


Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

City of London Police Major Crime

July 2008



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Contents

Introduction to HMIC Inspections

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09
Programmed Frameworks
Major Crime
Future Programmed Inspections
The Grading Process
Developing Practice
Force Overview and Context

Findings

Major Crime

Recommendations

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

July 2008

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical description of force area

The City of London Police (CoLP) is the Home Office force responsible for the City of London, policing the 'square mile' – the financial and commercial heart of Britain and the world's leading financial and business centre. The force is also responsible for policing the City's bridges, including Blackfriars, Millennium, Southwark, London and Tower. The City comprises a geographical area of 290 hectares or 1.22 square miles. Its boundaries extend to the River Thames and the London Boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Hackney, Islington,

Camden and the City of Westminster. Geographically, the CoLP is the smallest territorial police force in the UK.

The City of London Corporation is, uniquely, both the local authority and the police authority for the square mile and the local authority boundary is coterminous with that of the force. The majority of the City of London's police authority responsibilities are delegated to its police committee, whose members include residents, people working in the City and lay justices. Police committee members are drawn from those elected to represent the City's wards. The City of London's franchise is also unique because there is a business vote in addition to the usual residential electorate.

The City is a world financial centre whose role is of vital importance to the country. The area contains a large number of iconic sites and major business institutions, including, among many others, St Paul's Cathedral, the Bank of England, the Stock Exchange, the Lloyd's Building and the Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey). The City hosts large numbers of ceremonial and other public events at Guildhall and the Mansion House, and has one of the largest arts centres in the world at the Barbican. It has a relatively small resident population, but very large working and transient populations. There are three independent schools and one local authority school in the force area, together with a number of sites for further and higher education. This particular combination of demands is not typical of most Home Office forces, and the force is careful to balance its responsibilities to the national infrastructure with its duties to City communities.

In February 2004, the CoLP revised its existing community policing structure and adopted a ward policing model, aligning resources to each of the City's 25 wards. Officers are responsible for liaising, on a day-to-day basis, between the force, residents, businesses and the elected alderman and common councillors for that ward. Ward teams play a vital role in ensuring that the concerns of local businesses and residents are fed directly into the force. They also gather local intelligence, for example, to help ensure that wider policing resources are effectively targeted to address problems experienced or perceived locally.

Demographic description of force area

As well as being the UK's leading financial and business capital, there is a residential community of some 9,000 people, in 5,900 dwellings in the City, and a daily working population in excess of 320,000 people. The City's resident population is concentrated in the Barbican and Golden Lane estates to the west, and the Middlesex Street and Mansell Street estates to the east. However, there has been increasing residential development in other areas in recent years, particularly on the Islington border and around Smithfield.

The 2001 census showed that the average household was 1.6 persons, against an average of 2.4 for the rest of the country. This is attributable to lower birth rates as well as the higher than average number of one-person households (52% compared with a national average of 30%). The City of London has the least number of married couples per household in the country and only 3% of the City's residents are children under the age of five. This increases the average age of the population in this area, which at 41 years is two years above the England and Wales average.

Nearly 80% of the population is from a white ethnic classification. The next largest ethnic group is Bangladeshi at 3.8 %, followed by Indian at 2.2%. Just over half of all residents described themselves as Christians, whereas a quarter described themselves as having no religion. Muslims and Sikhs account for 5.6% and 0.3 % respectively. 3.1% of City residents describe their faith as Jewish.

July 2008

Ranked against the 32 London boroughs that surround it, the City has the highest levels of economically active residents. The average income of a City worker is more than twice the national average. Although the impact of the recent 'credit crunch' has yet to be fully assessed, City employment has continued to grow in recent years and is forecast to increase with the development and implementation of the Crossrail scheme, which will significantly enhance the transport infrastructure.

Recent changes to the licensing laws and the increasing number of public houses and bars that are opening for longer periods have had a considerable impact on policing in the City, as it moves to a 24-hour leisure, as well as a 24-hour working, environment.

The City is ranked first again in terms of educational attainment, because those who live in the square mile are three times more likely than the national average to have degree-level education or higher. Correspondingly, residents are the least likely to be without qualifications.

Structural description of force including staff changes at chief officer level

The force's senior command comprises the commissioner, the assistant commissioner, the commander and the director of corporate support, all of whom are ACPO members. The assistant commissioner holds the force-wide operational portfolio.

The previous commissioner retired in July 2006 and was succeeded in February 2007 by the assistant commissioner. In May 2007, the then CoLP commander was appointed as assistant commissioner and in June 2007 the then temporary appointment of a new commander was confirmed. The director of corporate support is the most senior member of police staff.

The force headquarters is at Wood Street police station. The City is divided into two basic command units (BCUs) for territorial policing: Snow Hill (CP4) in the west and Bishopsgate (CP6) in the east. The force's ward policing structure is aligned with the two territorial BCUs. Four other BCUs (anti-terrorism and public order, serious crime, economic crime and corporate support) provide specialist policing services in the City and beyond, and in the case of corporate support, support functions for the rest of the organisation. Each BCU is headed by an officer of chief superintendent rank, with the exception of corporate support, where the responsibilities are split between the director of corporate support and the commander.

The force has recently initiated a major project (Project 2009) to review and realign its structure in the light of changing policing needs and constraints. The first phase of Project 2009 will be completed by September 2008 and will establish the new overall structure for the force, with full implementation of the new model following thereafter.

Strategic priorities

The force's overarching aim is to provide a high-quality police service in the City of London and work with the community, other organisations and agencies to promote a safe, peaceful and crime-free environment.

The force's four local strategic priorities for 2008 to 2009 (expressed in the policing plan 2008–11) are:

July 2008

Counter-terrorism:

- to deter and disrupt all forms of terrorist activity that may directly impact upon the well-being and safety of the City of London's population and infrastructure; and
- to provide visibility and maximise information sharing, where appropriate, to enhance community engagement and public reassurance, thereby reinforcing the City of London's strategic importance within the UK economy.

