



HMIC Inspection Report
Gloucestershire Constabulary

October 2007



Gloucestershire Constabulary – HMIC Inspection Report

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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent both of the Home Office and of the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005 and has thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC then consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking fewer but more probing inspections. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that Neighbourhood Policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence will be gathered, verified and then assessed against an agreed set of national standards, in the form of specific grading criteria (SGC). However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

Programmed frameworks

This report contains assessments of the first three key areas of policing to be inspected under HMIC's new programme of work:

1. Neighbourhood Policing;
2. performance management; and
3. protecting vulnerable people.

Neighbourhood Policing has been inspected not only because it is a key government priority but also, and more importantly, because it addresses a fundamental need for a style of policing that is rooted in and responds to local concerns. The police service must, of course, offer protection from high-level threats such as terrorism and organised criminality, but it

also has a key role in tackling the unacceptable behaviour of the minority of people who threaten the quality of life of law-abiding citizens.

Performance management is an activity largely hidden from public view, although members of the public are directly affected by poor performance on the part of their local force. This inspection has focused on the need for forces to maximise the opportunities for performance improvement. It also posed questions as to whether forces have an accurate picture of how they are doing and the capability to respond to changing priorities. This area was selected for inspection because it is a key factor in delivering good performance across the board.

Protecting vulnerable people covers four related areas – child abuse, domestic violence, public protection and missing persons – that address the critically important role of the police in protecting the public from potentially serious harm. In the 2006 baseline assessment this was the worst performing area and raised the most serious concerns for HMIC and others. As a result, this area was prioritised for scrutiny in 2007.

Risk-based frameworks

In addition to its programmed inspection work, HMIC continues to monitor performance across a range of policing activity, notably those areas listed in the table below.

HMIC risk-based frameworks
Fairness and equality in service delivery
Volume crime reduction
Volume crime investigation
Improving forensic performance
Criminal justice processes
Reducing anti-social behaviour
Contact management
Training, development and organisational learning

While these activities will not be subject to routine inspection, evidence of a significant decline in performance would prompt consideration of inspection. For 150 years, HMIC has maintained an ongoing relationship with every force. This allows it to identify and support forces when specific issues of concern arise. On a more formal basis, HMIC participates in the Home Office Police Performance Steering Group and Joint Performance Review Group, which have a role in monitoring and supporting police performance in crime reduction, crime investigation and public confidence.

HMIC conducts inspections of basic command units (BCUs), also on a risk-assessed basis, using the Going Local 3 methodology. Combining these various strands of inspection evidence allows HMIC to form a comprehensive picture of both individual force performance and the wider national picture.

The grading process

Grades awarded by HMIC are a reflection of the performance delivered by the force over the assessment period April 2006 to July 2007. One of four grades can be awarded, according to performance assessed against the SGC (for the full list of SGC, see <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/methodologies/baseline-introduction/ba-methodology-06/?version=1>).

Excellent

This grade describes the highest level of performance in service delivery and achieving full compliance with codes of practice or national guidance. It is expected that few forces will achieve this very high standard for a given activity. To achieve Excellent, forces are expected to meet **all** of the criteria set out in the Fair SGC and the vast majority of those set out in Good. In addition, two other factors will attract consideration of an Excellent grade:

- The force should be recognised, or be able to act, as a 'beacon' to others, and be accepted within the service as a source of leading-edge practice. Evidence that other forces have successfully imported practices would demonstrate this.
- HMIC is committed to supporting innovation and we would expect Excellent forces to have introduced and evaluated new ways of delivering or improving performance.

Good

Good is defined in the Collins English Dictionary as 'of a high quality or level' and denotes performance above the minimum standard. To reach this level, forces have to meet in full the criteria set out in Fair and most of the criteria set out in Good.

Fair

Fair is the delivery of an acceptable level of service, which meets national threshold standards where these exist. To achieve a Fair grading, forces must meet all of the significant criteria set out in the Fair SGC. HMIC would expect that, across most activities, the largest number of grades will be awarded at this level.

Poor

A Poor grade represents an unacceptably low level of service. To attract this very critical grade, a force will have fallen well short of a significant number of criteria set out in the SGC for Fair. In some cases, failure to achieve a single critical criterion may alone warrant a Poor grade. Such dominant criteria will always be flagged in the SGC but may also reflect a degree of professional judgement on the level of risk being carried by the force.

Developing practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected as a strength in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit examples of its good practice. HMIC has selected three or more of these examples to publish in this report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces (each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required). HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Future HMIC inspection activity

Although HMIC will continue to maintain a watching brief on all performance areas, its future inspection activity (see provisional timescales below) will be determined by a risk assessment process. Protective services will be at the core of inspection programmes, tailored to capacity, capability and the likelihood of exposure to threats from organised criminality, terrorism and so on. Until its full implementation in April 2008, Neighbourhood Policing will also demand attention. Conversely, those areas (such as volume crime) where performance is captured by statutory performance indicators (SPIs), iQuanta and other objective evidence will receive scrutiny only where performance is deteriorating, as described above.

The Government has announced that, in real terms, there will be little or no growth in police authority/force budgets over the next three years. Forces will therefore have to maintain, and in some areas improve, performance without additional central support or funding. This in itself creates a risk to police delivery and HMIC has therefore included a strategic resource management assessment for all forces in its future inspection programme.

Planned Inspection areas
Serious and organised crime
Major crime
Neighbourhood Policing
Strategic resource management
Customer service and accessibility
Critical incident management
Professional standards
Public order
Civil contingencies
Information management
Strategic roads policing
Leadership

Inspection Overview and Context

Geographical description of force area

Gloucestershire Constabulary serves the county of Gloucestershire, comprising six local authorities. Gloucester is the county city and the largest town is Cheltenham. Situated at the northern edge of the South West region of England, Gloucestershire covers an area of 1,025 square miles, with large tracts of unspoilt natural landscape, including the Cotswolds in the east and the Royal Forest of Dean in the south-west, separated by the Severn Vale.

Demographic profile of force area

The population of Gloucestershire is currently 575,000. In comparison with national figures the proportion of the population who define themselves as being from a black or minority ethnic group is low. Gloucestershire has relatively low levels of unemployment.

Despite its image as an idyllic rural area, significant pockets of deprivation exist within the county, with 13 wards in the top quartile nationally for deprivation. Furthermore, Gloucester district as a whole represents a particular area of deprivation, being the 101st most deprived district in the country (out of a total of 354 districts). This situation has a significant impact on overall performance.

Structural description of force including staff changes at chief officer level

The chief officer group consists of the Chief Constable, a deputy chief constable (DCC), two assistant chief constables (ACCs) and two police staff directors for finance and human resources. The Chief Constable, Dr Timothy Brain, has been in post for six years, having previously served as the DCC in the county for three years. DCC Craig Mackey was previously ACC (operations) in the constabulary and will shortly be departing to take up the post of Chief Constable of Cumbria. ACC Mark Polin, former holder of the ACC (corporate services) post, now holds the ACC (operations) portfolio. The post of ACC (corporate services) is held by Mick Matthews who joined the constabulary in 2005. Both police staff directors have only recently been appointed. Mike Barrow holds the portfolio for finance, having served with the constabulary for 16½ years. Amanda Newman joined the constabulary in April and holds the portfolio for human resources, a post she previously occupied at Cardiff University. The police authority chair, Councillor Rob Garnham, is also new in post, having been appointed in April.

The force is made up of three basic command units (BCUs) known as divisions, each of which is coterminous with two local authority areas. Each division is split into inspector neighbourhood areas (INAs) within a geographic policing model; there is a total of 17 INAs.

Force developments since 2006

Strategic Priorities

On appointment in April 2001, the Chief Constable set out a clear vision for the constabulary, known as Vision 5. The intention of this five-year plan was to enable Gloucestershire to become the most operationally effective police force in the country. On April 1 2007, Vision 5 was superseded by **Vision2010**, Gloucestershire Constabulary's new three-year strategic plan. Vision2010 will ensure the constabulary is able to meet the challenges of the future, as well as the reasonable expectations of the people of Gloucestershire. It will continue where Vision 5 left off and build on the success of its predecessor. Each part of the plan has lead officers, applies to all areas of business and is complementary to the police authority's three-year strategy and local policing plan. The police authority fully endorses and supports Vision2010.

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The policing plan is published as a full website (not simply a downloadable document) at www.gloucestershirepolicingplan.org.uk/1.html. Vision2010 is linked to this site.

Current organisational strategic priorities for the force include:

- further strengthening Safer Community Policing across Gloucestershire;
- recruiting and developing the workforce to meet operational and organisational requirements;
- maximising the efficiency and effectiveness of all resources;
- improving technology to support operational policing; and
- increasing operational effectiveness through estate development.

Recent Achievements

- At the time of this inspection, Gloucestershire Constabulary was in the midst of Operation Outlook. This is the operational response to the catastrophic flooding that the county has suffered and is undoubtedly the largest single commitment the constabulary has ever been faced with.
- The Investors in People charter mark has been retained until 2010.
- The force is the first in the country to obtain accreditation to ISO 14001, an internationally recognised environmental management system standard for organisations that implement environmental strategies within their working environment.
- The force has introduced an SMS messaging service to deal with non-emergency enquiries from people who are deaf or speech-impaired or who have other specific needs.
- The staff development unit has been relocated to a new purpose built site at Wheatstone House.
- Members of the Neighbourhood Policing project team delivered a presentation entitled 'Using socio-demographics to understand police demand' to the national crime mapping conference at the Jill Dando Institute. This concerned the work undertaken to identify and profile communities in Gloucestershire.

Findings

National summary of judgements

	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
Neighbourhood Policing				
Neighbourhood Policing	6	14	21	2
Performance management				
Performance management	6	29	8	0
Protecting vulnerable people				
Child abuse	3	17	21	2
Domestic violence	1	13	27	2
Public protection	2	16	23	2
Missing persons	1	21	21	0

Force summary of judgements

Neighbourhood Policing	Grade
Neighbourhood Policing	Fair
Performance management	Grade
Performance management	Good
Protecting vulnerable people	Grade
Child abuse	Fair
Domestic violence	Fair
Public protection	Fair
Missing persons	Fair

Neighbourhood Policing

GRADE	FAIR
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National grade distribution

Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
6	14	21	2

National contextual factors

The national Neighbourhood Policing programme was launched by ACPO in April 2005 to support the Government's vision of a policing service which is both accessible and responsive to the needs of local people. It was anticipated that, by April 2007, every area across England and Wales would have a Neighbourhood Policing presence appropriate to local needs, with all Neighbourhood Policing teams in place by April 2008. For local communities this means:

- increased numbers of police community support officers (PCSOs) patrolling their streets, addressing anti-social behaviour (ASB) and building relationships with local people;
- access both to information about policing in their local area and to a point of contact in their Neighbourhood Policing team; and
- having the opportunity to tell the police about the issues that are causing them concern and helping to shape the response to those issues (Home Office, May 2006).

By focusing on the key areas of resources, familiarity/accessibility, problem identification and joint problem solving, this inspection has identified the extent to which Neighbourhood Policing is being implemented. It has also examined forces' capability and commitment to sustain implementation beyond April 2008.

Contextual Factors

The aim of Neighbourhood Policing is to increase public satisfaction and confidence, reduce the fear of crime and resolve locally identified problems of crime and ASB. There is a requirement that all identified neighbourhood areas should have a dedicated Neighbourhood Policing presence (safer community team (SCT)) by April 2007. This means that every community should:

- have increased numbers of PCSOs patrolling its streets addressing ASB issues and building relationships with local people;
- have obtained information from its local police force outlining details of the policing team and explaining how the local community can contact it; and
- have the structured ability to tell the police about issues which are causing it concern and making its members feel unsafe, in order to shape a problem-solving response to those issues.

Police forces should be implementing the model of Neighbourhood Policing which is most suited to their local environments and community needs. However, they must comply with

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the Ten Neighbourhood Policing Principles and the findings of the Neighbourhood Policing Reassurance Programme. Forces should engage with statutory and voluntary partners in order to develop a more efficient and complete service around both crime and quality-of-life issues.

An inclusive problem-solving approach will require police and partners to identify and tackle the underlying causes of crime and disorder in a way that resolves them in a readily sustainable and long-term way.

