

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



**HM Inspection Report**

**British Transport Police  
Major Crime**

**August 2008**



*British Transport Police – HMIC Inspection Report*

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## **Introduction to HMIC Inspections**

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both of the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities. A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that Neighbourhood Policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

## **HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09**

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents as phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;

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- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of Neighbourhood Policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

## **The Grading Process**

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

### **Meeting the standard**

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

### **Exceeding the standard**

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

### **Failing to meet the standard**

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

## **Developing Practice**

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit examples of its good practice. HMIC has selected two of these examples to publish in this report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

## **Force Overview and Context**

As a non-Home Office force, British Transport Police (BTP) differs significantly from Home Office forces in terms of funding, accountability and specialisation, although the force strives to observe relevant Home Office policing standards. HMIC regards BTP as a specialist police force for which some nationally accepted performance measures are applicable but recognises that other measures are relevant only to the force, such as timeliness of investigations for fatal railway incidents. A customised approach to this assessment has therefore been agreed with BTP and the British Transport Police Authority (BTPA) to take these differences into account.

This inspection follows the format of phase 2 of the HMIC inspection programme for serious and organised crime and major crime.

## **Geographical description of force area**

BTP is the specialist police force for the railways of England, Wales and Scotland and provides the policing services for the London Underground, Eurostar, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, the Docklands Light Railway, the Croydon Tramlink and the Midland Metro. BTP's national structure takes into account national borders, discrete legal systems, train and freight operating company (TOC and FOC) boundaries and other diverse elements of the railway network. It is not constrained by the geographical boundaries of other police forces and covers the whole policing environment of the rail network, including assistance for businesses and individuals, who operate, live and work in the surrounding areas. This structure is designed to provide a single point of contact and consistency in policing standards across the railway network.

## **Demographic description of force area**

With over 10,000 miles of track and more than 2,500 stations, the population BTP serves is mainly commercial, including 2.5 million passengers daily on the national rail system and another 3 million daily on the London Underground and Docklands Light Railway networks. Some 400,000 tonnes of freight travel through or visit premises within BTP's jurisdiction daily. The growth in public transport and the expansion of the 24-hour city culture means that BTP polices economic and social hubs throughout mainland Britain, made up of small communities of general retail outlets, offices, restaurants, bars and nightclubs. The force does not police a residential population, but is charged on a daily basis with the safety of some 5 million passengers and in excess of 100,000 railway staff.

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With 2,839 police officers and 1,227 police staff, 261 police community support officers and 254 special constables, BTP faces a significant challenge in policing a diverse and extensive rail network.

### **Structural description of force including staff changes at chief officer level**

The force headquarters (FHQ) is in Camden, north London, and there are seven territorial basic command units (BCUs), known as 'areas', with local geographic responsibility. The FHQ is the location of the majority of force specialist and support functions, including the major crime teams and force intelligence bureau (FIB).

BTP has a well-established management team with a wealth of command experience. The chief officer group has seen the appointment of a new assistant chief constable (ACC) (crime), Paul Crowther, and a new director of finance, Sharon Burd. A new post of ACC (London and Olympics) has been created and the incumbent, Stephen Thomas, has been appointed by the Home Office as the national co-ordinator for cross-modal Olympic transport security for all modes of transport for the 2012 Games.

There have been no major changes to the BTPA, although Sir Alistair Graham will not continue as chairman beyond September 2008. BTP maintains an excellent relationship with members.

Since the privatisation of the rail network, government policy has been that the user (the railway industry) pays for the services of BTP and that the BTPA enters into commercial agreements with the rail industry for the provision of police services. BTP relies on funding from Network Rail, the TOCs and FOCs, Transport for London and London Underground Ltd. This is a challenge for a modern police force, as it relies on commercial profit margins and the marketplace for the funding required for medium and long-term planning, and this has been a concern raised by HMIC for a number of years.

### **Strategic priorities**

BTP focused on five objectives set in the strategic plan for 2005–08, which were relevant to the period under inspection. These were to:

- work with partners and the railway community to prevent crime by tackling the causes of crime, as well as dealing with crime incidents;
- investigate all aspects of a crime and satisfy the needs of victims and witnesses. BTP aims to undertake investigations that are efficient, effective and timely, in order to increase the number of detections and the number of offenders brought to justice, and to increase the overall detection rate to a level that is above the average for Home Office police forces;
- increase the trust and confidence of the railway community and the travelling public by working in partnership with others to make the railway a safe environment for all;
- respond to incidents in a way that meets the needs of the railway community and the travelling public and takes into account local priorities; and
- make the most effective use of its people, supported by timely and accurate financial information to aid operational decision making, sustained by the use of sound information and communications technology.

BTP met all its operational targets in 2005/06 and 2006/07, and 94% in 2007/08 (90 out of 96).

Underpinning delivery of BTP's strategic objectives is the creation of a more diverse workforce. The force has long-term targets to increase the percentage of staff from black and minority ethnic backgrounds and to improve gender representation, both in the wider police officer population and in specialist posts and to levels that at least match the national average for Home Office police forces.

### **Force developments since the 2007 inspection**

The outcome of the Department for Transport (DfT) review of BTP in 2006 has continued to be a key driver for action within the force and police authority since the 2007 inspection. This review confirmed BTP's ongoing role as the national specialist police force for the railways, while emphasising the need for the force and all its partners to explore new ways in which to work together to reduce crime and the fear of crime, and to promote public safety on the rail network. The review identified a need for greater clarity about detailed aspects of BTP's operation in relation to its responsibilities to the rail industry, the rail industry's own duties and the role of local police forces. Since the 2007 inspection, BTP has sought to focus on areas that provide maximum added value to the fight against crime on the railways, notably by investing significant staff and resources in the development of Neighbourhood Policing, an ethos supported by the DfT review.

