


Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Dyfed Powys Police Major Crime

July 2008



Dyfed Powys Police – HMIC Inspection Report

July 2008

ISBN: 978-1-84726-714-6

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FIRST PUBLISHED 2008

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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical Description of Force Area

Dyfed-Powys Police covers more than half the landmass of Wales and is the largest police force area in England and Wales (4,188 square miles). The force is bounded to the south and west by the Irish Sea and the Bristol Channel.

Largely rural in nature, the area's largest centres of population can be found to the south and west. The area is served mostly by minor roads, and it takes some three-and-a-half hours to drive from the force's northernmost point to its far south-western tip. To put this into context, it is a distance of some 180 miles, significantly greater than that between Cardiff and London.

The main industries in the Dyfed-Powys area are agriculture and tourism, although there are significant petrochemical activities along the Milford Haven waterway in the Pembrokeshire BCU. This area has seen growth in recent times with the advent of liquefied natural gas terminals in the Haven and an associated pipeline carrying gas that cuts across three of the force's four BCUs. As well as providing 20% of the nation's gas production within the next 12 months, the petrochemicals industry within the Haven also provides a significant amount of refined products for the Republic of Ireland. This is now acknowledged as a significant industrial site in the national infrastructure.

Demographic Profile of Force Area

Current estimates of the total population of the force area (505,400 people) also indicate that 23% of people are of retirement age (65 for men and 60 for women) or over. This compares with an all-Wales average of 21% and a UK average of 19%. These rates range from 24% in Powys and 23% in Pembrokeshire and Carmarthenshire to 22% in Ceredigion, notwithstanding the strong full-time student presence (7,000+) in that particular area. Estimates (by the Office for National Statistics) of migration patterns during spring 2007 suggest that levels of outward migration are most pronounced in the 16–24 age group throughout the force area, countered by increases in the 45–64 age grouping over this time.

In recent times, there has been a significant influx of migrant workers into Dyfed-Powys, primarily from Portugal and Eastern Europe. Recently published statistics suggest that the numbers of migrant workers in Carmarthenshire, counted through the Worker Registration Scheme, were the second highest in Wales. Significant numbers also exist within the Pembrokeshire BCU, attracted by major industrial developments such as the liquefied natural gas terminals on the Milford Haven waterway.

Among the population, Welsh is spoken by approximately 34% of residents (172,000 people), with over half the residents of Ceredigion and Carmarthenshire able to speak Welsh, compared with the national average of 21%.

The sparse distribution of the population is reflected in a density of 46 persons per square kilometre, compared with an average for Wales of 141 per square kilometre. Indeed, Ceredigion and Powys are among the most sparsely populated areas of England and Wales, with 43 and 25 persons per square kilometre respectively. Reflecting the contribution of farming and tourism industries, these areas also record comparatively high levels of self-employment.

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Structural Description of Force including Staff Changes at Chief Officer Level

Chief Constable Terrence Grange retired from the service in November 2007 and was replaced on a temporary basis by Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) Andy Edwards. During the period following Mr Grange's retirement, the force was also without a substantive assistant chief constable (ACC), two chief superintendents from within the organisation having acted in the role for periods agreed by the police authority pending the appointment of the force's new ACC.

To provide additional resilience within the chief officer team, DCC Howard Roberts joined the force from Nottinghamshire Constabulary pending the appointment of the new Chief Constable.

Mr Nick Ingram, formerly of Cheshire Constabulary, took up the position of ACC on 19 May and on 8 June, Mr Ian Arundale, former DCC for West Mercia Constabulary, took up his appointment as Chief Constable.

The force has four basic command units (BCUs), three under the command of chief superintendents (Carmarthenshire, Pembrokeshire and Powys) and one (Ceredigion) under the command of a superintendent. They are provided central support from a headquarters (HQ) based at Llangunmor, near Carmarthen. The HQ campus houses the crime management and reduction and operations departments (incorporating the force communications centre) as well as support functions including human resources (HR) and finance, professional standards, development services and information systems and technology.

Strategic Priorities

The current force strategic priorities were developed at the culmination of a futures seminar for senior managers held in October 2007. The outcome was the refocusing of the current force strategy, Building on Strong Foundations, which sets out a number of key priorities, namely:

- neighbourhood policing;
- automatic number plate recognition (ANPR);
- restructuring of roads policing units;
- public protection; and
- improved corporate governance.

Progress against these objectives is closely monitored through existing force governance structures and will be formally evaluated and reviewed in the 2008 futures seminars to be held in the autumn.

The force's control strategy for 2008/09 features:

- drugs;
- terrorism and extremism; and
- violent crime.

Immigration crime and the impact of economic migrants on the force has once again been identified as a significant and emerging issue, while the control strategy as a whole is underpinned by the delivery of roads policing and neighbourhood policing.

The police authority's priorities for 2008/09 are consistent with those identified in the control strategy, with the addition of anti-social behaviour. This was adopted by authority members in recognition of the views of the public, generated through proactive consultation activity.

Force Development since 2007 Inspections

Since the 2007 inspections, force developments have been prioritised in a number of key areas which are outlined below.

Force Estate

A new custody facility for Newtown opened in May following a ten-month period of construction. The custody suite is at the cutting edge in terms of technological facilities to support and augment the roles and functions of custody staff across the county. The new facility is equipped with ten cells, associated Viper suite, fully equipped medical facilities, solicitor and family visiting areas and is 'future proof', making it able to meet increasing demands within the policing locality.

Land has been purchased for the development of a new station for Cardigan in the Ceredigion BCU. The structure and layout of the existing facility in the town centre does not meet the demands of modern policing, so the new development will commence in the coming year at a total cost of £2.5 million.

Proposals are being actively developed for a joint emergency services centre at Llandrindod Wells in Powys. This draws together the force, mid and west Wales fire and rescue service and Her Majesty's Court Service (HMCS). A feasibility study to ascertain the feasibility of the development is ongoing.

A site to relocate the helicopter support unit away from HQ has been identified at Pembrey in Carmarthenshire. Issues around the water table at the site, planning consents and agreement on the lease are in the process of being finalised.

Workforce Modernisation

Pembrokeshire BCU has adopted a pilot scheme to introduce custody interview teams within the division. The corporate services department is evaluating this initiative to ascertain savings in officer time and establish the feasibility of rolling this out more widely across the force.

In addition, a programme to increase the number of custody detention officers across the force has been approved by the authority. Three additional posts will be created during 2008/09, with more during the following financial years, to assist the organisation in meeting its responsibilities in relation to safer detention.

Significant success has been achieved in attracting partnership funding for additional police community support officers across the force. Among the funding partners identified at present are a number of town and community councils and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution.

Citizen Focus and Neighbourhood Policing

The force has established a citizen focus programme board chaired by the ACC and has a clearly developed action plan, which is being driven by this forum.

During his temporary tenure, DCC Howard Roberts took a proactive lead in driving forward neighbourhood policing within the organisation, with the result that significantly more staff are now allocated to neighbourhood policing duties and there is greater corporacy with regard to implementation around the four BCUs.

As part of the wider citizen focus agenda, the force has instituted a professionalising customer services project, examining all aspects of customer contact with the force. The initial report and recommendations arising out of this project, specifically relating to front counter services, has been submitted to chief officers for consideration.

Protective Services

Since the publication of the HMIC report *Closing the Gap*, the four Welsh forces have been working closely to bridge the gaps in protective services that were identified in the analysis. Furthermore, the force is currently finalising a capability assessment against the ACPO protective services standards to establish gaps in service delivery with a view to identifying threats and risks that need to be addressed.

Financial Crime

As part of its commitment towards enhancing its capability to deliver more effective protective services, the force has invested a number of resources into its investigation of financial crime. The investment has paid dividends in that the amount of monies seized by the force during the 2007/08 financial year was £967,567 compared with £271,130 in the previous year, an increase of 356%.

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Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard.
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Context

This element of the inspection report details Dyfed-Powys Police capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

As with serious and organised crime, skilful mapping and analysis has made it possible to determine more accurately the degree of risk posed and appropriate interventions to curtail the impact of such criminality.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.340	0.254	-25.29%	0.263
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.000
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.119	0.059	-50.42%	0.049
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	83.33%	166.67%	+83.34pp*	89.97%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.376	0.040	-89.36%	0.069
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	15.79%	150.00%	+134.21pp*	69.80%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.139	0.059	-57.55%	0.139
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	85.71%	66.67%	-19.04pp*	70.94%

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Number of manslaughters per 10,000 population	0.020	0.099	+395.00%	0.029
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	200.00%	100.00%	-100pp*	Not Applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.040	0.059	+47.50%	0.081
% of murders detected/convicted	100.00%	100.00%	0pp*	85.30%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	1.900	1.425	-25.00%	1.919
% of rapes detected/convicted	28.13%	23.61%	-4.52pp*	21.64%

*pp' is percentage points.

**Most similar forces (MSF) for Dyfed-Powys is: Devon and Cornwall, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, North Wales, North Yorkshire and Suffolk.

