City of London PEEL 2016

City of London Police has a good understanding of the current demand for its services. Every day, it collates, assesses, and acts upon a wide range of information on the current demand for its services and deploys its operational resources to meet that demand. The force has assessed intelligence relating to ‘hidden’ or unreported crime and has identified those areas of ‘hidden’ crime that pose the greatest threat to its communities. These are child sexual exploitation, modern slavery and human trafficking, and domestic abuse.

However, we found that City of London Police has identified some inefficient and wasteful practices. The force could do more to ensure that such inefficiencies are identified at an early stage. The force has recognised that there is potential for increased demand from crime such as cyber-enabled fraud, and increased violence within the City’s night-time economy.

City of London Police’s use of resources to manage demand requires improvement.

The force does prioritise resources to manage demand efficiently. However, the force’s detailed knowledge about how much it costs to investigate a particular type of crime, or to respond to an incident, is restricted to its economic crime directorate. This means that the force cannot be confident that it offers value for money in all of the services it performs.

We also found that that the force did not have enough detailed evidence about the efficiency and financial benefits it has realised from its change programmes; knowledge about the benefits it has gained from collaborative work with other agencies is limited. The force has made some progress in the way that it records the skills and capabilities of its workforce. However, not all of the accredited skills of the staff have been recorded, which makes this system less effective.

City of London Police’s planning for future demand is inadequate. The force does not have a detailed understanding of future demand. While the force has identified demand for some of its directorates, this has not been completed across the force. The force workforce plan was incomplete at the time of our inspection and did not consider the future (possibly additional) skills the workforce may need in 2020 and beyond. In addition, the force has recognised that its current ICT strategy is obsolete and has commissioned a new strategy. However, the absence of a functioning ICT strategy, confusion as to the existence of an ICT change programme plan, a lack of professional assessment of the impact of change projects and a draft workforce strategy which does not consider future skill requirements leaves us concerned that that the force has not adequately considered how new ICT systems could transform the way the force operates.

The gaps in the force’s plans that have been highlighted in this report mean that it is not possible for HMIC to give the public assurance that the force is making credible organisational plans for the future. Action is required by the force to avoid inefficiency and unexpected demand. It is for these reasons that we judge the force to be inadequate at planning for demand in the future.