Economic crime:

- to identify and disrupt offenders profiting from crimes that impact on the residential, public and business communities;
- to bring to justice successfully those who carry out such crimes by providing an effective investigative response to organised crime operating across force boundaries; and
- to establish and implement the requirements and force responsibilities set out in the national fraud strategy in order to identify, disrupt and prevent economic crime across the UK.

Protecting people:

- to maintain the City of London as a peaceful and secure environment for the residential, business and transient communities by reducing violent disorder arising from organised protests, alcohol-related incidents and anti-social behaviour.

Citizen focus:

- to deliver a high-quality, visible and accessible police service to the diverse communities who live and work in the City, by engaging with and working in partnership with our communities to promote a safe, peaceful and crime-free environment.

The force has a number of other strategic themes and priorities, which are linked to the National Community Safety Plan priorities and public service agreements, and to the needs and priorities of the Safer City Partnership (the crime and disorder reduction partnership for the City).

Force Performance Overview

Force development since 2007 inspections

The force has maintained good overall performance against crime and in terms of public satisfaction over the year ended 31 March 2008:

- Total recordable offences were 7,572, down 5.0% since 2006/07, and 2007/08 was the sixth consecutive year of crime reduction.

July 2008

- An overall sanction detection rate of 36.3% was achieved – this represents a slight increase from the 35% achieved in the previous year.
- A reduction in violent crime has also been noted, with 867 crimes having been reported by the end of March 2008, compared with 883 in 2007.
- Overall victim satisfaction rates of 84% exceeded the target of 75%. Within this overall figure, satisfaction with ease of making contact is 90%, satisfaction with action taken by police is 83%, satisfaction with being kept informed of progress is 73% and satisfaction with treatment received by CoLP staff is 91%.

After the publication of HM Treasury's *National Fraud Review* in July 2006, the CoLP has been officially recognised as the lead force for economic crime. This will expand its current 'lead' status in the south-east to cover all of the UK. In addition, the force received funding from the Department for International Development to fund ten posts for an overseas corruption unit, which was launched in November 2006. Work on implementing the recommendations of the *National Fraud Review* has continued during 2007/08, including a substantial and successful recruitment campaign. Unanticipated delays in relation to government funding to support the force's enhanced fraud activities mean that full implementation is not likely to take place until September.

In early 2006, the force recognised it faced a challenging financial situation in the short and medium terms, which would impact on the resources available to maintain or improve policing services. In response, the ACPO leadership launched a change programme entitled *Shaping Up for the Future*, involving an assessment of performance against existing resources, zero-based budgeting (ZBB) and the development of a front-line action group (FLAG) to ensure police officers and police staff are used effectively. A fourth aspect of this work, in relation to streamlining the structure of the force (Project 2009), is now under way, running in tandem with FLAG.

By adopting the ZBB approach, in which each unit has to bid to retain existing resources or obtain increases, the force has substantially exceeded its efficiency targets in each of the last three financial years. The ZBB process is now firmly embedded and will continue to be used to ensure the precise and most cost-effective allocation of resources.

Major Crime

GRADE	Fails to meet the standard
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Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details the CoLP capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as its response to preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those that pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	1.031	2.320	+125.02%	Not applicable
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	Not applicable
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.000	3.266	Not calculable	Not applicable
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	133.33%	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	4.355	1.089	-75.00%	Not applicable
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	0.00%	0.00%	Opp*	Not applicable
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	3.266	0.000	-100.00%	Not applicable

% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	33.33%	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of manslaughters per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	Not applicable
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	2.177	1.089	-50.00%	Not applicable
% of murders detected/convicted	50.00%	200.00%	+150pp*	Not applicable
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	10.887	0.000	-100.00%	Not applicable
% of rapes detected/convicted	0.00%	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable

*pp – percentage points.

**City of London is an outlier force and does not have a most similar force (MSF). Hence no average can be calculated.

Due to its size and its business-oriented composition, the City of London Police (CoLP) experiences very low levels of major crime when compared with other forces. Major crimes are occasionally perpetrated by visitors from the surrounding Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) area but its overall threat level from major crime remains low.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT) published in September 2007 indicated that CoLP was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to homicide, rape and kidnapping offences. As such, no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

Although organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, the CoLP has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types is partially mapped. It is currently estimated that 16 OCGs impact the force area, across one major crime type – economic crime.

The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a developing understanding of the historic, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified economic crime as its major crime priority within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on economic and violent crime.

Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and/or addressed.

July 2008

The force has invested suitable resources trained to the right level for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and to inhibit major crime.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a maturing approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with the MPS and British Transport Police (BTP) (eg regional witness protection, senior investigating officer (SIO) accreditation, the developing regional intelligence unit (RIU) and cold case reviews), albeit they are at a very early stage of formalisation.

Intelligence

MC01 Summary – The force has insufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has yet to commit to its major crime investigations with the requisite staffing.

Strengths

- The CoLP has a team of analysts established across the force, based in the force intelligence bureau (FIB) (with one vacant researcher post and one analyst seconded to a specialist enquiry). All analysts have 24/7 access to open and closed-source intelligence material.
- In addition, there are police officers who are trained crime analysts and they have been used to augment analytical resources on a temporary basis, albeit they hold other positions and are not dedicated to the function.
- Analytical support is provided for the production of all key National Intelligence Model (NIM) products and the FSA is informed by the economic crime department (ECD) strategic assessment and the work of the new fraud intelligence development team (FIDT) positioned within the ECD.