From the statutory performance indicator (SPI) data contained in the table above, it can be seen that the crime type of manslaughter poses a threat to Dyfed-Powys Police. The rate of offences (per 10,000 population) is significantly above the MSF average and is also one of the highest in England and Wales, after a large increase in offending in 2007.

The SPI data also indicates that major crime investigation in Dyfed-Powys Police is strong, with most sanction detection rates being in excess of the MSF average. The only exception to this is the sanction detection rate for kidnapping, which is below the MSF average after a significant fall in 2007.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT) published in September 2007 indicated that Dyfed-Powys was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to homicide, rape and kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Dyfed-Powys has made steady inroads into the problem and its resident groups have been initially mapped.

The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified public protection, alcohol-related crime, terrorism and extremism as its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on public protection, alcohol-related violent crime, drugs, terrorism and extremism, immigration crime and economic migrants.

Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and addressed.

The force has invested suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and inhibit major crime.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates maturing processes in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative arrangements with South Wales, Gwent Police and Operation Tarian (regional resources) are recognised.

Intelligence

Summary - The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime and to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has conditionally committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.

Strengths

- In January 2008, the Home Office published the statistical bulletin *Homicides, Firearm Offences, and Intimate Violence 2006/07*; this reports that Dyfed-Powys has one of the lowest homicide rates per million population in the United Kingdom. During 2006/07, Dyfed-Powys recorded four murders per million of the population against a UK average of 13.7.
- Crime analysis in Dyfed-Powys is undertaken at two levels, BCU (level 1) and force (level 2). At level 1, analysis concentrates on volume crime, anti-social behaviour and other crime and criminals impacting at local level. At level 2, the force intelligence bureau (FIB) analyses crime and criminals that cross BCU and force boundaries and impact on more than one BCU.
- The regional intelligence unit (RIU) is housed in Operation Tarian (Welsh for shield). It has a strategic analyst and a tactical analyst, who are complemented by three intelligence analysts dedicated to developing specific, serious OCGs and supporting live operations conducted by the regional task force (RTF). Additionally, there is a dedicated distraction burglary analyst.
- The force has recently invested in two new FIB analyst posts and now employs a principal analyst, two crime analysts and a financial analyst in the FIB. The force additionally employs an analyst in the west coast ports and special branch.
- At BCU level, there are five analysts and four crime support officers (researchers) in the four BCUs.
- Over the last two years, the FSA has developed into a comprehensive analysis of crime and criminality in which the level of threat/risk posed by major crime, such as violent crime and terrorism, is scored to determine the level of strategic priority.
- The strategic assessment undertaken in each of the four BCUs has more recently developed in a similar manner to the FSA, where the threat/risk posed by major crime and serious and organised crime is scored to determine the level of local strategic priority.
- At level 2 there is no full-time dedicated strategic major crime analytical capability; this decision is based on the recurrent level of major crime, which is low – ie, an average of 2.8 murders per year based in the last ten years. The principal analyst tasks strategic major crime work.
- The FIB analysts dedicate time to create major crime NIM products, such as an initial homicide problem profile, which has informed a three-year homicide prevention strategy.

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- The RIU produces the annual Wales strategic assessment and quarterly tactical assessments, as well as market and problem profiles, as and when tasked by either the regional intelligence group (RIG) (monthly meetings), the regional tactical tasking and co-ordination group (RTTCG) (quarterly) or the regional strategic tasking and co-ordination group (annually).
- The RIU has completed the following problem profiles in the last 12 months:
 - the facilitation and exploitation of migrants;
 - criminal networks and firearms;
 - intellectual property crime; and
 - criminal business profile on cannabis cultivation in Wales.
- The RIU is driving the OCG mapping process for Wales, which forms part of the regional strategic and tactical assessments.

Work in progress

- The force has undertaken some basic analytical work to understand the drivers of homicide but clearly, with an average of only 2.8 homicides per year over the last ten years, profiles and trends are less reliable.
- Corporate services comprises seven full-time analytical staff dedicated to the provision of performance data. Additionally, the unit has a pool of four analytical staff for the provision of analytical support to BCUs. The force is reviewing how corporate services might be able to position itself to provide enhanced level 2 strategic crime analytical support.

Area(s) for improvement

- The analytical structures at BCU level offer little resilience and provide no scope to develop products beyond basic volume crime work. This is exacerbated during periods of staff absence from post, for example, due to attachment to a major crime investigation.
- The force has identified violent crime as a very high priority in its strategic assessment, as it accounts for 24% of all crime, and has included it in the control strategy. It has not, however, produced a violent crime or domestic violence strategy with clear strand leads, a comprehensive menu of tactical options and delivery milestones, in order to grasp this problem firmly, since it is likely to impact on homicide prevention work.
- Level 2 analysts are tasked by the principal analyst and have no medium to long-term major crime themed overview. The force might like to consider apportioning areas of specific overview for the level 2 analysts. This enables the build-up of strategic and operational knowledge and oversight throughout the year, ensuring long-term analytical knowledge and expertise.
- The force does not have analytical capability overseeing offenders managed by multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA), missing persons and other associated risk areas that would identify emerging and potential threats.
- When operational analytical support to major crime investigation is required, consideration ought to be given to the provision of that support in a way that least affects other areas of the business. By way of example, in October 2007, the principal analyst

was redeployed to a homicide investigation during a critical phase of the strategic assessment process.

- The strategic assessment process is designed to give an accurate overview of current and long-term issues affecting the force at each level, enabling the strategic tasking and co-ordination group to set priorities. Ordinarily, the level 1 assessment precedes the level 2 assessment, which precedes the regional and national assessment, to provide a bottom-up intelligence picture. The strategic assessment process that took place in November 2007 was in reverse; the regional process took place prior to the force's.

Summary - The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be embryonic. The force's community impact assessments to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.

Strengths

- The force community impact assessment policy has been in place since April 2007 and has been updated to incorporate good practice. Input to divisional commanders and senior management teams has raised awareness of the requirements of the policy following a major crime.
- The force has developed strong strategic and tactical intelligence-sharing partnerships at BCU level; these are working effectively. Intelligence is routinely shared through MAPPA, the multi-agency risk assessment conferences held in respect of domestic abuse victims, community safety partnerships and neighbourhood-level community meetings.
- The force has completed a strategic assessment of protective services, which has informed the second All-Wales (Protective Services) Strategic Assessment and National Strategic Assessment.
- The relationship between the FIB and the RIU is well established and works effectively in practice.
- At regional level, partners and other agencies are fully engaged and information sharing works well in practice.

Work in progress

- The ACPO Wales regional strategic assessment (RSA) dated September 2007 was drafted prior to any FSA being completed, due to competing priorities around OCG mapping. The RIU is fully aware of this and is working with forces to ensure that future force strategic products will be produced at a time to inform future regional assessments fully.
- A number of agencies that actively engage at regional level are reluctant to engage further at force level and expect the information exchanged to be disseminated to forces. The RIU and three forces are establishing a process that facilitates the free flow of intelligence.

Area(s) for improvement

- Outside MAPPA and the domestic abuse risk assessment group (DARAG), the inspection found little evidence of effective relationships with partners and agencies at level 2 in order to enrich the intelligence picture in respect of major crime, near misses and precursor incidents.

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- Health services in Wales are somewhat fragmented and complex; they are not coterminous with police boundaries. This means that developing partnerships is complex and there is little liaison to develop homicide prevention work. Overcoming these barriers would benefit the force's violent crime prevention strategies, with the addition of intelligence concerning near-miss homicide and incidents that may be precursors that are not reported to the police. The benefit to health services is the long-term reduction of patients presenting with serious injury.
- The force has not engaged minority groups and there is therefore limited liaison to gain awareness of particular vulnerabilities or the potential impact on those groups of major crime.
- There are no documented terms of reference for the RIU, with a consequent lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities. An example of this is the inadequate sharing of information about OCGs from outside southern Wales that operate in the area, the question of whether the single point of contact (SPOC) for dissemination is the main force concerned or the RIU and the role (if any) that the RIU has in relation to major crime.