In addition, BTP is undertaking the reorganisation of its major crime resources to best address the threat presented by serious and organised crime. While in general terms the force can be said to have a low threat level for serious and organised crime and major crime relative to many Home Office forces, its geographic scope means that providing an effective and consistent response to such crimes is particularly complex. In recognition of this, the force plans to expand dedicated capacity both centrally and at area level to tackle major crime and serious and organised crime.

The force continues to build on its commercial awareness of the railway environment, working in partnership with the industry. It has investigated ways of promoting partnership activity, including the setting up of joint objectives with the railway industry to engender a commitment to improved communication from both sides. BTP, the BTPA and senior representatives from the Association of Train Operating Companies and other train operators established the Working Together Group to explore opportunities for greater partnership working with the industry. The protocols developed by this group will continue to shape BTP's working relationships over the course of the new strategic plan for 2008–11.

Preparation for the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games in 2012 will be a priority for BTP, as evidenced by the addition of an Olympics portfolio to the chief officer group. A viable and safe transport infrastructure will be essential in staging a successful Games, and BTP is committed to working towards this with partner agencies during the build-up to the Games.

Changes within BTP have included:

- the rationalisation of control room functions to improve response capability;
- the increased productivity and visibility realised from the effective use of modern technology, including a mobile data capability providing immediate access to force-wide systems and the introduction of new duty management systems;
- the realisation of £6 million of efficiency savings and the redirection of a total of £3 million released by further efficiency savings to improve service provision between 2005/06 and 2007/08;

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- the implementation of new structures and processes for the finance department to improve efficiency and value for money; and
- the introduction of a student officer training programme in collaboration with the City of London Police (CoLP) and City University (London).

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## Major Crime

<b>GRADE</b>	<b>Meets the standard</b>
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### Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details BTP's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as its response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those that pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

The overall threat level for BTP for major crime is low, but the challenges of effective and consistent delivery are considerable.

Statutory performance indicators have been moderated to reflect the fact that BTP does not record crime by population, nor is it possible to compare performance against the most similar force (MSF) group.

	1 April 2006 to 31 March 2007	1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008	Change	MSF group mean
Recorded life-threatening crime and gun crime	233	182	-22%	N/A
Number of abductions (child)	3	1	-67%	N/A
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	33%	0%		N/A
Number of attempted murders	4	2	-50%	N/A
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	75%	50%		N/A
Number of blackmail offences	3	0		N/A
% of blackmail crimes detected/convicted	67%	N/A		N/A
Number of kidnappings	15	8	-47%	N/A
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	40%	87.5%		N/A
Number of manslaughter offences	0	1		N/A
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	N/A	0%		N/A
Number of murders	3	2	-33%	N/A
% of murder crimes detected/convicted	133%	100%		N/A
Number of rapes	19	17	-1%	N/A
% of rape crimes detected/convicted	37%	18%		N/A

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The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified homicide and violent crime as its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on the impact of vulnerable groups, organised crime groups (OCGs) and violent offenders on these control strategy priorities. Within the documentation overall, the issues have been broadly identified and addressed.

The force has invested suitable resources to allow for intervention activity to maximise harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and to inhibit major crime.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a maturing process in its approach to tackling major criminality. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with Home Office forces, notably the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and City of London Police (CoLP) are recognised.

## **Intelligence**

### **MC01**

**Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime and to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has conditionally committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.**

### **Strengths**

- BTP produces an FSA that is reviewed and monitored by the chief officer group and assists in the formulation of the force control strategy. This facilitates the setting of the intelligence priorities for the FIB, defining the strategic intelligence requirement and providing a basis for FIB tactical assessments. In turn this drives the force tasking and co-ordination process across the organisation, aiding and supporting strategic business planning and resource allocation.
- There is a total of 43 analyst posts (including two temporary analysts for OCGs and cable theft) and 20 researcher posts established across the force. In addition, there are seven temporary researchers. The major crime team is well supported, with three analysts and two further analyst posts filled by contract staff. A full range of National Intelligence Model (NIM) products is produced, covering strategic and tactical aspects of major crime.
- There is a principal analyst based at FHQ with head of profession responsibilities for the analyst function. The principal analyst has arranged professional forums for analysts within BTP to discuss new innovations and areas of common interest.

### **Work in progress**

- BTP has recognised the need for the FIB to play a greater role in driving activity on major crime. The force has recently agreed plans to restructure the FIB, which will result in significant additional investment. The proposed plan will deliver six focus desks, each comprising an analyst, a researcher and a field intelligence officer covering the identified force level 2 crime priorities, including violence and sexual crime. This will represent a significant resource investment and ensure that sufficient analysis and intelligence capacity exists to meet the demand at level 2 and produce the associated products. It will require investment in both analytical and research capacity. If delivered successfully, this will enhance the effectiveness of force tasking and subsequent activity against major crime and serious and organised crime. The intention is for these reforms to be put in place by 1 July 2008, with recruitment for new posts being undertaken immediately.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The career structure for analysts is currently unclear and limited, leading to high levels of attrition as staff pursue options externally. While remuneration is clearly an issue, analysts report that there is a lack of a bespoke career structure and a limited understanding of their role and products from line management. The rate of attrition has a significant impact on the morale of staff, the quality of product and the financial costs associated with recruiting and training new staff. There is scope to enhance the role and function of the force principal analyst in addressing these important areas. Providing clear direction and meaningful support to analysts through a structured career

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development programme and meaningful quality assurance regime will have a significant impact on morale and retention. A number of forces that have close working arrangements with BTP, including the MPS and CoLP, have faced similar challenges and the force should consider learning from their experience.

