

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Devon & Cornwall Constabulary

Major Crime

July 2008



Devon & Cornwall Constabulary – HMIC Inspection Report

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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

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In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

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procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

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Force Overview and Context

Geographical description of Force area

Situated in the South West of the country, Devon and Cornwall Constabulary serves the counties of Devon, Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, covering approximately 4,000 square miles, including Dartmoor, Exmoor and Bodmin Moor and is the largest territorial police force in England. It covers around 550 miles of peninsula coastline, including part of the Jurassic Coast in East Devon, which has been awarded World Heritage status. Devon has 362,613 hectares of land classified as environmentally important – including areas of outstanding natural beauty, national parks and coastal protection areas. Policing an area this size presents many challenges, with the needs of both rural and urban communities at the forefront of the Force's approach to tackling crime.

The road network covers some 13,000 miles and is the second largest behind London and more than the whole of Belgium. The region is predominantly served by the M5, A303, A30 and A38 road links.

The South West has a wide range of domestic and European air services from its main airports at Exeter, Plymouth and Newquay. Both Land's End and Penzance airports offer frequent flights to the Isles of Scilly. A major sea port at Plymouth includes ferry links to Santander, Roscoff and the Channel Islands. The ferry port at Penzance provides a regular service to the Isles of Scilly.

The challenges of policing such an area are diverse and complex where one might expect to find an affluent population; there are areas of significant social deprivation, especially in the west of Cornwall, where unemployment is significant

Demographic profile of Force area

The main areas of population are Exeter, Plymouth, Torbay, and Truro. Plymouth has a population of over 241,000, plus an additional population of approximately 353,000 people who commute into the city for work and leisure. By contrast there are areas of rural sparsity and important heritage sites, such as Dartmoor, Bodmin Moor, the Isles of Scilly and the Cornish coastline.

The total population is approximately 1.6 million and the biggest in the south west with some 625,000 households. There is a minority ethnic population of approximately 18,460, representing some 1.2% of the total population. The resident population is significantly increased by the 10.9 million visitors who visit the area each year (Tourism Board, 2005). These visitors spend approx £2.4 billion per annum within the local economy.

In 2007, average house prices for Devon and Cornwall were £229,327 and £227,929 respectively, against an average of £210,578 for England. There is provision for 75,700 new houses in Devon between 1995 and 2011, according to the county's Structure Plan.

Strategic priorities

Six core strategic priorities have been identified and targeted during the financial year. These are Immediate performance uplift, Citizen focus, Neighbourhood policing, Protective services, £5.1m plus savings for 07/08 and £7.4m plus savings for 08/09, and an HR service that is fit for purpose. They take into account the requirements of new legislation, including the National Community Safety Plan, and they are mindful of public expectations, key commitments already made and budgetary constraints.

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The strategic themes look to underpin everything the force does and provide a context with which to take forward all aspects of the organisation. They reinforce a commitment to the vision, mission and values. The themes support continuous improvement in service delivery, and improved communication and engagement with local communities. The force is committed to developing and improving the internal processes, management structures and our leadership style.

Immediate performance Uplift

The stated aim is to improve performance across all aspects of the Force compared to the 2006/07 baseline assessment. The aspiration is to be a top quartile performing force. The remaining themes are key enablers for this to be achieved. Specific activity includes the corporate production of performance data and increasing staff awareness of Force performance issues.

Citizen Focus

Citizen focus is about 'making a difference' and fundamentally reviewing the way business is delivered in order to ensure a high-quality service. It includes putting the needs of the law-abiding citizen, the victims and witnesses, and the communities at the forefront of policing. Activity has focussed on improving the quality of service provision, customer service and internal performance processes, which exist to support this. Improved engagement, consultation and communication is key to increasing public confidence and providing reassurance.

Neighbourhood Policing

The fundamental aim is to meet the Government's vision of providing neighbourhood policing, which is accessible and responsive to citizens' needs by March 2008. It includes the provision of resilient neighbourhood teams – consisting of police officers, police community support officers and special constables – who will address low level crime and disorder issues and provide a dedicated team able to focus on local policing issues.

Neighbourhood Policing is about building trust and confidence in the communities served by the Force. By having dedicated local resources the Force is able to develop greater crime and community intelligence, drawing communities together to enable more serious threats to be dealt with.

Protective Services

Implementation of work to meet national standards will ensure the Force is able to fill the protective services gap and deal with modern-day policing issues such as counter-terrorism and major crime. The Force plans to review relevant departments and their requirements to ensure they are appropriately equipped to deliver against mandated standards.

£5.1m plus savings for 07/08 and £7.4m plus savings for 08/09

In order to support planned investment in neighbourhood policing and protective services, the organisation must ensure that the budget remains balanced and that there are sufficient funds to continue to deliver the core areas of policing. This will be carried out by reviewing Processes and structures will be reviewed to ensure the organisation releases capacity to work more efficiently.

An HR service that is fit for purpose

In response to the 2006/07 baseline assessment work will concentrate on achieving an improving trend for HR.

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Force Summary of Judgements

GRADE	Meets the standard
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Major Crime

Context

This element of the inspection report details Devon & Cornwall Constabulary's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those that pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

Of the offences in the major crime category, the constabulary is under threat from a significantly high level of rape (per 10,000 population) in comparison with its most similar forces (MSFs), noting peaks in the summer of 2006 and 2007.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.334	0.288	-13.77%	0.286
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.000
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.098	0.086	-12.24%	0.048
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	81.25%	71.43%	-9.82pp*	91.22%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.565	0.086	-84.78%	0.094
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	9.78%	28.57%	+18.79pp*	33.24%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.160	0.166	+3.75%	0.203
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	50.00%	44.44%	-5.56pp*	59.83%
Number of manslaughter crimes per 10,000 population	0.031	0.025	-19.35%	0.015

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% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	20.00%	150.00%	+130pp*	Not applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.074	0.098	+32.43%	0.073
% of murders detected/convicted	83.33%	62.50%	-20.83pp*	81.00%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	2.480	2.437	-1.73%	2.063
% of rapes detected/convicted	9.90%	20.65%	+10.75pp*	25.44%

*pp is percentage points.

**MSF group for Devon & Cornwall is: Avon & Somerset, Cumbria, Gloucestershire, Kent, Norfolk, North Yorkshire and Suffolk.


Major crime investigation in Devon & Cornwall Constabulary is less effective than in peer forces, with detection and conviction rates being below those of the MSF group average.

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
The National Protective Services Analysis Tool, released on 25 September 2007, revealed that Devon & Cornwall Constabulary faces a high level of demand in respect of the policing response to rape offences, which are above the average for MSF peer forces.

While the three-year trend is fairly stable following an upward movement, the constabulary remains above the MSF average.

Devon & Cornwall is bordered by one other force which also indicates raised demand for this crime type.



Rape (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total, Excl. MPS





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The National Protective Services Analysis Tool, released on 25 September 2007, revealed that Devon & Cornwall Constabulary faces a high level of demand in respect of the policing response to homicide offences, which are above the average for MSF peer forces.

While the three-year trend is downwards, following a peak in 2004/05, a recent upturn in offences means the constabulary remains above the MSF average.

Devon & Cornwall is bordered by one other force which also indicates raised demand for this crime type.

