



CLOSING THE GAP

**A REVIEW OF THE 'FITNESS FOR
PURPOSE' OF THE CURRENT
STRUCTURE OF POLICING IN
ENGLAND & WALES**

BY

**HM INSPECTOR OF CONSTABULARY
DENIS O'CONNOR CBE QPM**

**13 September 2005
(Prepared for hard copy
publication, August 2006)**

PREFACE

The original version of this report was presented to the Home Secretary on 13 September 2005. It examined service provision in a number of critical areas, including counter terrorism and serious and organised crime, from the national perspective. The overall findings do not identify individual forces, but instead have been aggregated to provide an overall picture.

This edited version has been prepared to facilitate wider stakeholder consultation of the issues raised and whilst the public interest has required the redaction of certain elements of the original text, this has not impacted either the substance, or the spirit of the original report and its conclusions. It has since also been prepared for hard copy publication in August 2006.

HMIC wishes to acknowledge and thank all those who contributed to this review.



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05 APR 2005

Dear Ronnie,

POLICE FORCE STRUCTURES IN ENGLAND AND WALES

Following Dennis O'Connor's initial report on the Level 2 gap I am writing to commission the further evidence gathering work he proposed. The initial report provides a helpful basis for a more informed debate on the question of force structures and I am grateful to Denis for his work.

The proposed national protective services assessment and more detailed review of collaboration are essential in building the firm evidence base needed to make future decisions on addressing the level 2 gap. It is these two complementary pieces of work that I would like HMIC to now take forward and provide a final report by 29th July 2005.

I would be grateful if the report could provide HMIC's views on long term solutions to addressing the Level 2 gap. As stated in the Home Secretary's original commissioning letter of 9th June 2004 we would like at the end of the next stage of work to receive 'HMIC's professional assessment of whether the present 43 force structure is the right one to meet the challenges posed by the current and future policing environment'.

I have asked Leigh Lewis and Stephen Rimmer to discuss with you and Dennis suitable governance arrangements for this work.

Given the potential structural implications of the review there continues to be inevitable interest amongst stakeholders about the outcome. Whilst we intend that the next stage of the review should be low key in terms of publicity we will want to inform that, following HMIC's initial report, further evidence gathering work has been commissioned the results of which will be presented to Ministers in the summer.

Hazel Blears
HAZEL BLEARS MP

BUILDING A SAFE, JUST AND TOLERANT SOCIETY



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Home Secretary

I am pleased to present my full findings to Hazel Blears' commission of 5 April 2005 overleaf, which invited me to progress a number of the key recommendations identified in the "Mind the (Level 2) Gap" report and in so doing provide a professional assessment of whether the present 43 force structure is the right one to meet the challenges posed by the current and future policing environment.

Within the wider context this brings to a conclusion your predecessor's commission to examine:

- how, and to what extent, policing can be made more effective through greater collaboration and co-operation between forces;
- the important local government dimension to policing and the impact any structural changes would have on the wider criminal justice partner agencies; and
- the capabilities, capacities, and functions that, in HMCIC's view, forces should be expected and be able to deliver in terms of policing their communities including the need to be able to maintain adequate levels of community policing.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Ronnie Flanagan'.

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1. **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Introduction

- 1.1 This report contains an assessment of the ability of the current structure of policing in England and Wales to provide effective and sustainable protective services¹ to a common standard in the future.
- 1.2 Much has been achieved in policing in the 20th century, and our concern now is with the future and how we adapt to protect the public in the 21st century.
- 1.3 This paper sets out an analysis of the current key issues on capability and capacity of protective services, the economics of policing and risks posed by organised criminality. We conclude that whilst Basic Command Unit (BCU) arrangements and neighbourhood policing provides a solid local platform for the future, the current 30 year old, 43 force structure of widely different sizes, and capabilities does not.
- 1.4 The analysis points to a future policing environment characterised by:
- Widespread enterprising organised criminality, proliferating international terrorism and domestic extremism;
 - A premium on intelligence, expertise and smart use of capacity; and
 - An increasingly risk concerned public and intrusive media.
- 1.5 Looking ahead the Police Service needs not only to deal effectively with volume crime, the current performance focus, but also have demonstrable readiness to tackle complex, volatile threats to individuals, neighbourhoods and businesses. This implies a major development in capability and to achieve this, changes must be made not only to the structure, but the whole configuration of policing at this level.
- 1.6 There will be a requirement for a more efficient, integrated operating platform above BCU level. The organisation of service delivery must be on a scale large enough to respond dynamically, but local enough to understand the diverse context within which it operates. This means significant rationalisation of the protective services and support processes to put them on a stronger more efficient footing. In turn this will place new demands on leadership, oversight and support from Government.
- 1.7 This report presents a set of options for change, supported by a number of design considerations that could enable the creation of a strong configuration which supports dynamic protective services and the necessary development of neighbourhood policing.

¹ These have been grouped under seven headings as follows: counter terrorism and extremism; serious organised and cross border crime; civil contingencies and emergency planning; critical incident management; major crime (homicide); public order; and strategic roads policing ie those services where the public depend on police otherwise known as Level 2 services. The National Intelligence Model (NIM) describes criminality as follows: Level 1 – local criminality that can be managed within a Basic Command Unit (BCU), Level 2 – cross border issues, usually of organised criminals, major incident affecting more than one BCU, Level 3 – Serious crime, terrorism operating at a national or international level.

National assessment of police organisational fitness

- 1.8 Central to this work has been the completion of a national assessment of the protective services provided by police forces above BCU level. This has been complemented by taking a fresh look at the economics of policing, and the risks posed by organised criminal markets.
- 1.9 Protective services were assessed in relation to standards identified and agreed with ACPO on intelligence (what do we know about the issue); prevention (what are we doing to stop this); and enforcement/resolution (what ability do we have to intervene effectively).
- 1.10 The findings are stark - very few forces assessed fully meet the required standard. It is also apparent that size matters: larger forces are likely to have much greater capability and resilience whilst smaller forces, in many cases, find it hard to provide the services to an acceptable standard. That said, being bigger is not enough to guarantee strong protective services. The environment (situation) also matters. For example, the presence of cities, ports, or events (ie repeated exposure to risks and challenges) also enhance the repertoire of protective services that forces offer the public. Able leadership can also be influential in allowing smaller forces to punch above their weight on these issues.
- 1.11 Forces with over 4000 officers, or 6000 staff, tended to meet the standard across the seven protective services measured, in that they demonstrated good reactive capability with a clear measure of proactive capacity. Forces below that size tended to fall somewhat short of the standard, with, in general, the smallest forces faring the least well. Notwithstanding this, there are outliers: some smaller forces were almost as successful as the majority of larger forces, whilst two relatively large forces (5000+ staff) received surprisingly low scores.
- 1.12 Vulnerability was evident in relation to counter terrorism and domestic extremism, serious and organised crime and public order. The response to serious and organised crime suffered in many places simply because there were not enough resources and specialist support to act upon the intelligence gathered. The strength of the public order domain was dependent upon the experience and exposure of the force, as well as capacity issues.
- 1.13 In relation to major crime, to some extent, success turned on whether forces had dedicated Major Investigation Teams (MITs) or not. Those that did not generated resilience problems for local policing. Civil contingency planning was generally more consistently stronger, but resilience concerns remained around the ability of forces to put those plans to effect. The capability in roads policing appears to be independent of size and is overwhelmingly focused on casualty reduction rather than a wider remit around criminality.

Intelligence disciplines need development

- 1.14 Intelligence was the aspect with the lowest scores, and greatest shortcomings, regardless of size of police force. The intelligence discipline at this level is still developing; that gathered tends to have a narrow base and in many places the analytical and other products appear to have only a limited influence on decision making. The demonstrable commitment and investment in the National Intelligence Model (NIM) by forces at a BCU level has clearly been effective, the same degree of commitment and adoption at a force level would significantly enhance the way intelligence is collected, handled and directed, and this is an essential part of the future.

Performance management should be extended to protective services

- 1.15 Whilst many interviewed acknowledged that the existing structure was inadequate for the present, let alone the future, they were uncertain about the best way forward. As one senior officer put it, “it is all very well highlighting Level 2 vulnerabilities as an issue, but what about performance?” Performance here is shorthand to being about the control of volume crime and disorder – clearly, it needs to be expanded to deal with public protection issues. Protecting the public is at least as much about ‘readiness to operate’, as was evident in the response to the 7 July 2005 London bombings, as it is about conventional outcomes eg murder detection. Performance measurement of these services is weak nationally in comparison to volume crime.
- 1.16 Some victims, whether “allegedly unattached minors” entering the UK and being placed in care who then disappear into prostitution, or the exposure of youngsters to poorly supervised sex offenders, have no obvious platform to argue the case for better policing. They, like others who receive inadequate protection from any of the protective services, are without a voice. The performance paradigm needs to change to accommodate ‘protection’ as well as crime control, but it should complement and build upon existing arrangements that have proved successful at BCU level.

Explaining shortcomings on protective services

- 1.17 Shortcomings on protective services can be attributed to a number of factors above and beyond those ideas discussed earlier. Partly, they arise from the national focus on volume crime over the last 10 to 15 years, coupled with the development of a performance regime and regulatory/support infrastructure to complement that focus (for example, the use of Compstat²-type mechanisms to hold BCUs to account). This has fostered a “new professionalism” in local policing characterised by enlarged BCUs; robust intelligence disciplines; focused leadership and a strong performance and reward culture; and statutory partnership arrangements. Nothing like this has yet happened in relation to force level (Level 2) services.

² ‘Compstat’ is a particular type of management process for monitoring performance, focusing activity on priority areas and for holding managers to account for performance outcomes that originated in the United States.

- 1.18 During that time, much of the discussion on organised crime, counter terrorism and civil contingencies has occurred at national level, rather than focusing on what could or should be done about these services at an intermediate (force/regional) level. The exception has occurred around those forces eg Avon and Somerset, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and Greater Manchester Police, where the dangers of violent organised crime have spilt onto the streets, albeit the spread of organised crime and terrorism is now raising a wider awareness and concern on these issues.

Organised crime poses a substantial threat

- 1.19 Particular effort has been made in this review to map markets associated with organised criminality without solely relying on conventional police information, which generally points to organised criminality being concentrated around metropolitan areas. When viewed in conjunction with conventional police data, recourse to information on drug use, counterfeiting and people trafficking from external agencies reveals a different picture of organised crime markets. This approach suggests that it is widespread, vibrant and growing, with only nine forces being rated as having a relatively lower level of activity. But it is worrying that so many gaps exist in our knowledge of organised criminal enterprises and markets – without detailed, sophisticated analysis of this tier of criminality forces cannot target effectively those who pose the greatest risks to communities and the economy.
- 1.20 There is good reason to believe that other risks, such as those posed by civil contingencies, terrorism and domestic extremism, are widespread rather than narrowly based.
- 1.21 There is an emerging view evident in the Police Service of Northern Ireland and to a degree, the MPS, that a ‘bottom up’ approach to gathering intelligence on serious threats from organised crime etc. offers the best way of assessing the market and tackling the social harms associated with it. A vigorous bottom up approach could in fact complement work done at a national level and provide a much more accurate picture of both the spread of this criminality and police impact in disrupting or disabling it. Neighbourhood Policing, properly linked in and tasked, must be part of the solution, offering the prospect of significantly enhancing intelligence on these issues.

What does the consolidated picture tell us?

- 1.22 By combining the results of the national assessment with the data obtained from the risk assessment, plus baseline assessment data on performance against volume crime indicators, it has been possible to identify those regions of the country that are most at risk ie where there is only limited capability and capacity, and where the challenges posed in reducing volume crime and providing strong protective services are not being addressed.
- 1.23 Vulnerability of forces, and groups of forces, in providing protective and volume services is not evenly spread, even on a regional basis. The most vulnerable parts of the country do not always have large capable forces within the geographic area that

could easily support them. In contrast some areas are relatively strong and proposals for change will require careful consideration and a measure of pragmatism. Unless the identified gaps are closed it is only a matter of time before these vulnerabilities are exposed, rendering the public unnecessarily at risk. Indeed it could be argued that in a number of recent high profile cases this has already been the case.

The economics of protective services

- 1.24 Although this review of structure is not predicated on a need to secure savings, it is essential that a business case for change takes proper account of economic factors. Gains from a more rational structure, eg sale of buildings, can be recycled to enhance investment in protective services and help offset the inevitable costs associated with change, eg IT harmonisation. Unfortunately, information in this area is far from perfect, but there is sufficient to take a view.
- 1.25 It has been estimated that the staff costs associated with the provision of protective services are between £1.1 billion and £1.25 billion. The costs of support services at police force level are also substantial sums. There is a strong belief within ACPO that there is a significant shortfall of resources devoted to organised crime and whilst efficiency targets for forces of 2% have been more than accomplished in the last six years these have not been sufficient to close the gap.³
- 1.26 Analysis was hampered by the absence of comparative financial information on the cost of protective service outcomes. This masks exactly how much real growth, estimated at just over 2.7% on average annually over the last nine years, has been invested in protective services. Whilst there is debate between chief police officers and the Home Office on the scale of cost pressures in policing, there is agreement that real term settlements, in excess of retail price inflation, are not sustainable in the long run. Real growth settlements in the next two years are likely, at best, to be half the rate of the last nine⁴. There is a need to properly benchmark costs now and estimate the practical benefits of additional investment in protective services in terms of readiness and harm reduction.
- 1.27 However, there is data available in relation to support services costs. The variability in the apparent cost of those services is of such a scale that it is highly unlikely that it is explicable simply because of definitional issues.
- 1.28 Variability is not confined to process and cost of support services but extends to the operational elements of protective services. For example, 13 out of 43 forces have fully resourced, specialist murder units, which allow better use of skilled specialist teams, and reduce disruption to BCUs. Variation is also evident in the management of sex offenders, the deployment of special branches and the devolution of roads policing.

³ The ACPO police reform steering group (2004) provided an estimation that “typically less than 6% of over 1500 organised crime groups acting at force or regional level are targeted by police on an annual basis”.

⁴ Based on estimates provided by the Home Office.

- 1.29 Murder is just one component of the protective services that can cause severe surges in spending. The review found that smaller forces are significantly less resilient financially and much more likely to apply for special grants to deal with surges in protective spending. Growth in costs of protective services eg murder investigation, escalating use of DNA and rising use of electronic forensics will exacerbate financial pressures. For example forensic costs are estimated to have risen from £34 million in 1990 to a predicted £200 million in 2006/7⁵.
- 1.30 The current structure and efficiency regime is not designed to yield a step change in value for money, nor easily support workforce modernisation. Tight budget settlements and rising demands in policing, mean that the every effort must be made to ensure maximum value for money to ensure that provision of service does not deteriorate. The existing efficiency regime provides a driver for this. Process and procurement reform might though be accelerated by the consolidation of forces in one form or another. Speeding up improvements would yield additional funding to improve services to the public.
- 1.31 Some feel for the scale of the efficiencies that might be achieved is possible. Direct savings from merger might amount to £70 million annually. If the potential for efficiencies on SPT read across to wider policing, productivity gains worth around £250 million annually might be generated through workforce modernisation and other improvements. The NPV of merger savings and productivity gains could amount to £2,250 million⁶.

Stakeholders have mixed views

- 1.32 Little work has been done on the way in which members of the public identify with police forces, although work undertaken for the National Reassurance Policing Project (2002) indicated that people identified strongly with a discrete neighbourhood, wanting an identifiable, named local officer. Some partners and local politicians identify with district/BCU level services, while a smaller, but important group, value links at the county/supra-county level. This suggests that public resistance to combining smaller forces can be abated, to some degree, by emphasising that local arrangements – ie at BCU and neighbourhood level – will not change.
- 1.33 Stakeholders inside and outside the service recognise the tensions associated with the current structure, and a need for change, but there is no consensus on the best way forward. Within some individual associations there is a wide cross-section of views. On the whole, the Association of Police Authorities (APA) is broadly supportive of collaboration and whilst the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) generally agrees the need for change, some chief officers are more inclined towards amalgamation whilst others favour a regional support solution.
- 1.34 The Chief Police Officers Staff Association (CPOSA), whilst accepting the need to enhance capability above BCU level have concerns on several issues including the

⁵ These figures are based on data provided by the Forensic Science Service in August 2005.

⁶ These calculations are explained in greater detail at Appendix I.

potential impact on chief officer conditions of service. Unison hope that a capacity building rather than cost reduction approach is taken to change and would expect a statutory staff commission to be established to safeguard staff interests.

- 1.35 The Police Federation and the Police Superintendents' Association are more positive about structural change, but emphasise the significance of preserving the local BCU based model and the importance of knowledgeable, technically able, chief officer teams supporting service delivery across the piece.
- 1.36 Within the criminal justice agencies, the correlation between capability and size does not appear to be as strong across the board although there are still concerns about the capability of their smaller areas and their ability to manage change. They stress the importance of co-terminosity and that changes to the police structure, that grouped existing force areas together, would be much more manageable from their point of view. At local government level the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister has indicated that "there are no current plans for local government reform". This could change, and if so, they too would stress the importance of co-terminosity.

Creating a 21st Century service

- 1.37 The evidence gathered thus far regarding capability of forces, criminal risk and economics is not definitive, but is strongly indicative. It is probably fair to assume that a detailed consideration of other protective services, such as professional standards, would follow this pattern. Whilst each of the strands have some significance in their own right, taken together they point to significant inadequacies in the present approach, which will not be remedied by the present organisation of policing.
- 1.38 One of the gaps this work has highlighted is the absence of a clear definition of what the purpose of policing below national level actually should be in the future and there is value in addressing this as part of this exercise. At the simplest level, three responsibilities of policing below the national level are evident:
- the development of local and neighbourhood policing;
 - the provision of protective services to national standards; and
 - the organisation of affordable support and strategic development.
- 1.39 Organisations which are capable on all of those fronts could be characterised as 'strategic police organisations or forces'.

Design considerations for restructuring

- 1.40 The existing 43 force structure is over 30 years old. It matches local government structures and has emphasised the need to drive down volume crime and provide local policing, with considerable success, but current scope and scale now act as constraints to improve protective services and the economics associated with them. Models of democratic policing vary between the disaggregated, and layered such as in the

United States or France, to all purpose, integrated bodies, as presently exist in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

- 1.41 The practical advantages of integrated units in facilitating intelligence, operational control and clarity of responsibility are compelling in an environment of “unprecedented uncertainty”⁷. This was evidenced in the ACPO response on police reform discussions in 2004, which showed that a laminate model, that envisages an integrated approach to policing, was superior to disaggregated models⁸.
- 1.42 Community affinity for policing services above the BCU level is also of value in demonstrating commitment to the needs of wider recognisable localities; and putting a human, accessible, accountable face on the imposing institution of policing.
- 1.43 In creating a structure that is fit for purpose the overall goal should be the creation of organisations that are large enough to provide a full suite of sustainable services, yet still small enough to be able to relate to local communities.
- 1.44 It would be possible to disaggregate certain functions - giving one force the role of investigating major crimes for two or three neighbours for example - but with the possible exception of counter-terrorism, this risks blurring important lines of accountability at a time when the service instead needs to take a clear, balanced view of the ‘police mission’.
- 1.45 BCUs are the critical building blocks of both the current structure and a possible new arrangement. They deliver the vast bulk of everyday policing services and many are now sufficiently large and have secured co-terminosity such that they can be left largely intact during a move towards a more streamlined structure.
- 1.46 Particular design considerations around combinations of forces in whatever form they take include:
 - **Size** – the review indicates minimum size of over 4000 police officers, but must be cognisant of the need to design-in resilience and spare capacity.
 - **Mix of capability** – any structural change must take account of the graded capability of potential ‘partners’ (ie forces that could be amalgamated or work more collaboratively) as indicated through both performance on volume crime and the Protective Services Review.
 - **Criminal Markets** – it is fundamental to understand the underlying criminal markets and context in which any new entity is to operate.
 - **Geography** – the scale and demography may require a measure of pragmatism in proposals for change.
 - **Risk** – it is essential that opportunities to reduce risk are maximised by considering current capability and consolidating to generate new strengths.

⁷ P. Bobbit “The Shield of Achilles”, p812 (2002).

⁸ V G Towell ACPO police reform paper “Roles and Responsibilities of the police service” (2004).

- **Co-terminosity** – it is essential to consider established political and partners’ boundaries.
- **Identity** – whilst accepting the local focus of public perception historical and natural boundaries should be maximised where possible.

