most Similar Family (MSF) for Greater Manchester is Merseyside, Northumbria, South Yorkshire, West Midlands and West Yorkshire.

From the SPI data contained in the table above, it can be seen that the crime types of life-threatening and gun crime, attempted murder, kidnapping and rape pose a threat to GMP. The rate of offences in each case fell in 2007 but remain above the MSF average and among the highest in England and Wales.


The SPI data also indicates that major crime investigation in Greater Manchester is less effective than in the MSF group. GMP is performing at a level below the MSF average for the areas of attempted murder, blackmail, kidnapping and manslaughter, with performance deteriorating in each of these areas in 2007. However, it should be noted that performance improved for both murder and rape, with GMP above the MSF average.

July 2008

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT), released in September 2007, revealed that GMP faces an exceptional level of demand in respect of the policing response to homicide offences.



Homicides (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total, Excl. MPS




In the long term, GMP is above the national average and, despite a decrease in 2007, remains above the MSF average.

Greater Manchester is bordered by three other forces, which also indicate raised demand for this crime type.


July 2008

NPSAT revealed that GMP faces an exceptional level of demand in respect of the policing response to rape offences.



In the long term, GMP is above the national average and, despite a decrease in 2007, remains well above the MSF average.

Rape (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total, Excl. MPS





Greater Manchester is bordered by four other forces, which also indicate raised demand for this crime type.

July 2008

NPSAT revealed that GMP faces an exceptional level of demand in respect of the policing response to kidnapping offences.

Kidnap (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total, Excl. MPS



In the long term, GMP is above the national average and, despite a decrease in 2007, is above the MSF average.

Greater Manchester is bordered by three other forces, which also indicate raised demand for this crime type.

Although nationally OCG mapping is in its infancy, GMP has made good progress ensuring that analysis of major crime types is thorough.

The force strategic assessment demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to address these. GMP has identified firearms and terrorism as two of its major crime priorities (priority group themes).

GMP’s work with partners to tackle the threats posed by guns and gangs is noteworthy.

The demand in respect of major crime on GMP on an annual basis is significant, with approximately 60 murders, 20 suspicious deaths, 1,200 registered sex offenders, 1,000 rapes and a significantly large off-street sex industry.

The introduction of the North West CTU has had significant implications on the force in terms of loss of experienced resources.

## Intelligence

**GMP has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, supplying intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.**

### Strengths

- The FIB was the subject of review in April 2007 and a resulting proposal was made that the bureau should have its own independent structure. The head of the FIB is the force head of profession for the NIM and there are now three clear portfolios within the bureau with a senior officer dedicated to each – serious and organised crime, volume crime and analytical coordination and development.
- The structure and resourcing of the FIB reflects a substantial investment in intelligence and analysis. Dedicated analytical resources are available to meet identified demands. This includes the ability to identify patterns and trends in respect of major crime. There is a focus on the key areas, eg MAPPA arrangements. Effective use is made of all types of intelligence, eg open source intelligence.
- A senior analyst is included in the force tasking and coordination process and acts as a gatekeeper to demand for analytical capacity. This means that analysts are tasked appropriately to priorities and not sidetracked to non-analytical functions.

### Work in progress

- Although there are sufficient resources in Manchester Metropolitan division to gather, collate and coordinate intelligence in conjunction with the FIB, capacity and resilience for managing intelligence need to be increased. Additional funding has been agreed through the local area agreement to appoint two extra analysts in 2008.

### Areas for improvement

- The strategic assessment recommends that given the high number of incidents of domestic abuse connected to homicide, the force should consider how prevention and enforcement elements could directly result in homicide reduction. This, linked to the issues in respect of knife crime, highlights a number of intelligence gaps.
- Analytical resilience for the production of the force strategic assessment is seen as an area for improvement.
- The quality of intelligence packages from the FIB is inconsistent.

**The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2/level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. GMP makes use of community impact assessments to evaluate risk following major crimes.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has developed strong links with SOCA and the forces that have an impact on policing in Greater Manchester, ie West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Merseyside. Such liaison is functionally determined rather than geographically or regionally focused.
- Regional tasking and coordination processes have been established and resources allocated based on the strength of the argument, the operational imperative and the fit with strategic direction.
- GMP maintains a close relationship with the Metropolitan Police Service in relation to counter-terrorism. Contingency plans exist for collaborative investigations. Business continuity plans have also been agreed with other forces in the North West region. There are effective links between the SCD and the CTU.
- GMAC provides a framework for the force and its partners to identify and correlate priorities and targets. This is underpinned by structures, systems and processes to promote information sharing and collaboration between partners in order to translate strategy into effective intelligence, prevention and enforcement control activity.
- The sexual offences unit has specific points of contact with all the departments and agencies with which it works, including St Mary's sexual offences referral centre and the CPS. This enables mutual familiarity and understanding to develop, which facilitates research, investigation and victim care.
- The drugs unit works closely with internal and external partners, forces and agencies to achieve common goals, keep abreast of relevant developments and learn from operational debriefs. Work undertaken in connection with middle-market drug trafficking has informed the development of national good practice.
- Area policing teams and IAGs play a key role in compiling community impact assessments in the Metropolitan division in the wake of incidents of serious and organised crime. This activity is supported by the SCD IAG.

### **Work in progress**

- The force continues to develop its understanding of the drivers for homicide through the development and use of profiles relating to a number of key areas.
- Although there is evidence of collaboration, GMP is focused on being a standalone regional force.
- Although involvement from partners in the development of the ANPR infrastructure in Greater Manchester has so far been limited to those areas most at risk from terrorism, serious and organised crime and major crime, GMP is liaising with the relevant authorities to maximise future opportunities for integration in relation to proposed CCTV systems.



July 2008

- GMP is party to a collaborative bid to the North West Development Agency with the Highways Agency and the Merseyside, Cheshire, Cumbria and Lancashire forces to establish a regional BOF for sharing information on key major routes and motorways in the North West.

### **Areas for improvement**

- There are missed opportunities in respect of effective liaison between MIT staff and divisional officers, in particular neighbourhood officers.
- Although GMP shows a clear commitment to regional intelligence and regional tasking and coordination processes based upon an intelligence assessment of the level of threat and harm to the force, it does not support the regional crime squad approach.
- The prevalent attitude in GMP in relation to working with other forces in respect of scientific services is one of co-operation rather than collaboration. The North West regional forensic science group for force forensic managers provides regular opportunities to discuss operational collaboration, but there is no evidence that collaborations result.
- Regional tasking and coordination processes would benefit from a regional capability to tackle kidnapping.

**The force strategic assessment has analysed the trends in relation to major crime. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly thorough. Problem profiles are used effectively and there is a wealth of evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.**

### **Strengths**

- GMP has identified the strategic threats in its strategic assessment, including major crime and serious and organised crime. These are reflected in appropriate control strategy priorities that provide a focus for individual divisional and departmental control strategies. Homicide is fully considered within the strategic assessment, with the current picture, analysis, key findings and recommendations highlighted. The impact of homicide and attempted murder offences on force resources is also considered.
- The force has adjusted its structures, resources and processes to meet emerging threats in relation to terrorism, people trafficking and gun and gang crime.
- The GMAC opportunity strategy documents the partnership priorities. It is a live document that is produced as a result of the strategic assessment and subsequent partnership business group meetings. The document translates the partnership priority areas into a single strategy, underpinned by a dedicated delivery plan.
- Force priority theme groups exist to address issues of guns and gangs (Operation Xcalibre), cash in transit robberies (Operation Vanguard) and serious sexual crime (Operation Talon).
- The criminal use of firearms is a recognised threat on a force, regional and national scale. In accordance with this, GMP has a dedicated control strategy under Xcalibre, and regionally the threat is detailed in the North West regional control strategy. Gun crime is acknowledged as a significant issue in a number of divisions, including the Manchester divisions. The issues have been fully recognised and the divisional commander receives strong support from the force command team, SCD, the local authority and other key partners.
- A golden thread of force priorities runs from the strategic assessment and force control strategy to the tactical activities in which the covert unit services are deployed.
- The intelligence flow from divisions relating to sex offenders is good, and sex offender managers have developed effective links with divisional operational policing units. Information is reciprocated by the central unit on a risk basis as part of a risk management plan. Operation Talon was established in recognition of a need to improve force performance in the areas of rape and sexual assault.