The roll-out of Neighbourhood Policing involves a programme of continued activity up until March 2008, when there is a requirement to have established appropriate coverage, community engagement and joint problem solving.

Gloucestershire Constabulary was inspected in 2006 and at that time was graded Poor for Neighbourhood Policing and problem solving. At that time there were pilot SCTs, but the learning and best practice had not been spread throughout the force. Additionally, there was insufficient development of neighbourhood profiles and neighbourhood panels, and a lack of structure around training and recruitment.

In response to this assessment, the force has addressed the identified shortcomings through a project approach to which it has allocated additional financial and human resources. As a result it has achieved significant improvements in the delivery of Neighbourhood Policing, driven by strong management leadership and governance. The new enhanced central delivery team has, through the project plan, driven and organised the activities of functional groups within the force (for example marketing, human resources and training) towards the Neighbourhood Policing corporate goal. Immediate results include the following:

- A revised Neighbourhood Policing structure has been produced. The force has a structure of Inspector Neighbourhood Areas (INAs) which has traditionally provided a system of geographical service delivery. This has now been strengthened by the identification of 55 communities, (within these INAs) to which resources have been allocated. These come under the INA structure, but are smaller and therefore closer to local people and their needs. Each of these communities now has a named contact point and will be staffed by dedicated constables and PCSOs. These communities form the key component of the force's enhanced approach.
- The 55 identified communities encompass 145 wards. Each community has at least one dedicated constable and these are supplemented by 442 hybrid (ie not fully dedicated) constables. There are 18 dedicated sergeants and 52 hybrid sergeants. There are currently 185 PCSOs.
- Each community, together with police and partners, is identifying a rolling programme of activity based upon priority, and in each case there will be at least three priorities addressed to meet public needs.
- Management leadership and direction at BCU level has been enhanced with existing Neighbourhood Policing champions driving progress against the project plan and reporting back to the central team. They are held to account by their own BCU commanders and are ultimately accountable for their team's activities to the communities they serve.

The force has undertaken considerable work to develop an understanding of all of its communities. An analytical approach has been taken which is both robust and rigorous and has used crime, demographic and social data. The necessary duration of this work has inevitably led to some delay in other aspects of the project, including the process of allocating SCT resources to the newly identified communities, undertaking a public

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perception survey and exploring opportunities to enhance joint working further. However, the quality of the product is commensurate with the time invested. The public perception survey will now be undertaken once the Neighbourhood Policing performance management guidance is available. This will ensure that full use can be made of the survey to measure the effectiveness of Neighbourhood Policing activity in accordance with the national guidance.

Notwithstanding this delay, the Neighbourhood Policing action plan includes a clearly achievable intention to conclude the project by the deadline date of April 2008.

Confidence in local policing, as measured by the British Crime Survey (BCS), is close to the most similar forces group average. The proportion of officer time available for front-line policing is higher than the national average and the current allocation of force resource to Neighbourhood Policing is 18% of the total.

In April 2006, a unique contract was signed between the constabulary and the county council to supply 63 county council-funded police constable posts to the force by 2010. These posts will be dedicated to Neighbourhood Policing; this additional resource will help to ensure that Neighbourhood Policing is correctly prioritised and distractions minimised.

Strengths

There is a robust governance regime involving personal accountability to the lead ACC. A project methodology drives progress, supported by an enhanced central delivery team and management framework. The ACPO lead has accountability direct to the Chief Constable for the ongoing delivery of Neighbourhood Policing. His commitment and leadership are clearly visible. He meets with the chief executives and other strategic leaders to overcome issues and to promote understanding. He has ensured the strengthening of the force project team by bringing in key resources to guide BCUs in local administration, leaving the project manager free to focus on strategic issues. The project team is led by a superintendent who has regular access to the ACC in structured weekly meetings in which the agreed project milestones are discussed.

Progress towards achievement of these milestones is reported monthly to the Neighbourhood Policing project group. This project group reports to the police reform board, which has chief officer representation. Action owners are required to report upon their actions every month prior to the Neighbourhood Policing project group meetings. Some of the actions included within the plan are encompassed within a single research and consultation project. This project is led by the research manager, who reports any significant findings or areas for concern directly to the superintendent (community partnership) and the chief officer group.

Champions (chief inspectors) exist on each BCU and have responsibility for driving the recommendations of the central team locally within BCUs. The ACPO lead has driven a clear focus on the provision of appropriate skills by training, and has invested effort to broaden understanding of the Neighbourhood Policing philosophy among partners. The force has made available additional funds to expand training and provide enhanced internal and external marketing.

There is a broad awareness among all staff of the force's approach towards Neighbourhood Policing. A comprehensive and compelling intranet site provides a vivid picture of progress and intent.

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The force has held a number of in-force events and sent delegates to regional events to raise the awareness of Neighbourhood Policing.

A robust communication strategy is in place that incorporates a variety of physical media, as well as seminars and events and the establishment of police information points. These measures are designed to inform the public about their Neighbourhood Policing team, and include an interactive website which is easily navigated, user-friendly and detailed. It offers users the opportunity to provide feedback to the force about issues that concern them within their communities, and to influence the setting of priorities. In addition, the force has recently developed PDF maps which show the communities and their named officers, together with a service whereby users can establish when the named officer is next on duty.

Spotlight, the force newspaper, has recently included detailed articles setting out the intended approach regarding communities and named contacts. The force intranet site supports this. Posters and other printed material augment these media and are used more locally by SCT staff. This material is considered to exemplify best practice.

Police information points have been deployed in key locations, such as post offices and libraries, to provide a consistent location for the community to locate information. Staff at all levels have given briefings and talks to partners and communities in order to spread the neighbourhood policing message.

All this activity is contributing to a culture change and an enhanced understanding of Neighbourhood Policing. This understanding is often tangible and visible, for example at station notice boards and in publications. Interviews with partners and the public confirm the efficacy of these communications and arrangements. A county-wide marketing campaign was undertaken between 14 and 25 May 2007, to coincide with the national campaign.

There is evidence of full implementation and coverage across all BCUs. The force already comprised 17 INAs, which formed the platform for the delivery of local policing. Unwilling to risk confusion by defining new 'neighbourhoods', the force has chosen to define 'communities'. This was achieved by the use of a comprehensive multiple-attribute regression technique applied to a variety of demographic datasets. The data was wide-ranging and was drawn from the Multi-Agency Information Database for Neighbourhoods (MAIDeN). Communities and partners were included in the selection process and nine consultative events were undertaken to take account of community views. Partners and community representatives reported some dissatisfaction with the extent of consultation on neighbourhood constitution and boundaries; however, they also cited instances where borders were changed to meet their requirements and reported that in the main the model is appropriate to meet community needs. Additional consultation took place with the county council, resulting in further minor refinement and the agreement of the final community boundary map.

The comprehensive multiple regression analysis described above affords the force the opportunity to review neighbourhood boundaries periodically, and its sophisticated analysis of demographic data ensures the ability to adapt to changing communities and their specific needs. It is intended to use this technique, and analysis of public patterns of movement around work and leisure, to review the allocation of resources to communities at the end of the roll-out and annually thereafter. This process will particularly target rural areas where it is recognised that visibility can be hard to achieve. The force should further develop its partnership/community consultation during this review process.

There is a clear rationale for allocating neighbourhood resources to communities, using a resource allocation formula. The delivery of this resource is seen as a priority and current

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vacancy levels are being monitored. The vacancy rate at present is negligible.

The police authority has uniquely negotiated with the county council the long-term funding of 63 additional police constable posts, which are all ring-fenced to work within SCT areas. At the time of inspection 29 of these posts were in place. This is a rolling programme of growth over four years, with 17 further new posts due in 2008/09 and another 17 in 2009/10.

SCTs share a common basic level of resourcing in which a sergeant leads a small team comprising constables, PCSOs and some special constables.

The force has clearly defined generic roles for Neighbourhood Policing constables, PCSOs, sergeants and inspectors within the integrated competency framework. PCSO terms of reference are described in a handbook that is being revised. PCSOs have been issued with aide-mémoire cards setting out their roles. Those who were recruited more recently have a clearer, more accurate picture of how the powers and deployments of PCSOs have evolved over time, and awareness of the PCSO role is growing among other staff, particularly within control rooms. There are examples of these staff intervening in cases of unsuitable PCSO deployment.

It is the ultimate aim of the force to have all new special constables attached to SCT areas. Special constables are encouraged to join SCTs and are becoming embedded in neighbourhood teams across all divisions. By July 2007, 53 of 135 special constables were linked to an SCT. The force is conscious that these volunteer staff often wish to maintain their pre-existing roles and that forcing them onto neighbourhoods could be counter-productive.

A clear abstraction policy with management intervention has been put in place. Ring-fenced officers may not be abstracted at all and non-ring-fenced officers may not be abstracted more than 20% of their time, although sergeants can be abstracted 50% of their time. Sequencing of constable to sergeant promotions has meant a gradual build-up of staff in acting roles, which has impacted on the need to abstract substantive sergeants to undertake custody duties. It is anticipated that this will be resolved in the near future. Abstractions are monitored by the staff themselves, who submit monthly returns. All SCTs account monthly to the ACC for abstractions.

A document which sets out force-level recommendations for community engagement was published in February 2007 and has been distributed throughout the force to guide engagement activity. This guidance is being implemented locally by SCT staff. SCTs were able to give examples of a variety of methods of engagement, including engagement with traditionally hard-to-reach groups. At Stow there was clear evidence of communities influencing local priority setting. Feedback is given to communities in a variety of ways at community level.

An independent advisory group operates at Gloucestershire Constabulary, and although the force is making use of key individual networks, these are a relatively new initiative and are not yet mature across all communities.

SCT staff have identified emerging communities, especially involving Eastern European migrant workers. This work has enabled a swift response to progressing an investigation into the unexplained death of a young local man, and to allow raised community tensions over the issue to be understood and resolved. This engagement activity is now seen as best practice.

Community influence is exercised in relation to a contentious horse fair, which takes place

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in the county. SCT officers have engaged with national representatives of the travelling community and taken their views into account, balancing their needs with those of the host resident community. The event requires very sensitive handling and awareness and is reportedly policed to the satisfaction of all.

There are no reports of partner reluctance, although the corporate (rather than project) risk register includes consideration of the potential for such reluctance to pose a risk to the implementation of Neighbourhood Policing. In addition, the county council funded officers contract includes risk control provisions governing the withdrawal of either party from the arrangement, including a 12-month grace period before any funding can cease. The risk is further managed by regular reviews of the agreement and its effectiveness.

There is significant engagement between the force training department and the Neighbourhood Policing team. The force training board meets quarterly to review the force training needs analysis, and this process has resulted in enhancements to training for neighbourhood Policing team staff. PCSO training has been prioritised, extended from five to eight weeks and undertaken jointly with constables within the Initial Police Learning and Development Programme. This training is based on Centrex modules and includes engagement, problem solving and hate crime/victim focus. Each new PCSO visits the SCT for the area where they will be deployed. They must work with an existing team member either to create a new scanning, analysis, response, assessment (SARA) plan, or to enhance an existing plan, tackling a local issue. These plans are then available to help problem solving in that area and are subject of a presentation to operational staff as part of the course. The training programme also includes a community placement.

Discussion between the force training manager and the Neighbourhood Policing manager has developed a phased approach for further training (phase 1 – new entrants; phase 2 – existing SCT staff; phase 3 – rest of the force).

Because of the recently enhanced PCSO training, new entrant PCSOs are well equipped to fulfil their roles. PCSOs who have been longer in post have not always maintained knowledge of their evolving role within Neighbourhood Policing and would welcome refresher training. Deployments generally match PCSO skills and abilities. PCSOs undertake monthly returns of activity and have monthly job chats with supervisors. Training needs are identified at this time.

Each PCSO and constable has been set a performance development review (PDR) objective to ensure that they complete the seven Centrex self-teach modules available on the Neighbourhood Policing website by the end of March 2008. At the time of the inspection this initiative was not well understood by staff, although some sergeants were aware and had commenced implementation.

PCSOs undertake a system of tutoring with experienced staff who are A1 assessors. These tutors have been trained in adult learning, problem solving etc, and offer support to students through a system of action planning managed via development portfolios.

There has been additional training for INA support officers and front-of-house reception staff to improve their knowledge of Neighbourhood Policing and to ensure that they give the correct response to callers and visitors.