A different configuration – not just a different structure

1.47 Structural adaptation is necessary, rather than simply desirable, but it will not in itself be sufficient. Complementing the work to identify design considerations, it is also clear that a different **Configuration**⁹ is required (a combination of structure, processes and relationship developments) to enable affordable protective services to flourish without undermining existing strengths of local policing and local forces. The following elements need to be considered in a new configuration:

- **Structure** (see options below).
- **Processes.**
 - a) Enhanced intelligence collection, analysis and use, to enable the best focus of resources on counter terrorism, serious and organised crime etc.
 - b) Development of a performance framework that acknowledges the importance of readiness to protect the public as well as control crime.
 - c) With a new comparative approach to efficiency that actively measures the allocation and impact of police resources and promotes workforce modernisation.
- **Relationships** – questions remain over responsibilities and roles as the National Crime Squad (NCS) and National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) ‘wind down’ and the terrorist threat becomes more evident (there is a need for a stronger shared understanding of the contribution of partners on the national and regional landscape in protective services including SOCA, MPS, Security Services, criminal justice partners etc).

1.48 Each of these elements needs to be owned and nurtured within the Home Office, ACPO and the upcoming NPIA if real progress is to be made. There is a resource gap, but additional resources will only have a limited impact if they are not used and focused in a configuration which is aligned for purpose.

Options for change

1.49 It is assumed that the status quo, even with an enhanced performance regime, stronger ‘bottom-up’ intelligence system and greater flexibility, will not produce significant

⁹ GJ Scholes and G Johnson “Exploring Corporate Strategy”, p420, Prentice Hall (2002).

improvements that yield consistent delivery of protective services to national standard. The structural options that have been identified include:

I. Collaboration

- 1.50 This option essentially preserves the status quo and supports the early work commenced by existing forces and authorities. However, the modest scale of collaboration to date, and the significant problems associated with it, such as governance and performance and accountability suggests that, at best, progress will be complex, slow and of limited impact.

II. Lead force for specialist capabilities

- 1.51 In theory, and with funding, the ‘lead force’ concept offers possible progress, albeit it would have significant implications for smaller forces in relation to the control and direction of enquiries conducted within their own borders, changes that they would need to acknowledge.
- 1.52 At a practical level, there is a shortage of sufficient candidate forces immediately willing and capable of adopting this type of role. Even if there were, it would only address specific categories of crime and would be unlikely to overcome the more fundamental issues identified in our work to date.

III. Lead regional force

- 1.53 Building upon existing infrastructure, processes and partnership arrangements, this option envisages one force within an ACPO region being resourced as a lead force to host the personnel, finance and logistics of the regional protective services requirements on behalf of the other forces in that region.
- 1.54 ACPO believes this could comfortably be a variant in the federation of forces option, but it could raise challenges on: integration; the clarity of accountability; and the perception by some that the ACPO regions are artificial entities.

IV. Federation of forces

- 1.55 Against an agreed framework, forces clearly below standard could self reform by contracting together to be served by a common set of protective services that could extend to the brigading of support services.
- 1.56 Local force areas would be preserved. Local policing (BCU etc) would remain local, decentralised and relatively independent. However, dissatisfaction with the status quo – a pre-requisite for major self reform – may be insufficient amongst some incumbents to provide the degree of leadership this option requires. Clarity of priorities, responsibilities and governance would be an enduring challenge. It therefore needs a considerable level of support and ‘incentivisation’ from the centre and would stand its best chance of success where a federation already contained a strong force that could nurture relatively quick progress.

V. Strategic forces

- 1.57 This is the most radical option with forces being re-grouped against a framework of design considerations, such as: exceeding critical mass; criminality; and geography. Again local policing arrangements (BCU, etc) need not be disrupted whilst force level services are rationalised. A prescriptive reform approach could be initiated relatively quickly if a new executive and strategic authority were appointed at an early stage and a tight timescale was set.
- 1.58 Although the clearest and most business-like approach, it could be perceived by some to be most disruptive and least ‘locally friendly’. This approach would require firm leadership, extensive support and national will.

Conclusion

- 1.59 The pattern of results from the review of all 43 forces has strongly mirrored those found in the pilot study and has allowed us to draw a number of conclusions.
- 1.60 Specifically, whilst size, scope and structure are not in any sense the only issues for the future of policing, they are extremely important. Put simply, when viewed from the context of the range of challenges and future threats now facing the service and the communities it polices, the 43 force structure is no longer fit for purpose. In the interests of the efficiency and effectiveness of policing it should change. Whilst some smaller forces do very well, and some larger forces less so, our conclusion is that below a certain size there simply is not a sufficient critical mass to provide the necessary sustainable level of protective services that the 21st century increasingly demands.
- 1.61 The position is likely to worsen rather than improve as time progresses. The costs and professional sophistication needed to provide adequate standards of protective services will become ever harder to deliver for smaller forces and we now firmly believe that some reorganisation of forces and re-configuration of protective services is inescapable.
- 1.62 The strategic forces option offers the best business solution. It offers the best potential, within reasonable time-scales, of improving protective services and providing better value for money. However, it needs to be well supported and to be part of a strategy that reconfigures intelligence, performance and value for money to help enable the Police Service “to guard (all) my people” (the mission detailed on the Queen’s Police Medal). A federal structure is the best alternative and could offer a degree of greater resilience, but may not offer a clear, decisive, durable solution. Both of these options would need appropriate accountability mechanisms at the local and strategic level. The lead force/lead regional force concepts could be initiated more rapidly, but will not deal well with the fundamental issues identified in this review.
- 1.63 Structural change requires a considered, realistic view about the time scales in which it can be achieved, and the evidence from the private sector is that mature leadership

makes all the difference in planning, initiating and achieving benefits from merger and acquisition.

- 1.64 In the last five years the Home Office and the Police Service have considered the advantages of a more rational structure for policing but have shied away from radical change to avoid the disruption and potential threat to continued success in reducing crime. This has allowed the weaknesses in Protective Services to go unresolved. It is, however, possible to move towards a more resilient structure without undermining local policing and successful crime reduction. The BCU as an operating platform is tried and tested, and disruption whilst protective services are being re-shaped can, and should be, minimised.
- 1.65 There is, in our view, nothing incompatible between a move towards a more strategic organisation and a concentration on delivering more responsive neighbourhood policing. Strong neighbourhood policing is essential to connect with the public and inform the work of protective services. A force which is big enough to deliver protection, but still small enough to identify with local communities, is an attractive one. Re-configuring for better protection of, and connection with, the public, needs to be seen as part of a package of police reform for this century.
- 1.66 Of course, any structural re-organisation is bound to carry with it up-front costs in terms of both money, potential diversion of resources, and disruption. This can be reduced, but it cannot be avoided entirely. These costs can be calculated but need to be set beside medium term savings (please see Appendix I). This suggests that any move to a more strategic organisation of policing needs to take place in a carefully planned and measured way which reduces the short-term risks as far as possible and keeps a clear line of sight on the benefits to be realised.
- 1.67 In order for the risks and deficiencies identified to be reconciled there must be an organisational imperative to be able to demonstrate capability and capacity to bridge the protective service gap within two years, and to be accruing the associated financial benefits within two to three years of introduction. Forces must be able to aim for an explicit position in relation to both capability and financial benefit.

2. INTRODUCTION

- 2.1 This report presents HMIC’s professional assessment of the ability of the present 43 force structure of policing to provide a comprehensive regime of sustainable protective services to agreed common standards and carries to a conclusion a number of the recommendations identified in the earlier report, “Mind the (Level 2) Gap”, specifically that:
- A confidential national assessment of protective services should be carried out by HMIC, with the support of key stakeholders.
 - A review should be undertaken to establish if collaboration is an appropriate and effective means of addressing any gaps in service delivery.
- 2.2 This analysis should be relevant to the citizen, who needs better protection in today’s society and to the tax payer who reasonably expects the state to protect him or her from substantial threats to their person, property and livelihood.
- 2.3 Central to this work is the concept of protective services. This has its origins the discussion raised by the Home Office/Strategy Unit report in 2004 on the nature of policing services at different levels. At force, regional, national/international level they suggested that the police **protect** the public; for example, by dealing with serious organised crime & terrorism. This is in contrast to local policing where police work **with** the public at the neighbourhood level to tackle anti-social behaviour, or where the police work **for** the public in dealing with volume crime¹⁰.
- 2.4 The constitutional implications of this work are significant and this report will frame its conclusions within the wider context of the Service’s ability to evolve and keep pace with changes in society: it acknowledges that adaptation has always been important, now it is at a premium. This is a dynamic and complex subject. The review moves beyond operational capability and capacity to take account of risk and economics. It draws together a number of themes that whilst individually not conclusive, together make a persuasive case that the structure that was created to meet the demands of 30 years ago is no longer capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century.
- 2.5 In particular, this assessment will address the issues of whether or not some forces are simply too small to be able to provide a full range of protective services efficiently and effectively and manage the associated risks; the concern that the new professionalism that has taken root at BCU level in delivering volume crime performance has not yet made its mark in protective services, where a more traditional approach to policing still dominates; the variable grasp of the significance of protective services across the most senior management of the service; and, for the first time, the economic component of the necessity for change.
- 2.6 Having concluded that change is necessary to deliver a competent level of protective services, the report will outline some design parameters that could be applied to options for change. The application of the design parameters in the context of re-

¹⁰ Police Reform: A joint Home Office/Strategy Unit project – Summary Report, p11 (2004).

configuration offer the best prospect for enhancing service delivery that deals not just with volume crime but also with risk and complexity.

3. **METHODOLOGY**

3.1 The “Mind the (Level 2) Gap” report that was presented to Ministers on 29 January 2005 identified the provision of protective, Level 2 services as the principal driver for structural change and developed a new methodology for assessing individual force capability and capacity in this area. This was based upon a series of templates that assessed service provision under seven broad headings that in turn reflected the 2004 National Strategic Assessment¹¹. These were:

- Major Crime (homicide).
- Serious, Organised and Cross Border Crime.
- Counter Terrorism and Extremism.
- Civil Contingencies.
- Critical Incidents.
- Public Order.
- Strategic Roads Policing.

3.2 Within this context ‘capability’ refers to an organisation’s ability to provide a service to an agreed standard. ‘Capacity’ refers to how much of that level of service can be provided.

3.3 It is, however, acknowledged that this methodology was necessarily concerned with operating standards and any serious consideration of the future fitness of police structures will need a broader take. The following issues were seen by stakeholders as priorities, namely the need to:

- address the assessed risks requiring protective services (also known as organised and Level 2 services);
- dynamically assess and adapt capability to emerging risks and threats;
- maximise efficiency where protective services are provided and supported;
- safeguard the resilience of local (BCU/Neighbourhood) services;
- enable effective integration with local criminal justice agencies and national agencies concerned with local enforcement and the development of policing;
- minimise disruption of service delivery, identity and accountability arising from any reconfiguration of protective services and their support functions; and
- develop capability in the human expertise necessary to support and deliver the above.

¹¹ A fuller description of the assessment methodology for protective service can be found at Appendix A.

Key work-streams

3.4 The application of these principles identified a number of key work-streams that ran in parallel to the twin assessments of national capability and capacity and of collaboration that were identified as recommendations within the original report and which are as follows:

- an analysis of the relative vulnerability to Level 2 issues faced by each force to gauge the level of fitness to respond to the threats and vulnerabilities they face;
- an assessment of the economics of protective services;
- developing the assessment of collaboration to include the lead force concept;
- an analysis of the fundamental design and critical success factors that will need to be addressed if any future decision to alter the structure of policing in England and Wales is to be successful; and
- further consultation with key partners and stakeholders such as the national Criminal Justice Board, the National Neighbourhood Policing Programme team, the Security Services etc.

4. **BACKGROUND**

4.1 Whilst this report can be seen as the logical progression of the work initiated by “Mind the (Level 2) Gap” it is important that that it is capable of withstanding scrutiny in its own right. In particular there is value in re-visiting the key findings and recommendations of the earlier report.

“Mind the (Level 2) Gap” revisited

4.2 This report framed its work within the three level model of criminality that has been adopted by the Police Service viz:

Level 1: Local issues - usually crime, criminals, anti-social behaviour and a concomitant need for reassurance - that can be managed within a Basic Command Unit (BCU).

Level 2: These are cross-border issues; usually the actions of organised criminality, major incidents and events affecting more than one BCU and potentially across boundaries into neighbouring forces. This can also include issues of wider public disquiet, notwithstanding that the original incident might otherwise be categorised as ‘Level 1’.


Level 3: Serious and organised crime, terrorism or other extremist activity operating on a national or international level. This can also include major incidents, events and other issues of widespread national concern, often with national media coverage, that can seriously undermine confidence on a wider scale.

4.3 It contrasted the Police Service’s success in dealing with Level 1 issues and the creation of a national body capable of dealing with Level 3 with its ad hoc approach to dealing with the challenges of Level 2 – only two forces were awarded a grading of ‘excellent’ within HMIC’s Baseline Assessment. It noted the scale of the challenge had been brought into focus by:

- our growing appreciation of the threat posed by local and regional organised crime groups;
- the increasing challenges (particularly confronting smaller forces) of dealing with major enquiries, including the provision of specialist services;
- the threat from terrorism; and
- questions about the service’s ability to come together at the regional and national level to deliver key projects and initiatives such as the National Intelligence Model (NIM), that whilst a success at BCU level is not yet as robust as it needs to be at Level 2.

4.4 As is apparent from the graph below, the success the service has enjoyed in driving down volume crime stands in contrast to the continued rise in many of the indicators

and other surrogate measures that one associates with Level 2 issues, and in particular organised crime, such as Class A drug seizures.



Graph 1

4.5 Sitting behind these figures are some even more concerning statistics that highlight the scale of the challenge facing the service in relation to organised crime, notably the findings of ACPO's police reform steering group¹², that concluded that typically less than 6% of the over 1,500 organised crime groups active at force or regional level were actually targeted by police on an annual basis¹³.

4.6 Another issue that was highlighted was the concern over the ability of smaller forces to handle 'Soham' type investigations. These reservations fell under two broad headings, the first relates to the ability of the force to maintain the highest professional standards, whilst the second focuses upon their ability to do so without undermining core service delivery. Whilst the underlying murder rate within England and Wales has remained steady over the past decade, most forces have reported a sharp increase in the number of critical¹⁴ and major incidents they have been called upon to deal with: one force has been required to virtually double its capacity in this area in the past four years¹⁵. This is, in part, due to the Police Service's greater

¹² Paul Stephenson, "What would a Level 2 model of policing look like and what would be the specifications of the services that it would offer" (2004).

¹³ *ibid*, p 13.

¹⁴ This was defined in the "Mind the (level 2) Gap" report as being "Where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and/or the community which; is beyond the capability of the BCU and has the potential to generate grave public concern at a local/regional/national/international level.

¹⁵ Paul Stephenson, "What would a Level 2 model of policing look like and what would be the specifications of the services that it would offer", p 9 (2004).

sensitivity to critical incidents and the desire to avoid the oversights of the past, but also reflects higher public expectations that every enquiry will be a model of excellence and where the media are intolerant of failure.

- 4.7 In addition to focusing upon capability and capacity in the provision of protective services the report also examined the supporting framework, notably in relation to target setting and priority, performance monitoring and collaborative working. In each of these areas it found significant shortcomings and overall it concluded that *“there is a great deal of reactive pragmatism, adhocism and vulnerability in the current arrangements. On the basis of this initial assessment, Level 2 police services are variable and uncertain in their reach and (if the same pattern is confirmed by a larger study) the present configuration is almost certainly inadequate to meet future challenges. We do not in that sense “have government structures that are supple and flexible enough to react in an environment of unprecedented uncertainty”¹⁶.*
- 4.8 The report made a total of five recommendations that are reproduced at Appendix B.

Evolving to meet challenges

- 4.9 This is not to suggest the service is not capable of rising to the challenge: it is and indeed has a long history of evolving to meet new challenges.
- 4.10 The 1962 Royal Commission on the Police devoted a full chapter to reviewing the development of police forces. In so doing it placed great emphasis on the local nature of policing and identified a number of features that underpin the modern character of the service¹⁷. The most relevant of these are:
- the local character of the office of constable (dating back to pre-Tudor times);
 - the embodiment of constables into forces; and
 - the subjection of police forces to a degree of local democratic supervision.
- 4.11 In 1962 there were still 125 individual police forces in England and Wales yet the wave of subsequent amalgamations that were provoked by the Royal Commission reduced this number to the present 43 by 1974. While there have been no further changes in this number since then it is worth noting that the evolutionary factors are still at work.
- 4.12 When HMIC started the current BCU inspection process there were nearly 320 BCUs in existence, but in only three years the pressures to achieve resilience, financial efficiency and co-terminosity have seen this figure fall to approximately 230. At the national level the flaws in the ability of the 1974 structure to cope with the challenges posed by Level 3 criminality were apparent by the early 1990s. In the first instance this led to the consolidation of the Regional Crime Squads into a National Crime Squad (NCS) and more recently, through the creation of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) which will combine NCS with elements of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), HM Customs & Excise and HM Immigration Service.

¹⁶ Bobbit, P “The Shield of Achilles” Penguin , p812, (2002).

¹⁷ The Royal Commission on the Police; Ch III, p9-20; (1962).

- 4.13 The corresponding evolution in the philosophy of policing has led to the emergence of the ‘General Purpose’ model of policing that still dominates the landscape. This has strong roots in local communities, whose views and needs continue to influence both Government and the Police Service. Moreover, in the emergence of the BCU it is also possible to argue that the vision of the Royal Commission, namely for organisations of approximately 500 that police clear geographic areas, has now been realised.
- 4.14 Certainly, it is clear a new professionalism has bitten in BCU policing and is starting to be applied in a new programme for neighbourhood policing. It is characterised by investment in intelligence, acknowledges the value of specialism, and the imperative of pro-activity to intercept problems rather than react to them. It seeks integration with other partners and is supported by a performance regime aligned to it. Fundamentally it structures itself around customer groups in neighbourhoods and local authority areas.
- 4.15 Organised crime has always existed, however until the 1960’s it was relatively unsophisticated and still had strong local roots and presence. In policing terms the creation of units to tackle extortion and armed robbery, such as the Special Flying Squad, were considered sufficient to deal with these challenges.
- 4.16 Since then cracks in the ‘General Purpose’ model of policing have started to appear as the growing pace of technological change, combined with greater social and economic mobility, has enabled increasingly sophisticated criminal activity to cross boundaries and borders and has also provided the means and opportunity to commit a wider range of offences, for example ‘high-tech’ crime and people trafficking. These have been the drivers behind the creation of first the Regional Crime Squads, then the National Crime Squad and now the Serious Organised Crime Agency.
- 4.17 This same dynamic also highlights one of the key differences from the evolutionary changes of the past. Until now these have often complemented, and kept pace with, changes in local government structures. This is no longer the case as instead policing now looks to the creation of larger and more sophisticated operating platforms that are capable of supporting the whole range of protective services.

Invisible customers

4.18 Hitherto communities have provided a reliable compass that has informed the shape of Government policy and the structure of policing. However, too much Level 2 activity now happens outwith their knowledge and underneath the public radar. Year on year the threats are growing ever more severe, yet sadly the victims of serious and organised crime or major incidents do not form an influential enough constituency to drive change.

CASE STUDY – ‘NEWCASTLE AIRPORT’

In December 2003, Northumbria Police secured funding from Operation Reflex to undertake a six month scoping exercise aimed at providing a clearer understanding as to the scale of the problem of ‘unattached minors’ arriving on Tyneside. As a result a local protocol was agreed between Police, Social Services and HM Immigration whereby all ‘unattached minors’ are photographed and fingerprinted within 24 hours of their arrival into the UK. This provides Police and Immigration with a means of identification should the children go missing or come to some other harm.

On 27 March 2005, three Chinese girls arrived at Newcastle Airport on a flight from Paris. The girls were using forged Japanese passports which they disposed of in the aircraft toilets. The girls claimed asylum on arrival at Newcastle and were treated as ‘unattached minors’ and placed into the care of Newcastle Social Services.

On 31 March 2005, the girls were reported missing by Newcastle Social services having left their temporary residence in company with an unknown male the previous night.

The subsequent investigation has revealed these were just three of a significant number of Chinese girls brought to the UK for sexual exploitation by just one organised criminal gang where provincial airports were used as points of entry.

Despite international media attention the three girls remain missing, albeit police activity into this enquiry had resulted in the ‘freeing’ of several Chinese girls sold as slaves to the sex industry.