Work in progress

- The force has recently approved an additional senior analyst post for its major incident room.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although the City of London experiences comparatively low levels of major crime (as per statutory performance indicators), there have been two murders in the past 12 months and there is evidence of increasing violent crime associated with growth in the night-time economy. At the time of inspection analytical products for these two enquiries have been generated by police officers temporarily seconded to the teams.
- When coupled with the analytical support required for serious and organised crime (for which the FIDT is largely responsible), there is a need for the force to improve its resilience in the provision of dedicated analytical support for major crime. This is necessary to provide essential continuity, expertise and skills for these enquiries and their major incident rooms.

MC02 Summary – The force seeks (and shares) intelligence about NIM level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships, albeit a greater contribution to the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) assessment is required. This work is assessed to be effective. The force assessments of community impact to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.

Strengths

- The CoLP has secured the attachment of a police officer to the MPS clubs and vice unit (CO14) and risk assessments are completed for all major music events and functions held in the City of London.
- Community impact assessments (CIAs) were completed by the relevant BCU commander for each of the two murders, as required by the *Murder Investigation Manual* (MIM).
- One of these tragic events concerned the murder of a young black man and the CoLP has worked hard, within a communication strategy, to improve its engagement with the black community that frequents the City of London. This has involved a media day for the minority press and contact with the local church. Regular contact has also been maintained with the MPS, with information and intelligence being routinely shared.
- There are strong, effective and growing working relationships with those engaged in law enforcement with the financial services industry. This includes ECD engagement with the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), Financial Services Authority, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Europol, Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC), Interpol and the financial industry, both locally and nationally. Many major financial institutions have been persuaded to adapt NIM models for their environment, resulting in good quality intelligence flows to the ECD, particularly for serious, organised and major crime.

Work in progress

- Under its force strategic priority to 'protect people' and the associated intelligence requirement detailed within the force control strategy (intelligence, prevention and enforcement (IPE) element), there is a drive to enhance intelligence on violent crime. This extends to all parts of the force and the material is collated and analysed by the FIB. The strategic assessments for both the economic crime and serious crime operations (SCO) departments are also routinely shared with SOCA.
- The CoLP has established effective working relationships for intelligence sharing with both the MPS and BTP. These extend across a range of themes, including links with the new MPS intelligence bureau (MIB), the MPS clubs and vice unit and surrounding MPS boroughs. These are in the process of being formalised through the intended creation of a new RIU. Two staff are now committed to the unit.
- The force is currently reviewing the process for the completion of CIAs and the new guidance currently awaits sign-off by the force's strategic diversity group.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force has yet to fully understand the drivers of homicide and 'near misses' through the introduction of NIM problem profiles, target profiles by crime group or situational profiles. The low instances of homicide have previously meant that these

July 2008

have been considered isolated instances, but greater emphasis needs to be placed on utilising intelligence products to develop a sound preventive solution.

- The force has failed to contribute intelligence towards SOCA assessments in seven areas of assessment during 2006 and 2007.

MC03 Summary – The FSA has analysed sufficiently the trends in relation to its major crime, albeit resilience in this area is limited. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be equally adequate. Problem profiles for economic and violent crime are satisfactory, with links to force and BCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues, albeit preventive opportunities to tackle near misses could be realised.

Strengths

- The CoLP has identified ‘protecting people’ and ‘economic and organised crime’ as two of its strategic priorities for 2007–10, within the force corporate plan and in the local policing plan for 2007/08.
- There is a commentary on the signal crimes of alcohol-related violence within the FSA, the resultant force control strategy, its IPE requirement and within the SCO department and Bishopsgate BCU action plans. The same can also be said of serious economic crimes, which also feature within the NIM products generated within the ECD.
- All intelligence products generated by the CoLP are compliant with the ACPO guidance on NIM 2005. The FSA goes to the police committee for scrutiny, members of which also attend the force tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) meeting.
- The force has a good understanding of the demographic profiles of the community.
- The CoLP incorporates a commentary within the FSA on the predicted trends for each type of serious, organised and major crime that potentially impacts upon them. This includes an analysis of the impact of economic crime and of the growing issue of alcohol-related violence.
- A thorough strategic firearms threat assessment has been completed by the Anti – Terrorist Public Order ATPO department and approved by the assistant commissioner, the key findings from which have informed the FSA. The FSA also includes a commentary on the latest counter-terrorism threats, the content of which is informed by the involvement of the CoLP at the MPS security review committee.
- Any potential emergent threat from known sex and/or violent offenders is monitored via the multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) and the Violent and Sex Offenders Register (ViSOR) database. An assessment of issues concerning vulnerable communities is incorporated within the BCU strategic assessments and control strategies, as they lead activity on the force priority of community policing. Headline comment is made on these themes within the FSA.
- The ECD started an internal road show regarding economic crime, including considerations for staff when dealing with signal crimes.

Work in progress

- Although the CoLP has identified the headline intelligence requirement within its force control strategy (IPE element), its work to produce a strategic intelligence requirement remains ongoing.

Area(s) for improvement

July 2008

- The FSA makes no reference to organised criminality other than that linked to economic crime. NIM profiles do not reflect a recognition that organised crime might operate within the non-business community because there is no underpinning of intelligence products that verifies this or otherwise. This leads to views in CoLP being anecdotal and sometimes at variance with each other.
- The CoLP has no recent instances of dealing with life-threatening crime, such as kidnaps and paedophile rings, and has a low number of individuals subject to MAPPA. The force will need to ensure that complacency is avoided and that intelligence products are in place to provide early recognition of such crimes.

