



DYFED-POWYS POLICE

20 – 23 APRIL 2004

POLICE NATIONAL COMPUTER

COMPLIANCE REPORT

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1. Executive Summary

1.1 Introduction

- 1.1.1 Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) conducted a Police National Computer (PNC) Compliance Inspection of Dyfed-Powys Police between 20th and 23rd April 2004.
- 1.1.2 Dyfed-Powys Police was subject to a PNC Compliance Audit using the April 2003 protocols on the PNC Compliance. Her Majesty's Inspector would like to acknowledge the enthusiasm of the Force for its services and also to place on record his thanks to all members of staff who contributed to this report and provided assistance during the inspection.
- 1.1.3 This report is based on views and comments obtained from strategic, PNC and customer level management and users at Force Headquarters and at two of four Basic Command Units (referred to within Force as divisions). These views have been supported by reality checks conducted by HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors.

1.2 Background

- 1.2.1 Dyfed-Powys Police is the largest geographical force in England and Wales and is responsible for policing a mainly rural area with a resident population of 488,250 people. The Force area includes a number of tourist areas and contains two major ports, Milford Haven and Fishguard; numbers to the area can swell to over 1 million during the tourist season. The Force also has boundaries with four other forces, South Wales, Gwent, West Mercia and North Wales.
- 1.2.2 Policing services are provided by four territorial divisions each coterminous with the area's unitary authorities and commanded by a chief superintendent. Each BCU, Pembrokeshire, Carmarthenshire, Ceredigion and Powys is led by a Chief Superintendent and contains a number of inspector-led policing sectors.
- 1.2.3 The Force is headed by the chief officer group, led by the Chief Constable, supported by the Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) and an Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) with individual responsibility for Operations and Support. The Force strength comprises approximately 1170 full-time equivalent police officers, 520 police staff and 150 special constables.
- 1.2.4 The PNC function within Dyfed-Powys is managed by the Operations Department which has responsibility for the Criminal Justice Unit (CJU) and the Phoenix Bureau and the PNC Bureau (PNCB) which includes the Phoenix Section and the Court Section. The Court Section is responsible for updating bail conditions and disqualified. The Phoenix Section is responsible for updating Arrest/Summons records (A/S) from source documents, inputting court results and updating sex offender registration orders. Both the Court Section and Phoenix Section work normal office hours Monday to Friday. The PNCB is responsible for updating vehicle and property records, updates to the wanted/missing index and managing

user access to PNC. The PNCB should operate on a 24 hour, 7 day system, however, due to shortages of staff, this is not always the case. Responsibility for urgent work when the bureau is not in operation is transferred to the control room.

- 1.2.5 The creation of arrest/summon reports on the PNC is achieved by a skeleton record being electronically transferred from the Force custody system direct to the PNC. Following the processing of a prisoner in the custody suite, the arresting officer updates the prisoner handling system that submits the skeleton record to PNC. The source document, known as the C646 is electronically transferred to the Phoenix Section where it is printed out to enable the remaining fields to be manually updated.
- 1.2.6 Court results are received via an Equis¹ terminal in the CJU. Two copies of the court register are printed out, one is used by the CJU to update any relevant bail conditions and one for the Phoenix Section to update court results on the PNC. Crown court results are sent manually from the courts but there is an electronic link between the force and Swansea Crown Court that did speed up the process. At the time of the inspection, this link was not available.
- 1.2.7 The PNC Bureau (PNCB) is based within the force control room at Force headquarters. It is responsible for entering Wanted/Missing (W/M) reports, vehicles, property and also for conducting Vehicle On Line Descriptive Searches (VODS) and Queries Using Extended Search Techniques (QUEST) searches on behalf of the force. VODS and QUEST searches can also be carried out locally on divisions by staff in the intelligence units.

1.3 Methodology

- 1.3.1 A full inspection was carried out covering the sections of; Leadership; Policy & Strategy; People; Partnerships & Resources; Processes and Results.
- 1.3.2 The inspection was conducted over three stages with a final assessment being provided in line with the current HMIC Baseline Assessment grading structure of;
- **Excellent** - Comprehensive evidence of good performance against the ACPO performance indicators and effective processes. Good-to-strong positive result trends over the last twelve months.
 - **Good** – Evidence of average/above average performance against the ACPO performance indicators and effective activity covering many areas, but not comprehensive. Results over the last twelve months show performance is not on target but is heading in the right direction.
 - **Fair** - Evidence of effective activity covering some areas, but concerns in others. Some favourable external comparisons but performance over the last twelve months against the ACPO performance indicators has not been on target and in need of improvement.

¹ The system used by the Magistrates Courts to record the outcomes of court hearings

- **Poor** - No or limited evidence of effective activity. Performance against the ACPO performance indicators over the last twelve months has been poor and/or deteriorating markedly and in need of improvement.

1.3.3 The first stage of the inspection involved the Force providing HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors with documentation to support their adherence to the protocols. This was followed up by a visit to the force with HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors conducting interviews with key staff. The visit to the Force also incorporated the final stage of the inspection, which was based upon reality checks. The reality checks included; reviewing PNC data against source documentation (arrest data and warrants) and checks against user access groups and training records.

1.3.4 Using the evidence gathered during each stage of the inspection, this report has been produced based upon the European Foundation of Quality Management (EFQM) format.

1.4 Current Performance

1.4.1 On 27th April 2000, ACPO Council accepted the ACPO PNC Compliance Strategy. The strategy is based upon the following four aspects of data handling;

- Accuracy
- Timeliness
- Completeness
- Relevancy

1.4.2 The strategy is owned by ACPO but is also reliant on other partners taking responsibility for key actions within the strategy. The partners include; Centrex; HMIC; Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) and individual forces.

1.4.3 With regards to individual forces, a number of performance indicators (PIs) specifically for PNC data standards were set. Each force has a responsibility to achieve the targets set by the PIs in order to improve their position for each of the aspects mentioned above. The key PIs of the strategy are as follows: -


- i. Arrest/Summons – 90% of cases to be entered within 24 hours (where forces are using skeleton records as initial entry, full update must be achieved within 5 days)
- ii. Bail Conditions – Entry of Police Bail within 24 hours
- iii. Court Case Results – 100% to be entered within 72 hours of coming into police possession. (Courts have their own target of three days for the delivery of data to the police, therefore, the police are measured against an overall target of 7 days, to take account of weekends and bank holidays)

1.4.4 Dyfed-Powys Police have performed consistently over the last twelve months in relation to the updating of arrest/summons reports on the PNC. During this period, performance against the target of entering 90% within 24 hours has either been on target or very close to the target, ranging from 84.3% to 92.2%. In terms of the

number of days to enter the quickest 90%, performance has also been very consistent ranging from 1 to 3 days, however, in September 2003, the force experienced an unusual trend of taking 31 days to enter 90% of their cases. The Force has been clearing a backlog of court results which could have had an adverse affect on this PI. Nevertheless, the Force is performing better than the national average on both performance indicators.

