



Inspecting policing
in the public interest

British Transport Police

Inspection findings

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

February 2011

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ACPO TAM	ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters
AFI	Area For Improvement
ASB	Anti-Social Behaviour
BC	Business Continuity
BTP	British Transport Police
BTPA	British Transport Police Authority
CHIS	Covert Human Intelligence Source
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CT	Counter Terrorist
DCC	Deputy Chief Constable
FCRL	Force Control Room London
FHQ	Force Headquarters
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
JTAC	Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NP	Neighbourhood Policing
NPAS	National Police Air Service
NPT	Neighbourhood Policing Team
PACT	Police and Communities Together
PC	Police Constable
PCSO	Police and Community Support Officer
PS	Protective Services
PSP	Problem Solving Plan
RTC	Road Traffic Collision
SCAS	Serious Crime Analysis Section
SIO	Senior Investigating Officer
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
STO	Sexual Offence Trained Officer
TP	Territorial Policing

Executive summary

This inspection has been carried out at the request of the British Transport Police Authority (BTPA) and was conducted by HM Inspector Mr Bernard Hogan-Howe QPM, MBA, MA (Oxon), CCMI.

The full report, based on findings from the inspection, will be accessible to the public on HMIC's website and show how well the force is performing in the areas of Local Crime and Policing, Protection from Serious Harm, Confidence and Satisfaction, and Value for Money.

During the course of the inspection HMIC staff examined BTP documents and performance data, and carried out a series of structured interviews and focus groups between 4 and 8 October 2010. A profile of how BTP spends its budget has also been prepared.

HMIC acknowledges the different funding arrangements and operating environment in which BTP works. There are also other differences between BTP and Home Office forces. As the national – and specialist – police force for the railways, BTP does not provide some functions that other forces need to have (e.g. armed response units). Equally, it provides services generally outside the remit of Home Office forces, such as dealing with fatalities on the rail network. Neither does BTP police a resident population but rather provides a service to passengers, rail staff and others who work on or live near the railway. HMIC has taken these differences into account when producing this report.

This inspection also reports on performance against the priorities contained within BTP's *Policing Plan* for 2010/11. Based on current and (where applicable) previous performance, HMIC considers that BTP is likely to meet the majority of targets in this year's plan.

It is doing particularly well in the areas of responding to immediate incidents, reducing violent offences, improving victim satisfaction, investigating fatalities and returning the railway to normality. More needs to be done to reduce live cable theft and improve perceptions of passenger safety. Consideration should be given to making some targets more stretching in the future, such as the victim satisfaction rate and female representation in the workforce.

In the summer of 2010 HMIC conducted a thematic inspection of how Home Office forces were tackling anti-social behaviour (ASB). BTP was not part of that inspection but a number of studies, including work carried out by the body representing rail users, Passenger Focus, has identified ASB as an important issue for the travelling public and for rail staff. In recognition of these concerns the force has appointed a senior officer to lead on how the force tackles anti-social behaviour. There is work to be done to improve the collection of ASB information in order to better identify repeat and vulnerable callers.

Theft of cable on the rail network is increasing, as is the associated disruption to passengers and the cost to the industry. Analysis by the force, including a study of the

correlation between an increase in copper price and increase in cable theft, suggests that the number of offences will continue to rise. BTP has called for additional legislation covering the processing and disposal of scrap metal. Tackling live cable theft is a force priority, and the force has been investing resources into solving the problem. Owing to the predicted increase in offences, now is an appropriate time for the force to carry out a thorough review on its approach to the problem. The force should satisfy itself that it is maximising all opportunities to deal with this crime, ranging from intelligence to enforcement.

How BTP deals with fatalities on the rail network is considered by HMIC to be a strength. BTP has the responsibility to manage fatalities, and (subject to there not being any suspicious circumstances) to arrange for a scene to be cleared quickly to enable the network to reopen. The way BTP assesses fatalities is considered to be good practice and the system in place has the potential to be transferable for use with some fatalities and serious road collisions that take place on roads critical to the transport infrastructure.

Many organisations are facing the toughest budget cuts in living history. BTP has made progress in identifying and delivering efficiency savings, but it also needs to ensure it is in a position to be able to respond to unforeseen and sudden reduction in budget. BTPA and the force have carried out work to scenario plan, but HMIC considers more could be done to identify the operational impact of potential cuts.

BTP wants neighbourhood officers to be visible to the public and rail staff. To support this intention they aim to minimise the occasions when officers and PCSOs are abstracted from their dedicated neighbourhoods. This also features as a target within the BTP Policing Pledge. The method by which this is reported is not fully developed and more work needs to be done to understand the true extent of abstractions.

All officers and staff interviewed or spoken to during this inspection were constructive in their comments and are thanked for their assistance. The inspection team were left with the impression of a body of officers and staff who are committed to providing a professional and quality service both to rail passengers and to the industry.

Recommendations

HMIC recommends that:

Recommendation 1

BTP introduce a system which identifies repeat and vulnerable victims, then takes action to reduce repeat victimisation.

(Local crime and policing page 14)

Recommendation 2

In order to maximise the impact against cable theft, BTP thoroughly review its approach to tackling this crime type. The review should include how the force gathers, shares and analyses intelligence, an assessment of preventative measures that have been introduced and the effectiveness of enforcement activity.

(Protection from serious harm page 19)

Recommendation 3

BTP share good practice in managing fatalities and delay on the railways with ACPO to enable other forces to identify if there are more effective ways of managing delay caused by Road Traffic Collisions on major road networks.

(Protection from serious harm page 21)

Recommendation 4

BTP assess and reports in more detail the operational impact and risks associated with its scenario planning against a range of budget cuts.

(Value for money page 27)

Recommendation 5

Abstractions of neighbourhood policing teams be reported by area and monitored at the force level so BTP can ensure teams are spending at least 80% of their time in their neighbourhoods.

(Confidence and satisfaction page 30)

Background

HMIC independently assesses police forces and policing activity ranging from neighbourhood teams, serious crime and the fight against terrorism in the public interest. In preparing our reports, we ask the questions which informed citizens would ask and publish the answers in accessible form, using our expertise to interpret the evidence. We provide authoritative information and our evidence is used to drive improvements in the service to the public.

The role of HMIC

The public want the police to succeed in their mission to keep people safe and secure. It is in the public interest that the quality of policing keeps improving. HMIC monitor and report on forces and policing activity with the aim of encouraging improvement.

We will always try to see policing through the public's eyes. Our reports will be clear, jargon-free and designed to be accessible, measured, objective, statistically reliable and authoritative.

We also continue to provide professional advice to police, using experienced officers and other experts (such as lawyers and accountants) to identify the 'best practice' to which all forces can aspire. We will encourage operational excellence and increasingly, a good deal for the public in terms of value for money.