July 2008

MC04 Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are routinely shared with partners and BCUs. There is no trigger plan for hot briefing when there is a significant change in the major crime threat or where the nature of the analysis demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols exist with key partners, such as probation, MPS and social services. The force can in part demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information (MoPI) compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- There is a regular exchange of intelligence between the CoLP and the MPS clubs and vice unit (CO14), with an officer seconded to CO14 to maximise this relationship.
- The CoLP also hosts the inner London intelligence forum and it is linked into intelligence meetings with the surrounding MPS boroughs. It also attends the MPS hosted meeting dealing with 'guns, gangs and knives' and receives key intelligence products from the MPS.
- For the purposes of MAPPAs, the CoLP has an information-sharing agreement (protocol) with key agencies including the MPS, social services and with the London probation service. This agreement is MoPI compliant.
- The force has an understanding of the benefits of serious crime analysis section (SCAS), Catchem and the kidnap and extortion databases but has had limited experience of their utilisation.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- On a practical day-to-day level, information and intelligence is routinely shared between partner organisations and institutions, and this works well. However, with the exception of MAPPAs data exchange, this remains reliant upon the maintenance of good professional relationships between individuals. This presents a degree of risk for the force should individuals change roles, etc and the CoLP is therefore urged to formalise these arrangements within MoPI-compliant information-sharing agreements.
- There is no evidence of a trigger plan being in place to deal with the need for hot briefings should there be a change in the major crime threat.

MC05 Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.

Strengths

- The community within the City of London is unique. About 3% is residential-based (about 9,500 residents) and about 97% is business-based (about 350,000 office workers). This clearly influences the approach taken to policing. The FSA incorporates a section dealing with 'the changing demographics of the City of London' in which emergent themes are discussed, including the growth of the city's night-time economy and the associated rise in violent crime.
- BCU demographic profiles have been undertaken to assist in identifying risk, vulnerability and difference.
- Work has been carried out to profile the community located on the borders of the City of London.
- For economic crime, the ECD has developed a comprehensive network of key partners (see above) involved in tackling this crime and staff are starting to gain a detailed understanding of the OCGs that orchestrate this complex type of criminality. To enhance this work, since January 2006, the ECD has undertaken an electronic survey of fraud victims – the results of which will be passed to a specialist university for independent assessment in November 2007.
- The FSA discusses, in some depth, the prevailing threats under economic crime, detailing the most common modus operandi of OCGs (eg boiler rooms, insurance fraud, cardholder not present fraud, etc).

Work in progress

- The ECD has worked hard to identify partners with a stake in tackling economic crime and this tends to concentrate upon long-term relationships with the larger businesses. Work is therefore ongoing to comprehensively profile all aspects of the business community and this will not only further inform the work of the ECD but also link into community profiles developed under neighbourhood policing.
- In partnership with the drugs and alcohol action team and the Primary Health Trust, work is under way to profile sex workers within the City of London.

Area(s) for improvement

- The FSA focus is towards future risks and threats with organised economic criminality and the impact on the business community. This is valid, but the CoLP should ensure that attention is also given within the FSA to assist the understanding of how organised criminality operates within other vulnerable communities.
- The force has failed to contribute intelligence to SOCA on seven areas of assessment during 2006 and 2007.

July 2008

MC06 Summary – The force maintains a strategic risk register that is reviewed every six months by the assistant commissioner, who chairs the force tactical TCG meeting. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan.

Strengths

- The CoLP introduced a strategic risk management process in April 2007 following an internal review. The register is comprehensive, robust and fit for purpose; it includes risks for the force and its two BCUs. It is helpfully integrated with the high-level NIM process, business planning and resource allocation process and includes action plans intended to mitigate the stated risk. The force risk register is reviewed every six months as part of the force strategic TCG process.
- The SCO department action plan incorporates action necessary to mitigate those risks applicable to its business. Each unit within corporate support has also identified its own areas of risk and linked these to their action plans.
- In addition, and due to the complexity of its work, the ECD also has a risk register for economic crime with its associated action plans.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- None.

July 2008

MC07 Summary – The force is creating ways of collaborating with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. The force currently shares intelligence and data with the MPS. Its Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) is not inter-operable.

Strengths

- The CoLP uses HOLMES (Version 11) for its major enquiries and it also makes use of the system's document-indexing capability for complex fraud investigations. Although there is no automated link with the force intelligence system (INTEGRA), the CoLP systematically transfers intelligence to it from HOLMES.
- Excellent use is made of its extensive automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) coverage. This will soon be further enhanced through direct links to MPS systems, the activation of which is imminent.
- The force makes good use of this rich source of intelligence through analysis by the FIB, which has an analyst being trained on the subject. SIOs and other crime investigators also routinely use ANPR data as an intelligence source to inform their enquiries.

Work in progress

- The CoLP currently enjoys access to the MPS Aware system (email, etc) through the FIB, albeit this is limited. Work is therefore ongoing to obtain 20 to 25 user licenses to extend access to the MPS system and a similar approach is being taken to access BTP systems. In addition, the CoLP (alongside BTP) is pursuing a feasibility study to access the MPS data warehouse, thereby enabling access to key systems, such as crime, intelligence and briefing, all of which are currently unavailable. This work is dependant upon the PNN programme (police national network) rolling out and will not mature until at least 2008.

Area(s) for improvement

- None.

MC08 Summary – The force has a case review policy that is applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed and major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) compliant. The policy is in development and will need to incorporate consideration for external review in all enquiries and in other potentially sensitive cases within a formal protocol.

Strengths

- There have been no category A murders or unexplained deaths in the CoLP in the past five years. Essex Police has been invited to conduct aspects of some, but not all, hot and cold case reviews for CoLP major crime cases with a thematic review of resourcing/personnel in one of the two murders that recently occurred in the City of London. The CoLP has conducted one cold case review of a shooting that took place in 2000 (Railway Tavern, Liverpool Street). All other major crime reviews are conducted internally by the CoLP.
- Reviews of the two murder enquires within the CoLP have, with the exception of an external review of resources, been conducted by internal CoLP staff. These reviews follow MIRSAP policy.
- Recommendations arising from reviews are actioned by the SIO with details of the action taken recorded on the policy log.
- The previous head of strategic planning has SIO experience; he is serious crime investigation review training (SCIRT) trained and therefore qualified to undertake reviews of major crime. The current head of SCO is also now SCIRT trained.
- National Policing Improvement Agency Serious Crime Analysis Section (SCAS) returns are routinely completed with both murder enquiry cases being submitted as required (there were no recorded rapes over the last 12 months).