A training evaluation strategy document has been published that relies upon the use of the Kirkpatrick evaluation process. It is proposed to evaluate and measure the transference of learning to the workplace and the impact on job performance using this method. This evaluation will be undertaken once the updated course is more firmly embedded. The Initial

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Police Learning and Development Programme is currently being independently validated by the National Policing Improvement Agency. This is a three-stage process and the product is already approved at the first two levels, with full validation expected shortly. Level 1 evaluation feedback sheets are also routinely collected from each intake as they undergo this training.

The traditional nature of some of the force estate means that some of the accommodation used by neighbourhood staff is cramped. However, staff report general satisfaction with the space available. The force is making effective use of bicycles to deliver PCSO visibility, and there are currently 29 PCSOs who have received cycle training and who have ready access to bicycles for patrol.

Police information points are in place in partner premises and mobile police station facilities are used to provide coverage and visibility in rural areas.

Neighbourhood officers are not routinely allocated to crime investigation. They do undertake a daily trawl of command and control for their area and will self-allocate work that is appropriate. Sergeants undertake a similar trawl and allocate tasks where necessary. Sergeants are able to access IT systems easily to monitor the current workload of individual officers in terms of crimes and incidents. They are also able to view comprehensive management information that records, down to individual level, all activities undertaken by staff. Monthly performance monitoring forms have been designed and circulated for the use of the teams.

A review of command and control allocation call queues revealed no burdensome backlog of lower-grade demand.

PDR objectives relating to the implementation of Neighbourhood Policing are set for neighbourhood staff. Examples seen included the submission of a target number of intelligence items and the establishment of community groups. Abstraction objectives are generic to the force. Although PCSOs reported an intelligent approach to visibility, focusing on key times and locations, it was not clear that these were incorporated as PDR objectives.

Partners attend police tasking meetings informally at SCT and BCU levels, but true joint tasking remains somewhat limited. Nevertheless, there are examples of joint activity in resolving problems which illustrate the potential in this regard.

Neighbourhood staff complete monthly returns of activity, and these are discussed at the one-to-one job chats with supervisors. BCU champions did not have a clear picture of the activity of neighbourhood teams towards their SARA plans. Chief inspectors need to be more intrusive about this key aspect of their role.

The force has policies in place on hate crime, vulnerable road users and repeat victims, which link to the force's strategic plan. These policies are applied by all members of the force and not exclusively by neighbourhood staff. The multiple regression analysis technique used to define neighbourhoods encompasses various vulnerability indices and provides data which supports the implementation of these policies. The hate crime policy has been written in accordance with the ACPO manual of guidance, and includes the specific roles and responsibilities of all key staff in relation to the reporting and investigation of hate crime. The introduction of the policy was supported by inputs from the diversity unit on all INA training days during October to December 2006, and was further used to launch the new hate crime attendance pack.

There is evidence of neighbourhood teams engaging with vulnerable groups such as

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schoolchildren (safer school initiatives) and elderly people (providing advice about bogus callers), as well as with travellers attending the annual horse fair at Stow-on-the-Wold referred to above.

The force has forged links with the Gloucestershire Rural Community Council which uses village agents who are community volunteers. The council supports elderly people within communities, and analysis of local vulnerable groups and individuals within neighbourhood profiles was provided to the inspection team.

The force has shown a commitment to learning and improvement through dialogue with the National Neighbourhood Policing Project, and this has confirmed its own focus on the identification of neighbourhoods and named contacts. The national team was invited to the force in late 2006 and gave recommendations which the force is pursuing. This and the HMIC baseline report of 2006 contributed to the force's Neighbourhood Policing action plan update document, which includes actions to address specific grading criteria by way of a gap analysis. It also requires use of the self-assessment guide by BCU commanders in order to examine their progress locally. The business improvement team has used telephone surveys and support calls to make reality checks within BCU areas – this method is outlined in the self-assessment guide. The resulting evidence is to be fed back to the divisional Neighbourhood Policing meetings. In addition divisional champions are to commence their own reality checks using the self-assessment guide. The priority is to establish whether effective community engagement plans and neighbourhood co-ordination processes are in place.

BCUs also make use of local steering groups to drive the implementation of Neighbourhood Policing. At Cheltenham and Tewkesbury the BCU commander chairs this group. The force gave input to a regional Neighbourhood Policing event at Newbury, sending key representatives from its SCTs and from partners and communities. This event was designed to share best practice and raise awareness. SCT members are able to search the force intranet for best practice and tactical options from other SCTs.

A two-day neighbourhood improvement workshop, attended by police and key partners, has been held by the force with the aim of improving neighbourhood management and ensuring continued support for Neighbourhood Policing. National Policing Improvement Agency facilitators were used and action plans developed.

The force makes use of a long-standing problem-solving methodology that relies on the SARA process. In all BCUs evidence was seen of activity aimed at solving problems, and in most cases there were joint working considerations. In some SCTs where key individual networks (KINs) are well established, they are being used to sign off SARA activity when completed. This illustrates willingness on the part of the force to give some degree of influence to local communities. Given that this process does not always address the underlying problem, the force is aware that additional guidance is needed to equip SCTs with methods, understanding and tactics to ensure that problems are solved in a sustainable way. The current three-phase training programme should address this issue.

The force's problem-solving approach is supported by the use of MAIDeN. This allows the exchange of data and information between all key partners and is governed by longstanding protocols at strategic and local levels. The force has provided examples of problem-solving initiatives, such as 'Kidi Cop'. For the most part police officers undertake their own research and analysis into community-based SARA problems, but they can request specialist analytical support via tasking and co-ordination (T&C).

BCU SARA plans are discussed at level 1 T&C meetings. Satisfaction and confidence data

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is included within the tactical assessment and informs decision making.

The use of the SARA form varies across the force, with electronic and paper-based systems both in evidence. This situation is currently under review. The intention is to adopt an all-electronic approach, affording greater accessibility, searchability, corporacy and governance. To this end SARA plan templates have just become available on the Neighbourhood Policing intranet site, together with guidance on the new neighbourhood co-ordination process.

In order to enable SARA plans to link better to National Intelligence Model (NIM) processes, the force has increased the capacity of the intranet for SARA plan storage. The community priorities within the SARA plans will be monitored and linked to the intelligence and tasking system. The facility allows for the plans to be stored in their entirety, and there is also a spreadsheet that allows relevant information to be seen at a glance, to assist with monitoring of the plans. Members of the central co-ordination team have notified staff of this facility through a bulletin entry, and have briefed staff at divisional Neighbourhood Policing meetings.

A number of SARA plans were examined. In the main it was clear that the host community had played a part in establishing the problem as a priority; in some cases, however, this was clearly not the case. The origin of data in SARA documents was not always made explicit, but data appeared to be drawn from multiple sources. It was apparent from examination of forms and discussions with staff that problem analysis did not always include a thorough examination of the victim, offender and location dimensions, and as such it was not clear that planned responses addressed the full range of problem-solving possibilities. However, planned responses do include joint activity between police, partners and communities, and good examples were seen of cases in which co-operation was strong and productive.

A division piloted a series of joint problem-solving training sessions between police and partners during June. The results and findings of this pilot will be implemented across the force area in due course. A police authority-funded staff member contributes input on headline youth-related issues to the training function. An example of this work in practice is a scheme whereby new police constables go on work placements in local youth offices.

A number of examples of verbal recognition were apparent, and it was clear that staff feel valued. There is no use of special priority payments or similar reward systems, although the Neighbourhood Policing action plan includes measures to address this issue by December 2007.

Work in Progress

The force has secured county council commitment to funding 63 dedicated police constable posts; however, for the most part staff are already in place within SCTs and as the funded posts come on line they will fill the vacancies which the staffing of SCTs has created elsewhere. Thus staffing is in place now, and will continue to grow up until 2010 when the remaining staff are employed.

The Neighbourhood Policing project plan does not include detailed reference to sustainability, although the ongoing commitment of the police authority in respect of constable and PCSO funding places the force advantageously in this regard. The project plan is in a recognised format with clear task definition, sequenced milestone dates and accountability. The team has not prepared a GANNT or PERT chart nor does the plan include recognition or management of project risk or critical path.

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The force intends to undertake a public perception survey to gauge the reaction to the formation of SCT areas. The use of community impact assessments (CIAs) has been developed in order to include vulnerable communities. Additionally there has been a recent revision of the CIA template to ensure that consideration is given to involving an independent adviser in the impact assessment process. To support this, the ACC (operations) has tasked the involvement of independent advisers at the divisional level.

Guidance on engagement was published to the force in February 2007. This guidance is now being implemented locally by SCT staff. Divisional and neighbourhood plans have been developed over the subsequent six months. BCUs have been challenged to deliver neighbourhood management arrangements by December 2007, including locally defined priorities. There is clear evidence of quality engagement work currently being undertaken.

Work is being done to strengthen the approach to performance management and accountability. It is intended that measures of neighbourhood performance will be incorporated at the force performance improvement conference. Performance management measures continue to emerge and could be further enhanced by the development of performance indicators for SCTs and members. Measures to disseminate performance information to partners to enable joint priority setting are also in progress.

There is a specials conference planned for autumn 2007 that will reinforce the message to link up with SCTs. All new special constables are automatically allocated to an SCT.

Although there are no joint strategic assessments in effect within the force at this time, the principle has been discussed and accepted at the force operations conference and the initiative will be driven by the NIM review action plan. The process for developing the joint strategic assessment has been agreed and initial meetings have taken place.

Only limited use is made of volunteers at this time, although there is some volunteer staffing of enquiry offices and monitoring of CCTV. This issue has been recognised by the force and as a result a volunteers working group has now been established, led by an ACC, to drive the necessary changes. The group has engaged with existing volunteers and staff associations, and has visited other forces that are recommended as beacon sites. A revised force policy has now been circulated in draft form and this includes options for volunteers to link their work to SCTs.

Neighbourhood profiles exist and are continuing to emerge in line with the community areas. The multiple-attribute regression analysis has produced a huge quantity of demographic data that has recently been included in profiles and will form the context for problem solving. SCT staff have developed profiles independently; these are mainly descriptive and contain information on key local community groups. The information in these profiles is of recognised value in addressing local events. They are tentatively linked to NIM inasmuch as they include problem and offender profiles.

There is limited use of community impact assessments (CIAs). The force has taken a number of measures within the diversity action plan to strengthen CIAs and their links to T&C processes. Analysts will ensure consideration of CIAs in developing analytical products. The diversity manager has gathered data relating to the regular and systematic use of CIAs across divisions and departments. As a result of this monitoring extra training was provided at divisional management team (DMT) level. These products are improving as a result, and should be used to measure and evaluate police tactics, to inform the risk-assessment process and as a means of community gap analysis.

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All seventeen INAs have published priorities, and across the force priorities are now being defined at community level. Discussion with partners revealed some strong examples of SCTs consulting, engaging and providing feedback. A variety of methods are employed ranging from street interviews to more formal council meetings and police community consultative meetings.

Areas for Improvement

The force should consider preparation of a GANNT chart for project activity, which would provide an enhanced understanding of the project critical path.

The force should find ways to strengthen routine analysis within local tasking/problem-solving documents. Current arrangements allow those SARA plans requiring analyst input to be raised within the force exception reporting guidance. This allows any high-priority request for analytical support from a neighbourhood co-ordination group to be routed to the tasking and co-ordination group (T&CG) and enables some degree of analysis, but it is not a process that is well used. As a result there is only very limited research and analytical product within most SARA plans. Effective problem solving with proper analysis at its heart is crucial to the neighbourhood approach; without it the deployment of this significant resource is less efficient. HMIC recognises the resource implications of achieving this, but activity should be designed around this analysis and should lead into formalised results analysis at a later stage.

The force should re-examine its approach to problem solving to ensure that it addresses the causes of problems rather than just the symptoms and thereby achieves sustainable solutions.

Opportunities for joint training, both within the force and with partners and the public, should be reconsidered within the force Neighbourhood Policing strategy.

The force should ensure that neighbourhood profiles are of sufficient sophistication to be a useful resource at BCU T&C meetings. They should include local tactical plans based upon analytical product, in order to capture crime and disorder trends.

Consideration should be given by the force and partners to the implementation of a formal evaluation process to monitor and inspect against implementation requirements and standards.

