

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



## HMIC Inspection Report

### Cambridgeshire Constabulary Major Crime

July 2008



*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – HMIC Inspection Report*

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## **Contents**

### **Introduction to HMIC Inspections**

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09  
Programmed Frameworks  
Major Crime  
Future Programmed Inspections  
The Grading Process  
Developing Practice  
Force Overview and Context

### **Findings**

#### **Major Crime**

#### **Recommendations**

#### **Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations**

July 2008

## Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

## HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

July 2008

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

## Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

## Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

July 2008

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

## Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

## The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

### Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

### Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

July 2008

## **Failing to meet the standard**

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

## **Developing Practice**

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

## Force Overview and Context

### Geographical description of force area

Cambridgeshire is a medium-sized county, occupying a strategically significant location as a main link between the Midlands and East Anglia. The county has a resident population of 716,000, in 297,000 households. This population is set to grow substantially over the coming decade, with large-scale housing development scheduled within the East of England Plan, in particular at Northstow, a new town planned for the south of the county.

The two major conurbations are Peterborough and Cambridge. While Peterborough is a significant city providing modern regional shopping attractions, it also has some of the most deprived wards in the country. Cambridgeshire has substantial rural areas and numerous local market towns, making up approximately 13% of the county's households. Major roads such as the M11, A1 and A14 cross the county, as does the East Coast main rail route.

### Demographic profile of force area

The pattern of economic development in the county means that there are some notable variations in population spread, economic standing and patterns of industrial growth. Cambridgeshire has also recently seen rising numbers of migrant workers, particularly in the north of the county, linked to EU accession states. The southern half of the county falls within the London commuter belt, with associated high housing costs in Cambridge and the surrounding villages. The city also has a substantial international reputation as one of the leading academic centres in the world. As such, it is a popular tourist destination as well as being home to a large number of students, making the population relatively young and affluent.

In the north of the county, Peterborough's recent expansion with the Hampton development was recognised when it was assigned city status by the Deputy Prime Minister. It has a large number of black and minority ethnic and other minority communities, with in excess of 70 languages being spoken, and its demographic complexity poses some significant policing challenges.

### Strategic priorities and direction

The force continues its move towards embedding neighbourhood policing and has identified all of its 31 neighbourhoods, both in the pathfinder basic command unit (BCU) and in the other two BCUs.

An essential component of neighbourhood policing – customer focus – is at the heart of current force development: the force believes that everyone who makes contact with the organisation should receive a first-class service. Through the citizen focus steering group, improvements are being achieved in customer satisfaction from first contact through initial follow-up and to post-incident customer care.

The strategic direction of the force was reviewed at the start of 2008 and a three-year plan includes:

- mission: 'Creating a safer Cambridgeshire';
- vision: 'First-class, citizen-focused policing';
- values: 'Sensitivity, Integrity, Respect'; and
- the five strategic policing priorities for the force:
  - understanding changing communities;
  - helping and protecting vulnerable victims;

July 2008

- responding to prolific offenders;
- addressing the five key crime challenges (organised crime groups (OCGs); vulnerable neighbourhoods; anti-social behaviour and criminal damage; acquisitive crime; and serious violent and serious sexual crime); and
- counter-terrorism

### **Force developments since 2007**

The constabulary and Cambridgeshire Police Authority are working with other forces in the region to develop business cases in areas of support activity that will benefit from a shared service model, including the following.

- Work is currently well advanced to embark on a collaborative initiative with Bedfordshire, Essex and Hertfordshire police in relation to the provision of ICT services.
- Approval in principle has been agreed to initiate a collaborative programme of work relating to fleet management with Essex, Norfolk and Suffolk forces.
- Exploration of opportunities to work with partners has already generated reductions in insurance premiums for the coming three years, and a three-year procurement opportunity has recently been agreed in relation to IT hardware.
- Outline approval has been reached on recommendations for a regional serious and organised crime collaborative, incorporating a regional intelligence capability, witness protection, covert entry, undercover work, and kidnap and extortion response.
- Five forces in the Eastern Region have agreed a collaborative approach to the provision of air support.
- A user requirement specification is currently being completed in consultation with the five other Eastern Region forces to develop shared management of police information (MoPI) processes.

In addition to the aforementioned collaboration, the force is also working to:

- develop its information and communications infrastructure in order to support secure data information sharing at local, regional and national levels, including the expansion of Airwave interoperability with other forces and sharer organisations;
- increase the availability of mobile service connections to support service delivery at the front line;
- further develop the force's risk and opportunities management framework to capture early decision-making opportunities that will pre-empt strategic risks and lead to better use of resources;
- continue to develop its interpretation and translation capability in response to policing demands generated by an increasingly diverse community; and
- maximise opportunities to work with partner agencies in order to share information and assets that improve overall service delivery to communities.

The constabulary has been subject to inspection through a number of audit and inspection mechanisms during 2007/08, including:

- HMIC;
- internal audit commissioned by Cambridgeshire Police Authority;
- the Audit Commission;
- National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) peer review; and
- internal quality assurance and inspection commissioned by the Chief Constable.

*July 2008*

Recommendations and/or areas for improvement identified through external inspection mechanisms are captured within delivery action plans, and progress is monitored via either delivery planning processes or the force's performance challenge group. Recommendations, and the constabulary's response to them, are formally presented to the police authority's scrutiny and audit committee for ongoing review and scrutiny.

In addition to external inspection processes, the force's internal quality assurance team continues to undertake inspection and compliance testing in order to identify strengths and areas for improvement across the force, as directed by the Chief Constable's management team. Reports are reviewed, and implementation of recommendations monitored, by the force delivery board.

July 2008

## Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard
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### Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Cambridgeshire Constabulary's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the force's response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those that pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.320	0.307	-4.06%	0.300
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	No change	0.000
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.200	0.147	-26.50%	0.075
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	73.33%	72.73%	-0.6pp*	92.01%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.628	0.174	-72.29%	0.155
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	0.00%	23.08%	+23.08pp*	32.96%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.240	0.294	+22.50%	0.239
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	50.00%	50.00%	No change	65.62%
Number of manslaughters per 10,000 population	0.027	0.013	-51.85%	0.016
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	50.00%	100.00%	+50pp*	Not applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.094	0.107	+13.83%	0.102

July 2008

% of murders detected/convicted	85.71%	75.00%	-10.71pp*	83.67%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	2.498	3.059	+22.46%	2.269
% of rapes detected/convicted	14.97%	15.72%	+0.75pp*	20.62%

\*pp' is percentage points.

\*\* MSF group for Cambridgeshire is Gloucestershire, Northamptonshire, Staffordshire, Suffolk, Thames Valley, Warwickshire and West Mercia.

From the SPI data contained in the table above it can be seen that the main crime type that poses a threat to Cambridgeshire is that of rape. The rate of offences for rape (per 10000 population) are above both the MSF and national averages, this is a result of a significant increase during 2007. Levels of attempted murder are also above the MSF average but it should be noted that there was a decrease in 2007.

The SPI data also indicates that Major Crime investigation in Cambridgeshire Constabulary is not as effective as its peer forces. Cambridgeshire is performing at a level below the MSF average for all crime types (the exception to this is Manslaughter where only a small number of forces have suffered offences in 2007). However it should be noted that investigative performance with regard to blackmail offences has shown a marked improvement in 2007.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT) published in September 2007 indicated that Cambridgeshire was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to Homicide, Rape and Kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Cambridgeshire has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types is initially mapped. It is currently estimated that 48 OCGs impact the force area, across a number of major crime types.

The force protective services strategic assessment demonstrates a reasonable understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified serious, violent and sexual offences as its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on changing communities in the force area.

Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and/or addressed.

The force has invested suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and to inhibit major

*July 2008*

**crime. In particular, Cambridgeshire’s role in developing knowledge and awareness around human trafficking is noteworthy.**

**This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a maturing process in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire are recognised.**

July 2008

**Summary – The force has strong dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has a strong analytical capacity, with a total of 34 analysts and researchers employed across various departments. The balance of senior analysts, analysts and researchers is appropriate, given current and predicted demand.
- The recent establishment of an intelligence cell within the major incident team (MIT) structure includes a team of dedicated analysts. This means that there are sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the needs of major investigations. In times of exceptional demand, analytical assistance is drawn from elsewhere in the investigations directorate.
- The MIT analysts operate a contact system, whereby at least one of the team is available to attend an investigation to assist with the intelligence process at the earliest possible stage.
- Where intelligence from covert enquiries forms part of a major investigation, consideration is given to deploying a second analyst to deal solely with this intelligence. This enables the original analyst to continue with their area of work, as well as ensuring that effective intelligence firewalls are in place to protect covert tactics.
- The centralised analytical structure provides strength to support not only major crime investigation, but also other protective services elements. MIT analysts produce a range of analytical products to benefit investigations, in terms of inference drawing, identifying lines of enquiry and evidential presentation. Where intelligence gaps are identified, briefing documents for investigative teams are produced, outlining specific intelligence requirements.
- Analysts have an input to all training events for investigators, and the senior analyst on the MIT is an integral member of the senior management team. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has also received training to improve its understanding of the products that can be produced and how these can assist in presenting a prosecution case.
- At the start of a major investigation, the senior investigating officer (SIO) and analyst agree terms of reference, setting out the research criteria for the investigation. The senior analyst has introduced a document setting the minimum standard for research across three separate grades, indicating the level of research required for each grade and the timescales involved. When the required research has been completed, the results, including the systems that have been researched, are submitted on a pro-forma document to the major incident room (MIR).
- While there are analysts and a researcher dedicated to the MIT, they fall under the wider management of the investigations directorate. Although this means that

July 2008

they can be tasked to carry out other elements of protective services work, their terms of reference are clear in that MIT demands remain their priority.

- A force homicide reduction strategy has identified a three-strand approach for the force to focus on: domestic violence, alcohol, and community cohesion. Each strand has an identified lead and an action plan that links directly to other areas of force business.

### **Work in progress**

- The force has recently established a dedicated intelligence cell within the MIT structure. This consists of one detective sergeant, one detective constable, an administrative assistant, a senior analyst, two analysts and a researcher. The cell will support all MIT operations in respect of analysis, research and applications for covert tactics, thereby standardising the intelligence functions, with the same officers carrying out Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) and single point of contact applications and acting as telephone liaison officers. This is recognised as a work in progress, as the capacity of the cell to carry out these roles has yet to be tested.
- The force is seeking to refine its analytical structure still further, with a vision that has the principal analyst setting the strategic direction; the senior analysts managing, guiding and governing; analysts doing analytical work supported by researchers; and a number of document managers preparing maps and presentations to ease the administrative burden on their colleagues. The number of researcher posts is likely to be increased, but this will be at the expense of some analyst posts.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Results analysis has been used in major investigations, although infrequently. Its use can depend on whether the SIO has specifically requested it to be produced or whether the nature of the investigation required one. As a consequence, results analysis tends to be used more for project and strategic, rather than for operational and tactical, work.
- In spite of the high number of analysts in the force, there are still a number of what staff describe as 'drive-by taskings', whereby analysts are tasked out of the blue and at short notice, from a variety of sources both within the force and beyond. This impacts on their ability to carry out existing requirements and tasks. An example of such a requirement relates to a request to carry out an analysis of all honour-based violence in Cambridgeshire over the last ten years. Such requests necessitate one analyst devoting three weeks of their time to completing the task. These requests seemingly override ongoing work and, although a force tasking system exists, 'urgent' requests appear with regularity from beyond the investigations directorate.
- Analysts do not always receive complete access to intelligence. There can often be a delay in transferring intelligence from the CHARTER system (an electronic means of managing surveillance and other authorities) to the force intelligence system, INTREPID, to enable access by analysts.
- Mapping systems available to force analysts are not up to date. The force has

*July 2008*

used 'Blue8' and although updates are received, it does not have the architecture to enable them to be loaded.