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- The CoLP investigates few homicide cases and a potential lack of familiarity could present risks to the force. Therefore and notwithstanding their classification, the CoLP should consider all reviews being conducted by a senior officer from another force. The use of independent review will help minimise risk, potentially enhance the CoLP knowledge base and enable the force to keep abreast of the latest investigative practices.
- Although there is an informal agreement for external forces (eg Essex Police) to undertake some independent hot and cold case reviews of major crimes, this arrangement (whether enhanced or otherwise) should now be formalised so that investigative risks can be correctly managed and force resources planned accordingly.
- There would be benefit in the CoLP systematically linking the key learning points arising from the reviews of major crime with staff training and development programmes.

MC09 Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historic, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The assistant commissioner chairs the force tactical TCG meeting and its agenda follows NIM guidance, with activity prioritised against the force control strategy. All key NIM products are generated for each meeting and there are feeders into the meeting from the ECD and BCU tactical TCG processes.
- For serious, organised and major crime issues, volume is relatively low and the CoLP primarily considers developing issues under economic crime and violent crime, both of which feature within the force control strategy. Problem profiles have been generated against these themes and corporate/specialist assets are deployed against them.
- The force TCG considers bids for operations (including those relating to major crime), which now include costs, results and learning points.
- Murder investigations are resourced in accordance with the MIRSAP requirements and are overseen by a gold group chaired by an ACPO officer, who will then link into the force tactical TCG as required.
- There is a 24/7 armed response vehicle capability, the profile for which is routinely adapted to meet demand. The TFG is represented by the operations department at the force TCG, which also has its own tactical TCG meeting.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- To support and build upon the control strategy, there is a need for a detailed action plan to provide a more structured approach to the implementation of the intelligence, prevention and enforcement (IPE) activity detailed within the force control strategy. This needs to incorporate key activity, leads, milestones and dependencies, the progress against which could be rigorously reviewed at the force TCG, thereby promoting clear ownership, accountability and good communication.

MC10 Summary – Due to appropriate training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.

Strengths

- All staff within the CoLP receive diversity training as a standard force requirement and specialist staff (eg family liaison officers (FLOs)) will undergo bespoke nationally approved training before being assigned such responsibility.
- Staff are briefed on the specific diversity issues that impact upon major crime investigations by the SIO. This was recently illustrated in a murder investigation that required engagement with the black community in which the issue of potential witness intimidation was a concern. Staff were briefed on what exactly could be offered by way of special measures at court and members of the force diversity team sit on the gold group.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- None.

Prevention

MC11 Summary – The force has an independent advisory group (IAG) and this is frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- The CoLP has a single pan-force IAG that has been functional for one year. The IAG has been engaged on both of the CoLP's murder investigations and the advice of specific members is sought as required. This was illustrated during one of the investigations, when advice was sought on identifying the best outlets for media appeals leading to a media day to encourage witnesses to come forward.
- Both murder investigations have been discussed at the IAG meeting and members of the force diversity team were included in meetings to gauge use of the IAG. The diversity team was also part of the initial briefing team for one of the investigations.
- IAG advice is formerly recorded and considered as part of the overall community assessment.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- Now that the IAG has been established for one year, the CoLP should review the lessons learned, whether the IAG is being utilised effectively and whether the benefits are being maximised.

MC12 Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that golden hour principles were sufficiently understood by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- The CoLP has a dedicated contingency planning and business continuity department located with the crime and disorder reduction partnership. The team works with the partners and key financial institutions to promote business continuity during major incidents and other civil emergencies.
- Critical incident training has been given to most staff. Those deployed in the force control room, casualty bureau and SCO department (specialist resources) have been specifically trained in the golden hour principles. SCO trainers have also been given an input on critical incidents to sergeants and inspectors courses. This is reinforced by the CoLP critical incident Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) that highlights key responsibilities. Overall, there is a good level awareness of the golden hour principles contained within the 2005 Practice Advice on Core Investigative Doctrine.
- There are a number of Computer-aided despatch (CAD) Special Schemes that cover major crimes (eg kidnap, extortion, etc) and these have been recently reviewed by the force. There is also an events control capability within the force control room, and business continuity arrangements for command and control are in place with the MPS.
- Members of the force support group within ATPO are trained to conduct house-to-house enquiries during the initial hours/days of a major investigation. Decisions to deploy them are taken by the gold group.
- The CoLP has a force contingency fund that was increased from £1.5 million last year to £4.4 million in 2007/08 to deal with all financial risks, including those arising from major investigations.

Work in progress

- The force is cognisant of the need to have contingency arrangements in place for a CAT A+ enquiry and is developing a protocol with Essex and Kent to support their investigative capacity.
- SCO department is currently considering the introduction of a draft service level agreement for the use of resources from the police associates register (retired officers).

Area(s) for improvement

- Although the force control room staff have received critical incident training and some have gained operational experience following the 7/7 atrocities, there remains a need to ensure that this training is enhanced with regular exercises.

July 2008

MC13 Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending were found to be analysed adequately, albeit there remains scope to improve the analysis and preventive action taken for ‘near misses’.