### **Work in progress**

- Although the latest version of the force strategic assessment reflects more analysis and input from partners than previously, there is potential for developing a joint assessment in collaboration with GMAC partners.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force strategic assessment has highlighted a number of intelligence gaps in respect of some key areas, including homicide and sexual offences.

*July 2008*

- The force has acknowledged the need to scope the extent to which kidnap and extortion is occurring across Greater Manchester and the requirement for the development of a problem profile. The force has also recommended the need to ensure compliance with the submission of SOCA 100 forms in respect of all such offences.

**Trend analysis and problem profiles are routinely shared with partners and BCUs. There is a trigger plan for 'hot briefing' whenever a significant change in the major crime threat, or the nature of the analysis, demands a fast time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as the UK Border Agency, are in existence. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach MoPI compliance by 2010.**

### **Strengths**

- There is evidence of good working relationships between GMP, neighbouring forces and other agencies in respect of intelligence sharing among intelligence practitioners at both force and local level. Information sharing agreements are in accordance with ACPO guidance in respect of MoPI.
- Communication and co-operation with partners and neighbouring forces at an operational level are underpinned by monthly tactical tasking meetings for priority crimes, including sexual offences (Talon), cash in transit robberies (Vanguard) and guns and gangs (Xcalibre). These meetings provide an effective infrastructure for partnership tasking and accountability.
- There is evidence of regular collaboration and sharing of intelligence between the divisions and partners, ie Manchester Metropolitan division, Trading Standards and UK Border Agency. In each case, it is underpinned by appropriate information-sharing protocols. Effective multi-agency collaboration in the Metropolitan division is reflected in the joint offender targeting group. This meets fortnightly to share intelligence about prolific and other priority offenders residing in the division and to implement control tactics. Partners include the youth offending team, probation service and the Intensive and Intrusive Supervision Scheme.
- Co-location, information sharing protocols, easy access and mutual professional respect underpin effective multi-agency collaboration in GMP. The probation service, NSPCC, post office services, and CPS all reported that there is a sound understanding of the parameters of confidentiality and that communication is open within the parameters set by information-sharing protocols.
- The sex offender management unit incorporates a MAPPA support unit with dedicated co-located police and probation service resources. A member of the force chairs the national and regional Violent and Sex Offenders Register (ViSOR) groups. GMP has generated a high number of Sexual Offence Prevention Orders (157 at time of inspection). The force makes use of covert intelligence markers; it uses intelligence-led management to reduce the levels of risk and is proactive in tackling registered sex offenders.

### **Work in progress**

- Acknowledging what is already in place, the force is seeking to establish more robust information-sharing protocols with partners. To reduce cash in transit robberies, the force is seeking to extend the intelligence-sharing and operational collaboration it has established with Barclays Bank to the Royal Bank of Scotland.
- The delivery of MoPI is to be conducted within each area of business by the use of a generic training package delivered via e-learning in collaboration with the NPIA.

**Area for improvement**

- The force does not have formal protocols for sharing information with health and local authorities or local utility providers.

**In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is clearly understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified sufficiently early.**

### **Strengths**

- Vulnerability of locations and communities is identified in the GMAC strategic assessment. The GMAC opportunity strategy 2007/08 documents the partnership's priorities. It is a live document that is produced as a result of the strategic assessment and subsequent strategic partnership business group meeting. The document is significantly different to a divisional business plan where the police document their priority areas. The opportunity strategy should identify opportunities to put interventions in place to tackle key risks to the partnership. It is seen as an incredibly useful tool, translating the partnership priority areas into a single strategy, underpinned by a dedicated delivery plan.
- Firearms discharges are concentrated within certain areas of Greater Manchester, in particular the four policing divisions of Metropolitan, North Manchester, Trafford and South Manchester. The issues relating to this activity and the association with gang activity are highlighted within the force strategic assessment. The force has seen some success in targeting this activity, with a number of operations which focused on drugs and firearms offences. The strategic assessment has further highlighted heightened tension between rival Asian drug dealing fraternities in recent months.
- Area policing teams in the territorial divisions play an active role in completing community impact assessments in the wake of major crime incidents. IAG members are effectively engaged in the process. Community impact statements are integral to gun crime case files.
- External cultural networks and IAGs are used to gain insight into the cultures of hard-to-reach groups and to improve the level of trust within such communities.

### **Work in progress**

- The force is working with the University of Salford to gain a better cultural understanding of vulnerable communities in Salford.
- Funding is being sought for a DVD to be privately produced and distributed externally in the Greater Manchester area in an attempt to demystify the witness protection system and enhance community confidence.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Although the force has access to GMAC's vulnerable locations index, it is not reflected in the force strategic assessment and there is no evidence that it is systematically used to proactively identify risks and threats.
- Work is required to ensure an effective two-way flow of quality and timely intelligence between neighbourhood policing staff and the force intelligence and briefing system.
- There is a cultural unwillingness in some communities in Manchester Metropolitan division to provide information to the police. Improving community confidence is a key challenge for the area policing teams.

**Regarding elements of intelligence, risk is reviewed at chief officer level with identified risks for major crime effectively managed.**

**Strengths**

- The force has determined that it must prioritise three critical functions to be provided at all costs: responding appropriately to grade 1 and grade 2 incidents; responding to and investigating serious crime; and providing an appropriate and commensurate custody function. The aim is to have reliable and effective plans in place to allow the force to continue to provide these functions under any circumstances.
- In support of the force process, divisional/branch coordinators, including the SCD, are required to identify processes within their relevant areas of responsibility that directly support the critical force functions and prioritise them so the functions remain viable. Once identified, the priorities are written into the divisional/branch business continuity management plan. Each unit within the SCD now has a plan that identifies every process carried out by that unit. For example, within the MIT this includes establishing major incident reviews and HOLMES accounts.
- The force has an integrated organisational intelligence process that combines areas for improvement identified through external inspections (ie HMIC), internal inspections and strategic force projects and programmes.
- Formal structures and systems exist for assessing and reviewing risks in relation to areas for improvement, incorporating clear improvement objectives in action plans, and for monitoring and reviewing improvement.
- A framework for critical policing continuity has been agreed based on the code of practice that accompanies BS 25999.

**Work in progress**

- The process of organisational assessment in GMP currently runs parallel to processes for compiling the annual force strategic assessment. Although the involvement of divisional and departmental commanders provides an opportunity to alert the organisation to pending impacts, it focuses more on performance risks than broader organisational impacts.
- An interim process has been adopted to develop a strategic risk register through a number of facilitated workshops involving all members of the command team and key stakeholders, including the Police Authority. The force is looking to identify 'show stoppers' and a bench-marking exercise took place with similar forces, ie West Yorkshire and Merseyside.
- Strategic accountability is underpinned by chief officer endorsement and involvement. It is proposed that the deputy chief constable should continue to champion risk management and that risks identified within strategic programmes should be managed through the chief officer led programme boards.
- In 2008 the force is looking to develop an enhanced strategic organisational assessment, with the intention of aligning production timescales with those of the strategic threat assessment, in order that both may inform the corporate planning and risk management processes.