Much of our work relates to the mainstream police forces in England and Wales, together with the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and British Transport Police (BTP). For the BTP, as with the forces in Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, HMIC inspection activity is undertaken by invitation. In April 2010, the British Transport Police Authority (BTPA) invited HMIC to undertake an inspection, setting out agreed terms of reference based on current UK-style risk-based assessments of forces.

The four areas assessed during this inspection were: Local Crime and Policing, Protection from Serious Harm, Confidence and Satisfaction, and Value for Money.

This inspection

The inspection included an examination of force documents and performance data, with the main part of the inspection conducted between 04 and 08 October 2010. A series of structured interviews and focus groups covering a wide range of ranks and roles was carried out with BTP and partner agencies. Visits were made to North Western and to London Underground Areas. The Force Control Room London was also visited and a number of reality checks were carried out at stations in four out of the seven BTP policing areas.

Force overview and context

British Transport Police (BTP) has responsibility for policing the mainline railways throughout England, Scotland and Wales, the London Underground, Docklands Light Railway, Croydon and Midland Metro tram systems, and part of the Tyneside Metro.

BTP is funded predominantly by the rail industry: a police services agreement requires the Police Service Agreement holders to pay for the force. The force has a budget for overground policing in 2010/11 of £202m and for the London Underground Area a further £50m.

Passenger journeys on the rail network have increased from 1.2 billion in 2006 to 1.3 billion in 2009-10, while passenger kilometres travelled also rose from 46.5 to 51.1 billion. As rail fares increased by 22.1% over the same period, passenger revenue went up from £5 billion to £6.1 billion

BTPA Strategic Plan

The BTPA Strategic Plan 2008-2011 sets out BTP's strategic goals as:

- 1) Reducing crime and disorder
- 2) Protecting the railway economy
- 3) Increasing BTP's capacity and capability through improved efficiency and effectiveness
- 4) Providing a better service to passengers, rail staff and the rail industry

BTP Policing Plan

In addition the BTP Policing Plan sets out 14 national targets and 39 Area targets. An overview of national targets is provided on page 10 of this report.

The force also produces Area Policing Plans, an Annual Statistical Bulletin and Annual Report and Accounts.

British Transport Police Authority

BTPA comprises 13 members, including some from the rail industry, that meet six times a year to ensure BTP provides an efficient and effective service to passengers, rail operators and their staff. BTPA also has six subgroups including the Professional Standards and Audit Committees. The authority is also responsible for setting the budget and targets for BTP and for monitoring performance.

Chief Officer Team


The Senior Management Team (SMT) comprises the Chief Constable who is supported by a Deputy Chief Constable (DCC); 4 Assistant Chief Constables (ACC): ACC Territorial Policing (TP), ACC Protective Services (PS); ACC Scotland; ACC Operations; Director of Human Resources and a Director of Finance and Corporate Services.

Establishment

BTP comprises the following staff:

- 2,928 officers;
- 1,350 police staff;
- 337 police community support officers (PCSOs); and
- 206 special constables.

Force structure (2010)



Performance

HMIC considers that BTP is likely to meet the majority of targets in its *Policing Plan* for this year. The force is doing well in responding to immediate incidents, reducing violent offences, improving victim satisfaction and clearing fatalities. More work needs to be done on reducing live cable thefts and on improving perceptions of passenger safety. Further commentary is provided on targets later in this report (organised under four main domains).

Explanation of colour codings

Green	Likely to meet or exceed the target
Amber	Will potentially meet the target
Red	Unlikely to meet the target

Performance indicator	2008/09	2009/10	Part Year to Date Target	End of September 2010
1. Reduce overall notifiable crime (excl. police generated offences) from the 2009/10 level.	60,348	55,751	27,875	28,758
2. Respond to at least 80% of immediate incidents within 20 minutes.	Data unavailable		80%	91%
3. Increase the number of staff detections for assault offences from the 2009/10 level.	1,526	1,464	732	720
4. Reduce the number of serious violence against the person, sexual and robbery offences from the 2009/10 level.	4,351	3,846	1,923	1,891
5. Increase the number of offenders detected for anti-social behaviour offences committed between 8pm and 2am by at least 20%.	4,314	4,270	2,562	2,464
6. Increase the number of offences detected for football related disorder offences by at least 25%.	511	754	480	436
7. Increase the proportion of offences brought to justice for serious violence against the person, sexual and robbery offences.	N/A	38%	31%	30%
8. Reduce the number of live cable offences from the 2009/10 level.	1,177	878	439	720
9. Increase safety at 36 high risk level crossings in partnership with network rail ¹ .	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
10. All non-suspicious fatalities to be cleared within an average of 90 minutes.	75	81	90	78
11. Overall victim satisfaction rate to be at least 80%.	80%	87%	80%	87%
12. Increase passenger's perceptions of safety for at least 42 stations. ¹	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
13. Improve the representation of female police officers.	14%	16%	16%	16%
14. Representation of BME officers to be at least that of 2009/10.	10%	6.6%	6.6%	6.6%
15. Sickness absence to be no more than an average of 7.7 days per employee.	7.38	7.73	3.6	3.87

¹ Performance against targets 9 and 12 will be reported after April 2011.

Inspection findings

LOCAL CRIME AND POLICING

This section provides information on how BTP is developing Neighbourhood Policing (NP) and tackling anti-social behaviour (ASB).

Neighbourhood Policing and anti-social behaviour

BTP adopted the principles of Neighbourhood Policing in 2007 and has made progress in a relatively short space of time. This has been despite the challenges of trying to define and engage with 'neighbourhoods' within a transient population.

BTPA are committed to ensuring the force delivers NP, and in 2009 commissioned an external review. This resulted in an action plan which is progressed through the NP Project Board. The recommendations of the review are monitored by the Authority.

HMIC previously inspected NP in 2008. The current assessment has identified that the force is working well to further develop NP, such as through the introduction of more joined-up policing at transport hubs, and of other partnership working such as the Fusion centre (see page 12 below).

BTP has 315 police constables (PCs) and 286 police and community support officers (PCSOs) assigned to NP. The force has 61 neighbourhood policing teams (NPTs) located within its seven policing areas.

Earlier this year, all Home Office forces were assessed as to how they record and deal with ASB. During this assessment HMIC also examined how BTP was going about tackling ASB. Inspectors found that BTP takes ASB seriously and are working with rail passengers and staff to reduce the number of incidents. However, the force needs to do more around recording ASB and identifying repeat and vulnerable victims.

Strengths

- ACC (TP) is the chief officer lead for NP and ASB and chairs the NP Project Board and Hub Governance Board.
- Each NPT is formed following the submission of a business case outlining perceived local demands, including an assessment of crime and incident data, stakeholder assessments and requirements, local community impacts and the local railway environment. Submissions are authorised through a justification process at the NP Board.
- Every NPT comprises of a mix of sergeants, PCs and PCSOs. Teams can vary in size, from 30 or so (assigned to Victoria Station, London) to smaller teams of five or six at smaller stations.
- There have been developments in providing training for NPTs. Between January to March 2010, a three-day course on NP was provided to supervisors,

PCs and PCSOs working within NPTs. Course content included the National Intelligence Model (NIM), problem-solving, running effective meetings and a briefing on the Contest strategy and Operation Fairway.