July 2008

**Summary – The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force’s community impact assessments (CIAs) to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.**

### **Strengths**

- For all homicide investigations or critical incidents, a CIA is carried out. The inspector with geographic responsibility for the area involved is usually responsible for its completion, having been tasked through the daily management meeting (DMM). Copies of the CIA are passed to both the SIO and the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) room and are reviewed on a regular basis according to risk.
- The force maintains a critical incident database. Lessons from CIAs and debriefs are fed into this database to assist organisational learning.
- The MIT analysts use analytical products regularly and examples were given of subject profiles, target profiles, problem profiles, timelines and association charts. There is a clear desire to use analytical information to support the evidential aspects of individual investigations.
- The force intelligence bureau (FIB) has effective links, and meets as required, with the UK Border Agency, the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), as well as with other statutory and non-statutory partners and stakeholders.
- Drug market profiles, violent crime profiles and anti-social behaviour profiles are shared with partners in a sanitised format.
- A dedicated confidential unit was introduced in summer 2007, which sits within the covert management and authorities unit and is staffed by one detective sergeant and one member of police staff. The unit manages sensitive intelligence from covert operations and interceptions. The unit acts as the conduit for sensitive intelligence, including that passing to or from the SOCA.
- The force responded positively to the national Operation Pentameter (human trafficking). In identifying trafficking and prostitution issues thereafter, the force implemented Operation Radium, which has proved successful at proactively targeting such issues and dealing with victims in a consistent manner. This was in advance of Operation Pentameter 2 and the work of the force in this field has been hailed as national good practice.
- The force scans all its intelligence for relevance to other forces and outside agencies. This process is filtered through, and therefore monitored by, a dedicated external FIB 'mailbox'. This activity is carried out on a daily basis by a nominated desk officer and is seen as a priority for the FIB which will, where handling codes allow, disseminate this intelligence in a timely manner.
- An engagement plan and a data collection plan for partners are in place, involving, for example, primary care trusts and the county council crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs). The force has created a list of who it can share data with; this includes statutory partners with whom information sharing is mandatory. Over and above this, other partners are being identified to

link into the planning process for the next force strategic assessment (FSA).

### **Work in progress**

- A good working relationship exists between the CPS and the investigations directorate, with lawyers involved at the early stages of a major investigation. A service level agreement (SLA) is being drawn up in connection with applications for warrants of further detention whereby, after joint training, all such applications will be handled by the CPS. This will be in place by spring 2008.
- The force is in the process of reviewing a number of its written information-sharing agreements, including those with the SOCA, the UK Human Trafficking Centre, the UK Border Agency, HMRC and HM Prison Service.

### **Areas for improvement**

- An improvement in liaison and intelligence sharing with other business areas and partners is needed as a matter of priority, as local individual arrangements between post holders are relied on at present and information sharing was described by many staff as 'granular'.

**Summary – The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly thorough. Problem profiles are satisfactory, with links to force-level and basic command unit (BCU)-level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.**

### **Strengths**

- The FSA provides an accurate overview of the current and longer-term issues facing the force in respect of crime, disorder, anti-social behaviour, substance misuse, and behaviour adversely affecting the environment. The purpose of the FSA is to drive the business of the county council, unitary authority and constabulary, making recommendations for the prioritisation of identified problems.
- There are four strategic assessment documents prepared simultaneously, with a strong element of partner involvement in each. These are one per BCU and an HQ protective services strategic assessment. Each of these documents informs the creation of the FSA and is in the possession of the strategic tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) members, who meet as a group to consider the overall FSA and agree the force control strategy priorities and intelligence requirement. This year the outline FSA only made a passing reference to OCGs and protective services, but the strategic TCG felt that this was so important that it merited inclusion as a control strategy priority in its own right (drawing on the evidence within the protective services strategic assessment).
- When the control strategy priorities are agreed, a strategic lead is nominated for each. This individual is then tasked to prepare an action plan and/or IPE (Intelligence, Prevention and Enforcement) strategy. The strategic leads then meet collectively with the BCUs to ensure that control strategy priorities attain a level of synergy across the force. The control strategy and IPE plans are then made widely available to all staff.
- The FSA outlines the process that was undertaken in its preparation, along with the data sources drawn on. It identifies a number of challenges linked to major crime, including:
  - changing communities (including an awareness of particularly vulnerable communities);
  - vulnerable neighbourhoods;
  - anti-social behaviour and criminal damage;
  - reducing acquisitive crime; and
  - serious, violent and sexual crime (acknowledging the links between domestic abuse, alcohol, violence and homicide prevention).
- A separate protective services strategic assessment has been produced to provide a strategic overview of current and predicted demand in respect of protective services, cross-border and organised criminality. This document informs the FSA and therefore drives priority setting at county, strategic

July 2008

partnership and force-wide levels.

- The protective services strategic assessment acknowledges that understanding communities cuts across all police activity and provides opportunities for the development of:
  - identifying OCGs;
  - understanding the development of gangs and local dynamics;
  - identification and better support to vulnerable victim groups;
  - building cohesive communities; and
  - community intelligence.
- There are a number of sections within the protective services strategic assessment with identified strategic intelligence gaps focused on areas of major crime, including:
  - firearms;
  - denying criminals the use of the roads;
  - developing communities;
  - terrorism; and
  - public protection and homicide.
- BCU intelligence products are linked to force intelligence products, as are strategic assessments; for example, crime types such as domestic violence, violent crime, multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) referrals and national threats, such as human trafficking, are very much to the fore. They are discussed fortnightly at BCU tasking meetings and at DMMs and there are trigger plans in place for these threats.
- Although the FSA was published in November 2007, the planning process began in April, with planning days for stakeholders such as the county council and crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) to identify issues. In all, three stakeholder days were held and over 50 partner agencies were represented. A range of issues were identified, ranging from litter to serious and organised crime. These were distilled into documents and became part of the resource used to produce the three BCU strategic assessments.
- Analysts held interviews with heads of department to identify key issues and these were all brought together to produce the protective services strategic assessment. This, along with the BCU strategic assessment reports, was then amalgamated to form the overall FSA, from which five control strategy priorities were identified.
- Following the setting of the force control strategy, BCUs set their own control strategy. BCUs view the force strategy as an enabler for their own strategic priorities, while being mindful of force priorities.

### **Work in progress**

- The force is still working to align and integrate CDRPs and its own processes regarding the production of joint strategic assessments.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Many staff, particularly at BCU level, are not aware of the content of the control strategy. With this, there is the inherent risk of staff operating in silos with insufficient understanding of how their area of business impacts elsewhere in the organisation.

July 2008

**Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are appropriately shared with partners and BCUs. There is an emerging trigger plan for ‘hot briefing’ whenever a significant change either in the major crime threat, or where the nature of the analysis, demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners exist. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information (MoPI) compliance by 2010.**

### **Strengths**

- Intelligence requirements are tasked to neighbourhood policing teams (NPTs) through sector inspectors, and from the response inspectors via the DMMs. Examples of tasking include address checks on MAPPA referrals, and officers being made aware of the top ten domestic abuse repeat offenders and locations in their area.
- A MoPI project team is well established and oversees a force action plan and delivery plan covering the ten MoPI workstreams and identifying any strategic risks. Force implementation of MoPI phase 1 saw the undertaking of a force capability assessment and the drafting of a force information management strategy. The force was one of only a small number of forces to complete phase 1 and declare compliance before the due date.
- The force has developed and rolled out an online MoPI training package which to date 71% of the force’s personnel have completed.
- The force MoPI project team has devised and publicised useful process charts in respect of information sharing. There are two separate charts, one for police officers sharing with partners and the other for partners sharing information with the police. The former appears on the MoPI microsite on Camnet (the force intranet) to assist officers with all matters related to information sharing, including a model agreement. The charts take the process from cradle to grave, offering practical advice and explaining relevant terms and requirements as it unfolds.
- The force diversity unit maintains a skills database of staff with language skills. The force has a list of officers (accessible via the force control room) who have knowledge and/or skills in particular areas or who can offer advice, for example with sign language.
- In addition to the protective services strategic assessment, there has also been a themed strategic assessment carried out around public protection. This was informed by various sources, including partners. The outcome of this process has been the identification of key strategic work, for example subject profiles in respect of MAPPA nominals and analysis to assist child abuse investigations and identify paedophile networks.
- In the 12 months to January 2008, the force made 161 requests for advice and assistance to the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) specialist operations centre. This compares favourably with the other forces in the Eastern Region.

### **Work in progress**

July 2008

- There are plans to create a database on Camnet, which will record every information-sharing agreement and every occasion on which information is shared.
- The immediate aim of the MoPI project is to rationalise the information held by the force and make it as accurate as possible. This is a key issue, as there is a significant amount of information contained within discrete systems across the force.
- The force has begun to run pilots to assess data quality across all of the key systems identified in the MoPI guidance. The first area being worked through is the crime system. Data quality is a recurring theme, which the force has quite rightly identified and prioritised.
- The force is undertaking a procurement process with Bedfordshire, Essex and Hertfordshire police to purchase a data warehouse. As the force is leading regionally in respect of retention, review and disposal user requirements, it is anticipated that the data warehouse procurement may include a system that has a retention, review and disposal capacity built into it.
- The force has obtained a storage capacity at a former RAF base, to where all physical records have been transferred. These will now be examined with a focus on identifying information relating to MAPPA nominals, registered sex offenders and OCGs. Any information not required in accordance with MoPI requirements will be destroyed.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force achieved only a 31% compliance rate with the code of practice in respect of submissions to the Serious Crime Analysis Section in 2007. The national average is 72%. During this period, the force made 13 such submissions, only 4 of which were made within the allotted timescale of 14 days.

July 2008

**Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.**

### Strengths

- New Link, Peterborough City Council's asylum and migration service, has access to an increasing number of different community groups, thereby providing the council and partners with a useful barometer in respect of community feelings and issues. In addition, the force has strong links with the seven mosques in the city. Such work within its diverse communities has provided the force with a better understanding of issues, for example those relating to exploitation by gangmasters.
- CIAs are maintained by the community support unit and include threat levels to minority groups. BCU CIAs are reviewed weekly to identify any threat or increase in threat to any vulnerable communities.
- The force has been extremely proactive around investigating human trafficking and the exploitation of women in the sex industry. The force is a national leader in this regard.
- The force has carried out a significant amount of work to identify and dismantle Vietnamese cannabis factories.
- The force is aware of the need for intelligence on emerging communities and has encouraged staff to seek this by way of the force intelligence requirement, with its emphasis on understanding changing communities.
- The force engages with partners to assist in the identification of, and engagement with, newcomer communities. A multi-agency newcomer's guide has been produced and is published in 14 languages. The guide includes key information to inform and advise newcomers to the county from overseas. Partners also feed information into the guide, in order to identify concerns facing different communities across the whole community safety arena. The force has worked with the local criminal justice board and other partners to secure funding of £20,000 from the Office for Criminal Justice Reform to publish this guide, which is available at key community sites such as doctors' surgeries and libraries.
- A community engagement strategy has been in place since 2005. This has been the subject of a recent review involving partner agencies to confirm its continued relevance.
- The diversity unit is working to map communities, and has recruited a dedicated traveller liaison officer to engage with this particular section of the community. The post holder, a police community support officer (PCSO), is based within the rural team and has force-wide responsibility for engagement with the travelling community.
- The force has utilised the vulnerable localities index and Mosaic (a demographic profiling tool) methods to examine the make-up of its neighbourhoods, staffing

July 2008

deployment with partners and resident communities.