July 2008

- GMP acknowledges the opportunity presented by local area agreements and the development of APACS to work more collaboratively with local authorities on issues relating to serious and organised crime and counter-terrorism.
- A total of £0.5 million has been allocated to develop a detailed programme management process (management success programme).
- The force has identified the need to feed PIRs from internal audit inspections into any future organisational impact assessment process.
- The span of control within the SCD is huge and a resource management unit and establishment review group have recently been created to support effective resource management.
- Business continuity management plans with key roles and responsibilities are being developed in support of critical force functions. Unannounced tests are planned, which may involve either a desktop walk-through or real time exercise involving shutting down systems or the closure of buildings.
- Operational risks can be raised through the local/operational risk registers on territorial divisions and from the SCD/FIB, and then feed up into the strategic process. The force has developed a strategy to address the strategic threat of gun crime and this has been developed into a newly devised structure known as Xcalibre. This involves the SCD establishing a head of profession with a proactive team supported by two syndicates of MIT. The force has also refocused the three syndicates in the ACU. This is in addition to the use of dedicated territorial divisional staff linked to the force TCG system and means that the SCD has committed 122 officers and staff to address the issue of gangs associated with firearms.
- The SSB was to submit its first local risk register at the end of April 2008. This will formalise interim arrangements that saw risks communicated directly to the force command team or at force meetings, eg at the forensic steering group or resources review group.

### **Areas for improvement**

- In the long term, it is envisaged that strategic risks will be identified, reported and managed through the processes being developed to support the force's strategic planning framework and programme management.
- The wider implications of the introduction of NABIS have not been thought through and the force does not currently have the level of forensic resources to meet the predicted increase in demand without a detrimental impact on other services.
- Although concern that the SSB is not currently compliant with FSS standards in respect of disclosure is a force disclosure project driver, there is no evidence of a link between the force disclosure working group and a force strategic risks register.



**GMP collaborates effectively on an operational basis with other forces. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been implemented.**

**Strengths**

- Intelligence collection within the force has access to a range of sources including divisional staff and staff undertaking specialist functions, eg dedicated source units and scientific support.
- Partner agencies effectively support the intelligence collection processes, eg SOCA, UK Border Agency.
- Whereas ANPR was considered mainly as a means of traffic enforcement, it is now seen as a strategic intelligence tool. This is reflected in the project management structure.
- An interim ANPR BOF has been developed pending the delivery of the national product.
- Intelligence from HOLMES is downloaded into the computerised corporate intelligence environment.

**Work in progress**

- Structures, systems and resources in GMP are not currently configured to derive maximum intelligence benefits from the existing ANPR infrastructure and technology. Ultimately a search facility will be available within the corporate operational intelligence system (OPUS).
- The force is working with the NPJA to improve intelligence links with HOLMES. GMP operates on the version 11b of HOLMES. The force is working towards version 12.
- Attempts are being made within GMP to make ViSOR a more effective intelligence tool in the management of registered sex offenders. Nominated points of contact in each division have access to ViSOR but staff turnover undermines effectiveness.
- Arrangements are well advanced for the Probation Service to receive access to ViSOR in March 2008. This will fill a current intelligence gap in terms of access to information from the prison service.
- Although an intelligence officer in each SCD syndicate facilitates the flow of information from major investigations into corporate systems accessible to territorial divisions, there is evidence of a weakness around the dissemination of intelligence from and between murder investigations.

**Areas for improvement**

- There are gaps in the inter-operability of the force intelligence system. This reduces opportunities for identifying intelligence links and the speed of access to information.
- National inconsistencies in the way in which information is input to ViSOR reduce the benefits of interrogation and place additional demands on administrative support to research the histories of registered offenders from other force areas. This derives

from the fact that forces vary in the way in which they use ViSOR within local intelligence infrastructures.

- Although information from ViSOR is used within the sex offenders management unit to determine risk management plans, it is not used to develop intelligence about patterns and trends. Any such analysis is carried out within the FIB but there is not an awareness or understanding within the sex offenders management unit about the extent to which the database is used.

July 2008

**The force has a dedicated major crime review unit. The case review policy is effectively applied, ensuring that major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the process is seen as effective at driving improvement in performance and sharing good practice.**

### **Strengths**

- There is evidence of a structured review policy and formal processes to ensure that investigations of major crime are efficient, effective and economic. Formal reviews are undertaken by the major crime review unit. Clear evidence of the effectiveness of the process was demonstrated by Operation Beddlington (missing from home investigation), which considered many facets of the investigation and made a number of recommendations, including recommendations relating to force and national policy, and the review of the initial family liaison and media response in respect of a high profile murder investigation which again made a number of recommendations. The review unit has specific points of contact with all departments/agencies with which it works, eg St Mary's referral centre. This facilitates research, investigation and victim care issues.
- There is a comprehensive, documented force policy for ensuring a formal process of assessment into divisional investigations that may represent a threat to divisions and/or the force. This applies to all major investigations undertaken by divisions where a standard divisional response may not be sufficient.
- The management of divisional major investigations policy sets out clear definitions, role-specific responsibilities, guidance and documentary requirements. A quality review process is in place in respect of the priority theme groups undertaken by the strategic lead (detective superintendent).
- The organisational investigation review process has been carried out within the protecting vulnerable people environment. Key themes identified include disclosure, use of the media and use of a mini HOLMES system.
- Tactical debriefs are held daily for each surveillance team and any lessons are recorded and used by team researchers to improve future operations. The North West surveillance group is also a source of developing practice.
- Operational graded response to kidnap is flexible and customised around a tasking and coordination type process set up specifically to address the particular circumstances of the case.
- There are appropriate links between the SCD and the PSD. GMP seeks out good practice from national bodies and proactively looks to improve service delivery. The force is actively involved in the development of national practice, eg submissions to the National Centre for Policing Excellence.

### **Work in progress**

- The force continues to develop processes to ensure a full intelligence picture is available to support each review.
- The mini HOLMES system is being more widely adopted across units within the SCD to support review processes.

### **Areas for improvement**

- With the escalation of gang-related shootings resulting in a fatality, the force has developed Xcalibre, which involves the commitment of significant numbers of staff to address the issue of gangs associated with firearms. Processes look to improve joint working practices and protocols relating to the investigation of homicides with a known or suspected gang-driven motivation.
- There is no formal system to ensure that staff from the RIPA section are involved in operational reviews or debriefs.

July 2008

**The force tasking and coordination process functions cohesively to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. GMP has a good understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.**

### **Strengths**

- Force tactical TCG meetings take place monthly, with presentations from each of the themed priority groups delivered by the chief officer lead. The force NIM structure comprises the strategic assessment, force strategic tasking and coordination group chaired by the deputy chief constable, strategic tasking and coordination groups chaired by the ACC lead covering the priority areas of Xcalibre, Talon, Vanguard, drugs, sentinel and volume crime, force tactical tasking groups chaired at ACC level and tactical TCGs covering the priority areas chaired at chief superintendent level.
- A NIM compliance officer has been appointed at project officer grade to manage a NIM compliance delivery plan, which is lead by the ACC (crime). The plan demonstrates a structured managed approach to NIM implementation and development. The force has produced a NIM in the workplace guidance document, which is available to all staff via the force intranet.
- The resources of the SCD are deployed principally to tackle NIM level 2 problems through the force tactical tasking and coordination process. Operations are prioritised on a risk and harm basis.
- The force has a confidential unit within the SCD to consider and apply confidential intelligence and enforcement tactics to key force threats. Activity is prioritised through a formal and accountable tasking and coordination decision making process that ensures minimal cost and maximum return.
- The Xcalibre priority group draws the SCD, territorial divisions and the operations department together to review the threat of gun crime in GMP in the light of recent firearms discharges and other relevant intelligence. Although not part of the formal NIM structure in GMP, it links to the force tasking and coordination processes and adds value by enabling key stakeholders to go into a greater level of scrutiny when reviewing incidents and intelligence than would otherwise be possible. The FIB has a dedicated firearms desk to collate, analyse and review intelligence and the divisions. Xcalibre taskforce, FIB and partners (including MMAGS) meet monthly at the Xcalibre tactical meeting, where risks are assessed and priorities, tactics and actions agreed.
- Although procedures exist for territorial divisions to bid for additional and specialist resources for tackling major crime at the monthly force tasking and coordination meeting, there is sufficient flexibility to access specialist support between meetings.