Homicides (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total, Excl. MPS



The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The constabulary has identified its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on the crime types identified.

Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and addressed.

The constabulary has invested suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return on harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and inhibit major crime.

This inspection assessment reveals that the constabulary demonstrates a maturing process in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, regional

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collaborative agreements with Avon & Somerset, Dorset, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire are recognised, albeit they are at an early stage.

Intelligence

Summary – The constabulary has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, supplying intelligence products that drive the energies of the constabulary. It has fully committed to its major crime investigations with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.

Strengths

- There is a team of dedicated analysts and researchers who provide analytical products and support to major crime investigations. Training for analysts and researchers is of a high standard. The structure appears to be effective and staff are working to capacity.
- The operational analysts and researchers prepare subject profiles, which include financial, internet and telephony research and analysis, as well as supplying operational intelligence to the senior investigating officer (SIO) through the major crime investigation team (MCIT).
- The analysts and researchers have responsibility for preparing the force tactical assessment as well as subject and problem profiles.
- The FSA is prepared by the head of performance and analysis, who draws material from open sources as well force level and basic command unit (BCU) strategic assessments.
- There is clear evidence that a wide range of internal and external data is used to inform the analytical product. The force intelligence centre (FIC) does not have the ability to have free search across partner databases at level 2, but there are members of staff from Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA), the probation service and Devon Social Services located within the FIC.
- The analysts and researchers submit and receive intelligence from the regional intelligence unit (RIU).
- A detailed quality assurance framework for analytical products has been introduced to assess the quality of products being produced by analysts, and to provide clarity as to what is required. The force lead or person commissioning the analytical product also conducts a reality check.
- The constabulary has established a confidential unit that includes analytical and research staff.

Work in progress

- None identified

Areas for improvement

- There is a need to review the analytical and research capacity in order to meet future demands for major crime. There is no analytical capability within the scientific

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support branch. However, within the FIC there is a dedicated forensic analyst who works closely with scientific support.

- There are limited performance indicators within the FIC to measure the effectiveness of National Intelligence Model (NIM) products produced by dedicated analytical resources.

Summary – The constabulary seeks intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. However, this could be improved – particularly the sharing of intelligence. This work is assessed to be in need of development. The force assessments of community impact to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.

Strengths

- The constabulary uses a wide range of open and closed sources both from within the organisation and through informal and formal arrangements with partners.
- There are agreed information sharing protocols with a large number of partners, including trading standards, HMRC and BIA. There are some 70 agreed protocols which appear to be working effectively.
- Sensitive intelligence is managed through the Charter database, which is used by other forces in the region. This allows intelligence to be submitted and then made anonymous automatically by the system. The raw data has restricted access and sanitised intelligence is made available across the constabulary where appropriate, particularly in relation to officer safety issues. It allows a secure audit trail for intelligence submissions. Intelligence is submitted electronically to the intelligence standards unit.
- The constabulary has a team of staff who provide live research for incidents reported to police, to provide intelligence and information to support tactical deployment and investigation. They also provide daily briefings for force tasking on all notable crimes or series from the previous 24-hour period. Missing persons are reviewed and they are able to escalate emerging incidents and identify linked logs and incidents. They provide out-of-hours contact for other forces contacting the FIC.
- There are a number of strategic and cross-region meetings which are attended by key Devon & Cornwall Constabulary staff.
- There are four prison intelligence officers covering prisons within Devon and Cornwall. They share appropriate intelligence with prison service intelligence officers.
- Community impact assessments (CIAs) are requested early in major crime investigations; these are completed by the local policing area commander or nominated deputy, in conjunction with level 1 analysts and the SIO.
- The force tasking processes drive the commission of analytical products, including problem profiles, target profiles, victim profiles and situational profiles where appropriate. More dynamic issues are picked up at daily tasking. Problem profiles for homicides and rapes have been completed. Through the homicide profile it was

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identified that outside of domestic violence homicides, young males in public places were at most risk.

- The RIU has drawn up an information sharing agreement, which has been signed by all forces in the region.

Work in progress

- The constabulary has identified the need for a 24-hour unit to proactively manage the response to and intelligence concerning critical incidents and major crime. This function will be provided by the live support research unit (LSR), which will work alongside the force control room.

Areas for improvement

- None identified

Summary – The FSA has sufficiently analysed trends in relation to its major crime. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be adequate. Problem profiles for homicide and rape are satisfactory, with links to force and BCU plans. There is sufficient evidence that the constabulary understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- The FSA is controlled and monitored by the professional standards and performance department and is strongly driven by the Chief Constable. Review of the FSA is on a rolling basis with formal reviews every six months.
- The FSA dated September 2007 details all the major crime types that Devon & Cornwall Constabulary is dealing with.
- The FSA and the control strategy identify operational priorities to manage the risk of identified threats or harm being realised. Environmental scanning is completed within the constabulary which considers the national and regional threat assessments.
- The force strategic intelligence requirement is looking for intelligence on the key areas identified in the FSA, including domestic violence, dangerous offenders and vulnerable victims.
- Profiles have been completed for:
 - homicide;
 - guns and gangs;
 - for cash-in-transit robberies (two profiles);
 - rural crime, particularly of a repeat nature;
 - organised deception teams, particularly around high value vehicles; and
 - trafficking of human beings.
- Problem profiles for kidnap and extortion have not been completed due to the low volume. However, subject profiles for those crimes have been completed. The homicide problem profile recognises domestic violence offences as precursors to homicide.

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- The force MAPPA processes allow intelligence to be gathered internally and externally to help inform decision making.

Work in progress

- Partners will be involved in the FSA interim review in May 2008. At BCU level police and partners have contributed to joint strategic assessments. Significant steps have been made to complete joint strategic assessments which feed into the FSA.

Areas for improvement

- There is a need for the FSA to include, for each threat, useful inferences that can assist decision making on whether to adopt or reject recommendations.
- The constabulary needs to expand its existing neighbourhood profiles to include vulnerable communities – either virtual or geographic – that cross Neighbourhood Policing team areas.
- There is limited reference to major crime within BCU plans and control strategies, which in the main concentrate upon volume crime activity. Emphasis on violent crime will impact upon murder and rape and protecting vulnerable persons.

Summary - Trend analysis and problem profiles are shared with BCUs but are rarely shared with partners. There is a full trigger plan for 'hot briefing' either when there is a significant change in the major crime threat or where the nature of the analysis demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as HMRC, BIA, the probation service and the prison service, are in place. The constabulary can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information (MoPI) compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- There is evidence of potential threats being shared in a timely manner to prevent or disrupt major crimes through MAPPA, child protection, domestic violence and Operation Pentameter arrangements. A significant change in the threat or need for fast-time response is dealt with through daily tasking at BCU and force levels, and through nominated senior officers who can task resources as appropriate. Out of hours the responsibility rests with the critical incident managers (CIMs) and on-call specialist advice.
- The constabulary has a MoPI action plan led by the assistant chief constable (ACC) Citizen Focus. It appears that the constabulary is on track to reach full MoPI compliance by 2010. Risk of non-compliance with MoPI features within the corporate risk register.
- There is sharing of information through the RIU. The constabulary has officers placed in the RIU with their own IT system, and within the FIC they have access to both Dorset and Merseyside intelligence systems.
- Within the FIC there are dedicated resources from the probation service, social services and HMRC. There are two officers embedded in the Serious Organised

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Crime Agency (SOCA), a police officer working in BIA and an analyst plus an intelligence development officer (IDO) in the RIU. This allows for dynamic intelligence sharing and access to other systems.