Strengths

- The CoLP incorporates a commentary within the FSA on the predicted trends for each type of serious, organised and major crime that potentially impacts upon them. This includes an analysis of the impact of economic crime and of the growing issue of alcohol-related violence.
- A thorough strategic firearms threat assessment has been completed by the ATPO department and approved by the assistant commissioner – the key findings from which have informed the FSA. The FSA also includes a commentary on the latest counter-terrorism threats – the content of which is informed by the involvement of the CoLP at the MPS security review committee.
- Any potential emergent threat from known sex and/or violent offenders is monitored via MAPPA and the ViSOR database. An assessment of issues concerning vulnerable communities is incorporated within the BCU strategic assessments and control strategies, because they lead activity on the force priority of community policing. Headline comment is made on these themes within the FSA.
- The ECD started an internal road show regarding economic crime, including considerations for staff when dealing with signal crimes.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force has yet to fully understand the drivers of homicide and ‘near misses’ through the introduction of NIM problem profiles, target profiles by crime group or situational profiles. The low instances of homicide have previously meant that these have been considered isolated instances, but greater emphasis needs to be placed on utilising intelligence products to develop a sound preventive solution.

July 2008

MC14 Summary – The policy covering threat to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of joint/regional/cross-border/multi-agency operations are patchy.

Strengths

- The CoLP has a documented and accessible SOP dealing with threats to life that has been recently reviewed and that will be included in the witness protection policy and its associated SOP. In the last 12 months there have been two occasions when warnings were given.
- In practice, if a threat to life situation was encountered staff generally know to contact the on-call SIO for advice. All such decisions are recorded on the force INTEGRA system.
- The strategic firearms threat assessment has informed the TFG's strategic objectives for 2007-2010 and their associated action plans. There is an up-to-date firearms deployment policy and SOP, which are accessible to all staff on a 24/7 basis.
- In October 2007, a joint and cross-border initiative took place with the MPS to conduct intelligence-led stops on vehicles potentially linked to the illegal use of firearms. This operation involved the TFG, the force support group and ANPR equipment, and was informed by intelligence from the FIB and MIB.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- There is a need to develop murder suppression activity within the CoLP. This should primarily focus upon individuals or groups of people in addition to premises and will inevitably require co-operation with the surrounding boroughs within the MPS to identify individuals who visit the City of London and who exhibit an escalating level of violence.

July 2008

MC15 Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by on-demand covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to and understood by dedicated staff only. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strength

- The CoLP has an in-force capability of officers trained in witness protection activity and the force is a part of the regional witness protection group, comprising the CoLP, MPS, BTP and SOCA. As a member of the regional group, the CoLP can call and rely upon the expertise and support of colleagues outside the force, should circumstances warrant.
- There is a force policy governing witness protection arrangements, albeit there have been few occasions that warrant such action.
- The court used by the CoLP has ‘special measures’ arrangements in place to enable the Crown Prosecution Service to apply for the protection of individuals and offer anonymity.
- All CoLP officers involved in murder enquiries are generally familiar with their statutory objectives under Criminal Procedures and Investigation Act (CPIA) regarding the use of covert tactics in major crime. A number of staff are trained in covert policing techniques and a single point of contact is used to deploy the tactics and to provide specialist advice on public interest immunity (PII) and CPIA matters.

Work in progress

- The CoLP is currently reviewing its vulnerable and intimidated witness policy following receipt of new guidance.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force policy in relation to witness protection is less well understood at BCU level; with few cases occurring, it is unlikely to be improved through experience. However, given the importance of this issue, the CoLP should ensure the level of awareness among staff is improved about the key principles for witness protection and as to where guidance can be sought on a 24/7 basis.

MC16 Summary – The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventive and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are fully used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The CoLP monitors harm through the national community tension mechanism through Special Branch and a community analyst in FIB who also links into the BCU analysts. All tension intelligence is graded (6x6x6 – ‘evidenced, experienced and perceived’) to assess community tension, albeit levels tend to be relatively low.
- Local tensions are collected through local ward meetings/contacts, evaluated by either the Divisional Intelligence Units DIUs or Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB) and subject to problem profiles (as appropriate). These are then incorporated within daily briefings and are accessible to staff through the force intranet.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although the CoLP focuses the whole range of policing assets to tackle harm in the community, there are no indicators used for measuring harm in those communities that enable an improved understanding of preventive and enforcement activity (eg measures from INTEGRA, increased confidence in local policing, etc).

July 2008

MC17 Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a developing policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted, commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- Under the commander (support), the professional standards department (PSD) leads on information security issues for the CoLP. There are security policies and management systems in place across the force, and the force completes the annual ACPO community security policy return, which includes annual penetration testing.
- The PSD produces its own risk assessment, control strategy and tactical assessment and has a proactive and investigative capability supported by a shared analyst.
- PSD risk assesses candidates applying for specialist posts with SCO and ECD. The department has responsibility for all force vetting within a force policy on the subject, which also follows national guidelines. Staff (and some members of the police committee) are vetted to the level commensurate with their role and individuals have their vetting status removed when appropriate.
- The CoLP has introduced a security management programme that delivers a series of preventive measures to address physical security, personnel security and information systems security.
- The force has undertaken a limited amount of proactive activity on anti-corruption matters, utilising a range of tactical options that includes collaborating with other forces.

Work in progress

- PSD is currently investigating options for further penetration tests conducted against the force and this includes its major crime systems.

Area(s) for improvement

- None.

MC18 Summary – See MC06

Enforcement

MC19 Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with appropriate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command groups.

Strengths

- Gold support groups are established for all major enquiries in the CoLP and this was evidenced in those formed for two recent operations. These have been chaired by the commander.
- Summarised reports on major crime and updates on major crime and other high-profile or sensitive enquiries are given to the police committee during the closed session of each meeting.

Work in progress

- Although two members of the police committee are currently vetted for counter-terrorism purposes, work is under way to ensure that all members are vetted to a level commensurate with their responsibilities.

Area(s) for improvement

- When establishing gold support groups, the CoLP should maximise the opportunity of widening the level of independent and community membership. Such membership usually involves only the chair of the IAG, as was the case for a recent operation.