- 1.4.5 Performance with regard to the input of court results has been less impressive. This has been in part due to the Force concentrating its efforts on clearing a large backlog of court results. This backlog has all but gone and the improved performance reflects this situation. In April 2003, only 3.1% of results were entered within 7 days, this compares to 36.3% in April 2004 now that the backlogs have been cleared. With regards to the number of days to enter the quickest 90% of results, a similar trend has been experienced. In April 2003, it was taking the force 60 days to enter 90% of cases, rising to a high of 89 days whilst the backlogs were being tackled. However, the latest statistics show that in April 2004, it was only taking 22 days to enter the quickest 90%. Whilst the force can be applauded for these improvements, they must also remain aware that they are far from achieving the targets and further work is required to fulfil this objective.
- 1.4.6 In terms of Impending Prosecutions (IPs), Dyfed-Powys Police have reduced the overall number of cases by 32.6% over the last twelve months. This significant reduction from 2,466 to 1,662 is partly due to the clearance of backlogs but HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were also encouraged by the processes in place to manage the legitimacy of older cases.

1.4.7 A graph illustrating Dyfed-Powys’s performance in the 12 months to April 2004 is shown below.



Note: The Y-Axis showing the percentage of A/S reports & Court Results input within given time periods shows a maximum of 90% to clearly show the performance of the Force in relation to the target set by the performance indicators of the ACPO Compliance Strategy. The dotted line between Nov 03 and Jan 04 for the number of IPs has been included to show the trend during the period, as PITO has been unable to provide IP statistics for Dec 03.

1.5 Conclusions

1.5.1 HMIC’s assessment of PNC compliance within Dyfed-Powys Police has been assessed as:

Good – Evidence of average/above average performance against the ACPO performance indicators and effective activity covering many areas, but not comprehensive. Results over the last twelve months show performance is not on target but is heading in the right direction.

1.5.2 This assessment is based on the detailed findings of the report. However, the key areas can be summarised as follows:

- Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary is pleased that the force has shown commitment at all levels to the delivery of key objectives for PNC. The force has embraced the ethos required from previous publications into the management of PNC information and has established suitable procedures to ensure that current performance can be sustained.

- HMIC is encouraged by the performance of the force against the performance indicators laid down by the ACPO Compliance Strategy for PNC. Further improvements can be made but the improvements and consistency made over the last twelve months should provide foundation for future progress.
- Overall there is a good awareness of PNC throughout the force and a culture exists in which advice and assistance is provided to ensure that operational officers benefit from the functionality that is available to them.
- Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary found strong evidence of Good Practice in each of the protocol areas that are used as the basis of the inspection.

1.5.3 The findings of this report should be read in conjunction with the previous reports and recommendations relating to PNC. The previous reports are;

- Police Research Group Report – 'Phoenix Data Quality', *published 1998*.
- HMIC Thematic Inspection Report – 'On The Record', *published 2000*
- HMIC Report – PNC Data Quality and Timeliness, 1st Report, *published 2001*
- HMIC Report – 'PNC Data Quality and Timeliness, 2nd Report', *published 2002*

1.5.4 A summary of good practice points, along with recommendations for improvement can be seen in Appendix A of this report.

2. Detailed Findings and Recommendations

2.1 Leadership

- 2.1.1 HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors view leadership within Dyfed-Powys Police as an area of strength for the Force. There was a high level of knowledge and understanding of the issues displayed by the chief officer who has responsibility for PNC within the force. This knowledge was supplemented by commitment to ensure that the force meets the targets and it's own objectives in relation to PNC. In addition to the chief officers, there was also a good level of awareness amongst divisional commanders of the requirements placed upon the force concerning the timely and accurate recording of information onto the PNC. During the course of the inspection, two divisional commanders were interviewed and both had a good knowledge of the ACPO performance indicators and the obligations placed upon them concerning the submission of information to PNC.
- 2.1.2 Dyfed-Powys Police has a well established PNC Steering Group (PSG) which meets quarterly and is consistently chaired by the chief officer with the PNC portfolio. The role of the PSG is clearly defined by a document outlining the terms of reference and objectives of the group. Membership of the group is also well structured including representation from all stakeholders within the force.
- 2.1.3 Management information on the performance of the force in relation to timely submission of source documents is circulated to divisional commanders on a regular basis. The management information provides a breakdown of the performance of each division plus additional information on officers who have submitted poor quality information and the types of errors or omissions that are being made by the respective divisions. HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors viewed this as good practice. The publication of the management information is also used for the regular Performance and Planning meetings conducted between a chief officer and each individual divisional commander. A number of performance issues are discussed at these meetings but PNC is a regular item on the agenda.
- 2.1.4 In addition to the PSG, the force also has a Divisional PNC Liaison Officer Group, with representation from each division, which is used as 'mid-tier' forum to disseminate information out to the divisions and also provides a line of communication from the divisions back to the PSG. The existence of the group is good practice, however, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors are of the opinion that the effectiveness of the group could be improved, providing benefits to the overall force performance. In one focus group, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors learned that one divisional representative had not been informed of their responsibilities in relation to the group, therefore, opportunities to review processes and improve performance could be missed. In another division, staff were not aware that issues could be raised with the PSG via their divisional representative. This lack of awareness can prevent feedback being obtained if procedural changes are made that have a significant impact on divisional staff.

Recommendation 1

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that suitable terms of reference be developed for the Divisional PNC Liaison Officer Group. The terms of reference should include the scope of the group and a clear of the roles and responsibilities of the members of the group. This should include the lines of communication between the members and the PSG but also the members and staff from their respective divisions.

2.2 Policy and Strategy

2.2.1 With regard to policy and strategy, the inspection covered a number of areas that warrant a review. These can be described under three broad headings: PNC Policy; Data Protection and Security. Each of these themes is discussed in further detail below.

2.2.2 PNC Policy

2.2.2.1 HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were encouraged to find a detailed PNC policy within the Force. The PSG is responsible for the overall PNC strategy within the Force. Having commissioned the publication of the policy, the PSG are now the formal owners of the policy and any changes or updates require the agreement of the PSG. When reviewing the policy, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were pleased to note that the responsibilities of all staff concerned with the various functions of PNC are clearly stated.

2.2.2.2 The policy is also supported by a number of 'Routine Orders' that are published on a weekly basis and are the equivalent of Force Orders. The policy and routine orders are stored on the force Intranet and are easily accessible by all staff. In addition, there is a PNC site on the Force Intranet containing all relevant documents and providing useful advice for staff in the use of PNC. However, during interviews and focus groups, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were informed by a number of staff, including key PNC staff, that they were unaware of the existence or contents of the policy.

