Report on an unannounced follow-up inspection of the non-residential short-term holding facility at:

# **Cayley House**

9–10 July 2012

by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

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# Overview

Cayley House is a non-residential short-term holding facility at Heathrow Airport which replaced the removals facility at Queen's Building in 2009. Reliance is contracted to manage the area, which is located next to Terminal 3 but is inaccessible from inside the terminal. It receives people who are due to be removed from Heathrow Airport from other places of detention around the country. It is open 24 hours a day and allows for the separation of men, women and families. An Independent Monitoring Board provides regular oversight but supervisory visits by UK Border Agency (UKBA) staff are not routine. In the three months before the inspection, 2,539 detainees were held at the facility, comprising 2,113 men and 426 women. No children were detained. The average length of detention was 3.29 hours, although some were detained for much longer, including one detainee who was held for 26 hours.

We also inspected escorts leaving holding rooms at Heathrow Airport to take detainees to flights. We accompanied three such escorts, which went to the point that the aircraft pushed back, allowing the detainees to complete their journeys unaccompanied (reported in escorts section).

# Cayley House

Inspected: 9–10 July 2012 Last inspected: 10–12 May 2010

# Inspectors Hindpal Singh Bhui Colin Carroll Beverley Alden

# The healthy custodial establishment

- HE.1 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons is an independent, statutory organisation which reports on the treatment and conditions of those detained in prisons, young offender institutions, immigration detention facilities and police custody.
- HE.2 All inspections carried out by HM Inspectorate of Prisons contribute to the UK's response to its international obligations under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). OPCAT requires that all places of detention are visited regularly by independent bodies known as the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) which monitor the treatment of and conditions for detainees. HM Inspectorate of Prisons is one of several bodies making up the NPM in the UK.
- HE.3 The concept of a healthy prison was introduced in this inspectorate's thematic review Suicide is Everyone's Concern (1999). The healthy prison criteria have been modified to fit the inspection of short-term holding facilities, both residential and nonresidential. The criteria for short-term holding facilities are:

**Safety** – detainees are held in safety and with due regard to the insecurity of their position

**Respect** – detainees are treated with respect for their human dignity and the circumstances of their detention

Activities – detainees are able to be occupied while they are in detention

**Preparation for release** – detainees are able to keep in contact with the outside world and are prepared for their release, transfer or removal.

HE.4 The purpose of this inspection was to follow up the recommendations made in our last inspection of 2010 and assess the progress achieved. Inspectors kept fully in mind that although these were custodial facilities, detainees were not held because they had been charged with a criminal offence and had not been detained through judicial processes.

# Safety

- HE.5 At our inspection in 2010 we made 25 recommendations in this area, of which seven had been achieved, two partially achieved and 14 had not been achieved. Two recommendations were no longer applicable or could not be inspected. We have made a further nine recommendations.
- HE.6 Detainees were subject to frequent moves between places of detention and some spent longer in the facility than was necessary. Escorts were handled adequately overall but staff varied in their helpfulness. The reception process was speedy but detainees were not offered access to a telephone and there was no assessment of welfare needs. There was not always a female detainee custody officer on duty.

- HE.7 Staff did not receive bullying and suicide prevention refresher training or carry antiligature knives. There had been three incidents of self-harm in the previous six months. During one, records indicated that an unapproved pain compliance technique had been used on a detainee, and in another the review had been undertaken by a manager involved in the incident.
- HE.8 Not all staff had received child protection training. The family room provided a generally decent environment for children but some health and safety hazards needed addressing.
- HE.9 All staff received annual control and restraint refresher training. Use of force was low but detainees were not routinely seen by a health services professional after an incident.
- HE.10 A UK Border Agency (UKBA) manager did not visit the facility daily. Risk assessments in IS91 (authority to detain) forms were not consistently completed. Facility staff did not adequately assist one detainee to contact his solicitor. The advice given by immigration officers was not always clear. Detainees were unable to talk to immigration officers after 7.30pm.