- The FIC has a memorandum of understanding for multi-agency intelligence sharing with HMRC, BIA, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Ministry of Defence.
- There was evidence of the use of the serious crime analysis system, kidnap and extortion, injuries, Genesis and National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) databases. The constabulary has made contact with the NPIA Crime Faculty for some specialist advice in relation to major crime. The constabulary has used the Metropolitan Police community and cultural resources unit for Operation Pavo and has used experience from other forces where they have a relevant community embedded within their area.

Work in progress

- The constabulary recognises the lack of a 24/7 intelligence management capability. Work is in progress to establish a 24/7 capability through the LSR (due to go live 2008/09).

Areas for improvement

- Some information is shared with partners, particularly in the protecting vulnerable people arena for specific cases. This was not consistent, particularly for level 2 crimes and investigations. Trend analysis and problem profiles are compiled and used internally, but these were not routinely shared with partners.
- There is a need to improve intelligence sharing with the National Health Service for violent crimes, although this is better at some unitary local authority sites.

Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.

Strengths

- The threat to the community is considered within the risk assessment for individual operations.
- Some community and vulnerable location profiling has been completed in response to specific operations, eg a specific community in Plymouth. Some work has been undertaken on behalf of Special Branch.
- The constabulary has good public protection arrangements which identify the risk posed by MAPPA offenders and potentially dangerous people. All referrals are recorded on MAPPA meeting minutes and entered onto the Violent and Sex Offenders Register (ViSOR) IT system. There is a central ViSOR unit and public protection unit (PPU) offender management teams who have responsibility for updating records and quality assurance.

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- The FSA details the constabulary's intention to protect vulnerable people by targeting offenders subject to MAPPA management, predatory and high risk sexual offenders, persistent domestic violence offenders and artifice burglars.

Work in progress

- Neighbourhood profiles have been completed as part of the Neighbourhood Policing project, and work is in progress to deliver to a corporate standard.
- The constabulary has not fully profiled vulnerable locations and communities. However, work is being completed by the head of serious and organised crime to identify this area of business.

Areas for improvement

- While some demographic profiling at neighbourhood level describes communities, these profiles need to be enhanced to identify areas of risk, vulnerability and difference to major crime issues.

RECOMMENDATION 1

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop corporate systems and processes which effectively measure and assess harm and threat to local communities.

Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence, the force strategic risk register is reviewed every three months by the risk forum and then by the chief officers group. Each BCU and department reviews its own risk registers on a quarterly basis to inform decisions for the corporate risk register. Each identified risk is linked to the relevant departmental/BCU business plan. The monitoring process is developing.

Strengths

- Each BCU and department assesses risk for inclusion within its own risk register. This is also used as a means for risks to be identified and inform the planning process. There is an escalation process for identified risks to be elevated to the corporate risk register.
- Risk management processes are run by planning and performance managers in BCUs and departments. These posts are specialist functions covering a number of business areas and operate at senior management team level. At force level there is a clear record of decision making and an audit trail of actions taken. (See 'Areas for improvement').
- The crime department risk register contains some 16 identified risks. Each risk has a specific description and category, which is then scored against performance, life and welfare, reputation/citizen focus, diversity, finance, impact and likelihood. This register then details controls currently in place, action owner and an action plan to address the appropriate element of the 4Ts of risk management – treat, tolerate, terminate or transfer. Once that course of action is determined, the register contains quarterly updates of the progress necessary to achieve that outcome.

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- There are a number of risks identified within the crime department risk register that impact upon major crime policing, eg the backlog in the force hi-tech crime unit, information sharing with partner agencies and the constabulary's capability and resilience to deliver kidnap and extortion operations. (See 'Work in progress'). Each one of these risks has an action plan and owner to address the risk using the 4Ts. There is clear connectivity between the way the constabulary manages the risk, contingency planning and BCU/department business plans, all of which help to inform the decision-making process to resource the identified risk.

Work in progress

- Within the crime department risk register dated December 2007, there is a risk identified in the constabulary's capability and resilience to deliver a successful kidnap and extortion operation and a subsequent action plan is in place to address this. The constabulary has a nominated kidnap and extortion lead (who is also the regional lead) and it has in place trained resources, bespoke accommodation and equipment for the management of these offences. However, the constabulary wants to improve and enhance its capability to respond more effectively and efficiently to all kidnap and extortion operations.

Areas for improvement

- Notwithstanding the positive comments above regarding BCU/departmental risk management, the inspection found that the drivers to ensure the risk registers and subsequent supporting actions were dependent on activity undertaken by junior members of staff within BCUs and departments. Furthermore, it was not clear how BCU activity was monitored and progress documented with a clear rationale for decision making and subsequent audit trail.

Summary - The constabulary is creating ways of collaborating with some other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Some of the operational databases are searchable from Dorset, Merseyside, the RIU and SOCA. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been fully implemented.

Strengths

- The constabulary has strong links with other law enforcement agencies, including staff from HMRC and BIA being located within the FIC. Staff from social services and probation located in the public protection unit provide links to relevant databases, eg the offender risk assessment system (OASys). Prison intelligence officers access the prison intelligence system.
- The RIU has access to the force's intelligence system and two members of staff are seconded to it. The FIC has access to the Dorset and Merseyside intelligence systems. Analysts also have access to the West Midlands FLINTS distraction burglary database. There are some 70 protocols allowing for intelligence sharing between partners.
- FIC staff have access to all force IT systems, including the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES), ViSOR and automatic number plate recognition (ANPR). The IT systems are used to aid investigations and identify trends and patterns for inclusion within various intelligence products.

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- Intelligence is collected from all sources within the constabulary, including uniform, investigative staff and specialist units. Detectives within the MCIT and the serious, organised and specialist crime branch (SOSCB) complete intelligence submissions in addition to action resulting on HOLMES.
- Every MCIT investigation into major crime is managed on HOLMES. The constabulary is currently using HOLMES Version 11C with plans to upgrade to Version 12 when the new server is in place and it is released from the supplier (planned for April 2008).
- There has been investment in both mobile and static ANPR cameras, and many examples were provided of operations where ANPR was used to good effect. It was evident from interviews of that ANPR is regularly considered as a tactic.
- The constabulary has completed an assessment of how it complies with the Bichard recommendations and has appropriate systems in place. (See 'Work in progress').
- Data Protection Act compliance is set out in policy and working practices. For major crime investigations, compliance – including record management and security – is generally monitored by the MCIT officer manager. Access to major incident rooms (MIRs) is restricted and identification is required to be worn by all members of staff and visitors. All members of staff are regularly reminded (three-monthly entry within the force weekly orders) of their personal responsibilities under the Data Protection Act and that access to material should only be "in the course of their official duties".

Work in progress

- The constabulary has set up a HOLMES account for intelligence development and sharing among all forces within the South West region for Operation Padme.
- From April 2008 the LSR will be responsible for the monitoring of ANPR reads from static and mobile sources within the constabulary.
- Operation Mercury was established to oversee the replacement of the crime information system (CIS). Intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking (IMPACT) and Bichard compliance will be built in to ensure full integration.