- BTP has introduced the 'Hub' principle at stations where an interface exists between London Underground and other Areas. These stations are: Victoria; Stratford; Finsbury Park; Euston; Waterloo; Liverpool Street, and Kings Cross. The purpose has been to ensure that NPT and Response officers from London Underground and Areas work under one line management and on the same radio network at these busy locations. Additional benefits are improved liaison with the Metropolitan Police and rail operators.
- The Fusion Centre was set up in September 2010 between Transport for London, British Transport Police and the Metropolitan Police to enable more effective sharing of information and the joint analysis of data. Initial analysis has led to Victoria, Stratford and Finsbury Park stations and surrounding areas becoming the first areas of focus by the group.
- BTP has received £17.5k from the Victoria Business Improvement District for November to December 2010. The additional funding is being spent on overtime to provide additional high visibility patrols at Victoria, with particular presence at areas near to the retail outlets.
- In February 2010, Passenger Focus published a report on rail passenger's views of ASB. One of the conclusions from the report, based on a response of over 1,000 questionnaires, was that passengers, particularly those under 26, are most worried about threatening behaviour, other passengers under the influence of drink or drugs, and theft of belongings. When asked what passengers thought could be done to make them feel safer, passengers wanted people under the influence of drink or drugs to be prevented from boarding trains and to see an increase in the number of rail staff and police on the trains. Previous research by Passenger Focus has also shown that fear of crime is most impacted by acts of disorder, drunkenness and intimidation after 8pm.
- As a result of these two pieces of research, and also on the basis its own consultation data, BTPA introduced a target to increase the number of offenders detected for ASB between 8pm and 2am by at least 20% (from the 2009/10 level).
- Earlier this year shift patterns within BTP were altered to allow for more officers to be available to respond to reports of ASB. Most officers interviewed understood and supported the rationale for working later shifts to meet customer demand.
- In 2009/10, 4,270 offenders were detected for ASB offences committed between 8pm and 2am. The benchmark part year to date for 2009/10 is 2,562 and the force is just under at 2,464.
- Problem Solving Plans (PSPs) contain detailed guidance notes using the SARA problem-solving model, and are used by officers and PCSOs to record activity

in resolving ASB and other local priorities. PSPs examined by the inspection team were comprehensive, with evidence of regular oversight by supervisors.

- There is evidence of BTP taking a professional approach to addressing ASB and using the skills from various disciplines to address the problem. One example is the creation of Graffiti Teams (which include detective officers), the regular use of Section 18 searches, and detailed investigation plans.
- BTP makes full use of the media to highlight work being carried out by the force. From April to September 2010 the Media and Marketing team conducted 65 ASB-related media releases, in an effort to reassure the public, raise awareness of activities by BTP and partners, appeal to the public for information, and highlight sentencing/arrests of offenders.

Work in progress

- The force has completed a self-assessment on ASB against HMIC specific grading criteria, and intends to develop an improvement plan. This will include liaison with Home Office forces and other partners to share ASB data, and comprehensive analysis to understand the nature and extent of ASB occurring within the force jurisdiction.

Areas for improvement

- The force does not have a system in place to ensure repeat or vulnerable callers are identified. A trial is being conducted (from the end of September 2010) at Force Control Room Birmingham in which operators ask callers reporting ASB, violence against the person or hate crime incidents if they have been a victim of any crime on the railways during the past 12 months. If they have, response officers are informed and expected to provide an enhanced service, as defined in the repeat victim policy. This policy needs reinforcing to all areas as not all repeat victims are provided with the appropriate response. This system also relies upon callers recognising previous reports as constituting ASB, and does not cater for third party reporting. The force uses the Criminal Justice Code of Practice for Victims of Crime definition of 'vulnerable'² when referring to ASB complainants, but there is no bespoke response plan for those who are identified as such. Some staff responded that the Pier Plans (a well-developed response to individuals believed susceptible to suicide on the railways) also caters for persons vulnerable to ASB. BTP should develop a system to flag vulnerable persons and then take action, in line with the repeat victim policy, to reduce repeat victimisation.
- HMIC recommends that BTP widen its definition of ASB to include criminal damage, and that it introduce a method to identify repeat and vulnerable victims.

² Vulnerable victims are all victims under 17 years old, or those whose quality of evidence is likely to be reduced because they have a mental disorder or learning disability or a physical disability or disorder.

Recommendation 1

BTP introduce a system which identifies repeat and vulnerable victims, then takes action to reduce repeat victimisation.

- The force needs to review the approach to local target-setting to ensure focus is shifted to NP priorities and includes a qualitative element. Some Areas have set a numerical target for the number of PSPs submitted. These targets are purely quantitative and not necessarily linked to policing priorities. Of those Areas with PSP targets, all are currently underperforming.
- Details of each PSP are held centrally at force headquarters (FHQ), but are not accessible remotely to the rest of the force. A database containing PSPs, available on the force intranet would allow for best practice to be shared throughout the force area.
- There is confusion amongst some staff regarding the final completion 'sign off' procedure of neighbourhood priorities. The formal tasking and co-ordination meetings and Police and Communities Together (PACT) meetings were both cited as the adopted method.
- The only facility for staff in the First Contact Centre and Force Control Rooms to establish local NPT priorities when taking calls or dealing with incidents is a search via the BTP website. BTP should consider the value of making local priorities immediately available to dispatch staff to inform call grading decisions.
- The force has an Area briefing system, which contains details of ASBO targets in each Area and is accessible to all Area officers. This information is also displayed on BTP station notice boards. However, there was little evidence of specific briefings to NH staff to inform them about ASB problems, locations, offenders and victims, force policy, options for resolution, or of good practice.
- If an ASB report result in a crime being recorded, the complainant will be contacted by the investigating officer (in accordance with the Victims' Code). Compliance checks for these crimes are undertaken initially by supervisory police staff in force control rooms, and subsequently by victim care managers. However, if there is no crime, there are no set standards or any compliance systems for follow-up contact with ASB complainants.
- There was limited evidence at some of the rail and tube stations visited by the inspection team of signs and posters providing details and locations of BTP police stations or contact numbers.

PROTECTION FROM SERIOUS HARM

The majority of policing activity carried out by BTP takes place either within neighbourhoods or on response duties on the network. However, BTP also deals with other policing activities which carry a higher risk than routine policing. These include:

- Combating terrorism;
- Cable offences;

- Fatalities and level crossings;
- Serious sexual assaults – such as rapes;
- Major crime - such as murder and serious violence;
- Serious organised crime; and
- Public order.