2.2.2.3 In addition, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors are of the opinion that the force policy should be maintained on a formal basis to ensure that the currency of the document is always clear. The current policy does not have any version or date attributed to it and therefore, it is unclear when the policy was produced or last reviewed.

Recommendation 2

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that attributes be added to the PNC policy showing the date and version of the document. This will provide staff with an indication of the currency of the document, supplying assurance that the latest, up to date version is being used.

2.2.3 Data Protection

- 2.2.3.1 HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were pleased to find that a risk based data protection audit plan was in existence within the Force. The plan has been developed using the methodology contained within the ACPO Data Protection and Audit Manual. However, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were also concerned that although the plan was available and a list of high, medium and low risk areas had been identified, the plan had not been updated or reviewed since April 2002. The lack of resources was cited as a reason for the inability complete the plan because other than the Data Protection officer, there are no permanent staff concerned in carrying out data protection audits.
- 2.2.3.2 Although the audit plan is not being met, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were encouraged to learn that high risk areas that have been identified within the plan, for example, wanted/missing reports and disqualified drivers have been audited and there have also been ad hoc audits of other applications within the system. HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors also found good practice in the Pembrokeshire division in relation to the management of warrants. An action plan has been developed to ensure that all warrants are current and the prosecution remains within the interest of the public, however, the plan was confined to the Pembrokeshire division and the information has not been disseminated to other divisions. The Divisional PNC Liaison Officer Group would have been a useful forum to disseminate the information. (See Recommendation 1).
- 2.2.3.3 Upon completion of a data protection audit on a PNC application, the PSG take ownership of the recommendations to ensure that all necessary actions are completed. This approach enables strategic and functional managers who are members of the group to be aware of all issues that may impact on them or their staff. It also ensures that objectives of the recommendations are achieved or suitable alternatives are sought at the discretion of the PSG.
- 2.2.3.4 The data protection unit is also responsible for Transaction Monitoring² within the Force, however, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were informed that due to resource issues within the Data Protection Unit (DPU), the process is not carried out on a regular basis, particularly over the last twelve months. Some transaction monitoring has been carried out but on an ad hoc basis when time permits. Nevertheless, during interviews and focus groups, all staff were aware of the process and felt that it is a suitable deterrent for anybody considering carrying out illegitimate transactions. HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were also encouraged by the robust process employed for transaction monitoring in that an officer's line manager must endorse all checks before being returned to the DPU.

² A process to confirm the validity of PNC transactions made by individual officers within a force. Officers are sent details of checks they have carried out and they must return documentation explaining the reasons for checks. The ACPO Data Protection and Audit Manual states that forces should conduct three transaction checks per day.

Recommendation 3

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force review the current level of resources available to the Data Protection Unit. The review should focus on the whether the force has the ability to meet it's obligations in terms of;

- (a) Completing all necessary audits identified within the risk based audit and reviewing the plan on an annual basis**
- (b) Carrying out a sufficient volume of transaction monitoring to satisfy itself that all transactions are being conducted for a legitimate purpose. This item will also ensure compliance with the ACPO Data Protection and Audit Manual.**

2.2.4 Security

- 2.2.4.1 The Information Security Policy, which is based on BS7799 and the ACPO Community Security Policy, is currently under review but HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors learned that it is the first such review since 2001. Any changes to Information Technology or Information Systems within the force which may have an impact on the policy are identified and discussed by the Information Security Board, a group which is chaired by a chief officer. In view of the length of time since the last review and changes in technology over recent years, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors remain to be assured that the Information Security Policy is relevant and up to date. The current review should resolve these concerns.
- 2.2.4.2 New recruits into the Force, both police officers and police staff, receive input on Information Security and Data Protection as part of their induction. In addition, every member of staff has recently been provided with a workbook to raise awareness of Information Security issues. The workbook contained sections on Freedom of Information, Information Handling and the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS). Staff were asked to work through the book, completing answers in relevant sections (not all staff were required to complete the section on NCRS) and return the completed books to the information security officer. At the time of the inspection, the deadline for returning the workbook had just passed and the analysis of the responses had commenced.
- 2.2.4.3 In addition to Information Security, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors had mixed views on the management of user access to the PNC. On the positive side, new users who require access to the PNC must first successfully complete an assessed training course to obtain the required level of access. The PNC trainers notify the PNC Bureau (PNCB) of users who require access to the system, the PNCB manage the user groups and assign appropriate access levels on receipt of the notification.
- 2.2.4.4 However, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were informed that one of the newly appointed PNC trainers had previously been employed within the PNCB and has retained the ability to allocate new PNC ids to staff on the completion of their training courses. By allowing that function to devolve into the training unit the Force has lost

the total independence it previously benefited from by maintaining that functionality within the PNCB.

- 2.2.4.5 In addition, the process for removing access if a user leaves the force or transfers to another post where the same level of access is not required, is not as robust. The force PNC Policy states that it is the responsibility of Line Managers to notify the PNCB of any changes to access levels. During the course of the inspection, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors found no evidence that this was occurring. There is a risk that users have retained a certain level of access if they have changed role to a new post where access is not required. This risk can lead to an increase in the number of illegitimate transactions, further enhanced by the current lack of transaction monitoring being carried out by the DPU. The force must ensure that all necessary changes to users roles are notified to the PNC bureau as soon as practicable, either through enforcement of the existing policy or through the development of a new procedure.

Recommendation 4

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force develop a procedure for notifying the PNC Bureau of changes in status to personnel who have access to the PNC. The procedure should ensure that updates are provided on a regular basis, for example, fortnightly to reduce the risk of unauthorised access to PNC data. One option for the force is to examine whether the Human Resources system can supply the information direct to the PNC Bureau, negating the need for line managers to be involved in the process.

- 2.2.4.6 With regards to the user groups that provide access to the various functions within PNC, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors found them to be well structured and aligned to job roles and training courses. However, it was also discovered that access to the driving licence application had been given to all users without any formal training. The restrictions placed upon the use of the information contained within the application, for example, for road traffic offences only, should result in a force limiting the number of sufficiently trained users having access to the information. Dyfed-Powys police have increased the risk of misuse of the information by providing all users with access, without any formal training.

Recommendation 5

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force review the provision of access to driving licence information. The review should consider which roles require the access and also whether an appropriate training structure is in place to provide new and existing users with sufficient training to use the application.

2.3 People

In a similar way to Policy & Strategy, this section has been split into the following sub sections; Communication, Data quality and Training. Each of these subsections is discussed separately below.

2.3.1 Communication

2.3.1.1 HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors view communication as an area of strength within Dyfed-Powys Police. During the course of the inspection it became apparent that the levels of knowledge and understanding of the functionality of the PNC was high throughout the various functions within the force. All staff are aware of the investigative capabilities of the PNC and also what their obligations are in relation to the submission of data to be updated on the PNC.