- 4.19 It is encouraging that the Police Service has identified the problems posed by serious and organised crime and the wider need to provide protective services. Elsewhere, we have also seen the emergence of the “laminated model” that envisages an integrated approach to policing.
- 4.20 This was developed by ACPO in 2004 and was based upon research on a series of police operations such as Operation Trident in the MPS and the investigation into the tragic events surrounding the Morecombe Bay cockle-pickers¹⁸. It showed that single purpose police organisations that facilitated intelligence gathering, maintained strong communication with communities and shared business disciplines such as NIM were best placed to deal with criminality that whilst originating from neighbourhoods nevertheless has a national/international context. In practical terms the application of the laminated model envisages the ring-fencing of specific functions such as response, investigation and support, tactical capacity and neighbourhood based teams.

¹⁸ ACPO police reform paper “Roles and Responsibilities of the police service” (2004). The full report is attached at Appendix C.

5. NATIONAL ASSESSMENT

5.1 This section is divided into three parts. The first represents the national assessment of capability and capacity at Level 2 that was recommended in the “Mind the Level 2 Gap” report, whilst the second comprises an attempt to quantify the relative threat posed by serious and organised crime to each force. The final element brings the findings together and reveals the true extent of the current vulnerability of the Service.

Assessment of Capability and Capacity

5.2 Within this section I have posed three key questions:

- Does size matter?
- How strong are protective services?
- Why have protective services suffered from relative neglect?

5.3 The assessment methodology was based on the series of templates that were developed and successfully piloted in nine forces in the “Mind the (Level 2) Gap” report. Each was assessed in relation to standards identified with ACPO in autumn for the “Mind the (Level 2) Gap” report on; intelligence (what do we know about the issue); prevention (what are we doing to stop this); and enforcement/resolution (what ability do we have to intervene effectively). The assessments obtained were combined to provide each force with an overall rating for each protective service. This was moderated by HMIC to ensure consistency.

5.4 Within the assessment itself, each force was scored on a rating scale of 1-4 for each of the templates. The scoring system is as follows:

1. Only reactive capability demonstrated.
2. Reactive capability, with only limited proactive capability demonstrated.
3. Reactive capability, with significant proactive capability demonstrated.
4. Reactive capability with comprehensive proactive capability demonstrated.

Does size matter?

5.5 The overall findings are stark. Only two forces assessed, the Metropolitan Police and Greater Manchester Police, achieved three or more under each heading, but even these fell short of the optimum standard (of four) across all areas. Reflecting this, it was also apparent that size matters: larger forces are likely to have much greater capability and resilience, whilst smaller forces in many cases find it hard to provide these services to standard. That said, being bigger is not enough to guarantee strong protective services. The environment (situation) also matters for example, the

presence of cities, ports, or events also enhance the risks and the repertoire of protective services that forces offer the public. Able leadership can also be influential in that it allows smaller forces to punch above their weight.


5.6 The results gathered have been consolidated and reproduced in the graph below that plots overall capability for all seven protective services. This strongly suggests that forces with over 4,000 officers (or 6,000 total staff) tend to meet the standard across the range of services measured in that they demonstrated good reactive capability with a clear measure of proactive capacity. Forces below that size tended to fall somewhat short of the standard with, in general, the smallest forces faring least well. But there are outliers; some smaller forces were almost as successful as the majority of larger forces, while two relatively large forces visited (5000+ staff) received surprisingly low scores. Please see Appendix D for force establishment figures as at 31 March 2005.



Graph 2

How strong are protective services?

5.7 This full national assessment has largely re-affirmed and detailed the findings of the original “Mind the (Level 2) Gap” report. The graph reproduced below plots the trend lines for each of the protective services and again shows that the size of the force is an indicator of its effectiveness. In particular, it confirms the vulnerability of small forces in relation to counter-terrorism and domestic extremism, serious and organised crime and public order. The data has been subject to statistical validation which confirms that the trend indicating that size correlates to ability to deliver acceptable service across six of the seven protective services is statistically significant.



Graph 3

5.8 The following paragraphs outline our findings under each of the seven headings plus those for the intelligence, prevention and enforcement functions that give structure to the National Intelligence Model. Within this, particular attention was paid to forces' Level 2 strategic assessments and consequent control strategies, which are key documents that identify the key challenges facing a force. Where these are inadequate it follows that the force in question is unlikely to be responding effectively to the challenges posed by serious and organised crime.

5.9 In addition to identifying shortcomings that illustrate the present gap in achieving standards, the good work and achievements of the stronger players will also be recognised.

COUNTER TERRORISM AND DOMESTIC EXTREMISM

5.10 This was identified as an area of significant concern in the original "Mind the (Level 2) Gap" report. The consequent national assessment of capability and capacity has, if anything, reinforced these concerns. In particular it has identified a number of structural and conceptual issues that are barriers to improved performance.

Structural issues

- 5.11 In structural terms size really does matter. At a force level, the sliding scale of capacity to deal with CT/DE incidents ranging from “caretaker” forces, whose resources would be strained within a matter of hours, to the “self contained”, that would could cope on their own for three to four days. Forces of at least 4000 officers tend to demonstrate the capacity and capability to effectively respond to both a covert and overt CT/DE operation albeit this would be limited to a matter of days and additional specialist resources would be required.
- 5.12 It is equally clear that no force can deal with simultaneous multi-site chaotic incidents or significant pro-active operations without mutual aid. Forces larger in size (3500) were more likely to have greater technical ability and the resilience to support CT/DE operations, whilst smaller forces (less than 2000) have reduced proactive ability.

SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME

- 5.13 The quality of the force strategic assessments varies widely and generally there is a need to develop a more consistent quality product. Whilst all forces have a basic level of NIM compliance in the sense that they produce strategic and tactical assessments and problem profiles, this acknowledges adherence to a process, rather than ensuring that quality intelligence prioritises and drives organisational activity. This view is supported by National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE), who have recently undertaken a (Level 1) NIM quality check across all 43 forces. Many forces look to their police heads of profession to provide the detail and direction on their particular specialism, rather than seeking to independently build up an accurate picture of criminal markets. The focus is often upon areas of activity the force, and staff, are familiar with, with easier access to sources and intelligence, such as drugs. A significant number of forces assessed to date appear reluctant to seek intelligence proactively on serious criminality, the symptoms of which are not as overt as drugs. The narrowness of this gaze is most prevalent in smaller forces, many of which acknowledge that they do not have the resources to dedicate to either the gathering and development of intelligence, or the prevention and enforcement to this activity.
- 5.14 The limited understanding of the problem posed by Level 2 criminality has led to a situation whereby few devote a proportion of their resources to combating serious and organised crime that is commensurate with the scale of the challenge they are facing. There is no adequate performance regime to measure serious and organised crime and the harm it causes to communities. Very few forces are able to provide any form of performance measurement other than traditional output measures such as arrests and seizures and only two forces are attempting to measure outcomes, through methods such as impact assessments, cost/benefit analysis and surveys.
- 5.15 In smaller forces the lack of resilience across the range of protective services can lead to resources from one specialist unit being drawn in to supplement another, such as serious crime team officers supplementing the force MIT at times of high demand.
- 5.16 The evaluation of tactics utilised in operations is also very limited across the board. Forces often default to costly tactics such as surveillance without analysing the costs

or considering other options, with only the more able capable of identifying opportunities to target the ‘underbelly’ of criminal networks through pro-active progression of minor offences, such as motor insurance offences, benefit fraud and anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs).

- 5.17 In the smaller forces the serious and organised crime investigative capability could amount to just seven or eight officers. Despite best intentions these teams can quickly become swamped and are unable to deal with anything other than reacting to operations one at a time, leaving little or no capacity to develop intelligence either for themselves or adoption at regional level. In addition, the evidence suggests that smaller forces particularly prefer that operations are not developed which would lead to depletion of their Level 1 resources. There do not appear to be any adequate business models available to match resources to the demand. Resources dedicated to this activity vary from six or seven members of staff in forces with just over 1000 police officers (a ratio of 167:1) to 430 members of staff in a force with just over 8,100 police officers (a ratio of 19:1).
- 5.18 Worryingly, the transition from NCIS and NCS to SOCA is potentially creating a vacuum that forces feel they cannot ‘backfill’ due not only to resources but expertise. This is evident in the current reliance on the NCS to provide the more sophisticated surveillance, a controller for kidnap and extortion, and support for special command centres.
- 5.19 The identification of the National Intelligence Requirement (NIR) is acknowledged as being essential in delivering an inclusive and consistent approach to intelligence collection in compliance with NIM. Whilst a ‘bottom-up’ approach to intelligence collection would be desirable as it is consistent with force ‘buy-in’ to neighbourhood policing, the failure of many forces to deliver adequate responses to regional and national intelligence requests has recently led NCIS to impose a collection plan that has a clear ‘top down’ focus. This is widely seen as unhelpful by forces, some of whom are ill-prepared to meet this new requirement, albeit their anxiety partly reflects a lack of investment by the majority of forces in mapping criminal enterprises. The facilitators of criminal markets, customers for illicit commodities and members of organised criminal networks all exist within the general community and it is clear that if forces expended the requisite time, effort and analytical resources on understanding the threat posed by serious and organised crime they would not only be able to meet the NIR’s requirements, but would also have a clear understanding of the complexity of crime within neighbourhoods.

PUBLIC ORDER

- 5.20 There is considerable evidence from the assessments to date that individual forces have developed specific expertise according to the extra-ordinary public order risks that they have faced. These include:
- Dorset hosting the Labour Party Conference in Bournemouth;
 - Huntington Life Sciences within Cambridge has been a focus for animal rights protest, including direct action against third party suppliers; and

- Devon & Cornwall and Norfolk have both been exposed to mass incursions in rural areas and have developed strategies to tackle rave events occurring within their force areas.
- 5.21 It is apparent that other forces, which suddenly find themselves facing similar risks, often call upon the expertise of these individual forces and there is clearly a willingness to pass on this experience. In essence these forces have coached their colleagues in their specialist area within the public order arena.
- 5.22 There would appear to be a rough correlation between size and reactivity at Level 2, with an establishment of around 2,200 officers being the minimum size associated with preparedness. Forces with officer strengths in excess of this figure were all able to demonstrate at least some pro-activity, whilst forces below this size struggled to provide evidence of anything other than reaction.
- 5.23 There is a marked difference in how forces approach the issue of day to day preparedness for Police Support Unit (PSU) mobilisation. Good practice was seen in some forces that designate operational staff on each shift for PSU duties if required (West Mercia) and in some forces mobilisation is tested regularly (Staffordshire evidenced testing four times per year). However, in a number of forces (particularly, although not exclusively, smaller forces) mobilisation procedures are not in place or are untested.
- 5.24 The quality and type of equipment available to staff varies considerably, to such a degree that it severely restricted the capability of some forces to deploy PSU resources to certain scenarios. For example, one force is unable to meet their national mobilisation commitment through lack of vehicles at present whilst another force does not issue flame-retardant overalls to their PSU officers.
- 5.25 With the notable exception of football related violence there is little, if any, evidence of forces perceiving public order as a Level 2 issue and few resources are dedicated to analytical work in this area. It rarely features as a theme in its own right in force strategic assessments, albeit public order is often an important strand in wider strategies to address anti-social behaviour or alcohol related violence.

MAJOR CRIME

- 5.26 To many forces major crime is seen as homicide and to a lesser extent serial, or serious sex offences. This often limits forces' consideration of major crime to quantitative measurement and its deliberations, if any is narrowly, reactively focused. The exclusion of major crime from strategic assessments is not confined to small forces, medium and larger forces which experience not insignificant numbers of murder each year make little or no reference to it in their strategic assessments.
- 5.27 The limited development of problem profiles around the vulnerable leads to a lack of recognition of precursor incidents such as domestic violence, mental health and child protection issues. In time this tends to result in a lack of emphasis being placed on preventative strategies. The assessment has also revealed that there are a number of

issues that the Service appears relatively blind to and there is no easily identifiable 'voice' of the victim. In particular this is evident from the variations in approach to dangerous offenders and child protection issues, both within existing communities and towards immigrants as they arrive in England and Wales.

- 5.28 The overall success of delivering the investigative element of this protective service is directly linked to the capacity of the force and how it organises its resources. Those forces that have dedicated, self-sustaining major incident teams (MIT) have the least impact on BCUs once they have been established.
- 5.29 The importance and emphasis placed on major crime investigation by the ACPO team of each force can have an impact on the success or otherwise of this area of business. Where there is clear ACPO experience and involvement in setting the terms of reference, managing and scrutinising these enquiries, positive results can be achieved. The reverse, however, is also true.

CRITICAL INCIDENTS

- 5.30 Generally the understanding of the concept of community intelligence is problematic, this manifests itself in issues surrounding its identification, collection, storage, evaluation and dissemination. This is often reliant upon historic relationships, which can be both ad-hoc and ineffective. Forces that have experience of community unrest make greater attempts to regularly, proactively, test the temperature of vulnerable communities, escalating this through the NIM process where appropriate (Staffordshire, Leicestershire). Forces perceiving themselves as low risk take a far less structured approach, essentially, waiting for the information to come in and reacting to it, whilst those that have 'suffered' a significant critical incident (eg Leicestershire - Kegworth, West Midlands - Gun Crime) demonstrate a high degree of capability to deal with these incidents. However, this tends to be polarised around the nature of the circumstances from which the incident arose, rather than ensuring preparedness across all potential critical incidents.
- 5.31 The investment of forces into specialist assets such as firearms seems directly attributable to size. There is significant evidence that in order to provide firearms cover in smaller forces this is reliant upon the 'double-hatting' of other specialists, frequently road policing officers. An unfortunate example of this occurred in a force where officers left a fatal road traffic accident on a major road to deal with a firearms incident due to no other adequately trained resource being available. In some cases informal arrangements have developed into a permanent service, allowing forces to choose to under-resource in this area (one force assessed provides ARV cover to their neighbour every night shift, without recompense).
- 5.32 Not all forces have profiled their communities to identify vulnerabilities, either within or outside of the force strategic assessment. The development of relationships with vulnerable groups is focused primarily on long established black and minority ethnic (BME) communities and, other than where situational factors exert a strong influence such as in some prominent 'gay neighbourhoods', there is limited progress in building relationships with wider, 'harder to reach', groups such as the homeless or asylum seekers.

ROADS POLICING

- 5.33 Where Roads Policing does appear within Strategic Assessments, the focus is primarily on casualty reduction, with limited or no consideration of tackling Level 2 criminality and terrorist activity on the roads. In some cases, forces that have a high profile for roads policing issues do not feature it within their policing plan.
- 5.34 The use of intelligence and information in this arena is generally weak and confined to the gathering and analysis of collision statistics; many of the forces assessed have no intelligence analyst dedicated to this function. A significant number also have a separate tasking and co-ordinating process for roads policing units and where they are tasked it is generally towards roads policing or reassurance issues rather than tackling Level 2 criminality.
- 5.35 Where forces have maintained a distinct Roads Policing Unit (RPU) the focus is towards casualty reduction as this is the only area in which there are clear performance indicators. In addition, the historic role of traffic policing has focused on enforcement of vehicle related offences and this mindset is still evident within some forces, particularly within centralised RPU. One force with a centralised unit demonstrating good practice was Thames Valley, with these officers focusing on both casualty reduction and tackling criminality.
- 5.36 The work of the Central Motorway Patrol Group (CMPG), a collaborative enterprise between the West Midlands Police, West Mercia Police, Staffordshire Police and Warwickshire Police, has also achieved good results, balancing the desire to address criminality whilst maintaining a focus on casualty reduction. On the debit side, however, concerns around infrastructure, processes and impact assessment have undermined the overall perception of effectiveness.


CIVIL CONTINGENCIES

- 5.37 The development of civil contingencies and emergency planning has seen a renewed emphasis recently with the introduction of the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA). This has demanded that forces adopt a far more proactive approach to the identification, development and testing of plans for vulnerable sites and emergencies. Forces are in varying states of compliance with the Act, albeit the majority of forces assessed have completed the risk assessment of vulnerable sites for their corporate risk register. The development of the relevant forums required by the CCA is in hand, as is the formalisation of information sharing protocols between partners, which has previously existed in a more informal and variable guise.
- 5.38 Whilst forces have planned for single site and scenario emergencies and many have tested and practised these to some degree, almost none of the forces assessed have planned, tested or practised for a chaotic, distributed event.
- 5.39 Whilst forces are all able to make plans and contingencies for emergencies, the critical aspect of the assessments has been the resourcing of enforcement (or reaction) activity. If a small force were subjected to a civil contingency incident, very quickly

they would require mutual aid. The resilience of forces increases as the resourcing base does, however it is acknowledged by all that every force outside the MPS would rely on mutual aid very early into a multi-site chaotic event.

INTELLIGENCE

5.40 As is apparent from the graph reproduced below, intelligence was the aspect with the lowest scores, and greatest shortcomings, regardless of size of police force. The intelligence discipline at this level is still developing; that gathered tends to have a narrow base and in many places the analytical and other products appear to have only a limited influence on decision making. The demonstrable commitment and investment in the National Intelligence Model (NIM) by forces at a BCU level has clearly been effective, the same degree of commitment and adoption at a force level would significantly enhance the way intelligence is collected, handled and directed, and this is an essential part of the future.



Graph 4

PREVENTION

5.41 Prevention is inclined to suffer because protective service activity tends to be incident or operation based rather than a systematic ingredient of the service. An example of this is the investigation of off-street prostitution, rather than dealing with human trafficking ie the Lithuanian prostitution problem. Few forces have moved beyond this position to look at the causation factors of offending at this level, a good example being the Metropolitan Police Service's (MPS) approach to homicide suppression. The ability of forces to invest in prevention is directly dependent upon size.

ENFORCEMENT

5.42 The capacity to secure enforcement and resolution of protective services is heavily contingent upon size, with larger forces much more able to make choices over a wide spectrum. In contrast smaller forces rely to a significant extent on multi-tasking of individuals. Some small forces implicitly or explicitly rely on assistance from others for fairly modest operations, one relies upon a neighbour for Armed Response Vehicle cover each night, whilst another relies upon its large neighbour for almost all public order support to spontaneous incidents.

Why have protective services suffered relative neglect?

5.43 Whilst many interviewed acknowledged that the existing structure was inadequate for the present let alone the future, they were uncertain about the best way forward: as one senior officer put it “it is all very well highlighting Level 2 vulnerabilities as an issue, but what about performance?” The definition of ‘performance’ as volume crime is a daunting inhibitor to the development of protective services. It almost certainly contributes to the high level variability of services nationally. Police performance now needs to be expanded to deal with public protection issues. Policing and protecting the public is at least as much about ‘readiness to operate’ (as was evident on 7 July 2005), as it is about conventional outcomes such as burglary detection.

5.44 The contrast between the consistency in planning around “readiness” for civil contingencies which is now specified in law, and the preparedness on other services is striking. Readiness is a consistent feature of all of these services, and could and should be specified and assessed. A number of them also have conventional outcomes, for example, major crime, serious and organised crime, road policing, counter-terrorism and domestic extremism and even to a degree public order. There is therefore no reason why a performance framework combining both some qualitative and quantitative issues could not be constructed. The more testing but vital element to also be considered is refining the concept of “harm” to communities by serious and organised crime. Some thought has also already been given to this in the Metropolitan Police, which has identified organised crime networks, problematic families and dangerous individuals as being worthy intelligence targets.

5.45 Some work has also been undertaken by units in the Home Office in relation to the subject of harm and it may well be possible to convert this mix of ideas into a practical starting point on this important subject.

5.46 The absence of proper performance framework for these services was evident across most forces and continues beyond force level to collaboration projects. The development of a new framework would do much to underpin the significance of this level of policing, and encourage chief officers and police authorities to engage with the professionals in these areas over what is being and should be achieved.

5.47 That underpinning would be welcome, particularly in view of the current Public Service Agreements which lack a police specific target and could increase the emphasis on measuring the police contribution to volume delivery, in the absence of

specific targets for protective services. Moreover there is a risk of making these services even less visible than they already are.

- 5.48 The victims, whether ‘unattached minors’ who enter the UK and are then placed in care and who disappear into prostitution, or the exposure of youngsters to poorly supervised sex offenders, have no obvious constituency to argue the case for better policing. They, like others who receive inadequate protection from any of the protective services are without a voice. The performance paradigm needs to change to accommodate ‘protection’ as well as crime control. A more focused approach to our HMIC baseline process will help redress the balance and provide a regular assessment of ‘readiness’ in relation to protective services.
- 5.49 Shortcomings on protective services can be attributed to a number of factors above and beyond those ideas discussed earlier. Partly, they arise from the national focus on volume crime over the last 10 to 15 years, coupled with the development of a performance regime, reward culture and regulatory/support infrastructure to complement that focus (for example, the use of Compstat-type mechanisms to hold BCUs to account). As indicated earlier in Chapter 4, this has fostered a “new professionalism” in local policing. Nothing like this has yet happened in relation to force level services.
- 5.50 During that time, much of the discussion on organised crime, counter-terrorism and civil contingencies has occurred at national level, rather than focusing on what could or should be done about these services at an intermediate (force/regional) level. The exception has occurred around those forces eg Avon and Somerset, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and Greater Manchester Police, where the dangers of violent organised crime have spilt onto the streets. However, the spread of organised crime and terrorism is raising awareness and concern on these issues.