Summary - The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly adequate. Problem profiles for homicide, violent crime and public protection are satisfactory, with links to force and BCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- The FSA takes account of the UK Threat Assessment control strategy priorities and regional control strategy priorities, as well as national policing priorities for 2007/08.
- Each of the 13 crime types is subject to a priority grading that determines the level of strategic priority, which is a calculation of threat and risk (threat multiplied by risk = priority grading). The strategic assessment clearly differentiates between very high, high, medium and low priority grading.
- Problem profiles have been produced for violent crime, homicide and public protection; additionally, the force has recently completed the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) gang assessment, which concludes this threat to be extremely low in Dyfed-Powys, with no evidence of an emerging gang culture.
- The force has produced a three-year homicide prevention strategy (2007–10) in order to reduce homicide in Dyfed-Powys. The strategy sets out broad strategic aims and, although embryonic, it demonstrates that a force with low levels of violent crime is not complacent and seeks to reduce them further.
- Intelligence products produced at levels 1 and 2, both strategic and tactical, are compliant with the ACPO guidance (National Intelligence Model (NIM) 2005).
- Based on the combination of the threat scores and risk assessment included in the FSA of November 2007, those crime areas emerging as very high priority are determined as force control strategy priorities, namely:
 - the unlawful production of controlled drugs, drug trafficking and misuse of controlled drugs;
 - violent crime, including alcohol-related violence and domestic abuse; and
 - terrorism and extremism.
- Immigration crime and economic migrants, together with roads policing, scored as high threats in the FSA; neither has been set as a control strategy priority but the force has addressed these by setting an intelligence requirement for immigration crime and economic migrants. Roads policing is seen by the force as a cross-cutting theme that will feature throughout all crime strategies and therefore has not been set as a standalone priority.
- A range of intelligence products has been included to inform the FSA and consider the future impacts, including:
 - NPSAT;
 - crime pattern analysis of offences and incidents involving firearms and bladed weapons;
 - SOCA;

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- iQUANTA;
 - the four BCU strategic assessments;
 - the criminal business profile regarding Vietnamese organised crime; and
 - the national community tension team overview of race, faith and homophobic crime.
- Each control strategy priority and associated prevention, intelligence and enforcement (PIE) delivery plan is allocated a lead officer at chief superintendent level who is accountable for delivery.
 - The potentially dangerous offender (PDO) policy is comprehensive in terms of assessing and managing the risk of known PDOs.
 - The second All-Wales (Protective Services) Strategic Assessment, covering major crime (homicide) and serious, organised and cross-border crime, was completed in September 2007. For Dyfed-Powys, the threat/risk assessment for major crime was low.
 - The RSA reviews the principal threats to Wales from serious, organised and cross-border criminality. It takes account of the UK Threat Assessment, relevant sections of the All-Wales (Protective Services) Strategic Assessment, intelligence directly sourced from the four Welsh forces, open sources, the national OCG mapping process and external agencies, such as SOCA and the Border Agency.
 - Each crime area in the RSA has been scored against a pre-set threat/risk matrix, used as part of the OCG mapping process, to determine high, medium or low priority grading to establish future actions to be taken in the region. (SO3)
 - Those crime areas in the RSA emerging as high priority, namely terrorism, domestic extremism and Class A drugs, are nominated as regional control strategy priorities. The medium priority areas of facilitation, trafficking and exploitation of migrants, cannabis cultivation, firearms and distraction burglary generate regional intelligence requirements, each having a documented intelligence requirement and delivery plan. The low priority areas of kidnap and extortion, intellectual property crime and fraud are areas for the region to maintain awareness.

Area(s) for improvement

- The FSA does not specifically consider major crime, precursor and near-miss offences in order to fully assess the threat faced by the force. The force has no systems or processes in place to support a robust analysis of precursor and near-miss offences.
- The homicide problem profile would benefit from more in-depth analysis of other factors, including consumption of alcohol, use of prescription and controlled drugs by victims and suspects and issues concerning the mental health of the victims and suspects. If the information were not available due to time passed, the force would benefit from collecting in-depth analytical information from this point forward.
- The homicide problem profile does not give the percentage of suspects that were previously known to police in some capacity or those with PNC warning markers, which might assist the force to identify those who have the potential to kill or cause serious harm (PDOs) at an early stage in their offending pattern.

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- No intelligence requirements have been set to close intelligence gaps in relation to homicide, including offences that may be precursor to homicide, and near-miss incidents.
- A senior investigating officer (SIO) is required to complete and submit form CRIMSEC 7A to the Home Office in respect of every homicide investigation; the form contains information that is useful to inform the analysis of homicide. The analysts were unaware of this form and the force might like to consider introducing a process whereby the form is routed through the strategic major crime analyst.
- Although violent crime is a control strategy priority, no analysis is conducted at level 1 to bring repeat violent offenders in the tactical assessment for presentation at the tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TTCG), incurring the likelihood of appropriate tasking.
- Threat-to-life issues are not routinely analysed, which would serve as a building block to complete the picture of threat in relation to major crime.
- There are no systems or processes in place to ensure analysis of precursor events and offences, near misses or other life-threatening offences and issues; this means that the threat faced by the force in relation to major crime could be underestimated.
- The RSA comprehensively considers the threat posed to the region by serious and organised crime; however, there is no analysis or assessment of the threat posed regionally by major crime.
- Regional intelligence requirements are not prioritised and are largely unknown in the forces. There are no systems or processes in place to collect relevant intelligence.

Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are rarely shared with partners and BCUs. There is an emerging trigger plan for ‘hot briefing’ whenever either a significant change in the major crime threat or the nature of the analysis demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as MAPPA and DARAG, are effective. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- National databases are fully utilised to assist investigation and inform practitioners of current best practice.
- The force is represented on the national homicide working group and arranges senior detective officer conferences to share issues and good practice.
- The west coast ports strategic intelligence group involves representatives from the Ports Authority, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the Border Agency and SOCA. The group has developed an information-sharing protocol; whilst information sharing predominantly concerns serious and organised crime, the force will develop this relationship on a wider basis.
- Information sharing concerning threat-to-life issues out of hours is facilitated by the force control room, which has access to all force intelligence systems, including the violent and sex offenders register and the IMPACT (intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking) nominal index.
- A dedicated team is in place to progress the management of police information (MoPI) guidelines. The team is working to an implementation support plan to ensure that the force remains on track to reach milestones. The ACC is the force lead for MoPI.
- BCU commanders attend the force TTTCG (FTTCG), which provides them the opportunity to make direct bids for level 2 resources and enables an awareness of level 2 problem profiles, other NIM products and tasking of level 2 resources.
- The force has reviewed information-sharing protocols to ensure MoPI compliance and has developed new protocols around major crime with HMRC, the Border Agency, local health boards and the sexual assault referral centre.
- The RIU has developed *Appendix A*, a document in which partners and agencies share information at the RTTCG on active and developing target nominals and operations, both to inform all agencies and ensure a joined-up approach where appropriate. The following are the contributors to *Appendix A*:
 - the four Welsh police forces;
 - British Transport Police (BTP);
 - the Border Agency;
 - all regional teams (the RTF, the RIU, the regional asset recovery team (RART) and the regional intelligence cell (RIC));
 - Trading Standards;
 - UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO);
 - SOCA; and

- HMRC.

Work in progress

- The force is currently profiling the life skills, talents and hobbies of its staff. Examples were provided where the force has made use of these skills – for example, three officers who can speak Polish fluently and an ex-marine who has expertise in CCTV recovery.

Area(s) for improvement

- Apart from sharing arrangements with MAPPA and DARAGs, there is little evidence of routine innovative intelligence sharing with partners regarding major crime, precursor or near-miss incidents and offences.

Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are not identified sufficiently early.

Strengths

- Quality of service delivery groups, chaired by a chief inspector, meet monthly with local communities in each of the BCUs to identify emerging risks and threats impacting on that particular community.
- In order to reduce the knowledge gap of how the changing population mix will affect policing, the force has recently published a report, *Impact of Changing Demographics on Force Resources*. Information was gleaned from a number of sources, including the Office for National Statistics, National Insurance registration of overseas nationals, Dyfed-Powys custody profiles, translation costs and front-line officer perceptions. This has identified the new and emerging communities within Dyfed-Powys.
- In March 2006, the force produced a problem profile on the victimisation and exploitation of migrants and their involvement in criminality. This provided a level of understanding of the vulnerabilities of the new and emerging communities, together with their susceptibilities as crime victims and propensities to commit crime.
- Local community safety partnerships and police officers are working more closely together; there is a good two-way communication flow, and joint strategic assessments are developing.
- The force has appointed a local Polish-speaking liaison officer in one of its neighbourhood teams; this initiative will build the general intelligence picture on the largest group of migrants resident in the force area.
- It is evident that there is a wealth of activity at BCU level to develop local links with new and emerging communities, to understand those communities and their impacts in terms of the current and future crime profile. Additionally, numerous events have taken place intended to harmonise emerging and existing communities.

Work in progress

- The November 2007 strategic assessment includes a documented intelligence requirement to close the intelligence gap concerning immigration crime and economic migrants.
- The force is working with unitary authorities to map communities using relevant data, although not all partners have been as co-operative as was expected. This is currently being addressed at ACPO level, with an expectation of improvement for 2008/09.
- The force is continuing to develop local neighbourhood profiles; such profiles, regularly updated and linked to NIM processes, could serve to address a number of the current gaps.

Area(s) for improvement

- The November 2007 strategic assessment demonstrates an assessment of new and emerging communities in the section entitled *Immigration Crime and Economic Migrants*. The FSA would be enhanced with a strategic community profile; this would facilitate a better understanding of the impact and threat of organised crime on those communities.
- It is evident that various meetings and initiatives are under way at BCU level that could improve the understanding of the range of communities policed in Dyfed-Powys; however, the initiatives are not joined up with overarching strategic direction and do not link with NIM processes to ensure that the full picture can be pieced together during the FSA process.
- New and emerging communities within Dyfed-Powys are ever changing; the force would benefit from updating the problem profile completed in March 2006 in relation to migrants.

Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence and prevention, the force strategic risk register is reviewed every six months by the director of finance, who oversees the force risk committee. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan.

Strengths

- The force has not recorded any current strategic risks concerning major crime prevention.
- The risk management policy provides guidance for the identification, analysis and prioritisation of strategic risk. Additionally, it documents how the force will manage risk in a cost-effective manner, maximising service provision and upholding the force reputation.
- The director of finance chairs the strategic risk management group. The group comprises the following permanent members: head of commercial services, force risk adviser, chief superintendent (operations), detective chief superintendent (Crime Management and Reduction Department), BCU commanders and a police authority representative.
- The force has employed a strategic risk adviser to advise the strategic risk management group how to discharge its responsibilities, including maintaining a risk register and accurate records, co-ordinating risk management across the force, consulting the police authority, providing appropriate training and developing best practice.
- The force risk register documents the management of each risk, categorised as strategic, operational, people or information risk. Each risk is risk scored (calculated as impact x likelihood) and a traffic light system is included to provide oversight of the stage of management and control. Each risk has a nominated owner.

Area(s) for improvement

- The strategic risk identification and management process implemented at force level ought to be replicated at BCU/department level. Risks identified at this level should inform the force level process.
- The force has identified its seven most important IT systems in order to manage the risk of system failure, taking steps to minimise downtime and prevent loss of information. The Home Office large major enquiry system (HOLMES) is not included in the list, despite it being crucial to major and serious and organised crime investigation. The force should consider adding HOLMES to the list of crucial systems in order to contingency plan the risk of the loss of this system during a protracted enquiry into serious and organised or major crime.
- The strategic risk meeting is scheduled twice yearly but a number of meetings have been cancelled due to the absence of the chair. This meeting should be co-ordinated with other strategic meetings and chief officers should ensure that it takes place, chaired by a deputy if necessary.

- Despite the regional set-up known as Operation Tarian, there is no bespoke system for managing regional risks; instead, they are managed on an ad hoc basis through what appears to be the most suitable forum. The forces might like to consider commencing a regional risk management process, which would fit into the regular all-Wales Chief Constable and police authority meeting process.

Summary – The force is fully collaborating with some/all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Some of the operational databases are searchable from the region and other Welsh forces. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been partially implemented.

Strengths

- All four Welsh forces are working in collaboration to share information more effectively. Each force has access to each other's intelligence systems through the FIB. The RIU has access to all four intelligence systems.
- In order to overcome long-standing problems of access to other agency and partner databases, Tarian actively encourages agencies and partners to base a member of staff, with access to their relevant IT systems, in the RIU.
- The force has invested in an ANPR capability conducive to the level of threat faced. The future development of systems is to be on an all-Wales basis to enhance interoperability and to maximise the effectiveness of their use across Wales

Work in progress

- Analytical capability in respect of ANPR is being developed, with a target date of May 2008.
- The force is the lead for the Welsh intelligence-sharing project. The long-term project aim is to align all information handling using MoPI standards and secure standardisation of all policies, processes and procedures in relation to information, intelligence and data management across Wales. The vision is to synchronise the change of systems across Wales, so that they become one system servicing the intelligence management of the country and beyond.
- HOLMES version 10 is currently in use; the force is working collaboratively with Gwent and South Wales to purchase joint servers to upgrade to version 12. The expected completion date is March 2008.
- Intelligence sharing remains work in progress, as the ACPO regional lead (ACC Giles York) intends to develop live information sharing both at force level and on a cross-region basis.
- The position of the static ANPR sites and further development is an all-Wales project to ensure consistency of approach and the widest possible cover without duplication.

Area(s) for improvement

- The major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) manual states: "From the outset of the investigation, and in line with the National Intelligence

Model (NIM), there should be an ongoing process to review the accrued covert material; this should be in consultation with the covert policing cell manager, with a view to further dissemination and sanitisation. This information can then be placed in force intelligence systems in a timely manner. Recommendation 8, The Bichard Inquiry 2004.” Dyfed-Powys has not established systematic processes to ensure that this happens on all occasions.

- There is no systematic method of tracking potentially actionable intelligence from cradle to grave; consequently, managers cannot satisfy themselves that the force is maximising intelligence opportunities presented by actionable intelligence.

Summary – The force has a documented memorandum of understanding with South Wales and Gwent and an internal process to review cases that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the memorandum of understanding and internal process are efficient. (This refers to organisational learning)

Strengths

- The force does not have a dedicated major crime review team but has not had a homicide unsolved after 28 days since the murder of Peter and Gwenda Dixon in June 1989; this murder is subject to an ongoing re-investigation following cold-case review.
- In order to comply with national guidelines, Dyfed-Powys has a documented memorandum of understanding with South Wales and Gwent to provide 28-day unsolved progress reviews where necessary. This arrangement is clearly satisfactory, based on the level of demand.
- Due to numbers that are easily manageable, the force does not have a specific major crime review policy. The head of the criminal investigation department (CID) has in place a process to oversee all necessary reviews and assign them to an appropriate person to conduct on his behalf, either in force or externally through the memorandum of understanding.
- A detective superintendent represents the force on the regional major crime review practitioners meeting in order to keep abreast of regional and national developments.
- Good practice is sought through the national homicide working group and other national seminars attended by the head of the CID and deputies.
- Fatal 'fail to stop' collisions are always investigated as crimes; there is only one current case of an unsolved fatal collision, which is currently being re-investigated.
- There is no formal cold-case review policy for unsolved serious sexual assault. However, there are only three unsolved serious sexual assaults where the suspect is unknown, and all are reviewed periodically to assess whether new investigative opportunities might bear fruit, particularly advancing forensic techniques.

Work in progress

- The force is piloting an intranet-based 'organisational memory' of best practice, to assist current and future SIOs. The site contains information on national best practice together with lessons learnt.
- The force has a draft investigation of sexual offences policy, currently at the consultation stage, which documents reviews that are to be undertaken.

Area(s) for improvement

- BCU-based detective inspectors (DIs) act as SIOs in all cases of rape other than stranger rape, when an HQ-based detective chief inspector (DCI) acts as the SIO. Reviews of rape investigations are undertaken informally by line managers. There is no formal review or system to monitor the quality of review in accordance with

Recommendation 5 of HMIC's thematic inspection of rape investigation and prosecution, *Without Consent* (published in January 2007).

Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The homicide rate has remained largely stable since 1989, averaging just under three homicides per year, albeit with a current slight upward trend. Over the past 12 months, there has not been a domestic homicide (which usually account for 50% of the force homicide rate). With such low numbers, meaningful analysis is difficult.
- Major investigations are resourced on the basis of the requirements of the investigation and regularly reviewed by the FTTCG, with decisions documented in individual policy files. Due to low numbers, co-ordination of operations is not difficult.
- The ACC chairs the FTTCG. The force has developed what it terms a 'bottom up' approach, which fully engages BCU resources, particularly during the intelligence-gathering phases, to grow intelligence from ground level with the aim of identifying higher tiers of the OCGs in order to target them.
- The FTTCG holds specialist assets and teams investigating homicide to account for delivery against tasking and elements of performance.
- The force tasking and co-ordination policy provides guidance to strategic and tactical TCGs in line with ACPO guidance in NIM 2005.
- High-risk sex and dangerous offenders are a standing agenda item at the monthly FTTCG. This adds a public protection dimension to the FTTCG, enabling ACPO-level oversight and the deployment of level 2 resources to protect the public from those individuals considered to present the greatest risk.
- Effective systems are in place for hot tasking outside the FTTCG. The on-call detective superintendent authorises all decisions to deploy or otherwise and briefs the ACPO officer at the earliest relevant time. Similarly, ad hoc tasking meetings chaired by the ACPO lead are convened for spontaneous operations or to review an individual operation sanctioned out of hours.

Area(s) for improvement

- Some 21% of domestic violence crime is a repeat offence, and the force has DARAGs in place for high-risk victims; however, there is no suspect-based strategy. Repeat offenders are not reviewed for consideration at level 1 TCGs. This is a key plank of homicide prevention.
- Violent crime is a very high priority for the force in the FSA, yet, despite this, repeat and prolific violent offenders are not presented at NIM TCGs to enable consideration of appropriate suspect-based proactive tasking.

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- The FTTCG does not review force intelligence requirements or oversee specific actions to reduce the intelligence gap.
- The FTTCG does not review the force control strategy PIE action plan to hold strategic leads to account for delivery throughout the year.
- The force has nominated BCU commanders as strategic leads for control strategy priorities. The force ought to reconsider whether BCU commanders, some of whom may not possess a crime background, are best placed to undertake this role, taking into account the pressure of their BCU commander role. There is no requirement on the leads to attend the FTTCG and provide updates.
- The FTTCG ought to set documented objectives/success criteria for every sanctioned level 2 operation. This ensures that the SIO, all officers and staff involved have clearly defined, tightly focused parameters in which to work.
- The force has no process to prioritise collection against the regional intelligence requirements. The regional intelligence requirements were unknown when tested at all levels in the force.