A formalised approach to the engagement of SCTs to provide services to repeat and vulnerable victims, for example of hate crime, should be considered.

While there is some joint engagement and tasking this process needs formalisation and linking to current T&C processes and the NIM intelligence stream.

Further consideration should be given to the means by which CIA links with the T&C process on divisions. Divisional senior management teams, the diversity unit and possibly the NIM steering group should routinely draw upon CIAs in order to ensure that the two processes are linked.

The guidance on local engagement processes should be enhanced by adding descriptions of approaches to engaging with hard-to-reach groups. Although young people are specifically mentioned within the plan and there is a tactical list of engagement options within the policy document – ‘Procedure and methods for informing citizens about their

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named SCT officer and local priority action owner' – consideration should be given to broadening the scope of these measures and efforts should be increased to provide feedback to communities about actions taken to resolve neighbourhood problems, and their outcomes.

RECOMMENDATION 1

The force should further enhance its efforts to develop joint problem solving with partners; concentrating upon the root causes of these problems rather than the more visible symptoms.

Developing Practice

INSPECTION AREA: Neighbourhood Policing

TITLE: Operation Kidi- Cop

PROBLEM:

Pittville Secondary School lies near a busy road. The speed limit is 30mph but there is a clear view and downhill gradient towards Cheltenham. There are no crossing points and no pavement on one area. In 2005 a pupil was injured while crossing to attend school.

SOLUTION:

Officers targeted motorists for speeding, seatbelt and phone offences. Around 40 vehicles per operation were stopped.

Students became aware and requested involvement. They wrote to drivers about the injured pupil and their support for the scheme. They wanted to deliver their letters personally. Thus Operation Kidi- Cop came about.

The operation was amended to include pupils. Police process offences at the roadside first, then a student approaches. The student hands over the letter and moves away. The driver can then leave.

Please note:

- Teachers accompany pupils.
- Pupil numbers are kept low (easier supervision).
- Pupils are briefed by police and teachers.
- Pupils wear reflective jackets.
- Pupils are kept in a safe area.
- Pupils do not speak to drivers.
- Pupils do not approach a driver if conflict is possible.

Reporters have taken part and subsequent headlines have included ‘Motorists, kill your speed, not us: pupils’ and ‘Slow down – you are a danger to pupils.’

OUTCOME(S):

Since Operation Kidi- Cop there have been fewer traffic offences in the vicinity. The October operation gave a nil return for speeding – previously speeds had reached 45mph.

Traffic calming measures are being installed and Vernon Coaker MP has praised the initiative.

The operation appears on the national Neighbourhood Policing website document library.

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INSPECTION AREA: Neighbourhood Policing

TITLE: Understanding Communities

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PROBLEM:

There was a need to identify community areas for the effective provision of Neighbourhood Policing. The aim was to define local delivery areas and to understand the nature of each of those communities in order to understand policing needs.

SOLUTION:

Multiple regression analysis was undertaken on multi-agency socio-demographic data to determine which factors could be used to explain policing demand at a super output area level. This analysis led to the construction of several derived variables that could be used to explain variability in crime, incidents and victims.

Five separate regression models were built, one for each of the following:

- total crime;
- BCS crime;
- total incidents;
- ASB incidents; and
- total victims (by home address as opposed to location of crime).

For each model the force was able to identify the variables that were most important in terms of explaining police demand in an area. This allowed the generation of two sets of demand profiles – one based on predicted demand derived from the model and one based on observed demand derived from crime, incident and victim levels. This information, alongside Ordnance Survey data and the findings of consultation with staff, partners and other stakeholders, was used to inform the drawing up of boundaries of local community areas.

Following on from the modelling and mapping, analysis was undertaken to generate descriptors that would inform policing delivery in each area, based on the levels of expected demand and observed demand and the difference between the two. Where actual crime and incident figures were higher than expected this indicated that demand was based on factors unconnected to the resident population. In the case of victims, an elevated level of predicted risk would be based on the resident population, but related to events outside the geographical area. Using the socio-demographic data, each area was classified for predicted risk, observed risk and whether the observed risk represented an amplified or moderated demand.

Finally, the relationship between the separate models and the component parts of those models was considered, in order to describe specifically the demand that existed in each of the areas.

OUTCOME(S):

The final output was the definition of 55 community areas for the county. Each community area will be provided with a detailed demand profile that informs the provision of policing on the basis of the rational analysis of factors that affect demand.

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Performance Management

GRADE	GOOD
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National grade distribution

Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
6	29	8	0

National contextual factors

There is no single accepted model of performance management across the police service but any such model or framework must be fit for purpose. Ideally, forces should demonstrate that individuals at every level of the organisation understand their contribution to converting resources into agreed delivery, and know how they will be held to account. On a daily basis, first-line supervisors monitor, support and quality assure the performance of their teams. At the other end of the spectrum, chief officer-led performance meetings – often based loosely on the American Compstat model – are a vehicle for accountability and improvement. Robust leadership, a commitment to improvement and reliable, real-time information systems are all critical factors in effective performance management.

There is no mechanistic link between overall force performance and the grade awarded in this framework. The grade is based on the quality of the force’s processes that enable it to identify and react to changes in performance.

Contextual Factors

The force has good arrangements, systems and structures in place in order accurately to monitor performance in terms of both crime and business.

Analytical products, including strategic and tactical assessments, are of good quality, take risk into account and scan the wider environment.

Meeting structures include all relevant staff and functions within the force and appropriately hold staff accountable for performance at corporate, team and individual levels.

New arrangements developed in order to make this programme of meetings more efficient came into place in April 2007. The previously separate support and operational performance meetings have merged within the force performance improvement conference (PIC) and have been rescheduled to provide an enhanced action-centred approach.

The ACC maintains close control of performance issues through a system of weekly meetings which is responsible for determining the ‘four Ps’ (progress, problems, priorities and points for action), and reports these to the PIC. This process highlights performance down to INA/SCT level. There is a strong emphasis upon risk throughout this process, and emerging areas for concern and crime trends are identified and actioned. They are often linked to force objectives or complementary workstreams.

HMIC observed good examples of actions and activities being raised using NIM principles. Strategic planning is integrated and informed by the NIM process. The force control strategy reflects both national and local priorities.

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The force's analytical capability has shown development in this respect, but it still needs to improve further the qualitative content of its data and analysis. Datasets are generally plentiful and will be enhanced as analytical capability and capacity increase at Neighbourhood Policing level, as there are associated increases in community intelligence.

Strengths

The force makes a simple, yet effective use of the 'four Ps' model described above, in order to drive performance. The model can be applied to any business situation and has been adopted across the force; it is easy to use and understand and has been seen to be working efficiently. It is now being used by BCU commanders, who have introduced this system of challenge into their local PIC process.

The ACC (operations) meets with each of his chief superintendents (three from BCUs, one from specialist criminal investigation services (SCIS) and one from operations) both individually and collectively as a group each month. In addition, each BCU and support department, eg SCIS, receives a chief officer group quarterly visit at which performance is discussed. The ACC (operations) does not set individual reduction or detection targets within PDRs for senior staff; instead, personal objectives are set to identify areas for improvement, for example to improve the BCU performance management process.

The DCC attends the police authority performance working group, but police authority members do not routinely attend the force Performance Improvement Conference (PIC) meetings. However, the police authority is intrusive around performance and relationships with the force are good. The DCC has responsibility for the development of the annual policing plan, while the ACC enforces and drives performance against agreed targets. The priorities for 2007/08 and the wider plan (Vision2010) have been circulated to the police authority and more recently debated at a joint force/police authority seminar.

The weekly performance meetings referred to above allow rigorous management of performance against targets. Analytical products inform these meetings between BCU commanders and the ACC (operations). The weekly performance document is also discussed each Friday prior to the monthly force PIC meeting. A 'Z' score system is used to identify areas of concern. The data includes predictive risk assessment (for the next month) and is therefore both backward- and forward-looking. The datasets are also sent to analysts who complete tactical assessments so that business processes and NIM systems are more fully integrated. Notable areas of performance include crime reduction, eg total crime down by 7.33% (2007/08 year to date) and BCS crime down by 6.5%. All divisions are showing a reduction in their crime figures. Sanction detection performance is thriving with a rate of 31.5%.

The relationship between NIM level 2 and other aspects of the force's performance management has been refined. For example, there is no longer any detailed discussion of performance issues within the NIM level 2 T&CG meetings where this is not appropriate, and level 1 volume crime issues are not discussed at this level. The model is being developed further by a recent merging of the support and operations PICs.

The 'Divisions' area within the force intranet gives access to electronic briefing bulletins that are updated daily. Bulletins are available at INA/SCT level. All previous bulletins are archived on the force intranet for ease of reference. Local SCT priorities are also accessible on the internet for scrutiny by both constabulary employees and the wider community. These priorities are selected and resourced through consultation with the community and SARA plans are developed as a direct response.

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At neighbourhood level all PCSOs complete monthly returns of activity within community areas and give problem-solving (SARA) updates, allowing sergeants to measure progress against targets. At a higher level these are monitored through the T&C meetings. BCU commanders hold staff to account for performance against their agreed SARA plan priorities and the force Neighbourhood Policing project team has access to these plans and would escalate priorities upwards to force level if necessary. Any poor performance by SCT staff is managed via an action plan process and electronic PDR (EPDR). All SCT staff have monthly job chats with supervisors, where performance, both quantitative and qualitative, is discussed.

The force intranet site includes a section entitled 'Driving performance forward', in which users can see force priorities in the context of the Vision2010 project.

There is good evidence of information sharing and learning across the organisation: for example, BCU chief inspectors attend their crime and disorder reduction partnership (CDRP) meetings and give feedback on themes and issues. To ensure an understanding of demand beyond the force's geographical borders, the force strategic analyst meets with other analysts from surrounding forces to discuss cross-border issues and plan responses. Best practice regarding problem-solving tactics is shared between SCTs. Real-time management information is available from analysts to allow supervisors to manage staff effectively. Surveys are routinely used to inform organisational planning.

The force has established business improvement 'champions' for control strategy themes such as violent crime. Each champion has developed a delivery plan that is monitored by the force crime reduction group. Delivery plans are monitored by the relevant ACC, and by the ACC (operations) at the force T&C meeting. Local delivery has been delegated to BCU chief inspectors, which increases ownership. (The only exception is the drugs delivery plan which the detective superintendent (SCIS) owns.) These delivery plans are seen as a successful tool and have been observed to deliver performance improvements: for example, an increase in dwelling burglary during October 2006 was successfully addressed by the co-ordination of a full force response which was driven by a burglary action plan.

Work in Progress

Work is currently under way to identify a suite of indicators for cases of rape. These will be based upon recent Home Office guidance. A problem profile is also being developed to complement and inform this initiative.

The performance management regime is continually being developed in order to make it more efficient. A new PIC book has been produced which is streamlined and outlines data in a more succinct way. New sections, such as one on forensics, have been added. Existing departments' data is also being examined in an incremental way through the PIC process and there is discussion to identify any data gaps. Another example of improvement is the move to hold a weekly meeting prior to PIC. This meeting was being used to analyse operational performance in more detail and to prepare and agree the operational '4 Ps' prior to the PIC meeting, thereby freeing up some time in the actual PIC meeting.

All staff have EPDRs, but these are currently being closed down with a new year about to start. Objectives are, and will continue to be, set in line with BCU/INA/SCT policing plans. Current EPDRs tend not relate to organisational objectives but focus upon improvements that individuals can more readily make within their roles to improve efficiencies, eg National Crime Recording Standard compliance, call-back times etc.

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The BCU strategic assessment process is currently being reviewed in order to gain additional efficiencies and exploit best practice. A new template has been developed. The new BCU strategic assessments are due to be produced for November 2007.

Organisational strategic assessments are also being developed. Scoping is being undertaken to establish how best to enhance analytical products and utilise the existing skills of the strategic analysts.

Areas for Improvement

Many examples of good work are recognised by the force, using a variety of methods including commendations, bonus payments and the like. HMIC saw recognition of good work at performance meetings where senior officers gave praise to attendees. While this approach was well received, it relies heavily on the ability of attendees to cascade the information among their staff. Such recognition would benefit from a more structured and formal dissemination; it could be communicated to the whole force on a monthly basis, for example in weekly orders, bulletin or the force intranet.