- The force used Operation Outlook (launched in January 2007) as a means of gathering community information. Staff received briefings that stressed the importance of such information and its relevance to organised criminality and terrorism.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Areas for improvement**

- There is limited understanding of those communities that are vulnerable to criminal infiltration. The force does a good job in liaising with the voluntary sector, as do NPTs, but this understanding could be further improved through NPT profiles.

**Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence, the force strategic risk register is reviewed every month by the force risk manager. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan.**

**Strengths**

- The force operates a Lotus Notes database, which records all key risks and mitigating actions. The strategic risk department manages this database. The force risk manager is responsible for embedding the risk procedure force-wide by ensuring that regular risk reviews take place at all levels and that business managers are trained in the use of the risk register database. Risks requiring further mitigating actions are assigned tasks, responsible officers and timescales, in order to bring the risk within acceptable levels of control.
- Authorised force officers have access to the Lotus Notes risk register and update tasks as they are completed. In the event that this does not occur, the database automatically emails the risk owner and the assigned officer for completing the task, as a reminder. Force senior managers in divisions, directorates and HQ departments meet monthly in their respective management teams to discuss risks, further actions being undertaken and amendments to be made to the risk register, as appropriate within their area.
- The force risk manager reviews the risk register monthly. Occasionally, risks are highlighted for consideration by the force management board.
- BCUs and departments, including the investigations directorate, have different risks, which appear on their own registers and which they are expected to mitigate and/or manage. A risk profile can be escalated from departmental or BCU to force level, if it is potentially beyond the BCU or department to manage.
- Each formal force project has its own associated risk register, examples being MoPI and the introduction of the National Strategy for Police Information Systems human resources package. If any risks are identified that cannot be managed by the project, they too are passed to the force executive board (FEB).
- Each risk on the database is given a unique reference number. This shows the nominated owner of the risk and to whom it has been allocated. Each risk is given a rating based on a scoring matrix, and this rating is displayed on the register. A table also shows how the force plans to deal with the risk and a confidence rating for the action plan. Behind the main display sits an action plan, which can be updated by the delegated owner.
- The strategic risk department quality assures and monitors all risks identified by directorates or BCUs that are considered important enough to appear on the force risk register. The FEB is responsible for managing high-level corporate (strategic) risks and ensuring that the risk management framework is effective; the force delivery board is the primary vehicle for discussing any operational risk identified.
- The police authority scrutiny and audit committee receives quarterly updates on the force's development and progress in its approach to risk management. In addition, the scrutiny and audit committee is invited to review the force risk

July 2008

registers on request and outside committee meetings.

- ‘Closed’ risks remain on the database in an archive facility, thereby allowing ready access if required. The force risk manager, who acts as an independent overseer of the process, carries out a closing statement.
- The police authority maintains its own risk register, which is reviewed as a standing item of the performance panel (a sub-group of the scrutiny and audit committee). Items on the police authority register tend to be general, such as the risks associated with not controlling the force budget.

### **Work in progress**

- The police authority commissioned a risk management report, which identified a number of recommendations, currently being worked on by the force. These included: the updating of police authority risk registers to present inherent and residual risk, further actions required and responsible officers and deadlines for actions; a formal review of risk registers for the police authority on at least a quarterly basis; the formal communication of the force risk management policy to all staff; formal risk management training for police authority members and staff; and the reporting of the force's top risks to members of the scrutiny and audit committee on a quarterly basis.

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

July 2008

**Summary – The force is creating ways of collaborating with some forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Some of the operational databases are searchable from the Eastern Region Intelligence Unit (ERIU). The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been partially implemented.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has a facility via its intranet site (Camnet) that allows officers to search HOLMES accounts for names, addresses and vehicles. The force maintains three separate types of core HOLMES account: live, dark (professional standards/covert enquiries) and test/training. When live enquiries are concluded, they are archived on the test server. Both live and test/training accounts can then be searched through Camnet, as the information is regularly downloaded into a data warehouse. In the event of a 'hit', the searcher is directed to contact the HOLMES support team within the MIT. The facility to search HOLMES accounts in this way is restricted primarily to intelligence staff (FIB/divisional intelligence unit (DIU)).
- All outstanding HOLMES1 accounts have now been upgraded and converted to the HOLMES2 database.
- Staff access to HOLMES for specific cases is agreed by the SIO and implemented and controlled by the HOLMES support team.
- Intelligence is shared on a daily basis between Cambridgeshire, Norfolk and Suffolk through the exchange of tagged events on their command and control systems. Intelligence is exchanged between the respective FIBs using 5x5x5 (a nationally used system whereby all intelligence is graded 1 to 5 according to its provenance, reliability and further dissemination) logs.
- A three counties (Cambridgeshire, Norfolk and Suffolk) automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) project manager develops and oversees collaborative opportunities surrounding ANPR and also maintains a watching brief on work in the remainder of the Eastern Region (Bedfordshire, Essex and Hertfordshire). Included in the regional work is an element of equipment sharing between forces.
- ANPR back-office facility (BOF) data is routinely accessed by analysts although, given its volume, it is not part of the weekly scanning process.
- There is evidence of ANPR being used proactively. For example, vehicles belonging to OCG nominals can be flagged on the ANPR hotlist, and both FIB analysts and DIU staff access BOF data routinely.
- ANPR is well used and understood by force SIOs. Examples were given of operations to which it has contributed, such as Operation Aberdeen. This was the kidnapping of a man from Peterborough who was later found murdered on the Thames Valley/Hampshire border.
- The INTREPID system is accessible by all staff through CAMNET, but restrictions are in place as intelligence develops to a higher security level.
- The inspection found good evidence of joint working between the serious and

July 2008

organised crime team (SOCT), NPTs and partners, for example on vice and human trafficking operations. Open and closed research takes place to develop intelligence on specific properties, and the local knowledge of PCSOs and NPT staff is used to identify brothels. If there were any indications that women were being held against their will, a warrant would be executed that day. In other cases, the force would commit to a longer-term joint operation with partners, with a shared focus on enforcement and harm reduction.

- Sector intelligence officers on NPTs are tasked by DIUs to fill intelligence gaps at level 1. Intelligence tasks are also identified from the critical incident database and fed to the NPTs through DMMs.

### **Work in progress**

- There is an element of analytical work ongoing, led by Cambridgeshire, as to the movement of criminals. This will further enhance the intelligence-led process by locating ANPR cameras where they are best placed to impact on disrupting the criminal use of road networks.
- A standard operating procedure (SOP) is being drawn up in conjunction with Norfolk and Suffolk to detail and standardise the roles and responsibilities in ANPR processes across the three forces. Suffolk and Norfolk already have linked BOF and there are plans to extend this to include Cambridgeshire and possibly Essex.
- The second phase of the i2 workstation, an analytical tool, (pending at present) will include ANPR as a searchable data source when implemented.
- There is no routine access to regional forces' ANPR data unless specifically requested, although with the forthcoming upgrade of BOF this may become possible.
- Work is ongoing regionally to develop ANPR sites at prison establishments, thereby recognising and exploiting intelligence opportunities.
- Intelligence from the examination of mobile telephones, such as contact numbers, can be captured using a program to allow data to be exported into an Excel spreadsheet. There is no system in place as yet, however, to enter this onto wider intelligence systems; this could be a valuable investigation tool for major investigations.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force does not have access to neighbouring forces' intelligence systems; only the ERIU has such access. As a consequence, the force is not always as informed on cross-border issues and intelligence as it could be. Access to other forces' intelligence systems is not formalised.
- Responsibility for ANPR in force does not sit with the investigations directorate, resting instead with roads policing/operations. In spite of some pockets of good practice, ANPR was seemingly viewed very much as a 'traffic issue' by a significant number of those interviewed. There is considerable scope for the force

*July 2008*

to develop the intelligence potential of ANPR.

- ANPR tasking is very fluid and it was accepted that there is a large element of self-tasking within the roads policing unit (RPU). Formal requests for ANPR assets do, however, come through the force tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TTCG).
- In spite of ANPR links to CCTV systems and a number of vehicles fitted with ANPR, there is no dedicated intercept facility. This represents a significant flaw in the overall ANPR picture and can impede operational effectiveness.

July 2008

**Summary – The force has a case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is highly effective.**

### **Strengths**

- The major crime review procedure clearly sets out the process by which all major crime reviews are conducted and identifies the different types of review that may be undertaken. The assistant chief constable (ACC) is responsible for commissioning reviews, although the head of investigations or the head of the MIT identifies cases for review and sets the terms of reference on behalf of the ACC.
- Invariably, either the head of investigations or the head of the MIT will carry out an early intervention review (72 hours), whereby they will review fast-track actions and lines of enquiry with the SIO. Thereafter, a 7- and/or 28-day review will be commissioned if the offence remains unsolved.
- The head of investigations or the head of the MIT drafts the terms of reference for the reviewing officer. Lessons from reviews are fed onto the investigations website on Camnet to ensure that they are made widely available. The recommendations contained in the review are formulated into an action plan which is maintained on the website, identifying nominated owners and timescales for delivery or compliance.
- The head of investigations and the head of the MIT have attended a review officers' course and generally carry out the reviews themselves, although other SIOs in the force or outside forces have been called upon if necessary.
- In the event of a progress or closure review, the host BCU will be invited to attend and take part in a discussion panel, from where good practice and/or learning points can be shared with the wider force.
- The HOLMES administrator sits on the regional HOLMES user group and feeds learning and good practice from this, as well as internal reviews, to other HOLMES staff through a series of supervisors meetings. There is also a regional disclosure group and an exhibits user group, where again good practice is discussed and fed back to the force by those attending.
- In the event of forensic issues being included in the terms of reference for a review, either the scientific support manager or a senior scenes of crime officer (SOCO) will form part of the review team.
- The head of the investigations directorate is a member of the ACPO homicide working group and is the temporary ACPO lead for public protection and child abuse. As such, he is well placed to pick up national good practice.

### **Work in progress**

- The force previously used a separate 14-day review for HOLMES, but this was not maintained due to it being resource intensive. However, with the recent structural changes to the MIT HOLMES section and the training of staff to fulfil

July 2008

different roles, this process is to be reintroduced.

- There is currently only one staff member trained to perform the role of crime scene co-ordinator. This is an invaluable role for investigations that involve the management of more than one crime scene. The force is planning to train four of its senior scenes of crime managers to carry out this role.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Line managers undertake reviews of rape investigations informally. There is no formal review or system to monitor the quality of review as advocated in Recommendation 5 of the HMIC thematic inspection of rape investigation and prosecution, *Without Consent* (January 2007).