To respond to these threats, BTP needs sufficient numbers of skilled specialist investigators. This area of work, known in Home Office forces as Protective Services, is governed by national standards. It relates to activities such as intelligence-gathering; preventing crimes such as murder; and solving major crimes. In this report violent crime is also included within this domain.

This section of the report includes commentary on how BTP tackles these functions. A summary is also provided on findings from the July 2010 revisit on Major Crime and Serious and Organised Crime. At the same time, HMIC also examined progress made on the 2008 inspections of Public Order, Civil Contingencies and Critical Incident Management. We found that BTP had made progress in resolving many issues outlined in these previous reports as areas for improvement (AFIs).

Combating terrorism

The railway network has long been regarded as a target for terrorists, dating from the London bombings in the 1970s to the more recent co-ordinated suicide attacks on 7 July 2005 on three London Underground trains. Assessment by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) is that the railway remains one of the most attractive terrorist targets in the UK.

Unlike Home Office forces, BTP does not receive any additional significant funding to tackle the terrorist threat. In the main, any resources connected with this function come from within its overall budget.

Strengths

- From December 2009 to November 2010, BTP dealt with 153 calls relating to potential bomb threats. The force has a well-tested response to such threats. Force Control Room London (FCRL) has sole responsibility for bomb threat categorisation and for liaison with Network Rail's main control centre in Milton Keynes. Bomb threat categorisation is carried out by the Duty Inspector. There are two categories:
 - Category 1, which means it is viable and prompts evacuation.
 - Category 2, which leads to a sweep search but not evacuation.

Officers trained to carry out assessments are required to conduct online scenarios every six months to test their judgement when classifying threats.

- BTP has two counter terrorism security advisors based at FHQ.
- Counter terrorism profiling has been undertaken by a seconded MPS member of staff funded by ACPO TAM Prevent. This information has also been used in the preparation of community profiling in Manchester.

- The force carries out a number of counter terrorism (CT) training exercises each year. The exercises test BTP officers as well as rail staff, and regularly involve colleagues from other forces and emergency services. A well-publicised event in March 2010 was a five-day counter terrorist exercise between Camden Road and Kentish Town (that had been closed for track and station refurbishment).
- BTP has seconded one officer to each of: West Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit; National Ports Assessment Centre; and the Olympic Special Branch Intelligence Cell. The officers are working on any CT-related issues that could impact on the rail network.
- Officers from Response and NPTs interviewed said they were confident in the training they had received for CT-related incidents and felt they had been adequately prepared for the role.

Work in progress

- To better illustrate the value that BTP provides to the rail industry in tackling crime and reducing disruption, the BTPA is considering the development of a detailed benefit model. Although not yet fully quantified, initial indications are that the financial value in, for example, not having to close lines or stations as a result of risk-based threat assessment, would be significant.

Areas for improvement

None identified

Cable offences

The theft of metal from the network, including live cables, is a significant problem for the rail industry and one of the biggest operational challenges for BTP. Thefts vary from the taking of live cables to the theft of cable in storage and can involve many different locations of crime spread across great distances.

The theft of live cables results in significant delays to trains, causing disruption and dissatisfaction amongst passengers. There is also a cost to industry in terms of penalties for delayed trains and for the replacement of cables. It is estimated cable theft will cost the industry £19m in delay penalties alone in 2010/11.

In 2010 there has been an increase in cable thefts, and in April the number reached an all time high. Just under 300 cable-related crimes were recorded, of which 172 were live cables. Despite the force taking action to deal with the problem and making hundreds of arrests each year, this crime is on the increase and BTP will not meet its target in reducing the number of live cable thefts.

The following table provides information on the number of live cable and total cable offences along with detections from April 2008 to September 2010.

Live cable	2008/09	2009/10	April-Sept 2010
Recorded	1,182	876	729
Detection rate	9%	7%	11%
All cable (inc live)			
Recorded	2,089	1,688	1,407
Detection rate	12%	10%	14%

BTP has a chief officer as the ACPO lead for tackling metal theft. Although BTP and the ACPO Metal Theft Working Group has called for a change in legislation for scrap metal dealers and for new powers to close premises, even if introduced this will take some time to implement. Meanwhile as the price of metal continues to increase the number of offences are likely to continue to rise.

Opportunities exist for BTP to shape the national operational response to the theft of metal; this will require close co operation from other forces.

Strengths

- The DCC is the ACPO lead for tackling metal theft and chairs the Conductive Metal Theft Working Group.
- The ACPO Working Group, in consultation with representatives from the recycling industry, has helped draft a code of practice for scrap metal dealers. The code, if adopted, will only be voluntary. The force is lobbying the Government for the code to be set out in legislation and to be widened to prevent cash transactions and allow a senior police officer to close down a dealer if conditions are broken.
- The force lead for cable theft has recently changed from ACC (PS) to ACC (TP). This coincides with a shift of detective posts from the National Task Force based at FHQ to the North Eastern Area. The Area is experiencing more cable theft than any other (see also Areas for Improvement, below). The purpose of the realignment is to get detectives closer to where offences are taking place, rather than having to deploy teams from London to the North. The following posts have been transferred: Detective Inspector, Detective Sergeant and nine Detective Constables.
- A problem profile on metal theft was prepared by BTP in 2008, and revised in February and then September 2010.
- Cable theft is investigated by Area resources. A cable conference is held every two weeks, which all areas across BTP dial into. An analyst and statistician also provide information on cable theft trends.
- The force is developing its use of Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) for this crime type (see also Areas for Improvement, below). Technology is being used to tackle the problem, including 'trembler alarms' on stretches of cable and the use of 'SmartWater'.

- Various initiatives are held across BTP to tackle cable theft, including days of action. More recent activities include the RAILPOL (European Network of Railway Police Forces) action day on copper theft, and Operation Ablett where more than 100 BTP officers carried out inspections at scrap metal dealers. This operation resulted in eight arrests, written warnings given to dealers and the recovery of 17 tonnes of scrap metal.
- In the North Western Area the team has had some success through concentrating on locating burn sites and fully exploiting forensic opportunities.

Work in progress

- A four-year cable theft strategy is currently being drafted. It is planned that the final version of the strategy will be endorsed by the Strategic Command Team in early 2011.
- The force wants to further increase the use of CHIS in tackling cable theft, and discussions are underway with a number of Home Office forces to establish if they will manage the CHIS on behalf of BTP (with BTP paying all associated costs).