At strategic level partners are fully engaged in data sharing (eg MAIDeN), but there should be more intelligence and joint co-ordinated activity to address joint priorities at all levels. This is particularly important in order to drive Safer Communities activity.

The force could enhance its approach to the analysis of productivity, efficiency and effectiveness by refining its approach to results analysis of operations and tasking. Current requests for results analysis are made at the end of operations or tasking and would be better considered at the commencement of activity. Such an approach could usefully be applied to the activity of SCTs and would provide the basis for feedback to host communities.

RECOMMENDATION 2

That the Force ensures it reviews ongoing operations regularly and at an early stage; incorporating both operational and business outcomes.

RECOMMENDATION 3

That the Force considers how best to capture the performance information that arises as collaborative working arrangements develop in order to ensure that corporate aims and those of the Joint Partnership, are being delivered.

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Developing Practice

INSPECTION AREA: Performance management

TITLE: iQuanta risk assessment tool

PROBLEM:

Senior officers were seeking an 'early warning' system for any changes in performance monitored by the iQuanta system that might be of interest to the police standards unit (PSU).

SOLUTION:

Staff within the performance team reviewed the methodology published by the PSU for identifying areas of concern within force performance. A system was developed to assess all the key crime types on the range of comparisons used by the PSU, and a scoring system was introduced to allocate a risk score to each. With these, it is possible to produce a simple one-page document summarising the risk for crimes and detections across the key areas using a traffic light system. This is provided for each division. The methodology used by the PSU is applied to 'real time' data within the internal systems, so that any issues can be flagged up early, rather than waiting for iQuanta.

OUTCOME(S):

This initiative has ensured that the internal performance management process is aligned with the national performance management process. It summarises a considerable amount of information in a brief and simple format, and enables managers to focus on the key areas of risk.

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Protecting Vulnerable People – Overview

National contextual factors

The assessment framework for Protecting Vulnerable People was first developed in 2006 as part of HMIC's baseline assessment programme. It replaced two existing frameworks – Reducing/Investigating Hate Crime and Crimes against Vulnerable Victims – which focussed on hate crimes (predominantly racially motivated), domestic violence and child protection. Following consultation with practitioners and ACPO leads, a single framework was introduced with four components – domestic violence, the investigation and prevention of child abuse, the management of sex and dangerous offenders, and vulnerable missing persons. Although the four areas are discrete, they are also linked and share a common theme – they deal with vulnerable victims where there is a high risk that an incident can quickly become critical, and where a poor police response is both life-threatening and poses severe reputational risks for the force.

This year's inspection has been carried out using similar assessment standards as those in 2006. These highlight the importance of leadership and accountability; policy implementation; information management; staffing, workload and supervision; performance monitoring and management; training; the management of risk; and partnership working.

The work carried out by forces to protect the public, particularly those most vulnerable to risk of serious harm, is complex and challenging. No single agency, including the police, has the capacity to deliver the required response on its own. Success is therefore, dependent on effective multi-agency working and there are a number of established partnerships, involving a wide range of services and professionals, aimed at ensuring that an integrated approach is adopted to protecting those most vulnerable to risk of serious harm.

Contextual factors overview

In the 2006 baseline assessment, Gloucestershire Constabulary received an overall grade of Fair for the protecting vulnerable people (PVP) function, which for the purposes of this assessment comprises the delivery of child protection, domestic violence (DV), public protection and missing person (MISPER) services. The force strategy, Vision2010, includes a clear intent to 'improve the services we provide to protect vulnerable people'.

In order to identify the most effective and efficient delivery platform, and following on from the 2006 baseline assessment, the force undertook to conduct a wide-reaching review of its approach to the PVP function. The project reports to a steering group comprising the project lead, the detective superintendent in charge of Specialist Criminal Investigation Services (SCIS), the detective superintendent (community partnership services) and the leads for all the activity areas being reviewed. The review will also consider the delivery of hate crime services, resourcing, workloads, systems and processes, information technology (IT) support, the management of risk, standards and doctrine, and opportunities for partnership working. Her Majesty's Inspectorate welcomes this review and looks forward to examining its findings when they become available in the autumn of 2007.

In addition to the review, the force is collaborating with the Gloucester Royal Hospital in order to build a SARC within the confines of the hospital. Her Majesty's Inspectorate welcomes this project, which should enhance service delivery and strengthen partner arrangements.

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Strengths

The protection of vulnerable people is a clear priority within the force, with the strategic intent contained within the Vision2010 three-year strategic plan. There are appropriate links between Vision2010 and subordinate PVP-related policies. Each BCU within the force displays a similar commitment, with some variation in the strategic intention found within their respective plans. This variation will be addressed by the review described above.

The ACC (operations) is the force lead for PVP. He holds the detective superintendent (SCIS) to account for the functional delivery of the service through regular meetings and the force performance management system.

The inspection team found the force intranet guidance pages on PVP to be coherent, well-structured and easy to navigate.

Work in progress

The PVP review is clearly a considerable undertaking on the part of the force. This is recognised by the inspection team, which was also pleased to find a detailed process of benchmarking being undertaken with neighbouring forces, including Wiltshire, Avon and Somerset, Surrey, Dyfed-Powys, Cambridgeshire, Norfolk and West Mercia.

Areas for improvement

As collaborative working arrangements develop with partner agencies, the inspection team suggests that the force consider how best to capture the performance information that arises in order to ensure that corporate aims are being delivered.

While accountability to the ACC (operations) appeared to be effective, the force might consider how its internal audit and inspection department could further support the PVP function in order to enhance the service provided and ensure that recommendations from the PVP review are consistently delivered.

At the time of the inspection, effective integration of IT systems across the PVP function was not apparent. This situation was found to be adding to the administrative burden of staff employed within the function and may leave the force vulnerable. The force has recognised the issue and is exploring a means by which to achieve integration. The inspection team supports this approach and looks forward to seeing this loophole addressed.

RECOMMENDATION 4

That the force expedites its upgrading and integration of IT systems to ensure that data which might inform links between areas of vulnerability is managed effectively.

RECOMMENDATION 5

That the force develop recommendations upon completion of its PVP review, in order to improve corporacy, efficiency and its service to victims. These recommendations should concentrate upon areas of risk.

Protecting Vulnerable People – Child Abuse

GRADE	FAIR
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National grade distribution

Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
3	17	21	2

National contextual factors

The Children Act 2004 places a duty on the police to ‘safeguard and promote the welfare of children’; safeguarding children, therefore, is a fundamental part of the duties of all police officers. All police forces, however, also have specialist units which, although they vary in structure, size and remit, normally take primary responsibility for investigating child abuse cases. Officers in these units work closely with other agencies, particularly Social Services, to ensure that co-ordinated action is taken to protect specific children who are suffering, or who are at risk of suffering, significant harm. The Children Act 2004 also requires each local authority to establish a Local Safeguarding Children Board (LSCB). This is the key statutory mechanism for agreeing how the relevant organisations in each local area will co-operate to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in that locality, and for ensuring the effectiveness of what they do.

Membership of LSCBs includes representatives of the relevant local authority and its Board partners, notably the police, probation, youth offending teams, strategic health authorities and primary care trusts, NHS Trusts and NHS Foundation Trusts, the Connexions service, Children and Family Courts Advisory and Support Service, Secure Training Centres and prisons.

Contextual Factors

The service provided by Gloucestershire Constabulary was inspected during the 2006 baseline inspection process. At that time the force was found to be providing an effective service. A specific recommendation made by the inspection team related to the need for the force to separate child abuse investigation within its policy documentation from the more general category of violent crime. This is being considered as part of the review previously discussed, with child abuse investigation featuring significantly in this activity.

The force recently completed a gap analysis of service provision against the ACPO guidance *Investigating Child Abuse and Safeguarding Children* (2005). The outcomes were included within an action plan that was almost completed at the time of the inspection.

Strengths

As with the remainder of the PVP function, the inspection team found effective leadership of this service being provided by the detective superintendent (SCIS) who is operationally accountable to the ACC (operations). The force child protection policy is linked to the Vision2010 three-year plan and the force control strategy, effectively outlining the expectations of the child protection unit (CPU) and divisional community protection teams (CPTs).

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The force has robust arrangements for dealing with historical interfamilial abuse through its force CPU. There are good links between the CPU and BCUs, and a meeting structure within the unit manages workloads and identifies risks. Some historic cases are dealt with by the divisional criminal investigation department, with the bulk being overseen centrally by the CPU.

The ACC (operations) ensures the delivery of the CPU by a number of means, including reviews of individual cases and a comprehensive performance management regime. The detective superintendent (SCIS) is held to account using a bespoke 'four Ps' performance model. This approach takes account of issues including multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA), resourcing and caseload management, with the data being available on the force intranet.

There is a well-established performance regime within the child protection function. Performance is monitored and guided through a robust performance improvement forum, which reports to the equally robust PIC.

Mechanisms have been put in place the better to capture repeat victims at the report stage by the creation of a child-related incident code on command and control. This relies on control room staff using the code correctly and CPU staff trawling such incidents on a daily basis in order to maximise the intelligence picture.

Through the PVP review previously described, the force is taking action in order to raise the profile of child abuse. In addition the chief inspector in charge of the community partnership team is improving the links between the community safety structure and system and the response to *Every Child Matters* (HMSO, 2006) a key national guide.

The force has recently launched an enhanced risk-assessment process for child protection referrals, which requires closer supervision and assessment of risk by front-line supervisors. New forms supporting this process have also been introduced and this is viewed by the inspection team as a positive development.

The child protection detective inspector has responsibility for all internet child protection issues and has dedicated two members of staff to address the issue, which is a growing crime type. New posts of team office manager and administrator are being agreed and the ACC has requested a business case for further staffing increases. Until these new posts are filled, detective constables are filling the office manager role.

At the time of the inspection, abstraction from the CPU team was occurring, with a detective sergeant permanently attached to another function. In addition, staff were periodically abstracted to cover night shift criminal investigation department duties (two days per year). This was not viewed by the inspection team as excessive.

All CPU police investigators are either substantive detectives or undergoing the Initial Crime Investigators' Development Programme. In addition, officers train jointly with partners in Achieving Best Evidence (a recognised programme). New investigators within the CPU are mentored by experienced staff and one of the detective sergeants offers child abuse familiarisation training to detective sergeants and constables within the response team cadre. Inspectors are not specifically trained in child abuse but do receive awareness inputs as part of their overall development.

Since February 2007, to enable appropriate actions to be taken at first contact, force control room operatives have limited access to the CPU database.

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There is confidence that the processes adopted and links between child protection and other vulnerability themes will identify risk areas. BCU staff act as intermediaries for information coming to the police, and although the central CPU is not co-located within BCUs there are close working relationships. It is intended to review these arrangements within the PVP review.

The extent to which partner needs are met will be examined as part of the PVP review previously discussed. The detective chief inspector responsible for PVP also attends operational meetings with partners, and the force contributes positively to the case conference process.

The force maintains a good relationship with the Gloucestershire safeguarding children board, and there is evidence of effective data sharing arrangements between partners. The detective chief inspector who is second in command of PVP represents the force on this board. Data sharing is enhanced by strong personal relationships among board members, and partners are now exchanging data by secure email. It has been agreed in principle that data sharing would be further enhanced by co-location, with a social care worker operating from within the central public protection unit (PPU). This is seen as a practical and positive step towards information sharing, and will help to build trust between the agencies. This approach will be extended in September 2007 to encompass a social worker operating within the CPU two days a week. This development is viewed positively by the inspection team.

Work in Progress

The establishment of the CPU comprises a dedicated detective inspector who is supported by two detective sergeants, three detective constables and an office manager, with one officer on maternity leave. The addition of a police staff investigator, who will not have police powers, was planned at the time of the inspection. Considering the force-wide responsibility of the CPU, the inspection team was not assured that the unit possessed sufficient staff to meet its investigative obligations. This is an issue that the force is aware of and is seeking to address by reducing the administrative burden placed upon investigative staff and introducing additional police staff investigators. This will be monitored by Her Majesty's Inspectorate in future visits to the force.