## **MC02**

**Summary – The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force’s community impact assessments to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.**

### **Strengths**

- BTP seeks intelligence with partners at both strategic and operational level. At strategic level, partnership intelligence is cited as part of the intelligence requirement for the force crime priorities on major crime and serious and organised crime. Partnership contribution is embedded within operational teams both at FHQ and area level.
- The force makes consistent use of community impact assessments following major crime, accessing the support of independent advice and utilising key individual networks (KINs) and community partners, through the new Neighbourhood Policing teams.
- There are formal protocols in place with 14 Home Office forces, and established working arrangements in place with the remaining forces. In addition, there are formal agreements in place with railway-specific bodies. These arrangements are often data led, with bespoke intelligence requirements agreed for operational matters, as required. Notable examples reported by partners as being effective include Operations Aura and Cobalt, where BTP has led major investigations and has worked closely with Home Office forces.

### **Work in progress**

- Existing partnership intelligence exchange tends to be via bulk data transfers rather than through response to bespoke requirement. Recent changes to information technology (IT) by many Home Office forces have reduced access to partner intelligence systems. BTP is seeking funded inclusion in the national intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking (IMPACT) project, which would resolve many of these issues; however, interim solutions are also being sought with key partners including the MPS. To this end, a small team of three staff is dedicated to IMPACT nominal index within the FIB. However, timelines for this are unclear as yet. Given its significance, this work would benefit from a force-level working group to co-ordinate and drive activity.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- While protocols exist, contribution to and from Home Office forces to the BTP intelligence picture is ad hoc. The FIB should provide clearer strategic direction for partnership activity on major crime, informed by the BTP intelligence requirement. This should provide the structure for developing future corporate information-sharing protocols under a sustainable corporate framework.

## **Developing practice**

- A full range of NIM products is produced by the FIB for major crime, including problem, geographic and target profiles. In addition, work to identify victim profiles has been undertaken, including commissioning innovative research through the University of Surrey to examine and better understand the links between mental health and deaths, both suicide and homicide, on the railway. Preliminary results have indicated a need for greater understanding of how these issues impact on the rail community and on the potential for enhancing preventative activity with partners. Further work in partnership with the university is ongoing.

## **MC03**

**Summary – The FSA has analysed trends in relation to major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly thorough. Problem profiles for drug supply, cable theft and violent crime are satisfactory, with links to force and area level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.**

## **Strengths**

- A full range of NIM intelligence products is generated by BTP in accordance with national standards. The FSA is informed by the National Strategic Assessment and UK Threat Assessment on organised crime and covers key serious and organised crime types, including Class A drugs, organised immigration crime and gun crime. The FSA considers and incorporates current and emerging threats and the impact of serious and organised crimes in the future.
- The FSA goes to the police authority for scrutiny prior to reaching the force strategic tasking and co-ordination group for approval and the consequential publication of the force control strategy. Major crime is integrated within the FSA, with a detailed focus on level 2 focus crimes.
- The force control strategy sets out key strands of major crime as a priority. While the force generally faces a low level of threat posed by life-threatening issues such as kidnap and gun crime, these matters are well understood and supported by appropriate plans and resources. These are bracketed under violent and sexual offences and fatalities and disruptions. Each strand has an identified plan for intelligence, prevention and enforcement (IPE) with a defined lead. All analysts and researchers have access to open and closed source intelligence material and liaise with Home Office forces at area intelligence bureau (AIB) and FIB level, where appropriate.
- Major crime planning is clearly linked to tactical activity through both corporate plans, including the violence reduction strategy, and the force tasking and co-ordination process.

## **Work in progress**

- None identified.

## **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

#### **MC04**

**Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are routinely shared with partners and areas. There is a full trigger plan for ‘hot briefing’ whenever a significant change in either the major crime threat or the nature of the analysis demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols exist with key partners, such as Home Office forces. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information (MoPI) compliance by 2010.**

#### **Strengths**

- The FSA is shared, and agreed in consultation, with rail industry partners. It is promulgated across the organisation via chief officer and senior management team (SMT) leads and the FIB. Specific intelligence requirements are sought from partners and areas through established tasking and co-ordination forums as well as in line with specific operational needs. However, further intelligence updates on major crime themes are limited.
- In addition to the FIB, each area has an intelligence capability (AIBs), but these have a clear geographic focus and are not always sighted on the corporate intelligence picture relating to major crime. AIBs have developed their own information-sharing agreements with partners and these are often highly effective in tackling local issues. An example of this was Operation Avens. During the course of this protracted and successful inquiry, significant joint intelligence activity took place with the MPS, the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and authorities abroad, under a locally agreed memorandum of understanding.
- In addition to the collaborative agreements discussed above at MC02, dynamic intelligence sharing takes place between BTP and Home Office forces as required, with recent examples given for subjects linked to both violent and organised crime – Operation Korab (robbery) and Operation Cobalt (shooting). The force also participates in regional and national initiatives to tackle major crime, including serious crime analysis section (SCAS), Catchem and Genesis.