Areas for improvement

- Despite the activity being undertaken by BTP and partners, the force is failing to achieve the target of reducing live cable theft offences from the 2009/10 level. For April to September 2010, 720 offences have been recorded: this equates to a 63% increase from 2009/10. All Areas apart from London North are failing to meet the target. North Eastern Area has been particularly hit by this crime type, with 390 offences.
- The force is not carrying out intelligence interviews on all persons arrested or convicted for metal theft. Wherever possible, this should be conducted by a CID officer with consideration as to whether the suspect might also be suitable for potential referral to the Dedicated Source Unit.
- The force does not have a force-wide trigger plan detailing the response to reports of cable or other types of metal theft.
- The budget for CHIS is £30,000 for the whole of BTP. The force should consider whether this is enough, given the amount of crimes committed and of how it wants to increase the number of CHIS.
- The scale of metal theft in the UK is such that consideration should be given to setting up an inter-force initiative similar to Operation Liberal, the national approach to dealing with distraction burglars. Although the crime type is different and not all offenders travel great distances to steal cable, having a national intelligence hub for co-ordinating and assessing intelligence on metal theft, offenders and MOs from all forces would provide a more reliable intelligence picture.

- BTP fully understands the implications to passengers and the rail industry of cable theft and has invested significant time, effort and resources in attempting to tackle the problem. However, despite this effort the theft of cable is increasing. Now is an appropriate time for the force to thoroughly review, outside of the tasking and co-ordination process, how it is addressing this crime.

Recommendation 2

In order to maximise the impact against cable theft, BTP thoroughly review its approach to tackling this crime type. The review should include how the force gathers, shares and analyses intelligence, an assessment of preventative measures that have been introduced and the effectiveness of enforcement activity.

Fatalities and level crossings

There are around 300 fatalities on the rail network every year. Each one is potentially suspicious and BTP have to be able to attend the scene promptly and make a reliable assessment as to whether a scene should be preserved or if it can be cleared to allow trains to run normally. This area of policing is very demanding for BTP, not only because of the unpleasant nature of most deaths on the railway but because of understandable pressure to open lines quickly. The force is quite clear that it will not compromise safety, the respect and dignity of the deceased, or the investigation process in an effort to meet performance targets. BTP has guidance in place setting out roles and responsibilities for staff involved in these incidents and works closely with rail operators, both when training for such events and operationally. The principles behind the systems and processes BTP has in place to risk assess incidents are worth sharing with other police forces, as they may be transferrable to the management of fatalities and serious accidents on roads.

Safety at level crossings is a concern to BTP and the rail industry. Aside from the obvious risks to those using level crossings, any breach of signs and instructions can cause injury to the offender as well as rail passengers. Delays are also experienced following incidents at level crossings where collisions have taken place or where crossing equipment has been damaged. The target for level crossings is new for 2010/11 and the force has taken a number of steps to reduce the problem.

Strengths

- BTP has a comprehensive standard operating procedure (SOP), updated in August 2010, for dealing with fatal accidents. Other guidance documents support the SOP, such as Fatality Management good practice and a Fatality Guidance document. Officers HMIC spoke to during the inspection were familiar with the SOP and of action to be taken in the event of a deployment to the scene of a fatal accident.
- BTP has four classifications covering deaths on the network: suspicious; unexplained: death in the workplace; and non-suspicious. On receipt of a call to a fatality the duty officer in the Force Control Room will make the first assessment with two immediate objectives: preserving life, and establishing first accounts made by witnesses. An Area supervisor is deployed to the scene and

will contact the on-call senior officer or senior detective (depending on the assessment). If a death is considered unexplained or suspicious the location is treated as a crime scene and a senior investigating officer (SIO) and forensic support deployed.

- For non-suspicious incidents there is usually some form of evidence, such as CCTV or witnesses (eg the train driver). The force's 90-minute target for reopening the rail line applies for all non-suspicious deaths. From April to September 2010 there have been 97 non-suspicious fatalities. BTP is meeting its target time, having achieved an average of 78 minutes from the time a call was received to lines re-opening.
- London Underground Area runs 'Expert sessions' throughout the course of the year, involving industry and police experts on key crime and safety issues. In May 2010 an Expert session was held on fatality management. Attendees in addition to BTP included managers and staff from London Underground, Docklands Light Railway, MPS, London Ambulance Service, MIND, Samaritans and Westminster Primary Care Trust. The session covered non-suspicious fatalities and in particular focused on how to reduce and improve the response to suicides. In total 18 actions were identified from the day and all have been incorporated into a plan that is monitored by the Area. An informative booklet summarising the main points and actions of the session has been produced and shared with other Areas.
- In 2009/10, 2,733 offences were recorded in connection with level crossings; this is a slight reduction from the 2,988 recorded in 2008/09. BTP has introduced a target for 2010/11 to increase safety at 36 high risk level crossings. Each Area concentrates on six sites and, working with Network Rail, Areas are writing problem-solving plans for each location. The force is focusing its efforts on three main activities: education, engineering and enforcement.
- Within the North Eastern Area BTP has carried out radio interviews, distributed leaflets and, at a school near to one level crossing, a community project is being carried out on the dangers of level crossings. In London South BTP has worked with Network Rail, the Highways Agency and councils to introduce additional traffic calming measures and more signage for crossing. In Scotland £7,000 of funding has been obtained through a safety partnership to provide for live remote monitoring equipment. In London North the number of people prosecuted as a result of enforcement activity has been placed on signs.
- To date (December 2010) 14 of the 36 PSPs at level crossings have been signed off. The plans are signed off when safety measures have been put in place. The force will be further evaluating these locations using measurements such as reported incidents, reduction in offences and near misses.
- BTP has significant experience in assessing and dealing with fatalities on the rail network. Their expertise results mainly from very clear guidance, reliable decision-making and good liaison with train operators and other agencies. For Home Office forces, lengthy road closures on motorways and trunk roads following road traffic collisions (RTCs) are becoming common place. The impact

on road users and the national infrastructure is perhaps equally serious as the delays caused to rail users. HMIC is of the view that the systems BTP has for managing fatalities could well be transferred to forces investigating RTCs. HMIC recommends that BTP work with ACPO to share good practice, with a view to finding a more effective way of managing delays caused by RTCs on major road networks.

Recommendation 3

BTP share good practice in managing fatalities and delay on the railways with ACPO to enable other forces to identify if there are more effective ways of managing delay caused by road traffic collisions on major road networks.

Work in progress

- A pilot is operating in London South Area in which the force is working with Network Rail to use a mobile CCTV van to capture motoring offences related to level crossings. Offenders are referred to a safer driving course as an alternative to prosecution. This pilot will be evaluated and, if successful (and subject to funding), will be rolled out across BTP.

Areas for improvement

- BTP does not have a problem profile for fatalities on the rail network. Such research would potentially identify further preventative opportunities and build on the good work the force is already carrying out in this area.

Serious sexual assaults and violent crime

BTP plans to reduce the number of serious violence against the person, sexual and robbery offences from the 2009/10 level. It also aims to increase the number of detections for staff assault offences for the same time period.