2.3.1.2 HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were also encouraged to find a culture in which staff are also prepared to provide assistance or advice to their colleagues for the benefit of the force. This ensures information is passed to officers who are otherwise not aware of certain aspects of functionality on the PNC. An example provided during the inspection was that of control room staff who might advise officers to consider VODS searches for vehicles when a full vehicle registration mark is not known. This culture provides a line of communication to all staff because if success is achieved by using a particular search facility on the PNC, information is then cascaded to all other staff within the division.

2.3.1.3 The culture of 'can do' and the use of 'word of mouth' to promote success was seen by all staff as an effective line of communication, however, the force should not rely on this informal process to achieve it's communication objectives. There are risks in this approach, for example, information being watered down as it passes down a the communication chain, therefore, it was encouraging to note that the force is currently considering the implementation of a formal marketing strategy via the PNC Steering Group.

2.3.2 Data Quality

2.3.3.1 HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were also encouraged by the culture of processing high quality information to PNC. Officers are held accountable for the information that is submitted to the Phoenix Bureau and staff within the Phoenix Bureau carry out supplementary checks to ensure that only correct information is being processed. (See also paragraph 2.5.2.2)

2.3.2.2 Although this positive culture exists, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors found opportunities that the force may wish to exploit in order to satisfy itself further that high quality information is originating from Dyfed-Powys. Within the Phoenix Bureau, 100% of the work carried out by new staff is subject to a quality assurance process by line managers. This level of quality assurance is maintained until a suitable and consistent standard is achieved. However, once the standard is

achieved, no further quality assurance is carried out. The result is that experienced staff do not have any of their work quality assured.

Recommendation 6

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force introduce a formal quality assurance process to ensure a proportion of the work of all staff is checked for accuracy. The process should include the recording of performance and identification of common errors. In addition, recorded performance should be included within the Personnel Development Reviews of staff.

- 2.3.2.3 In addition to the experienced staff in the Phoenix Team, the work of the staff in the PNC Bureau (PNCB) is not quality assured. The PNCB make updates to the wanted/missing index, update stolen vehicles, other vehicle reports and reports on the property application. In the absence of PNCB staff, responsibility for these updates transfers to the force control room at force headquarters. Due to the experience of PNCB staff and sporadic responsibility assigned to control room, PNCB staff quality assure all updates made by control room staff. The location of the PNCB within the control room provides a suitable mechanism for this process, however, following a job evaluation exercise early in 2004 in which a number of staff received lower grades, it now means that PNCB are checking the work of staff on a higher grade.

Recommendation 7

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the Force reviews the lines of responsibility for the quality assurance of PNC updates made by staff in the control room. Staff responsible for the quality assurance should have supervisory responsibility over the inputting staff in order that any problems can be dealt with accordingly.

- 2.3.2.4 Despite the lack of quality assurance for experienced staff, reality checks conducted by HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors did not reveal any major qualitative issues with the information that is being submitted by the Force.

2.3.3 Training

- 2.3.3.1 PNC training within Dyfed-Powys Police is delivered separately by the Force training unit who provide a service to the whole force and a trainer dedicated to the Phoenix Bureau. HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors consider the use of a dedicated trainer within the Phoenix Bureau for more complex updates, e.g. Arrest/Summons, Court Results and Bail Conditions, to be good practice. The use and positioning of the trainer enables staff within the Phoenix Bureau to be kept up to date with procedural guidance and dissemination of changes is more efficient. This view was echoed by the staff who felt more confident knowing that the resource was available to them all of the time. It also reduces the waiting time for specialist updating courses when new staff join the team.

- 2.3.3.2 Training outside of the Phoenix Bureau is planned following the submission of Training Needs Analysis (TNA) forms to the training school on an annual basis. Currently, there are no restrictions on who receives training, providing the need for the course has been identified on the TNA.
- 2.3.3.3 Upon completion of a training course, students are required to pass a formal assessment before authorisation for access is approved. HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors view this as good practice, however, they were disappointed to learn that the assessment is only carried out by the Force trainers, staff in the Phoenix Bureau are not required to complete any form assessment. Staff within the Phoenix Bureau are released into the workplace immediately after the training course, relying on the quality assurance process for new staff to identify any deficiencies in the knowledge obtained during training. HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors are of the opinion that an assessment conducted at the end of the update training will provide a more reliable indication of the competency of new staff before they are able to input data unsupervised.
- 2.3.3.4 In addition to a formal assessment at the end of a training course, the Force utilises end of course evaluation forms to gauge the effectiveness of the training course. This process is conducted immediately at the conclusion of the training course and invariably, the comments only reflect the quality of the delivery of the training. HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors are of the opinion that post evaluation of training courses, for example, three months after the course, will be useful to evaluate the effectiveness of the training once the student is back in the workplace. During the inspection, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were informed that there is an informal process in place in which managers submit feedback to the trainers, however, this is dependent upon the manager taking the time to provide the information. The Training Department is currently in the process of developing an on-line post training evaluation with a formal link to subsequent training needs assessments and professional development.

Recommendation 8

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the Force introduce a more robust process for the selection of staff receiving PNC Training courses and subsequent access to the PNC. The Force should;

- (a) Determine which positions are entitled to PNC access through examination of the roles and responsibilities of the post. Once determined, only those posts that require access should be provided with training.**
- (b) Introduce a formal assessment of all PNC training courses, including update courses.**
- (c) Facilitate the introduction of a formal process of post-training evaluation.**

- 2.3.3.5 During interviews and focus groups, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were advised by PNC trained staff that since their initial training on the system, in some cases over ten years ago, no further training has been provided, despite a number of significant developments to the system. Therefore, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were pleased to be informed by PNC Trainers that a programme of refresher training has just commenced. The programme aims to provide existing users with

updates on the recent developments and the changes or benefits that can be obtained from the system with its current functionality. At the time of the inspection, planning had taken place to provide refresher training to 450 staff.

2.4 Partnerships and Resources

2.4.1 HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were pleased to discover that the force has forged good relationships with the courts. This relationship with the Magistrates Courts has enabled the force to monitor the performance of the courts in the supply of information and engage in dialogue if issues arise that require resolution by the courts. This relationship has also resulted in the force gaining electronic access to the Magistrate Courts information, the court registers are now printed within the Force. In addition as Dyfed-Powys have an Equis terminal located within CJU, queries can be made directly to the court registers by the Force without having to contact the courts.

2.4.2 The relationship building with the courts also resulted in an electronic link between the Force and Swansea Crown Court, a court outside of the Force area. Staff in the Phoenix Team reported that this link provided a useful mechanism to obtain information from the court but at the time of the inspection, the link had not been working for a number of weeks. HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were informed that there is no resolution to the problem in sight.