Summary – Due to appropriate and comprehensive training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.

Strengths

- Due to the low numbers of major crime investigations, combined with the relatively homogeneous Dyfed-Powys community profile, no bespoke training has been provided to staff to raise awareness of the needs of diverse communities during an investigation.
- All officers and staff have undergone generic diversity training, with enhanced training for chief inspectors and above. The independent advisory group (IAG) was involved in the senior officer training.
- Diversity is a golden thread throughout the national SIO training course. In the event of a major crime affecting a particular ethnic or other diverse community, the force would ensure that the SIO and investigation team were fully briefed. An example of this is a rape investigation, which involved Polish migrants; the investigating team were briefed in respect of Polish culture to provide a background understanding.
- Polish migrants are by far the largest new and emerging community in Dyfed-Powys. The force has appointed a local Polish-speaking liaison officer in one of its neighbourhood teams; this initiative will build the general intelligence picture on the largest group of migrants resident in the force area and is an investment that will assist the SIO in the event of a major crime involving the Polish community.
- Partners are increasingly involved in training, examples being joint interview training with social service partners for vulnerable adults and children.
- Each BCU has provided workshops for all officers and staff, following generic diversity training tailored to the particular diverse communities within that BCU.

Work in progress

- Diversity refresher training for all police officers and staff in the form of a two-day course was being rolled out across the force at the time of inspection in November 2007 and is due for completion by April 2008.
- The force is currently profiling the life skills, talents and hobbies of its staff. Examples were provided where the force has made use of these skills – for example, three officers who can speak Polish fluently and an ex-marine who has expertise in CCTV recovery.

Prevention

Summary – The force has an IAG and key individuals who are always used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- The role of an IAG in major crime investigation is to review the investigative strategy and advise the SIO on relevant diversity issues, which may impact on or be affected by the crime itself and subsequent police action. They may in some instances act as a conduit to the community to prevent rumour and misinformation. Dyfed-Powys has an IAG and key individual networks (KINs) in place. People from each group do act as independent advisors to SIOs or to gold groups, when considered beneficial from a community or investigative perspective.
- The neighbourhood teams have established KINs; a KIN involves local community members, who together represent a broad cross-section of the community, and is used to gain public opinion, identification of tensions and problems in the community that may impact on policing. The KIN is also a conduit for local police to feed back information to the community, where appropriate.
- A protocol has been developed in Dyfed-Powys providing guidelines for the involvement of the IAG in crime investigation; this follows national guidelines.
- The BCU commander, when undertaking a joint community concern assessment with the SIO, often consults KINs.
- The Dyfed-Powys IAG additionally advises the force from a community perspective in relation to policy making.
- When IAGs are involved as advisors to an SIO, their advice is formally documented; the SIO records in the policy file actions taken, and whether or not advice is accepted or acted on.

Summary – Embryonic contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were sufficiently understood by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- In November 2006, the force was involved in Operation Oyster Catcher, an exercise involving the armed services, a number of emergency services and local authorities to test the response to a major terrorist incident in Wales. This exercise tested the force’s capacity in respect of:
 - the management of simultaneous, large complex major crime scenes;
 - the running of five simultaneous linked incidents on HOLMES;
 - the post-incident procedure following military intervention;
 - the management of a live hostage scenario;
 - hostage reception following a maritime incident; and
 - forensic issues specific to terrorism.
- Golden hour crime and critical incident training are incorporated for all student officers as part of their initial training programme and for officers on promotion training courses.
- There are clear call-out procedures for the SIO. The SIO determines the level of investigative support required at that time and the control room has access to call-out lists and the skills database.
- The force has the capability of setting up a major incident room (MIR) out of hours; this was recently tested following the murder of a young female in Pantyffynnon (Operation Georgia) when the MIR was set up on a Sunday, prior to the discovery of her body.
- The major crime investigation policy identifies types of crime that are classed as major crime.
- The majority of persons interviewed demonstrated a general awareness of golden hour principles.
- One benefit of relatively low crime numbers is that the BCU command teams are able to closely scrutinise the initial investigation of serious crime and regularly feed back through shift inspectors examples of good and poor initial investigation of crime. The rationale is that officers will learn by mistakes and pick up on areas of good practice, so that golden hour principles become engrained in the working practices of front-line officers.

Work in progress

- The force held an operations conference for bronze and silver commanders (inspector and above) with presentations on Osman warnings, golden hour principles and crimes in action. The force is looking to hold similar conferences twice yearly.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force has not considered and documented in contingency or business continuity plans how it would respond to, and minimise the impact of, the escalation of major crime beyond the resourcing supplied by neighbouring forces and Operation Tarian. Given the limited resilience in terms of major crime staffing, it ought to undertake this exercise as a matter of priority.
- Front-line officers and control room staff, other than new student officers and those attending promotion courses, have not received specific training inputs concerning golden hour principles, or good practice when attending suspected major crime scenes.
- The force has not defined 'unexplained death' or 'suspicious unexplained death', meaning that front-line officers and staff have varying perceptions of the meaning of these critical terms.
- In practice, the officer attending the scene of any death makes the decision as to whether or not there may be suspicious circumstances; no additional training has been provided to aid this decision-making, particularly covering circumstances where a body may display less obvious signs of homicide.
- In order to satisfy itself that potential homicides are not being overlooked, the force should consider the attendance of an experienced CID supervisor at all unexplained deaths. The CID supervisor should make the decision as to whether the death is suspicious and document that decision, together with the rationale.
- The major crime investigation policy contains no guidance for:
 - first responders, including steps to consider and powers to establish and maintain crime scene cordons etc;
 - officers attending unexplained deaths; or
 - uniformed supervisors.Furthermore:
 - there is no mention of 'fail to stop' fatal or near fatal road traffic collisions; and
 - the role of the BCU commander lists a range of points on which they should satisfy themselves, including the main lines of enquiry. This is inappropriate unless the BCU commander is professionalising the investigative process (PIP) level 3 trained.
- The force has no systematic means of updating front-line officers and staff on good practice or lessons learnt from force reviews or national forums on their initial actions during the golden hour of a major crime investigation, to maximise evidential potential and minimise the incidence of omissions or errors.
- Control room staff have received training inputs on critical incident identification and handling but not major crime; they have no specific aides-memoire, other electronic menus or aids.

Summary - The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.

Strengths

- The low volume of major incidents makes it difficult to undertake meaningful assessment of future demand with certainty. The force has, however, produced a problem profile containing basic analysis stretching back to 1989 in order to understand the homicide profile.
- The homicide rate has remained largely stable since 1989, at 2.8 per year, with a current slight upward trend. Over the past 12 months, there has not been a domestic homicide (which usually account for 50% of homicides in Dyfed-Powys).
- The force has adopted a preventative approach to domestic violence, with the adoption of victim-based risk assessment and management through multi-agency groups in cases of high risk.
- While the force does not have any major town centres, it has recognised the link between alcohol consumption and violence and is working with local licensees in troublesome venues to reduce alcohol-related violence.
- MAPPA nominals who are believed to present a risk of harm to the community are subject to regular proactive tasking.
- Intelligence products comply with the ACPO guidance in NIM 2005.
- Serious alcohol-related violence is recognised in the FSA as an important issue for the force to tackle, and features as a control strategy priority.
- The force monitors street violence and knife-related crime through NIM processes in order to inform the strategic assessment.

Area(s) for improvement

- The homicide prevention strategy is not supported by an action plan or other documentation to demonstrate exactly how it will achieve each broad aim set out in the strategy, or who is responsible for delivery of each strand.
- There has not been a domestic-related homicide in the past 12 months; such deaths normally account for 50% of Dyfed-Powys homicides. Domestic-related violence still accounts for a considerable proportion of the violence against the person offences and yet the FSA provides no in-depth analysis to inform strategic TCG decisions. Domestic abuse does not specifically feature in the control strategy priorities.
- Some 21% of domestic violence crime is a repeat offence but there is no overarching domestic violence strategy, including strands such as offender-based strategies.
- The force would benefit from developing a partnership intelligence strategy in respect of near-miss and precursor offences.

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- There is no method for promulgating lessons learnt which might prevent homicide. Examples include front-line officers and staff facing situations, which might be a precursor to homicide, where they are not in possession of knowledge to assist their dynamic risk assessment, for example:
 - persons with mental health issues coming to police notice involved in threats, violence or not taking medication;
 - the investigation of certain categories of harassment;
 - persons coming to notice who believe they may have dishonoured their family etc.
- Common to most UK forces, persons coming to police attention are processed for a particular incident in isolation. The homicide reduction strategy does not include the introduction of systems and processes to review persons coming to police notice holistically. This would assist the force to identify PDOs that are recorded on police systems but not recognised as such.
- The national confidential inquiry into suicide and homicide by people with mental illness reveals that over the five-year period examined, people with schizophrenia committed 5% of all homicides in England and Wales. The problem profile does not provide such figures or those with mental illness and known to the police.
- The homicide prevention strategy ought to include the development of relationships with mental health practitioners to jointly identify, assess, and manage persons with mental illness, whether known to the police or not, who have the potential to kill or cause serious harm.
- The force has identified violent crime as a very high priority in its strategic assessment, as it accounts for 24% of all crime, and has included it in the control strategy. It has not, however, produced a violent crime strategy with clear strand leads, a comprehensive menu of tactical options and delivery milestones, in order to grasp this problem firmly, since it is likely to impact on homicide prevention work.
- The violent crime control strategy PIE plan lacks breadth, particularly in relation to enforcement, long-term prevention and partnership working.