Areas for improvement

- The CIS does not interface with other systems such as command and control, ANPR and HOLMES, and the new National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS) custody package does not interface with other systems.
- There should be shared intelligence requirements and associated collection plans with partners to improve efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence gathering and exchange. There is a need to exploit existing protocols to gather and share information at level 2.
- The constabulary should consider setting up reciprocal arrangements with other forces within the South West region for access to each other's intelligence systems.

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(Note: this should improve following the implementation of the confidential unit in April 2008).

- It is evident that the constabulary has yet to set up a robust system for the collection, dissemination and management of community intelligence.
- There was a lack of awareness by non-specialist officers of the existence of IMPACT nominal index (INI) checks.

Summary – The constabulary has a case review policy that is always applied to major crime investigations, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidance; the policy is effective and the organisational learning is developing.

Strengths

- An independent and dedicated criminal case review team within the professional standards and performance department concentrates its activities upon major crime and critical incident review in circumstances where risk dictates. There is a formal policy for the review of such cases and tight processes within the tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) regime scrutinise the activities, strategies and operational lines of enquiry within major crime investigations.
- The major crime review policy is reviewed annually by the review team, and was last reviewed in February 2007. New policy guidelines were published in June 2007.
- There are five types of review identified and the commissioning officer for independent reviews is normally the deputy chief constable (DCC), who will then task the criminal case review unit. The head of crime or the head of branch can commission other types of review.
- The review process is seen as supportive, with the main intention to consider what is missing and develop new lines of enquiry, rather than identifying what went wrong.
- MCIT detective chief inspectors (DCIs) are closely supervised through a challenging and yet informal approach by line managers. Additionally, they peer-review their operations and report progress to the head of crime or head of department.
- Major crime investigations carried out on territorial BCUs are subject to the same review timescales, and these are reviewed by the BCU DCI.
- The constabulary submits returns to the National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) for rape. Furthermore, the constabulary has improved its performance in its data submissions to the NCPE serious crime analysis system. The constabulary has link officers within the FIC who manage the process.

Work in progress

- A new organisational learning regime driven by the DCC took effect from 1 April 2008. This will draw upon learning from other forces and will link into the current continuous improvement database.

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Areas for improvement

- The constabulary should develop a formal model for debriefing all major crime investigations and should ensure that all staff involved have an opportunity to contribute. This process could be overseen by the review team.
- There needs to be a more co-ordinated approach and system of follow-up to ensure that actions and improvements identified from the review and debriefing processes have been completed. Criminal case review recommendations are, however, managed through the continuous improvement database.

Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process functions cohesively to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The constabulary undertook a comprehensive review of their response to major crime investigations and levels of resourcing (Operation Sprimont) in 2004/05, including a review of historical, current and predicted demand. Understanding of those demands is provided through strategic and tactical assessments and informed by analytical intelligence products which have considered local, regional and national threats.
- The constabulary has robust NIM tasking and co-ordination processes at both level 1 and level 2. BCU tasking mirrors that of the crime department. There is commitment from chief officers for the process, which is evidenced by the DCC chairing both sensitive tasking and the force performance and improvement tasking group (PITG). If the DCC is not available to chair this meeting, the Chief Constable will fulfil this role.
- The constabulary operates a sensitive and non-sensitive tasking process, which begins at level 1 on BCUs, using a revised and comprehensive tactical activity document (TAD). The product from BCU tasking is then fed into the PITG, which provides a fortnightly robust process to assess current and proposed investigations.
- There is a daily tasking process which begins on BCUs and is then escalated up to a force level, and it is this and the fortnightly process that are used to manage the impact of and threat from major crime. The force daily tasking is chaired by the director of intelligence with representation from all specialist teams within the crime department.
- The PITG meeting does record the outcome of specialist policing activity and the force daily tasking provides a robust challenge to SIOs about the use and outcome of specialist policing activity. Furthermore, decisions not to resource proposed operations are documented with the rationale and often these will be returned for further intelligence development or disruption activities.
- It was clear that specialist teams are not deployed outside the daily or fortnightly tasking process. If there are dynamic resourcing requirements, approval is sought from the head of crime and the ACC (organised crime (OC)).

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- The crime department has its own separate finance and personnel functions devolved to it. In addition the constabulary has a specialist operations budget that can be used for major operations. The finance manager attends the sensitive TCG meetings and is involved in discussions at a very early stage for the resourcing of major crime investigations or critical incidents.

Work in progress

- None identified

Areas for improvement

- None identified

Summary – Due to limited training, the constabulary’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is in need of development.

Strengths

- While training for major crime and diverse community needs is not structured (see ‘Areas for improvement’), it is included within some courses.
- A group of specialist officers within the crime department have attended a bespoke Islamic awareness training course hosted by Exeter University. Two courses have been held, and there are plans for additional officers to receive this training.
- Call handlers have received input from the crime scene investigator (CSI) trainer on crime scene preservation, which they can use to advise victims of crime.

Work in progress

- None identified

Areas for improvement

- While diversity is included within some training courses, there is not a structured approach to providing awareness training of diverse community needs during major crime investigations. Few staff have received specific training and, with the exception of the Islamic awareness training (see above), no benefits have been realised. This is a developing area for Devon & Cornwall Constabulary and many other forces in England and Wales.

Prevention

Summary – The constabulary has independent advisory groups (IAGs) and these are occasionally used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

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Strengths

- The detective superintendent who is head of the major crime branch has responsibility for interacting with IAGs and the critical incident working group. There are four separate IAGs: three for race, disability, and lesbian, gay, transgender and bisexual representatives, and one for training.
- The IAGs have been established for varying periods of time. While they may be consulted for issues and risks on which they can provide advice and guidance, this consultation is ad hoc – particularly in respect of major crime investigations.
- The constabulary has established a corporate manslaughter working group; among its members are external partners who can provide advice and guidance. Evidence was provided for Operation Truck, where local authority, Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and utility suppliers were engaged in a multi-agency working group.
- At BCU level there are sound working relationships with crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) and there was some evidence of joint tasking to prevent volume and signal crimes.
- There is evidence that Devon & Cornwall Constabulary has worked together with partners such as BIA, HMRC and SOCA in order to tackle and disrupt major and serious and organised crime.
- There are good working relationships and sound working processes with drug and alcohol action teams and MAPPA partners and within both areas of activity there is significant multi-agency preventative activity.
- Key individual networks (KINs) and Police and Communities Together (PACT) groups have been established in all Neighbourhood Policing teams and their identified members can be consulted about crimes and incidents in their locality.

Work in progress

- None identified

Areas for improvement

- The constabulary should consult IAGs about CIAs on a more routine basis and, furthermore, should consider gold groups in major crime investigations. It was evident that when gold groups were established they were police-centric and lacked independent representation. It is recognised that the constabulary considers IAG representation when sensitive issues are discussed (reasons not to include are documented).

RECOMMENDATION 2

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should review how it can more effectively use its IAGs. This review should ensure vulnerable groups are represented, that IAGs are routinely consulted during major crime investigations and where appropriate consideration be given to members participating in gold groups.

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- The IAGs' membership is not drawn from all representative groups from within the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary area and while they can provide advice and guidance, they are not always representing their communities or groups.
- While there are terms of reference for the lesbian, gay, transgender and bisexual IAG, these need refreshing. The terms of reference for all the IAGs and the critical incident working group should be reviewed and promulgated to interested parties.
- Partnership agreements need to be reviewed on a regular basis.

Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that 'golden hour' principles were understood by most call-management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- The constabulary operates a gold, silver and bronze arrangement for the command of incidents. While there is no written procedure, there are adequate out-of-hours on-call systems – both formal and informal – for the contact and deployment of specialist staff.
- Resources from the crime department provide weekend coverage, and this enables support to be provided to BCUs and an effective response provided to major crime investigations.
- On each BCU, 24/7 duty officer cover is provided by a trained CIM. Furthermore, there is an on-call superintendent for Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) issues.
- Within the HQ crime department there are formal on-call arrangements for SIOs and CSIs. There are less formal arrangements for all other specialisms and roles.
- There is a tiered approach to crime scene management through CSIs and crime scene managers (CSMs) who manage all aspects of forensic retrieval at crime scenes.
- There is some limited information on Pirates (an IT based briefing system) that provides advice and guidance to officers and staff eg sudden and unexplained deaths and Operation Omega for the response to suspected homicides.
- Control room staff have been trained to manage out-of-hours source and covert intelligence. They create an incident log which is referred to CIMs.
- Force control room inspectors are trained and have the delegated authority to authorise armed response vehicles to arm when being deployed to crimes and incidents.
- There is a dedicated forensic trainer who has provided training to operational staff in scene preservation in order to maximise 'golden hour' opportunities.

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- It is evident from group interviews that there is a clear understanding of 'golden hour' issues and actions required to be taken at crime scenes (eg Operation Omega).
- Guidelines on major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) are followed and a capability assessment for compliance has been undertaken.
- A new missing persons' management system is in place to reduce the risk of a missing person investigation not being managed appropriately. This has included training, an IT database and improved partnership working.

Work in progress

- None identified

Areas for improvement

- There is a need for all CIMs to receive specific training.
- The constabulary has experienced significant difficulties with the external provider of forensic medical services. Examples were brought to the notice of the inspection team.
- There is a need to introduce a system of drop down menus for call handlers and aides-mémoire for first responders. While some information was available to staff, it was not always current or accessible.

Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending were found to be analysed adequately.

Strengths

- There is analysis of the current and future demand of major crime types and precursors to these offences. The constabulary has a good understanding of the threats arising from risks identified in the FSA.
- Key word searches to identify precursor crimes and detailed analytical work is completed by FIC analysts. This provides a clear understanding of the risks posed by domestic violence, knife-related criminality, violence against children, stranger attacks on lone females, violence involving multiple offenders, and male-on-male street violence. The FIC provides analytical capability to identify signal crimes such as theft of underwear. Modus operandi of this nature are flagged up to the public protection unit for more detailed research and investigation.
- Prevention strategies for victims, vulnerable people and locations are implemented.
- The information and intelligence sharing with partners regarding MAPPA offender issues is good. MAPPA offenders are managed centrally and the constabulary has established MAPPA processes to reduce the risk posed by dangerous offenders.
- A preventative approach to domestic violence has been adopted and the constabulary uses the Cardiff risk model. Independent domestic violence advisors are in place across the force area and they work in partnership with domestic

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violence officers to support high risk victims identified through the multi-agency risk assessment conference process.

- The prison liaison officers are feeding into the intelligence system information and intelligence regarding prisoners who are due to be released. This information is assessed by the FIC focus desks in order to identify risks of reoffending.
- CIAs are used to engage with communities in order to prevent crimes and reduce community tension, eg Operation Zeneca.

Work in progress

- BCUs are establishing dedicated PPUs. These units include officers and staff providing support and investigations for domestic abuse, public protection (registered sex offenders and MAPPA offenders), child abuse, vulnerable adults and hate crime. These units are supported by the central PPU.
- The Plymouth BCU is introducing scoping CIAs for Neighbourhood Policing issues. This will ensure assessment of risk for signal and precursor crimes occurring within local communities.
- In 2008/09 the constabulary is looking to introduce the Thames Valley domestic abuse risk model (SPECSS+) which will enhance risk assessment processes.

Areas for improvement

- Some neighbourhood demographic profiling has been completed. However, these profiles need to be developed to identify areas of risk, vulnerability and difference to impact on major crime issues.

Summary - The policy covering threat to life is fully accessible to staff and is partially understood and fully implemented. Examples of joint, regional, cross-border and multi-agency operations are evident.

Strengths

- The constabulary has a detailed threat to human life policy, which is accessible to all staff via the force intranet Expert system. It includes an easy-to-follow flowchart and a menu of tactical options. The policy is owned by the head of crime. It is reviewed on an annual basis and was last reviewed in August 2007.
- The constabulary has considered, as part of its strategic assessments, kidnaps and firearms related offences. Owing to the low number of reported crimes a suppression strategy has not been drawn up. However, these crimes are constantly monitored as part of the daily and fortnightly tasking process and should an escalation occur appropriate strategies will be drawn up. These crimes are also considered within the homicide prevention strategy.
- During the fieldwork phase of the inspection, awareness of the policy including the use of the Osman warning was understood by many of the interviewees but knowledge was not comprehensive.
- Authorisation for the use of Osman warnings is required from nominated detective superintendents, which provides consistent risk assessment, decision

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making and subsequent action. They have raised awareness through presentations to force SIOs.

- Where there is threat to life, prevention tactics such as arrest of the subject or potential victim and overt disruption are considered and used. These are generally considered before the use of Osman warnings. The rationale behind the decision made and options discounted will be recorded as a policy decision either on the CIS log or within the SIO's policy book.
- Evidence was provided during the fieldwork phase of the use of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) as a preventative tactic. One of the elements of the ASBO was to prevent individuals from entering the force area.
- Reverse Osman warnings are considered and used as appropriate. An example of this tactic was provided to the inspection officers.
- The constabulary has a cadre of eight duty SIOs who provide a 24/7 call-out rota, although in the first instance the BCU duty CIM provides that first point of contact for advice and guidance.
- There is clear evidence of joint, regional, cross-border and multi-agency operations being run to disrupt major crime. Examples are Operation Pentameter, Operation Fabula, Operation Padme and Operation Montana.

Work in progress

- A new system has been introduced to capture Osman warnings, in recognition of the fact that previously monitoring and management of these was poor.

Areas for improvement

- There is a need to establish a mechanism to monitor those individuals who have been subject to threats to life and have subsequently left the force area.

Summary – The constabulary has a witness protection capability that is supported by dedicated covert resources. The constabulary operates a policy that is promulgated to and understood by dedicated staff and is understood to a limited extent by other staff. The constabulary is collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- The constabulary has a good understanding of the need for and mechanisms by which tactics, covert resources and witnesses can be protected and, where appropriate, offered anonymity.
- There is a dedicated witness protection unit.
- There is a witness protection policy that is accessible to officers via the intranet. During group interviews officers showed limited understanding of the need to protect witnesses and where they would go for advice and guidance. (See 'Areas for improvement').

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- There is a formal referral process for witnesses resident in the force area who require entering into the witness protection programme.
- A new regional witness protection detective sergeants group has been started, with meetings allowing specialist staff to discuss current issues and develop collaborative working arrangements.