# Respect

- **HE.11** At our inspection in 2010 we made nine recommendations in this area, of which one had been achieved, two partially achieved and six had not been achieved. We have made a further three recommendations.
- HE.12 The accommodation was reasonable but some repairs were slow to be addressed and detainees waiting for long periods had nowhere suitable to sleep. Supplies of clothing were limited. Most staff were reasonably welcoming but they did not proactively engage with detainees, and some were brusque.
- **HE.13** Some staff had received no diversity training for a number of years and there was insufficient awareness of the wide-ranging backgrounds and particular issues faced by detainees in the immigration system.
- HE.14 Information about complaints against UKBA was not kept at the facility or by immigration staff. Complaint forms in one holding room were worn and tatty. The Independent Monitoring Board visited regularly. A confidential helpline for detainees was not well understood.
- **HE.15** A range of fresh sandwiches, snacks and microwave meals was available but did not cater for the diverse needs of individual detainees.

# Purposeful activity

- **HE.16** At our inspection in 2010 we made one recommendation in this area, which had not been achieved. We have made no further recommendations.
- **HE.17** The provision of foreign language newspapers, books and DVDs was adequate. There remained no access to exercise in the fresh air.

# Preparation for release

- HE.18 At our inspection in 2010 we made five recommendations in this area, of which one had been achieved, one partially achieved and three had not been achieved. We have made one further recommendation.
- HE.19 Detainees were not able to access the internet, email or fax facilities. Property was appropriately managed. There were inadequate supplies of suitable clothing for onward journeys. Some detainees did not have the resources to make the onward journey from the airport to their final destination following removal.

# Section 1: Progress on recommendations

# Recommendations

# Escorts, vans and transfers

1.1 Detainees should not be subject to unnecessarily frequent moves between places of detention. (1.10)

**Not achieved.** We found several examples of detainees being subject to frequent moves between places of detention. One had been in six places of detention in two months and had been moved to Scotland and back in that time. Another had been in five places of detention in five weeks.

We repeat the recommendation.

1.2 Couples transferred and located apart from each other should be enabled to communicate with one another, unless relevant risk information justifies prevention of contact. (1.11)

**Unable to inspect**. No couples were detained at the facility during the inspection and we could not therefore establish whether they were able to communicate with each other during earlier detention and transfer. However, once in Cayley House, staff told us that related detainees were normally held together in the family room and could freely communicate.

1.3 Vehicles with internal cages should not be used for journeys within the airport unless clearly justified by individual risk assessment. (1.12)

**Achieved.** Vehicles with internal cages were no longer used.

1.4 There should be clear protocols, well understood by staff, for the handling of medication brought into the facility by detainees. (1.13)

**Achieved.** We were told that detainees bringing medication bearing their name into the facility were able to take it, although they were not permitted to keep it in possession. If the medication did not have the detainee's name on it, staff called a medical advice triage line and made the decision based on the advice from a medical professional. We spoke to several staff, who were all familiar with this protocol.

## Additional information and escorts at Heathrow Airport

- 1.5 Many detainees were transported to the establishment in the early hours of the morning. For some, this was in order to board an early flight but we met one detainee who had left an immigration removal centre (IRC) at 11pm and arrived at Cayley House at 2am, for a flight at 10pm that night. The holding room logs evidenced that some detainees had been held at Cayley House for 18 hours before being taken to flights, which was excessive.
- 1.6 We accompanied several detainees with in-country escorts who went with them to their flights and waited until the flight had left, but did not board. The first of these involved a Brazilian man who had arrived from Portugal and was being returned there. He had been detained from his

flight and arrived at the Terminal 1 holding room on the Monday evening. He was held in the room overnight and was due to return to Portugal the next day, after 18 hours in detention. He had no objections to his treatment and accepted the UK Border Agency (UKBA) decision not to allow him entry. Staff were friendly, assisted him with his luggage and escorted him through public areas reasonably discreetly. They wore high visibility vests but these did not have any prominent logos and little attention was drawn to him as he walked through the airport and boarded the plane. However, he was asked to leave the plane by the captain because Reliance staff had not brought with them a copy of his risk assessment. The man was returned to detention until another flight could be booked. The assessment recorded no risks.