July 2008

MC20 Summary – The ACPO lead and/or the head of the crime department are not yet trained in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate testing in critical incident command, CIAs and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The head of ECD and the head of public order are both trained in the management of linked and series crime.
- Staff on the BCUs, SCO and ATPO departments are trained in critical incident command, including the provision of specialist support such as public order, firearms, CIAs and major incidents. Guidance on the completion of CIAs has been published and there is a critical incident SOP.

Work in progress

- Work is ongoing to develop the completion and content of CIAs, which awaits approval from the CoLP strategic diversity group after which further training is to be given.
- The head of SCO is due to undertake a course on the management of linked and series crime in the near future.

Area(s) for improvement

- The commander and the assistant commissioner with responsibility for crime have yet to be trained in the management of linked and series crime. These individuals all have key roles to play in the investigation of major crime whether as the SIO, their line manager or as the chair of the gold group, and such training is therefore essential.

MC21 Summary – The force’s performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of inputs, outputs and outcomes, albeit this is developing.

Strengths

- The ACPO (commander) chair of the gold group for major crimes continuously reviews activity, costs incurred, resources and outputs at these meetings.
- Within SCO department, major crime performance is reviewed at weekly and monthly meetings, making use of bespoke performance indicators designed to monitor the pursuit of investigative activity and lines of enquiry.
- Major crime investigations within ECD are subject to an initial scoping exercise to determine the investigative and resource parameters and, thereafter, ECD line managers routinely review each case on a weekly basis using a forward-planning document. Cases are reviewed monthly by the DCI. The head of ECD personally leads the most serious and/or sensitive cases of economic crime.

Work in progress

- The ECD is currently reviewing its performance management framework with a view to introducing new measures that better reflect its investigative activity, the identification, categorisation and disruption of OCGs and with discernable links to costed inputs. This may also include detailed management information designed to assess the tactical options considered, those used and their cost.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although there is evidence that CoLP has systems in place to ensure lessons are learned from past major crimes, the force should establish a comprehensive system that also maximises the learning from judicial hearings, inquests, appeals, public enquiries and any Part 8 reviews.
- There would be benefit in the CoLP systematically linking the key learning points arising from the reviews of major crime with staff training and development programmes.

Performance management and resilience

MC22 Summary – The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands, albeit staff have yet to be fully professionalising the investigative process (PIP) accredited. Collaborative agreements with the MPS and Essex Police are currently being developed. Force procedures to manage human resources provide partial protection for the investigative capability and PIP accreditation for detectives is incomplete and ongoing.

Strengths

- The relevant gold group will oversee the expeditious abstraction of resources for major enquiries from across the force and other agencies, and strives to minimise the impact upon other force priorities. Meetings are fully minuted and key decisions are entered into decision logs.
- There is a 24/7 call-out arrangement for SIOs that is accessible through the control room or FIB (during office hours). All DCIs in the CoLP have completed an SIO course. There is accommodation for major incident rooms at both Wood Street and Bishopsgate.
- The resource disposition within the SCO department is broadly proportionate with the current demand for the investigation of major crime, including the provision of specialist assets to support major investigations outside its command (eg ECD work). This includes the abstraction of detective officers for major enquiries from across the CoLP, a range of proactive assets such as surveillance capability, Covert Rural Observation Post officers (CROPS), Family Liason Officers (FLOs), the scientific support unit, source unit, the high-tech crime unit, ANPR and trained Undercover UC officers.
- The CoLP has an internal capacity for hostage negotiation (to level 6) with a team of trained hostage negotiators and one more to follow. The force is soon to sign up to a regional hostage and crisis negotiation memorandum of understanding with Sussex, Norfolk, Bedfordshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Cambridgeshire and the MPS that will formalise the provision and receipt of mutual aid in this area.
- Resources are also drawn from the police associates register and specialist proactive assets can be called upon through the Central Deployment Unit (CDU). All staff deployed in major investigation teams (MITs)/major incident rooms are trained to the MIRSAP standard.
- There is a cadre of trained FLOs within the force. The force also has trained interview advisers and interview co-ordinators alongside a collaborative agreement with BTP to access further advisers. There is a dedicated team of staff trained in the use of HOLMES.

Work in progress

- The CoLP, through its SCO department, is reviewing its MIT capability and a decision has yet to be taken by ACPO on the subject. The force is in the process of accrediting its SIOs with Essex Police through their attachment to Essex enquiries. Essex Police was seen as an attractive option over the MPS due to the demands experienced by MITs in the MPS. This decision is being taken against a backdrop of a shortage of detective posts, with the CoLP to resource an in-house MIT should it

be deemed necessary.

- In considering its final resource disposition, the CoLP is taking account of the implementation of its FLAG project to maximise its operational capacity. It will also need to carefully consider the analysis of its predictive demand for major crime (including health and safety oriented investigations) to arrive at a structure that most cost-effectively meets this requirement. This will need to take account of all available options, including outsourcing enquiries to adjacent forces (through a documented protocol) and the provision of a fast-time capability to provide on-site detective support during the critical golden hour period of activity.

Area(s) for improvement

- Notwithstanding the ongoing review of the CoLP major crime capability and SIO shadowing arrangements, the force currently has no formalised arrangements with surrounding forces to take on major enquiries and has no fully accredited SIOs to lead such enquiries from within the CoLP. It would therefore be vulnerable in its ability to conduct major crime investigations that are compliant with the ACPO MIM guidance.
- The current arrangements for resourcing major enquiries are not subject to any documented trigger plan that minimises any potential adverse impact on BCUs.
- The force should be aware of the operational benefit that could be accrued by engaging the MPS homicide assessment teams to support the initial assessment of the scene of a suspicious death when determining the requirement to support their operational capability.
- The force has only trained approximately half of its major crime investigators to the appropriate level of PIP accreditation. It is pursuing a programme of training to address this issue, known as the detective up skilling training (DUST); the current cycle is due to be completed by April 2008.