Recommendation 9

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force seek urgent resolution to the problems with the electronic link between the CJU and Swansea Crown Court. The link was identified as a factor in improved performance whilst it was functioning.

2.4.3 Currently, within Dyfed-Powys Police, there are no formal arrangements between the Force and Non-Police Prosecuting Agencies (NPPAs). The result is that the Force is not being informed about prosecutions at the commencement of proceedings against an offender. Invariably, this means that the only notification the Force receives is when an offender appears on the court register, thus having an impact on the timeliness figures produced by the force. HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors are of the opinion that the Force should consider the development of a Service Level Agreement between themselves and NPPAs. This will ensure that the force can manage the receipt of information from NPPAs and also the supply of information to NPPAs, for example, previous convictions, when requests are made.

Recommendation 10

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force develops and introduces a Service Level Agreement (SLA) for each of the Non-Police Prosecuting Agencies (NPPAs) that prosecute in the force area. The SLA should include the two way flow of information between the force and the agencies, including the submission of data to the force at the commencement of proceedings and the supply of previous convictions from the force on behalf of the NPPAs.

2.5 Processes

In addition to the strategic and functional aspects of the PNC, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors also conducted a low level review of the processes employed by the force to facilitate the timely and qualitative issues relating to the management of information it owns on the PNC. This review found a number of areas worthy of note within this report, these include, the submission of the C646 source document, the submission of fingerprints, updates of ad hoc intelligence, management of warrants and the management of Impending Prosecutions.

2.5.1 Submission of the PNC Source Input Document (C646)

2.5.1.1 Dyfed-Powys Police have given due consideration to the supply of the source documents, both electronically to PNC and manually to the Phoenix Team. The expectation of all staff is laid down with the overall PNC Policy document and the PNC web site on the force intranet provides a lot of useful information to staff. The result is that a culture of high quality exists within the force. However, this culture is proving to add inefficiencies within the Phoenix Bureau.

2.5.1.2 Despite the responsibilities of officers being laid down in policy and the sub-standard forms being returned to officers, there is no quality assurance of the submissions made a divisional level. Divisional supervision are not making any checks against the information be submitted by local officers. Initial registration of a case to PNC is via an electronic link from the custody system. Once an offender has been processed, the officer updates the relevant fields and submits the case direct to PNC via the link. Once the initial details of the case have been registered, the officer completes the remaining fields in order that a manual C646 can be printed within the Phoenix Bureau, to enable the Phoenix team to populate the remaining fields.

2.5.1.3 The result of this process is that often poor quality information is supplied or omissions are being made by officers, for example, to save time an officer may only submit one offence to PNC when the offender may have been charged with three offences. The consequence of this is that staff in the Phoenix Bureau do not have confidence in the information that is being provided to them to make the necessary updates to PNC. The staff currently carry out a number of additional enquiries on various systems, e.g.

Information Assets³ before they make the update to PNC. This inefficient approach is limiting the capacity of the staff within the Phoenix Bureau.

Recommendation 11

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the Dyfed-Powys Police enforces the policy which outlines the responsibilities of officers when submitting information to the Phoenix Bureau. Enforcement should comprise of strict monitoring by the Phoenix Bureau, supplemented by accurate and detailed management information being supplied to Divisional Commanders on a regular basis to enable them to deal with any non-compliance issues in an appropriate manner.

2.5.2 Submission of Fingerprints

2.5.2.2 Fingerprints are currently sent to the Phoenix Bureau to enable the staff to confirm the Arrest/Summons number before sending the fingerprints to the Scientific Support Unit for recording and processing. HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors are of the opinion that the fingerprints should be sent direct to the Scientific Support Unit, relieving the Phoenix team of an administrative task and enabling the quicker processing of fingerprints.

2.5.2.3 The fingerprints require an Arrest/Summons number before they are processed but due the way that cases are transferred to PNC, this number is known to the officer before the fingerprints are submitted, therefore, the officer should add this number before submitting the fingerprints. During the inspection, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were able to view a number of sets of fingerprints that had no numbers recorded on them, despite the number already being available. This coincides with the lack of supervisory controls at divisional level (see paragraph 2.5.2.2). If this process were reviewed to remove this task from the Phoenix team, further opportunities to increase capacity could be exploited.

Recommendation 12

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force examine the process for the submission of fingerprints to the Scientific Support Unit. They should seek opportunities to remove redundant administrative process by making officers accountable for the accuracy of information recorded on the fingerprint forms.

2.5.3 Submission of Ad Hoc Intelligence Updates

2.5.3.1 HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were pleased to discover that a formal process exists for the supply of ad hoc intelligence updates to the Phoenix Bureau. Local Intelligence Officers (LIO) on the divisions receive all intelligence submissions from officers on their respective divisions. The LIO examines the intelligence and if anything is relevant to

³ An intranet based data warehouse used by the force providing a single point of access to information systems

PNC, a form is submitted to the Phoenix Bureau for the appropriate update to be carried out. This process is included within the force policy.

2.5.3.2 However, on examining the submissions made during 2004 from LIOs, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were disappointed to note that only two divisions had made submissions. This highlighted a weakness in the process in that the policy was not being enforced, resulting in the potential loss of useful information from PNC. The force should examine this process to ensure that each LIO is aware of their responsibilities when handling intelligence submissions from officers. Another point of note is that not all officers were aware that their intelligence updates were forwarded to the Phoenix Bureau if relevant information was included. This may lead to further missed opportunities and therefore, consideration to this issue within the Marketing Strategy should be made.

Recommendation 13

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force ensures that all divisions are complying with the policy for submitting ad hoc intelligence information.

2.5.4 Management of Warrants

2.5.4.1 As previously stated in paragraph 2.3.2.2, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors found good evidence that warrants are being managed well in the Pembrokeshire BCU. The development of an action plan to review all outstanding warrants on a regular basis is good practice. The plan enables the division to gain assurance that all outstanding warrants remain relevant and within the public interest. In cases where there is no public interest to hold the warrant any longer, for example if the warrant is for a minor offence which dates back a number of years, the BCU consults with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) concerning the withdrawal of the warrant and subsequent proceedings. This process within the Pembrokeshire BCU is viewed as good practice, however, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors were disappointed that the BCU was isolated in this approach and that dissemination of the action plan should have been carried out.

2.5.5 Bail Input Under Sections 9 and 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003

2.5.5.1 Sections 9 and 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provide the police with the power to take Fingerprints and non-intimate DNA samples from persons detained at a police station for a recordable offence. If this process is not in place, it is possible that offenders are being brought into custody who are already subject to Sections 9 and 10 bail. Consequently, the arresting officer is unaware of this information, and the custody sergeant has to make bail decisions without this vital information. The Force is also losing the opportunity to take full advantage of these powers to maximise the potential advances in forensic science in the detection of crime. If the taking of such samples is done at an early stage of the custody process, this will remove any perceived problems relating to bail. Part of the procedures will need to address the creation of a PNC record to obtain an Arrest Summons number to allow the fingerprints and DNA to be entered

onto the respective national databases. This includes the creation of PNC records for persons released on bail.