- 1.7 In another case, a 21-year-old American woman had arrived from the USA and was being returned to Frankfurt, where she had earlier caught a connecting flight. She had been held for over 18 hours, sleeping on chairs in the family room, until she left for her flight with a single escort. Again, this was reasonably discreet but the escort was brusque and unhelpful, although polite. The young woman was clearly upset and anxious about how she could get home from Frankfurt, as she had insufficient money with her. She was advised to go to the German immigration authorities.
- 1.8 The third escort we accompanied comprised four men who had come from an IRC, some having served prison sentences. They had spent a short time in Cayley House, and were then driven to Terminal 3 in an escort vehicle and escorted on foot to the flight by two escorts. Staff interacted with them well and were helpful for example, by assisting one of them to obtain his mobile telephone from his luggage. One of the staff spoke their language and was able to answer a number of their questions. He appeared to have been allocated to the escort as a result of his language skills. The removal was managed discreetly by Reliance staff but at the point that the detainees were boarding the plane, a member of the ground crew shouted out to colleagues that she had paperwork 'for the deportees'. This was in the hearing of other passengers. The detainees did not object but staff told us that when this had happened on another flight recently, the detainee had refused to board and had been returned to detention.
- 1.9 We did not see the UKBA escort monitor but were told that he was regularly at the airport and sometimes accompanied in-country escorts.

#### Further recommendation

1.10 The UK Border Agency (UKBA) and escort contractors should ensure that people do not spend unnecessary time in detention.

#### Housekeeping point

**1.11** UKBA should discuss the importance of discretion with airlines.

## Arrival and accommodation

1.12 Detainees should be booked in or discharged from the holding room one at a time, and staff not dealing with the detainee should not be in the reception area. (1.27)

**Partially achieved.** We saw groups of male detainees arriving and leaving the facility. They were seated in a waiting room and were called to the reception desk one at a time. However, there were often large numbers of staff standing in the small reception area, up to eight at one point, which made the environment feel crowded and chaotic. This was in spite of a sign displayed stating there should be no more then three staff at a time in the area.

#### Housekeeping point

- 1.13 Staff not dealing with the detainee should not be in the reception area.
- 1.14 Pay telephones should have privacy hoods, to enable detainees to make calls in private. (1.28)

**Not achieved.** Pay telephones remained without privacy hoods. We repeat the recommendation.

1.15 Detainees should be searched sensitively, and not in the presence of detainees of the opposite sex. (1.29)

Achieved. Detainees were searched one at a time, in a room off the main reception area, out of sight of detainees in the waiting room. We did not see male and female detainees arriving together but were told that women would not be searched in sight of male detainees and vice versa. There was a curtain in the doorway of the searching room which could have helped to facilitate this but it was ripped and did not close.

## Housekeeping point

- **1.16** The curtain in the searching room should be replaced.
- 1.17 The holding room should have a stock of clean clothing, including underwear, for men and women in a range of sizes. (1.30)

**Not achieved.** The facility had almost no clothing for detainees beyond a small number of tracksuit bottoms for men. There was no underwear and no provision for women. **We repeat the recommendation.** 

1.18 Detainees should not be held for substantial periods or overnight without adequate sleeping facilities. (1.31)

**Not achieved.** Each of the holding rooms contained at least one lounger-type chair. However, these were narrow, likely to be uncomfortable to sleep on for any length of time and situated in sometimes noisy holding rooms.

We repeat the recommendation

1.19 Detainees held for more than 24 hours should receive a health screening. (1.32)

**Not achieved.** In the holding room logs we found records of one detainee who had been held for 26 hours. However, there was no health care provision at the facility, except in emergency cases, when staff could call an ambulance.

We repeat the recommendation.

## **Additional information**

1.20 The facility was open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, staffed by a day shift, a night shift and two teams of escorts coordinating flights. We were told that there was not always a female detainee custody officer (DCO) on duty, which presented difficulties in searching and supporting female detainees. Detainees arrived and were held under the correct authority (authority to detain forms; IS91s). The reception process was speedy and well coordinated.

Detainees were not permitted to keep their mobile telephone if it had an integral camera or recording facility but staff did not explain that they could keep the SIM card or offer a dummy mobile telephone. They did not offer detainees a free telephone call and some only became aware of this entitlement when we told them. There was no assessment of welfare needs beyond staff asking if the detainee had any questions.