Child protection performance information is historically difficult to obtain because of the sensitivity of the subject, joint working arrangements with partner agencies and the referral system. This is a common theme nationally, albeit relatively straightforward to resolve. The force has made inroads into this issue with improved partnership arrangements and a revised means of capturing referrals via the command and control system. This is essential if workloads are to be managed effectively and officers in this demanding field are to be afforded to correct level of management support. At the time of the inspection, there were discussions concerning the development of performance indicators for CPU staff. These will require careful management and must include more effective management of caseloads against an agreed target before investigators are likely to feel confident that their needs and welfare are being given similar status. Very basic activity-based costing is used to measure incidences of increased numbers of referrals, and further development of this approach is supported by the inspection team.

The detective inspector in charge of the CPU is active in promoting the service and has been proactive in improving performance monitoring arrangements. He has also re-drafted the force child protection policy, which was due to be ratified at the time of the inspection. The new policy embraces national and local guidance and best practice and addresses

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some of the performance management issues previously discussed.

The inspection team additionally supports the force's work to develop a suite of key performance indicators for the CPU function, but suggests that the data be used carefully given the resource limitations experienced by the unit.

Areas for Improvement

The force GCIS IT system is intended to alert control room staff in particular to check across force databases when dealing with CPU cases. The functionality of this system was, however, questioned by staff interviewed during the inspection. More detailed searching of relevant databases is critical if an effective response to incidents is to be achieved consistently. The inspection team urges the force to ensure that the GCIS system is exploited as intended or that an alternative method of searching is considered.

The CPU relies on the measurement of risk and work volumes to drive activity rather than using intelligence from NIM systems. As a result the unit is more responsive than proactive, although it can respond to emerging issues or taskings coming to the attention of the T&CG. The current review process should be widened in order to identify emerging demands and to enhance the ability to tackle this important crime area proactively.

The inspection team encourages the force to continue to develop joint review and auditing processes for the CPU in a way that formalises and improves the current arrangements. A more detailed analysis of cases in order to identify gaps in both risk and service provision is necessary in order to exploit the learning opportunities inherent. This should be considered in conjunction with the development of joint objectives and targets with partners.

RECOMMENDATION 6

That the force develops its business processes in order to give more resource to the prevention/reduction of child abuse and also become more proactive in its approach to offenders.

Developing Practice

INSPECTION AREA: Protecting vulnerable people – child abuse

TITLE: Child Protection/need referral risk management

PROBLEM:

There was no consistency of decision making concerning child protection referrals and there was a danger that through ad hoc application of criteria risk of harm might be missed. This danger was potentially compounded if the individual concerned was a repeat victim.

SOLUTION:

In order to apply internal organisational consistency, it was thought necessary for the CPIU supervisors to have sight of each referral. Each referral is then graded on the basis of the risk of harm posed to the child, as follows:

- high – immediate action required to remove or prevent harm;
- medium – identified welfare issue / potential harm exists; or
- low – no immediate welfare issue.

The rationale is then recorded and the file updated. This has meant a complete change in the internal reporting process and a restructuring of the documents. Fundamental to the decision-making process is the checking of all IT systems, including the national IMPACT nominal index (INI), and the referral cannot progress unless documentation of that aspect is complete.

OUTCOME(S):

This was an obvious change in work practice, but one that has meant that a specific area of organisational vulnerability has been eliminated. It has reinforced with CPU staff the need to make informed decisions based on all the available information, and has ensured consistency in the process.

FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Simon Atkinson, CPIU – 01242 276196

INSPECTION AREA: Protecting vulnerable people – child abuse

TITLE: Serious case review roadshows

PROBLEM:

How to address the learning issues that arose from the examination of serious case reviews and how to communicate that learning to a wider audience.

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SOLUTION:

The CPIU inspector sits on the serious case review committee within the Gloucestershire safeguarding children board, as well as on other subcommittees. Specific learning opportunities have been identified for numerous agencies as a result of three recent cases, as well as some from the national perspective. It has been decided that a roadshow will be delivered across the county, and the CPIU inspector has been instrumental in preparing aims and objectives and ensuring delivery method collectively with the key stakeholders. The force has contributed financially and will provide a location for at least one event. All key individuals both internally and externally are invited to share in the learning and enter the debate.

OUTCOME(S):

It is envisaged that the right individuals at the appropriate level will be able to spread the corporate message and change processes if necessary. It is anticipated that the roadshow method will get to the heart of the issues swiftly and pragmatically. The constabulary's strategic input in this project is vital to the process.

FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Simon Atkinson, CPIU – 01242 276196

Protecting Vulnerable People – Domestic Violence

GRADE	FAIR
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National grade distribution

Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
1	13	27	2

National contextual factors

There is no statutory or common law offence as such of ‘domestic violence’; the term is generally used to cover a range of abusive behaviour, not all of which is criminal. The definition of domestic violence adopted by ACPO does, however, take account of the full range of abusive behaviour as well as the different circumstances in which it can occur:

‘any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults, aged 18 and over, who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality’.

As with the investigation of child abuse, responding to and investigating domestic violence is the responsibility of all police officers. Again, however, forces have dedicated staff within this area of work, although their roles vary. In some forces staff undertake a support/liaison role, generally acting as a single point of contact for victims and signposting and liaising with other agencies and support services; in others, staff have responsibility for carrying out investigations.

Irrespective of who carries out the investigation in domestic violence cases, an integral part of every stage is the identification of risk factors, followed by more detailed risk assessment and management. In 2004, HMIC, together with HMCPSI, published a joint thematic inspection report on the investigation and prosecution of domestic violence. At that time, risk identification, assessment and management were in the early stages of development throughout the service. Since then, there has been considerable progress in developing formal risk identification and assessment processes and - in a number of forces - the implementation of multi-agency risk assessment conferences (MARACs). Other improvements include the introduction of specialist domestic violence courts and the strengthening of joint working arrangements.

Contextual Factors

Since September 2004, DV and hate crime services have been provided by dedicated staff within the CPTs located on each BCU. Policy and strategy in relation to DV is the responsibility of the community partnership department, and as such is effectively split from other PVP themes. The previously described review of PVP is considering this arrangement along with the current accountability structure for DV.

DV amounts to 25% of all recorded violent crime within Gloucestershire, making its effective management critical. DV has prominence within the force strategic assessment, with 35% of all cases reported being incidents of repeat victimisation.

Strengths

DV is explicitly included within the force strategic assessment, violent crime strategy and control strategy.

The force has published a delivery plan in relation to DV. This is a strategic document that outlines actions under the headings of intelligence, enforcement, and prevention. The actions are tasked to a variety of portfolios throughout the force and among partners, including CDRPs. The plan is regularly updated and forms part of the Vision2010 three-year plan.

The DV policy is consistent with ACPO guidance and provides clear direction to staff about what is expected of them.

It is the aim of the force that all staff involved in the initial response to DV incidents will at least undergo accredited awareness training. This comprehensive approach includes consideration of consultation, diversity, and links to associated PVP disciplines, for example MISPER cases where domestic abuse is suspected.

Accountability for delivery against DV strategic aims relies upon relatively unsophisticated measures (including arrest rates) at the force PIC. Following a review of crime recording, the force has seen an improvement in the standard of recording and risk assessment in respect of DV. As public confidence improves in the police approach there has also been a rise in the reporting of DV incidents, which is a positive development.

Accountability to chief officers is reinforced by regular performance meetings between the community partnership superintendent and the ACC (corporate services). BCU commanders are also held to account by similar robust processes, as previously described, including PIP and the force performance review meeting. BCU commanders are increasing their focus and attention upon DV issues, with the early arrest of named offenders a priority.

First attenders at DV incidents are expected to be proactive, with a positive arrest approach evident to the inspection team. A new DV risk assessment process has been introduced, requiring the completion of a DV1 form by first attenders at DV incidents.

The force uses a bespoke DV database in order to record all DV incidents which are additionally recorded on the crime system.

A banner on the force command and control system reminds operators of the appropriate action when logging DV cases, and the force has raised awareness among control room staff to ensure a proper response to DV calls. Control room staff should, as a matter of course, check the DV database for previously created links/intelligence when deploying officers to incidents.

Flagged incidents are forwarded to the officer who initially responds to the incident and to dedicated DV staff, and this is reinforced by a verbal briefing. This procedure ensures the management of risk from an early stage. At times when DV officers are not available, the log is stored until the internal system, with automatic prompts, reminds the control room supervisor to initiate further contact at an appropriate time.

Intelligence bulletins regarding repeat DV offenders are published on the force intranet and are visible within briefing rooms.

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There is a comprehensive set of checks and balances in respect of reported DV incidents. This commences with the taking of the initial report and continues through to the investigation by the DV unit (DVU) and beyond. Local sergeants have a responsibility to manage all DV incidents proactively. They are required to check all DV1 reports submitted and to assess the risk assessments made. Specialist DV staff tended to deal with the more vulnerable and risk-oriented cases, for example those involving repeat victims and offenders.

Team sergeants have responsibility for reviewing all cases before going off duty at the end of their shift, and for picking up any DV issues which might need to be brought to the attention of specialist staff via the call-out system. Specialist officers will offer assistance when on duty, which, as a result of their small numbers, is normally on weekdays from 8am to 4pm.

Advice and policy as well as support contact details are available via the force intranet. Staff report high levels of support and competence on the part of control room staff.

The force makes effective contributions to the Gloucestershire county partnership structures and processes in respect of DV. The ACC (corporate services) chairs the county CDRP strategic group, and a county-wide DV strategic group reports to this group, delivering activity through four subgroups.

Gloucester and the Forest of Dean BCU has worked with a voluntary organisation, the Gloucester DV Support and Advocacy Project, in the creation and establishment of 'retraction' surgeries. These have been successful in improving the confidence of victims to support police prosecutions. Womens' support groups have assisted with providing visiting speakers for police officer-based street skills courses. This has helped to reinforce awareness of the need for an effective early response, with the speakers being well received.

Work in Progress

The introduction of the risk assessment process, together with the need for DV officers to search multiple databases, has increased workload within DVUs. This increased workload has been identified within the force strategic assessment as a growth area that may require additional resourcing.

The risk-assessment process was found to be mostly embedded within BCUs, with training of staff in the completion of DV1 forms continuing. In the meantime, there is a perceived bias among officers towards grading all DV incidents as high-risk, which may require some management intervention. Appropriate DV cases where there is significant risk are referred to the level 2 MAPPa process. This ensures an appropriate response to the risks posed by such people and engagement with partner agencies early in the process. MAPPa principles can be applied to any case that falls outside referral guidelines.

The force DVU and CPU databases do not automatically generate and identify links between offenders. As a result the force is reliant upon the skills, commitment and knowledge of operators in order to cross-search and identify patterns. There is work in progress to improve the cross-searching of these databases. The force is also considering the possibility of linking the databases to the existing UNITY crime system.

The force has a long tradition of committed staff within the DV and child protection (CP) units. The victim-centred approach has been extended to accommodate the nationally developed multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) approach to multi-agency

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working. Information sharing, however, remains an area for development, with the force making considerable efforts, including the development of information-sharing protocols and multi-agency training.

The force is working with partners in order to implement DV courts fully across the county. A weekly specialist DV court already convenes at Cheltenham.

Individual specialist training for DV officers requires further consideration. Although a series of two-week courses is planned, there has been insufficient training needs analysis to inform them fully. Some officers have received no training on DV risk assessment, and no guidance has been given; a 'Sea Change' initiative is set to address this shortfall.

The previous call management system provided contact centre staff with drop-down menus in order to ensure the effective management of DV and similar incidents. At the time of the inspection no effective replacement had been developed, with call handlers using paper prompts and relying on a common sense approach. This is an area that the inspection team is assured will be addressed in the near future.

All DV staff have been surveyed as part of the PVP review in order to establish training and welfare needs as well as to identify suggestions for improvements. The results of this data analysis are yet to be published.

Areas for Improvement

The force does not possess a consistent model for the management of DV cases by BCUs. With stark differences found between the BCUs, the inspection team urges the force to consider how it might address this situation, in order that the people of Gloucestershire may receive a similar service regardless of where they live or work.

The force should define appropriate performance measures for DV, linked to more formalised audit and review mechanisms. Such audit processes should as far as possible develop the corporacy and consistency of incident management and investigation across the force and help to enhance the support given to victims.

The force should consider reviewing job descriptions for specialist DV staff. Although there are generic job descriptions for all specialist roles, the inspection team found examples of these being modified locally in order to accommodate local management direction. In some cases this has eroded the quality and efficacy of the documents to the point where they have little relevance. Some officers were not aware of the existence of job descriptions or had drafted their own, which is unacceptable.