### **Work in progress**

- The force strategic assessment has made a number of recommendations in respect of serious sexual crime, including that the Talon strategic TCG should commission a review of performance to determine the success of measures relating to the detection of offences; the force should assess the priority of and review its PIE response to human trafficking for sexual exploitation; and the sex offender management unit should report sex offenders posing the greatest risk to the community to the Talon TCG.
- NIM training is being delivered in divisions based on an assessment of need.

July 2008

- Mobile ANPR tasking is directed through local divisional tasking and coordination processes where an ANPR capability exists. If local divisions do not have access to ANPR technology, bids are prioritised at the monthly force tactical TCG.
- Intelligence packages vary in quality due to the unavailability of specialist resources to develop information, eg surveillance, CROPS and covert method of entry.
- Deployment decisions relating to the dedicated surveillance services of the CPU take place at the unit's weekly tasking and coordination meeting. Work is ongoing to incorporate this tasking within the FIB tasking and coordination processes in order to bring stricter scrutiny and ensure more objective assessment and balance between competing volume crime and serious and organised and major crime demands.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Arrangements for deploying the DSU are not governed by strict tasking and coordination principles. In practice, the unit plays a large part in deciding its own deployment based on what it considers to be the priorities of the day.
- The quality of tactical assessments and procedures and standards in relation to the tasking and coordination process varies across territorial divisions. Key factors are the quality of analysts and the dynamism of OPU managers.
- There is scope to refine prioritisation arrangements in order to ensure more efficient and effective use of limited technical resources.

July 2008

**Due to appropriate training, the force's awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.**

### **Strengths**

- GMP delivers a mandatory two-day diversity training package to all staff.
- In addition to mandatory force diversity training, family liaison officers receive ongoing training to raise awareness and understanding of specific issues reflecting the social diversity of Greater Manchester, eg funereal cultures. Lessons learnt are incorporated in training days and applied in future operations.
- Drugs unit officers in the SCD have a good knowledge of local communities and maintain close liaison with neighbourhood policing team inspectors to ensure that the impact of their policing activities on the local community can be assessed and appropriately managed.
- Mandatory force training and practical experience have provided staff in Manchester Metropolitan division with a good level of knowledge and understanding of diversity related issues.
- Awareness and understanding of religious and ethnic festivals and events are promoted through divisional tasking and coordination processes.
- Multi-agency diversity training days are held to develop awareness, learning and best practice.

### **Work in progress**

- Although staff in the various teams of the SCD demonstrated a good level of awareness and understanding of diversity issues impacting on their specific roles, much of their knowledge comes from practical experience and personal learning initiatives (often through informal contacts) rather than any organised training above and beyond the mandatory force diversity training package.
- Targeted recruitment is being carried out to increase the number of minority ethnic family liaison officers.

### **Areas for improvement**

- To build upon the foundation of mandatory force diversity training, processes are required to identify specific training needs in relation to specialist investigatory roles in the SCD and to incorporate them into a programme of ongoing training.
- There is no evidence that the IAG of the SCD has been involved in shaping diversity training for specialist investigators.
- Greater freedom of movement within an enlarged European Union is changing society and social relationships in Greater Manchester and having a corresponding impact on policing and other services. Advice for dealing with individuals and communities within this developing environment is very limited and interpreters are often the main source of help and guidance for investigators.

## Prevention

**The force has an IAG and key individuals that are used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.**

### Strengths

- GMP has developed some strong links with key statutory and non-statutory agencies to tackle priority major crime themes. These partnerships address preventive as well as intelligence and enforcement aspects of criminality.
- The MMAGS works in collaboration with the Xcalibre taskforce to target those at highest risk with multi-agency interventions. It also delivers preventive programmes to schools and communities.
- The CTU has engaged with home-watch coordinators in Wigan division on the theme of public vigilance.
- Sex offender management is a centrally controlled function within the SCD. Operational management is divided between three geographically based teams, each of which has its own administrative support for receiving and endorsing intelligence, and creating and inputting ViSOR records.
- GMP collaborates in a MAPPA support unit with a jointly funded MAPPA strategy manager who is involved in a regional risk group to manage the safe movement of high-risk individuals.
- Partnerships are fundamental to the development of serious sexual offences prevention strategies. The force has consistently invested in the St Mary's sexual offences referral centre to support victims, enhance intelligence and improve enforcement; the Genesis project has been developed to enable the provision of forensic samples anonymously; and Manchester Action on Sexual Health (MASH) targets the sex industry.
- External cultural networks and IAGs are used to gain insight into the cultures of hard-to-reach groups and to improve the level of trust within such communities.
- The SCD has a dedicated IAG to advise strategically on policy and on tactical factors affecting harm and threat to local communities. The IAG meets on a six-weekly basis and there are currently nine members of varied ethnicity and backgrounds. One SCD IAG member is attached to each priority theme group. Link members attend strategic meetings and engage with divisional, force and partner representatives to bring a community perspective to decision making. IAG members are routinely involved in training and their inclusion within the golden hour arrangements is now in the corporate mindset. IAG meetings are formally minuted with members held to account through formal actions, which are recorded. Members are given information/access to a significant amount of detail across a range of policing activity, eg ongoing murder investigations, taskforce activity, missing from home enquiries, involvement of partner agencies, consultation regarding diversity champion forum etc. There is clear evidence that members of IAGs are informing force policy and advice is considered and formally recorded in line with the relevant community/risk assessment. The SCD IAG has been observed by a neighbouring force (Lancashire Constabulary) in order to develop good practice.



July 2008

- There has been a significant drive to embed effective IAGs in the Metropolitan division in order to improve the relationship between the police and communities. There are two distinct groups: one focusing on guns and gangs in specific areas with membership reflecting the diversity of those communities (it won a national award for innovation in 2005); the second is reflective of communities across the division and has a division wide role. IAG members are not vetted, which is force policy, to facilitate engagement with hard-to-reach groups. Members are used to test the impact of policing operations on communities and have a key role in relevant gold groups created to manage critical incidents. Contact details are widely circulated in the division. MITs have effective links with the divisions through the establishment of gold groups involving members of the senior management teams. Links are further established through the use of local intelligence, which strengthens the investigation process.
- Operation Baton reflects effective use of IAGs from the local territorial division and the SCD.
- The abusive images investigation unit incorporates NSPCC staff working alongside police officers (ESPY). The unit engages in prevention and covert internet investigations. The force has close links with the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre and has success in identifying victims of abuse.

### **Work in progress**

- Consideration is being given to recruit more members to the SCD's IAG to reflect the wider diversity of Greater Manchester.
- The CTU, fire and ambulance services and civil contingency officials are delivering specialist training on the risk of terrorism to the business and retail sectors in Manchester.
- To raise awareness and understanding in the CPS of specific issues relating to offences of rape, specialist investigators and CPS representatives in Wigan division meet monthly to discuss all rape cases.

### **Area for improvement**

- Although there is some crossover between members of the SCD IAG and IAGs in territorial divisions, such links are limited.

**Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. 'Golden hour' principles are understood by call management staff and first responders.**

### **Strengths**

- The command and control system provides a comprehensive checklist of actions to be taken in the event of incidents of serious and organised and major crime. Data pulse is managed by a number of administrators who are responsible for maintaining the currency of information in the light of formal reviews. The process ensures an effective audit trail for golden hour response activity. All communications staff are trained and mentored in dealing with major/serious crime incidents.
- There are effective 24/7 contingency arrangements for alerting on-call staff to incidents. Communication centre staff report the arrangements are effective.
- The force has effective leadership for managing the initial response to major crimes.
- There is flexibility within the SOCG to interchange staff between teams in order to match resources to the greatest areas of risk.
- There is flexibility within the SCD to support the CTU and SOCA.
- GMP has sufficient capacity, capability and flexibility within the MIT to maintain resilience for HOLMES.
- GMP has an effective operational response to hostage incidents, consistent with ACPO policy, which supports effective management and deployment of the hostage and crisis negotiation unit and the peaceful resolution of such incidents.
- Force guidance ensures risk assessed support and protection for ambulance staff from the police when attending potentially violent incidents.
- Business continuity plans have been agreed with other forces in the North West region.