Strengths

- The target for increasing the number of detections for assaults on rail staff (from the 2009/10 level) is replicated in each Area. As a force total, BTP is currently just missing the part year to date target. From April to September 2010, 815 assaults had been detected (against a target of 830).
- The force has adopted a robust approach to dealing with assaults on rail staff and has engaged closely with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) through a special reference group. The reference group includes unions and operators. More emphasis has been placed on this crime type as a result of better co-operation and awareness. An overall decrease of 10% on the number of assaults has been evident between 2005/06-2009/10.
- For the *Policing Plan* target of reducing serious violence against the person, sexual offence and robbery offences from the 2010/11 level, the force is

currently achieving the target. The number of offences recorded this year is 1,891, against a target of no more than 1,923.

- The number of robberies recorded has shown a decrease of over 69% between 2005/06 and 2009/10; this has also been evident in sanction detections, with almost a 47% decrease. Success is attributed by BTP to thorough investigations (every robbery is investigated) and to the increasing coverage and better quality of CCTV at stations.
- BTP is responsible for the investigation of rapes and serious sexual offences on the rail network. Major crime and review policy determines – and Area detective inspectors will manage – investigations unless the cases are stranger rapes, in which case one of the five FHQ-based SIOs will lead.
- BTP recorded 20 rapes in 2008/9, 16 in 2009/10 and six in the first half of this year. Since 2005 BTP has recorded 93 rapes and has detected 35%.
- BTP has an information-sharing agreement in place with the NPIA Serious Crime Analysis Section (SCAS). Of the 182 Serious Sexual Assaults recorded between January 2006 and September 2010,³ 69 have met SCAS criteria and so information has been submitted by BTP. BTP also receives intelligence from SCAS on any rapes where initial contact between an offender and victim took place in premises/areas that BTP are responsible for policing.
- Operation Portcullis is a national operation which uses knife arches and drugs dogs in addition to Operation Shield (where BTP use security scanners) in order to tackle youths carrying weapons and drugs onto the railway. All Areas have submitted plans in support of Operation Portcullis. These varied in terms of commitments in support of the operations, from London South undertaking to carry out seven days of action at nine locations, to the Wales and Western Area which committed to a single operation.
- Knife-related violence is being addressed with support from the Home Office's Tackling Knives Action Programme (TKAP) The programme, designed to reduce serious youth violence and improve public confidence, funds enforcement, education and prevention interventions. The force has received £50,000 this year from TKAP. One example of how funding is being used is the joint initiative between London South Area and Millwall Football Club. Four football tournaments have been held in areas of high gang and knife crime. Young people aged between 11 and 18 years who attend the matches have been encouraged to discuss knife crime issues with BTP officers.

Work in progress

- BTP has funded a production called 'Pact', which is played by the Arc Theatre Group. The story involves the aftermath of the stabbing of a 16 year old and will

³ The figure 182 also includes rapes

involve discussions with the audience (of up to 120 young people) The BTP Independent Youth Advisory Group has also provided input into the production.

Areas for improvement

- The force is just missing the target of increasing the proportion of offences brought to justice for serious violence against the person, sexual and robbery offences by at least two percentage points from the 2009/10 level. For April to September 2010 the rate is 30%, against a target of 31%.
- BTP has 55 sexual offence trained officers (STOs). They secure and preserve forensic evidence, obtain victim statements and provide support to victims of rape and other serious sexual assaults. Of this number, 40 are considered to be available for deployment. The force does not maintain any record of when STOs are deployed or of the time taken to reach a victim. This would be relevant information to know to help ensure officers' skills are kept current and that victims are receiving prompt attention.

Major Crime and Serious and Organised Crime

In 2008 BTP was inspected on how it deals with major and serious and organised crime. This followed similar inspections on Home Office forces in England and Wales. The force was measured against specific grading criteria and found to have 'met the standard' for major crime (as with Home Office forces, serious and organised crime was not graded). The force did not receive any recommendations in either report but some areas for improvement were identified.

A Major Crime Memorandum of Understanding was signed with ACPO earlier this year, and sets out that Home Office forces will investigate all Category A murders within BTP's jurisdiction, as well as most Category B (subject to negotiation). BTP will in most cases investigate Category C. The following sets out the number of murder/attempted murder investigations led by BTP since 2007:

2007

2 x murders, both detected by Home Office forces
3 x attempted murders, all investigated and detected by BTP

2008

0 x murders
3 x attempted murders, all investigated and detected by BTP

2009

0 x murders
2 x attempted murders, both investigated and detected by BTP

2010 to date

2 x murders, one Category A and investigated by the MPS, one investigated and detected by BTP
4 x attempted murders, all but one investigated by BTP

For 2009/10 the four headquarters-based SIOs have dealt with a total of 14 incidents where an SIO has been required to lead an investigation.

For serious and organised crime, OCG operations are now fully costed and each Area has a dedicated financial investigator. BTP needs to ensure Proceeds of Crime Act legislation is fully exploited. Although lessons learnt from operations are now captured, the force needs to have a system in place that allows these to be easily retrieved and shared with newer or less experienced staff.

For both major and serious organised crime the force still faces a number of challenges. These include how to justify the resourcing of investigations that can be hundreds of miles from where teams are based, and how to ensure specialists – including SIOs – maintain their level of skills.

The cost of major crime specialist resources and support functions and issues around maintaining levels of skills should be considered within scenario planning (as recommended on page 27 of this report).

Public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents

BTP was inspected by HMIC in 2008 on how it manages public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents. As with the major crime and serious and organised crime inspections, while none of the reports included recommendations, they did contain AFIs. In July 2010 HMIC found that progress had been made against AFIs in all three reports.

BTP has built up expertise in dealing with public order and in managing large crowds travelling to sports or music venues. The force also moves serials of officers on trains with football supporters when there is a higher risk of on-train disorder or ASB. The revisit found the force had developed its approach to identifying risk and has produced a public order and public safety strategy for 2009/12, as well as a public order risk matrix for each Area.

The force is also experienced in managing critical incidents whether fatalities on the track or the assessment of potentially explosive devices. Following the inspection, the force trained more supervisors and inspectors on nationally delivered critical incident courses.

When examining progress made against AFIs in Civil Contingencies the inspection team focused on business continuity (BC), as this was considered to be an area of weakness in 2008. The force had introduced a new database to contain BC plans but HMIC found the plans were too generic. The team had visited the Force Control Room London and found out-of-date evacuation plans, and that the BC plan lacked detail. BTP took immediate action to resolve this issue and during this inspection the evacuation plan was found to be up to date. The force is now running a testing programme for all of its BC plans; these tests, some involving full initiation of plans, will be completed by April 2011. The Force Control Room London will be subject to a full test at the end of December 2010.

VALUE FOR MONEY: STAFFING AND COSTS

BTP is funded predominantly by the rail industry; a police services agreement requires the PSA Holders to pay for the force. The force has a budget for overground policing in 2010/11 of £202m, and a further £50m for the London Underground Area.

BTPA has recently set the 2011/12 budget for BTP at 3.3% less than the current year. Further pressure will be placed on the budget because of the January 2011 VAT increase to 20%, and because of the pension deficit.