Summary – The policy covering threats to life is in draft format. Staff demonstrated reasonable understanding of the necessary steps to take. Examples of joint, regional and cross-border/multi-agency operations are evident.

Strengths

- The force regularly considers a whole range of deployments, both overt and covert, in respect of potentially dangerous people who are registered as MAPPA nominals.
- The force held an operations conference for bronze and silver commanders (inspector and above) where awareness presentations were given on Osman warnings, golden hour principles and crimes in action. It plans to hold similar conferences twice yearly.
- Although the draft threat-to-life policy has taken a number of months to progress, officers and staff at all levels are aware of the importance of immediately referring such issues to the duty bronze inspector for initial assessment and subsequent escalation of command responsibility to the on-call superintendent, in accordance with the critical incident policy. All such incidents require policy logs to be kept.
- Firearms-related offences are extremely low in Dyfed-Powys and the force does not believe that it needs a firearms suppression strategy; however, it is proactive around firearms licensing.

Work in progress

- The threat-to-life policy is in draft format; it has recently been the subject of advice from counsel and is being reviewed by the force solicitor. The force ought to consider the inclusion of developing practice from other forces to ensure that the policy is comprehensive and incorporates guidance on the following:
 - Clarification of what constitutes a 'threat to life' to provide guidance on a range of scenarios – eg, anonymous information received stating that a shooting or similar incident would occur at a named venue on a known date.
 - A threat assessment guide, combined with referral thresholds to a suitable SIO based on the level of threat to ensure greater consistency of application. For example, a threat to life scoring low might be managed by a BCU-based DI overseen by their line management, whereas a threat scoring high/very high might require management by the on-call detective superintendent overseen by ACPO.
 - A menu of tactical options which provide guidance to officers dealing with threat-to-life issues, incorporating guidance around the options, eg, situations when service of an Osman warning might act as a catalyst and lead to serious injury or loss of life.
 - Consideration of the proactive issue of Osman warnings, for example in the case of repeat domestic violence with an increasing continuum of violence.
 - Suitable means of storage, sanitisation, if appropriate, and transfer to the force intelligence system.

Area(s) for improvement

- Osman warnings are retained in hard copy with the relevant case papers. The force ought to develop a process that facilitates the recording of warnings on a searchable intelligence system to enable analysis and inform future decision makers should the same person be threatened at a later date.
- A firearms problem profile has never been completed to gain a full understanding of firearms-related crime in Dyfed-Powys, to include the range of persons involved in the criminal use of firearms, from suppliers and converters and distributors through to individuals with access to firearms. The force has no intelligence requirement to fill knowledge gaps in this area.
- Regional officers dealing with threat-to-life issues currently have to work through different policies in relation to threats to life across the three southern Welsh forces. South Wales and Dyfed-Powys are still in draft format and the forces might like to consider the adoption of a common threat-to-life policy.

Summary – The force has a witness protection liaison capability and insufficient covert resources. However, it has a collaborative agreement with South Wales to buy in services. The force operates to a policy that is promulgated to and understood by all staff. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners.

Strength

- A general awareness at all levels was demonstrated of the continuum of witness protection measures available and where to access them.
- Officers and staff interviewed demonstrated an awareness of the means-to-protect tactics; this has been strengthened by the establishment of a covert registry as the SPOC and centre of excellence in all such matters.

Work in progress

- An all-Wales group is led by an ACC to consider the provision of witness protection for Wales; a paper has been completed and is with the Welsh chiefs and chairs group for consideration. If approved, this is likely to provide a single, cost-effective and efficient service for Wales.
- The force has no witness protection policy but awaits adoption of the draft all-Wales policy produced by South Wales Police and currently circulated for consultation.

Summary - The force has a limited system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- BCUs have processes monitoring levels of volume crime; crime rates in Dyfed-Powys are low and stable and, consequently, changes in levels of signal crimes are quickly noticed.
- The force undertakes postal, telephone and face-to-face surveys to help gauge public opinion on local issues, impacts of crime in general terms and the public perception of policing.
- BCUs undertake a weekly community tension assessment, which quickly provides an indication of changes from the norm that can be further investigated.
- The Powys drugs alcohol centre provides essential information to the police on a regular basis on the impact of drug addiction trends in the Powys area.
- The force neighbourhood teams have established KINs. A KIN involves local community members, who together represent a broad cross-section of the community and are used to gain public opinion, identification of tensions and problems in the community that may impact on policing. The KIN is also a conduit for local police to feed back information to the community, where appropriate.
- The neighbourhood policing teams have a variety of means of consulting local opinion, including surgeries, partners and communities together meetings and youth group meetings.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force does not have in place indicators, which allow it to monitor the effects of preventative/enforcement activity.
- Community engagement is a crucial aspect of enabling the police service to understand the harm caused by crime in specific communities. Neighbourhood policing teams, specifically tasked, are one method the force could employ to assess and measure a baseline and changes from the baseline over time and on specific occasions. Such tasking must be linked to NIM processes in order to apply it dynamically and to ensure it informs further tactical and strategic tasking.
- Formal community impact assessments pre and post-operations will inform the results analysis as above.
- The development of partnership working, particularly around sanitised information sharing from partners such as health, would add major crime data (unreported assaults) to the overall intelligence picture to help gauge the effectiveness of activities, such as a violent crime initiative.

- Neighbourhood teams are not part of the response to level 2 crime and the force ought to consider the role that neighbourhood teams can play, and how meaningful neighbourhood profiles linked to NIM systems will enrich the intelligence picture.
- Results analysis at levels 1 and 2 is not undertaken. Continual results analysis will help the force to build a picture of tactics that appear to work best from a police perspective, those that have the greatest impact on community confidence and satisfaction, as well as those which reduce crime levels over the short to longer term.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force sometimes considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a developing security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- Vetting of staff in the police service exists to provide a safe working environment for staff and to protect members of the public and police information; it is a cornerstone of achieving an ethical, honest and corruption-free police service. Dyfed-Powys Police has employed a vetting officer.
- All officers and staff employed on serious and organised crime work are security vetted to counter-terrorist check level.
- All serious and organised crime assets are based at HQ, where physical security is of an appropriate level – eg, swipe card authority limits access.
- The force has introduced Safe Call, an independent mechanism for officers to report misconduct or wrongdoing, similar to the theory behind Crimestoppers. Safe Call is independent of the police service and therefore intended to give officers and staff confidence to report misconduct or wrongdoing anonymously.
- The service confidence policy ensures that the force is able to take positive action to protect its staff assets or members from risk. The policy comes into effect where there is insufficient evidence to discipline or prosecute an officer or member of staff, but sufficient intelligence exists no longer to have confidence in the integrity of a postholder, who may be removed to a post where the level of risk presented is minimised. The policy also covers situations where a spouse or partner has a pending criminal trial.
- An inappropriate association policy has been adopted to introduce a framework for reporting associations, which have the potential to compromise either the individual or the organisation.

Work in progress

- The security vetting manager is new in post and the force has yet to produce a vetting policy in line with the ACPO guidance, due to be published in spring 2008.
- The force aims to build a one-stop vetting shop, based on the Gloucester model, to streamline its systems and processes.
- The force security policy, currently in draft format, states the intention to monitor actively all serious and organised crime operations.

Area(s) for improvement

- Once vetted to an appropriate level, officers are not subject to review to ensure there is no change in circumstances that might affect their vetted status (although officers are

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expected to act proactively in informing the PSD of a significant change in their circumstances).

- The PSD is not involved in major crime operations or routinely made aware of force or regional target nominals, other than through sporadic attendance at the FTTCG.
- Management vetting is intended to enhance basic security vetting, as it can examine aspects such as financial vulnerability, inappropriate behaviour, personal integrity, vulnerability to improper pressure or influence and vulnerability through health or welfare conditions; it can include other issues. The force is currently not undertaking management vetting.
- Family liaison officers are not posts that are currently considered for vetting. The force might like to consider security and management vetting of a small number of family liaison officers, in order that it can be confident that it has taken every step to minimise the risk of embarrassment to the force during a high-profile investigation.
- MIRs are set up at key police premises near to the location of the incident, using offices which can house the MIR. Many of the potential MIRs are at outlying stations, not all of which are 24-hour opening. The MIR contains all original documentation, and exhibits are likely to be in the same building. A security review should be undertaken to ensure that the 24-hour security of the buildings is sufficient to prevent criminal acts intent on destroying evidence. The integrity of the MIR is paramount; when the MIR is set up, steps should be taken to limit access to the office to those requiring it. The inspection found that it was not usual for locks to be changed and therefore previous occupants of the office were still able to gain access to the MIR.
- Major crime exhibits usually remain at the station where the exhibits officer works, which may not be the most suitable location due to the evidential value of the exhibits, weighed against the conditions of storage. Consideration needs to be given to the integrity of exhibits in the early stages of an investigation and the force should explore a major crime central exhibit storage facility.