Building on good practice

- 5.51 One clear benefit of this assessment is that it has allowed HMIC to identify the key characteristics that underpin the successful provision of protective services. These are as follows:

COUNTER-TERRORISM

- 5.52 High performing forces generally:
- understand the benefits to be gained through investing in developing intelligence from the bottom up, providing Special Branch or equivalent officers to the local level, integrating them with the community and community officers;
 - have developed mechanisms for early identification of the symptoms of terrorist and domestic extremism activity and are able to provide a consistent, quality response to preventative and enforcement activity;

- have produced a threat matrix that contextualises risk and vulnerability;
- have invested in sufficient, dedicated resources (for each distinct role required) to respond to incidents of this nature; and
- raise awareness amongst front-line staff so that staff responding to this type of incident will understand the risks, critical issues and their responsibilities.

SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME

5.53 High performing forces generally:

- focus on criminal markets, not just targets;
- proactively gather (analyse and action) intelligence across a broad range of criminality, not just familiar territory such as drugs;
- understand how criminality operates across all levels and borders and has effective structures to share intelligence with neighbours, partners and other law enforcement agencies;
- have sufficient, dedicated resources to tackle demand, and are well practised in a wide range of specialist tactics;
- have Tasking and Co-ordinating arrangements at both force and regional level which scrutinise and prioritise operations to ensure maximum impact on this level of criminality; and
- have progressed a performance regime towards understanding the harm this criminality has on communities, and qualitative measures, including cost/benefits, of the effects of their operations.

PUBLIC ORDER

5.54 High performing forces generally:

- consider a wide range of situations that have the potential for public order rather than traditional areas such as town centre violence;
- have learned from the experience of not only their own force, but also others, and developed the expertise in their resources to respond to a range of circumstances;

- have developed their response to more than a reaction, including sufficiently trained, experienced and equipped officers, practised in a wide range of tactics;
- exist in a state of preparedness with a well rehearsed, scaleable mobilisation plan, which provides a timely initial (and continued) response to public disorder with minimal impact upon front-line services;
- have a selection of experienced, accredited staff available for all levels of command;
- have the capacity to carry out pro-active, preventative activity; and
- have formal arrangements with neighbours to meet times of exceptional demand.

MAJOR CRIME

5.55 High performing forces generally:

- take account of the range of offences under the major crime heading, seeking to understand it through pro-active intelligence gathering, analysis and profiling;
- have considered the precursors to major crime, such as domestic violence and child protection and have clear, proactive, preventative strategies and robust review and checking mechanisms in critical areas such as dangerous and serious sex offenders;
- have invested in sufficiently experienced and dedicated resources to provide a quality response to the investigation of these crimes, without impacting upon Level 1 resources;
- have clear direction, leadership and scrutiny of major crime by senior managers; and
- have consistent, independent review mechanisms for the review of both current and closed cases.

CRITICAL INCIDENTS

5.56 High performing forces generally:

- have a structured approach to pro-actively gathering and assessing community intelligence, understand their communities, particularly the vulnerable ones, and systematically test the temperature of communities for early identification of tension;

- have strong links to communities (especially hard-to-reach) and regular contact with and contribution from community advisers;
- have sufficient experienced and dedicated resources to respond to firearms issues (including Command) with access to a wide range of tactical options; and
- have comprehensive plans to ensure the continued operating of the force in the event of an emergency and have considered, planned and practised across a range of critical incidents.

ROADS POLICING

5.57 High performing forces generally:

- consider the range of national road policing priorities including denying criminals use of the roads network;
- effectively and pro-actively target these resources, through analysis and profiling, to preventative and enforcement activity towards casualty reduction and tackling criminality; and
- have developed a robust performance regime which ensures effective measurement of the contribution these resources make to force priorities.

CIVIL CONTINGENCIES

5.58 High performing forces generally:

- have identified, developed and tested plans (with partners) across vulnerable sites and considering a range of emergencies;
- have planned and practised their response, not only to the scale and type of emergency that could be managed from within their own resource base, but also distributed chaotic events which would require access to significant additional resources; and
- ensure that it has sufficient expertise available to provide an appropriate response to emergencies, including trained front-line personnel.

Assessment of risk

5.59 This section has been compiled using Government/agency and industry (Federation Against Copyright Theft) statistics alongside conventional police data in an attempt to assess the levels of serious and organised crime, rather than the current police reaction

to it, in each force area in England and Wales. This is a significant piece of work as it contextualises the findings of the national assessment of capability and capacity and is an indicator of the relative vulnerability to Level 2 issues faced by each force. Clearly, the ideal position is that each force's capability and capacity in the provision of protective services is at least commensurate with the level of threat faced by each force. In particular, this strand has focused upon the following areas:

- Firearms
- Class A Drugs
- Immigration
- Money Laundering
- Counterfeit Goods

5.60 Each category has been examined individually for various indicators that could provide an overall picture of the situation across the country. Due to the time restrictions only central agencies that may hold data for either counties, or force areas, in England and Wales were contacted. There has been no attempt to add gravity factors to the data, such as demographic information or harm calculations; this, however, could be undertaken in the future. A full list of the data sources can be found at Appendix E.

5.61 Whilst only the area of serious and organised crime has been considered in this report the other protective services areas can also be mapped.

Presenting the findings

5.62 The maps that have been prepared to support these assessments use colour coded comparators, with green indicating lower comparative risk/activity, amber indicating medium comparative risk/activity and red indicating high comparative risk/activity. In particular it should be noted that the ratings are **relative** to other forces and thus a 'green' does not indicate that a force has little or no activity, instead it merely means it is lower in comparison to those forces rated as 'amber' or 'red'.

5.63 Maps are available for all five themes and there is a composite map summarising the overall level of risk faced by each force. Three are more informative than the others and are reproduced in this document. They are: the overall map showing the combined assessment; the picture in relation to Class A drugs; and that in relation to counterfeit goods. The other maps are reproduced at Appendix F.

Class A Drugs Assessment

- 5.64 The picture painted by this map differs from those produced by more traditional methods. It suggests that drug abuse is more widespread across England and Wales and deeper than supposed.
- 5.65 The new data providing a fresh insight is being collected by, and is readily available from, agencies other than the police. Information concerning problem drug abusers is held primarily within Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and Drugs Action Teams and this was essential in determining the availability, demand and market in each area. In contrast, the data available from within the Police Service, particularly seizure data, was of limited assistance in understanding markets as it reflects the investment and emphasis placed on this issue by forces. The conventional statistical approach focused on policing activity potentially penalises the most proactive in this area.
- 5.66 It was also apparent that a number of forces were either unaware of the risks or were not looking. The case study below is but one illustration of this.

CASE STUDY – ‘HIDE AND SEEK’

A decision was made by a force that the issue of Class A Drugs should be seen as symptomatic of the activity of serious and organised criminals and not viewed in isolation. Whilst no doubt factually correct, it failed to acknowledge the singular significance that drugs offending may have in communities, a view that was reinforced through the failure to task dedicated resources to evaluate the markets, produce bespoke investigative teams or accurately identify the underlying problems that the force faced.


The force was unaware of Home Office research that placed the use of Class A drugs by injecting addicts in one part of that force as significantly higher than London or Liverpool, with the implication being that the community was suffering a high level of drugs related harm.

Neither the problem, nor the Home Office research, were known to the force who saw themselves as having ‘no particular’ Class A drugs problems, albeit some practitioners within the force had previously sought to identify this position.

Counterfeit Goods Assessment

- 5.67 No attempt has previously been made to map criminal activity in relation to counterfeit goods, yet this too can give a valuable insight into the spread and activities of organised crime. The data provided for this map originated solely from the Federation Against Copyright Theft (FACT) as none of the government agencies store this data in a useable format.
- 5.68 Because this is seen by some in society as almost a ‘victimless’ crime and sits outside of the sphere of usual police activity counterfeiting is largely ‘unchecked’. This has allowed offenders to infiltrate otherwise legitimate communities and in so doing not only maximise the financial benefits of their illicit activities but erode the relationships between communities and authorities.
- 5.69 The degree of ‘semi-legitimacy’ bestowed by some in the communities served by these criminal gangs takes no account of the proven links to other commodity based serious and organised criminality.

Counterfeit Goods



Summary

- 5.70 The threats and risks associated with protective services are most immediately obvious for issues around counter terrorism and some aspects of serious and organised crime. Within this report particular effort has been made to map the markets associated with organised criminality. Difficulties have been encountered on this issue for a number of years because too many forces have not supplied adequate and appropriate intelligence to NCIS. This has led to a view that organised criminality is concentrated around Metropolitan areas. Recourse to information from external agencies eg Drugs Action Team (drugs treatment), Immigration Service (people trafficking), and Federation Against Copyright Thefts (counterfeit and illicit goods) reveals a different picture of organised crime markets. This approach suggests that it is widespread, vibrant and growing, with only nine forces being rated as having a relatively lower level of activity. But it is worrying that so many gaps exist in our knowledge of organised criminal enterprises and markets – without detailed, sophisticated analysis of this tier of criminality forces cannot effectively target those who pose the greatest risks to communities and the economy.
- 5.71 There is good reason to believe that other risks such as those posed by civil contingencies, domestic extremists, terrorists and dangerous offenders are widespread rather than narrowly based.
- 5.72 In particular, this work has highlighted real concerns in relation to how the Service first identifies, and then manages, risk. This is particularly relevant to serious and organised crime, where serious deficiencies exist.
- 5.73 At the national level NCIS provides what is effectively a top down threat assessment, albeit there is limited ability to recognise and deal with dynamic events/trends. The MPS and some other forces undertake some “Horizon Scanning”, but most forces focus primarily upon their own crime profile. As things stand there is no national or even regional structure in place to bring these elements together.
- 5.74 Few forces have invested in a sophisticated analysis of their criminal markets and organised criminal enterprises and as a consequence do not have a clear grasp of where their vulnerabilities lie. In some areas there has been an element of ad-hocracy in the ability of the service to identify cases of human trafficking and sexual slavery.

CASE STUDY – ‘NO CRIME HERE!’

Whilst reviewing a force both the Director of Intelligence and Head of Crime emphasised that the force did not have a problem with Level 2, cross border, serious and organised crime and that resources allocated to that area of work were deployed in support of Basic Command Unit problems.

Upon investigation, two of the force’s BCUs reported ‘suffering from’ problems of ‘off-street’ prostitution, involving the exploitation of illegal immigrants, and Class A drug abuse, sourced from London, both of whom had to abstract from neighbourhood policing to address the problem.

Neither of these issues were evident in either the Force Control strategy or being actively investigated or supported at a force level through the TTCG process.

5.75 A paper produced by Assistant Commissioner Tarique Ghaffur for this review stresses that the key to reducing harm to communities from serious and organised crime must come from adopting a holistic approach to social harm. The initial focus needs to be on those neighbourhoods facing the most problems. In particular, there is a strong need to connect with new and vulnerable communities within such difficult neighbourhoods. At the present time such communities have no recognisable voice nor are there any appreciable role models. It identifies the need to address five key areas:

- Organised Criminal Networks (OCNs)
- Dysfunctional role models
- Problem families
- Dangerous people
- New crimes

A brief definition of these terms is outlined at Appendix G.

5.76 Much of the current activity against dangerous persons is operating in ‘silos’ compounding the risks to communities. There is a clear need for a much more co-ordinated approach to identifying and dealing with dangerous people, including those coming into the United Kingdom. A key element of this holistic approach is the requirement for a solid governance framework. Underpinning this framework is the need for a rigorous performance measurement regime that captures effective planning, performance, review and improvement, as well as incorporating a process for identifying and managing risk and harm.

5.77 Complementing this, there is an emerging view in PSNI and some forces including Lancashire and the MPS that a ‘bottom up’ approach to gathering intelligence on serious and organised crime offers the best way of assessing criminal markets and tackling the social harms associated with them. A vigorous bottom up approach on criminal markets could, in fact, complement work done at a national level on criminal targets and provide a much more accurate picture of both the spread of this criminality and police impact in disrupting or disabling it. Neighbourhood Policing, properly linked in and tasked offers a real prospect of significantly enhancing intelligence on these issues.

What does the consolidated picture tell us?

5.78 One of the striking conclusions of the work to quantify the risks facing forces is the emerging picture over the extent to which organised crime has stretched its tentacles beyond our cities. This has not been evident in information passed to NCIS previously, where only a limited number of forces have provided intelligence.

5.79 By combining the results of the national assessment with the data obtained from the risk assessment, plus data on performance against key Level 1 indicators, it has been possible to identify those parts of the country that are most at risk; in essence where there is only limited capability and capacity and yet the challenges from organised criminality and in providing the full range of protective services are substantial.

6. THE ECONOMICS OF PROTECTIVE SERVICES

6.1 Two fundamental questions are addressed in this section:

- does the current structure of policing support the efficient and affordable provision of protective services and support services?; and
- are there indications of how changes in that structure could provide a more efficient basis for service provision?

6.2 In attempting to answer those questions this section will first address wider contextual issues in relation to overall police funding ie financial growth year on year of past years set against police ‘cost pressures’ (increased costs of staffing and additional service provision eg forensic). This is followed by a brief look at resilience of the present force structure as evident from force reserves and the potential to manoeuvre within their budgets. Consideration is then given to the variability of costs of services across forces, including a case study on murder investigation, and the evidence available on the difference that scale makes to efficiency.

Costing protective services.


6.3 Work undertaken for the “Mind the (Level 2) Gap” report suggested that the staff costs associated with the provision of protective services were between £1.1 billion and £1.25 billion¹⁹. By any definition this is a large sum of money. Although progress is being made with the introduction of Activity Based Costing (ABC), financial data is not yet structured in a way that allows analysis of how much of the increase in police funding has been invested in protective services. The present inability to produce a meaningful analysis is a cause for concern and is indicative of the lack of attention that has been paid to the cost of force level services as a whole.

6.4 The obstacles encountered in preparing the case study on murder investigation are illustrative of the overall position. From the outset it was clear that there is a lack of corporacy, understanding and management information in relation to costing activity, outputs and outcomes in this area. Indeed, some forces do not use the Home Office categorisation for homicide, thereby ruling out direct comparisons. Although major investigation teams do work within a budget, and the staff costs can be calculated, it has proved difficult to extract any reliable and valid data on the actual cost of homicide investigation, either collectively or individually. Some partners either were unable to provide expected data or were concerned about the implications of sharing the information they held for commercial or other reasons.

The Wider Picture:

6.5 Funding for policing has risen in real terms by just over 27% since 1996/7; a cash rise of 58%.


¹⁹ “Mind the (Level 2) Gap”, p13 (2005).



Graph 5

- 6.6 In the same period there have been above inflation cost pressures, most notably in relation to pay and pensions and a significant investment in extra police officers and staff. Initially, much of the growth in police officer numbers was funded through the Crime Fighting Fund (CFF), which pays for the additional cost of a specified number of police officers (including their initial training), although as forces point out, this does not include all the additional cost, eg accommodation, which have to be subsumed within other funding. A significant proportion of the growth in police officer numbers reflects local decisions taken by police authorities and chief constables.
- 6.7 Neither are these the only areas in which this trend is apparent. Over the same period the Service has recruited significant numbers of community support officers and has also invested in new technologies such as Airwave, and DNA etc. A range of specific grants has been provided by the Home Office to support these developments, albeit ACPO do not believe these funding streams always meet the full costs of these services and hence add to other pressures.
- 6.8 Notwithstanding the debate between chief police officers and the Home Office on the scale of cost pressures in policing there is agreement that real term settlements in excess of retail price inflation are not sustainable in the long run. Real growth settlements in the next two years are likely, at best, to be half the rate of the last nine. There is a need to properly benchmark service costs now and estimate the practical benefits of additional investment in protective services in terms of readiness and harm reduction.
- 6.9 As is apparent from the graph reproduced below significant efficiency savings have also been achieved over the last five years. These average over 2.5% of net revenue expenditure and include 1% cashable gains. Notwithstanding this, ACPO believes

these gains have not been sufficient to offset what it sees as is a significant shortfall of resources devoted to organised crime²⁰.



Graph 6

6.10 Some case study material is available which suggests that the growth in the need for and cost of protective services is more severe than in day to day policing. Information from the MPS, West Yorkshire and GMP illustrates how some costs have risen. For example:

- MPS homicide forensic spend rose by 51% between 2002/03 and 2004/05, reflecting both the availability of new scientific techniques and their increased use to support operational policing;
- new forensic and investigative techniques such as DNA are now employed to review ‘cold cases’ (unsolved rapes and other serious crimes). The Home Office provides financial support on forensic analysis for unsolved rapes – results to date are impressive, with DNA/other matches being secured for around £14,000 per hit, but this does not cover investigative time and the cost of processing cases through the CJ system. GMP has had the biggest take-up so far, with 19 cases, and it will probably spend several million pounds to bring these cases to a conclusion; and
- West Yorkshire has experienced rising demand in the last five years in respect of: wider use of investigative techniques such as cell site analysis, low copy number DNA, imaging and cold case reviews; and the requirement to professionalise the investigation process and establish teams with a wider range of dedicated roles.


6.11 The typical forensic cost for each category of homicide²¹ is difficult to calculate due to the limited management information, but in relation to Category C offences has

²⁰ See chapter 4.

²¹ Current practice guidance defines categories of murder for resourcing as follows:

been estimated at between £5,000 per case to £11,000, with Category B homicides range between £23,000 and £79,000 per case. Category A homicides are invariably complex investigations that seemingly have no upper limit and their associated forensic costs regularly go into six figures.

- 6.12 These same pressures are also evident in critical support components nationally. The Forensic Science Service has provided the following indications of growth in demand for their services.



Graph 7

- 6.13 They show estimations of the increase in expenditure over the last 15 years (this is an estimate of the total expenditure for all supplies – it does not include additional expenditure “in house”). The estimated growth rate, unadjusted for inflation, has been 10% between 1990 and 1999, rising to 24% between 1999 and 2002. This reflects the significant and developing contribution of DNA and additional funding made available by Government to directly expand its use. We do not have any management information from which to determine if the increased use of forensic evidence has changed the efficiency of police protective services.
- 6.14 Projecting future use, it appears likely that electronic forensic science will expand enormously (this includes mobile phone analysis, PDA analysis etc). There are no firm national projections for this expansion but analysis of this nature is a major consideration in cases of terrorism and is becoming part of the core investigative techniques of serious crime investigation. Kent Police have tracked the growing costs of phone analysis indicating that it has increased by 40% in this financial year alone. The table below shows the increase and projected costs for Kent over six years:

Category A – Homicide or other major investigation which is of grave public concern or where other vulnerable members of the public are at risk, where the identity of the offender is not apparent, and the investigation or the securing of evidence requires significant resource allocation;

Category B – Routine homicide or other major investigation where the identity of the offender is not apparent, but the continued risk to the public is low and the investigation or the securing of evidence can be achieved within normal force resourcing arrangements;

Category C - Homicide or other major investigation where the identity of the offender is apparent from the outset and the investigation or the securing of evidence can be achieved easily.


Year	Cost £	Number of submissions Year
2001	35K	Data not available
2002	74K	478
2003	130K	900
2004	173K	1368
2005	253k	1820
2006 (projected)	c.300K	c.2200

- 6.15 The FSS projects that on top of the current level of expenditure a further 8% will be added in the coming years to cope with the challenges the market will face. This suggests a doubling of expenditure within ten years.

Financial Resilience:

- 6.16 There are two aspects to resilience. The first concerns financial capacity of police forces and the second their ability to manoeuvre within their existing budgets.
- 6.17 Some forces struggle to absorb unpredicted demands arising from major incidents for example, to pay for a significant level of overtime or the cost of mutual aid. The smaller the force and its budget, the harder it is to absorb exceptional demands without a significant impact on everyday policing. Cambridgeshire's struggle to manage the scale of the Soham inquiry was an extreme but by no means isolated example. Costs in excess of £1 million are now common for a single major investigation, and in some high profile cases may be much higher. Unconventional major incidents such as riots, air crashes and natural disasters can cost in excess of £5 million.
- 6.18 One proxy for a force's ability to manage the cost of major incidents is the level of the authority's non-earmarked reserves, which in effect provide a contingency fund. The graph below shows the level of non-earmarked reserves held by authorities in 2003-04. In general, larger forces tend to have bigger cash reserves, and thus a cushion for extraordinary demand, though these reserves may be a smaller percentage of net revenue expenditure. Conversely, smaller authorities tend to hold a larger percentage reserve overall than their bigger counterparts but these are smaller in cash terms. Some 28 police authorities held non-earmarked reserves of less than £5 million in 2003/4, some by a considerable margin. Of these, all but one (Kent) had fewer than 3,500 police officers. It must be stressed that the level of reserves is a matter for judgement by the Authority and its advisers – there is no legal requirement as to the appropriate level of reserves. Good accounting practice requires Authorities to take a view on the financial risks they might face and to provide cover for them. As a guide, the Audit Commission advises local authorities to hold between 2.5% and 5% in non-earmarked reserves. The Metropolitan Police Authority, not shown on the graph below, hold currently a non-earmarked reserve of 1%, just under £30m. The graph below needs to be treated with care as some authorities hold in non-earmarked reserves cover for items which other authorities set aside earmarked reserves.