A Value for Money profile has been prepared by HMIC for the force, which will allow for some initial benchmarking to take place. Although there are difficulties in some respects in comparing BTP with other forces (e.g. BTP does not have a resident population and some of its priorities differ), there will be some elements that will allow BTP to examine a number of functions more closely. An example of this is support services.

Strengths

- The force has made efforts in attempting to reduce costs whilst maintaining an effective and efficient service. In 2008 BTP set up an initiative named 'Frontline First' to examine ways to streamline back office functions and reinvest resources in frontline policing. The programme succeeded in realising almost £14.3m in cashable and non-cashable savings. From some of these savings BTP created three new Neighbourhood Policing Teams. The new posts included one inspector, seven sergeants, 29 PCs and 17 PCSOs.
- In September 2009, Frontline First2 was introduced, with the rationale of making cashable savings to balance the budget. A saving of £3.6m was made from the 2010/11 budget. Focus is now on two areas of activity: intelligence and prosecutions, the latter jointly with the Crown Prosecution Service. Frontline First2 is conducting thematic scrutiny reviews of activities that generate high levels of spend, and also engaging staff in coming up with ideas for efficiency savings.
- The Department for Transport (DfT) has recently commenced research to examine the potential to improve services and reduce costs associated with BTP, the Highways Agency and the Vehicle Operator Services Agency. Proposals include options from sharing operational support services, through to the creation of a strategic transport network enforcement agency that combines the functions of the three existing organisations. The project aims to identify reductions of around £75m (15%) across all three organisations.
- The DCC leads on the force Futures project to identify further savings. The drive towards making savings is supported by a current freeze on recruitment and promotion. Work is also being carried out to reduce costs in accommodation and hotel charges.

- The force has some formal collaborative arrangements for procurement in place, including around equipment, clothing and forensics. Other collaborative arrangements are less significant in terms of savings and are based on more effective working with colleagues in other law enforcement agencies, or on closer working arrangements with Train Operating Companies.

Work in progress

- A Payroll Review Programme has been introduced to implement the recommendations of a review on pay and allowances. The review outlined a number of issues to do with BTP staff experiencing problems in receiving correct payments. The programme seeks to rectify the problem through the introduction of electronic timesheets, the co-location of the payroll function to the HR Business Centre, and the communication of payroll changes and processes to all BTP personnel.
- Many staff expressed concerns and frustration to the inspection team regarding BTP IT systems. Repeated themes were: slow operating speeds; regular freezing causing loss of work, and multiple log-ons required to access different applications, all on the same network. One example provided is the inability of accredited financial investigators to access the national IT system. These concerns are recognised by the senior management team and a programme (under the direction of the DCC) to upgrade access speeds at the slowest 26 stations and to improve other functionality (such as memory capacity, software and bandwidth), was completed at the end of 2010. A separate project to replace the Wide Area Network is currently underway and is due to complete at the end of 2011.
- Although BTP does not have its own air support, plans have recently been announced which mean the force will take on the operational deployment of aircraft forming the proposed National Police Air Service (NPAS). BTP has the necessary infrastructure in place, since it has experience of deploying officers across England, Scotland and Wales from its two control rooms. This national collaborative work is anticipated to save £15m every year across UK policing (see also Areas for Improvement, below).

Areas for improvement

- BTP has carried out several detailed exercises in identifying and delivering efficiency savings. Although it has undertaken scenario planning, to aid prioritisation, more work could be done to fully understand the operational impact budget cuts would have on its ability to provide a policing service. HMIC recommends that BTP assess and report in more detail the operational impact and risks against its scenario planning.

Recommendation 4

BTP assess and report in more detail the operational impact and risks associated with its scenario planning against a range of budget cuts.

- More detailed work has to be done on modelling demand if BTP takes on the deployment responsibility for the NPAS, and on understanding IT implications. This is a potential risk given the current problems with IT in the force.

CONFIDENCE AND SATISFACTION

Public confidence in policing is influenced by various factors, which are likely to include how well forces deal with neighbourhood concerns. One of the first steps to improving confidence and satisfaction is to fully understand the perceptions the public have of what the important issues are. Listening to the experiences of users – whether victims of crime or otherwise – is also important. BTP carries out a wide range of surveys and uses data on policing from both national and more local surveys to help them understand what rail passengers think of the service provided

Passengers identify timely train services as their priority when assessing performance of the rail network. BTP fully recognise the part they play in this by either reducing live cable thefts or responding quickly to fatalities on the track: both of these types of incident can cause significant delays and impact on passenger satisfaction. Disruption can also be caused by criminal damage, trespass, level crossing offences and route crime. However, assessment of performance is also about how police officers and staff manage their interaction with the public, especially with those who are victims of crime.

HMIC found that officers and staff interviewed during the course of the inspection demonstrated considerable commercial and customer service awareness. The force produces some high quality marketing and publicity material to support NPTs and to let the public and rail operators know what they are doing to tackle priorities. However, more needs to be done to bring all of the NPT websites up to a good and consistent standard.

Demonstrating a commitment to improving the service, BTP has produced a Policing Pledge. This contains 11 points designed to better inform the public and rail staff of what they can expect from the force.

The BTP Policing Pledge

Pledge 1: Always treat you fairly with dignity and respect, ensuring you have fair access to our services at a time that is reasonable and suitable for you.

Pledge 2: Respond to incidents that require a police presence in a manner that helps keep travel disruption to a minimum.

Pledge 3: Answer emergency calls as soon as possible, giving you an estimated time of arrival and getting to you safely.

Pledge 4: Allocate our resources to target local concerns and priorities through local monthly meetings with the railway industry and regular engagement with passengers and their representatives.

Pledge 5: Agree annual local operational policing priorities with our partners and publish them within our Area policing plans.

Pledge 6: Provide updates on local crime and policing issues through the monthly publication of crime maps, which will illustrate crime levels and trends at each station.

Pledge 7: Where we have Neighbourhood Policing Teams, provide you with information so you know who your dedicated team is, where they are based, how to contact them and how to work with them. We will ensure that Neighbourhood Policing Teams and other police patrols are visible at times when they will be most effective and when you tell us you need them most. Teams will not be taken away from your neighbourhood business more than absolutely necessary. They will spend at least 80% of their time in your neighbourhood, tackling local priorities.

Pledge 8: Make the railway safer by working with station operators to implement the Secure Stations Scheme.

Pledge 9: Provide a quality service to victims of crime on the railway. If you are a victim of crime on the railway, we will keep you informed about the progress of your case by updating you at least on a monthly basis until the case is closed.

Pledge 10: Deal with you in a polite, professional and efficient manner whenever you come into contact with us.

Pledge 11: Acknowledge any dissatisfaction with the service you have received within 24 hours of reporting it to us. To help us fully resolve the matter, we will discuss with you how it will be handled, give you an opportunity to talk in person to someone about your concerns and agree with you what will be done about them and how quickly.