- 1.21 The accommodation was reasonable, although several chairs were broken, including in the family room, and presented a health and safety risk (see also section on childcare and child protection). We were told that they had been broken for some time and that repairs were not prompt. Payphones in each of the holding rooms accepted incoming calls.
- 1.22 Some detainees arrived at the facility mistakenly believing that they were eligible for the Facilitated Return Scheme (FRS), which led to confusion and additional distress immediately before removal. For example, a Vietnamese detainee believed that he had been accepted onto the FRS because he had received a letter which stated, 'you are eligible to apply for the scheme'. As the detainee was not fluent in English, he had misunderstood the letter.

#### **Further recommendations**

- 1.23 A female detainee custody officer should be on duty whenever female detainees are held at the facility.
- 1.24 On arrival, detainees should be interviewed privately to establish any immediate needs, offered a free telephone call and advised how to make further calls thereafter.
- **1.25** Accommodation should be kept in a good state of repair at all times.
- 1.26 Details of the facilitated return scheme should be provided in the detainee's own language at the earliest possible stage of detention.

# Positive relationships

1.27 Staff should address detainees and each other with respect at all times. (1.36)

**Not achieved.** Most staff were polite and reasonably helpful. They addressed each other respectfully and some interacted well with detainees. However, others were brusque. We saw one member of staff chastising a polite detainee who simply wanted help to contact his solicitor (see section on legal rights).

We repeat the recommendation.

1.28 Staff numbers in the reception area and in other parts of the facility should be controlled effectively by managers. (1.37)

**Not achieved.** See recommendation 1.12 and housekeeping point 1.13.

1.29 Staff in the holding rooms should engage with detainees or sit with them, but not use the rooms for breaks or discussions with other staff who have no role in caring for detainees. (1.38)

**Partially achieved.** We saw staff using the holding rooms for breaks but only while they were empty. Most, but not all, staff were reasonably welcoming but they did not sit in the holding

rooms to talk to detainees or proactively engage with them, predominantly remaining in the reception area and corridor.

## Housekeeping point

**1.30** Staff should sit with and actively engage detainees in the holding rooms.

# Legal rights

1.31 The IS91 should confirm that a risk assessment has been conducted even when no risk factors have been identified. (1.42)

**Not achieved.** In five of the seven IS91s we examined, the risk assessment had not been completed.

We repeat the recommendation.

1.32 The UK Border Agency (UKBA) should negotiate with the Legal Services Commission to offer telephone advice to detainees using an interpretation service similar to that used in its police station telephone immigration advice line. (1.43)

**Not achieved.** Telephone immigration advice was not available to detainees. Immigration staff at the Returns Facilitation Unit (RFU) were not aware whether or not negotiations with the Legal Services Commission had taken place.

1.33 Details of the Community Legal Advice line should be displayed in the holding room. (1.44)

**Achieved.** Colour posters promoting the Community Legal Advice helpline were displayed in all three holding rooms. Information about the helpline had been translated into 10 languages. The notice in the male holding room was covered in graffiti.

#### Additional information

- 1.34 Detainees without mobile telephones or money were not routinely offered a telephone call (see section on arrival and accommodation).
- 1.35 During the inspection, a detainee wished to contact his solicitor but did not have access to the telephone number. A member of staff incorrectly advised him to call immigration staff from the RFU for help and was neither helpful nor patient thereafter when the detainee could not obtain the number. The detainee asked another DCO to help him find the telephone number on the internet but the latter simply told him that there was no internet access. This detainee was polite, quietly spoken and clear throughout. He was anxious and fearful about an imminent removal without having had a chance to speak to his solicitor. Only after we intervened did staff assist the detainee by giving him access to his luggage so that he could retrieve the number.
- 1.36 Detainees' legal documents were kept with their luggage in the store cupboard. They could generally access their documents on request to a DCO. We observed a detainee request access to his documents and be given assistance to do so. As the facility was located airside, legal visits were not permitted.

#### Further recommendation

1.37 Detainees should be able to contact their legal representatives without impediment, and staff should readily and quickly assist them in doing so.