2.5.5.2 Currently, Dyfed-Powys Police are not recording arrestees under the Criminal Justice Act and only those offenders charged, summoned or cautioned are being recorded. This is resulting in the loss of recording opportunities for fingerprints and DNA samples, however, HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors are encouraged by the forces commitment to commence recording of this information. A plan is in place to commence recording from June 2004, including the provision of two extra staff within the Phoenix Bureau to cope with the extra demand that will be placed upon the unit.

2.5.6 Management of Outstanding Impending Prosecutions

2.5.6.1 Following the publication of 'On the Record' by HMIC in 2000, forces were obliged to implement procedures to ensure that all outstanding cases on PNC owned by them were reviewed regularly to ensure that all were legitimately outstanding. In particular, this obligation related to cases that are over twelve months old.

2.5.6.2 HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors found a good process in Dyfed-Powys whereby each month, a list of outstanding cases over 12 months old is received from PITO. The list is divided amongst the staff who have the responsibility to review the legitimacy of the case.

2.5.6.3 HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors are happy that this process is providing the force with suitable assurance that all cases are legitimately outstanding. The latest statistics available from PITO (April 2004) show that of all cases owned by Dyfed-Powys, only 7.6% are older than twelve months.

2.6 Results

2.6.1 In the 12 months to April 2004, Dyfed-Powys have consistently achieved, or been very close to the target of entering 90% of cases within 24 hours. Performance has ranged from 84.3% to 92.2% which both exceed the national averages for England and Wales. In addition, the number of days to enter the quickest 90% also exceeds the national averages for England and Wales. Other than one erratic month in September 2003 when it took 31 days to enter the quickest 90% of cases, performance against this target over the last twelve months has ranged from 1 to 3 days.

2.6.2 In terms of court results, performance has not been as consistent or as good as those achieved for arrest/summons reports. However, improvements have been made over the last twelve months. With regards to the percentage of cases entered within 7 days of the court date, this has improved from 3.1% in April 2003 to 36.3% in April 2004. The number of days taken to enter the quickest 90% of court cases has also reduced over the last twelve months from 60 days in April 2003 to 22 days in April 2004. It is hoped that inefficiencies identified within this report where capacity can be increased will increase the chances of improved performance against this indicator.

2.6.3 As previously stated in paragraph 2.5.7.3, the force is managing the number of outstanding impending prosecutions (IPs). The number of IPs has decreased by 32.6%

over the last 12 months from 2,466 to 1,662. In addition, 92% of cases owned by the force are less than twelve months old.

- 2.6.4 A graph illustrating the performance in these three areas can be seen in Section 1 of this report at paragraph 1.4.7.
- 2.6.5 With regards to MO keywording, the force acknowledged that it could be doing more to populate the database, a view that is shared by HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors. During 2003, the force was consistently updating cases but for six consecutive months to April 2004, due to a cited lack of resources, the force experienced a reduction in the overall number of cases that contained MO keywords. Nevertheless, the process for updating keywords ensures that quality information is being used. For cases that are identified as suitable for keywording, Phoenix staff review the witness statements on the CJU system to ensure complete details are recorded. HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors consider this good practice.
- 2.6.6 One area of concern identified by HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors is the recording of bail conditions within the Court Section. Currently, bail conditions are only entered on PNC for indictable offences. PNC functionality was changed a number of years ago to facilitate the recording of all bail conditions and to alert forces that offenders may be on bail with conditions. Therefore, it is the view of HMIC PNC Compliance Auditors that the force should consider recording bail conditions for all offenders. There are a number of operational policing advantages for both Dyfed-Powys police and the other forces throughout the United Kingdom for this information to be input onto PNC within that 24 hour target.
- 2.6.7 The recommendations outlined so far in this report aim to improve the quality of the data being input and to assist Dyfed-Powys Police to achieve the targets of 90% Arrest/ Summons within 24 hours and 100% of court results being entered within 72 hours of receipt from the courts. They should also provide the force with opportunities to maximise the use of the PNC and increase the levels of awareness of officers regarding the investigative capabilities of the system.

Appendix A

A Summary of Good Practice within Dyfed-Powys Police:

- A chief officer, the Assistant Chief Constable, has ownership of PNC issues within his portfolio. The chief officer also chairs the PNC Steering Group which meets on a regular basis.
- The force has introduced a Divisional Liaison Officer Group to provide a line of communication between the divisional, operational staff and the PNC Steering Group.
- Management information concerning the performance of officers submitting source documents is distributed to Divisional Commanders on a regular basis.
- The force has introduced a detailed PNC policy which outlines the responsibilities of each member of staff who are concerned in the various function of the PNC.
- Staff in the control room have the knowledge and experience to prompt officers to use additional functionality of the PNC if the officer has not considered it themselves. This culture provides a useful means of raising awareness if successes are gained from the additional checks or searches.
- The force has a PNC trainer dedicated to the needs of the Phoenix Bureau. This provides staff with an immediate point of contact and enables them to remain up to date with procedural and functional changes.
- Students who are trained to enquiry level by the force training school are required to pass a formal assessment before access to the PNC is granted.
- A formal process exists for the provision of ad hoc intelligence updates to PNC.

Summary of Recommendations for Dyfed-Powys Police:

Recommendation 1

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that suitable terms of reference be developed for the Divisional PNC Liaison Officer Group. The terms of reference should include the scope of the group and a clear of the roles and responsibilities of the members of the group. This should include the lines of communication between the members and the PSG but also the members and staff from their respective divisions.

(Paragraph 2.1.4)

Recommendation 2

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that attributes be added to the PNC policy showing the date and version of the document. This will provide staff with an indication of the currency of the document, supplying assurance that the latest, up to date version is being used.

(Paragraph 2.2.2.3)

Recommendation 3

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force review the current level of resources available to the Data Protection Unit. The review should focus on the whether the force has the ability to meet it's obligations in terms of;

- (a) Completing all necessary audits identified within the risk based audit and reviewing the plan on an annual basis
- (b) Carrying out a sufficient volume of transaction monitoring to satisfy itself that all transactions are being conducted for a legitimate purpose. This item will also ensure compliance with the ACPO Data Protection and Audit Manual.