July 2008

MC23 Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through an infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Elements of technical support unit activity are delivered through verbal collaborative agreements, which are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.

Strengths

- The CoLP has an infrastructure to deliver some assets in support of specialist investigations. Within SCD department, this includes a surveillance capability, a dedicated source unit, a high-tech crime unit, scientific support, witness protection and UC officers. A dedicated TSU officer is seconded to the MPS (SCD11) to promote access to further specialist assets (including armed surveillance) should they be required. Outside SCD, there is the CoLP TFG team and access to significant ANPR equipment/data.
- The deployment of these assets has been evidenced during two homicide enquiries.
- Collaborative work with other forces takes place as required and tends to arise from investigations into economic crime. Assets and support are requested in accordance with the skills, links and features of a particular enquiry.

Work in progress

- Although the CoLP does not currently have an armed surveillance capability, its firearms officers have been trained to provide armed support for surveillance. These staff need to routinely exercise these skills and such training is planned for the future months ahead.

Area(s) for improvement

- The CoLP should ensure that documented collaborative arrangements are in place with neighbouring forces to provide additional specialist resources in order to effectively deal with exceptional demand.

MC24 Summary – The force has a part-time and on-demand case review team that is generally deployed when current and historic major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is efficient.

Strengths

- There have been no category A investigations or unexplained deaths in the CoLP within the last five years.
- Essex Police has conducted a thematic review of resourcing/personnel in one of the two murders that recently occurred in the City of London. The CoLP has also conducted an internal review of its investigation into the death of Roberto Calvi and one cold case review of a shooting that took place in 2000 (Railway Tavern, Liverpool Street). All other reviews are conducted internally by the CoLP.
- Reviews of the two murder enquires within the CoLP have, with the exception of an external review of resources, been conducted by internal CoLP staff. These reviews follow MIRSAP policy.
- Recommendations arising from reviews are actioned by the SIO, with details of the action taken recorded on the policy log.
- The heads of public order (who have SIO experience) and SCO are SCIRT trained and therefore able to undertake reviews of serious crime.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- The CoLP investigates few homicide cases and, notwithstanding their classification, should give consideration for all reviews to be conducted by a senior officer from another force. The use of independent reviews will help minimise risk, potentially enhance the CoLP knowledge base and enable the force to keep abreast of the latest investigative practices.
- Although there is an informal agreement for external forces (eg Essex Police) to undertake some independent hot and cold case reviews of major crimes, this arrangement should now be formalised (whether enhanced or otherwise) so that investigative risks can be correctly managed and force resources planned accordingly.
- There would be benefit in the CoLP systematically linking the key learning points arising from the reviews of major crime with staff training and development programmes.

MC25 Summary – The inspection found that the force was predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the MIM and MIRSAP.

Strengths

- All SIOs, investigation officers and officers of supervisory rank are issued with a copy of the ACPO MIM. The MIRSAP manual is accessible through the force intranet. Both standards (MIM and MIRSAP) are followed, as evidenced by two recent homicide investigations.
- Policy files are completed for every major crime that includes decisions not to pursue a line of enquiry. Separate policy files are created for sensitive decision making.

Work in progress

- None.

Area(s) for improvement

- None.

Recommendations

Major Crime

Recommendation 1

To enhance the overall level of dedicated analytical support and resilience for major crime (alongside that for serious and organised crime).

Recommendation 2

To formalise existing informal arrangements with external forces for hot and cold case reviews and to maximise the use of external scrutiny for all major (and high-risk, serious and organised) crime investigations.

Recommendation 3

To ensure that the ACPO leads for major (and serious and organised) crime are trained in the management of linked and serious crime.

Recommendation 4

To ensure that the CoLP either has a PIP 3 accredited SIO capability commensurate with its demand or a formal protocol with external forces for the provision of such a capability.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition
ATPO	Anti Terrorist and Public Order

B

BCU	basic command unit
BTP	British Transport Police

C

CIA	community impact assessment
CoLP	City of London Police
CPIA	Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CROPS	Covert Rural Observation Post Officers

D

DC	detective constable
DCI	detective chief inspector
DCPCU	dedicated cheque and plastic card unit
DI	detective inspector
DS	detective sergeant
DUST	detective up skilling training
DWP	Department for Work and Pensions

E

ECD	economic crime department
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F

FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FIB	force intelligence bureau
FIDT	fraud intelligence development team
FLAG	front-line action group
FLO	family liaison officer
FSA	force strategic assessment

H

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System

I

IAG	independent advisory group
IPE	intelligence, prevention and enforcement
IT	information technology

M

MAPPA	multi-agency public protection arrangements
MIB	MPS intelligence bureau
MIM	<i>Murder Investigation Manual</i>
MIRSAP	major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MIT	major investigation/incident team
MoPI	management of police information
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
MSF	most similar force(s)

N

NCPCD	national cheque and plastic card database
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
NPSAT	National Protective Services Analysis Tool

O

OCG	organised crime group
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P

PIP	professionalising the investigative process
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act
PSD	professional services department

R

RIU	regional intelligence unit
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S

SAR	suspicious activity report
SCAS	serious crime analysis section
SCD	specialist crime directorate
SCIRT	serious crime investigation review training
SCO	serious crime operations
SFO	Serious Fraud Office
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SOP	standard operating procedure
SPI	statutory performance indicator

SSU scientific support unit

T

TCG tasking and co-ordination group

TFG tactical firearms group

TSU technical support unit

U

UC undercover

V

ViSOR Violent and Sex Offenders Register

Z

ZBB zero-based budgeting