## Casework

1.38 A UKBA manager should visit Cayley House daily to check conditions and the treatment of detainees; these visits and any issues arising should be recorded. (1.50)

**Not achieved.** A UKBA manager did not visit the facility daily. A UKBA contract monitor visited but not every day. Issues arising were not recorded. **We repeat the recommendation.** 

1.39 UKBA should ensure the efficient administration of Facilitated Returns Scheme discharge money. (1.51)

**Achieved.** Detainees no longer received discharge money in cash. DCOs now issued a card with which detainees could withdraw money from an ATM in their country of origin. Staff said that the scheme worked effectively, with the FRS team sending the cards by courier to Cayley House.

1.40 The chairs in the interview room should not be chained to the floor. (1.52)

**Not achieved.** Of the four chairs in the interview room, two were bolted and two chained to the floor.

We repeat the recommendation.

1.41 Telephone interpreting should be used by UKBA staff whenever appropriate, especially where there is evidence of emotional or behavioural difficulties. (1.53)

**Partially achieved.** None of the detainees passing through Cayley House during the inspection presented challenging behaviour. We saw a UKBA officer speak to a Vietnamese detainee using a telephone interpreter but overall usage of telephone interpreting by DCOs was low, given the high throughput of detainees, at a total of 62 calls in the previous three months.

We repeat the recommendation.

#### Additional information

- 1.42 The RFU, based at Terminal 3, was responsible for ensuring successful removals. RFU immigration staff liaised with case workers, Reliance and UKBA's country returns operations and strategy unit. RFU staff attended the facility occasionally, but less frequently than at the time of the previous inspection, and the team had reduced from 30 to 15 staff. They preferred to answer detainees' queries over the telephone rather than face to face. Furthermore, they finished work at 7.30pm, so detainees with late flights could not have last minute queries resolved.
- 1.43 We saw a member of RFU staff giving poor advice to a detainee who had been refused leave to enter the UK as a visitor. He was upset at being returned and asked if he could come back to the UK or whether any kind of ban was in place. The officer replied vaguely that the

detainee should not 'rush back' and failed to explain UKBA powers<sup>1</sup> to apply re-entry bans, or to check whether a ban had been applied.

#### Further recommendation

1.44 Returns Facilitation Unit staff should always be available to answer detainees' immigration queries and provide full and accurate information.

# Duty of care

## **Bullying**

1.45 Staff should receive anti-bullying and self-harm and suicide prevention training. (1.60)

**Not achieved.** Staff did not receive training in anti-bullying. Some staff had received self-harm and suicide prevention training from a workplace coach but that had been over a year ago, under the previous contractor.

We repeat the recommendation.

#### Additional information

1.46 Staff could not recall any incidents of bullying. Female detainees used a female-only holding room.

#### Suicide and self-harm

1.47 Staff should be trained on the care planning system, assessment, care in detention and teamwork (ACDT), and booklets should be opened at the facility when necessary. (1.61)

**Not achieved.** DCOs had not been trained in ACDT procedures or opening ACDT booklets. If a detainee arrived on an open ACDT document, staff kept it open and continued to make entries in the observation logs initiated by the sending establishment. Staff opened 'suicide and self-harm warning' forms when a detainee presented self-harm risks for the first time. The form travelled with the detainee on departure from the facility.

1.48 Staff should routinely carry anti-ligature knives. (1.62)

**Not achieved.** DCOs did not carry anti-ligature knives. Four knives were located around the facility: in reception, the office, the kitchen and a store cupboard. The reception and office were at the opposite end of the facility from the male holding room, and the kitchen and store cupboard were kept locked, which could have caused a delay in the event of an emergency. **We repeat the recommendation.** 

## **Additional information**

1.49 In the six months before the inspection, there had been three self-harm incidents. The first involved a detainee who had self-harmed on board an aircraft by attempting to cut his arms.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Paragraph 320 of the immigration rules.

First aid had been applied on the plane and the detainee had been brought back to Cayley House.

- 1.50 The second incident involved a detainee who had banged his head on the front desk at reception. Two DCOs and a detainee custody manager had intervened, and all three had written incidents reports. While the reports were reasonably detailed and assured us that force had been justified, they had been reviewed by the detainee custody manager involved in the incident, which could have led to a conflict of interest.
- 1.51 The third incident involved a detainee who had concealed a razor blade in his mouth. DCOs had restrained the detainee to get him to surrender the blade. One of the incident reports noted, 'As he would not release the blade from his mouth I used a controlled hit to his face to try to dislodge it'. This was clearly not an approved pain compliance technique and carried a high risk of injury to the detainee. The report stated that the, 'Detainee had blood coming from his mouth and his head'.