Police Authority Unearmarked Reserves 2003/4



Graph 8

RESILIENCE

- 6.19 The significant resourcing demands of some major incidents are reflected in the application to the Home Office for one-off special grants – Appendix H lists the awards made by the Home Office since 1990 (excluding party conferences and national summits such as G8).
- 6.20 An important measure of resilience is the flexibility a force has to deal with contingencies coupled with the utilisation level of existing resources. For example, a murder squad, if it is to be most effective, must be instantly available when called upon, and capable of deploying a full strength MIT very quickly. In addition, it must be able to respond to differing types of investigations with differing scales of response. To guarantee such responsiveness the murder squad should have more capacity than will be used in murder investigations. In addition, because murders are not regular, this capacity must, to minimise risk, be sufficiently large to cope with unexpected surges in demand. Overall this implies that such a unit may only be partially utilised for their core role, to ensure that surge capacity always exists.
- 6.21 The other key element is the use that is made of residual capacity. MITs again provide a worthwhile case study. Thirteen forces have self-contained MITs and use them to assist in other areas, such as Level 2 investigations, in roles where they can quickly be extracted if demand requires. Interestingly, larger forces also, by virtue of their size, have more tasks which can usefully and efficiently use this residual capacity, which in overall terms also represents a smaller proportion of their overall workforce.

- 6.22 A case can be made that those with deeper pockets should be much better placed to withstand the in year pressures that are an increasing part of policing and to manage developmental requirements without significantly degrading other areas of business.

Efficiency of Service Provision

- 6.23 Whilst the debate about structure is not predicated on a need to secure savings, there should be some enhanced operational impact from a better brigading and use of premises and specialist/technical resources, but that remains to be documented. In terms of staffing, economies of scale could arise from IT/Communications; HR staff; ‘supplies and services, premises and support (SPT); and buildings²².
- 6.24 Whilst there are no industry standards or absolute benchmarks on the costs per head or costs per service there is an accumulation of information regarding the costs of provision of support services. There are definitional issues in relation to these costs; however, the more striking feature is the high degree of variability, the scale of which is not explicable by definitional issues alone. Some variation issues are illustrated below in relation to IT and Human Resources
- 6.25 Staffing levels within these disciplines range from 0.7% to 2.7% of total staff with the smaller percentages being found in larger forces. However, these figures need to be treated with caution as they do not reflect the extent to which some forces out-source service provision. Arguments in favour of moving away from 43 centres of IT delivery focus not so much on cost savings, which would be negligible, but on effectiveness and greater inter-operability. The recent PITO review found agreement that *“43 separate IT departments is unsustainable; a consensual and evolutionary strategy that leads to their rationalisation is required”*.
- 6.26 As a percentage of total staff, numbers range from 1% to 2%, with larger forces again enjoying smaller ratios. The cost of HR support per employee ranges from £178 per annum to £770 per annum – the average public sector figure is £377. This variability cannot be explained solely by different accounting practices nor at this time can it be deemed to be size related.

Supplies & services, premises and transport (SPT)


- 6.27 Work has also been undertaken within the Home Office to look at the variation in expenditure on certain categories of police expenditure – supplies and services, premises and transport. The total unexplained variation in expenditure on these categories ranges from £250 to £790 million depending on the exact assumptions made²³. Some of this variation may be justified by factors that have not been considered eg performance, data errors, specific local circumstances. Further

²² The source document for this section is a briefing note commissioned from the Police Standards Unit and is reproduced at Appendix I.

²³ The £250m figures represents all forces below the average cost for their MSF reaching the average for their MSF and those above the average making no improvement. The £790m figure uses the absolute best of all forces as the comparator.

discussions with police forces will help identify these factors. Even so, some of the variation represents potential efficiencies. Assuming efficiencies equivalent to only one third of the lower figure could be achieved, then efficiency gains of around £80m could be realised.

6.28 The size of unexplained variation in expenditure by force is illustrated in the chart below. This shows that there are a number of forces whose expenditure on SPT is very different even though they have similar sized budgets. Equally, there are a number of forces with very different budgets whose relative expenditure on SPT is very similar. These associations require further investigation.



Graph 9

Estates and Management Support

6.29 Although this issue has yet to be examined in any detail it is quite likely that streamlining the structure of policing could yield significant savings from the rationalisation of existing buildings estates (one off gains) and, possibly, management support roles and functions.

Merger efficiencies

6.30 It is possible to estimate the likely direct savings from merger. Merging two forces with gross revenue expenditure of £100m each could save 1% to 2% of their combined budget. If applied across England and Wales this might generate annually reoccurring savings of £50 million to £100 million. £70 million would be a reasonable saving.

Operational scale efficiencies – Murder Investigation.

- 6.31 This chapter has noted the limited data on the economic aspects of protective services and this is particularly true when attempting to quantify the direct service costs of particular protective services. Some of these data issues are evident in a case study of the utilisation of specialist resources and experience in the area of homicide and the use and value of Murder Investigation Teams (MITs) in a cross-section of 11 forces split between those who operate dedicated or hybrid MITs and those who do not.
- 6.32 Only 13 forces operate a full MIT and it is clear the principal drivers underpinning their creation was the need to protect the force's reputation; to provide a centre of excellence/best practice; to ensure the utilisation of specialist skills and to succession plan; to minimise disruption to BCU activity; and to maintain a state of readiness 24/7 for critical incident ownership and management. Levels of demand and the availability of resources, often a real issue for smaller forces, were also factors in the creation of MITs; however, there was little if any evidence that economic considerations were an important factor in the overall decision.
- 6.33 Based on 2002 and 2003 homicide statistics, a linear correlation exists between the population in the relevant force area and the number of homicides per year, the average being around one per 100,000 population per year. This implies that a smaller force with a population of around 0.5 million, such as Gwent, could expect an average of five murders per year, albeit in any one year this could be as low as two or as high as eight or nine. In contrast a larger force with a population of two million, such as West Yorkshire, can expect to average 20 murders per year, ranging from as low as 12 and to as high as 27 in exceptional years.
- 6.34 The advantage of MITs is that they are instantly available when called upon and should also be capable of providing a flexible and scaled response as appropriate. There are tensions between the minimum level of utilisation required to keep a MIT properly skilled with the risk there might not have sufficient capacity to cope with demand. Analysis suggests that in larger forces the number of major inquiries fluctuates less significantly and that this allows a higher level of utilisation. In contrast, smaller forces that are prone to greater variability in demand are necessarily required to maintain greater residual capacity to cope with risk, albeit they generally have less opportunity to exercise and refresh the specialist skills required. Where full MITs exist they equate on average to approximately 2.5% of force size. The data in relation to the hybrid model operated by Lancashire has been included for comparative purposes.

Force	Force Strength	MIT	Total MIT staff costs
West Yorkshire	5458 Police, 3405 police staff	231 staff, 151 police, 80 police staff	£7,551,744 (2.6% of force strength)
Hampshire	3820 police, 1962 police staff	107 staff, 87 police, 20 police staff	£3,769,264 (2.5% of force strength)
Lancashire	3593 police, 1715 police staff	74 staff, 45 police, 80 police staff	£2,621,582 (1.3% of force strength)

- 6.35 MITs typically deal with all categories of homicide, albeit in a number of forces category C investigations, which comprise the majority of homicide investigations, are dealt with outside the team. In these circumstances, responsibility for such cases invariably falls to the local BCU. Where hybrid teams exist, and staff are precepted from BCUs and other departments there are often issues regarding the skills and experience of those staff provided. This can affect the quality of the investigation and increases the organisational risk of failure. Where there is no provision in a force for a MIT, staff have to be extracted from day-to-day policing activity. Unfortunately, there appears to be no research as to the effect on day-to-day policing in BCUs and the impact on performance with regard to the abstractions.
- 6.36 The potential in terms of scale and scope of service is also evident from the examination of major crime conducted for this review. Larger police organisations are likely to offer a service that is more preventive in character with stronger utilisation rates and greater expertise in the staff employed.
- 6.37 A central pool of resources can deliver economies in relation to communication, flexible management and retention of experience. It allows for the development of a professional expertise that reduces force risk in relation to homicide investigation. There are some efficiencies to be made in the number of staff trained and abstraction of staff from other duties; however, due to the variants of management information in costings, forensic service provision, categorisation of homicide and the make-up of MITs and/or arrangements to investigate homicide it has been difficult to calculate the desired make up of a MIT. That said, a strategic force or police organisation would, at today's costs, need to consider putting at least 2.5% of its staff into a workable and efficient MIT – at least 150 staff.

Conclusion

- 6.38 To conclude, the answers to the two questions that prefaced this section are: the current structure of policing probably does not support the efficient and affordable provision of protective services and support services; and yes, there is evidence that changes in that structure might provide a more efficient basis for service provision.

- 6.39 Moreover, sufficient evidence now exists to conclude that without a change in the dynamics the situation will only get worse, particularly if, as expected, the growth in future funding settlements does not match that of recent years. Neither the Service nor Government has a strong enough grip on the economics of protective services; put simply resources can be managed better to meet the various financial and operational pressures on the Service. This view is demonstrated by the Service's ability over recent years to exceed efficiency targets at the same time as improving its performance.
- 6.40 The current structure and efficiency regime is not designed to yield a step change in value for money, nor easily support workforce modernisation. Tight budget settlements and rising demands in policing, mean that the every effort must be made to ensure maximum value for money to ensure that provision of service does not deteriorate. The existing efficiency regime provides a driver for this. Process and procurement reform might though be accelerated by the consolidation of forces in one form or another. Speeding up improvements would yield additional funding to improve services to the public.
- 6.41 Some feel for the scale of the efficiencies that might be achieved is possible. Direct savings from merger might amount to £70 million annually. If the potential for efficiencies on SPT read across to wider policing, productivity gains worth around £250 million annually might be generated through workforce modernisation and other improvements. The NPV of merger savings and productivity gains could amount to £2,250 million²⁴.

²⁴ These calculations are explained in greater detail at Appendix I.

7. STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION

- 7.1 Stakeholders inside and outside the service recognise that there are issues but there is no immediate consensus on the best way forward. Their views can be summarised as follows:

APA

- 7.2 The Association of Police Authorities is considering collaboration, drawing on ideas emerging from the Three Counties Project, the South East Policing Alliance and the South West Region to provide draft templates for future collaboration agreement. Their deliberations include the possibility of commissioning projects associated with operating and support services, with neighbouring forces and other alliances. They have also discussed the federated option outlined later.

ACPO

- 7.3 The Association of Chief Police Officers generally agree the need for change: some are more inclined towards amalgamation and others a regional support solution. There is a strong belief, based on estimates made in 2004, that there is a shortfall of resources devoted to organised crime that has been increasingly evident since regional crime squads were brigaded nationally in 1998.
- 7.4 A very small number openly advocate the national solution and feel that other options are a step along that road.

Local Government

- 7.5 Since the last major reorganisation in 1974 police structures have been intimately bound up with local government boundaries. A debate has been underway for some time as to the merits of the two tier model as opposed to the unitary. The Government are aware of the issues that generate this debate but consultation with the ODPM elicited the response “there are no current plans for local government reform”. However, discussions are taking place over the question “What is the City?” which may have consequences at BCU level, in the future, but the Department would seek co-terminosity in any new arrangements.

The public at large

- 7.6 Little or no work has been done on the ownership of local forces by members of the public. However, the work carried out as part of the reassurance agenda and the signal crimes research²⁵ shows that people identify with a very discrete

²⁵ D O'Connor (2002) Civility First. Published in 'Justice' magazine.
M Innes., N. Fielding and S. Langan, “Signal Crimes and Control Signals: Towards an Evidence Based Framework for Reassurance Policing”. Guildford: Surrey Police (2002).

neighbourhood and that their requirement of the service is for an identifiable and named local officer and possibly a local supervisor. The opportunity to badge the police at a more local level needs further examination but would be facilitated by consistent and national livery standards with the ability to locally tailor. This would enable more local affinity, not less.

Criminal justice agencies

- 7.7 For criminal justice agencies, the correlation between capability and size does not appear to be as strong across the board, as in policing. However, there are still concerns about the capability of their smaller areas and their ability to manage change. They stress the importance of co-terminosity and that any changes to the police structure that grouped force areas together, would be much more manageable from their point of view.

Chief Police Officers Staff Association

- 7.8 The Chair and vice Chair of CPOSA were concerned about the lateness of engagement with the staff association. They wish to be formally engaged with those scoping any change process and expressed concern over the potential for significant disruption and disfunctionality, even if any change programme was properly resourced and managed. Appropriate spans of chief officer command must be maintained to enable active strategic leadership and engagement, both internally and externally. They further noted with concern that the potential impact on conditions of service for chief officers had not been addressed to date.

The Police Federation

- 7.9 The Police Federation give a measure of support for the need for a structural solution to assist bridging the Level 2 gap. They have independently identified that expertise is a matter of utilisation as well as accreditation and would support a solution that would increase the development opportunities for those they represent. The preservation of the BCU-based local policing model was stressed at length, as was the need for knowledgeable and technically able chief officer leadership.

The Superintendents' Association

- 7.10 The Superintendents' Association are clear that 'strategic forces' founded on a BCU based neighbourhood policing model could not only help address the Level 2 gap but would offer the opportunity for resilient and appropriately skilled chief officer teams to be constructed. These teams could better support their membership. They also hold deep reservations on collaboration as a model based on the experience of their members working in these arrangements.

M Innes., et al. "Signal Crimes and Reassurance Policing". Guildford: University of Surrey and National Reassurance Policing Programme (2004).

- 7.11 There is a desire to see that disruption caused by any change to local policing is kept to a minimum. In particular they were wary of undergoing a series of steps towards a lasting solution and preferred one radical change. They felt that this would be less disruptive overall.

Unison

- 7.12 Unison hope that a capacity building rather than cost reduction approach is taken to change and would expect a statutory staff commission to be established to safeguard staff interests. This issue is explained in greater detail at Appendix J.

8. CREATING A 21st CENTURY POLICE SERVICE

8.1 The evidence gathered thus far regarding capability of forces, criminal risk and economics is not definitive, but is strongly indicative. It is also probably fair to assume that a detailed consideration of other protective services, eg professional standards, would follow this pattern. Whilst each of the strands have some significance in their own right, taken together they point to significant inadequacies in our present approach, which will not be remedied by the present organisation of policing.

The purpose of police forces

8.2 One of the gaps this work has highlighted is the absence of a clear definition of what the purpose of policing below national level should actually be: there is value in addressing this as part of this exercise. At its simplest level three responsibilities of policing below the national level have been evident during the course of this work:

- the development of local and neighbourhood policing;
- the provision of protective services to national standards; and
- the organisation of affordable support and strategic development.

Organisations which are capable on all of those fronts could be characterised as ‘strategic police organisations or forces’.

Design considerations for restructuring

8.3 The existing 43 force structure is over 30 years old. It matches local government boundaries and has emphasised the push on volume crime, and local policing, all of which have been valuable. However, it is now also a constraint on improving protective services and the economics associated with them. Models of democratic policing vary between the disaggregated, the layered such as in the United States or France, to all purpose integrated bodies as presently exist in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The practical advantages of integrated units in facilitating intelligence, operational control and clarity of responsibility are compelling in an environment of “unprecedented uncertainty”²⁶. This was evidenced in the ACPO response on police reform discussions in 2004 which showed that a laminate model of policing was superior to disaggregated models²⁷. The ACPO work was based on studying the processes around a number of significant cases and operations including Operation Trident in London, and the cockle pickers’ case in Lancashire. The laminate model was agreed by ACPO at the time as the preferred means of organising policing, because of the absolute premium on knowledge and intelligence. Those imperatives have not declined in value. The result of adding layers or disaggregating policing into very distinctive tiers can be estimated around what has happened with NCIS and the Police Service in relation to intelligence flows. In essence, NCIS has suffered from a high level of attrition of intelligence en route from BCUs through

²⁶ P. Bobbit “The Shield of Achilles”, p812 (2002).

²⁷ ACPO police reform paper “Roles and Responsibilities of the police service” (2004).

forces to its offices. The result has been a much more limited view of the forces affected by organised crime than is the case, or certainly appears to be the case, from the short amount of work done in this review on testing for signs of criminal markets by reference to other agencies.


- 8.4 Community affinity for integrated policing services above the BCU level is also of value in demonstrating commitment to the needs of wider recognisable localities; and putting an accessible, accountable face on an otherwise imposing agency.
- 8.5 In creating a structure that is fit for purpose the overall goal should be the creation of forces large enough to provide a full suite of sustainable services, yet still small enough to be able to relate to local communities. Such an organisation would benefit from a mix of environments that stimulate development of protective services. Analysis of force responses to public order, critical incidents, and serious and organised crime demonstrate that forces learn from the challenges in their environment. Those who have had to deal with extreme animal rights activists, gun crime, party conferences etc become more expert, and more accomplished in their tactics, for example using covert and technical interventions more confidently. Those evolutionary developments are evident in the smaller forces as well as the larger forces; the latter, however, tend to have the more varied environments and the greater likelihood that they will have to repeatedly raise their game in order to match those environments.
- 8.6 BCUs are the critical building blocks of both the current structure and a possible new arrangement. They deliver the vast bulk of everyday policing services and many are now sufficiently large and have secured co-terminosity such that they can be left largely intact during a move towards a more streamlined structure.
- 8.7 Particular design considerations around combinations of forces in whatever form they take include:
- **Size** – the review indicates minimum size of over 4000 police officers, but must be cognisant of the need to design-in resilience and spare capacity.
 - **Mix of capability** – any structural change must take account of the graded capability of potential ‘partners’ (ie forces that could be amalgamated or work more collaboratively) as indicated through both performance on volume crime and the Protective Services Review.
 - **Criminal Markets** – it is fundamental to understand the underlying criminal markets and context in which any new entity is to operate.
 - **Geography** – the scale and demography may require a measure of pragmatism in proposals for change.
 - **Risk** – it is essential that opportunities to reduce risk are maximised by considering current capability and consolidating to generate new strengths.

- **Co-terminosity** – it is essential to consider established political and partners boundaries.
- **Identity** – whilst accepting the local focus of public perception, historical and natural boundaries should be maximised where possible.

What would success look like?

- 8.8 The potential success of the options for an improved organisation of policing will need to be assessed. It is appropriate to benchmark any ‘would be’ improvements against the characteristics and standards that differentiate high performing organisations. The relative strength of existing forces (and regional groups of forces) with regard to local policing, protective services and risk are variable, and this too needs to be considered in judging both the success and the speed with which change can be achieved. Some customisation around change support, methodology and timing is inevitable, but the destination and expectation must be clear from the outset.
- 8.9 In order that we do not add to the complexity of existing organisational review mechanisms and build upon current arrangements, we have worked with the Police Standards Unit to use the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF)²⁸ as the vehicle for identifying and expressing the characteristics and standards against which success can be both measured and predicted.
- 8.10 The principle behind each of the domains can be applied equally to the protective services as to Level 1 neighbourhood policing and each of the domains can be expanded to include a set of characteristics and/or expected standards. In particular, it must be recognised that protective services cross-cut domains 1-4. The NIM concepts of intelligence, enforcement and prevention have been incorporated in domains 1-3 (see diagram below), whilst the definition of “Providing Assistance” contained within domain 4 has been expanded upon to include the issue of resilience.

²⁸ This includes the additional domain of “Leadership and Corporate Governance”, as used by HMIC in the Baseline Assessment process.



Domain A: Citizen Focus

Neighbourhood Policing delivered at Level 1

- 8.11 Activity cannot rely upon the abstraction of resources aimed at delivering neighbourhood policing. The delivery of service should complement Level 1 activities.

Level 2 and 3

- 8.12 There must be clear evidence that work undertaken is core business and mainstreamed, and links with NIM at all levels of criminality.