The force should consider developing a reduction strategy for DV, in which partners and communities could be more fully engaged. NIM principles should be used to target minority communities, which experience shows are often more vulnerable and subjected to increased risks. The strategy should include cross-cutting objectives and targets for all concerned.

The force should continue to monitor the administrative burden created by the revised risk assessment process in order to minimise its impact upon operational staff.

RECOMMENDATION 7

That the force completes its current review of its response to DV in order to improve corporacy, consistency and efficiency. Systems and processes should be developed in order to incorporate enhanced case review mechanisms and performance indicators.

Developing Practice

INSPECTION AREA: Protecting vulnerable people – domestic violence

TITLE: Risk management process for domestic violence

PROBLEM:

In 2005 it was identified that the force response to DV was lacking a method by which harm reduction measures could be managed across the county. While work within the Community Protection Teams (CPT)s dealt with individual cases perceived to be high-risk, there was no mechanism for ensuring that all cases were managed to an appropriate standard and that input from partner agencies was formalised.

SOLUTION:

A risk assessment process was implemented for all DV incidents and a MARAC process was instituted to manage the high-risk and very high-risk cases.

The process requires all officers who attend a DV incident to risk-assess it by completing form DV1. This information is then forwarded to the DVUs who conduct a further, more detailed, risk assessment, filling in form DV2, checking various IT systems and then assessing the incident as being low-, medium-, high- or very high-risk. Those incidents that are deemed to be high-risk or very high-risk are then further considered for being put forward to a MARAC meeting.

MARAC meetings are chaired by the divisional detective inspectors responsible for the CPTs and are held fortnightly. While they are focused on the safety of the victim and family, they are modelled on the MAPPA style of management and focus on risk of serious harm rather than reoffending.

OUTCOME(S):

The benefits are already apparent.

The effect of the procedures has been to reveal just how much has been missed by not conducting thorough checks on the individuals involved in all levels of incident and, furthermore, not conducting a robust, consistent and thorough risk assessment. Some examples from the first few weeks:

- A caller stated that his wife had had an affair with a local man. When she was discovered, and broke off the relationship with this other man, the man had made threats towards her and her elderly mother. Before police could attend, the wife called back to say that the matter had been resolved. At the time that the case was risk-assessed the man's identity was uncertain, but research revealed his details, and it transpired that he had a long history of violent offending, including imprisonment for rape, assaults and drink driving. This made a considerable difference to the actions that needed to be taken to protect the victim, who was unaware of the level of risk he posed.
- A woman reported that her husband was leaving her and going to the USA. He had assaulted her but caused no injury. There was no previous history of DV. A statement was taken from the woman, but her husband had not been apprehended at this stage. The DVU received a copy of the statement as well as the DV1 form.

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There was mention of the man telling his wife he wanted to stab her. He had previous convictions for threatening a witness in a drugs trial with a combat knife as well as for other assaults and drugs offences. He was assessed as high-risk and appropriate actions were taken.

In neither of the above cases would research previously have been done, in this detail, at such an early stage, nor would the risk levels have been recognised.

Cases assessed as high-risk and very high-risk both show an identifiable risk of serious harm, and differ only in that in cases of very high risk the harm is considered to be imminent. These cases attract consideration of a number of options which will be presumed to be carried out unless impractical or not relevant. These are:

- direct victim contact by the DVU in addition to the officer in case;
- contact with the probation service where involved;
- preparation of a high-risk DV offender target briefing sheet;
- referral to divisional detective inspector for assessment and daily meetings;
- target briefing sheet to INA inspector and identification officer
- Surveillance on the victim's address;
- covert submission for UNITY marker;
- recording of grading on DV database; and
- referral to MAPPA co-ordinator for consideration of level 2 meeting/MARAC meeting.

FORCE CONTACT: Detective Sergeant Steve McCormick – 01452 752200

Protecting Vulnerable People – Public Protection

GRADE	FAIR
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National grade distribution

Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
2	16	23	2

National contextual factors

The Criminal Justice and Courts Services Act 2000 led to the formation of the Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements, commonly known as MAPPA, requiring the police and probation services to work together as the Responsible Authority in each area of England and Wales to establish and review the arrangements for the assessment and management of sexual and violent offenders. Subsequent legislation brought the Prison Service into the Responsible Authority arrangements and also requires a range of social care agencies to co-operate with the Responsible Authority in the delivery of the assessment and management of risk in this area. These agencies include health, housing, education, social services, youth offending teams, Jobcentre Plus, and electronic monitoring services.

Under MAPPA, there are three categories of offender who are considered to pose a risk of serious harm:

Category 1 – Registered Sex Offenders (RSOs)

Category 2 – violent and other sex offenders

Category 3 – other offenders (with convictions that indicate they are capable of causing, and pose a risk of, serious harm).

To be managed under MAPPA, offenders must have received a conviction or caution. However, there are some people who have not been convicted or cautioned for any offence, and thus fall outside these categories, but whose behaviour nonetheless gives reasonable ground for believing a present likelihood of them committing an offence that will cause serious harm. These people are termed Potentially Dangerous Persons (PDPs).

Following risk assessment, risk management involves the use of strategies by various agencies to reduce the risk, at three levels:

- Level 1 offenders can be managed by one agency;
- Level 2 offenders require the active involvement of more than one agency;
- Level 3 offenders – the ‘critical few’ – are generally deemed to pose a high or very high risk and are managed by a multi-agency public protection panel (MAPPP).

In 2003, the Home Secretary issued MAPPA guidance to consolidate what has already been achieved since the introduction of the MAPPA in 2001 and to address a need for

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greater consistency in MAPPA practice. The guidance outlines four considerations that are key to the delivery of effective public protection.

- defensible decisions;
- rigorous risk assessment;
- the delivery of risk management plans which match the identified public protection need; and,
- the evaluation of performance to improve delivery.

Contextual Factors

The ACC (Operations) is the force lead for managing vulnerable persons, chairing the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) strategic management board (SMB). The ACC is supported by the detective chief superintendent in charge of SCIS, who is the strategic lead for public protection and works closely with the force MAPPA manager. The MAPPA manager is a seconded officer from the probation service. Tactically, the force has sought to co-locate police officers with partner agencies wherever possible within the PVP domain, which is good practice.

The detective superintendent with functional responsibility for public protection has a broad portfolio which includes responsibility for the force major investigation team and forensics/scientific support. He is supported by a detective chief inspector he also has additional responsibilities, including senior investigating officer to the force major incident team, force senior identification manager and force lead for disaster victim identification.

The detective chief superintendent chairs a joint sexual offences steering group, which includes representation from the Crown Prosecution Service, a rape crisis organisation and other key partners. The county has secured funding for the development of 'circles of support'. This initiative involves the recruitment of training volunteers to form circles of support and supervision for very high-risk offenders. This is an approach originally pioneered in Canada with some success.

The ACC (operations) attends a regional MAPPA meeting, which at the time of the inspection was focused on developing a regional strategy.

The force public protection team, which is a central function, supervises the delivery of MAPPA services provided by BCUs. The Violent and Sex Offenders Register (ViSOR), a national multi-agency database, is located both centrally and within the BCU teams and was found to be proactively used by the force. At the time of the inspection the probation service was not using ViSOR, with a national debate about its application by the service likely to impinge upon its go-live date. The phased approach adopted by the probation service will indeed see the South West being one of the final regions to go live.

The wide-ranging review of PVP arrangements discussed earlier in this report is also considering whether to centralise all divisional resources engaged in public protection. This is an option that will require dedicated managers, including a detective inspector to lead the team and possibly a dedicated functional lead of a higher rank.

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Strengths

The ACC (Operations) chairs the MAPPA SMB (Strategic Management Board) and intends to use his position to develop a number of processes. This will include more effective auditing of cases and further improving the relationships between partners. The ACC takes a very active interest in MAPPA issues, as recently evidenced by his visit to the Barton Street Hostel, which houses dangerous high-risk offenders and enjoys a good working relationship with the force.

The force intranet includes a comprehensive section relating to PVP, with guidance and advice to officers on – and force response in relation to – INI, ViSOR, CPUs, MAPPA, DV and MISPERs. Following each link allows access to further pages, which describe accountability networks to ACC level, contacts, policies and other guidance, and forms. The inspection team was impressed by the detail contained on the intranet.

The force has a structured and well-documented approach to the supervision of public protection offenders across each risk category and response level. The MAPPA policy document outlines strategy, good practice, information-sharing protocols and legal guidance, and is easy to navigate and understand. The MAPPA arrangements are responsive to individual need, with partners eager to support interventions, for example with housing vulnerable clients.

All level 3 referrals (high-risk) are submitted to the MAPPA manager, who undertakes a gate-keeping role in deciding which go to the multi-agency MAPPA panel. She also chairs the reviews of all new level 3 cases. The MAPPA panel convenes on a monthly basis with the facility for extraordinary panels where necessary.

BCU MAPPA meetings are also chaired by the MAPPA manager. This provides the opportunity for best practice to be promulgated and gives a consistency of approach. Category 2 violent offenders are managed by probation service offender managers.

All new sex offenders are firstly assessed at a divisional MAPPA level 2 meeting, where their level of risk is assessed alongside the risk of reoffending. The level of risk management required for each case is then decided upon and an action plan constructed.

The meeting arrangements for dangerous offenders are clear, and in the case of violent offenders meetings are scheduled to coincide with their release from prison. This has made the process both timely and more relevant and ensures that public safety considerations are managed effectively. There has been an increase in the numbers of level 2 (high-risk) DV offenders, and this is starting to cause some resource challenges in terms of managing referrals.

At the time of the inspection the force was assisting with the management of nine level 3 dangerous offenders through the MAPPA process. The MAPPA process is supported by a forensic psychiatrist and a psychologist, which is good practice. The MAPPA manager reported confidence in the police contribution to MAPPA, citing the strategic contribution as particularly helpful and inclusive.

Part of the process of managing registered sex offenders (RSOs) is the requirement for responsible bodies, including the police, to conduct home visits. This process is interpreted differently across the country, with good practices including the participation in the visits of specialist trained officers and where possible trained neighbourhood officers. This was found to be the practice in Gloucestershire, with officers citing the approach as useful in

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enhancing their local knowledge of offenders and of the MAPPA system. PCSOs and neighbourhood teams were generally found to be knowledgeable about their local RSOs; however, some expressed frustration at not always being informed about them.

The force rightly seeks to ensure that officers charged with investigating dangerous offenders remain involved throughout, in particular when sex offender prohibition orders are sought. In addition, all public protection staff have undertaken the basic PPU training course, which is provided by Lancashire Constabulary.

The inspection team was pleased that supervisors play an active part in the management of public protection team officers, including assisting with home visits where appropriate. BCU public protection officers are currently supervised by the CPT sergeants.

BCU public protection officers experience varying workloads across the force. This is a factor that is recognised and has resulted in activity to improve the risk assessment process and achieve closer supervision, as described above. A generic email address has recently been established to enable any employee to notify the public protection teams of concerns, intelligence or information. This is a good practice that at the time of the inspection had yet to be fully exploited.

The principles of NIM are mainstreamed within MAPPA processes at both strategic and local level. This has improved, for example, the sighting of BCU commanders of the risk they hold, which is appropriate. The inspection team was pleased to find improving levels of management supervision and support given to the PPU discipline.

A key element of managing potentially dangerous people and RSOs is the force's capability to support the process through surveillance. This was found to be robust, and is managed through the T&C process.

The inspection team was pleased to find high-risk MAPPA offenders listed within the level 2 tactical assessment. The assessment includes detailed action plans and provides information sufficient to inform the meeting and to allow the chair to offer additional direction and support where necessary. This is good practice.

The force is engaged in Operation Laser, a systematic review of historic rape cases. This is good practice and provides a new intelligence gateway for the management of potentially dangerous and high-risk sex offenders.

Subject profiles are completed by the major investigation analyst for all level 3 MAPPA offenders and are circulated to divisions, the control room and relevant personnel in the area of public protection. This information is available to operational officers from the secure UNITY, PNC and ViSOR systems.