#### **Further recommendations**

- 1.52 Incident reports should be reviewed by managers who were not directly involved in the incident.
- 1.53 Only approved techniques should be used when applying pain to force a detainee to comply with instructions.

# Childcare and child protection

1.54 All UKBA staff coming into contact with children should be subject to enhanced Criminal Records Bureau checks. (1.70)

**Achieved.** RFU staff who had contact with children had been Criminal Records Bureau checked to enhanced level.

1.55 Some removals facilitation unit staff should receive a higher level of child protection training. (1.71)

**Not achieved.** RFU staff had completed the online tier 1 Keeping Children Safe training package but not levels 2 and 3.

We repeat the recommendation.

1.56 Detainee custody officers should receive child protection training. (1.72)

**Not achieved.** Some staff had received training from a workplace coach on child protection but this had been more than a year ago, when the previous contractor ran the facility. We were told that training by Barnardo's was being rolled out for escort staff.

#### **Additional information**

1.57 In the three months before the inspection, no children had been held. Families with children were now removed under the family returns process. Many of those returned under the new process were taken from Cedars pre-departure accommodation straight to the aircraft, without stopping at Cayley House.

1.58 The facility was equipped to accommodate children. Attempts had been made to soften the environment of the family holding room with posters and murals, bean bags and soft matting for children to play on. The room contained a plastic highchair, a table and four chairs fixed to the floor. Two of the chairs were broken; one had been covered with a towel but the second was uncovered, with sharp metal edges exposed, posing a safety risk to children (see further recommendation 1.25). In addition, four empty plastic bags carrying a suffocation warning had been left on a bookshelf in the family room. A travel cot was available in the store room and there were nappies, a baby changing mat, baby wipes and nappy bags in the women's toilet. Baby food was not kept because of the low numbers held but staff would purchase food if necessary, using petty cash. A selection of children's books, games and colouring books with crayons were available.

# **Diversity**

1.59 Staff should receive routine refresher training in all aspects of diversity policy and procedures. (1.77)

**Not achieved.** Some staff had received no diversity training for a number of years and were not familiar with the Equality Act 2010 or protected characteristics. There was no particular training on the specific issues facing detainees.

#### **Further recommendation**

1.60 All staff should receive training in all aspects of diversity, including the wide-ranging backgrounds of, and particular issues faced by, detainees in the immigration system.

#### Additional information

1.61 There were no adapted facilities for detainees with disabilities but staff we spoke to could not recall any such individuals being detained at the facility. There had been no disability care plans completed in the previous year. Copies of the Qur'an, prayer mats and Bibles were available in the male and female holding rooms. Staff were familiar with the requirements of Ramadan and a briefing note was sent out identifying dates and fasting times.

## **Activities**

1.62 Detainees held for several hours should have access to exercise in the fresh air. (1.79)

**Not achieved.** There remained no access to exercise in the fresh air for detainees, despite some long periods of detention of up to 26 hours. We repeat the recommendation.

#### Additional information

1.63 The provision of foreign language newspapers and books in the holding rooms was adequate (see also section on childcare and child protection). There was a television, DVD player and some DVDs in each room.

# Facility rules

1.64 Managers should train staff in procedures to support clear and coordinated management of incidents. (1.87)

**Not achieved.** We were told that the close supervision room was no longer used to segregate detainees. Staff said that they had not received any training, beyond control and restraint, to support the effective management of incidents within the centre. **We repeat the recommendation.** 

1.65 A UKBA manager should record renewed authorisation of location in the close supervision room after each period of four hours. (1.88)

No longer relevant. See recommendation 1.64.

1.66 Detainees subject to control and restraint procedures should be seen by a health services practitioner as soon as possible after restraint is removed. (1.89)

**Not achieved.** We were told that detainees were not routinely seen by health services staff after the removal of restraint.

We repeat the recommendation.