Strengths

- Passenger Focus is the national body representing rail passengers. Positive feedback was provided by Passenger Focus on BTP, with special mention made of how the force had been engaging with the group. Examples were provided of the force listening to the concerns of passengers, and how this more developed contact had helped shape priorities for the force.
- The National Passenger Survey is carried out twice a year by Passenger Focus, with a combined sample size of 50,000. A number of questions are contained within the survey on security at stations, perceptions of crime and on BTP. Data is provided to BTP within a month of the survey being carried out. To better understand passengers' views on the policing element, BTP has paid for additional surveys to be carried out at 36 stations.
- BTP has also introduced a 'mini passenger survey' within all Areas. This survey covers in some detail passenger views of personal safety and of ASB. London Underground has also carried out surveys on passengers in conjunction with Transport for London.
- A monthly telephone survey is conducted for victims of theft, violent, racist and vehicle crime. Around 5,000 victims are surveyed in this way. Results are analysed and fed into BTP's performance framework, and circulated to the Strategic Command Team and Area Commanders. Any dissatisfaction recorded

during the course of the survey leads to an examination of the crime report, and remedial action is taken if necessary.

- Officers and staff interviewed gave the impression of genuine commitment to improving services for victims of crime. The force achieved an average of 87% overall satisfaction during 2009/10 against a target of 80%. This was an achievement for the force and all Areas performed equally well. For the period April to September 2010 the force is maintaining its performance of 87% for overall satisfaction and 85% for victims of vehicle crime. The satisfaction with the service received by victims of racial and violent offences has increased (an increase to 93% and 90% respectively). Satisfaction with service of victims of theft has reduced slightly (from 87% to 84%).
- Satisfaction with the way victims feel they have been treated was particularly high at 95% for 2009/10. This credible position has been maintained for the first six months of 2010/11.
- For the force target of 'increasing passengers' perception of safety for at least 42 stations where the perception is currently low', BTP is meeting the target for 28 stations. Six stations do not have current survey data and eight stations have seen varying degrees of decline.
- As part of the inspection HMIC carried out reality checks and spoke to retailers and rail staff at a number of stations, as well as to guards and staff on trains. Overall, feedback was positive on how BTP responded to requests for assistance, and staff were confident they could rely on officers to provide a prompt response if help was needed. One longstanding member of rail staff described the local response team as 'brilliant'. He went on to say the local sergeant had made clear his team were there to help should the need arise, and that on football match days officers were always deployed near to concourse staff to provide support in dealing with any troublesome supporters. (See also Areas for Improvement, below).
- The BTP magazine 'The Line' is published nearly every month and incorporates features and news relating to the work the force carries out on the railways. This informative publication is produced for all stakeholders and is available in hardcopy or on the force website. London Underground Area also produces a monthly magazine circulated to its staff. The magazine, called 'L', is a professional publication and contains key messages from the Area Commander, items of interest and examples of how Response and NPTs have been successful in problem solving.
- NPTs in London Underground Area and in most other Areas have a quarterly magazine providing examples of problem solving and other events. The magazines are available in hardcopy or can be read on the NPT pages on the force website.
- To improve confidence amongst lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) communities, Liverpool NPT has set up a hate crime action plan. This involves using undercover as well as high visibility patrols. Crime prevention advice has

been provided and a drop-in centre was arranged for members of LGBT communities to meet the police.

Work in progress

- To better understand a variety of communities, a placement scheme is being piloted in London North for PCs and PCSOs. This sees links being formed with LGBT forums, and with mental health, faith and cultural groups.

Areas for improvement

- NPTs are required to spend a minimum of 80% of their time (85% for London Underground) in neighbourhoods tackling local priorities and concerns. The force abstraction policy was in the main understood by staff, but there is no effective system to record and report on abstractions forcewide. London Underground Area has developed its own comprehensive performance management database (bespoke to London Underground), which also contains data on abstractions. HMIC recommends that the force introduce a system to report on the level of abstractions of NPT staff. Such information will be of use to the force and BTPA and enable the monitoring of Pledge Point 5 in respect of NPT abstractions.

Recommendation 5

Abstractions of Neighbourhood Policing Teams be reported by area and monitored at the force level so BTP can ensure teams are spending at least 80% of their time in their neighbourhoods.

- BTP is meeting its target of improving the representation of female police officers in the force to 16%. Consideration should be given to increasing this target: Home Office forces averaged 26% in July 2010.
- As mentioned above, reality checking by HMIC at stations and on trains was in the main positive. Comment was made by a minority of staff and retailers that although PCs and PCSOs were visible, some had not visited shops or spoken with staff. This is something that could be improved by better supervision and monitoring by NPT sergeants.
- BTP does not monitor performance against the Policing Pledge as a separate entity. Parts of the Pledge are monitored by the NP Project Board. Any that feature in the *Policing Plan* (e.g. Pledge Point 4, setting local priorities and Pledge Point 9, keeping people informed) are reported at force performance meetings. The Policing Pledge is not obvious on the force website or at stations, and to date BTP has not reported to the public how successful (or otherwise) they have been in meeting the Pledge.
- NPT websites are still in need of some development to ensure the content of all of them is relevant and up to date. Some of the pages do not contain dates of forthcoming PACT meetings, or minutes of meetings. Updates on the work teams have carried out on priorities is quite basic on a number of pages. One of

the websites HMIC considers the force could use as a benchmark is the NPT at St Pancras. The website provides plenty of information on what the team has achieved, as well as very detailed commentary on priorities.

Conclusion

This report on the recent and current performance of BTP establishes the strengths, work in progress and areas for improvement. HMIC fully recognises the different policing environment of BTP, the specialist areas and functions it provides, and the progress it is making. HMIC will revisit the force in July 2011 to measure progress made against recommendations.

HMIC recommends that:

Recommendation 1

BTP introduce a system which identifies repeat and vulnerable victims, then takes action to reduce repeat victimisation.

(Local crime and policing page 14)

Recommendation 2

In order to maximise the impact against cable theft, BTP thoroughly review its approach to tackling this crime type. The review should include how the force gathers, shares and analyses intelligence, an assessment of preventative measures that have been introduced and the effectiveness of enforcement activity.

(Protection from Serious Harm page 19)

Recommendation 3

BTP share good practice in managing fatalities and delay on the railways with ACPO to enable other forces to identify if there are more effective ways of managing delay caused by Road Traffic Collisions on major road networks.

(Protection from Serious Harm page 21)

Recommendation 4

BTP assess and report in more detail the operational impact and risks associated with its scenario planning against a range of budget cuts.

(Value for Money page 27)

Recommendation 5

Abstractions of Neighbourhood Policing Teams be reported by area and monitored at the force level so BTP can ensure teams are spending at least 80% of their time in their neighbourhoods.

(Confidence and Satisfaction page 30)