#### **Work in progress**

- The force is working towards MoPI compliance by 2010.

#### **Area(s) for improvement**

- While some of the relationships to share intelligence between partners are governed by data-sharing agreements, some are not and therefore tend to rely on working relationships between individuals. Generally, this pragmatic arrangement works, but it nevertheless presents a risk to BTP, as there is a need for a formalised and overarching structure to co-ordinate intelligence-sharing agreements in support of the FSA and the force strategic intelligence requirement.

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## **MC05**

**Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.**

### **Strengths**

- BTP operates in a unique environment, policing a community that travels, works and touches upon the national rail network. The FSA incorporates a section dealing with the rail industry perspective in which emerging themes are discussed, including the results of passenger perception surveys.
- BTP has made good progress in mapping OCGs and understanding their impact on rail-related crime. In addition, there is a developing appreciation of the role of the rail network as an enabler of level 2 criminality, with OCGs travelling across areas. There has been a number of recent successful operations where OCGs have been interdicted during travel, most notably on football-related issues (Operation Monopoly).
- The force has sought to develop greater understanding of how vulnerable communities interact with the rail network. The force has commissioned academic research through the University of Surrey on potential links between mental health and deaths on the railway. The force participates in local multi-agency public protection arrangements with Home Office forces, when appropriate.
- There is a developing awareness of vulnerable locations and communities for other crime types, notably cable theft, as a result of the sustained and dedicated work of Operation Drum.

### **Work in progress**

- In addition to the good work mapping OCGs, there is extensive ongoing work to profile the broader railway community through the roll-out of BTP's Neighbourhood Policing programme. This will not only enhance local problem-solving activity but will provide a clear intelligence dividend for the IPE activity against major crime and serious and organised crime.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- The link between the FIB and AIBs needs to be clarified in terms of intelligence submission and dissemination. There is no explicit community intelligence function within the FIB and there is a need to ensure that the effective partnership collaboration occurring at area level, particularly with the emergent Neighbourhood Policing teams, is informing the corporate intelligence picture at level 2 for major crime and serious and organised crime.

## **MC06**

**Summary – The force strategic risk register is reviewed every six months by the chief officer group. Each department and area maintains a strategic risk register with all identified risks having an articulated action plan; these are robustly monitored and controlled. Risks in relation to major crime are escalated via the ACC (crime) for consideration by the chief officer group, as appropriate.**

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### **Strengths**

- The force risk register is comprehensive, robust and fit for purpose. It includes risks escalated from specialist departments and areas by the relevant chief officer lead. It is integrated with the high-level NIM process, business planning and the resource allocation process and includes action plans intended to mitigate the stated risk. The force risk register is reviewed every six months as part of the force strategic tasking and co-ordination group process.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified.

### **MC07**

**Summary – The force is creating ways of collaborating with all Home Office forces to provide the same level of access to and interrogation of intelligence across the UK. BTP is supporting the London regional intelligence unit (RIU) with staff and there is ongoing activity to link BTP with the IMPACT programme. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been partially implemented.**

### **Strengths**

- BTP uses the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES, Version 11) for its major inquiries and complex level 2 investigations. While there is no automated link with the force intelligence system, BTP systematically transfers intelligence to it from HOLMES. Likewise, procedures are in place to utilise intelligence available from other specialist units, including the dedicated source-handling unit and forensics.
- There are intelligence-sharing arrangements in place with Home Office forces, partner agencies and railway-specific bodies. The force also supports the RIU structure through dedicated and embedded staff.

### **Work in progress**

- As discussed at MC02, there is ongoing activity to seek inclusion in the national IMPACT project.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- There are interoperability issues within internal BTP IT systems that limit the scope of available intelligence on homicide. Search capability across specific data, including forensic and incident data, has been enabled; however, this is spreadsheet-based and increases duplication of activity. Refinement of internal systems, including HOLMES, would greatly inform and enhance external contribution at level 2 and level 3.
- As discussed above at MC04, there is a need for a formalised and overarching structure to co-ordinate intelligence-sharing agreements in support of the FSA and the force strategic intelligence requirement.

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## MC08

**Summary – The force has a case review policy that is rarely applied and is under development. The aim of the policy is to ensure that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance.**

### Strengths

- The force investigates Category B and C murders in negotiation with the geographically relevant Home Office force. Category A investigations are usually conducted by local forces.
- There is a review policy for murder investigations in accordance with guidance in the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual (MIM)*. The force has undertaken two reviews in the last 12 months, for a Category C murder (Operation Aura) and a shooting (Operation Cobalt). These reviews were carried out internally; however, the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and MPS have made contributions to previous reviews.
- Recommendations arising from reviews are actioned by the senior investigating officer (SIO) and details of the action taken are recorded on the policy log. Any corporate learning is disseminated via the chief officer group to areas.
- There is a cadre of serious crime investigation review training (SCIRT) trained staff at FHQ and on areas; however, there is no dedicated capacity to undertake reviews of serious crime.

### Work in progress

- The force chief officer group has recognised lack of compliance with the existing BTP major crime review policy and the impact on organisational learning in this area. It has committed to raise review capacity through the new major investigation team. This team will undertake a quality assurance role through the daily review of major crime response, as well as delivering an investigative and cold case review regime. Consideration is being given to integrating regular external review into this process to maximise organisational learning opportunities. At the time of the inspection, the new arrangements were planned to be in place by 1 May 2008, with accompanying guidance to staff.

### Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

## MC09

**Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.**

### Strengths

- The ACC (crime) chairs the force tactical tasking and co-ordination (TTCG) meeting and its agenda follows NIM guidance, with activity prioritised against the force control strategy. A full range of NIM products is generated for each meeting, ensuring accurate and timely assessment of threats in major crime areas. There is input into the meeting

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from the economic crime unit and BCU TTCCG processes. Specialist team leads from major crime and serious and organised crime functions attend the TTCCG process and tasking decisions are documented appropriately.

### **Work in progress**

- The force has recognised that it faces a challenge regarding its capacity for undertaking major crime and serious and organised crime investigations. Adherence to force abstraction policy on resourcing from areas is problematic and often proves a major distraction to the SIO in the critical early stages of an inquiry. The force has agreed plans to develop a national crime team with enhanced staffing of both investigative and HOLMES management functions. It is planned that the team will be fully operational by 1 July 2008 and will be accompanied by a new abstraction policy for areas. This policy will require the geographically responsible area to support major crime inquiries with a criminal investigation department (CID) supervisor and resources deemed appropriate by the SIO. Final arbitration will sit with the relevant gold group and will require regular review. The force believes that adoption of this policy will enhance the initial response to major crime and the sustainability of consequent inquiries.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

### **MC10**

**Summary – Due to appropriate and comprehensive training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.**

### **Strengths**

- All staff within BTP receive diversity training as a standard force requirement, and specialist staff e.g. family liaison officers (FLOs) undergo bespoke, nationally approved training via the force crime academy before being assigned such responsibility.
- Training for major crime feeds into the overarching force training requirement, which is reviewed regularly through the chief officer group.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

## **Prevention**

### **MC11**

**Summary – The force has an independent advisory group (IAG) and this is frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.**

#### **Strengths**

- BTP has a strategic-level National Independent Advisory Group (NIAG), that offers advice and community perspectives on policy issues. In addition there is a London-based independent advisory network (IAN), which offers guidance and insight on tactical matters. This was recently utilised in Operation Aura, when advice was sought on ways to reach the gay community following a murder. Independent advisers are engaged on gold groups for major crime and serious and organised crime as a matter of policy.
- NIAG and IAN advice is formally recorded and considered as part of the overall community impact assessment. In addition, BTP utilises the services of the relevant Home Office IAG for advice when required. A recent example of this was Operation Cobalt, where a local MPS IAG was contacted.
- There are established partnerships in place with Home Office forces via the regional TTCG, and at area level via the level 1 TTCG. A range of other statutory partners are engaged by BTP in prevention activity, including Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), Financial Services Authority and the Department for Work and Pensions. A current example is the multi-strand violence reduction strategy, which articulates partnership as a central theme of all activity.
- BTP has close partnerships with rail industry bodies and passenger groups at both strategic and tactical level. Rail industry representatives participate in the level 1 TTCG and are engaged regularly at level 2 on preventative matters.

#### **Work in progress**

- The BTP Neighbourhood Policing programme is building understanding and communication with KINs, including hard-to-hear groups, at local level. Meetings are held regularly within the Neighbourhood Policing sites, where preventative activity features as a regular agenda item. This is enabling effective communication with communities affected by major incidents. A recent example was within the Pontypridd Neighbourhood Policing area, where a child fatality occurred on the network and was recognised by first responders as a critical incident. Early intervention by the Neighbourhood Policing team reassured the community and prevented this tragic accident escalating into a major incident for the force.

#### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

### **MC12**

**Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that 'golden hour' principles were sufficiently understood by call management staff and first responders.**

## Strengths

- BTP has published a comprehensive critical incident policy based on recognised best practice from the MPS racial and violent task force. Training on this issue and the golden hour principles has been given to staff deployed in the force control room, first-line responders and specialist staff. Overall, there is a good level of awareness of the golden hour principles contained within the 2005 *Practice Advice on Core Investigative Doctrine*.
- There are established and tested protocols set out in the force major incident manual that outline the response to major incidents and the deployment of dedicated specialist teams. The force is represented by contingency planning officers on all regional resilience forums.
- BTP has a dedicated civil contingencies unit located within the Olympics portfolio overseen by the ACC (London and Olympics). The unit is responsible for policy and co-ordination with stakeholders at force level on emergency preparedness, civil contingencies and business continuity. There is an identified force contingency planning officer based within the unit who has indirect management responsibility for identified contingency planning officers on each area.

## Work in progress

- As discussed above at MC09, the new policy on major crime and serious and organised crime requires areas to provide a CID supervisor to inquiries to ensure suitable resourcing in the early stages. If effective, this will enhance initial response in line with golden hour principles.

## Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

## MC13

**Summary –The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.**

## Strengths

- BTP incorporates a commentary within the FSA on the predicted trends for major crime. Each identified priority area has a prevention strand and lead within the associated action plan. In addition, a full range of NIM products is regularly completed for these offences at FIB and AIB level to inform the force TTCG process.
- Potential emerging threats from known sex and/or violent offenders are recognised in the force public protection policy, which ascribes clear guidance to first responders, the line supervisor, control room staff and the FIB. An example of this approach being incorporated into force operational activity is the violence reduction strategy. This strategy highlights six key themes impacting on crime and fear of crime on the network and includes prolific/serial offending, mental health and the physical environment.