(Paragraph 2.2.3.4)

Recommendation 4

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force develop a procedure for notifying the PNC Bureau of changes in status to personnel who have access to the PNC. The procedure should ensure that updates are provided on a regular basis, for example, fortnightly to reduce the risk of unauthorised access to PNC data. One option for the force is to examine whether the Human Resources system can supply the information direct to the PNC Bureau, negating the need for line managers to be involved in the process.

(Paragraph 2.2.4.4)

Recommendation 5

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force review the provision of access to driving licence information. The review should consider which roles require the access and also whether an appropriate training structure is in place to provide new and existing users with sufficient training to use the application.

(Paragraph 2.2.4.5)

Recommendation 6

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force introduce a formal quality assurance process to ensure a proportion of the work of all staff is checked for accuracy. The process should include the recording of performance and identification of common errors. In addition, recorded performance should be included within the Personnel Development Reviews of staff.

(Paragraph 2.3.2.2)

Recommendation 7

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force reviews the lines of responsibility for the quality assurance of PNC updates made by staff in the control room. Staff responsible for the quality assurance should have supervisory responsibility over the inputting staff in order that any problems can be dealt with accordingly.

(Paragraph 2.3.2.3)

Recommendation 8

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force introduce a more robust process for the selection of staff receiving PNC training courses and subsequent access to the PNC. The force should;

- (a) Determine what posts are entitled to PNC access through examination of the roles and responsibilities of the post. Once determined, only those posts that require access should be provided with training.
- (b) Introduce a formal assessment of all PNC training courses, including update courses.
- (c) Facilitate the introduction of a formal process of post-training evaluation.

(Paragraph 2.3.3.4)

Recommendation 9

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force seek urgent resolution to the problems with the electronic link between the CJU and Swansea Crown Court. The link was identified as a factor in improved performance whilst it was functioning properly.

(Paragraph 2.4.2)

Recommendation 10

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force develops and introduces a Service Level Agreement (SLA) for each of the Non-Police Prosecuting Agencies (NPPAs) that prosecute in the force area. The SLA should include the two way flow of information between the force and the agencies, including the submission of data to the force at the commencement of proceedings and the supply of previous convictions from the force on behalf of the NPPAs

(Paragraph 2.4.3)

Recommendation 11

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that Dyfed-Powys Police enforces the policy which outlines the responsibilities of officers when submitting information to the Phoenix Bureau. Enforcement should comprise of strict monitoring by the Phoenix Bureau, supplemented by accurate and detailed management information being supplied to Divisional Commanders on a regular basis to enable them to deal with any non-compliance issues in an appropriate manner.

(Paragraph 2.5.2.3)

Recommendation 12

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force examine the process for the submission of fingerprints to the Scientific Support Unit. They should seek opportunities to remove redundant administrative process by making officers accountable for the accuracy of information recorded on the fingerprint forms.

(Paragraph 2.5.3.2)

Recommendation 13

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the force ensures that all divisions are complying with the policy for submitting ad hoc intelligence information.

(Paragraph 2.5.4.2)

Appendix B

Thematic Inspection Report on Police Crime Recording, the Police National Computer and Phoenix Intelligence System Data Quality - 'On The Record'

Recommendation 9 (Chapter 5 page 86)

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that all Forces produce position statements in relation to the 1998 PRG report recommendations on Phoenix Data Quality and the ACPO Compliance Strategy for the Police National Computer. He further recommends that Forces produce a detailed action plan, with timescales, to implement their recommendations. The position statements and action plans together with progress updates should be available for audit and inspection during future HMIC PNC Compliance Audits and inspection of Forces. Forces should send copies of action plans to HMIC's PNC Compliance Audit Section by 1 February 2001.

Recommendation 10 (Chapter 6 page 104)

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that Forces urgently review their existing SCAS referral mechanisms in the light of the above findings. These reviews should include verification with SCAS that all Force offences fitting the SCAS criteria have been fully notified to them, and updated. This process should be managed by Forces through their in-Force SCAS Liaison Officers.

Recommendation 11 (Chapter 7 page 111)

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the marketing, use and development of national police information systems is integrated into appropriate Force, local and departmental, strategic planning documents.

Recommendation 12 (Chapter 7 page 112)

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that where not already in place, Forces should establish a strategic PNC Steering Group. This group should develop and be responsible for a strategic plan covering the development, use and marketing of PNC and Phoenix.

Recommendation 13 (Chapter 7 page 118)

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that all Forces conduct an audit of their present in-Force PNC trainers to ensure they have received nationally accredited training. Any individuals who have not been accredited as PNC trainers by National Police Training should not conduct in-Force PNC training.

Recommendation 14 (Chapter 8 page 145)

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that Forces ensure that each Phoenix inputting department develops an audit trail to register the return of substandard PSDs, via line supervisors, to originating officers. The system developed should include a mechanism to

ensure the prompt return of PSDs. Forces should also incorporate locally based audit trails, monitoring the passage of returned PSDs between line supervisors and originating officers.

Recommendation 15 (Chapter 8 page 146)

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that Forces develop clear guidelines to cover their expectations of officers on the return of incomplete or substandard PSDs. This guidance should be communicated to all staff and regular checks conducted to ensure compliance.

Recommendation 16 (Chapter 8 page 148)

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that Forces should develop a system to ensure that all ad-hoc descriptive and intelligence updates registered on local Force systems are automatically entered onto the Phoenix system. The policy should clearly outline whose responsibility it is to notify Phoenix inputters of any descriptive changes. Forces should also ensure that the policy is marketed to staff and that regular checks are conducted to ensure compliance.

Recommendation 17 (Chapter 8 page 150)

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that Forces develop a formal system to ensure that a proportion of each member of Phoenix inputting staff's work is regularly checked for accuracy. Forces should also consider the benefits of measuring other aspects of their work including speed of entry and compliance with policies. Performance outcomes should be evidenced in staff PDRs.

Recommendation 18 (Chapter 9 page 164)

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends, where not already present, that Forces develop risk assessed Force Data Protection Officer audit programmes.

Recommendation 19 (Chapter 9 page 164)

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that Forces integrate PNC and Phoenix data quality compliance into their performance review and inspectorate programmes for BCUs and specialist departments.

Recommendation 20 (Chapter 9 page 165)

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that PSD performance statistics should be incorporated in routine Force performance information. The statistics should identify omissions and errors in individual fields, in particular, descriptive information. Appropriate accountability measures should be established to ensure that any performance shortfalls identified are addressed.