Work in progress

- A review is currently under way to update the management of witness protection records to ensure that accurate and up-to-date information is available on the standalone IT system.

Areas for improvement

- While there was good understanding of witness protection at level 2, further work should be undertaken with officers and staff at level 1. A marketing programme to raise awareness of specialist and BCU staff is being developed by the witness protection team and this started being delivered in Spring 2008.
- There is a need to develop a menu of tactical options to provide guidance to officers looking to protect victims and witnesses who may fall outside the remit of the witness protection unit. This has been identified by the constabulary and detailed in the crime department annual plan.

Summary – The constabulary has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The constabulary has a dedicated results analyst who can monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. At the start of some operations, the results analyst agrees with the SIO what the results indicators and outcome measures will be. The analyst uses open and closed sources to identify the impact of operational activity on communities. These sources include community intelligence from PACT groups, KINs and Neighbourhood Policing teams, as well as specific intelligence from partners and covert human intelligence sources (CHISs). (See 'Areas for improvement').
- Under the Neighbourhood Policing project the constabulary has developed a work package that delivers community intelligence training to neighbourhood beat managers and police community support officers. (See 'Areas for improvement').
- Major crime enquiries utilise their intelligence cells in order to scope local intelligence requirements, which are then fed back to BCUs.
- There was limited evidence to show that the constabulary collects information from KINs, PACT groups and Neighbourhood Policing teams.
- There is evidence to show that Neighbourhood Policing team officers attend major crime briefings and debriefings to discuss community tensions.

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- Thorough decision making is undertaken to determine which operations are subject to results analysis, ensuring that this resource is used to best effect.

Work in progress

- As mentioned elsewhere in this report, Plymouth BCU has commenced a process utilising CIA tools to assess and measure the harm and threat to local communities during the planning stage or instigation of an operation.

Areas for improvement

- While it is acknowledged that having a dedicated results analyst is a strength, there is a capacity issue in that only 40% of major crime and serious and organised crime investigations can be fully analysed for success against the operation objectives.
- The constabulary needs to develop a corporate system and process that effectively measure and assess harm and threat to local communities.
- With limited exceptions, BCU intelligence requirements do not consider major crime and serious and organised criminality and this should be seen as a significant gap in the constabulary's approach to tackling these crime types.
- It is evident that the constabulary has yet to set up a robust system for the collection, dissemination and management of community intelligence.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the constabulary sometimes considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a comprehensive security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- HMIC examined the professional standards and performance department and the security policies applied to major crime investigations and staff employed on those operations. In general these policies and practices were applied and appeared effective.

Work in progress

- None identified

Areas for improvement

- Two areas for improvement were identified and have been shared with the constabulary.

Enforcement

Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are effective, although the police authority involvement is limited. Independent

advisory groups and community representatives are rarely used as members of gold command groups.

Strengths

- There is a dedicated ACPO lead for major crime investigations. The current ACC (OC), while holding the rank on a temporary basis, is an experienced SIO who takes a very active approach to the oversight of the investigation of serious and organised crime. (See 'Areas for improvement').
- The ACC (OC) does review the policy books for more serious homicides and stranger rape investigations. There is evidence of him challenging the policy decision drafting and the actual decisions made.
- The DCC chairs the force PITG, which is attended by all ACPO officers, BCU commanders and departmental heads. Robust accountability mechanisms exist for holding BCU and department commanders to account at the PITG meeting, which links performance management and the NIM process at a strategic and tactical level.
- The constabulary receives good support from the Devon and Cornwall Police Authority (DCPA). Evidence of this was that following the Meeting the Challenge project to enhance the capacity and capability of major crime and serious and organised crime resources in the constabulary, the police authority provided additional funding to increase level 2 resources.
- Engagement of the police authority members is at chief officer level, through regular meetings between the DCC, the chair of the DCPA and the DCPA chief executive to discuss force issues and performance, but there are no specific agenda items for major crime. (See 'Areas for improvement'.) Major crime investigations, eg Operation Truck, can be raised at any time with the chair or deputy by an ACPO officer.
- All police authority members have had the basic level of vetting, with the police authority chair, deputy chair and chief executive being vetted to security clearance level. Police authority vetting is completed by the constabulary on behalf of the police authority.

Work in progress

- None identified

Areas for improvement

- The DCPA is undergoing fundamental changes to its structure, moving away from link members to commissioning teams of police authority members to look at specific areas when the need arises. There are no dedicated lead members for major crime and there is a need to engage with the police authority to raise awareness of the impact of major crime in the force area.
- There was evidence of gold support groups being held. However, with the exception of Operation Truck and the Plymouth gas explosion, these did not have community representation.

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Summary – The ACPO lead and the head of the crime department are not yet trained in the management of linked and series crime. They are supported by other senior members of the constabulary who have undergone that training. Additionally, they are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, CIAs and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The ACC (OC) and head of the crime department have not been trained in the management of linked and series crime (the head of the crime department has a date allocated for his training). However, both officers are very experienced and have demonstrated their capability in the management of those crimes. Other senior managers have undergone this training and are able to provide support when required. (Note: Since the inspection the head of crime has received the MLSC training).
- The constabulary has not had cause to appoint an officer in overall command (OIOC), but plans have been made should the requirement arise. Operation Izzard, a current joint investigation with the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), has seen the PSNI appoint an OIOC, with the head of crime for Devon & Cornwall Constabulary taking the deputy OIOC role.
- The officers from the force diversity team can provide a link to an SIO to put them in contact with a member representing the relevant area of responsibility (eg Operation Jigsaw and Operation Barra). Diversity officers can be used as critical incident advisors. Officers provided assistance to Operation Pentameter in the following ways:
 - pre-event: helping with the CIA and with identification of communities and victims;
 - during the operation: working as a tactical advisor in person or contactable by telephone;
 - post-event: linking in with the community and providing advice and guidance for the media strategy.

Work in progress

- The planned introduction of the 24/7 LSR will identify critical incidents or potential critical incidents, and will co-ordinate a live time intelligence-led response. They will have access to force databases and, as a result, will have better capability to identify linked crimes.
- The recently established critical incident working group, made up of volunteers including representatives from the IAGs, will provide advice and guidance to SIOs managing major crime investigations.
- The police authority has appointed a new ACC (OC), who takes up appointment in June 2008. This officer is a detective chief superintendent from another force who is trained in linked and series crime.

Areas for improvement

- The constabulary should provide training for officers required to complete CIAs.

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- While CIAs are subject to regular review, the constabulary should ensure that every time one is completed it is forwarded to the most appropriate IAG for information.

Summary – The constabulary’s performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored to a limited extent, through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes, cost, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- There are effective NIM tasking processes and management of major crime investigations.
- As detailed earlier in this report, there is a dedicated criminal case review team and a review policy.
- Every live major crime enquiry is reviewed after seven days by the SIO. This can be with the assistance of other peer SIOs. There is formal policy and a rigorous process to review each live enquiry after 28 days. This review looks at lines of enquiry and staffing, and scopes future actions. The findings of each review are fully documented within the policy file. Bids for additional resources and finance can be made to the head of crime.
- The SIO will stipulate operational objectives, suggested tactics, timescales and anticipated results. A budget allocation will be made: this includes costs such as overtime, expenses, hire vehicles and hotels. This budget is monitored by the SIO, assisted by the crime department finance manager, who robustly records and monitors spend against profile.
- Evidence was not provided of external reviews of major crime investigations. However, if an external review was required then it would be the subject of a bid for review at the regional TCG.
- The constabulary consistently seeks national good practice, through attendance at training events, seminars and national working groups at all levels. Practitioners’ seminars, both within the constabulary and regionally, are well attended.
- Evidence was provided to demonstrate that the constabulary has learned from past events and major crime investigations, eg M.S. Napoli and Operation Sprimont.
- Within the headquarters PPU a DS and DC have responsibility for all multi-agency Part 8 case reviews, the serious case review process with partner agencies for domestic violence homicides and serious incidents, and adult protection reviews.