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### **Work in progress**

- There is extensive ongoing effort to profile the broader railway community through the roll-out of the BTP Neighbourhood Policing programme. This will enhance local problem-solving activity and will provide a clear intelligence dividend for IPE activity against major crime and serious and organised crime.
- Following the previous HMIC inspection, the force has committed to review its policy and command and control arrangements for missing person reports to ensure that it adopts a risk-based approach. These recommendations are being progressed through a project team answering to the ACC (crime) and are expected to be in place by 1 July 2008.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

### **Developing practice**

- As discussed above at MC02, BTP has commissioned research through the University of Surrey to examine and better understand the links between mental health and deaths, both suicide and homicide, on the railway.

## **MC14**

**Summary – The policy covering threats to life is accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of joint, regional, cross-border and multi-agency operations are abundant.**

### **Strengths**

- BTP has a comprehensive threat to life policy published and accessible on the intranet. Officers have given Osman warnings in accordance with national guidelines, which was demonstrated within specialist units and at area level. Warnings have been given during the past 12 months and recorded on the force intelligence system.
- While awareness of the threat-to-life policy was variable across the force, in practice, if a threat-to-life situation was encountered, specialist staff generally knew to contact the on-call SIO for advice.
- BTP has a violence reduction strategy focused on reducing incidents of serious assault and major crime. Regular intelligence-led joint initiatives are conducted with Home Office forces and rail partners in support of this.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- While the force has an overarching violence reduction strategy, there is no bespoke firearms suppression strategy. While relatively few firearms-related crimes are recorded within BTP, the force should acknowledge the undoubted use of the rail network for the transport of firearms by OCGs and criminals. Such activity has a clear associated threat

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to those legitimately working and travelling on the rail network and should be addressed within OCG disruption activity.

### **MC15**

**Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by on-demand covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by, dedicated staff only. The force is partially collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.**

#### **Strengths**

- BTP is part of the regional witness protection group (with the MPS, CoLP and SOCA) and complies with the National Memorandum of Understanding on witness protection. There is an identified single point of contact on witness protection matters.
- The force has a limited capacity to manage low-risk witness protection matters and collaborative arrangements exist with the MPS to manage any higher-risk cases should circumstances warrant it.
- There are ‘special measures’ arrangements in place at court to enable the Crown Prosecution Service to apply for the protection of individuals and offer anonymity.
- All BTP officers involved in murder inquiries are generally familiar with their statutory objectives under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA) regarding the use of covert tactics in major crime. A number of staff are trained in covert policing techniques and a single point of contact is used to deploy tactics and to provide specialist advice on public interest immunity (PII) and CPIA matters.

#### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

#### **Area(s) for improvement**

- While knowledge of witness protection is apparent within some specialist BTP staff, there is currently no policy framework or formal collaborative agreements in place on this issue. In addition, there is no specific budget or dedicated resources available for such matters. While there are relatively few occasions where witness protection arrangements are required, it does remain an area where demand can be predicted and therefore current arrangements should be reviewed to ensure suitable resilience.

### **MC16**

**Summary – The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that a broad range of community policing assets is partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.**

#### **Strengths**

- BTP monitors harm through the National Community Tension Team (NCTT) mechanism and through special branch and the FIB, which also links into the area analysts. All tension intelligence is graded to assess community tension and despatched to NCTT, although levels tend to be relatively low.

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- Local tensions are collected through local ward meetings or contacts, evaluated by the AIBs and subject to problem profiles as appropriate. These are then incorporated within daily briefings and are accessible to staff through the force intranet.

#### **Work in progress**

- BTP is currently developing a Neighbourhood Policing programme to utilise the full range of policing assets in tackling harm in the community. Work is under way to develop meaningful indicators for measuring harm in communities; this will enable an improved understanding of preventative and enforcement activity. This work is evolving through a number of pilot sites and initial community and partner response is encouraging.

#### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

#### **MC17**

**Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a comprehensive security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted, commensurate with exposure.**

#### **Strengths**

- The force has a dedicated force security manager and operational security officer who oversee all aspects of BTP's security management programme. These roles report on the state of the force's intelligence operations and produce the annual formal report on operational security actions taken throughout the year, highlighting remedial actions taken and developing strategic policies as required, in order to maintain chief officers' awareness of intelligence issues within the force.
- The professional standards department (PSD) produces its own risk assessment, control strategy and tactical assessment and has a proactive and investigative capability.
- There is a clear and comprehensive vetting structure that is adhered to and maintained effectively. PSD has responsibility for all force vetting in accordance with a force policy on the subject, which follows national guidelines. Staff and police authority members are vetted to a level commensurate with their role and individuals have their vetting status removed when appropriate.

#### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

#### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

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## **Enforcement**

### **MC19**

**Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are partially effective, with appropriate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.**

#### **Strengths**

- The ACC (crime) is responsible for major crime issues in the force and provides regular reports to police authority members on such issues. Due to the nature of the business discussed, this normally occurs in the non-public element of the meeting and more detailed briefings are given to the individual police authority leads who, for major crime purposes, have been vetted to the appropriate level.
- The unique operating and funding environment of BTP requires an additional consideration of the rail industry perspective on policing activity and resource management. In this regard, BTP consults extensively and regularly at strategic and tactical level, and this is reflected in its FSA and crime policies, such as the violence reduction plan.
- Gold support groups are used for significant major crimes in line with published force policy.

#### **Work in progress**

- BTP has recognised that major crime gold groups are often performing the role of arbiter on resourcing matters to the exclusion of their primary objective of strategic scrutiny. The new BTP major crime policy, which identifies an area lead for resourcing aspects of the initial investigation, should increase clarity of responsibility.

#### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

### **MC20**

**Summary – The ACPO lead and the head of crime are fully trained and competent in the management of major crime. These officers are supported by staff that have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.**

#### **Strengths**

- The ACC (crime) and the head of the major crime department both have extensive detective experience, including performing the role of SIO. The head of department has completed national SIO training and is due to attend a Serious Crime Intelligence Management Information Technology and Resources (SCIMITAR) course shortly.
- The force had two officers at superintendent level accredited to professionalising the investigative process (PIP) level 3, and accreditation for a third officer is being finalised. There is major investigation experience at detective chief inspector (DCI) and detective inspector (DI) levels, including staff who have performed the role of SIO previously in

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Home Office forces. However, these are not at present accredited to PIP level 3. The policy is for all staff in major crime to be accredited to PIP level 2.

- BTP has a cadre of 53 trained FLOs and each area has one FLO co-ordinator. FLOs are called out based on their specialism and availability or on a rotational basis. There is comprehensive welfare support for FLOs.
- HOLMES (Version 11) is deployed on major crime and large organised crime inquiries, and its case management tools are also used for economic crime department (ECD) inquiries. There is a dedicated team of one DI, one detective sergeant (DS) and five detective constables (DCs) fully trained in the use of HOLMES.
- All BTP officers involved in murder inquiries are generally familiar with their statutory objectives under CPIA regarding the use of covert tactics in major crime. A number of staff are trained in covert policing techniques and a single point of contact is used to deploy tactics and to provide specialist advice on PII and CPIA matters.

### **Work in progress**

- BTP recognises the capacity challenges it faces for SIOs under existing arrangements. The proposed new structure for major crime and serious and organised crime will enhance this by broadening the pool of PIP level 3 trained staff. The proposal is that all DCIs and DIs on the national crime team, and nominated area DCIs, will undertake the PIP level 3 accreditation process. If successfully implemented, this will improve existing capacity and enhance both the initial response to major crime and management of the inquiry. It will also ensure that the force has longer-term sustainability for the SIO position. The date for adopting this new structure and policy is 1 July 2008.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

### **MC21**

**Summary – The force performance in the investigation of major crime is being developed to incorporate reviews of each operation in terms of cost, inputs and outputs.**

### **Strengths**

- BTP has a strong corporate performance ethos, and within the major crime sphere there are basic performance measures in place that reflect the force's core business and many of the desired outputs and outcomes (e.g. sanction detection rates and Proceeds of Crime Act orders made).
- Within the crime department, investigations are reviewed at the weekly SMT meetings and bespoke performance criteria are set for investigations that concern major crime and serious and organised criminality.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- BTP should review its existing performance management framework with a view to introducing new measures that better reflect its investigative activity and the identification, categorisation and disruption of major crime and that have discernable links to costed inputs. This may also include detailed management information designed to assess the tactical options considered and used and their cost.
- The force currently has limited review capacity and this has impacted on organisational learning.

### **MC22**

**Summary – The inspection teams found sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with SOCA and Home Office forces exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide partial protection for the investigative capability.**

### **Strengths**

- Resource disposition within the crime department is broadly proportionate to the current demand for the investigation of major crime, including the provision of specialist assets to support investigations on areas. This includes the abstraction from BCUs of detective officers for major inquiries, and a range of proactive assets such as surveillance capability, covert rural observations post (CROPS) officers, FLOs, the scientific support unit, the source unit, the high-tech crime unit and trained undercover officers.
- One DS is accredited to PIP level 3 and at the time of the inspection the other had completed his portfolio, which was to be signed off. There is extensive major crime investigative experience at DCI and DI levels, including staff who have performed the role of SIO previously in Home Office forces.
- Staff identified to resource major incident teams and major incident rooms are trained to the major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) standard. Decisions to deploy these assets are taken by the force TTCG, the gold group (if applicable) or, in urgent cases, by the detective chief superintendent or the on-call SIO.
- There are sufficient level 5 interview advisers in place and trained. Capacity is being expanded on areas through a development programme.
- There is a 24/7 investigative response, with senior detectives providing an on-call rota.
- Policy logs are opened for all serious and/or high-risk investigations and policies and decisions are recorded therein.
- All staff in the crime department have role profiles specific to their function and/or specialism. Staff generally described their investigative workload as manageable and acceptable, with investigative supervision available and routinely practised.

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- Crimes are allocated to investigators in accordance with their complexity and the officer's current workloads. All homicides, suspicious deaths and unexplained deaths are investigated under the leadership of a SIO of detective superintendent rank.
- There is a dedicated HOLMES team. This team co-ordinates the running of all HOLMES accounts and the resourcing of any major incident rooms, which are staffed in line with the corporate abstractions policy.
- Investigations are supervised by line management and updates are given to the force TTCG as required. Murders attract the full weight of resources in accordance with the ACPO MIM and following deliberation by the gold group that is formed on each occasion (a recent example was Operation Aura).
- The use of HOLMES is at the discretion of the relevant SIO. In addition to homicide investigations, a number of serious and organised investigations are entered on HOLMES as Category D investigations.