### **Work in progress**

- Within the SCD, functional silos are being drawn together into a coherent unit by flexible deployment on the basis of the threat, intelligence and risk management. The cultural shift will be facilitated by co-location in the new divisional headquarters.
- Business continuity management plans with key roles and responsibilities are being developed in support of critical force functions. Unannounced tests are planned that may involve either a desktop walk-through or real time exercise involving shutting down systems or the closure of buildings.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Awareness, knowledge and understanding among initial responders in territorial divisions with regard to crime scene management is varied and needs to be improved.

**The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed.**

**Strengths**

- There are clearly defined portfolios within the FIB for serious and organised crime, volume crime and analytical coordination and development. Each has a dedicated senior officer lead.
- Within the SCD, functional responsibilities have been broadly separated into the areas of prevention, intelligence and enforcement. Proposals have been made for the intelligence function to be given independent status and there is a belief that prevention should largely be owned and managed by partners.
- Specific arrangements and operations are initiated to protect vulnerable groups in relation to predicted spikes in demand.

**Work in progress**

- Links are being strengthened between gun crime, protecting vulnerable people and wider community issues. The development of the new government PSA targets should assist this process by promoting multi-agency responsibility and accountability.
- The force is seeking to develop stronger links with partners to tackle the gun and gang culture in Greater Manchester. To build on the interventionist contribution of the MMAGS, it has recently established a violent gang strategy board to harness multi-agency activity to intervene earlier and address the underlying causes of this type of criminality.
- The joint Manchester and Trafford violent crime board seeks to identify families most at risk from gun crime and implement controls to mitigate any threats. It operates with executive level leadership in parallel with CDRP structures and is currently examining the potential role of mediation.
- GMAC is helping to promote a common awareness and understanding across partner agencies of key issues in relation to threats and vulnerability among communities in Greater Manchester.

**Areas for improvement**

- Research is required to develop prevention strategies through a better understanding of the particular needs of vulnerable people within an increasingly diverse community. This is a gap in the strategic assessment.
- GMP is failing to achieve its local target of 40% detection rates in respect of offences of rape and attempt rape. The force has acknowledged the need to commission a review of performance to help determine the success of the measures in place to improve detection rates for such offences.

**The policy covering threats to life is accessible to staff and is understood and implemented. Examples of regional, cross border, multi-agency operations are abundant.**

### **Strengths**

- There is a comprehensive, documented force policy for dealing with threats to life, setting out clear roles and responsibilities. This applies to all such threats other than those relating to terrorism, which are dealt with under separate arrangements by special branch.
- The threats to life policy reflects a clear understanding of the obligation placed on the force by the ruling of R v OSMAN underpinned by specific rank/role responsibilities and requirements for documented risk assessments and decision making.
- There are appropriate checks within the force threat to life policy to ensure the confidentiality of sources, techniques, tactics and the identity of any suspected assailant. Decision making must be underpinned by intelligence and, where warnings are not given, intelligence must be regularly monitored and assessments reviewed.
- GMP received an initial allocation of £140,000 under the tackling guns action programme. This was reinforced with an additional £100,000.
- There is evidence of collaboration between the CCRU and its equivalent in Lancashire.
- Preventive aspects of major crime incidents are considered within a formal investigatory review process.
- There is clear focus on prevention and vulnerability, particularly when dealing with domestic abuse.

### **Work in progress**

- A gang mediation scheme is being explored, based on existing good practice in Northern Ireland, London and the West Midlands, to minimise the potential for those involved in conflict to resolve issues through violence.
- The prevention of knife crime has been identified as a key area for strategic development.
- PCSOs are involved in citizenship education in schools, engaging with particular classes for a full term and working on issues relevant to the particular area in which the school is situated.

### **Areas for improvement**

- A strategic plan is required to bring key partners together in all areas at risk to devise and implement a homicide reduction strategy that addresses the underlying causes of firearms criminality across the force.

*July 2008*

- There is a lack of clarity in force strategies about ownership and the lead responsibility in respect of prevention activity.
- The SCD has identified marketing and reduction strategies in respect of major crime as an area for improvement.

**The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by dedicated covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to staff. GMP is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.**

### **Strengths**

- The ACPO witness protection national and regional networks provide an infrastructure for accessing information, expertise and developing practice. An officer from GMP was recently seconded to the new central witness bureau to support project development.
- There is a thorough understanding within the covert policing function of the need to protect tactics and the identity of officers and witnesses from public knowledge.
- Some 50% of witness protection demands relate to individuals from ethnic minority groups. IAG members have been used to gain insight into the cultures of hard-to-reach groups and to improve the levels of trust within such communities. There is evidence of cultural networks from outside of the region.
- The force provides a range of options to witnesses in gun crime cases through third-party lay support and critical advisers, in order to gain trust and support without inducement.
- Witness protection arrangements meet the need for 24/7 access, prompt intervention and confidentiality. Initial assessment is available 24 hours a day.
- The covert policing unit recognises the significant risk to witness protection arrangements from social networking by subjects and their families on the internet, which has increased the risk of compromise. Specific briefing is being given to mitigate against this.
- Confidentiality governs information sharing within the force and with partners and other forces and organisations.
- Provided confidentiality is not compromised, there is a growing openness to explain covert capacity and capability. Information is available internally on the force intranet and cultural networks are used to target information in hard-to-reach communities.
- CHISs are the main source of intelligence for identifying serious and organised and major crime threats in GMP. Effective firewalls and protocols exist to protect anonymity.
- Sex offender managers have a clear understanding of their responsibility to protect registered offenders. Publicity requires ACPO ratification and, through risk assessment, will seek to balance the safety of offenders (and suspected offenders) with the safety and security of communities.
- Risk assessments are completed by the SIO at the outset of each major crime investigation and are reviewed continually.

### **Work in progress**

- A witness protection user group has recently been established within the SCD to facilitate effective deployment and support to the various SCD functional areas. Although it will focus on the more serious aspects of criminality in the force in the short term, it is intended to expand the group to include territorial divisions that create the greater, but less serious, proportion of demand.
- The CPU is taking action to reduce the risk to witness protection subjects and their families from social networking on the internet.
- The SCD is working with crime training to raise awareness of risks around witnesses in investigations. Awareness is focused on a number of areas, including police and community risk, physical risk, psychological risk, legal risk, economic risk and moral risk.
- A force project has been initiated to identify the strategic threats in relation to disclosure. Terms of reference had still to be agreed.
- The crime training unit is developing tiered training to raise awareness, knowledge and understanding across the force in respect of disclosure.

### **Area for improvement**

- There is no evidence of formal project management or ACPO lead in respect of the disclosure project.

July 2008

**The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventive and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are used to help understand levels of harm in the community.**

### **Strengths**

- The force makes use of a number of indicators to measure harm within communities and, together with partners, has introduced a number of initiatives to address areas of concern. These include an alcohol strategy (link with Greater Manchester Alcohol Coordinators Group), drugs strategy (consultation undertaken with both the public and professionals with a view to looking at well-being) and health strategy (with an identified need to develop work around mental health).
- Neighbourhood officers routinely check levels of public confidence in policing in communities. After a major crime incident, neighbourhood officers are tasked to seek out places where local people gather to engage with relevant sections of the community and identify any concerns.
- More than 500 retailers and other business people in Greater Manchester are to be shown how to prepare for a terrorist attack. Officers from the CTU, the fire and ambulance service and civil contingency officials are carrying out specialist training. Training involves taking observers through a simulated terrorist attack on DVD.
- The force takes appropriate measures to highlight its successes and monitor the impact of its activity. This is shown in the use of national television, eg the BBC programme 'Honour Kills' based on a murder investigation.
- GMP has piloted a scheme involving mediation as a means of intervention between young people involved in violent confrontations. Work is being undertaken through safeguarding children.