Work in progress

- The constabulary is developing its process to review an operation’s effectiveness and efficiency. For example, the review of Operation Gometra – which ran for approximately 12 months – was commissioned by the DCC and identified new areas of enquiry and investigation.
- Some post-operational review of major crime investigations is completed, but there was limited evidence that the desired outcomes are measured against cost, inputs or

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outputs. Once the constabulary fully understands the efficiency of its tactics it will be more able to make decisions about the use of these tactics against its identified operational goals in the future.

Areas for improvement

- Individual SIOs have evidenced focus upon cost efficiencies within their enquiries, but no formalised true cost-benefit assessment is undertaken for each operation.
- Some limited use is made of activity based costing and activity analysis but this is viewed by the inspection team as ineffective and incomplete.

Performance management and resilience

Summary – The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands. In addition, collaborative agreements with SOCA and other forces in the South West region exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Constabulary procedures to manage human resources provide sufficient protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- Devon & Cornwall Constabulary has a major crime branch that has sufficient dedicated resource and leadership. Furthermore, there is a major incident support team (MIST) that manages the MIRs co-located with the MCITs.
- The MCIT structure provides resilience, gives clear lines of leadership, reduces travelling time, covers weekend working and provides the constabulary with more efficient and consistent major crime investigation capability.
- In recent months there has been a significant increase in the number of major crime investigations. This demand has been catered for within existing resources enhanced by strong management and processes, eg daily and bi-weekly TCGs, where resourcing of crimes is discussed.
- Additional resource had been sourced through a police personnel agency to undertake specific roles within the MCIT. This ensured that there was no impact on BCU resourcing.
- There is in place an investigative policy that caters for level 1 and level 2 criminality at BCU and force level. Protocols can be accessed through the Expert intranet site.
- There is a dedicated investigative training capability with the learning and development unit. The training user group determines the constabulary's training needs, including the needs of crime department personnel. Crime and specialist training is adequate.
- Within the major crime department there are sufficient interview-trained officers.

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- Each post has a detailed role and skills profile. Every department, including major crime, maintains an electronic record of an individual's skills and training.
- Within the public protection arena the constabulary undertakes training with other agencies for child abuse and adult protection investigations at all levels.
- Devon & Cornwall Constabulary is the only force to employ a dedicated pathologist.
- Trigger plans exist and are used by control room staff, eg in the case of Operation Omega.
- Each BCU and department has a dedicated logistics officer who arranges resourcing and co-ordination of incidents and operations for both slow and fast-time incidents.
- When capacity allows, detectives within the crime department will assist BCUs in the investigation and detection of volume crime (Operation Limburger).
- The constabulary has adequate systems and processes in place to ensure appropriate response to unexplained deaths in communities and institutions. The constabulary has a close working relationship with the HSE and was able to provide joint investigation evidence.
- During the inspection fieldwork phase, interviewees were clear about their roles and responsibilities when responding to reported incidents of this nature.
- The ACC (OC) has introduced a three-day continuous professional development training programme for all inspectors and chief inspectors.
- While formal protocols for regional collaboration in times of exceptional demand are not recorded in writing, such arrangements do exist and can be accessed through the regional tasking process or more dynamically through direct contact with the respective heads of crime. Evidence was provided showing how South West regional assets had been used in major crime and serious and organised crime operations.
- The head of crime is the regional lead for serious and organised crime and he has instigated an assessment of regional specialist assets which will inform collaborative working arrangements.
- There is no standing regional team to meet threats identified in regional/national intelligence assessments. A process has been agreed that any requirement of this nature would be directed through the regional tasking process.

Work in progress

- The constabulary is undertaking significant professionalising the investigative process (PIP) training for all crime department detectives. Four SIOs have been trained to PIP level 3 and others are completing the programme.
- A workforce modernisation programme is being delivered across the force area and suitable posts have been identified for civilianisation, allowing officers to return to front-line policing. Some posts already have police staff undertaking functions previously carried out by police officers, eg surveillance operatives.

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Areas for improvement

- There should be a more formalised succession planning process to identify suitable individuals for future senior posts. While the constabulary has recognised that there is a risk for succession planning of detective inspectors, it is not documented within the crime department risk register. There is need for this to be placed upon the risk register and included with the crime department business plan with clear objectives and timescales.
- Kidnap and extortion response awareness training is being delivered to control room and force enquiry centre staff. However, there still appeared to be some vulnerability if an incident was reported direct to a BCU, and further training should be delivered.
- There is a need to introduce a process to monitor unexplained and sudden deaths so as to allow the early identification of patterns and links.

RECOMMENDATION 3

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should introduce a process to monitor unexplained and sudden deaths which will allow the early identification of patterns and links.

- There was a lack of clarity among uniform staff as to what amounts to a critical incident.
- There is a need for refresher training for constables and sergeants to standardise approach and understand roles and responsibilities when responding to critical incidents and major crimes.

RECOMMENDATION 4

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should review the level and coverage of training given to operational staff in order that they fully understand their roles and responsibilities when responding to critical incidents. Furthermore, guidance should be issued to call-handling and front-line staff in order that they can refer to operational procedures.

Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be effective. There are verbal collaborative agreements for the provision of specialist and covert resources which proved effective when implemented. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a wide range of offences.

Strengths

- The Meeting the Challenge project was the constabulary's response to Closing the Gap. Management and operational capabilities within the crime department have been enhanced and modified in order to improve efficiency, decision making and operational effectiveness. Clear evidence was provided demonstrating the use of specialist and covert assets, and these resources are seen as an integral part of force business.