Enforcement

Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with appropriate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.

Strengths

- The Dyfed-Powys ACPO team (as at 1 April 2008) comprises an acting Chief Constable, a DCC (on secondment from Nottinghamshire) and one acting ACC. Ian Arundale will take up post as Chief Constable in June 2008.
- The then ACC was the force lead for major crime and serious and organised crime, and chaired the FTTCG. Although he is now the acting Chief Constable, he has retained leadership in this area. The FTTCG effectively holds level 2 resources to account.
- Due to the low volume of major incidents, the police authority has no specific governance arrangements covering this area of business; however, it is satisfied that it is fully briefed in terms of cost and progress.
- Due to the small number of major crime investigations, there is no performance management framework; oversight is provided by way of formal briefings and through FTTCG oversight.
- The relevant BCU commander is accountable for resources and costs connected with major crime investigation.
- The detective superintendent holds regular peer review meetings with SIOs, where lines of enquiry are reviewed and agreed. The peer review meeting is documented in the policy file, but SIO policy decisions are not countersigned by the line manager.
- The ACPO lead considers setting up gold support groups, when appropriate in all the circumstances; the force in the near past has had gold groups for the murder of Kelly Hyde (Operation Georgia) and one is currently in place for the re-investigation of the murders of Peter and Gwenda Dixon (Operation Ottawa).
- Whenever the force establishes a gold support group, independent and community membership is always considered for inclusion. On occasion, when it may not be appropriate to form a gold support group but the investigation/community would benefit from community input, this has been provided by way of direct independent advice to the SIO.
- The PAW is now established as a legal entity and early in 2008 will have employer status. PAW members will be security vetted to security cleared status. The PAW has a specific lead and oversight for major crime in Wales.

Work in progress

- Police authority members are undergoing security vetting to an appropriate level.

Area(s) for improvement

- The major crime investigation policy contains a list of 'key issues about which BCU commanders should satisfy themselves'. The majority of this list is inappropriate and contrary to the ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual*, which makes clear the role of a BCU commander. These issues ought to be the responsibility of the SIO.

Summary – The ACPO lead and the head of crime are fully trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime and these officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The acting Chief Constable, temporary head of crime and a detective chief superintendent are trained in the management of linked and series crime.
- The acting ACC is trained in the strategic management of critical incidents and the serious crime, intelligence management, information technology and resources (SCIMITAR) training.
- All DCIs and detective superintendents have attended the national SIOs course and are undergoing accreditation for PIP level 3.
- The strategic ownership of homicide clearly rests with the relevant BCU commander, who also provides many of the investigation team; this ensures local ownership and long-term community planning beyond the investigation phase.

Area(s) for improvement

- None of the ACPO team or senior CID officers have been trained in the strategic management of critical incidents (SMOCIT) or a similar nationally-accredited course. Dyfed-Powys would benefit from the senior command team undergoing such a course.

Summary - The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes, cost, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- Performance management of major crime investigation is achieved on two levels – routinely through monthly BCU performance meetings and through ACPO at the gold group meeting or other appropriate forums.
- The force is represented on the national homicide working group and regional homicide review forum and sends representatives to national conferences to glean good practice and learn lessons from elsewhere.
- There is no corporate package to cost homicide investigation, although SIOs are held to account for spending by the relevant BCU commander.
- The force has set up an SIO intranet site in order to promulgate lessons learnt and good practice across the organisation.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although major crime investigation is a low volume activity in Dyfed-Powys, it is hugely impactful on other force business, both at BCU and force level. However, without performance indicators, it is not possible to be satisfied, for example, that the outside enquiry team and the MIR are working at optimum efficiency. The force ought to consider performance measures covering the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of investigations as they progress.
- No performance management information is produced and reviewed by any forum for:
 - rape investigation;
 - the source handling unit;
 - the telecoms SPOC (throughput and delays); and
 - the hi-tech crime unit (throughput and delays).Such information would provide ACPO oversight of each stage of the investigative process and may act as an early warning indicator where there appears to be over or underperformance in a particular area, to enable an early focus of attention.
- Activity-based or similar costing of homicide investigation might afford the force the opportunity to improve processes and work smarter, reducing the considerable burden that such investigations impose on the force.
- The ACPO team is keen to expose the SIOs to shadow colleagues in a metropolitan force such as South Wales for them to gain experience. South Wales is willing to accommodate this but no SIO has yet taken up this opportunity. The force ought to make this happen in practice in order to widen the experience base of its SIOs.

Performance Management and Resilience

Summary - The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with SOCA and Tarian exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide sufficient protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- Over the past ten years, the force has, on average, recorded 2.8 homicides per year. The vast majority have been relatively straightforward and all have been solved within 28 days. It is against this backdrop that the force has to balance the well-rehearsed arguments for and against a dedicated major crime team.
- Major crime investigations are adequately staffed, using a mixture of HQ and BCU-based staff. The force has clearly not encountered any difficulties in staffing investigations at short notice or out of hours (including the setting-up of MIRs).
- Just before the inspection, a homicide occurred which the force classed as a category A incident. This is defined by the ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* as: “A homicide or other major investigation which is of grave public concern or where vulnerable members of the public are at risk, where the identity of the offender(s) is not apparent, or the investigation and the securing of evidence requires significant resource allocation”. This homicide occurred out of hours and the force was able to staff the investigation adequately, setting up the MIR on a Sunday without difficulty.
- Specialist advice and support to major crime investigation is available on a 24-hour basis, but with some inevitable delay in attending scenes, due to considerable travelling times to reach some parts of the force area.
- In the event of extraordinary demand, the force is able to rely on mutual assistance from its two southern Welsh neighbouring forces. This has worked in practice over a number of years and has recently been cemented with a memorandum of understanding signed by all three forces.
- The force crime training manager oversees training for major investigation roles and advises on succession planning.
- All SIOs are undergoing the PIP level 3 accreditation and are currently evidence gathering against the national occupational standards requirements.
- Family liaison support, welfare and co-ordination are systemised and well managed by the force.
- The force has sought to ensure that only specialist trained CPS lawyers review cases of serious sexual assault.
- The force has a service level agreement for setting up MIRWeb and CasWeb within one hour during the normal working day and two hours outside this time. It has a dedicated room in HQ with 12 terminals; there are 69 trained staff and the system is tested on a regular basis.

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- The SIO has access to tier 5 interview-trained co-ordinators through an on-call rota.
- The scientific support unit has sufficient equipment, or a plan of where to gain access to specialist equipment out of hours, to enable it to process a range of possible scene types in all weather conditions.
- In November 2006, the force was involved in Operation Oyster Catcher, an exercise involving the armed services, a number of emergency services and local authorities to test the response to a major terrorist incident in Wales. This exercise tested the force's capacity in respect of:
 - the management of simultaneous, large complex major crime scenes;
 - the running of five simultaneous linked incidents on HOLMES;
 - the post-incident procedure following military intervention;
 - the management of a live hostage scenario;
 - hostage reception following a maritime incident; and
 - forensic issues specific to terrorism.

Work in progress

- Consideration has been given to a collaborative southern Welsh forces major crime investigation team, and this remains an agenda item for future chiefs and chairs discussion.
- Scientific support in the three southern Welsh forces will be regionalised over the next two years. The scientific support manager from Gwent is leading a project that will provide a more enhanced service than that currently provided in each force, but at less cost. The regional scientific support manager will be in post by late April 2008. This project includes the amalgamation of TSUs.

Area(s) for improvement

- Even with a low volume of predictable major crimes/homicides, the force should consider further the benefits of a small, dedicated cadre of officers to form a major investigation team. Keeping specialist investigative skills honed is essential, and considerable benefit ensues from practice in working together under extreme pressure. Other small forces have found that such teams rarely have downtime.
- Intelligence support to major crime investigation can make considerable demands on FIB staff, which effectively stops level 2 proactive development and impacts on level 2 NIM analytical products. The force should consider ways of providing operational analytical support to major crime in a way that least detracts from usual business.
- The force does not have a specific unexplained death policy and, in practice, the uniformed officer assigned makes the decision as to whether a particular death is suspicious. The force ought to consider the involvement of an experienced CID supervisor in all unexplained deaths to make the decision as to whether the death is suspicious, and document that decision together with the rationale.