The force has a vetting policy that governs the selection of suitable staff to operate in the field of public protection. Personal risk to public protection staff is monitored during mandatory annual referrals to the force occupational health unit. The force is alive to the dangers to staff during visits to MAPPA nominals and requires that risk assessments for individual staff be undertaken jointly with occupational health unit staff.

There are no records within the force that require back-record conversion onto the ViSOR system, which is a positive finding. All public protection staff are trained in the use of ViSOR and Risk Matrix 2000.

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Work in Progress

The force is developing a joint audit tool for the management of joint MAPPA investigations and performance. This will enhance the delivery of joint standards, risk management and strategic decision making.

Work is in progress to incorporate the national Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre training package into the training and induction process for public protection officers. These officers are not Initial Crime Investigators' Development Programme-trained, as it is recognised that their specialised role would not afford them all the necessary experiences that are required by this training programme. They do, however, attend a one-week course delivered by Lancashire police, entitled 'Managing Dangerous Offenders'.

Officers engaged in managing RSOs are provided with occupational counselling, which is good practice. This is to be extended to those engaged in the management of ViSOR intelligence. Engagement of specialist public protection officers in a health surveillance programme has been mandatory since January 2007, and this demonstrates a strong commitment to staff welfare.

Areas for Improvement

The force has not undertaken a review to establish the most appropriate staffing levels for PPU's at BCU level, nor have resilience and succession planning been considered. The current staffing ratios should be matched against known demand profiles. This is included in the PVP review, but recommendations are yet to be identified (managers suggest that there should be two members of staff per division – a total of eight staff).

There are some difficulties concerning approved accommodation for RSOs within the county; for example, a property at Gloucester intended to accommodate RSOs has not done so because of public concern. This concern is being addressed through discussion, and the RSOs will now be housed there. Police should work in partnership to agree practical solutions to address public perceptions and fears.

The Public Protection Unit at the Department of Justice has recently published its communication strategy. In response to this, the force is in the process of developing a local strategy which will address issues such as this. It will be an objective for the MAPPA SMB this year.

Evaluation, audit and control of ViSOR completion/compliance falls to the detective sergeants at the CPTs. However, they are not felt to have sufficient capacity within their core role to discharge this responsibility effectively. As a result, the ViSOR sergeant conducts spot-checks on reports of home visits. This process should be reviewed and resources allocated in accordance with the identified risk.

There is a comprehensive procedural guidance document for home visits to RSOs. This outlines in detail the requirement for officer safety risk assessments. It does not, however, stipulate where and how these are to be recorded. There is a lack of awareness among staff of the requirements of this document, and as a result the risk assessments are generally not completed. A formalised, recorded process of risk assessment needs to be adopted by officers making home visits. While the potential dangers to the public are measured, officer safety risks and risks relating to the potential for officers to be compromised are not.

RECOMMENDATION 8

That the force review the level of skill and knowledge (in particular with regard to risk areas) amongst its staff who are completing RSO home visits in order to make sure that this is at an appropriate level and that risk is minimised.

Developing Practice

INSPECTION AREA: Protecting vulnerable people – public protection

TITLE: Initial MAPPA level 2 meeting for all offenders convicted/cautioned for a qualifying offence and offenders currently subject to notification requirements who move into the county from another area

PROBLEM:

RSOs are by definition category 1 MAPPA offenders and the responsible authority has a statutory duty to make arrangements to risk-assess and manage them. The ACPO-approved risk assessment tool Risk Matrix 2000 does not predict risk of serious harm (only of reconviction) and does not apply to women or offenders under 18. Not all offenders have had an Offender Risk Assessment System (OASys) assessment or probation supervision, so there is no assessment made of the risk of serious harm. Persons who are subject to a caution will have had no PSR or any sort of assessment of their risk of doing serious harm. Offenders who have been on the register for a long period or who have moved around may never have been subject to a proper multi-agency risk assessment process. It is evident from many ViSOR records that in some force areas Risk Matrix 2000 is the only form of risk assessment carried out on an RSO. There is an inherent vulnerability for the force in taking on the management of RSOs without assessing all available intelligence/Information.

SOLUTION:

There is a MAPPA level 2 meeting held on each division at least once a month, chaired by the force MAPPA manager. Upon initial registration of an RSO, or notification of residence in Gloucestershire, the Risk Matrix level is checked on ViSOR, as is the current risk management plan (if applicable). The divisional public protection officer will carry out a full initial home visit within five working days of registration, to produce a lifestyle profile. The offender is included in the next divisional level 2 meeting (at most a month away) unless the home visit or other information dictates that an emergency meeting should be held. Level 2 meetings are attended by the three core agencies – police, probation service and social services, with other key agencies invited when considered appropriate. At the meeting all available information available to the agencies is shared, including any previous risk assessments, Matrix 2000/OASys data, current dynamic information (including the home visit report) and records of previous contact (including the officer in case report and previous public protection officer concerns if available). Only after this pooling of information is completed can a correct level of risk of serious harm and reconviction be assessed. When this assessment is completed, an appropriate level of risk management is decided upon and a risk management plan formulated to implement this.

OUTCOME(S):

This process not only affords the best method of obtaining all available information at an early stage, but also removes the onus (and pressure) on one person to carry out an initial risk assessment. It incorporates static risk results, dynamic information and the judgement of professionals from at least three key agencies involved in risk assessment and risk management. It gives the police and probation service offender managers more confidence in the system; and of course, if it is decided at the meeting to manage an offender at level 1, the offender can be returned to level 2 if the risk level increases.

Protecting Vulnerable People – Missing Persons

GRADE	FAIR
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National grade distribution

Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
1	21	21	0

National contextual factors

Each year, thousands of people are reported to police as missing. Many have done so voluntarily and are safe from harm, whether or not they return home. But a number are vulnerable, because of age or health concerns, and the police service has developed well-honed systems to respond swiftly and effectively to such cases. For obvious reasons, missing children arouse particular concern, and many forces deploy 'Child Rescue Alert' to engage the media in publicising such cases. Key good practice in this framework are early recognition of critical incident potential, effective supervision of enquiries, the use of NIM problem profiles and other intelligence techniques to analyse repeat locations (eg, children's homes), and the use of an IT-based investigation tracking system such as COMPACT.

Contextual Factors

The force recognises the importance of dealing effectively with MISPER cases, and has recently renewed its procedures contained within the 'first action at scene' policy. The force review of PVP previously mentioned will further examine the management of MISPERs.

The force makes use of the Compact database to report and manage MISPERs. The database allows them to access the history of the person and any risk factors. The system also includes a log of actions, with computer-generated prompts as to what must be done. There is personal handover of MISPERs between sergeants, and ultimately the duty inspector maintains 24-hour responsibility.

Prior to the inspection the force had managed a MISPER investigation that was referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission. An internal review following the inquiry culminated with an action plan being developed, which has since been fully delivered.

Strengths

Vision2010, the force strategic three-year plan, makes specific reference to MISPERs. The ACC (operations) has portfolio responsibility for the SCIS, which includes the management of MISPERs. There is a well-established performance system for the activities within this portfolio.

Each BCU has a 'missing from home' (MFH) champion in order to ensure that policies and procedures are followed. These MFH champions meet to share best practice.

A joint-agency MISPER protocol between police and statutory partners drives performance. This document was recently reviewed to accommodate new learning; it is succinct, and describes responsibilities, definitions and appropriate actions. The joint protocol

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complements the internal force MISPER policy document, which is extremely detailed and comprehensive.

Contained within the MISPER policy is good practical guidance for officers interviewing MISPERs who have been found safe and well. The guidance covers welfare considerations and activity and movements while missing, and is consistent with ACPO guidance, as is the remainder of the document.

The force records MISPER incidents on the Compact database, which is searchable by supervising officers. Once MISPER incidents are reported, they remain visible to shift supervisors and until resolved are passed from shift to shift. The Compact system provides prompts of actions to be undertaken, and new tasks can be added.

Since May 2006 there have been quarterly Compact user/MISPER meetings chaired by the detective inspector at SCIS. This is good practice, with momentum being built in terms of refining processes and procedures.

MISPER reports are owned by a role (the duty inspector) rather than a person. If the subject remains outstanding for longer than 48 hours, a senior investigating officer is consulted. All MISPER cases are considered at the daily management briefing, an approach supported by the inspection team. The level 1 T&CG meetings consider high-risk cases that may require further tasking or resourcing. The force critical incident policy caters for vulnerable MISPERs and provides suitable guidance for managers.

ACPO guidance on risk assessment of MISPER cases is delivered to all inspectors as part of their generic training. Inspectors interviewed were confident that the training and quality of response across the force are now more robust than formerly, and that they address the matter of risk.

Accountability is dependent upon day-to-day leadership and management by front-line officers, supervisors and managerial staff. High-risk cases are directly supervised by detective inspectors.

Force control room inspectors act as a liaison with BCUs, the better to manage calls of well known MFH, particularly those relating to individuals in the care of local authorities who regularly go missing. This is good practice.

The force 24-hour report includes publication by the ACC (operations) and BCU commanders of the status of MISPER reports across each BCU, showing the number of reports and the relative risks. This enables managers to exert effective control and ensure that intrusive supervision of each case is maintained.

Work in Progress

The force is currently conducting a major review into its response to the PVP function. The MISPERs role is included within this review.

Areas for Improvement

Jointly with partner agencies, the force should consider developing a process for reviewing MISPERs, and in doing so ensure that individual ownership and the criteria for each review are clearly defined.

RECOMMENDATION 9

That the force, jointly with partner agencies, considers developing a process for reviewing missing persons and in doing so ensures that individual ownership and the criteria for each review is clearly defined.

Recommendations

Neighbourhood Policing

Recommendation 1:

The force should further enhance its efforts to develop joint problem solving with partners; concentrating upon the root causes of these problems rather than the more visible symptoms.

Performance Management

Recommendation 2:

That the Force ensures it reviews on going operations regularly and at an early stage; incorporating both operational and business outcomes.

Recommendation 3:

That the Force considers how best to capture the performance information that arises as collaborative working arrangements develop in order to ensure that corporate aims and those of the Joint Partnership, are being delivered.

Generic PVP

Recommendation 4:

That the force expedites its upgrading and integration of IT systems to ensure that data which might inform links between areas of vulnerability is managed effectively.

Recommendation 5:

That the force develop recommendations upon completion of its PVP review, in order to improve corporacy, efficiency and its service to victims. These recommendations should concentrate upon areas of risk.

Child Abuse

Recommendation 6:

That the force develops its business processes in order to give more resource to the prevention/reduction of child abuse and also become more proactive in its approach to offenders.

Domestic Violence

Recommendation 7:

That the force completes its current review of its response to DV in order to improve corporacy, consistency and efficiency. Systems and processes should be developed in order to incorporate enhanced case review mechanisms and performance indicators.

Public Protection

Recommendation 8:

That the force review the level of skill and knowledge (in particular with regard to risk areas) amongst its staff who are completing RSO home visits in order to make sure that this is at an appropriate level and that risk is minimised.

Missing Persons

Recommendation 9:

That the force, jointly with partner agencies, considers developing a process for reviewing missing persons and in doing so ensures that individual ownership and the criteria for each review is clearly defined.

Appendix: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC	Assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ASB	Anti-social behaviour

B

BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic command unit

C

CDRP	Crime and disorder reduction partnership
CIA	Community impact assessment
CPIU	Child Protection Investigation Unit
CPT	Community protection team
CPU	Child protection unit

D

DCC	Deputy chief constable
DV	Domestic violence
DVU	Domestic violence unit

E

EPDR	Electronic performance development review
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H

HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
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I

INA Inspector neighbourhood area
INI IMPACT nominal index
IT Information technology

M

MAIDeN Multi-Agency Information Database for Neighbourhoods
MAPPA Multi-agency public protection arrangements
MARAC Multi-agency risk assessment conference
MFH Missing from home
MISPER Missing person

N

NIM National Intelligence Model

O

OASys Offender Risk Assessment System

P

PCSO Police community support officer
PDR Performance development review
PIC Performance improvement conference
PPU Public protection unit
PSU Police standards unit
PVP Protecting vulnerable people

R

RSO Registered sex offender

S

SARA Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment

SCIS Specialist criminal investigation services

SCT Safer community team

SMB Strategic management board

T

T&C Tasking and co-ordination

T&CG Tasking and co-ordination group

V

ViSOR Violent and Sex Offenders Register