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- There are adequate out of hours on-call systems, both formal and informal, for the contact and deployment of specialist staff. These arrangements are constantly tested in real-life events. Access to specialist resources is dynamic, timely and reliable.
- The constabulary has a dedicated surveillance team that is used to target level 1 and level 2 offenders. They have foot, mobile, CROPS and technical capability. All officers are vetted to the appropriate level. Training for surveillance operatives is completed in force. Trained officers, when attached to BCUs, retain their accreditation if they attend half-yearly training sessions.
- There is a dedicated source handling unit that controls all CHIS across the constabulary at levels 1 and 2. There is a dedicated source unit (DSU) team geographically co-located with each BCU. The process used for the collection of CHIS intelligence, targeting and subsequent actions are very tightly monitored through IT based NIM systems. Covert operations do consider the use of CHIS. However, the constabulary tends to use undercover officers and there are numerous examples of such operations, especially test purchase. The constabulary has a wide number of agreements with other forces for the use of test purchase operatives.
- Financial and economic crime investigation falls within the remit of the economic crime unit. There is a dedicated team that investigates level 2 offenders and offences, and financial investigators located on BCUs who have responsibility for dealing with level 1 crimes and suspect activity reports.
- There is sufficient in-force investigative and forensic technical capability for the investigation of major crimes.
- There are sufficient trained family liaison officers (FLOs) across the force area. There is an FLO co-ordinator who sits on the MCIT.
- Search teams and police search advisors are sourced through the operations department. These teams are well resourced and well trained.
- Within the MCIT there is a dedicated major incident support team. This has four major incident rooms and three satellite offices, and provides sufficient HOLMES and back office support to major crime investigations.
- The constabulary has a nominated kidnap and extortion lead (who is also the regional lead) and it has in place trained resources, bespoke accommodation and equipment for the management of these offences. However, the constabulary wants to improve and enhance its capability to respond more effectively and efficiently to all kidnap and extortion operations.
- The constabulary is a member of the South West Collaboration Programme, which has received demonstrator site status and funding from the Home Office to meet protective service targets for high risk areas by 2009. The programme identifies nine discrete projects within protective services. These include telephony SPOC, witness protection, confidential units, covert operations, kidnap and extortion, hi-tech crime and forensic telephony, technical support units, CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) and ANPR. There are further projects covering back office and support functions. Devon & Cornwall Constabulary is leading telephony SPOC, confidential units (with Avon & Somerset) and kidnap and extortion.

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Work in progress

- The constabulary is a member of a group of 12 forces from the West of England and Wales who have formed a collaborative alliance to source forensic services at a more economic rate.
- At the time of the inspection fieldwork the constabulary was in the process of appointing a new head of the scientific support branch. On appointment, the successful candidate will have good support from the two experienced managers who have jointly been carrying out that role.

Areas for improvement

- While the constabulary has a dedicated hi-tech crime unit, it is evident that it has inadequate processes and protocols to manage the volume of forensic examination of computer hard drives and mobile phones.
- During the fieldwork it became evident that the ability of the scientific support branch to effectively process video capture images was being limited by the low number of staff dedicated to this function.

Summary – The constabulary has a full-time, dedicated and independent criminal case review team that is always deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is effective and efficient.

Strengths

- As detailed earlier in this report there is a dedicated criminal case review team within the professional standards and performance department. This team undertakes formalised scheduled reviews, although the majority of work that it undertakes is current rather than historic unsolved cases.
- Unsolved homicide cases are re-examined at least every two years. The review team takes ownership of the re-examination, but to develop MCIT SIOs they are given the responsibility of leading the review. There are six unsolved cases and these are having forensic analysis carried out on a regular basis as new forensic technology is introduced.
- Cold case reviews are commissioned by the DCC. Terms of reference bespoke to the specific case are drafted and agreed between the DCC and the review team.
- Road deaths are reviewed by staff within the roads policing unit (RPU). The MCIT has assisted the RPU with criminal investigations and the criminal case review team has undertaken a review of a fail-to-stop road traffic collision (Operation Hyssop).
- While Devon & Cornwall Constabulary has not recently undertaken a review of a category A+ homicide, processes are in place for this to be completed and to request the assistance of another force should circumstances dictate. External review would be commissioned by the DCC.

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- The constabulary demonstrated compliance with MIRSAP. Furthermore, evidence was provided of a 14-day self-assessment review process that MIST detective sergeants undertake and which is then used to inform the 28-day major crime review.

Work in progress

- None identified

Areas for improvement

- None identified

Summary – The inspection found that the constabulary was fully compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the murder investigation manual and MIRSAP.

Strengths

- The ACPO murder investigation manual is widely available in paper form and on the Intranet.
- MIRSAP is widely understood and implemented across the MIRs. The constabulary has demonstrated its flexible application of MIRSAP through the staffing of critical MIR posts, eg the combination of exhibit and disclosure officer. There are sufficient trained staff within the MIST. The structure of four MIRs aligned to the MCITs gives flexibility, with all members of staff being HOLMES trained.
- Policy files are completed for every major crime, and where HOLMES is used, policy files are recorded within it. If HOLMES is not used, a paper policy file is completed.
- Decisions not to pursue lines of enquiry and the rationale for these decisions are fully documented within the policy files. Where the tasking and co-ordination process directs lines of enquiry, policy logs are updated and limited rationale is included within the TCG minutes.
- Gold policy logs are recorded on HOLMES. Sensitive decision making is initially recorded on paper files and will be added to HOLMES at the close of an enquiry if appropriate.

Work in progress

- A project is being scoped to form one or more virtual MIRs that will use advances in information and technology, eg to scan documents and allow MIRs to be set up or shared through the networking of HOLMES databases. This would improve effectiveness and efficiency within the MIST.

Areas for improvement

- None identified

Recommendations

Major Crime

Recommendation 1

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop corporate systems and processes which effectively measure and assess harm and threat to local communities.

Recommendation 2

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should review how it can more effectively use its IAGs. This review should ensure vulnerable groups are represented, that IAGs are routinely consulted during major crime investigations and where appropriate consideration be given to members participating in gold groups.

Recommendation 3

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should introduce a process to monitor unexplained and sudden deaths which will allow the early identification of patterns and links.

Recommendation 4

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should review the level and coverage of training given to operational staff in order that they fully understand their roles and responsibilities when responding to critical incidents. Furthermore, guidance should be issued to call-handling and front-line staff in order that they can refer to operational procedures.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACC (OC)	assistant chief constable (organised crime)
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition
APA	Association of Police Authorities
ASBO	Anti-Social Behaviour Order

B

BCU	basic command unit
BIA	Border and Immigration Agency

C

CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CIM	critical incident manager
CIS	crime information system
CSI	crime scene investigator
CROPS	covert rural observation post trained officer

D

DC	detective constable
DCC	deputy chief constable
DCI	detective chief inspector
DCPA	Devon and Cornwall Police Authority
DS	detective sergeant
DSU	dedicated source unit

F

FIC	force intelligence centre
FLO	family liaison officer
FSA	force strategic assessment

H

HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HSE	Health and Safety Executive

I

IAG	independent advisory group
IMPACT	intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking

K

KIN	key individual network
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L

LSR	live support research unit
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M

MAPPA	multi-agency public protection arrangements
MAST	mobile armed surveillance tactics
MCIT	major crime investigation team
MIR	major incident room
MIRSAP	major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MIST	major incident support team
MoPI	management of police information

MSF most similar force(s)

N

NCPE National Centre for Policing Excellence

NIM National Intelligence Model

NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency

NPSAT National Protective Services Analysis Tool

NSPIS National Strategy for Police Information Systems

O

OASys offender risk assessment system

OCG organised crime group

OIA operational intelligence assessment

P

PACE Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

PACT Police and Communities Together

PIP professionalising the investigative process

PITG performance and improvement tasking group

POCA Proceeds of Crime Act 2002

PPU public protection unit

R

RIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

RIU regional intelligence unit

RTCG regional tasking and co-ordination group

S

S&OC serious and organised crime

SGC specific grading criteria

SIO senior investigating officer
SOCA Serious Organised Crime Agency
SOCIT serious and organised crime investigation team
SOSCB serious, organised and specialist crime branch
SPOC single point of contact

T

TAD tactical activity document
TCG tasking and co-ordination group

V

ViSOR Violent and Sex Offenders Register