### **Work in progress**

- As mentioned above, the successful implementation of the national crime team and changes to SIO policy will enhance the capacity of the force to tackle major crime and serious and organised crime. It is anticipated that these changes will be fully operational by 1 July 2008.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- There are few formal collaborative agreements in place with Home Office forces for the provision of specialist support for major crime. Informal understandings exist with Home Office forces covering both the investigative primacy of major crime investigations and a range of proactive tactical support measures. An exception is the memorandum of understanding in place with the MPS on homicide investigation that sets out clear lines of responsibility by classification. BTP should consider this as the basis for further ACPO-led negotiation with Home Office forces.
- There is a force policy requiring areas to identify and maintain suitable major incident room accommodation; however, the pressure on the BTP estate means that adherence is mixed. While BTP has developed flexible solutions with mobile police stations and IT, the lead time to deliver this has proved problematic. There is a need to continue refining this area.
- The policy is for all staff in major crime investigation posts to be accredited to PIP level 2. Of the 178 applicable posts in England and Wales, 39% have attained accreditation. The force has recognised that further activity in this area is needed and is currently running a pilot within the north-west area to increase accreditation.

### **MC23**

**Summary – The force has a range of collaborative agreements in place with Home Office forces for the investigation of serious and organised crime and major crime and support from specialist services. These collaborations are considered to be practical but often develop at working level rather than being facilitated through overarching and sustainable protocols.**

### **Strengths**

- BTP has an infrastructure to deliver some assets in support of specialist investigations. Within the crime department, this includes a surveillance capability, a dedicated source unit, a high-tech crime unit, scientific support, witness protection, undercover officers and technical support. BTP makes full use of its specialist resources when reactive or proactive activity would benefit from their deployment.
- In addition to internal resources, there are specific arrangements in place with some Home Office forces where there is a requirement for specialist support. Examples include arrangements with the MPS for Category A and B homicides, witness protection and armed surveillance.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified.

### **Area(s) for improvement**

- As mentioned above, where collaborative arrangements exist with Home Office forces they are rarely formalised. Issues of investigative primacy of major crime and a range of proactive tactical support measures are often negotiated on a case-by-case or individual level and are not documented or maintained corporately. This presents an unacceptable risk to the force should key individuals change roles or relationships deteriorate.

### **MC24**

**Summary – The force has a limited review policy. The plan for a single major crime team with capacity to review major investigations will be an important tool in the continuing development of BTP’s investigative capability.**

### **Strengths**

- The force investigates Category B or C murders in negotiation with the geographically relevant Home Office force. Category A murders are usually investigated by the local force.
- There is a review policy for murder investigations in accordance with guidance in the 2006 ACPO MIM. The force has undertaken two reviews in the last 12 months, for a Category C murder (Operation Aura) and a shooting (Operation Cobalt). These were carried out internally; however, the NPIA and MPS have made contributions to previous reviews.
- Recommendations arising from reviews are actioned by the SIO and details of the action taken are recorded on the policy log. Any corporate learning is disseminated via the chief officer group to areas.
- There is a cadre of SCIRT trained staff at FHQ and on areas; however, there is no dedicated capacity to undertake reviews of serious crime.

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**Work in progress**

- The force chief officer group has committed to review the existing BTP policy and resource levels for major crime review. The major investigation team will undertake a quality assurance role through the daily review of major crime response as well as delivering an investigative and cold case review regime. Consideration is being given to integrating regular external review into this process to maximise organisational learning opportunities. The new arrangements are planned to be in place by 1 May 2008, with accompanying guidance to staff.

**Area(s) for improvement**

- The force should maximise the learning opportunities from reviews of major crime investigations by ensuring that some reviews are independently conducted by other forces.

**MC25**

**Summary – The inspection found that the force was compliant with ACPO MIM and MIRSAP.**

**Strengths**

- All SIOs, investigation officers and officers of supervisory rank are issued with a copy of the ACPO MIM. The MIRSAP manual is accessible through the force intranet. Both standards (MIM and MIRSAP) are followed, as evidenced by Operations Cobalt and Aura.
- Policy files are completed for every major crime and include decisions not to pursue a line of enquiry. Separate policy files are created for sensitive decision making.

**Work in progress**

- None identified.

**Area(s) for improvement**

- None identified.

## **Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations**

### **A**

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
AIB	area intelligence bureau

### **B**

BCU	basic command unit
BTP	British Transport Police
BTPA	British Transport Police Authority

### **C**

CID	criminal investigation department
CoLP	City of London Police
CPIA	Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996

### **D**

DC	detective constable
DCI	detective chief inspector
DfT	Department for Transport
DI	detective inspector
DS	detective sergeant

### **F**

FHQ	force headquarters
FIB	force intelligence bureau
FLO	family liaison officer
FOC	freight operating company
FSA	force strategic assessment

### **H**

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System

**I**

IAG	independent advisory group
IAN	independent advisory network
IMPACT	intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking
IPE	intelligence, prevention and enforcement
IT	information technology

**K**

KIN	key individual network
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**M**

MIM	Murder Investigation Manual
MIRSAP	major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MoPI	management of police information
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
MSF	most similar force

**N**

NCTT	National Community Tension Team
NIAG	National Independent Advisory Group
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency

**O**

OCG	organised crime group
Osman	Osman v UK (1999) 1 FLR 193, where the court established that in certain circumstances the state has a positive obligation to take preventive measures to protect an individual who is at risk from the criminal activities of others

**P**

PII	public interest immunity
PIP	professionalising the investigative process

**R**

RIU	regional intelligence unit
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**S**

SCIRT	serious crime investigation review training
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SMT	senior management team
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency

**T**

TOC	train operating company
TTCG	tactical tasking and co-ordination group