1.67 Pain compliance techniques should not be used in moving vehicles. (1.90)

**Achieved.** No detainees we spoke to reported having had pain compliance techniques applied on a moving vehicle, and incident reports did not indicate that this had occurred.

# Complaints

1.68 All complaints should be investigated, and the investigations completed promptly. (1.94)

**Achieved.** Copies of complaints were not kept in the facility; instead, they were forwarded to UKBA detention services' customer service unit. Detainee custody managers could not remember the last time that a complaint had been made against staff working at the facility.

1.69 Information about complaints against UKBA staff should be available locally. (1.95)

**Not achieved.** Information about complaints against UKBA staff was still not kept in the facility or by the RFU.

We repeat the recommendation.

## **Additional information**

1.70 In the three months before the inspection, four complaints had been submitted. Complaint forms in English and 14 other languages were available in all three holding rooms. However, the complaints folder in the male holding room was in tatters and the forms lay in a disorganised heap. Child-friendly forms were available in the family holding room. The Independent Monitoring Board regularly visited the facility and detainees could raise concerns with its members. Notices promoting their work were displayed around the facility. Detainees could call a confidential telephone service called 'Confide' to report issues about their treatment but the purpose of the service was not well advertised.

## Housekeeping points

- 1.71 Complaint forms should be kept in an orderly manner.
- 1.72 The confidential telephone service, 'Confide', should be better promoted and its purpose made clear to detainees.

## Services

1.73 Ambient meals should be replaced with a range of frozen meals. (1.99)

**Not achieved.** Frozen meals were not available. A different and better range of ambient meals had been introduced since the previous inspection, and was adequate.

#### Additional information

1.74 A range of fresh sandwiches, snacks, drinks and microwave meals were available, and offered to detainees on arrival. However, there were no sandwiches suitable for vegans, and all microwave meals containing meat were halal, making them unsuitable for some detainees to eat.

#### Further recommendation

1.75 The range of food available should be suitable for the diverse individual needs of detainees.

# Preparation for release

1.76 Detainees should be able to receive visits. (1.105)

**Not achieved.** As the facility was airside, detainees were unable to receive visits. However, the majority of detainees were not held for long periods before removal and most had arrived from IRCs, where visits are routinely available.

1.77 There should be a clear and auditable system to control and track each item of property. (1.106)

Achieved. As detainees arrived at the facility from another place of detention, their property was already bagged and sealed with a yellow tag containing a serial number. The serial number was recorded on the detainee's person escort record (PER) on arrival and the luggage placed in the store room. If the detainee required access to their luggage, the seal would be broken, a new one attached and the PER updated. Detainees left with their luggage smoothly and without delay.

1.78 Detainees should have access to the internet, email and fax machines. (1.107)

**Not achieved.** Detainees did not have access to the internet and could not send or receive emails. Staff did not assist detainees in sending faxes, including to their lawyers, even though a fax machine was available in the facility office. Detainees wanting to fax documents were referred to UKBA.

We repeat the recommendation.

1.79 Suitable clothing should be available for issue to detainees needing it for onward journeys. (1.108)

**Not achieved.** The limited range of clothing available was inadequate and particularly unsuitable for detainees being returned to cold climates. We repeat the recommendation.

1.80 Interpretation should be used to inform detainees about what is happening next. (1.109)

**Partially achieved.** The detainees we saw leaving the facility understood what would happen next. Staff told us that they would use telephone interpreting if necessary (but see recommendation 1.41).

#### Additional information

1.81 We observed four detainees leaving the facility, and the departure process was quick and efficient. They waited in the small room beside reception, underwent a rub-down search and confirmed receipt of their luggage. We spoke to two other detainees who were due to be removed that day (one a lone female), who were distressed as they had no money to make their way from the airport to their final destination following removal. Small information cards were available in reception, detailing the location and contact details of IRCs. Large opaque plastic bags were available for those without a suitable bag.

## Further recommendation

1.82 Detainees should be given sufficient resources to enable them to make the onward journey to their final destination.

# Section 2: Summary of recommendations

The following is a list of both repeated and further recommendations included in this report. The reference numbers in brackets refer to the paragraph location in the main report.