July 2008

**Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.**

### **Strengths**

- Specialist assets are ultimately held to account through the force performance challenge group (FPCG), chaired by the Chief Constable. The meeting receives updates on ongoing operations, which stage operations have reached and any cold case issues.
- Specialist resources in the investigations directorate are held to account by the superintendents who head each specialist unit. Quarterly performance figures are produced which are shared with BCUs and other departments.
- The tasking of analytical resources is co-ordinated through the DMM and/or force tasking processes.
- The ACC chairs the force TTCG meetings, which are utilised as a forum for tasking force resources according to demand and incorporating requests from BCUs and HQ departments.
- In the weeks leading up to Christmas, the domestic violence unit runs an initiative in support of domestic abuse victims. This consists of giving advice to NPTs on preventative measures they can discuss with known domestic abuse repeat victims. NPTs also spoke of there being a strong emphasis on domestic violence at area tasking meetings.
- Demand in respect of major crime is considered on two fronts. Firstly, the force has implemented a homicide reduction strategy which has examined a significant amount of data pertaining to the nature of homicide offences within the county. This has identified three main ‘types’ of homicide against which the force is seeking to employ preventative measures. Secondly, a specific strategic assessment relating to protective services has been commissioned and this makes reference to the wider aspects of public protection, including not only homicide but also vulnerable youths and adults along with paedophilia.

### **Work in progress**

- A formal review of the National Intelligence Model is being carried out. Issues exist around corporacy, in that HQ departments and BCUs tend to produce products of differing quality, and work in different ways. The intelligence steering group identified this as an area for development, and the review must address this if the force is to fully embed its work against major crime in its daily business.

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

**Summary – Due to appropriate training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.**

**Strengths**

- Beyond the generic force diversity training programme, there is no bespoke training for officers involved in major crime. However, the force recognises the importance of developing expertise in this area and has created a critical incident database. Issues highlighted from critical incident and major enquiry debriefs are entered on the database for easy reference. Its contents are also cascaded to the wider force through investigator forums or toolbox talks.
- The human resource department holds details on its database of specific skills held by officers and police staff, for example cultural or linguistic. Entry onto the database is entirely voluntary, and access is open to all staff. The department is responsible for regularly checking that the database remains accurate and up to date.
- SIOs attend critical incident debriefs and divisional gold group meetings to identify lessons learnt and good practice, which are passed on to MIT staff through supervisory or office meetings.
- Area-based hate crime teams are considered very supportive when called on to assist with cultural issues during criminal investigations. As well as being contactable directly, hate crime staff can also be tasked through DMMs although there is no formal facility to contact these officers out of office hours.
- The force has carried out a significant amount of work with various communities through the Initial Police Learning and Development Programme. Student officers are required to complete a community engagement project over the duration of their training period. The Association of Muslim Police Officers assists by delivering talks on cultural awareness issues such as etiquette when entering a mosque.
- Awareness of cultural issues among NPT and other staff, both on the front line and HQ based, is good. Officers have access to force seminars, and supervisors attend toolbox talks to develop their learning in this area.
- The family liaison officer (FLO) database holds details of officers with specialist skills, such as sign language. If a particular skill is required from an FLO but not held by an officer in the force, then other forces will be approached to assist so as to ensure that the needs of the victim are met.

**Work in progress**

- Officers can access information in respect of different communities through the Camnet-based 'Know your communities' microsite. This is a useful and informative guide to key cultural issues that officers may encounter. There are plans to include video streaming on the microsite to further enhance its capability.
- The Association of Muslim Police Officers is working with the training department to develop a written cultural guide for inclusion in the patrol directory.

July 2008

- Experience of cultural issues has been developed across the MIT through shared learning from investigations. An example given related to the burial needs of members of the Muslim faith. It is proposed to capture this learning and widen its access when the new key individual network (KIN) database is fully operating.
- While diversity awareness among student officers and younger service officers is good, the force acknowledges that further work is needed to improve awareness among longer-serving officers and police staff.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The HQ-based diversity unit is viewed as not being as supportive as it could be, with the consequence that BCUs tend to rely on their own hate crime teams as points of contact for all advice on cultural issues.
- Access to advice relating to diversity issues is restricted to office hours. Other than the critical incident database, there is no access to published guides such as pocket-sized reference books. Officers spoke of using the internet at night if they needed assistance with a particular cultural issue.

## Prevention

**Summary – The force has an independent advisory network (IAN) and a key individual network (KIN) which are frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.**

### Strengths

- A previous independent advisory group has been absorbed into the Cambridgeshire Independent Advisory Network (CIAN), which widens the scope of the force to access community advice for major investigations. It also recognises the growing and changing nature of communities resident in the force area. The force also makes use of community tension teams to help inform community issues.
- An example was given of a murder investigation involving the traveller community, with whom the FLO was having problems interacting. Recognising the potential for adverse consequences for community relations, the force established a bespoke IAN. This included representatives from the traveller community, the Farmers' Union and Countryside Watch, who were able to offer differing viewpoints and ultimately calm the situation. The force took the conscious decision not to undertake any vetting of these individuals, as it was considered necessary and proportionate to accept a degree of risk inherent on a 'needs must' basis. While the use of the IAN in these circumstances is a strength, the force should consider the composition of IANs or gold groups providing community advice.
- The community cohesion unit at Peterborough has a team of officers and PCSOs who speak 17 languages between them. This, along with the local knowledge of the NPTs, provides ready access to community advice and support for most types of incident, including homicide, and by way of an example provided by the force, abduction.
- The force has established a network of multi-lingual support officers who provide interpreting services. These are members of the public who work with the force on contracts and are paid only for the services they provide. Given the huge translation service bill the force was faced with in 2006 (£836,785), this is an innovative and cost-effective step, which has led to significant financial savings in 2007 (down to £528,000).

### Work in progress

- The force is developing a KIN database which was due to go live in March 2008. The database is an IT solution that includes CIAN members, but which will be more robust around the key issues of identifying how diverse the force's community contacts actually are, the level and frequency of engagement with them (all contact is recorded by the system) and the value this brings to the force and community. The force is also considering access levels and vetting issues.
- The KIN database will record details of individuals who have indicated their willingness to be contacted for community and diversity advice. NPT inspectors will be responsible for ensuring that details of contacts are kept up to date, including willingness to remain on the database and to be contacted.

- The force will be seeking to draw on the knowledge and expertise of the Association of Muslim Police Officers to improve its community engagement and KIN activity.

**Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

**Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were sufficiently understood by call management staff and first responders.**

### **Strengths**

- Awareness of golden hour principles is good among front-line officers. Scene preservation is dealt with promptly and efficiently, and senior detectives spoke of no adverse issues relating to the setting up of cordons or the use of scene logs. This is due in part to all force supervisors attending a one-week crime scene management course.
- Critical incident awareness is good, with response inspectors attending to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated and that the scene is sufficiently protected. Events that have the potential to escalate to this level are identified at an early stage through daily tasking and management procedures.
- Call-out procedures for major or critical incidents are robust, with call-out rotas being available and up to date in the force control room. In most cases, the first point of contact is the area detective inspector (DI) who, having assessed the circumstances, will consider whether a force SIO should be contacted.
- An SLA between the scientific support department and BCUs provides for a daily scenes of crime service to BCUs from 7am to 11pm. Outside these hours, an on-call service is provided for serious crime, either for attendance or advice.
- Any requests for an SOCO to attend a scene out of office hours are routed through the on-call area DI, who will assess whether the circumstances require an SOCO to be contacted. While this process differs from many other forces, in which responsibility would fall to the senior SOCO, this decision was arrived at following an internal quality assurance inspection, which identified the need to tighten up on the unnecessary call-out of staff.
- In support of golden hour principles, the force carries out training scenarios at a local airfield. A policy document provides guidance on who should be called in the event of a major crime or critical incident, and the force patrol manual also includes guidance on the golden hour principles.
- All force SIOs appear on a call-out rota in groups of three. This means that at any one time the detective chief superintendent or a detective superintendent is the on-call force SIO, supported by a deputy SIO (detective chief inspector (DCI) or DI). The third member of the team will be an officer shadowing for learning and development purposes who will be working towards their professionalising the investigative process (PIP) accreditation.
- A dedicated MIT assumes responsibility for most homicides in the force and a HOLMES manager and indexer are always available to respond to set up an MIR out of normal business hours.
- There is a business continuity agreement with Norfolk to provide a HOLMES service on stand-by when version or server upgrades are taking place.

July 2008

- Overall testing of force infrastructure, for example the force control room and call handling, takes place on a regular basis. The ACC is keen to test areas of the force to ensure that they are fit for purpose. The ACC is also keen to ensure that the most appropriate partners take the lead and responsibility in the event of an emergency, for instance an influenza pandemic. In preparation for such situations, the ACC has arranged training for local authority chief executives on how to prepare themselves for chairing gold groups.
- A policy is in force whereby homicide investigations are classified in accordance with the *Murder Investigation Manual* and minimum staffing levels are set out for each category.
- In all instances of homicides investigated by the MIT, the SIO's aim will be to utilise the MIT staff in the enquiry. This does not preclude the fact that at the beginning of any major enquiry there may be divisional officers involved in retrieving significant evidence.
- Every detective constable on the MIT is trained to perform the exhibits and disclosure officer role and most have had the opportunity to perform these roles at least once, with ongoing refresher training provided. Detective sergeants also receive awareness training for disclosure, while some staff are to be trained in an advanced area of disclosure to deal with particularly sensitive issues.
- In the event of a Category A homicide investigation, there is resilience within the scenes of crime department to meet the demands of the rest of the force. Assistant SOCOs have been trained to provide support and there is flexibility to move staff around the force as required.
- A business continuity plan exists for the MIT. This incorporates a list of functions, dependent functions and relevant departments affected. The plan sets out a list of actions to act as a starting point for the recovery process, ranging from immediate evacuation and commencement of a log, to identifying damage and disruption and communications strategies. Each function is subject to a risk assessment.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

July 2008

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force has now switched to version 12 of HOLMES. However, the disaster recovery system previously in place to support HOLMES is now obsolete, so the back-up server is not compliant with version 12. This should be addressed as a matter of some priority.
- In 2007 a programme was set up to train BCU staff in HOLMES functions as part of business continuity planning, but only three sergeants from one BCU attended. BCUs were unwilling to release staff for this training on the basis that the force had an MIT to perform these functions and therefore it was not an efficient use of resources to send staff on a two- to three-week course. Although it is acknowledged that long-standing cross-border agreements with Suffolk and Norfolk have been used successfully in the past to address shortfalls, the force may wish to revisit this training to ensure that there is sufficient resilience in this area beyond the MIT.

**Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.**

**Strengths**

- A homicide prevention strategy explores the potential for preventing homicide within Cambridgeshire. In doing so, it draws on data from the last three years of homicide within the county. It also utilises the strategic analysis completed by the force of homicides between 1996 and 2006. The strategy identifies three key themes to preventing homicide. These are community cohesion, domestic abuse, and alcohol/drugs, which taken individually or together account for 64% of homicides in the force area.
- To ensure that this knowledge informs and drives daily business, the force domestic abuse strategy links into and refers to the homicide prevention strategy through aspects such as the domestic abuse risk model (SPECSS) and the concept of multi-agency risk assessment conferences (MARACs). The work carried out in respect of the night-time economy also links into and features the homicide prevention strategy, as does work around community cohesion, which through Operation Outlook feeds in details of inter-community violence.
- The force has identified links between domestic abuse, child protection and vulnerable adults. SLAs have been agreed with BCUs, clearly outlining responsibilities and accountabilities. Domestic abuse scanning occurs on all BCUs, although there is some potential for improvement in this practice.
- NPTs carry out prevention work to break offending patterns of domestic abuse. If repeated incidents of domestic abuse are identified, or children are on the 'at risk' register at addresses where domestic abuse is regularly happening, then the NPTs will conduct cold visits at different times of day to check on the welfare of victims and children. Outcomes from the visits are reviewed through the DMM.
- Homicide prevention through community cohesion ties in with key work on BCUs. Fortnightly multi-agency meetings take place on Northern BCU, whereby a number of interventions are in place to reduce or remove tensions. An example is the Safer Schools programme, which has seen BCU resources in schools on the area double in an attempt to defuse tensions between gangs and ethnic groups.
- Near-miss offences, such as an increase in the number of stabbings, are identified through the area or protective services DMMs. Resources or analytical support can be offered as a consequence and specialist assets would also be considered.
- Community safety sergeants on BCUs are responsible for maintaining the BCU CIA. The top ten repeat calls in each division are disseminated to the NPTs each month, and it is their responsibility to problem-solve these to reduce demand. All three divisions do this differently but with similar objectives.