Community Identity

- 8.13 The understanding of the need to brand any organisation with a recognisable and meaningful character, for example by adoption of a particular geographical identity.

Customers

- 8.14 There is a need to articulate who is the customer and what is the extent of service provision that is intended.

Professional Standards

- 8.15 Essential to the delivery of any policing service is the identification of robust mechanisms to ensure integrity, fairness and transparency.

Problem Identification

- 8.16 In order that any meaningful impact on harm can be assessed it is necessary for any organisation to be able to demonstrate a detailed understanding of the risk and problems to be faced.

Domains 1-4: Reducing Crime, Investigating Crime, Promoting Public Safety and Providing Assistance

- 8.17 The seven protective services fall within domains 1-4 and the templates and scoring system for reviewing protective services that have been developed for this work should be the foundation of any subsequent assessment methodology. The characteristics that typify a force performing at a high level across the protective service areas have already been identified in chapter 5 above.
- 8.18 The NIM concepts of ‘prevention’, ‘intelligence’ and ‘enforcement’ are included in domains 1-3 respectively, whilst domain 4 will now also assess overall resilience.

Domain B: Resource Usage

Additionality

- 8.19 There cannot be an expectation or reliance upon the presumption of additional resources, either financial or human. Service delivery may well be dependent upon existing resources managed smarter and with greater efficiency. Without developing and supporting a comparative economic performance regime it will be hard to assess efficiency achieved. Neither will it be easy to support essential developments in workforce modernisation.

Cost Benefit Analysis

- 8.20 There is a need to develop the understanding of how this element of police business can be utilised to maximise decision-making, resource impact and inform the selection of operational options. An outline framework for any consideration of proposals by police authorities and forces is attached at Appendix K.

People and HR

- 8.21 Any organisational structure should provide an opportunity to develop expertise to protect the public. Any change in structure will generate a substantial range of HR issues for consideration (see cost/benefit framework and chapter 7, stakeholder views).

Resilience (financial costs)

- 8.22 There must be clear and guaranteed funding, which is dedicated to the service and mainstreamed to any participating organisation.

Leadership and Corporate Governance

Clarity

- 8.23 There is a need to identify clear and unambiguous terms of reference and strategy for any organisation; it must be clearly linked to and reflective of the other policing services provided and should be regarded as core business not a peripheral activity.

Structures


- 8.24 Form should follow function with identified roles, responsibilities and lines of reporting clearly articulated. Areas of responsibility and spans of control should be identified and be widely accepted and understood.

Professionalism

8.25 The people charged with managing or delivering services must be able to evidence the requisite professional competencies required, hold the appropriate accreditation and have completed the necessary training, for example as a Gold commander.

Expertise

8.26 Whilst not contingent upon individual experience, it is essential that organisations and their key processes are subject to scrutiny by chief officers with the expertise to critically evaluate their effectiveness and suitability. Consideration should be given to the availability within chief officer teams of experience, not only in BCU operations, but also in managing change, serious crime and crisis management. The diagrammatic representation reproduced below has been anonymised, but reflects what we see as the distribution of skills and experience amongst chief officers within one ACPO region. The shortfalls identified are not necessarily uncommon.



Boundaries

8.27 The organisation must not be constrained by the formal or informal confines of sub-geographical demands placed upon it, outside of the limits and parameters of the intended operating area, ie the territorial imperative to show immediate return to local areas should not overwhelm tasking as it has in some collaborations to date.

Performance

8.28 There must be a performance regime in place to assess protective services. HMIC will work with PSU to develop a process by April 2006.

Processes

8.29 Key processes must be identified, mapped and managed in order to maximise performance outcomes and minimise lack of clarity, role ambiguity and ineffectiveness. Data will be provided by the Home Office on variance in support service costs that should assist in targeting processes for examination and comparison.

A different configuration – not just a different structure

8.30 Structural adaptation is necessary, rather than simply desirable, but it will not in itself be sufficient. Complementing the work to identify design considerations, it is also clear that a different **Configuration**²⁹ is required (a combination of structure, processes and relationship developments) to enable affordable protective services to flourish without undermining existing strengths of local policing and local forces. The following elements need to be considered in a new configuration:

- **Structure** (see options below).
- **Processes.**
 - a) Enhanced intelligence collection, analysis and use, to enable the best focus of resources on counter-terrorism, serious and organised crime etc.
 - b) Development of a performance framework that acknowledges the importance of readiness to protect the public as well as control crime.
 - c) With a new comparative approach to efficiency that actively measures the allocation and impact of police resources and promotes workforce modernisation.
- **Relationships** – questions remain over responsibilities and roles as the National Crime Squad (NCS) and National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) ‘wind down’ and the terrorist threat becomes more evident (there is a need for a stronger shared understanding of the contribution of partners on the national and regional landscape in protective services including SOCA, MPS, Security Services, criminal justice partners etc). Uncertainties have emerged in discussions in forces around where their role fits in counter-terrorist activities, also in relation to a perceived void being paraded with the formation of SOCA (on intelligence gathering and some tactical issues, eg kidnap), the

²⁹ GJ Scholes and G Johnson ‘Exploring Corporate Strategy’, p420, Prentice Hall (2002).

role of the NCPE, NPIA and how forces will link with regulatory bodies in the future.

- 8.31 Each of these elements needs to be owned and nurtured within the Home Office, ACPO and the upcoming NPIA if real progress is to be made. There is a resource gap and evident limitations in the present version of the national funding formula, but additional resources will only have a limited impact if they are not used and focused in a configuration which is aligned for purpose.

9. OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

- 9.1 It is assumed that the status quo, even with an enhanced performance regime, stronger bottom up intelligence system and greater flexibility will not enable significant improvements that yield consistent delivery of protective services to national standard. The structural options that have been identified are: greater/incentivised collaboration; lead forces; federation of forces; and strategic forces. Each will be addressed in turn.

I. Collaboration

- 9.2 This option essentially preserves the status quo and would extend existing initiative by forces and authorities.
- 9.3 This report has specifically examined the merits of collaboration and in particular, has evaluated nine current policing collaborations across England and Wales. In addition to the South East Policing Alliance, the South West Region and the Three Counties Collaboration Project which were highlighted within the APA CTG paper as being worthy of consideration, it has also examined: the Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN); Operation Tarian in southern Wales; the Chiltern Transport Consortium; and the three West Midlands-based collaborations viz the Central Motorway Patrol Group, the West Midlands Task Force and Counter Terrorism Support Unit. In parallel, work was also undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness of two of the Regional Tasking and Coordination Groups (RTCG).

COLLABORATION – THE POSITIVE BENEFITS

- 9.4 The benefits of collaborative working are easier to evidence in relation to the provision of infrastructure or support services. The Chiltern Transport Consortium has been successful in providing cost effective and reliable transport services for both the Thames Valley Police and Bedfordshire Constabulary, whilst the Three Counties Collaboration Consortium is successfully overseeing improvements to the infrastructure, most notably in relation to custody provision, across Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire Constabularies. Building upon this, these same three forces have now adopted service level agreements for major crime support and to provide a ‘Level 2’ response to serious and organised and cross border crime, albeit these are neither as developed nor as capable as the infrastructure projects. There are real limits in operational terms in the way these resources can be used (see para 9.12).
- 9.5 There were clear examples of benefits being accrued through collaborative working in discrete areas of new policing business such as GAIN which uses a multi-agency networking arrangement to develop intelligence products, and with the Regional Asset Recovery Teams (RARTs) which have proved successful in impacting upon criminals, particularly at Level 2, through the restraint and recovery of assets.
- 9.6 Both are developing in areas that have never been previously exploited and provide added value in ‘niche’ markets. They have also received significant new funding to

underpin 'start-up' costs, but despite their proven value nevertheless face uncertain futures when the funding runs out.

- 9.7 Within the West Midlands region there is evidence that all three 'additional' policing services have achieved positive outcomes, the CTSU in providing a regional counter-terrorism and domestic extremism coordination function; the CMPG in consolidating motorway policing services across for four forces in the West Midlands; and the Task Force in delivering the RART and Regional Intelligence for the four forces, plus a small dedicated Level 2 operational team that is tasked by the Regional TCG. Notwithstanding this, it is also apparent that these results have been achieved against an uncertain performance backdrop, where impact cannot be measured effectively, and being dogged by structural, procedural and human resource constraints.

CONSTRAINTS TO EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION

- 9.8 The review of collaboration has identified a number of constraints that limit the efficiency and ultimate effectiveness of collaborative working.

GOVERNANCE

- 9.9 In governance terms the most effective collaborative is that between Bedfordshire and Thames Valley Police in the Chiltern Transport Consortium, where responsibility for procurement and fleet management rests solely with the latter. Best described as a customer-client arrangement for fleet provision, this is common in other business sectors.
- 9.10 All of the other collaborations answer to a Strategic Management Group composed of senior representatives of key contributors, several of which are underpinned by a project board. It was apparent that the various governance arrangements were seen to dilute the clarity of leadership, inhibit dynamic decision-making and impose a degree of bureaucracy. Where key stakeholders were engaged it was largely linked to overseeing their investment, be it in staff or finance, rather than in providing corporacy and firm strategic direction.
- 9.11 It is also apparent that words do not always match deeds with collaborations that, on paper, appear to be strong often being left under-resourced, creating a perception of a lack of value and 'buy-in'. A good example of this can be found in the creation of one of the Regional Intelligence Cells (RIC) where, having signed up to support the collaboration, two of the forces covered declined to advertise vacancies to their own staff as they believed this would lead to abstractions that would negatively impact upon their in-force capability.
- 9.12 Direct police authority involvement was only apparent in two collaborations and this was at the level of finance officer. In all cases the reporting mechanisms to each police authority are through the normal force feedback reports and existing force oversight procedures. The role of the police authorities was seen by many police officers engaged in operationally focused collaborations to be an inhibiting factor, limiting the development of truly 'problem focused' arrangements that span force

boundaries. Perhaps as a result of the legal requirement to provide for an efficient and effective service within a force area, this territorial approach has led to some units allocating resources on a pro-rata basis rather than according to need and has acted as a bar to 'cross boundary' working. In one instance it was found that resources could only be committed to an operation if the issue at hand was a problem for all of the contributors. As a consequence, a force that was under 'attack' from a serious and organised Class A drugs network, sourced from a different ACPO region, and outside of the collaboration area, was not able to call upon the support of its partners to address this serious drain on its capacity, whilst at the same time still finding itself mandated to contribute resources to a less impactful problem that spanned the collaboration area.

OPERABILITY

- 9.13 None of the collaborations examined were predicated on the basis that existing front-line policing services could be provided more effectively through pooled resources; they instead existed to provide additional or new capability and 'insurance' by proposing the leveraging of resources at times of need. There are a number of practical hurdles that limit the effectiveness of such arrangements. In particular this approach relies upon the probability that at the time of need only one of the partners will be experiencing extreme demands. Even if this were the case there is also evidence that where priorities clash, demands in the providing force would invariably outweigh even quite significant demands of their partners.
- 9.14 Collaborations that provide operational policing services do so as 'additional' resources, they are drawn from the sponsoring organisations and supplement existing force provision by adding value at the regional level. Such collaborations are invariably resourced through the allocation of 'spare capacity', or by 'back-filling' posts through the use of external funding. As a consequence none are resourced on a scale commensurate with actual demand; for example the West Midlands Task Force, which was created to impact upon Level 2 serious and organised crime in the West Midlands, has neither the numbers of staff, nor the levels of training, that exist in each of its sponsoring forces.
- 9.15 It is also apparent that the size of the force has a bearing on how the collaboration is viewed. In some cases smaller forces that contribute resources feel they do so by denuding their own expertise and capacity whilst seeing no return on investment, as assets are drawn into the more problematic conurbations; whilst in at least one larger force the opposite was the view, with the relationship being described as almost 'parasitic'. Within the South West Region the larger forces have expressed views that the proposed process solely would mandate the larger partners to arrangements to insulate the smaller ones from amalgamation, with little benefit for them.
- 9.16 It also appears that the structures that underpin each of the collaborative arrangements are not dynamic enough to respond to the need to make quick strategic decisions, nor have established mechanisms in place that can readily call upon any further support from the sponsoring bodies as a matter of routine and process.

LEGAL STATUS

- 9.17 Excluding the Chiltern Transport Consortium, which enjoys a different status, none of the collaborations were specific entities in their own right. This lack of legal entity status of the majority of collaborations has a direct impact upon their ability to recruit or employ staff. In relation to police staff the de facto solution has been for one force to take ownership of the employees on temporary contracts, linked to the funded life-span of each arrangement. This has a distinct and negative effect on the capacity of each arrangement to attract and retain the best people.
- 9.18 The secondment of sworn police officers or partner agency staff is the universal arrangement for resourcing dedicated units; however, this in turn comes with two negative constraints. First, whilst receiving day-to-day direction from the unit line management, all such officers remain the ultimate responsibility of their home force and this can cause logistical difficulties for managers who have to become 'expert' in the complexities of each organisation, diverting time and effort into managing numerous similar but different processes.
- 9.19 The second issue, invariably omitted when considering the employment and secondment of staff to a dedicated collaborative arrangement, is the lack of adequate human resource (HR) management. This often leads to lack of staff development in context of their sponsors, retention issues and problems with recruitment and succession planning.

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

- 9.20 With the notable exception of the Chiltern Transport Consortium all of the other collaborations can best be described as joint projects, with finite timescales; this 'approach' impacts upon funding, mainstreaming activity and resources, both financial and human. Of these the Three Counties Project appears to be the most durable as a number of its sub-projects financially commit the participants to deliver described services, such as shared custody centres, over a long term due to Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contractual arrangements.
- 9.21 It is interesting to note that whilst the South East Policing Alliance has appointed a project manager, some 10 months later it still has not agreed terms of reference.
- 9.22 Recent academic work has highlighted the dangers if a 'project mentality' is allowed to develop, notably that it:
- reinforces perception of peripheral activity, even when it is not, making later adoption problematic;
 - engenders degrees of investment, both in terms of time and resources, that are disproportionate to other areas of business, making any results or 'outputs' nebulous as they do not result from levels of investment that would have existed if mainstreamed, or that will continue if adopted;

- shows that many projects that are developed this way are quickly consigned to history post-project phase.
- 9.23 The ‘project’ ethos allows individual collaborations to grow within the same region, but due to their origins and lack of organisational congruity they develop in parallel on a mutually exclusive basis, adding to the burden of organisational complexity and not seeking to maximise joint working arrangements such as shared facilities or administration (as evidenced by the lack of interface between the West Midlands Task Force, Central Motorway Patrol Group and Counter-Terrorism Support Unit).

PERFORMANCE

- 9.24 Performance is either judged in terms of outputs or compliance to project delivery dates, the only one arrangement that can show economies of scale is the Chiltern Transport Consortium where it benchmarks against pre-implementation arrangements.

ASSESSMENT OF REGIONAL TASKING & COORDINATION

- 9.25 Two regional tasking and co-ordination groups were examined as part of this review. Both operate similar processes, the intelligence profile and data is prepared via NCIS and through the Regional Drugs Intelligence Office. Once the strategic assessment has been produced a control strategy is agreed by the constituent forces, usually at ACC level and by representatives of NCS, the RART, British Transport Police, HM Revenue and Customs and HM Immigration. It is worthy of note that the Security Service is not represented and that the attendance of BTP can be problematic. One of the regions has recently decided that it needs to have the buy-in of the chief constables, and a chief constable has been identified to chair all future strategic meetings.

TASKING AND CO-ORDINATING

- 9.26 Both chairs stated that it was very difficult to get the buy-in of a number of participants around the table, particularly the non-police representatives who were not empowered to make decisions and instead had to refer back to their own organisations. Neither was the position much better in relation to the police representatives: none of ACCs who sit on the two Groups have the delegated authority to commit resources. It is not perhaps surprising that in one of the regions there has not been a single operation in which resources have been committed to a joint enterprise. It was also apparent that the smaller forces involved in both regions either could not, or would not commit any resources whilst the larger ones were largely prepared to do so where a good case could be made.
- 9.27 There is a clear need for meaningful regional intelligence/cross-border intelligence to drive this process and at present it is apparent that the agreed control strategies do not encompass the full range of Level 2 problems experienced by forces. One of the regions has only a ‘virtual’ intelligence cell and no dedicated resources to call upon.

Both chairs felt this area was weak and until it was addressed properly the whole process was in danger of becoming little more than a ‘talking shop’.

- 9.28 Performance monitoring is wholly inadequate and one of the chairs stated that if there are any outcomes they are “despite the tasking and co-ordinating process and not because of it”.

Conclusion

- 9.29 The most successful and mainstreamed arrangement is the Chiltern Transport Consortium; it is worthy of note as being described as a 'business acquisition' on a customer-client basis where one force transfers ownership of resources to another to provide a service.
- 9.30 This more detailed analysis substantiated the findings of the earlier “Mind the (Level 2) Gap” report. Under current policing structures collaboration does not offer an effective or efficient model for gaps in Level 2 services, the local territorial imperatives are simply too strong. Where they exist, collaborative ventures generally affect only a very limited part of business. Although the adoption of formalised processes is being considered by the APA, the experience to date is that management costs are high, the functionality of operational support systems is low and governance problematic.
- 9.31 Present progress, practice, and governance together with the fact that some are sceptical of the value of change suggests that at best, progress will be complex, slow and of limited impact. The position is best summarised by one of the contributors to this element of the review who simply stated *"any success we have cannot be compared to how much better we would have done if managed by one organisation"*.

II. Lead Force for specialist capabilities

- 9.32 In theory, and with funding, the ‘lead force’ concept offers possible progress, albeit it would have significant implications for smaller forces in relation to the control and direction of enquiries conducted within their own borders that they would need to acknowledge.
- 9.33 At a practical level, there may be a shortage of sufficient candidate forces immediately willing and capable of adopting this type of role. The City of London Police have assumed a lead role for fraud in the south-east, but their expertise in this area is almost unique and it is not immediately clear that there are enough forces elsewhere to ensure full national coverage. Even if there were, it would only address specific categories of crime and would be unlikely to overcome the more fundamental issue identified in our work to date.

III. Lead regional force

- 9.34 Building upon existing infrastructure, processes and partnership arrangements, this option envisages one force within an ACPO region being resourced as a **lead force** to host the personnel, finance and logistics of the regional protective services requirements on behalf of the other forces in that region. It would also provide command and control for day-to-day operational purposes and would free the constituent forces to concentrate on local policing and their own Level 2 requirements. Strategic governance and deployment at the regional level would involve chief constables and police authorities from all forces in a region operating under a statutory, codified process and operational deployments would be in accordance with the principles of the National Intelligence Model. Services would be delivered through one or more operational hubs within a region to provide a level and spread of capacity and capability appropriate to the operating environment. Links to local communities would be maintained through minimum service guarantees.
- 9.35 Some in ACPO believe this comfortably could be a variant in the federation of forces option, but it could raise challenges on: integration; the clarity of accountability; and the perception by some that the ACPO regions are artificial entities. In practical terms neither is it certain that each ACPO region contains a force that is fully capable of assuming this role (see the East Midlands and East Anglia). Equally, within some of the other regions there could even be a surfeit of candidates such as in the Northwest. As such, it could prove difficult to establish full national coverage capable of delivering protective services to a common standard.

IV. Federation of forces

- 9.36 Against an agreed framework, forces clearly below standard could self reform within this option, contract together to be served by a common set of protective services that could extend to the brigading of support services.

- 9.37 Local force areas would be preserved. Local policing (BCU etc) would remain local, decentralised and relatively independent. This explicit preservation would appeal to a range of interests
- 9.38 Should there be a reliance on self reform , there is a risk that dissatisfaction with the status quo – a pre-requisite for major reform – may be insufficient amongst some incumbents to provide the degree of leadership this option requires.
- 9.39 The maintenance of local force policing styles within a federation could lead to tensions within a new devolved framework. A two tier model that at ‘old’ force level supports local policing and at the ‘federated level’ provides protective service would face challenges in managing relationships internally and externally to avoid different operating practices and priorities clashing. Clarity of responsibilities and governance would be an enduring challenge.
- 9.40 This option would need a considerable level of support and incentivisation from the centre and would stand its best chance of success where a federation already contained a strong force that could nurture relatively quick progress.

V. Strategic forces

- 9.41 This is the most radical option with forces being re-grouped against a framework of design considerations, such as: exceeding critical mass; criminality; and geography. Again, local policing arrangements (BCU, etc) need not be disrupted whilst force level services are rationalised. A prescriptive reform approach could be initiated relatively quickly if a new executive and strategic authority were appointed at an early stage and a tight timescale was set.
- 9.42 Although the clearest and most business-like approach it could be perceived by some to be most disruptive and least ‘locally friendly’. This approach would require firm leadership, extensive support and national will.

10. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The limitations of “Generalist” Policing

- 10.1 When the “General” Policing model first evolved there was considerable overlap between the needs of local policing and the provision of protective services. It was rooted in a less dynamic and mobile society with more serious crime being dominated by well known criminal families in the local community³⁰. The national dimension barely featured on the radar.
- 10.2 Since then the inexorable rise in, and growing sophistication and diversification of, serious and organised crime has fundamentally changed the picture, with “entrepreneurial orientated, flexible, adaptive networks that readily expand and contract to deal with the uncertainties of the criminal enterprise”.³¹
- 10.3 The specification around police services is rising, as evident in the growing number of specialisms (eg vulnerable persons units, computer crime units etc) and the codification of the riskier areas of policing activities (eg firearms, child protection issues etc). In parallel expectations are rising (eg the widespread use of family liaison officers, and an extensive and a presumption of extensive forensic recovery).
- 10.4 The material gathered in this review of capability, risk and economics, goes with the grain of those developments. Larger forces manage the specialisms and their associated development cost more easily at present. This trend will not let up, indeed if anything it will intensify and the challenge of keeping up with national standards and protective services can only become harder for smaller forces in the future. There are potential consequences in this for those who live in areas covered by smaller forces. They are less likely to have well-practised staff in investigating out-of-the ordinary murders or strong murder suppression methods for those suffering from domestic violence; not only will some hard drug markets be more easily able to flourish, but protective systems, for example around sex offenders, could be weaker; staff may be less well versed on critical incidents, and more dependent on aid from others in the event of civil contingencies (which may or may not be available).
- 10.5 The best fit of the present structure is around the first broad responsibility for general day-to-day policing. The discharge of the second two, identified earlier (providing protective services and affordable support and development) is variable and inhibited by the present 43 force structure. Some rebalancing of the structure will be a necessary part of addressing those responsibilities, consistently rather than on a postcode basis.

Human Expertise

- 10.6 During this Review the team was struck by the difference in development opportunities between forces. Some environments allow the full range of skills to be practiced, improved and promote the development of new skills when new challenges

³⁰ This issue was dealt with by Pearson, “The Profession of Violence” (1973); and Murphy, “Smash and Grab” (1993).

³¹ Potter, “Criminal Organisations” (1994).

arise. A few smaller forces have attempted to overcome the relative infrequency of issues/events by secondments to murder teams or to those charged, for example, with management of football events. However, this is a poor second best to active practice in the field. The specification associated with the Professionalisation of Investigation Programme (PIP) will require not only accreditation but evidence of utilisation of the skills/knowledge attained.

- 10.7 The significant effect that ACPO officers with previous experience/skills in protective services has already been referred to earlier in the text. One of the clear findings of the national assessment of capability and capacity and even of the risk issue around criminality, was that where ACPO teams were adept on the understanding of this area of business, their force was able to punch above its weight. In part this explains why some smaller forces did disproportionately well.
- 10.8 Given the current focus upon local policing, be it through PPAF or the targets of the National Community Safety Plan, it is not surprising that for much of the time police leaders are focused firmly on the former. One potential consequence of this direction is the relative scarcity of senior officers with a deep background in the nature, risks and demands of protective services. This scarcity is evident in a number of ACPO teams.
- 10.9 This may explain, in part, the concerns of the assessment raised in relation to the inconsistent and sometimes dysfunctional manner in which the National Intelligence Model is being applied at Level 2. Generally, this was not found to be such an issue in the larger forces, where the teams were bigger, operational exposure was valued at the point of selection, and portfolio responsibilities were tightly defined. Those forces were also blessed with some leadership in depth that enables those services to be promoted and developed.
- 10.10 Whilst the competence of individuals at different levels will be a key part of success in handling protective services, policing needs to be organised above BCU level with a real capacity to undertake workforce modernisation, ie to apply the right skills to roles and streamlined processes to enhance the capacity available for service to the public. Workforce modernisation does offer the potential to deliver sizeable efficiencies (20% +) but requires a strong organisational platform that cannot be assumed given the wide differences in the capability of forces and the relative weakness of information in the cost of operational services.

Conclusion

- 10.11 The pattern of results from the review of all 43 forces has strongly mirrored those found in the pilot study and has allowed us to draw a number of conclusions.
- 10.12 Specifically, whilst size, scope and structure are not in any sense the only issues for the future of policing, they are extremely important. Put simply, the 43 force structure is no longer fit for purpose. In the interests of the efficiency and effectiveness of policing it should change. Whilst some smaller forces do very well, and some larger forces less so, our conclusion is that below a certain size there simply

is not a sufficient critical mass to provide the necessary sustainable level of protective services that the 21st century increasingly demands.

- 10.13 The position is likely to worsen rather than improve as time progresses. The costs and professional sophistication needed to provide adequate standards of protective services will become ever harder to deliver for smaller forces and we now firmly believe that some reorganisation of forces and re-configuration of protective services is inescapable.
- 10.14 The strategic forces option offers the best business solution. It offers the best potential, within reasonable time-scales, of improving protective services and providing better value for money. However, it needs to be well supported and to be part of a strategy that reconfigures intelligence, performance and value for money to help enable the Police Service “to guard (all) my people” (the mission detailed on the Queen’s Police Medal). A federal structure is the best alternative and could offer a degree of greater resilience, but may not offer a clear, decisive, durable solution. The lead force/lead regional force concepts could be initiated more rapidly, but will not deal well with the fundamental issues identified in this review.
- 10.15 Structural change requires a considered, realistic view about the time scales in which it can be achieved, and the evidence from the private sector is that mature leadership makes all the difference in planning, initiating and achieving benefits from merger and acquisition.
- 10.16 In the last five years the Home Office and the Police Service have considered the advantages of a more rational structure for policing but have shied away from radical change to avoid the disruption and potential threat to continued success in reducing crime. This has allowed the weaknesses in protective services to go unresolved. It is, however, possible to move towards a more resilient structure without undermining local policing and successful crime reduction. The BCU as an operating platform is tried and tested, and disruption whilst protective services are being re-shaped can, and should be, minimised.
- 10.17 There is, in our view, nothing incompatible between a move towards a more strategic organisation and a concentration on delivering more responsive neighbourhood policing. Strong neighbourhood policing is essential to connect with the public and inform the work of protective services. A force which is big enough to deliver protection, but still small enough to identify with local communities, is an attractive one. Re-configuring for better protection of, and connection with, the public, needs to be seen as part of a package of police reform for this century.
- 10.18 Of course, any structural re-organisation is bound to carry with it up-front costs in terms of both money, potential diversion of resources, and disruption. This can be reduced, but it cannot be avoided entirely. These costs can be calculated but need to be set beside medium term savings (please see Appendix I). This suggests that any move to a more strategic organisation of policing needs to take place in a carefully planned and measured way which reduces the short-term risks as far as possible and keeps a clear line of sight on the benefits to be realised.

10.19 In order for the risks and deficiencies identified to be reconciled there must be an organisational imperative to be able to demonstrate capability and capacity to bridge the protective service gap within two years, and to be accruing the associated financial benefits within two to three years of introduction.

APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGY – ASSESSING FORCE CAPABILITY

In developing the templates that allow for the assessment of force efficiency and effectiveness in a number of key areas HMIC took as the starting point the discussion raised by the Home Office/Strategy Unit report in 2004 on the nature of policing services at different levels. At force, regional, national/international level they suggested that the police **protect** the public, for example by dealing with serious organised crime & terrorism. This is in contrast to local policing where police work **with** the public at the neighbourhood level to tackling anti-social behaviour, or where the police work **for** the public in dealing with volume crime³².

By this definition, the policing services that fall within the headings ‘working with’ and ‘working for’ are delivered at beat, sector and BCU level and should be met almost entirely from local resources. This is not the case with regard to the provision of protective services. In many respects this is a force and/or regional function that is often conducted outwith the knowledge of local people, and requires an assessment of the twin issues of force capability and capacity.

The critical police force products in relation to protective services have been encompassed under ‘Intelligence’ (what we know about the matter); ‘Prevention’ (what we can do to reduce or prevent harm); and ‘Enforcement’ (how we can deal effectively with this crime in the criminal courts, or achieve resolution through another means). This language is increasingly common within the Police Service and in particular, this vocabulary is now closely associated with the National Intelligence Model.

The process of creating assessment templates against which forces can be benchmarked comprised a number of phases and reflected the ten principles of inspection³³. The phases were as follows:

- identification of key stakeholders (the ACPO presidential team, the Association of Police Authorities and the members of the Police Modernisation Board, chaired by the Police Minister;
- develop standards of minimum capability and capacity for protective services;
- piloting of the standards in a cross-section of forces. (Between December 2004 and January 2005, HMIC staff piloted the templates in five forces. A further four forces volunteered to self-assess, thus bringing the total to nine. The forces were chosen to give a representative sample and ranged from metropolitan forces through to a geographically large, but numerically small, rural force);
- refining the standards to accommodate issues identified during the pilot phase.

³² Police Reform: A joint Home Office/Strategy Unit project – Summary Report, p11 (2004).

³³ Office of Public Service Reform, Inspecting for Improvement, p 34 (2003).

ACPO was uniquely placed to assist in progressing this work. Through a series of joint meetings that were facilitated by staff from NCPE the provision of protective services, as they currently exist, was reviewed within the context of the ACPO National Strategic Assessment³⁴ and then grouped under the following headings:

- Major Crime (homicide)
- Serious, Organised and Cross Border Crime
- Counter Terrorism and Extremism (edited from this report)
- Civil Contingencies
- Critical Incidents
- Public Order
- Strategic Roads Policing.

In identifying these discrete headings it was acknowledged that they have the potential to overlap. It is also true that the provision of a number of specific functions such as firearms and covert policing capabilities cross-cut, and are therefore common to many of the headings.

Each heading was identified as a separate work stream and was allocated to an identified ACPO lead who, with the assistance of HMIC, led on the creation of the template. This comprises a high level description of the service provided, articulates the minimum required standards (in terms of levels of service provision irrespective of the size of the force) and identifies how performance against the standard can be measured. By so doing, the templates are a vehicle for ensuring that the consistency of approach that is now evident in how forces deal with volume crime is replicated for protective services.

Inevitably, the templates are complex documents. In an attempt to simplify the assessment process HMIC additionally identified those few critical indicators, referred to as ‘pulse points’, that will give a health check on whether or not the minimum standards are likely to be achieved, or are actually being met.

The ability to meet predictable demand reflects achievement against both reactive and proactive standards within the templates and is scored for each protective service area according to the following criteria:

1. Only reactive capability demonstrated.
2. Reactive capability, with only limited proactive capability demonstrated.
3. Reactive capability, with some proactive capability demonstrated.
4. Reactive capability with comprehensive proactive capability demonstrated.

Copies of the high level descriptors, plus the pulse points for each templates follow below.

³⁴ Specifically these were: Terrorism, Firearms, Violent Crime, Policing the Roads, Serious & Organised crime, Illegal Immigration – People Smuggling & Trafficking, and Hate Crime.

To prevent and investigate any major crime and to detect and relentlessly pursue the people who commit them.

A major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of an SIO and specialist assets.

Pulse Points

1. Is Intelligence about these crime types sought, included and considered in the Force Strategic Assessment?
2. Are there sufficient dedicated and trained staff, equipment and accommodation to meet predictable demand and access to such staff etc to meet extraordinary demand? Are there effective contingency arrangements to deliver these standards and/or existing strategic planning to grow or incorporate these standards into the force capability?
3. Does the force have interoperability of Intelligence System/effective intelligence and data-sharing structure internally, with neighbouring forces and key partners to aid investigations and identify trends and patterns around homicide?
4. Does a review process exist that includes routine re-examination of historical unsolved cases?
5. Is there evidence of activity in prevention of homicide (Osman options)?
6. What are the outcomes of activity in tackling major crime – detection, reduction and prevention?

Serious, Organised and Cross Border Crime

To deter, disrupt and dismantle serious, organised or cross border crime, prioritising that which causes significant physical, social or economic harm to individuals or communities.
These offences include those that require the use of specialist resources and methods that would ordinarily be beyond the capability of a BCU.

Pulse Points

1. Is intelligence about these crime types sought, included and considered in the Force Strategic Assessment?
2. Is there an effective intelligence sharing structure with neighbouring forces and key partners?
3. Do intelligence products at this level inform and prioritise operations against targets?
4. Are there sufficient dedicated resources (or access to them) to meet the predicted demand of this level of crime, and protocols and standing arrangements for coping with extraordinary demand, without impacting on 'front-line' policing?
5. Does the force have an ability to measure the success or otherwise of its efforts to tackle this level of criminality?

Counter Terrorism and Extremism

To effectively contribute to the preservation of national security and to the protection of communities from the threat and impact of terrorism and extremism in line with UK national strategies.

Pulse Points

1. Is there a chief officer-led group which regularly reviews and directs the response in relation to the threat from CT/Extremism?
2. Is CT/Extremism within the Control Strategy / Business Plans?
3. Has a Community Impact Assessment been conducted on the most vulnerable communities and
 - a. a strategy been put in place to prevent the violent radicalisation of vulnerable individuals;
 - b. an associated intelligence collection plan been developed?
4. Do frontline staff know how to respond to a report of suspicious activity of potential CT significance?
5. Does access exist to sufficient specialist staff to support a CT/Extremist investigation?
6. Has consideration been given as to how to respond to deadly and determined attacks?
7. Is there joint operational deployment with neighbouring forces/other agencies in respect of CT threats which demonstrates interoperability?
8. Can the force measure the success or otherwise of its efforts to tackle this area of work?

Civil Contingencies and Emergency Procedures

To ensure that there is an effective capability to identify, analyse and assess all potential threats that may lead to an emergency* and provide a commensurate response to manage the situation and mitigate effects.

**Defined in Civil Contingencies Act 2004 as: an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or the security of the UK or a place in the UK*

Pulse Points

1. Is the force party to a generic 'all hazards' plan that has been agreed by partner organisations within the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) and does the force contribute towards the LRF at ACPO level?
2. Does the force have plans in place to address specific threats eg scenario based, fixed site?
3. Are emergency plans supported by a scheduled and monitored training, exercise and testing regime?
4. Are operational staff aware of generic emergency response arrangements and specific plans as appropriate?
5. Does the force have sufficient trained and practiced personnel with access to adequate resources to provide an effective initial response a major incident?
6. Does the force representative on the LRF engage with the Regional Resilience Forum and are regional issues affecting police appropriately integrated into the LRF and vice versa.

Critical Incidents

The prevention and effective leadership of any critical incident (internal or external), which includes any incident requiring a police firearms response

Where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and/or the community which:

- **is beyond the capability of a BCU; and**
- **has the potential to generate grave public concern at a local/regional/national/international level.**

Pulse Points

1. Actively gathers intelligence and comprehensively assesses the risks and threats associated with geographical areas and communities covered, in particular community tension indicators within vulnerable communities.
2. Effectively engages with partners to share and make the best use of information to assist in developing integrated emergency plans.
3. Effectively uses intelligence to manage identified risks to prevent critical incidents and has in place rehearsed contingency plans and business continuity plans to deal with and minimise the impact of any escalation.
4. Maximises effectiveness of partners in managing critical incidents including routine use and involvement of Independent Advisory groups (IAG's), key individuals and support networks to inform policy and direction of incidents.
5. Has in place the knowledge and resources to effectively manage critical incidents and has protocols and standing arrangements to cope with extraordinary demands.

Public Order

At events that are policed at force or regional level, to facilitate lawful actions and activity so as to ensure public safety and the maintenance of peace. Wherever public disorder occurs to protect the public and restore order in a manner that is reasonable and proportionate.

Pulse Points

1. Intelligence about these incident types is sought, included and considered in the Force Strategic Assessment.
2. Interoperability of Intelligence System/effective intelligence sharing structure with neighbouring forces and key partners to agree roles and responsibilities, develop and test working relationships and identify good practice.
3. Intelligence products shared between partners inform and prioritise activity to identify, prevent or minimise the impact of spontaneous or pre-planned public disorder incidents.
4. There are sufficiently trained and tested resources to meet the predicted demand of this type of incident, and protocols and standing arrangements for coping with extraordinary demand, without impacting on 'front-line' policing.
5. The force has an ability to measure, or attempts to measure, the success or otherwise of its efforts to tackle this type of incident.

Strategic Roads Policing

A service that protects the national road infrastructure from threats posed by terrorism, disrupts criminals using the roads, confronts anti social behaviour, and makes our roads safer and accessible for users, reducing the risk of death and injury.

Pulse Points

1. Is intelligence and information that influence the way in which the roads are policed, sought and considered in the BCU and Force Strategic Assessments?
2. Do intelligence products regarding criminal use of the roads (including the threat from terrorism) inform, direct and prioritise resources towards targets and does the force have an ability to measure the success or otherwise of its efforts?
3. Does the force have sufficient resources and contingencies in place to meet the demands of spontaneous or significant pre-planned incidents on its roads?
4. Are life threatening and fatal collisions investigated in accordance with the Road Death Investigation Manual and does the force engage with partners to reduce the levels of these collisions?
5. Do dedicated resources (or access to them) exist to meet the predicted demand for policing the roads and are there protocols and standing arrangements for coping with extraordinary demand, without impacting on 'front-line' policing?

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A formal consultation process should be undertaken. This should include the tripartite partners and other stakeholders, on a confidential basis, possibly using the Modernisation Group chaired by the Police Minister.
2. A confidential national assessment of protective services should be carried out by HMIC, with the support of key stakeholders.
3. A review should be undertaken to establish if collaboration is an appropriate and effective means of addressing any gaps in service delivery. This should include the potential for regionalisation of some or all of these themes and be considered in parallel to any national assessment work either by the National Police Improvement Agency, if established, or, alternatively, a working group including HMIC, the APA, ACPO and led by Home Office officials.
4. The Metropolitan Police Service 'risk management model' should be considered by the National Centre for Policing Excellence with a view to developing and agreeing a common risk assessment process to be used nationally.
5. The PPAF Steering Group is tasked to develop a performance regime for the identified Level 2 services as a matter of the highest priority.

THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE POLICE SERVICE

Introduction

The Strategy Unit paper 35 presents options for policing that dramatically review the role of the Service. Such a narrow approach to policing is unlikely to be successful. This paper is intended to provide an ACPO view on the role of police in 21st century. It goes on to outline how that service is delivered.

The role of the Service represents the keystone upon which the archway leading to effective police reform relies for strength and integrity. The arguments made regarding structure, accountability, finance and workforce modernisation will be stronger if rooted in an understanding of what policing is truly about. It is therefore imperative that we seek to clarify what the role of the police is to be in the 21st century and then examine how best to deliver such a service. A return to a truly shared and common vision of policing is at the heart of this process. If we intend to build the brand of policing we must agree what product we are supplying.

In 1829 Sir Richard Mayne set out “The Object of the Police”³⁶:

*“The primary object of an efficient Police is the prevention of crime:
The next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed,*

To these ends all the efforts of police must be directed to,

*The protection of life and property,
The preservation of public tranquillity,*

And the absence of crime will alone prove whether those efforts have been successful and whether the objects for which the police were appointed have been attained.”

This was revisited, refined and restated by Lord Scarman OBE³⁷ in 1981 as:

*“The prevention of crime,
The protection of life and property
The preservation of Public tranquillity”.*

Despite many attempts and elaborations and rebrandings those three things remain at the heart of policing. The Human Rights Act 1998 brought with it for the first time a statutory framework for the role and responsibilities role of the Police Service. With Article 2, the right to life, taking precedence. It is therefore incumbent on the Service to reframe our role not in terms of crime but in terms of the rights of the individual and to recognise that the role of the Police Service is to address and militate against risk. To ensure that this is understood, not just by ourselves but by society at large, there should be a common message used by the entire Service and forces should not reinterpret the message or rebrand themselves. The

³⁵ Prime Ministers Strategy unit paper (unpublished) 4th March 2004.

³⁶ Extract from Sir Richard Mayne’s Instructions to “The new police of the Metropolis” 1829.

³⁷ The report into the Brixton Riots 10-12 April 1981 p62.

Service must give a common, consistent, concise and coherent message. The statement of common purpose³⁸ has failed to provide such a vehicle.

Thus it can be held that the role of the Police Service can be summed up as:

“Protect life, reduce crime, keep the peace”.

or, to fit better with the modern agenda;

“Protect life, reduce crime and disorder”.

The role of the Service in terms of this simple imperative requires that the Service must retain a 24/7 365 days a year capability.