### **Work in progress**

- Close liaison between GMP and St Mary's sexual offences referral centre points to a gap between the number of allegations of rape and recorded offences. Work is being undertaken to close this gap and construct more effective measures of performance based on attrition across the whole process from reporting to conviction.

### **Area for improvement**

- There is no clear link in Manchester Metropolitan division between the IAGs and the neighbourhood key individual networks.



**The inspection found evidence that the force fully considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a comprehensive security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.**

### **Strengths**

- Within the professional standards environment, intelligence sharing/management and RIPA compliance have improved, and processes are generally enhanced through the inclusion of quality assurance processes.
- Staff, training and equipment for the PSD are commensurate with levels of risk and threat.
- GMP has invested heavily in anti-corruption initiatives with significant resources allocated to this area of activity. Individuals are targeted based on their involvement with drugs and OCGs.
- Investment in resources for professional standards investigations includes an in-house surveillance capability and independent communication systems.
- There are appropriate links between the SCD and the PSD.
- The PSD is involved in the investigative review process on major crime investigations ensuring good quality assurance on investigative standards, which gives confidence. The process also ensures good cross-fertilisation of investigation standards and techniques for the benefit of SIOs within the professional standards arena. The PSD also advises on incident management in order to ensure that public confidence and reassurance issues are fully considered. Links between PSD and the major crime review team are strong. Issues raised have included initial reporting, scene management and family liaison.
- Sophisticated technological measures are taken to ensure the security of the confidential unit. Although all members of staff have access to an identified level of briefing on the force intranet, more detailed awareness and understanding is restricted to functional necessity, eg SIOs, firearms silver cadre.
- Members of staff in the HOLMES unit of the MIT are trained in data protection.

### **Work in progress**

- The PSD is looking at tasking and performance management structures with particular regard to timeliness and investigation progression.
- The process of bringing together the various organisational elements that manage aspects of professional standards is being formally project managed.

## **Enforcement**

**Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are effective with appropriate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.**

### **Strengths**

- There is clear ACPO lead and accountability (ACC crime) for all functions and activity relating to major crime and the work undertaken within the SCD.
- Effective Police Authority governance arrangements are in place with lead members identified for specific functional areas. Appropriate vetting arrangements are in place.
- GMP has a detailed structure in place to address identified areas of development across a range of operational issues, including major crime and critical incidents, ie areas for improvement identified in HMIC inspections are risk assessed and tracked to ensure appropriate action and measures are put in place. Where appropriate, working groups are established to oversee activity. The ACC (crime) has an active part in monitoring compliance.
- A process is also in place in respect of managing major crime and critical incidents that are deemed 'local risks'. An example of such a risk is the impact in respect of tier 5 interviews, with the MIT taking responsibility for all homicides. The process in place ensures full consideration of the risks and identifies the necessary action to mitigate such risks.
- Gold groups with active IAG involvement and appropriate ACPO lead are consistently set up to support major investigations.

### **Work in progress**

- A project managed force action plan exists to address areas for improvement identified through audit, inspection and legislation in respect of managing critical incidents and tackling major crime. Risks are scored on the basis of impact and likelihood, and there are clearly defined objectives, timescales and action owners accountable to an ACPO led programme board.

July 2008

**The ACPO lead and/or the head of crime are trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by members of staff who have undergone comprehensive training and testing in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.**

### **Strengths**

- GMP has been well tested over an extended period of time in respect of linked and series crime. Chief officers and senior managers are competent to manage such incidents. The force has appropriate structures in respect of critical incident command and policing in partnership etc.
- The capacity of the SCD has been extended by reconfiguring structures and improving processes.
- Detection rates are above target in respect of category A, B and C murders.

### **Area for improvement**

- Although a training needs analysis has been carried out for members of the sexual offences unit within the SCD, little of the training requirement has been provided.

**The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes.**

### **Strengths**

- The SCD policing plan for 2007/08 combines annual policing plan priorities, corporate priorities and divisional priorities in a business planning framework to focus team activity.
- The SCD performance management framework requires the CCRU to submit a monthly Excel spreadsheet. This sets out the cases that the unit is currently researching and investigating, the current status, and any outputs and outcomes. Other management information enables links to be made between inputs, outputs and outcomes.
- Performance management in the SCD is underpinned by monthly GRIP meetings, which are structured around priority themes and divisional priorities linked to the force control strategy. The SCD performance bulletin reports performance across a wide range of indicators relating to major crime, with clear links to force and divisional priorities, and includes homicide, serious violent crime, rape/attempt rape, sex offender management (visits, conferences attended etc), witness protection and HR issues (appraisal, sickness).
- Established financial management arrangements are in place in respect of all major crime enquiries. The SCD has a professionally qualified financial manager who holds staff responsible for expenditure and drives efficiency.
- There is evidence of a structured review policy and formal processes to ensure that investigations of major crime are efficient, effective and economic. The force has undertaken operations were investigations into kidnap that highlighted the cost implications of an increase in this type of offending.
- The management of investigations carried out by the SOCG has been enhanced by the introduction of investigative assessment processes, the increased use of HOLMES, ongoing review and assessment, effective performance management and an awareness of costs.
- There is a comprehensive, documented force policy for ensuring a formal process of assessment into divisional investigations that may represent a threat to divisions and/or the force. This applies to all major investigations undertaken by divisions where a standard divisional response may not be sufficient. The management of divisional major investigations policy sets out clear definitions, role specific responsibilities, guidance and documentary requirements.
- There are links between the PSD and the investigative review process to ensure that the professional standards implications of major crime investigations are clearly understood. This helps to promote public confidence and reassurance.
- Performance management arrangements for HOLMES incorporate reviews and dip sampling to identify developing practice for application in future operations.
- Learning from operational reviews is incorporated into a wider programme of investigatory improvement.

July 2008

- Through membership of the homicide working group, the head of the category C murder team has access to national good practice and contributes experiences to enhance national learning.
- The SSB strategy and performance framework details special considerations for homicide and other major enquiries with an agreed forensic strategy put in place. The strategy is subject to regular review and is monitored via the strategy meetings and the crime scene manager logs. All SSB services are monitored and evaluated through the forensic investigation group chaired by the ACC (crime).
- A regional kidnap group has been set up to develop relationships and share best practice from investigations.
- Family liaison officers are routinely involved in investigatory briefs and debriefs whenever they are available and wherever appropriate. Their role is determined by the SIO and family liaison officer coordinator, and in all cases family liaison officers feel they have open access to SIOs. Representation on the national executive board for family liaison and taking a lead at regional meetings provides GMP with the opportunity to influence national policy, learn about developments (eg counter terrorism family liaison officers) and developing practice (eg managing diversity), and share good practice.

### **Work in progress**

- Although serious and organised crime and major crime feature periodically in the force themed GRIP meetings, the main focus of such meetings is PSA crime in response to pressures from the Home Office PCSD.
- The force is moving towards a balanced performance framework in which the focus will be on the critical success factors identified to achieve divisional and departmental outcomes. This is due to go live in April 2008. The SCD is at the forefront nationally of developing performance management for level 2 activities and the investigation of major crime.
- Although SIOs in the SCD consider the cost implications of investigations and certain lines of enquiry, costs do not formally feature in the divisional performance management framework. This is being developed to make closer links between input costs and outputs and outcomes.
- The mini HOLMES system is being more widely adopted across units within the SCD to support review processes.
- Homicide prevention research in Scotland is being considered by GMP to develop early intervention strategies.
- A review of child and domestic-related deaths is being carried out in order to reduce incidents and improve investigations.
- The performance of the identification of technical services in relation to major crime is measured in line with forensic strategies determined on a case-by-case basis. A new performance framework for the SSB has been drafted that seeks to compare force performance with others in its most similar group, whereas the current framework compares performance outputs against the force's average in respect of

such factors as rates of attendance, hits etc. The SSB is also seeking to build on the current foundation of ISO accreditation across all functions.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The SCD performance meeting is chaired by the head of division and attended by all senior managers. A detailed performance bulletin is provided to all staff, supported by an overview of the ongoing operations. However, no formal agenda is provided to attendees and there are no minutes from previous meetings. This inhibits the effective management of actions and outcomes.
- There is also scope to integrate financial management more effectively within the broader performance framework. The SCD performance meeting was presented with an overview of the financial position of the division by the finance manager. However, there was little challenge of issues in respect of financial management with an acknowledgement of a need to develop appropriate challenge in respect of areas such as forensic submissions, telephone billing, hotel accommodation etc.
- During kidnap investigations, there can be opportunities to achieve wider objectives in relation to OCGs, and this needs to be recognised.
- There is no evidence of effective structures or processes to identify, evaluate and disseminate good practice in relation to sex offender management at either force or regional level.
- By excluding force intelligence staff from operational debriefs, opportunities are being missed to learn lessons and identify good practice.