**Work in progress**

- The force acknowledges that there is still work to do in relation to domestic abuse, but progress has been made and cases are now better managed via the DMM, ensuring that outstanding offenders are pursued and dealt with. Repeat

July 2008

victim identification and management have improved, assisted by the establishment of the MARAC process. One BCU has invested in 15 headcams in an attempt to reduce the gap between reported domestic abuse incidents and offences brought to justice, particularly among the Asian community where attrition rates are higher. The force also acknowledges that there could be further improvements in the provision of victim advocacy services, but these are partner funded. Ultimately, the force would benefit from an integrated domestic abuse strategy.

- In relation to tackling alcohol and drugs, there is a full partnership support programme in place, but again there remains scope for development. There is a strong drive to have in place a co-ordinated alcohol harm reduction strategy that includes planning partners, as there have been a number of issues with supermarkets selling large amounts of alcohol, especially to Eastern Europeans, who then feature disproportionately in alcohol-related offences.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Drug-related deaths are not pursued unless it is clear that the circumstances are suspicious. Dealers are not pursued to identify supply chains in relation to drug deaths. This represents an area of vulnerability for the force and the processes around the investigation of drugs deaths should be standardised as a matter of priority.

**Summary – The policy covering threats to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of regional operations were found.**

**Strengths**

- There is a clear and comprehensive force policy in respect of threats to life. A document sets out the procedure, with supporting flowcharts, to be followed in the event of intelligence being received to indicate such a threat. Initial responsibility falls to the DI/duty officer, who makes an assessment of all available intelligence and in set circumstances briefs the on-call superintendent. This officer in turn reviews the intelligence grading, risk assessment and tactical options in place or under consideration. The superintendent has to ensure that a number of actions are undertaken. These include nominating an SIO, creating a tactical plan, starting a policy file, informing ACPO and completing a CIA.
- Any force response to resolve a high-risk threat to life must be overseen personally by an officer of ACPO rank, who will appoint an SIO to take charge. If a letter is to be issued, prior approval must be obtained in writing from ACPO.
- In the event of out-of-hours advice or assistance being required in respect of threat-to-life issues, the on-call SIO will be contacted. Advice for staff also appears on Camnet.
- Overall, there was a good level of awareness among senior and detective staff of the concept of ‘Osman’ warnings (see Glossary) and what/why they are used.
- A record of all Osman warnings is maintained on INTREPID, which documents the intended victim’s details, the nature of the threat, the fact that an Osman warning has been issued and the suspected aggressor’s details.
- A nominal search on INTREPID would automatically flag up any previous Osman warnings.
- The lessons identified as a result of the Van Colle case (a case whereby the police response to an individual at risk was found to be lacking) are being cascaded to front-line supervisors by way of toolbox talks. The recently revised threat-to-life policy also includes these lessons, and the patrol directory will be amended so that it too addresses threat-to-life issues.
- Armed criminality or commercial robbery have not formally been adopted as control strategy priorities. As the biggest risk of harm from this crime type comes from OCGs, the force will target armed criminality through this priority area. Activity relating to BB guns and air rifles is likely to be prioritised through neighbourhood panels.
- Although there is evidence to suggest that OCGs in the county do have access to firearms, the scale and spread of this use and access are different from those in other counties. A detailed firearms threat assessment has taken place and was refreshed in October 2007. This confirmed that the criminal use of firearms remains relatively small. As a consequence, the force homicide prevention strategy focused on the three main sources of potential homicide, excluding

firearms.

- The force worked successfully on Operation Arctic, a regional gun crime operation investigating a series of armed robberies and automatic teller machine offences, in conjunction with a number of other forces. Other similar operations are currently ongoing.

### **Work in progress**

- Rather than having a separate firearms suppression strategy, elements of the action plan in the firearms risk assessment against identified risks are currently considered sufficient. A more thorough tagging of firearms incidents, linked to a robust intelligence review which is currently under way, may lead the force to consider such a strategy, but at present it has not been commissioned.

### **Areas for improvement**

- There is no analytical work carried out around the circumstances leading to the issuing of Osman warnings. This is of particular relevance, as more Osman issues are arising due to the ability of the force to identify risks, particularly those contained solely in the criminal fraternity, often referred to as 'bad on bad'.
- While Osman warnings generally inform trigger plans, most notably in the form of operational orders, the force needs to consider the longer-term aspects of such cases and the propensity for further violence, once the initial threat has been dealt with.
- The force must strive to ensure that awareness of its threat-to-life policy is widely understood by those charged with overseeing the initial response, particularly at DI level. Focus groups spoke of recent issues with Osman warnings where the on-call DI has been contacted for advice but the individual was unclear as to the procedures to be adopted or what advice to give.
- Awareness of the threat-to-life policy and inherent issues among NPT and BCU staff was found to be limited.

**Summary – The force lacks a witness protection capability, relying instead on a collaborative agreement with Norfolk Constabulary. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by, dedicated staff only. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.**

### **Strengths**

- To improve its response to witness protection issues, and recognising that its capacity was limited, the force entered into a collaborative arrangement with Norfolk and Suffolk. As part of the agreement, the force pays Norfolk £50,000 per year, plus any costs associated with each case, to handle all its witness protection issues. Norfolk is at present handling one particularly complicated and sensitive case on Cambridgeshire's behalf, with the likelihood of another of similar magnitude on the horizon.
- The DCI in the FIB is the nominated single point of contact for witness protection issues.
- There is a clear procedure that is adopted if an essential witness, who meets the necessary criteria, is identified. The matter is referred initially to a DI on division and then to the FIB. The inspection found a good awareness of this procedure among divisional and HQ-based staff. Once assessed in force as suitable, the case is then referred to Norfolk.
- There is a formal process to monitor expenditure in witness protection cases carried out on the force's behalf by Norfolk, whereby the head of investigations, and if necessary the finance director, meet regularly with their Norfolk colleagues to discuss current and future funding issues on a case-by-case basis.

### **Work in progress**

- The force witness protection policy was reviewed in December 2007 and sent out for consultation, including to Norfolk. This is currently awaiting approval.
- The force, in common with many others, is striving to overcome the situations it has experienced whereby other forces temporarily house witnesses in their force area and for up to two years classify it as temporary, and as such do not inform the host force.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force is overly reliant on Norfolk to manage its witness protection issues and as such there is no contingency plan or resilience should Norfolk be unable to cope with demand. There is a view that the force would seek assistance from Essex but this is not documented.
- The officer in the FIB who assists the DCI single point of contact is trained, but not formally accredited to national standards.
- There is some misunderstanding across the region, in that Norfolk believes that Suffolk would support Cambridgeshire if required, when in fact there is minimal resilience in Suffolk. Cambridgeshire has only negotiated with Norfolk to support

*July 2008*

it and was unaware that Norfolk saw Suffolk as a contingency. This matter ideally needs to be addressed by the respective ACPO teams as a priority.

- Awareness of witness protection issues in general, and the Van Colle case in particular, was poor among NPTs and front-line staff, including supervisors.
- The collaborative arrangement with Norfolk is not formalised or documented, appearing instead to be reliant on correspondence between key individuals.

July 2008

**Summary –The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.**

### **Strengths**

- The process for identifying signal crimes or significant community events is sound, in that analysts are fully involved in scanning to highlight potential issues. For example, an increase in burglary dwellings would be seen as potentially indicative of an increase in drug activity. Such matters would be raised at the BCU DMM and/or the fortnightly area tasking meeting. This could also feature as part of the level 2 DMM held after those on BCUs. The inspection found evidence of a good working relationship between the FIB and DIUs.
- The DMM process is considered effective in terms of identifying community and other issues at BCU level that impact not only on that BCU, but also on a wider scale. The FIB scans a number of systems on a daily basis, including Serious Crime Analysis Section offences, drugs incidents, sexual offences and distraction burglaries. The scanning process is informed by the control strategy priorities and involves an FIB desk officer rostered to come into the office early to carry this out and prepare the information for the DMM.
- Measuring threat and harm to communities at level 1 is conducted through auditing teams on BCUs. Potential threats, for example a change in the type or nature of offences, are also reflected at the force level 2 TTCG meeting. BCU CIAs are examined by the auditing team and assessed as low, medium or high.
- Operation Bakerloo on Northern BCU examines emerging tension across communities in the city of Peterborough. This involves, where appropriate, members of the IAN and special branch, and aims to prevent any escalation in tension through the identification of preventative action. Any measures put in place are reviewed by the group on an evolving basis to assess the effectiveness or otherwise of particular actions or strategies.
- The CIA that runs alongside a major enquiry continues after an enquiry has been detected or concluded, to allow the BCU to understand the impact of recent police activity. Responsibility for informing the CIA rests with the NPTs, although the community safety department is responsible for maintaining the document.
- NPTs, in particular the multi-lingual PCSOs, are an effective tool used by the force to gauge levels of tension in different communities and the impact of policing activity thereon.
- A 'crossfire team' on BCUs is responsible for monitoring performance and detection rates and will identify any drop in performance. The force operates on the principle of 'today's jobs today', thereby ensuring that incidents are responded to in a timely manner.

### **Work in progress**

- The threat posed to vulnerable communities from criminal gangs represents an area of concern for the force. One example given related to a number of assaults

July 2008

among the Lithuanian community in Peterborough. While the levels of recorded assaults were falling, ambulance statistics showed a 20% increase in calls to resource such incidents. Information/data was not being received from accident and emergency (A&E) units and the force is seeking to address this. Uniformed and plain-clothes officers now work in A&E units and a template to share information, taken from the *Delivering Safer Communities* document, is in place.

- At Peterborough A&E unit, the BCU is funding a receptionist to sit in the unit to complete questionnaires asking why patients are attending, for example as a result of attending licensed premises, or which community group they are from. It is envisaged that this initiative will allow the BCU to gain a broader understanding of the threats present and which communities are involved and affected.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Little, if any, work has been carried out in respect of developing a set of indicators to assess and measure harm in communities.

**Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force sometimes considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a draft security policy in place to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.**

### **Strengths**

- There is evidence of a strong operational security culture within the force, which operates a 'clear desk' policy, swipe-card controlled access, SOPs and notices of inclusion. The clear desk policy is enforced, with secure cabinets available for the storage of files.
- A system is in place to identify the most frequent users of the internet. Information is initially sent to line managers to deal with, although the professional standards department (PSD) may become involved with repeat offenders.
- The PSD has established a confidential reporting line. An email facility exists in the form of a link to the PSD from INTREPID, so officers can raise concerns online if they wish. There is also an external telephone number for public use, called 'SafeCall', which uses an 0845 number.
- Anti-corruption initiatives are intelligence led. The force is currently running two such investigations. Due to the level of resources available, the force conducts risk assessments of each case and prioritises accordingly.
- A memorandum of understanding exists between all six regional forces in respect of PSD operations, with an additional protocol for telecommunications matters.
- The heads of the PSD and the MIT meet regularly to discuss major crime issues. The head of the MIT has been asked to quality assure the PSD draft policy on golden hour response to deaths in custody or following police contact. It has been agreed that in the event of a death in such circumstances, the head of the MIT would be the SIO, supported by a deputy SIO from the PSD.
- The PSD has its own investigative capability, with a DCI who is accredited to PIP level 3. If the PSD requires assistance from the MIT with investigations, then a request for MIT resources will go through the tasking process.
- The major crime property retention and storage policy provides a framework to deal with the issues of short, medium and long-term storage of major crime documents and exhibits. The purpose of the policy is to ensure that the integrity and maintenance of all exhibits and documents are maintained. The policy also ensures that property is properly disposed of in an expedient manner as soon as practicable, thereby freeing up space at the appropriate time. The policy sets timescales for SIOs and exhibits officers to ensure that best use is made of all existing storage space.
- The relevant system users control access to the Camnet 'Vision' search facility. Access to the different search levels depends on the role of the individual. To obtain access to the various levels, an officer must email a request, authorised by their line manager, to the relevant system user (each system having a nominated

user manager).

### **Work in progress**

- The PSD is ready to undertake 'mystery shopping' exercises, but currently these do not meet defined PSD priorities. The PSD does, however, carry out market testing of complaints.
- If FEB approval is secured, the force vetting unit has identified around 200 to 300 individuals and a list of critical posts to be the subject of management vetting (MV).

### **Areas for improvement**

- A paper has been submitted to the head of the PSD from the force vetting manager seeking FEB approval for the introduction of MV for sensitive posts within the force. The paper includes the drivers for the introduction of MV, together with a list of business areas recommended for such vetting. The force must consider vetting as a priority and move forward as a matter of some urgency.
- While the force vetting unit is adequately funded and resourced at the present time, this will change if the force moves to carry out MV. Further staff will be required, although a review of resources is not expected to be held for at least another 9–12 months.
- No vetting process is in place for the investigations directorate. Some members are vetted to security cleared (SC) level but not all. A skills profile has been prepared recently, but this did not include vetting levels. This represents a significant area of vulnerability for the force.
- The force has given little consideration to contingencies and/or policies around staff who are in existing critical posts but who refuse or fail the planned vetting process.
- Given that vetting is in such an embryonic state in the force, no consideration or scoping of aftercare implications have yet taken place. This must be a key aspect of force activity to reduce the risk of infiltration.
- There are no inbuilt systems to alert the force of any inappropriate use of IT systems, for example an officer conducting checks of registered sex offenders in the area where they lived rather than where they worked. If such activity was identified, however, the officer's use of IT could be monitored thereafter.
- Following the retirement of the force security manager, there are no plans to replace this individual, so the head of the PSD is currently managing this area, although the policy for estates management and security rests with the estates department.
- Staff expressed concern at the level of checks undertaken when accepting PCSOs into the organisation. The ACPO team took a conscious decision to waive the three-year residency rule when recruiting PCSOs with multi-lingual skills, to enable the force to have a team of PCSOs to meet the requirements of

*July 2008*

diverse communities across the force. While the rationale for such a decision is acknowledged, the force must implement contingencies and strategy for any adverse implications that may arise.

- The force should consider how vetting issues should be handled in respect of members of the CIAN or key individuals upon whom the force may rely for community advice.
- The force has a procedure for storing documents and exhibits over the short, medium and long term. For the medium term, documents and exhibits are moved to a hangar at Alconbury, where they are placed into individual alarmed pods. Although the premises are alarmed and there is a call-out procedure in place, there is no contingency for protection in the event of a fire. This is a situation the force should address at the earliest opportunity.

## Enforcement

**Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are effective, with appropriate use made of independent advisory groups and community membership of gold command support groups.**

### Strengths

- The ACC provides a weekly operational update to the police authority, which includes the previous week's events as well as forthcoming events. There is also a 'way forward panel' run by the police authority chair every four to six weeks to discuss wider issues, such as major trial updates.
- The police authority is present at the Chief Constable's monthly 'off the record press briefing', aimed at local journalists and television stations.
- The head of the investigations directorate updates the chair of the police authority as to ongoing costs of operations through personal meetings with the chair and formally through the police authority finance and resources meeting.
- All members of the police authority are vetted to counter-terrorist check level and basic checks are also undertaken. Five members are SC vetted, based on their access to sensitive information and operations.
- The ACC will inform the chair of the police authority personally if an incident merits the police authority becoming aware. An example was the death of a child on the A47 witnessed by a police officer.
- The ACC is the chief officer lead for serious and organised crime. The work of the investigations directorate is overseen through the FPCG and the force tasking process, both chaired by ACPO officers.
- The ACC takes an active role in managing the protective services portfolio and achieves a fair balance between being supportive and challenging.
- A previous independent advisory group has been absorbed into the CIAN, which widens the scope of the force to access community advice for major investigations. It also recognises the growing and changing nature of communities resident in the force area. The force also makes use of community tension teams to help inform community issues.

### Work in progress

- None identified.

### Areas for improvement

- Although formal meetings are held between ACPO and the police authority at which major crimes are discussed, there is no lead member for major crime. The police authority views operational activity as a police matter; consequently, it considers the need for involvement in this activity to be minimal.

*July 2008*

- There is a dedicated police authority lead member for protective services, but the focus has almost exclusively been on counter-terrorism. Consequently, there is scope for the police authority to be more involved in the oversight of major or serious crime issues, either in terms of operational activity or funding issues.
- The police authority treasurer monitors force finances, which includes spending on major and serious organised crime. However, there appears to be no formal monitoring mechanism other than by way of the finance and resources committee.

July 2008

**Summary – The ACPO lead and the head of crime are trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, CIAs and policing in partnership.**

### **Strengths**

- The three ACPO team members have all received internal RIPA training and are trained in the role of officer in overall command (OIOC), as is the head of the investigations directorate. The head of the MIT is due to attend the OIOC course in the near future.
- The ACC has an investigative background and is a trained SIO. He has also attended SCIMITAR training and is trained as a gold commander. He has chaired a number of gold groups, with examples cited of a product contamination and the kidnap of a UK national (from Peterborough) in Pakistan. This latter case attracted considerable sensitivity, particularly around the issues of community advice, as given the various interests apparent the force had to exercise extreme caution when seeking such advice.
- The head of the investigations directorate represents the force and the region on a number of key national groups, including the homicide working group, and is currently the ACPO lead for child protection and infant deaths. He is also the vice-chair of the family liaison committee. He is a trained SIO and has attended the management of linked and series crime course.
- The head of investigations has had key roles on two linked kidnap enquiries and has performed the role of OIOC once, as well as being the deputy OIOC on Operation Arctic. He is currently working with Greater Manchester Police to review the role of the OIOC, which involves consideration of the most appropriate person to perform the role and the most effective structures.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

**Summary – The force’s performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes, cost, inputs and outputs.**

**Strengths**

- For the first ten days of a major investigation, finance is provided from a centrally held fund, controlled by the ACC. Unless the circumstances of the investigation justify a further bid from this fund, finance beyond this period is provided and rigorously managed from the budget allocated to the head of the investigations directorate. Such a process serves to concentrate the minds of senior investigators and ensures strict oversight of expenditure on major crime enquiries.
- The head of the investigations directorate monitors expenditure on major enquiries on a weekly basis and all budgets are discussed formally at a bi-weekly senior management team meeting. A full breakdown of costs is provided to the head of the investigations directorate on a monthly basis. This is reinforced through monthly meetings between the ACC and the head of the investigations directorate, which also includes the force finance manager and each of the BCU commanders. All current operational activity in respect of major crimes can be discussed at the FPCG or the force TTCG.
- A business manager has been appointed to the MIT, whose role is to capture all operational costs, including forensics, travel and overtime.
- The head of the investigations directorate manages the overall budget for the directorate, including the £2 million forensic budget and the separate SOCO equipment budget of £45,000.
- Monitoring of CPS performance in rape investigations is conducted through regular meetings with a full-time rape lawyer, although the same process does not exist for counsel. Force performance relating to rape investigations is also discussed at the FPCG.
- Lessons learnt from reviews are entered onto the investigations website on the intranet. SIO seminars are held every six months, which all DIs and above attend along with senior SOCOs and senior analysts. These seminars focus on internal operations and good practice is highlighted and discussed. Guest speakers are also invited to speak on their specialist areas.

**Work in progress**

- While policies and structures for rape investigations have been developed, performance has remained constant (the force has an 83% attrition rate). A public protection unit action plan is in place, led by a DI, and includes domestic abuse and serious sexual assaults. The force has submitted a growth bid to the police authority for two dedicated rape investigators on each BCU, together with six full-time sexual offence trained officers. These officers will allow for 24/7 coverage across the force. If the growth bid fails, then BCUs will appoint their own investigators, although these are likely to have a larger remit, such as investigating woundings and other serious assaults.

### **Areas for improvement**

- While the investigations directorate budget is rigorously managed, there was little awareness among force SIOs of how funding is allocated to their enquiries. The current process requires each SIO to update the head of the MIT at a weekly management meeting on the status of their investigations and to identify what further enquiries and resources are required. The head of the MIT will then submit a budget request to the head of investigations. SIOs lacked awareness of this process.

## Performance management and resilience

**Summary – The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability within the force and supported by a written regional agreement to meet the predicted major crime investigation demands; collaborative agreements with the SOCA exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide partial protection for the investigative capability.**

### Strengths

- Force policy and guidance for dealing with sudden deaths has recently been updated. There is also an SLA between the MIT and BCUs, which clarifies the process by which a suspicious death is handed over to the MIT from a BCU. The MIT will assume responsibility for all homicide investigations, but will also support any BCU enquiries that are not deemed as being a homicide investigation with staff should there be capacity to do so.
- There is good awareness and knowledge of the protocol for dealing with deaths in medical settings and prisons. Relationships with the three prison establishments in the county are effective, with prison staff having received awareness training on scene preservation from the force.
- A less well-refined protocol exists for deaths in military establishments, although there is an effective liaison with the commanding officers of the establishments in the force area.
- Force SIOs have received NPIA training in work-related deaths, although these are usually dealt with by BCUs. SIOs interviewed stated that they had also attended seminars on deaths in medical settings.
- In the event of an infant sudden death, there is an on-call detective sergeant or DI from the child and domestic abuse investigation unit, who will be contacted along with the force SIO.
- An SLA exists with the forensic science service (FSS) for sexual offence submissions and, as part of it, the FSS has provided some training for SOCOs in this area. The force also has an effective relationship with FSS specialist advisers and can demonstrate effective and regular use thereof.
- Senior SOCOs deliver scene preservation training to new recruits on their initial course and to the sergeants course. The force is currently preparing to introduce a night detectives course that will include golden hour principles.
- All forensic submissions from BCUs have to be approved by the senior SOCO, except for drug identifications, which divisional drug officers oversee. Forensic submissions are then sent to the force submissions officer, who retains an overview of which exhibits have been sent and received back.
- There is good awareness of golden hour principles across the force. Staff have received training on scene preservation, resulting in cordons and scene logs being used promptly and effectively at the outset of any major crime scene being

July 2008

identified.