Policing is not an exact science nor is it simple, as the case studies will show. The work of the NCPE³⁹ to identify, evaluate and codify best practice and the introduction of the NIM.⁴⁰ as the business process that drives policing, have allowed the Service to identify common practices and products that enable us to do business better, to such an extent that some partners are not only taking a part in our process but are adapting the NIM as their business model. The recognition the NIM as an inclusive model enables the use of a variety of tactical analytical and deployment processes, such as Problem Orientated Policing,⁴¹ that are proportional and successful. What worked for Sherman in 1996⁴² is still true today in that simple tactics like target hardening and directed (not random) patrol are effective.

The ability to operate effectively, both at an individual level and organisationally requires a flexibility that can move from persuasion to coercion and back again in varying time scales. This ability to travel the British policing continuum is founded in a multifaceted service supported by clear control mechanisms. The constable who asks an individual to be quiet and go home can react to an escalation in tension easily as can the organisation when required to do so. Equally in dealing with investigations and interventions many elements of the organisation are mobilised or involved at different stages and in doing so utilise many different tactics and techniques. It has been said that policing is simple: from the case studies it is apparent that policing in a modern context is anything but. Each of these case studies has been analysed and mapped to show its complexity; the detailed analysis is contained in the appendices.

The Models

In order to better model policing today as a robust, flexible and inclusive service, we can take the constituent parts and visualise them as layers.

³⁸ ACPO statement of common purpose 1990.


³⁹ NCPE work programme.

⁴⁰ NIM.

⁴¹ NCPE paper on POP and NIM Townshend 2003.

⁴² What works, what doesn't, what's promising, L.Sherman 1996 Report to Congress.


The Constituent Layers of Policing



Layers are in themselves flexible but weak with friction at the boundaries. However in policing these layers are bonded together to form a laminate with Communication, Intelligence, Standards, Common Purpose, Local Identity, Community Involvement and Command providing the glue.

The Current model


- Bonding factors and integrated layers



These bonding agents integrate the layers into the strong laminate model that is able to withstand the shocks of excessive demand and crisis but is flexible in normal circumstances.

As the layers are separated and policing functions and roles are disaggregated the bonding factors become stretched and the layers delaminate. Delamination results in a proliferation of boundary issues between the layers, problematic communication duplication in functionality and delay.

Devolved Responsibilities *Delamination*



NB. In this case the stretch and weakening of the bonding factors is exacerbated by a multiplicity of standards.

Patten⁴³ looked at layered models of policing in Spain and Belgium and found;

“The problem of communication between police departments in Belgium had contributed to the appalling paedophile atrocities there”.

and

“There were appalling problems arising from poor co-ordination in Spain”.

He concluded that:


“A decentralised but unified Police Service is greatly to be preferred”.

A non-police example of the problems of delamination and disaggregation may be that of the rail service. The monolith that was British Rail can be represented as a laminate organisation.

⁴³ Patten, C. The report of the independent commission on policing for Northern Ireland Sept.1999.


British Rail

- Bonding factors and integrated layers



The initial and subsequent restructurings have delaminated the organisation into a variety of elements with the management of the track, trains and infrastructure being disaggregated.

Disaggregated Rail



Each of these discrete elements appeared to be self sufficient and free standing in terms of process charts and organograms, but with the dismantling of the beast that was British Rail the responsibility for safety became diluted and accountability something that could be devolved, contracted, sub contracted and out sourced with sometimes fatal consequences.


The protection of life, however, belongs to the whole Service, not to Traffic, not to the CID, not to the Community Unit but the whole Service. It is as incumbent for a detective to stop

and deal with an accident as it is for a traffic officer to arrest a thief; with disaggregation that clarity may be lost.

The laminate model is however inclusive and other layers can be incorporated, be they CDRPs, LSPs or other partnership groups. Nor is the model antipathetic to the modernisation agenda⁴⁴, indeed it is a model that enables safe integration of alternative service provision within broadly based, multi-skilled agency.

The model – Status Quo Plus

- Laminate Model
- Bonding factors and integrated layers



The Service has already paid the price of a solely efficiency-based policing handling service provision, with the move to demand management, whereby better call handling forces were better able to manage the deployment of resources with forces such as Surrey moving from deploying to over 75% of calls for service to deploying to 55%. This move by forces to a position of responding only to immediate conflict or crisis has eliminated positive and trust building contacts such as assisting individuals unable to gain entry into their homes or wanting advice in relation to non criminal matters. What the service did not recognise is that every time the police say no to a request for help it is potentially a blow to public confidence and trust, regardless of how well justified or explained. Have we reached the point where if you ask a police officer for the time, he or she will say “Ring the speaking Clock”? Research from Kent has shown that there is a correlation between the introduction of demand management and a decrease in public confidence.⁴⁵

The laminate model of policing allows for the move from a fixed idea of **Police Role** to a dynamic model of **Police Service** where, regardless of the provider service, provision is owned by the police and the chief constable and local commanders are held to account.

The strategic questions posed by the strategy unit can be addressed by the following measures out lined in this paper.

The defacto role of the Service includes:

Protection of life, reduction of crime and keeping the peace.

The laminate model of policing needs recognising and the bonding factors agreed and owned by appropriate bodies (NCPE, ACPO etc.)

⁴⁴ Modernisation of the Workforce paper.

⁴⁵ Acpo research paper April 2004.

The Case Studies

The case studies detail the levels of involvement and engagement of the various elements of policing and partnership in five scenarios:

Neighbourhood:

A “Simple” local criminal (from ASB to Arson including burglary and drug related offences).

Force:

An Organised protest organisation (From Denial of Service through harassment to Public order offences).

The Oldham Riots (from initial call to resolution then subsequent community safety initiatives).

National:

Operation Trident (from local community to international co-operation).


Operation Lund (the deaths of Chinese cockle pickers at Morecombe Bay).

These case studies provide a detailed analytical breakdown and visual map of the complex relationships and workings of policing. Each shows that there are a multiplicity of concurrent engagements and interventions in relation to each of the issues. They all show that without the bonding elements the interventions of those involved could not be as effective.

In terms of the laminate model the case studies can be represented as follows:

Level One Criminal

- Primary Active layers
- Principal Active Bonding factors




Animal Rights Protest Organisation

- Primary Active layers
- Principal Active Bonding factors




Operation Trident

- Primary Active layers
- Principal Active Bonding factors




Operation Lund

- Primary Active layers
- Principal Active Bonding factors



The Oldham Riots

- Primary Active layers
- Principal Active Bonding factors



These applications of the laminate model of policing show that this method of configuring resources, tactics, strategies and philosophies from all sources is robust and inclusive. It is also true that such a model in no way affects the debate around force size/funding.

Why the Laminate Model is important

The development and health of these elements is essential in controlling risk, exercising proportionality and providing focus in the broader police mission. They are critical in 'protecting life'. Some have been improved in the last ten years and are now nationally specified (intelligence) but are still not nationally embedded by supporting IT systems, inspection regimes, etc. Some are in the process of being framed, eg high risk issues now being developed as national standards (use of lethal force, murder investigation, handling of vulnerable persons). Some have a high degree of variability reflecting history, local/national political pressures and skills (performance management).

It is not a final expression of this model, the bonding agents are still the subject of debate (eg should information be considered as well as intelligence). Nor is it intended to foreclose on debate about disaggregated models but it points up the potential loss of coherence, strength and speed that may follow disaggregation.

For both the professional association (ACPO) and Government it highlights how crucial certain integrating processes are to providing a coherent service that protects life and reduces crime.

The following issues must be at the heart of any debate:

What are the most important bonding factors?

Which are currently weak or strong?

What should be done?

It is crucial that as policing becomes more complex and multifaceted that the bonding factors are strengthened.

Current assessments and inspection reports show that some of the bonding elements are not as strong as they might be. Collectively they highlight:

- patchy take up of best practice and processes, even at BCU level in the same force;
- no common processes for performance management;
- no common interoperable information/ intelligence exploitation systems;
- no common priorities in terms of capacity and capability development; and
- inconsistent levels of commitment to the ongoing improvement and development of some current national systems (PNC, SCAS etc).

Adoption of the national model will provide a framework within which these issues can be addressed.

APPENDIX D

2004/05 Force	Total Strength Police Officers	Total Strength Support Staff
Avon & Somerset	3,398	2,005
Bedfordshire	1,232	713
Cambridgeshire	1,418	832
Cheshire	2,207	1,137
Cleveland	1,689	748
Cumbria	1,260	730
Derbyshire	2,082	1,165
Devon & Cornwall	3,399	2,034
Dorset	1,475	881
Durham	1,738	736
Dyfed-Powys	1,183	531
Essex	3,230	1,968
Gloucestershire	1,308	663
Greater Manchester	8,119	3,303
Gwent	1,438	688
Hampshire	3,804	1,965
Hertfordshire	2,145	1,414
Humberside	2,252	1,034
Kent	3,630	2,228
Lancashire	3,586	1,715
Leicestershire	2,311	1,033
Lincolnshire	1,234	678
London, City of	881	298
Merseyside	4,339	2,126
Metropolitan Police	31,073	13,561
Norfolk	1,554	984
Northamptonshire	1,289	973
Northumbria	4,088	1,491
North Wales	1,676	867
North Yorkshire	1,561	928
Nottinghamshire	2,522	1,318
South Wales	3,316	1,510
South Yorkshire	3,307	1,729
Staffordshire	2,309	1,325
Suffolk	1,323	813
Surrey	1,959	1,472
Sussex	3,094	1,950
Thames Valley	4,189	2,611
Warwickshire	1,012	590
West Mercia	2,380	1,492
West Midlands	8,154	3,143
West Yorkshire	5,671	3,016
Wiltshire	1,227	811
England & Wales	141,059	71,207

APPENDIX E

Data Sources

The following list outlines the data received from various agencies that was used to compile the maps provided later in this report.

Firearms

- Home Office document 'Crime in England & Wales 2003/2004: Supplementary Volume 1: Homicide and Gun Crime'.

Class A Drugs

- Users of DATs across England.
- Home Office drug seizure data.

Immigration

- Asylum seekers in NASS accommodation.
- Asylum seekers supported by local authorities.
- Asylum seekers on subsistence only support.
- Asylum seekers in detention centres.
- Op Reflex arrests.
- Op Reflex Operations.


Money Laundering

- Forfeiture and confiscation figures.


Counterfeit Goods

- Federation Against Copyright Theft.


Firearms Risk



Money Laundering



Human Trafficking & Particularly Vulnerable Communities



Definitions used in AC Ghaffur's report

1. **Organised Criminal Networks (OCNs).** Serious and organised crime emanates from and impacts on local neighbourhoods. Even the most dangerous criminals engaging in serious crime are based in 'local communities'.
2. **Dysfunctional role models.** The shortage of positive role models, particularly in minority ethnic communities, makes such dysfunctional criminal role models, living beyond their means, attractive to disadvantaged youngsters.
3. **Problem families.** There are a significant number of large extended problem families. The pervasive influence of the senior family members make it difficult for citizens to safely complain to police even about minor criminal acts or anti-social behaviour without fear of more serious reprisals.
4. **Dangerous people.** These include paedophiles, sex offenders, serious criminals, and people who are pathologically violent. The propensity to cause harm to individuals and communities is often unpredictable but always serious, making police efforts around both prevention and enforcement very challenging.
5. **New crimes.** In terms of the regulated financial sector, 'high tech' financial damage can be caused to large corporations, with potential to erode the economic legitimacy of London. There has also been an emergence of cash-only businesses, in the form of sex shops, internet cafes, hairdressers and nail painting salons, for the purpose of laundering money from organised criminal activity.

APPENDIX H

APPROVED POLICE SPECIAL GRANTS 1990 TO 2005

Date	Force	Subject	Grant where known
1/1 & 27/3/90	South Yorkshire	Hillsborough Stadium Disaster	Yes £1.029m
		West Midlands Police Investigation	£4.012m
24/09/1991	Northumbria	Newcastle riots – damages compensation	Yes
1999-March	Surrey	General Pinochet	Yes £200,000
1999-2000 - July	Devon & Cornwall	Eclipse of the sun	£0.52m
1999/2000 - July	Kent	Gateway to Europe costs	£0.67m
1999/2000 - March	Essex	Stansted hijack	£2m
1999/2000 – March	South Yorkshire	Hillsborough compensation	£1m
2000/01 – August	Wiltshire	Porton Down	£0.87m
2000/01- January	Cambridgeshire	HLS	£1m
2000/01- March	Cleveland	Operation Lancet (discipline Inquiry)	£1.9m
2000/01- March	MPS	May Day	£1m
2000/01 – March	South Yorkshire	Hillsborough compensation payments	£1m
2001/02 – April	City of London	May Day demos	£0.2m
2001/0 - May	South Wales	Millennium Stadium	£0.3m
2001/02 – Sept	Essex	Stansted hijack	£0.135m
2001/02 – Sept	Staffordshire	Guinea pig farm	£0.2m
2001/02 – Sept.	Surrey	General Pinochet	£0.1m
2001/02 – Nov	North Yorkshire	RAF Menwith Hill & Fylingdales	£1m
2001/02 - January	West Yorkshire	Bradford riots	£2.2m
2001/02 - January	Gtr Manchester	Oldham riots	£1.44m
2001/02 - January	Lancashire	Burnley riots	£0.82m
2001/02 - January	Staffordshire	Stoke-on-Trent riots	£0.56m
2001/02- March	MPS	Fuel Dumps refurb	£1m
2001/02 – March	Gtr Manchester	Commonwealth Games	£1.7m
2002/3 – May	South Wales	Millennium Stadium	£0.3m
2002/03 – June	South Yorkshire	Hillsborough compensation payments	£0.8m
2002/03 – Nov	Gtr Manchester	Commonwealth Games	£3.3m
2002/03 – January	Cambridgeshire	HLS	£1.1m
2002/03 – January	Cambridgeshire	Soham murders	£3.55m
2002/03 - March	Gloucestershire	RAF Fairford	£0.25m
2002/03 - March	Surrey	A Dowler, Deepcut & SE serial rapist	£0.28m
2003/4 – May	South Wales	Millennium Stadium	£0.15m
2003/4 – July	Staffordshire	Guinea pig farm	£0.25m
2003/4 - November	Lincolnshire	Operation Barrage (Fraud Investigation)	£0.5m
2003/04	Gloucestershire	RAF Fairford	£6.458m
2003/04 – Dec	Surrey	Pennyhill Park	£0.818m
2003/04 - March	Durham	President Bush state visit	£0.8m
2004/05 - May	South Wales	Millennium Stadium	£0.17m
2004/05 – June	Surrey	Heathrow airport security policing	£0.136m

2004/05 – July	Cambridgeshire	HLS	£0.96m
2004/05	Gloucestershire	RAF Fairford	£0.5m
2004/05 – Sept	Derbyshire	G5 Summit Hassop Hall	£0.038m
2004/05 – Nov	Lincolnshire	Operation Barrage (Fraud Investigation)	£0.4m
2004/05 - March	Wiltshire	Porton Down - Operation Antler	£1.7m
2004/05 - March	Cumbria	Mountain Rescue Radios	£223k
2004/05 - March	Lancashire	Morecambe Bay - Cockle Pickers	£1.2m
2005/06 - May	Cleveland	Financial assistance	£2.0m
2005/06 - May	Lincolnshire	Operation Barrage	£0.4m
2005/06 – June	Hampshire	Trafalgar 200	£0.5m

APPENDIX I

NET PRESENT VALUE CALCULATIONS FOR BENEFITS OF SERVICE REVIEW

Outline and Assumptions

This Appendix provides the supporting calculations for the Net Present Value (NPV) calculations shown in the main document. All calculations use a deflation rate of 3.5% and are assumed to continue year on year.

Where we assume savings are deferred to later years, or accrue over several years, we deflate the down-stream value of any savings at 3.5% until they occur. So, if we assume a £70m saving occurs over the first two years we assume new savings of £35m in the first year and new savings in year two of £35m times 100%-3.5% or £33.775m.

All calculations are rounded to the nearest £10m. All calculations are based on a ten year period.

Calculations

Using the text in the main report, we assume a £70m saving generated upon force restructuring, representing benefits of scale. This equates to an NPV of almost £600m over ten years. If this saving is accrued over two years the total NPV is £560m.

In addition, the report identifies an additional £250m a year of productivity gains which may be realised. It is likely that any additional savings would be spread over a number of years, and so NPV figures for these savings have been generated for them occurring over three and five years from year 2 onwards. This leads to NPV's of £1,650 and £1,420m.

Scenario	Savings (NPV) over ten years
£70m savings in year one through efficiencies of scale	£600m
£70m savings in year 1 and £250m in productivity savings equally over 3 years from year 2	£2,250m
£70m savings in year 1 and £250m in productivity savings equally over 5 years from year 2	£2,020m
£70m savings over 2 years from efficiencies of scale	£560m
£70m savings over 2 years and £250m in productivity savings equally over 3 years from year 2	£2,210m
£70m savings over 2 years and £250m in productivity savings equally over 5 years from year 2	£1,980m

This provides a range of potential savings from £560m to £2,250m over ten years.

MANAGEMENT OF RE-ORGANISATION (UNISON VIEW)

- UNISON will want to ensure the utmost protection of members' interests in any change process.
- protection would have to be both centrally and locally managed by:
 - (a) central staffing commission; and
 - (b) regional/local machines.

Staff commission would be required to be established under statute. Unions would have to be consulted about its terms of reference, constitution and modus operandi.

- Potential for the creation of shadow authorities to appoint key officers/staff and prepare for staff transfer.
- It should be accepted that:
 - services should be maintained with as little disruption as possible; and
 - provision is made for fair, equal and clear arrangements for the transfer or recruitment of staff.

Statutory protection of staff interests

Any Bill should contain:

- fundamental safeguards and transfer provisions;
- rules need to be fair, apply to everyone and be published as early as possible;
- commission(s) should be set up on informal grounds prior to the Bill;
- re-organisation may affect staff income and compensation/protection should be made available in these cases;
- pension entitlements would be protected (eg pension at early retirement/redundancy).

General arrangements for staff transfer

- Secretary of State would be empowered to make provision by order for the transfer of staff and would be required to make provision for the protection of their interests;

- legislation would require the order to contain safeguards for terms and conditions, ie
 - guarantee of no less favourable terms and conditions;
 - salaries protected.
- machinery should also be set up to deal with personal hardship;
- compensation to be paid to any staff member who suffers loss of employment or fall in salaries;
- commission would act as a clearing house for job applicants;
- appeals machinery.

Consultation

- importance of joint machinery and joint consultation;
- early publication of timetables;
- no compulsory redundancy policy;
- it would be the stated aim to avoid redundancies, but if any voluntary redundancies should arise there must be maximum discretion applied within the relevant Statutory compensation frameworks.

Detailed compensation proposals would be required, for example

- resettlement compensation;
- retirement compensation;
- disturbance and travelling allowance;
- excess travelling expenses;
- lodging expenses;
- exceptional hardship;

Problem with differences in job-grading: potential equal pay costs, between different police authorities.

Appointments

- potential for ring-fenced competition for new posts in merged authorities;
- issue of vacancies in the immediate pre-transfer period.



Likely costs and benefits

7th September 2005



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Costs

- HR
 - Pensions – inherited issues
 - Other employee benefits – inherited issues
 - Redundancy
 - Early retirements
 - Retention
 - Pay and benefit changes – transition costs
 - Relocation
- IT
 - Licences
 - Migration of systems
 - Installation and running costs of new systems
- Finance
 - Outstanding loans
 - Existing financial commitments
 - Capital costs
 - PFIs
 - Funding and reserves
- Property and leases
 - Property owned and leased
 - Vehicles and equipment owned and leased
 - Commitments to maintain existing locations or property holdings
 - Relocation costs
- Integration
 - Resource requirements for integration planning and execution
 - Training
 - Communications: internal and external
 - Stakeholder management
 - Professional advisors
 - Opportunity
 - Management disruption
 - Negative reaction of external stakeholders
 - Employee morale – and consequent service disruption



Benefits – this will depend upon the type and degree of integration eg shared services etc

- HR
 - Elimination of duplication of functions – associated people and technology cost savings
 - Harmonisation of packages
- IT
 - Cost savings from single system operation – people and running costs
- Finance
 - Elimination of duplication of functions
 - Increased purchasing power – reduction in costs
 - Pooling working capital finance requirements
 - Lowering cost of capital through combined balance sheets
 - Pooling of reserves
- Location
 - Reduction in number of headquarters and running costs
- Integration benefits
 - Cost savings re-invested in more service
 - Improved morale – and correlation with improved service delivery
 - Service levels
 - Readiness to protect
 - Employee benefits
 - Succession planning
 - Expertise development
 - Investment in training
 - Reduction in variances