## Performance Management and Resilience

The inspection teams found a strong investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands. Force procedures to manage human resources provide protection for the investigative capability, however GMP has been impacted on by the creation of the North West CTU.

GMP has not stood still and new developments include the introduction of a category C murder investigation unit (all members of support staff), the Xcalibe taskforce, the complex case unit, the development of an internal (SCD) communications strategy, the SCD IAG, the MAPPA support unit, themed priority groups, organisational reviews, a new career development process and progress on a performance management framework.

### Strengths

- There is evidence of demand profiling in the SCD to inform decisions about resource availability and cover.
- The head of the SCD has instigated appropriate processes/structures to support the development/career paths of staff within the division. A psychologist helps with staff development and the head of division has undertaken common placement work with a number of agencies.
- GMP's MITs are organised in nine syndicates which operate from dedicated facilities across the force to investigate all homicides. Staffing, accommodation, equipment and specialist support are fit for purpose. To relieve the demand on territorial divisions, the SCD has taken responsibility for investigating all category homicides. The establishment of the category C homicide investigation team reflects innovative workforce modernisation to relieve demand on territorial divisions.
- The sex offender management unit is a specialist resource within the SCD that deals with predicted demand in order to free divisions to focus on the demands of volume crime.
- There is a kidnap element to investigator training through NPIA accredited courses and awareness training has been delivered to contact centre staff.
- Force guidance provides a framework of guidance to staff about responding to reports of deaths. It sets out clear objectives and role-related responsibilities to support efficient and effective investigation by the police and the coroner and contains advice about the interests of other agencies.
- Force guidance for dealing with ambulance personnel, equipment and hospitals supports effective emergency response and forensic investigation.
- There is effective leadership and training for managing the initial response to incidents of serious and organised and major crime. Operational communications room duty managers are alerted to any such incidents and oversee the response to ensure all required actions are carried out effectively.
- All call takers and dispatchers receive training, mentoring and supervision for dealing with reports of serious and organised and major crime.

July 2008

- The force provides in-house investigator training for all ranks from constable to superintendent ranging from tier 1 to tier 5. Tier 2 will be linked to national ICIDP training with effect from April 2008. All detective superintendents engaged in major crime investigation are trained to PIP level 3. To promote continuous professional development, SIO workshops are held every three months. At PIP level 3, the SIO course incorporates a one-week Hydra exercise, which includes uniformed officers to deal with the critical incident element.
- The SCD has a DAG and positive action has been successfully undertaken to broaden the diversity of the ACU.
- The MAPPA support unit has a jointly funded MAPPA strategy manager. The unit also includes a senior probation officer, five MAPPA coordinators, a forensic psychologist and administration support. GMP is involved in the development of NPIA training for public protection officers.

### **Work in progress**

- The SCD has outgrown its existing accommodation and currently operates from eight different sites across the force. Building has started for a new £20 million divisional headquarters, to facilitate communication, intelligence, management and performance. Plans for refurbishing the SSB laboratory and installing new equipment will make the force self-reliant within two years.
- The SCD is making resource management processes more robust to accommodate the advent of the flexible tenure policy and the need to improve the tracking of staff development.
- A costed plan sets out a proposed schedule of formal training in 2007/08 for members of the SCD to support specialist investigation.
- Recruitment to the CTU has created significant strain on the resources of GMP. A process of traineeship is being established to reduce the impact of skilled people transferring out of the force.
- Demand for witness protection is increasing and the current level of resources within the witness protection unit is not sufficient for purpose. Three police staff growth posts have been approved for April 2008.
- Budgetary growth has been approved to create a centrally based CSI support team in April 2008. This will provide resilience for addressing divisional priorities in the event of a surge in serious and organised crime.
- There are plans to develop a pool of family liaison officers specifically to undertake a counter-terrorism role. A regional training course is being developed for delivery in 2008.
- GMP's dedicated PIP coordinator is developing the principles in respect of PIP level 3 accreditation, in line with requirements for category A, B and C homicide investigation.



July 2008

- The crime training department is working with the SCD to develop kidnap training, which is currently being delivered by the NPIA. The long-term goal is that it should be delivered in-house.
- GMP delivers its own negotiator training and is seeking NPIA accreditation to deliver this at other centres.
- The SSB is being restructured on the basis of policy and performance management, moving from its two-wing structure to focus on scene examination and identification and technical services (DNA database, fingerprint unit, footwear unit, high-tech crime unit, imaging unit, crime scene surveyors and forensic laboratory). The new structure includes a post of procurement contract manager to help drive down costs and improve service.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Incidents of kidnap are increasing, which raises questions about the capacity of the SCD to deal effectively with future demand.
- Demands on the SCD are generating a significant spend in staff overtime with implications for budget management and health and safety.
- Demand in respect of serious and organised and major crime is increasing in Manchester Metropolitan division and is having a detrimental impact on volume crime investigation, community engagement and local problem solving.
- Although there is sufficient flexibility and resilience in the SSB to deploy staff from their normal focus, on a short-term basis, in the event of a surge in demand without adversely affecting performance, a protracted terrorist incident would have a detrimental impact on volume crime performance.

**Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be highly effective. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a wide range of offences.**

### **Strengths**

- Force capacity for specialist investigations is incorporated within the SCD, with clear strategic lead and accountability to ACPO level. GMP has the capacity and capability to deal with extraordinary demand in relation to homicide investigation. During the New Year period 2007/08, the SCD launched six separate murder investigations over a period of 50 hours. This level of demand was a considerable challenge, even for a metropolitan force the size of GMP, but due to the flexible structures in place, the innovative category C homicide unit and the willingness to manage risk by the senior management team, the force was able to resource and manage one category A homicide, two category B homicides and three category C homicides. All of these investigations were launched without breaching the MIT service level agreement, which states that the MIT will investigate all homicides in Greater Manchester without impacting on divisional resources.
- GMP's MITs are organised in nine syndicates, which operate from dedicated facilities across the force to investigate all homicides. Staffing, accommodation, equipment and specialist support are fit for purpose. To relieve the demand on territorial divisions, the SCD has taken responsibility for investigating all categories of homicides.
- A CCRU exists to research and investigate undetected homicides and serious sexual offences in Greater Manchester. Budget, resources and training are considered adequate and investigatory resources are not abstracted, except to meet extraordinary demand.
- There are clear links between the force priorities in respect of serious and organised and major crime and the priorities of the SCD.
- Within the SCD, there is flexibility to deploy a wide range of specialist resources across different functions and the experience gained from managing a persistent demand of serious and major crime ensures that staff maintain high levels of skill and expertise.
- The MIT is a central resource within the SCD with specialist resources dedicated to investigating homicide and other major crimes.
- Links between the force MIT and territorial divisions are underpinned by 'gold groups' incorporating members of the divisional senior management teams and representatives of relevant local agencies.
- The force uses a divisional investigative assessment (DIA) to ensure a formal assessment is undertaken into those divisional level investigations that may represent a threat to the division and/or the force. The DIA is carried out by the detective superintendent on duty cover who has a clearly defined role in the process with various support mechanisms in place.
- The sexual offences unit in the public protection section of the SCD has specialist resources dedicated to the investigation of serious and series sexual crime and is developing expertise in human trafficking. Support includes a dedicated financial

July 2008

investigator and HOLMES. The unit has been involved in a number of cross-border operations.