- The force has fully signed up to and embraced the PIP process, which is now well embedded in the force. The appointment of a full-time PIP registrar and a full-time internal verifier, and integration with the performance development review (PDR) process, have given the PIP project credibility throughout the force.
- The force has 27 SIOs accredited to PIP level 3, including divisional DCIs; DIs will not pursue PIP accreditation but will attend the NPIA DI course. The rationale for this decision was the difficulty DIs would have in maintaining the skills.
- If a new SIO joins the MIT and is not already PIP accredited, then they are allocated an SIO course on appointment and would immediately begin their portfolio towards accreditation.
- All SIOs have HOLMES access and good awareness of HOLMES through attendance at six-monthly awareness updates.
- Divisional DIs are exposed to more serious crimes, as they are generally the first senior detective present and responsible for all golden hour issues. They will then assume responsibility for rape, serious assaults and witness intimidation issues that do not reach the MIT. It is envisaged that the NPIA DI course will further equip them with the skills to handle such investigations.
- A number of tier 5-trained interview advisers are located in the MIT and the SOCT as well as on BCUs.
- There are sufficient HOLMES terminals within MIRs to cope with predicted demand, with additional terminals on BCUs to support any unexpected increase in demand.
- Two members of the HOLMES team are responsible for all HOLMES training, which is delivered to suit individual roles within the MIR. Refresher training is also delivered and the MIT budget provides for this.
- The force has a collaboration agreement with Norfolk and Suffolk to staff major investigations at times of extraordinary demand. This agreement has been implemented on a number of occasions, most notably for Suffolk on Operation Sumac. The force would also consider an approach to the ACPO Police National Information Centre if resources were required from beyond the region.
- The MIT has four MIRs located across the force area. Each has an office manager and a detective constable for HOLMES, a detective sergeant and seven investigators, as well as administrative support. BCU staff spoke favourably of the support they receive from the MIT, particularly at weekends when assistance is often provided with obtaining witness statements or in suspect interviews.
- In addition to providing all HOLMES and casualty bureau training, the HOLMES unit can support office managers and its staff are trained and competent to provide back-up in this role. For business continuity purposes, this provides three extra office managers.
- A total of 42 trained call-takers are available for the casualty bureau, with an additional 12 for MirWeb (a web-based message input facility directly linked to

July 2008

the HOLMES2 Incident room database). All call-takers receive a six-monthly, half-day refresher course. The force has committed to resource eight call lines for 16 hours a day, with ten call-takers on duty at any given time within that period. This is dependent, however, on their host department or BCU releasing them for this role.

- The force has also trained 15 staff for the roles of messaging and nominal matching in the casualty bureau, and four MIT sergeants are due to be trained for the casualty bureau supervisor role.
- There is a chief inspector dedicated to examining collaboration and issues arising from the *Closing the Gap* report on a full-time basis. The force is also heavily involved in a number of collaborative ventures with other forces in the Eastern Region under the auspices of the six counties collaboration (serious and organised crime) group. This includes the areas of firearms, surveillance and the technical support unit (TSU).
- The force has 54 accredited FLOs supported by eight family liaison co-ordinators (FLCs), all on a 24-hour rota. All FLOs are accredited to PIP level 2. A database holds the deployment status of FLOs, together with details of welfare referral. While this is a sound structure, the force is having difficulty in recruiting new FLOs, with only 12 out of 15 vacancies being filled in 2007. These are key roles in major investigations; therefore, the force may wish to review the way FLOs are recruited or deployed to ensure that future posts are filled.
- The force also has nine FLOs trained to deal with families that have experienced the sudden death of an infant.
- The FLO procedure document sets the requirements for welfare referral. All traffic FLOs are required to attend one annual pre-arranged appointment with the occupational health department. It is the responsibility of the officer's supervisor to ensure that mandatory referral is complied with. Crime FLOs are required to make contact with the welfare officer on completing an FLO role or on their return to their full-time duties, whichever is the earlier. There will be no exception to this without prior agreement with the FLC.
- The core roles of exhibits, disclosure and file building within the MIR are always sourced from the MIT and all MIT detective constables are trained in these roles. Therefore, if a major investigation is kept on BCU and operated on HOLMES, the MIT would supply officers to perform these roles. The MIT will also provide an exhibits officer to attend post-mortems for suspicious deaths that are handled by BCUs.
- A staff rotation policy has been introduced to replace the force tenure policy for the MIT. It has been identified that there is a need to routinely move staff across the various teams attached to major investigations in order to enhance their professional capability, maintain enthusiasm and ensure that the efficiency of management is maintained. Reviews of posts from detective constable to DCI are conducted at different stages through the year. Moving staff across geographic teams is seen as enhancing their personal development. The movement of staff between teams also ensures that a balanced supervisory process takes place and that no bad practice is adopted and then maintained on any individual team based on cliques being formed.

July 2008

- In March 2007, a detective career development post was introduced. The idea is to deal with a perceived skills gap on BCUs at detective constable level. With the MIT dealing with all homicides and any other crimes of sufficient complexity, there has not been sufficient opportunity at BCU level for detective constables to gain experience in major crime investigation. Consequently, a vacancy is held on the MIT known as the 'MIT development post'. It is advertised each year and offered to individuals on BCUs for a four-month attachment.
- The force has introduced a series of toolbox talks which are one-day training events held across the county, catering for up to 150 people at a time. Topics have included missing persons and golden hour principles. They are targeted mainly at sergeants, but anyone can attend to gain benefit. Attendance is recorded and can be used as PDR evidence. All newly promoted sergeants are required to attend.

### Work in progress

- The force is now looking to develop its toolbox talks to 'e-toolbox' for those who are unable to attend the present talk days. This is an IT solution where a specialist speaker, for example an SIO, is videoed giving a presentation. This is streamed via the force intranet, making it accessible to all staff. The video is divided into chapters and the viewer can move from one to another as required, as well as re-winding to listen to specific points over again. A set of frequently asked questions allows for interaction.
- The force is drawing up a skills matrix for all its staff to provide an up-to-date picture of skills and gaps in training. This will also be used for workforce planning purposes and promotion processes to identify gaps when staff move on. Delivery of this is due for spring 2008.
- A hybrid sexual assault referral centre exists at one hospital within the county to provide victims with the best available service within one building. A bid for £600,000 has been submitted to the police authority for the creation of a number of sexual assault referral centres across the county.
- The force has developed a serious sexual offence action plan to address the recommendations contained in *Without Consent: A Report on the Joint Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Rape Offences*.
- The force is trying to amalgamate PIP with the PDR process, as at present completing both is an additional demand on officers' time. Officers have also expressed concern about the review element of the accreditation process, as divisional criminal investigation department (CID) staff do not get exposure in this area. To overcome this, the head of the MIT has extended an invitation to divisional staff to get involved in reviews, but in reality the demands of the divisional work make this difficult to achieve.
- While a database is maintained to record all FLO deployments, there is no trained FLC to oversee traffic FLO deployments, although an officer is to be trained in the near future.

### Areas for improvement

July 2008

- Unless asked, supervisors are not routinely attending sudden deaths. This leaves a police constable to decide whether or not a death is suspicious. This has serious consequences for the force, in that crucial early evidence could be lost at a potential homicide scene if the wrong decision is made.
- There was a lack of awareness among those who carry out house-to-house enquiries of the personal description form. This is an essential pro-forma, which describes each individual being interviewed during these enquiries. Again, in the event of a Category A homicide, lack of knowledge in how to complete a personal description form could lead to valuable evidence or potential witnesses or suspects being missed.
- BCU senior detectives do have the opportunity to remain on an investigation as deputy SIO if it is passed to the MIT. Invariably, however, this does not happen, as there is reluctance on the part of BCUs to release them. Consequently, development and PIP accreditation opportunities are missed.
- There is a lack of structure around the management and investigation of rape investigations. Stranger rapes are not specifically built into the remit of the MIT and are left to BCUs to investigate. While all efforts are made to provide a quality investigation, this is not always achieved. A DCI or DI will oversee a rape investigation during its early stages and may start a policy file. However, much of the work is left to a detective constable supervised by a detective sergeant. In some areas, the investigator could even be a temporary detective constable, such is the lack of experience at BCU CID level. It is acknowledged that much of this may be offset through the serious sexual offence action plan (see Work in progress), but the situation at the time of the inspection was one in need of significant improvement.
- This lack of experience within the CID can have consequences for the quality of first response to major crime scenes. Although uniformed supervisors also attend, it is to the late/night duty detective constable that some will turn for advice. Unfortunately, many divisional detective constables in the force are inexperienced and the night crime car can be staffed by temporary detective constables, who may have only recently sat the CID exam.
- Authority to close a rape investigation varies across the force. While authority should rest with a DI, on Southern BCU this falls to a detective sergeant. This officer is responsible for overseeing all rape investigations, in addition to maintaining her own workload and managing her team. On a weekly basis, she examines all current rape investigations to ensure that lines of enquiry are being pursued. Although this may be a thorough process, responsibility for signing off rape investigations should sit at a higher level.
- The procedure for contacting a Home Office pathologist lacks structure and could lead to unnecessary costs being incurred. At present, divisional DIs or traffic sergeants, as well as individual SIOs, are calling pathologists to scenes. If a divisional officer does make the call, then that officer's BCU is responsible for payment of the call and for any subsequent post-mortem. Authority for contacting a pathologist should sit at a higher level to ensure consistency and a control of force budgets.
- The lack of staff to fill some lead roles within a HOLMES incident room means that compliance with major incident room standardised administrative procedures

July 2008

(MIRSAP) is not always achieved. Staff interviewed stated that a Category B homicide investigation would involve the office manager also performing the role of receiver and reader. This means that the office manager is checking their own work.

- There is no resilience on BCUs to staff a HOLMES incident room for a local investigation. The MIT has provided HOLMES-trained staff rather than BCUs using their own. Consequently, some divisional staff have become de-skilled and there have also been issues with divisions being reluctant to release staff for refresher training.
- There are delays with BCUs releasing staff who have successfully applied for a specialist post. CID offices are particularly affected and even when an officer is released, their post is not always backfilled; this creates a resilience issue within the department.

July 2008

**Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Resources and equipment are delivered through written collaborative agreements, which are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.**

### Strengths

- There are strong collaborative arrangements in respect of crime training across the Eastern Region. The force training manager is chair of the regional investigative training managers group, which has overseen the establishment of a regional team to deliver the Initial Crime Investigators' Development Programme simultaneously from two centres in the region, in Hertfordshire and either Norfolk or Suffolk (in turn). Core crime trainers are based at both these centres and are supported by external training providers when necessary.
- The force is now heavily involved in a number of collaborative ventures with neighbouring forces in the Eastern Region under the auspices of the six counties collaboration (serious and organised crime) group.
- The force has a mobile armed surveillance team (MAST), resourced by roads policing officers, which acts as a bolt-on to the force surveillance team as appropriate and necessary. In the event of a call-out request, a MAST could be assembled and on the road within a maximum of two hours.
- Numerous examples were provided of the proactive use of specialist resources, covering covert techniques to detect abduction and shooting offences. Training and awareness are provided to staff at all levels in relation to the acquisition and use of such techniques.
- There is in existence a three counties collaborative protocol in respect of serious and organised crime. The aim of the protocol is to provide clarity over the preferred deployment of resources in cases of extraordinary demand in the following areas:
  - surveillance (mobile/armed/technical/ covert rural observation posts);
  - covert human intelligence sources and undercover operatives;
  - financial investigation (asset recovery/money laundering);
  - economic crime investigation, including identity theft;
  - deployment of mobile and static ANPR equipment and databases;
  - high-tech crime, including network investigation and data recovery;
  - kidnap investigation; and
  - technical support capability, including intrusive deployments.
- Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire constabularies have agreed to support each other in the delivery of the above disciplines in times of extraordinary demand. The nature and extent of the support to the owning force will be determined on a case-by-case basis, agreed by the respective head of crime for the neighbouring force(s) providing it.
- The force is a signatory to a regional firearms agreement with the five other regional forces and the Ministry of Defence Police at Wethersfield. Where an operation for which firearms have been issued requires officers to follow subjects into another force area, the initial authorisation will remain valid. A reciprocal

July 2008

arrangement will exist, allowing armed officers to cross into adjoining force areas, provided that the authority of the other force's operations room inspector is sought. The inspector will ensure that an officer of ACPO rank in the host force is informed at the earliest opportunity.