Appendix C

PRG Report “Phoenix Data Quality” Recommendations

- National performance indicators and standards for timeliness of input, data fields to be completed, quality assurance requirements and the provision of training should be agreed by ACPO and promulgated to all Forces.
- Achievement against and compliance with these indicators should be audited after a period of 12 months, perhaps through the inclusion in the scope of HMIC audits.
- Senior officers take an active and visible role in policing compliance with agreed standards within their own Force.
 - ACPO performance indicators should be reflected in Force policy or standing orders (or the Force equivalent). Guidance should include the responsibilities of officers at each stage of the process e.g. for the provision of source documentation, for approval, time taken to pass to input bureaux, and the bureaux' responsibilities for data entry and quality control.
 - Line and divisional managers, as well as chief officers, should be held accountable for compliance with these standards. This could be achieved through inclusion in divisional efficiency assessments, and through the publication and dissemination of performance statistics throughout individual Forces and nationally.
- Source documentation should be common across all Forces, if not in design, in the information requested. A national format, stipulating a hierarchy of fields to be populated, should be developed.
- Programme(s) geared to raising awareness amongst operational officers and line managers of the potential benefits of Phoenix in a practical sense and their responsibilities of the provision of data should be developed. To ensure all officers have an opportunity to benefit from these programmes, consideration should be given to inclusion of a 'Phoenix awareness' module in probationer training, promotion courses and divisional training days.
- Best practice in administrative arrangements and organisational structures should be widely distributed. Internal working practices and organisational structures should be streamlined to remove any redundancies.

- Greater computerisation of the transfer of results from courts direct to Phoenix should continue to be developed. In the shorter term, the Police Service is likely to retain responsibility of the input of court information. To minimise the resource burden on the Police Service in this interim period, the police and courts should work to ensure recognition of each other's requirements and to minimise any inconsistencies in their respective working practices.
 - In the first instance, this might be achieved by ACPO highlighting to Magistrates' Courts and to the Crown Court, perhaps through the Trials Issue Group, the importance of Phoenix records to the integrity of the criminal justice system as a whole. Liaison meetings could usefully be established to introduce greater consistency in working and recording practices between the courts and police Forces e.g. for recording data. In the first instance, this could be pursued locally, perhaps through the court user group. Issues considered by such meetings might include supplying additional information (such as Arrest / Summons numbers) to the Magistrates' Court system and to automated transfer of court registers.
 - Consistent practice and performance is also required from the courts. Recommendations referring to performance indicators and standards, audits and monitoring, senior level commitment, common recording practices, awareness of system customers and administrative 'best practice' could equally apply to the courts. Mirroring the responsibilities of Chief Constables for their Force, the Court Service and the Magistrates' Court Committee should be accountable for the performance of courts.
 - Consistent practice in advising custody details, including transfers and releases, is required. This includes consistency in advising CRO numbers to maximise the number of complete records. The police and prison services should liaise to encourage greater understanding and acknowledgement of each other's requirements.

Appendix D

Police National Computer Data Quality and Timeliness – 1st Report

Recommendation One (Paragraph 5.2)

Her Majesty's Chief Inspector recommends that ACPO nationally review the position and priority of PNC within the structure of portfolio holders to reflect both the technical and operational importance of PNC.

Recommendation Two (Paragraph 5.11)

Her Majesty's Chief Inspector draws renewed attention to Recommendations 11 to 20 of '*On the Record*' (2000), and recommends that all forces develop appropriate systems, overseen at a senior level, to ensure that they are implemented.

Recommendation Three (Paragraph 5.19)

Her Majesty's Chief Inspector recommends that PITO review, as a matter of urgency, the supplier/customer relationship between PNC and forces, particularly in relation to the marketing of PNC functionality, and the type, frequency and validity of management information reports produced.

Recommendation Four (Paragraph 5.29)

Her Majesty's Chief Inspector recommends that Her Majesty's Inspector (Training), in consultation with PITO and National Police Training, conducts a review of the quality and availability of accreditation training for PNC trainers and the extent to which they are subsequently employed in forces.

Recommendation Five (Paragraph 5.31)

Her Majesty's Chief Inspector recommends that discussions take place between ACPO, PITO and other relevant stakeholders to examine what opportunities exist for a short term 'technology solution' for the inputting of Court Results, either involving NSPIS applications currently in development, or an interim solution.

Recommendation Six (Paragraph 5.34)

Her Majesty's Chief Inspector recommends that renewed and re-invigorated discussions should take place between relevant stakeholders to, (a) Ensure that local systems are in place to maximise co-operation with the courts to achieve their respective 72 hours targets and, (b) Work towards Magistrates' Courts and Crown Courts assuming full responsibility for inputting all case results directly onto PNC.

Recommendation Seven (Paragraph 6.10)

Her Majesty's Chief Inspector recommends that following appropriate consultation with relevant stakeholders, a national inspection protocol for PNC data quality and timeliness be introduced.

Recommendation Eight (Paragraph 6.12)

Her Majesty's Chief Inspector recommends, that following appropriate consultation with relevant stakeholders, the Secretary of State should consider using his powers under Section 5 of the Local Government Act 1999, to require all police authorities to institute a Best Value Review of processes to ensure PNC data quality and timeliness. Such review should be conducted against a common template and terms of reference.

Recommendation Nine (Paragraph 6.14)

Her Majesty's Chief Inspector recommends, that in consultation with the Standards Unit and other stakeholders, HM Inspectorate should urgently review their current PNC audit responsibilities in the light of the findings of this report, with a view to adopting a more proactive stance in relation to force performance, data quality and timeliness.

Recommendation Ten (Paragraph 6.16)

Her Majesty's Chief Inspector recommends, that in consultation with other stakeholders, ACPO IM Committee initiate research with a view to encouraging mutual support between forces for out of hours PNC data entry purposes.

Appendix E

Police National Computer Data Quality and Timeliness – 2nd Report

Recommendation 1

The Home Office should lead and co-ordinate an urgent re-examination of the current PNC strategy and standards with a view to producing national binding performance and compliance criteria to which all relevant stakeholders and partners are agreed and committed.

Recommendation 2

ACPO nationally and Chief Constables locally must ensure that the national standards for PNC operation, resourcing and training are fully integrated into local Information Management Strategies and recognised as an important part of operational service delivery. This area must receive sustained high-level support through a 'champion' at chief officer level.

Recommendation 3

PITO should be tasked to consolidate the force 'profiling' approach as used in the inspection into the routine statistical returns provided to forces. PNC statistics should then be integrated into the mainstream suite of management information/indicators that inform decisions at force and BCU levels.

Recommendation 4

HMIC should be tasked to establish a risk-assessed programme of monitoring and inspection that is able to respond quickly and effectively to deviations from accepted standards. This programme should include;

- remote monitoring of performance (PITO profile statistics)
- regular collaboration and contact with force PNC Managers
- proportionate programme of visits and inspections
- targeted interventions to respond to identified problems

Recommendation 5

The Home Office should establish a structured process for addressing and remedying any significant and persisting deviation from the agreed national standards (see Recommendation 1). This process should identify the respective roles of HMIC, Police Standards Unit and police authorities. It should set out the escalation of responses, which might include an agreed action plan, re-inspection, Intervention, and ultimately withdrawal of facility.