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- There is no overarching training strategy in respect of major crime, providing a rationale for the number of trained officers in any particular role on a BCU, although the force believes the numbers to be rightly based on current demand patterns.
- Golden hour principles and forensic awareness are taught to all new recruits and officers on promotion courses, but there has been no training input for mid-service first responders not benefiting from such training.
- The availability of trained sexual offence liaison officers (SOLOs) on a 24/7 basis is ad hoc; there may or may not be a SOLO on duty at any one time, as SOLOs are not formally on call. A more robust and sustainable procedure needs to be developed to guarantee a 24/7 capability, especially for the north and south BCUs.
- No identified member of staff is nominated as the SOLO champion, taking responsibility for co-ordinating and managing the development, deployment, workload and welfare needs of SOLOs across the force.
- The current accommodation for managing victims of serious sexual assault (in Powys) is a small room in a private residential care home for the elderly. Although not inspected by HMIC, this is widely viewed by officers as unsuitable; the force should review facilities for areas where a sexual assault referral centre is not within a reasonable distance, to ensure they are fit for purpose.

Summary - Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Some elements are delivered through developing collaborative agreements with neighbouring forces and Tarian, which are thoroughly tested. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a wide range of offences.

Strengths

- HMIC examined the provision of surveillance, source-handling units, financial and economic crime investigation, forensic and other support to the investigation of major crime and found it to be appropriate.
- A training plan ensures that sufficient officers are trained in specialist skills; numbers are based on historic requirements with built-in resilience. Because such skills are not regularly utilised in the operational environment, the force provides regular refresher training.
- The hi-tech crime unit can expedite requests; the order in which equipment is examined is based on a risk assessment completed by the SIO, which includes the risk of an offender committing further offences. The capacity of this unit appears satisfactory, based on present levels of demand.
- The force SIOs are dual trained in major crime investigation and kidnap, due to the very small number of cases requiring this expertise.
- BCUs have small proactive policing teams, with foot surveillance and CROPs capability to undertake level I investigations.
- The level 2 crime response team (major crime support team) undertakes its own case preparation and management. The low volume of major crime case papers are prepared by the relevant BCU-based case officer and team assigned.

Work in progress

- The force does not currently have a CHIS strategy to focus work proactively in line with force/BCU level priorities, although this is in development.
- Collaborative arrangements with its two southern Welsh neighbours provide Dyfed-Powys additional specialist support when the need arises. This arrangement is not documented but has always served Dyfed-Powys well. The Welsh forces are working at Chief Constable level to formalise these and other arrangements.
- Scientific support in the three southern Welsh forces will be regionalised over the next two years. The scientific support manager from Gwent is leading a project that will provide an enhanced service at less cost; the regional scientific support manager will be in post by late April 2008.

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- A new regional covert forensic manager post will be filled in spring 2008 to provide the regional forensic lead and expertise in covert operations, crimes in action and complex forensic issues such as large-scale unlawful production of Class A drugs such as methamphetamine.
- Although each of the three southern Welsh forces currently has an adequate response to the threat of kidnap and extortion, they are exploring whether Tarian ought to be the single response of the three forces, ensuring a streamlined response with enhanced expertise and equipment, providing a cost saving and impact reduction on each of the forces.

Area(s) for improvement

- ANPR development in the near future will provide the force with new analytical opportunities. Dyfed-Powys needs to consider how best to analyse the product from its existing and future ANPR in order to maximise the opportunities it presents.
- Specialists in the TSU are not often deployed on higher-level work and the force should consider ways of maintaining their technical expertise.
- Clearly, there are strengths and weaknesses to whichever way a force structures its dedicated source units. The centralised controller arrangement means that the controller cannot effectively supervise BCU-based staff and, due to the geographical landmass, spends a considerable proportion of each working week engaged in inefficient travelling time.

Summary – The force has an on-demand case review team that is always deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is in development. (Refers to impact on cases)

Strengths

- The force does not have a dedicated major crime review team but has not had a homicide unsolved after 28 days since the murder of Peter and Gwenda Dixon in June 1989; this murder is subject to an ongoing re-investigation following cold-case review.
- In order to comply with national guidelines, Dyfed-Powys has a documented memorandum of understanding with South Wales and Gwent to provide 28-day unsolved progress reviews where necessary. This arrangement is clearly satisfactory, based on the level of demand.
- Due to numbers that are easily manageable, the force does not have a specific major crime review policy. The head of the CID has in place a process to oversee all necessary reviews and assign them to an appropriate person to conduct on his behalf, either in force or externally through the memorandum of understanding.
- A detective superintendent represents the force on the regional major crime review practitioners meeting in order to keep abreast of regional and national developments.
- Good practice is sought through the national homicide working group and other national seminars attended by the head of the CID and deputies.
- Fatal 'fail to stop' collisions are always investigated as crimes; there is only one current case of an unsolved fatal collision, which is currently being re-investigated.
- There is no formal cold-case review policy for unsolved serious sexual assault. However, there are only three unsolved serious sexual assaults where the suspect is unknown, and all are reviewed periodically to assess whether new investigative opportunities might bear fruit, particularly advancing forensic techniques.

Work in progress

- The force is piloting an intranet-based 'organisational memory' of best practice, to assist current and future SIOs. The site contains information on national best practice together with lessons learnt.
- The force has a draft investigation of sexual offences policy, currently at the consultation stage, which documents reviews that are to be undertaken.

Area(s) for improvement

- BCU-based DIs act as SIOs in all cases of rape other than stranger rape, when an HQ-based DCI acts as the SIO. Line managers undertake informal reviews of rape investigations. There is no formal review or system to monitor the quality of review in accordance with Recommendation 5 of HMIC's thematic inspection of rape investigation and prosecution, *Without Consent* (published in January 2007).

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force is predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the *Murder Investigation Manual* and MIRSAP.

Strengths

- **CONTEXT:** All homicide investigations conducted by the force occurring since 1989 have been solved in 28 days. Consequently, the force has never had a homicide investigation subject to review by an independent review team. Over time, such reviews provide an indication of a force's compliance with the ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and MIRSAP. Additionally, they provide lessons learnt and good practice for SIOs to adopt.
- The HOLMES manager is a member of the HOLMES national training working group and national casualty bureau group and brings back to force new learning arising from membership.
- All SIOs are required to document HOLMES policy in a policy file.
- The HOLMES manager checks the system for compliance with MIRSAP and notifies the SIO of non-compliance.

Area(s) for improvement

- The MIRSAP manual states: "From the outset of the investigation, and in line with the National Intelligence Model (NIM), there should be an ongoing process to review the accrued covert material; this should be in consultation with the covert policing cell manager, with a view to further dissemination and sanitisation. This information can then be placed in force intelligence systems in a timely manner. Recommendation 8, The Bichard Inquiry 2004." Dyfed-Powys has not established systematic processes to ensure that this happens on all occasions.
- The major crime investigation policy contains a list of 'key issues about which BCU commanders should satisfy themselves'; the majority of this list is inappropriate and contrary to the ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual*, which makes clear the role of a BCU commander. These issues ought to be the responsibility of the SIO.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

That the force progress implementation of a threat-to-life policy and standard operating procedures at the earliest opportunity.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition

B

BCU	Basic Command Unit
BTP	British Transport Police

C

CasWeb	A web based user interface of the HOLMES 2 Casualty Bureau application enabling forces to help each other if one force is dealing with the aftermath of a major disaster.
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CID	criminal investigation department
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CROP	covert rural observation post

D

DARAG	domestic abuse risk assessment group
DC	detective constable
DCC	deputy chief constable
DCI	detective chief inspector
DI	detective inspector
DS	detective sergeant

F

FIB	force intelligence bureau
FSA	force strategic assessment

FTTCG force tactical tasking and co-ordination group

H

HMCS Her Majesty's Court Service

HMI Her Majesty's Inspector

HMIC Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HMRC Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

HOLMES Home Office large major enquiry system

HQ Headquarters

HR Human Resources

I

IAG independent advisory group

K

KIN key individual network

M

MAPPA multi-agency public protection arrangements

MIR major incident room

MIRSAP major incident room standardised administrative procedures

MIRWeb A web based user interface of the HOLMES 2 MIR application enabling forces anywhere in the UK to provide call handling and data entry facilities to assist another force.

MoPI management of police information

MSF most similar force(s)

N

NIM National Intelligence Model

NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency

NPSAT National Protective Services Analysis Tool

O

OCG	organised crime group
OSC	Office of Surveillance Commissioners
Osman	Osman v UK (1999) 1 FLR 193, where the court established that in certain circumstances the state has a positive obligation to take preventive measures to protect an individual who is at risk from the criminal activities of others

P

PAW	Police Authority for Wales
PDO	potentially dangerous offender
PIE	prevention, intelligence and enforcement
PIP	professionalising the investigative process
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
PSD	professional standards department

R

RART	regional asset recovery team
RIC	regional intelligence cell
RIG	regional intelligence group
RIU	regional intelligence unit
RSA	regional strategic assessment
RTF	regional task force
RTTCG	regional tactical tasking and co-ordination group

S

SAR	suspicious activity report
SGC	Specific Grading Criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SOLO	sexual offence liaison officer
SPI	Statutory Performance Indicator

SPOC single point of contact

T

TSU technical support unit

TTCG Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Group

U

UKIPO United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office

W

WAG Welsh Assembly Government