## Recommendations

To UKBA

- 2.1 Details of the facilitated return scheme should be provided in the detainee's own language at the earliest possible stage of detention. (1.26)
- 2.2 Returns Facilitation Unit staff should always be available to answer detainees' immigration queries and provide full and accurate information. (1.44)

## Recommendations

To UKBA and Reliance

- 2.3 Detainees should not be subject to unnecessarily frequent moves between places of detention. (1.1)
- 2.4 The UK Border Agency (UKBA) and escort contractors should ensure that people do not spend unnecessary time in detention. (1.10)

## Recommendations

To the facility contractor

#### Arrival and accommodation

- 2.5 Pay telephones should have privacy hoods, to enable detainees to make calls in private. (1.14)
- 2.6 The holding room should have a stock of clean clothing, including underwear, for men and women in a range of sizes. (1.17)
- 2.7 Detainees should not be held for substantial periods or overnight without adequate sleeping facilities. (1.18)
- 2.8 Detainees held for more than 24 hours should receive a health screening. (1.19)
- 2.9 A female detainee custody officer should be on duty whenever female detainees are held at the facility. (1.23)
- 2.10 On arrival, detainees should be interviewed privately to establish any immediate needs, offered a free telephone call and advised how to make further calls thereafter. (1.24)
- 2.11 Accommodation should be kept in a good state of repair at all times. (1.25)

#### Positive relationships

2.12 Staff should address detainees and each other with respect at all times. (1.27)

## Legal rights

- 2.13 The IS91 should confirm that a risk assessment has been conducted even when no risk factors have been identified. (1.31)
- 2.14 Detainees should be able to contact their legal representatives without impediment, and staff should readily and quickly assist them in doing so. (1.37)

#### Casework

- 2.15 A UKBA manager should visit Cayley House daily to check conditions and the treatment of detainees; these visits and any issues arising should be recorded. (1.38)
- 2.16 The chairs in the interview room should not be chained to the floor. (1.40)
- 2.17 Telephone interpreting should be used by UKBA staff whenever appropriate, especially where there is evidence of emotional or behavioural difficulties. (1.41)

## **Duty of care**

- 2.18 Staff should receive anti-bullying and self-harm and suicide prevention training. (1.45)
- 2.19 Staff should routinely carry anti-ligature knives. (1.48)
- 2.20 Incident reports should be reviewed by managers who were not directly involved in the incident. (1.52)
- 2.21 Only approved techniques should be used when applying pain to force a detainee to comply with instructions. (1.53)

## Childcare and child protection

2.22 Some removals facilitation unit staff should receive a higher level of child protection training. (1.55)

#### **Diversity**

2.23 All staff should receive training in all aspects of diversity, including the wide-ranging backgrounds of, and particular issues faced by, detainees in the immigration system. (1.60)

## **Activities**

2.24 Detainees held for several hours should have access to exercise in the fresh air. (1.62)

#### **Facility rules**

2.25 Managers should train staff in procedures to support clear and coordinated management of incidents. (1.64)

2.26 Detainees subject to control and restraint procedures should be seen by a health services practitioner as soon as possible after restraint is removed. (1.66)

## **Complaints**

2.27 Information about complaints against UKBA staff should be available locally. (1.69)

#### Services

2.28 The range of food available should be suitable for the diverse individual needs of detainees. (1.75)

# Preparation for release

- 2.29 Detainees should have access to the internet, email and fax machines. (1.78)
- 2.30 Suitable clothing should be available for issue to detainees needing it for onward journeys. (1.79)
- 2.31 Detainees should be given sufficient resources to enable them to make the onward journey to their final destination. (1.82)

# Housekeeping points

#### **Escorts, vans and transfers**

2.32 UKBA should discuss the importance of discretion with airlines. (1.11)

## Arrival and accommodation

- 2.33 Staff not dealing with the detainee should not be in the reception area. (1.13)
- 2.34 The curtain in the searching room should be replaced. (1.16)

## **Positive relationships**

2.35 Staff should sit with and actively engage detainees in the holding rooms. (1.30)

## **Complaints**

- 2.36 Complaint forms should be kept in an orderly manner. (1.71)
- 2.37 The confidential telephone service, 'Confide', should be better promoted and its purpose made clear to detainees. (1.72)