- Responsibility for responding to incidents of kidnap and extortion rests with the investigations directorate. The surveillance unit has carried out work to identify potential drop zones and 'red' centres. A second phase of this work will see the drop zones videoed.
- The TSU has an equipment budget of £70,000, which is considered sufficient to meet predicted demand.
- The force has had a dedicated specialist operations unit (SOU) in place since 2003. It has a full-time establishment of one detective sergeant and two detective constables. Two of the officers are fully trained and accredited national undercover operatives, with the others currently undertaking the training process. The SOU provides tactical advice to all undercover/test purchase and decoy operations as well as cover officers for such investigations. The SOU carries out full feasibility studies on behalf of the force, along with all RIPA applications and risk assessments. The force can realistically run two test purchase operations at any given time with the resources at its disposal.
- The SOU acts as the central co-ordination point for test purchase officers and negotiates the presence of test purchase officers from other forces to work in the force area and vice versa. A skills profile exists for each force test purchase officer so that operatives with the most appropriate skills are deployed on each occasion.
- A full covert banking system exists and legends have been arranged, via the regional undercover accredited centre (Essex), but funded by Cambridgeshire.
- A 'covert adviser' is attached to each adopted operation to offer specialist advice on sensitive and other tactics.
- In respect of kidnap offences, the force has made contingencies for the use of its surveillance team to act as 'blue' with the support of the SOCA. There is a policy in place and SOPs to cover this eventuality, including arrangements to handle sensitive intelligence through the confidential unit. There are also 'go bags' held with the TSU, which is on call to resource 'red' centres.
- With only one surveillance team, any extraordinary demand would be addressed by requesting assistance from Norfolk, an arrangement that currently works well when it is invoked.
- The force reassessed its training needs as part of the TSU review and identified issues around log keeping and camera operation as being of concern. As a result, the force entered an agreement with the NPIA to 'buy in' nationally accredited training and deliver it locally. This represented a considerable cost saving and, over a two-week course, 48 staff were trained in camera competency. A separate log-keeping course is being arranged at the present time, with two courses planned in addition to the one already delivered. This course will incorporate not only the 48 previously trained on the camera course

July 2008

but a further 12 staff, including members of the SOCT.

- The regional TSU lead force is Norfolk and it has assisted Cambridgeshire on occasion. Cambridgeshire often seeks assistance from Essex and/or the SOCA, with which relations are strong.
- The RPU has its own trained SIOs to manage the investigation of fatal road collisions. SIOs are working towards PIP level 2 accreditation and have received training in the use of policy files and on crime scene considerations.
- A dedicated collision investigation unit of 15 officers is responsible for investigating all fatal road collisions within the county and they are also working towards PIP level 2 accreditation. They are trained to tier 2 investigative interviewing standard but if tier 3 or 5 standard is required, then the MIT provides support.
- There are 60 trained RPU FLOs trained to national standards. Some FLO courses are joint RPU/crime. A database is maintained to record all FLO deployments, although there is no trained FLC to oversee RPU deployments. However, an officer is to be trained in the near future.

### **Work in progress**

- Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire are looking to share their ANPR intercept teams and the Norfolk SOP has been accepted by the other two forces, which will be implementing it as a result.
- The majority of serious and organised crime operations are managed on a paper system, as opposed to HOLMES, although the paper system does allow for the electronic retention of documents on an FIB shared drive, with access controlled by the SOCT DCI and FIB managers. The DCI is reviewing the current systems and protocols, with a view to introducing a more effective electronic system such as CLIO (used by other forces to manage kidnap operations).
- The key findings from the protective services gap analysis of serious and organised crime were that the biggest gaps in terms of resilience and threat related to drugs and cross-border crime. The force is now in the process of formulating its plan to respond.
- The force is considering whether to appoint, as a growth post, a full-time civilian member of staff as a principal TSU officer.
- The head of the TSU has submitted a £150,000 capital growth bid to be phased over three years to convert the force to digital systems, such as events management software. This has been supported by the FEB but is awaiting ratification by the police authority.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The TSU is managed by a DI, who also has responsibility for the force surveillance team and the SOU. There is only one dedicated member of TSU staff, with three (against a figure of four) 'field officers' based in the surveillance team, but who carry out TSU deployments. This presents clear difficulties in

July 2008

terms of resilience and the ability to service the volume of requests for TSU assistance. Staff described the TSU as being 'barely afloat'.

- One of the surveillance team field officers or the dedicated TSU officer is always on call, although if the latter is called out, resilience is non-existent the following day; and if it is a member of the surveillance team, then it too is left short. When the TSU officer is on leave or sick, the surveillance team field officers cover his work. This again means that the surveillance capability is affected, with the force described by staff as 'standing still for the week'. The TSU has not grown in Cambridgeshire as it has in other forces and is comparatively understaffed.
- No joint MAST training between the surveillance unit and firearms team has taken place for over a year.
- One SOCO has been trained in covert forensic recovery, but has not yet begun to put this training into practice.

**Summary – The force has an on-demand case review team that is generally deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is efficient.**

### **Strengths**

- A major crime review procedure document sets out the process by which all major crime reviews are carried out, including cold cases. It defines a cold case review as not being a re-investigation but an internal review of a historic investigation.
- The force has developed a matrix on which all outstanding homicides, some rapes and some missing persons enquiries are entered, including the location of case papers and exhibits. The matrix considers matters such as forensic potential, witness potential, outstanding enquiries and intelligence. These enquiries are then put onto HOLMES.
- Operation Advance referrals from the NPIA are initially received and reviewed by the head of the scientific support department. The scenes of crime department has contributed to the review of these cases, while the main lines of enquiry are pursued by the MIT.
- The RPU has carried out its own review of cold cases, although the number of these is small. Assistance has been sought from the scientific support department and the FSS, following which a crime SIO was invited to review the findings.

### **Work in progress**

- Discussions with Norfolk and Suffolk are being held to examine the potential for a three counties cold case review team. There is no indication from any of the forces as to how long this may take to develop.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The lack of a dedicated review team means that any new investigative opportunities are only pursued when there is capacity within the MIT to do so. More concerning is the potential for a suspect to re-offend while lines of enquiry remain within the incident room to trace and arrest that suspect.
- The facility to review long-term missing persons is not robust. The missing persons database only covers those missing over the last ten years. Beyond that, the force relies on the Police National Computer to identify cases, although the location of case papers may not always be known.

July 2008

**Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force is predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the *Murder Investigation Manual* and MIRSAP.**

**Strengths**

- Policy files are used by SIOs on all homicides in compliance with the *Murder Investigation Manual* and MIRSAP. The head of the investigations directorate or the head of the MIT reviews them at regular intervals.
- There are occasions when some roles within the MIR are collapsed, creating situations where HOLMES staff perform more than one role. However, this is always done following consultation with the SIO and the office manager, as well as in accordance with the recommendations of MIRSAP.
- The role of the disclosure officer is seen as one that will not be performed alongside another, nor will the office manager role. Most MIR staff have an awareness of, and can carry out, the role above their own position. The force is also seeking a police staff office manager from within existing MIR staff with the necessary experience.
- SIOs consider carefully their indexing requirements for each individual investigation and have deferred, on occasion, to the minimal indexing guidelines contained within MIRSAP.
- Guidance books and NPIA doctrine books coming into the force go directly to a central point in the practice guidance department. Each one is then cascaded out to the most appropriate lead person for that area of work and all relevant information is put onto the intranet.
- The head of the investigations directorate has contributed to writing national guidance and has written the family liaison chapter of the *Murder Investigation Manual* as well as the ACPO child protection guidance document.

**Work in progress**

- None identified.

**Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

## Recommendations

### Recommendation 1

With regard to the regional arrangements for witness protection, there appears to be an element of misunderstanding, in that Norfolk believes that Suffolk would support Cambridgeshire if required, when in fact there is minimal resilience in Suffolk to do so. The force has only negotiated with Norfolk to support it and was unaware that Norfolk saw Suffolk as a contingency. This matter must be addressed by the respective ACPO teams as a priority, as at present there is no contingency plan and limited resilience should Norfolk be unable to cope with demand.

### Recommendation 2

Drug-related deaths are not pursued unless it is clear that the circumstances are suspicious. Dealers are not pursued to identify supply chains in relation to drug deaths. This represents an area of vulnerability for the force and the processes around the investigation of drugs deaths should be standardised as a matter of priority.

## Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

### A

A&E	accident and emergency
ACC	assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition

### B

BCU	basic command unit
BOF	back-office facility

### C

CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CIA	community impact assessment
CIAN	Cambridgeshire Independent Advisory Network
CID	criminal investigation department
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service

### D

DAAT	drug and alcohol action team
DCI	detective chief inspector
DI	detective inspector
DIU	divisional intelligence unit
DMM	daily management meeting
DSU	dedicated source unit

### E

ERIU	Eastern Region Intelligence Unit
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**F**

FEB	force executive board
FIB	force intelligence bureau
FIU	financial investigation unit
FLC	family liaison co-ordinator
FLO	family liaison officer
FPCG	force performance challenge group
FSA	force strategic assessment
FSS	forensic science service

**H**

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HTCU	high-tech crime unit

**I**

IAN	independent advisory network
IPE	Intelligence, prevention and enforcement

**K**

KIN	key individual network
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**M**

MAPPA	multi-agency public protection arrangements
MARAC	multi-agency risk assessment conference
MAST	mobile armed surveillance team
MIR	major incident room

July 2008

MIRSAP	major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MIT	major incident team
MoPI	management of police information
MSF	most similar force(s)
MV	management vetting

**N**

NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
NPSAT	National Protective Services Analysis Tool
NPT	neighbourhood policing team

**O**

OCG	organised crime group
Osman	Osman v UK (1999) 1 FLR 193, where the court established that in certain circumstances the state has a positive obligation to take preventive measures to protect an individual who is at risk from the criminal activities of others

**P**

PCSO	police community support officer
PDR	performance development review
PIP	professionalising the investigative process
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act
PSD	professional standards department

**R**

RIG	regional intelligence group
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
RPU	roads policing unit

**S**

SAR	suspicious activity report
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July 2008

SC	security cleared
SCIMITAR	Serious Crime Intelligence Management Information Technology and Resources'
SGC	specific grading criteria
SLA	service level agreement
SIO	senior investigating officer
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SOCO	scenes of crime officer
SOCT	serious and organised crime team
SOP	standard operating procedure
SOU	specialist operations unit
SPI	statutory performance indicator
<b>T</b>	
TCG	tasking and co-ordination group
TSU	technical support unit
TTCG	tactical tasking and co-ordination group