- Although GMP does not maintain a standing commitment to kidnap investigation, the force command team and SIOs have developed, through experience, a clear understanding of the responsibility and requirement for effective response. There are a number of operations that demonstrate that the force has developed a capability sufficient to meet demand.
- The force has established a complex case unit with dedicated CPS lawyers to improve its capability for investigating major crime. A formal referral process is in place with tasks allocated against agreed criteria.
- The SSB has a forensic laboratory that is capable of meeting most screening needs in respect of serious and organised and major crime, as well as volume crime.
- A family liaison officer adviser is available 24/7 to coordinate family liaison activity, to ensure that newly trained inexperienced family liaison officers have the support they need to undertake the role with confidence, and to monitor mandatory annual referral to occupational health. Policies, systems and processes for allocating family liaison officers and funding their services are effective.
- Nightingale trained officers provide a first response capability to allegations of rape and other serious sexual offences.

### **Work in progress**

- The scale and scope of demand and the need to optimise organisational capacity and capability are perpetual challenges for the force.
- The force is scoping the proposal of using SCD detective inspectors for force night duty. The intention is to further support divisional colleagues and at the same time expose SCD officers to divisional areas of responsibility, eg missing from home, Nightingale incidents etc.
- Recruitment criteria for the CTU have had a disproportionate impact on GMP. The SCD has supplied a large number of skilled and experienced investigators to the CTU, and this has had a knock-on effect on territorial divisions that have provided replacements to the SCD.
- Plans are advanced to enhance in-house forensic screening services in GMP in order to become self sufficient within two years. The force is also working with the NPIA to procure training and accreditation for forensic staff that will enable them to give expert evidence in court proceedings in place of FSS staff.
- There are proposals for rationalising the structure of the source units in GMP with a view to increasing efficiency and effectiveness.
- Preparations are well advanced in GMP to accommodate and resource the national analytical ballistics intelligence system (NABIS), which was due to go live in April 2008.

July 2008

- Structures, systems and resources in GMP are not currently configured to derive maximum enforcement benefits from the existing ANPR infrastructure and technology. Until such time as national developments in relation to ANPR have been completed, an interim solution for GMP has been agreed by the force project board.
- A CCTV expert is being recruited to support major crime investigations.
- GMP is collaborating with the SOCA and NPIA to procure training to deal with level 2 responses to serious and organised and major crime.
- The force is working with the homicide working group to develop SIO policy books. The recording process in place in force is comprehensive and aids SIOs in their investigations.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Kidnap investigations have highlighted weaknesses in national arrangements for translation and interpreter services and in cultural support among communities who have members engaged in this type of criminal activity.
- Regional enforcement is required to tackle the problem of kidnap rather than case-by-case cooperation.
- The performance management framework of the force TSU is based principally on outputs broken down to divisional level, rather than outcomes. A scheme to improve the measurement of customer satisfaction and quality of service has met with a poor response from customers.
- There are significant challenges in respect of the capacity of the abusive images unit to undertake work around the areas of prevention, intervention and disruption.

**The force has a dedicated case review team that is deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is highly effective.**

### **Strengths**

- A CCRU (managed by a detective inspector, supported by a detective sergeant and five detective constables) exists within the SCD to research and investigate undetected homicides and serious sexual offences in Greater Manchester. Budget, resources and training are considered adequate and investigatory resources are not abstracted, except to meet extraordinary demand. The resources of the unit are principally directed in support of an operation focusing on the undetected homicides in Greater Manchester and a national operation focusing on serious sexual offences. Priorities are determined by forensic potential.
- The force has introduced an organisational review process focusing on all serious and organised crime enforcement operations, including drugs, armed crime, economic crime, robbery, sex offender management, sexual crime and abusive images. The process includes the review of the objectives and outcomes examining operational policy, investigative strategy, lines of enquiry, resources assigned and progress made. New lines of enquiry may be explored and timescales for milestones or closure agreed.
- There is evidence of a structured approach to the management of investigations with a review policy and formal processes to ensure that investigations are efficient, effective and economic.
- There is a comprehensive, documented force policy for ensuring a formal process of assessment into divisional investigations that may represent a threat to divisions and/or the force. This applies to all major investigations undertaken by divisions where a standard divisional response may not be sufficient.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Members of staff in the CCRU feel isolated on occasions from mainstream activity within the SCD. This is exacerbated by management changes and a lack of effective communication.
- Concerns were expressed that the focus of the CCRU may in the future be limited to research and that responsibility for the investigatory element may be transferred to territorial divisions. Clarification is needed in the interests of effective staff management, role clarity and victim care.

July 2008

**The inspection found evidence that the force is fully compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the Murder Investigation Manual and MIRSAP.**

### **Strengths**

- GMP has issued a MIT manual of guidance that incorporates the key areas of HOLMES 2, MIR and MIRSAP policy and good practice. The manual contains a number of updates added during 2007 including disclosure policy, updating actions, Crime Stoppers protocol, category C murder minimum indexing standard, debrief questionnaire etc.
- The force MIT has effective working relationships with criminal justice partners to support investigation and case progression. Systems and processes adhere to national guidelines, ie MIRSAP.
- To improve productivity, GMP adopts a risk-based approach to the application of MIRSAP. This is underpinned by formal review processes.
- The deployment of family liaison officers in GMP is managed by a force coordinator in accordance with selection criteria from the ACPO strategy manual and the strategy of the SIO. The use of proven investigators trained to at least PIP level 1 is consistent with current ACPO policy.
- The detective superintendent within the MIT with responsibility for the function of family liaison has undertaken a family liaison officer coordinator course to better understand the demands and requirements of the role.

### **Work in progress**

- Although complying with the national policy book, GMP is working with the NPIA to improve the product and ensure it is fit for purpose. In areas such as this, the force is helping to determine and improve national standards and good practice.

## Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

### A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ACU	armed crime unit
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition

### B

BCU	basic command unit
BOF	back office facility

### C

CCRU	cold case review unit
CDRP	Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CID	criminal investigation department
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CTU	counter-terrorism unit

### D

DAG	diversity action group
DIA	divisional investigative assessment
DSU	dedicated source unit

### F

FIB	force intelligence bureau
FSS	forensic science service

**G**

GMAC	Greater Manchester Against Crime
GMP	Greater Manchester Police

**H**

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System

**I**

IAG	independent advisory group
ICIDP	Initial Crime Investigators Development Programme
IOCCO	Interception of Communications Commissioners Office

**M**

MAPPA	Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements
MIR	major incident room
MIRSAP	major incident room standardised administrative procedure
MIT	major incident team
MoPI	management of police information
MMAGS	Manchester Multi-Agency Gang Strategy
MSF	most similar force(s)

**N**

NABIS	national analytical ballistics intelligence system
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
NPSAT	National Protective Services Analysis Tool



**O**

OCG organised crime group  
OPU operational policing unit

**P**

PCSO police community support officer  
PIP professionalising the investigative process  
PIR post implementation report  
POCA Proceeds of Crime Act 2004  
PSA public service agreement  
PSD professional standards department

**R**

RIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000  
RIU regional intelligence unit

**S**

SAR suspicious activity report  
SCD serious crime division  
SGC specific grading criteria  
SIO senior investigating officer  
SOCA Serious Organised Crime Agency  
SOCG serious organised crime group  
SPI statutory performance indicator  
SSB scientific services branch

**T**

TCG tasking and coordination group  
TGAP tackling gangs action programme  
TSU technical support unit

**V**

ViSOR      Violent and Sex Offenders Register